United Poultry Concerns v. Chabad of Irvine - Motion To Dissolve TRO

Case 8:16-cv-01810-AB-GJS Document 24 Filed 10/11/16 Page 1 of 34 Page ID #:177
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Prepared By:
Michael Jones, CA Bar No. 271574
M. Jones & Associates, PC
505 North Tustin Ave, Suite 105
Santa Ana, CA 92705
Telephone: (714) 795-2346
Facsimile: (888) 341-5213
Email: mike@MJonesOC.com
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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WESTERN DIVISION
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Case No.
8:16-CV-01810-AB-(GJSx)
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UNITED POULTRY CONCERNS,

Plaintiff,
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v.
NOTICE OF DEFENDANTS
MOTION TO DISSOLVE
CHABAD OF IRVINE; ALTER
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
TENENBAUM, IN HIS
ORDER; OPPOSITION TO
INDIVIDUAL, CAPACITY; DOES 1 PLAINTIFFS PRELIMINARY
THROUGH 50,
INJUNCTION MOTION; AND
MOTION TO STRIKE THE
Defendants
COMPLAINT
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HEARING SCHEDULED
DATE: OCTOBER 13, 2016
TIME: 10:00 AM
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ASSIGNED TO HON. ANDR

BIROTTE JR., District Judge;
HON. GAIL J. STANDISH, Magistrate
Judge
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NOTICE OF DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISSOLVE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
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TO THE HONORABLE ANDR BIROTTE JR., AND ALL INTERESTED

PARTIