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Memo50-NATO For 2026
Memo50-NATO For 2026
Authors
Matthew Ansley,
Georgia Institute of Technology
Patrick E. Boyle,
Harvard Kennedy School
Nicholas Dube,
East Carolina University
Najia Humayun,
Georgia Institute of Technology
Future-Proofing NATO:
A Forthcoming Decade of Change
Stephan Lbbert,
Leuphana University Lneburg
Joss Meakins,
Columbia University
Edgar Palomino,
University of Pennsylvania
Alfie Shaw,
University of Oxford
INTRODUCTION
NATO is now closer to the brink of war than it has been since 1991. If peace and
prosperity are to be maintained, the Alliance must adapt to the proliferation of
threats that it faces, which is only possible if it recognizes that the 20th century's
bipolar world of stable borders, guaranteed identities, and clearly defined opponents
is over. In order to address new threats in the forthcoming decade effectively, the
Alliance must (1) improve its electronic warfare capabilities, (2) adopt hybrid models
of national defense, (3) coordinate efforts on economic warfare, (4) secure its
space-based infrastructure, and (5) integrate research into developing threats.
The key to dealing with unconventional threats is to strengthen unity and cohesion.
This should be achieved by: (1) countering disinformation campaigns with the help
of NGOs, (2) redoubling public diplomacy efforts, and (3) state-building efforts in
regions of high risk.
NATO should adopt an innovative conventional response to the rising ambitions of
Russia and China that is appropriate to the contemporary context in which it exists,
rather than a rehash of its Cold War strategy. In the case of the former, the Alliance
has overlooked the Arctic area and must close its capabilities gaps. As regards the
latter, NATO must involve China in both dialogue and operations in order to create
an effective diplomatic platform.
Cornel Turdeanu,
Simon Fraser University
Dawid Walentek,
University of Amsterdam
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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Directors
Potential adversaries have committed more resources to EW than has NATO. While
attempting to match potential adversaries may be unfeasible for bureaucratic, financial, or political reasons, NATO's EW mission should at least be enlarged. There
should be enough EW capability to ensure shifts and deployments of sustainable duration. Excessively long shifts invite mistakes. Emphasis should be placed on keeping
NATO's C3I systems functioning reliably, including investing in personnel specialized
in cyber defense. Though part of an EW mission, this task force may be raised from
other NATO areas such as the Alliance Communications and Information Systems
School in Latina, Italy. NATO forces should be trained to operate in a network-denied
environment so that they are prepared to meet this possibility.
The costs of the expanded program should be borne collectively by the allies. This
could be achieved with joint initiatives across national boundaries, drawing upon inherent specialties and benefiting from diverse perspectives within and from allies.
Special care should be given to assessing EW equipment already in NATO's possession; upgrades represent a cheaper alternative to development.
1.2 Counter hybrid offense with hybrid defense.
At current levels of defense spending, NATO cannot deter by being a lion, so it must
be a fox. Rather than countering hybrid tactics with smart defense, the Alliance should
counter hybrid attack with hybrid defense. This strategy should center on the (re)introduction of national military service. NATO should invest in preparation for asymmetric defensive warfare in its threatened allies. Following the Swiss model of national
defense, NATO must, amongst other things, encourage the adoption of total defense
strategies by its most vulnerable members in order to raise not only the cost of conflict, but the cost of occupation for potential adversaries, thereby reducing the risk of
conflict. Hybrid defense cannot be NATO's only response to hybrid offense, but, given
current willingness to act and to spend on defense, it represents a viable and positive
alternative.
This strategy would undermine the advantage that NATO's would-be enemies gain
from superior concentrations of conventional troops by raising the cost of an invasion
to prohibitively high levels, not necessarily at the invasion phase, but certainly by the
occupation phase, forcing the enemy to question at the strategic level whether conflict
is a worthwhile pursuit. In addition, strengthening in-situ capability would reduce the
Alliance's vulnerability to anti-access and area denial tactics, a key threat to the Alliance's utility.
This strategy would strengthen national identity and emphasize the values that underpin NATO, reducing vulnerability to hybrid offense of the sort seen in Crimea. It would
increase the visibility of the military in society and heighten popular and political support for it.
1.3 Target adversaries' financial infrastructure.
NATO has underachieved in asymmetric conflicts and confrontations with non-state
actors. Targeting adversaries' financial infrastructure will counter asymmetry, while
complementing conventional capabilities.
Targeting financial infrastructure should become a structural element of NATO's policy. Economic warfare has been used in the past by individual NATO members, but
never by the Alliance. NATO's interest in this area should move beyond research on
merely macroeconomic trends.
NATO should target the elements of the financial infrastructure: physical (e.g. trade
and transport nodes and pipelines) and non-physical (e.g. banking, online sales platforms). Terrorist groups, organized crime, and those advancing offensive hybrid strategies largely depend on the combination of the two in order to finance their activities.
Economic warfare means mapping enemies' financial infrastructure, then identifying
and targeting the weakest element of the system through either soft (e.g. introduction
2
significant time and effort in research or the utilization of NATO media such as its Facebook page and YouTube channel. Although these formats represent a significant
improvement in NATO public diplomacy, they are not suited to future challenges. With
the population becoming increasingly multicultural, national interests diversifying, and
the influence of ideology increasing, the variety of personal interests and perspectives
increases even more.
Unilateral information broadcast from NATO itself would not be accepted in all parts of
society and could be perceived as NATO propaganda, as the reception of Russian
media disinformation has shown. Hence, the role of private institutions offering sound
information from multiple perspectives will become increasingly important in the struggle for unity and cohesion within the alliance.
NATO should support independent NGOs in order to promote objective and multiperspective media sources. Increasing support will allow such institutions to improve
their current offerings and add new accessible formats, for example monthly TV debates and independent video-channels.
2.2 Expand public diplomacy to increase support for specific policies.
In light of the threat of declining support for specific NATO policies among the publics,
NATO should foreground its role in defending the democratic values of such populations. Those that produce anti-NATO rhetoric often paint the Alliance as a militaristic
and confrontational actor. To counter these arguments and declining willingness to
act, NATO must credibly be understood as an Alliance that serves to underwrite
peace, ensuring the principles of democracy, the freedom of the individual and the rule
of law principles in stark contrast to those of the Alliance's adversaries.
To promote this understanding amongst member state populations, NATO should
ensure that Public Affairs work is not just a marketing strategy, but a real chance for
dialogue between NATO leaders and the public. Only if people feel that they can contribute to defending peace will they value NATO's capacity to act and, concomitantly,
demand independent and objective information. For this reason, the Alliance should
expand its current outreach and engagement efforts (e.g. NATO conferences for university students) and develop continuous interaction formats like public polls, panel
discussions and citizen workshops that highlight NATO's values, broaden access to
the Alliance, and provide an insight into security policy topics.
2.3 Improve social programs to reduce vulnerability to hybrid warfare.
To prevent conflicts within member countries, many fueled by weaponization of the
media by adversaries, NATO should prevent the alienation and marginalization of
recently stateless former-Soviet citizens and international refugees. NATO should
increase cooperation with the EU, starting by participating in the Eastern Partnership
Program, and expand the work of the NATO Centre for Excellence in Civil Military
Operations in order to encourage social projects. Furthermore, non-EU NATO members should contribute financially to existing EU or national programs in those countries targeted (e.g. social inclusion of Russian minority in Estonia or Syrian refugees in
Germany). Within the member countries, domestic best practices should be adopted
to ensure that the respective ethnic groups will be optimally integrated into member
countries' society and their values.
CONCLUSION
Effectiveness is a significant source of NATOs legitimacy. The Alliance is one of the
key guarantors of peace and order in a period otherwise characterized by disorder,
confusion, and animosity. NATO must be both reactive and directive, forcing its enemies to respond to its changes in strategy and new procurements, but also preparing
to adapt its own strategies to those of its opponents. Only then can NATO maintain its
supremacy and uphold the defense of its members well beyond 2026.
Wars of the future may not only involve battlefields, but shift to include the realms of
cyber- and economic-warfare. NATO should invest in deeper understanding and capability in these types of conflict, preparing to combat a range of actors. In electronic
warfare, NATO cannot afford to fall behind, either in its own defenses for its strategic
and tactical communications and intelligence sharing, or in its offensive capability.
Shifting conventional threats mean that NATO must be willing to adopt hybrid defen5
Cornel Turdeanu is a fourth year Political Science Student at Simon Fraser University
in Vancouver British Columbia. He is a founder of NATO@SFU, a group currently
working to engage students in the discussion on NATO.
Dawid Walentek is a PhD Candidate in Political Science at the University of Amsterdam. He is interested in trade policy of the EU and the US.
The authors have written this Memo after qualifying with individual submissions, which
provide more detailed information on the aforementioned policy recommendations for
those interested:
Matthew Ansley: NATO Must Keep Up with Opposing Force Research
http://www.atlantic-community.org/-/nato-must-keep-up-with-opposing-force-research
Patrick E. Boyle: Space Junk: The Biggest Threat to NATO Interoperability in 2026
http://www.atlantic-community.org/-/space-junk-the-biggest-threat-to-nato-interoperability-in-2026
Joss Meakins: The Battle for Tallinngrad: New Ways to Fight an Old War
http://www.atlantic-community.org/-/the-battle-for-tallinngrad-new-ways-to-fight-an-old-war
Dawid Walentek: NATO Should be Targeting the Financial Infrastructure of the Enemy
http://www.atlantic-community.org/-/nato-should-be-targeting-the-financial-infrastructure-of-the-enemy
The articles have been written for category A Preparing for NATO 2026 of the Shaping our NATO competition and respond to the questions: What could surprise NATO
in 2026? What scenario is NATO currently insufficiently addressing? What can realistically be done to prepare?
The competition has been made possible by generous contributions from the NATO
Public Diplomacy Division, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Foundation for
Polish-German Cooperation.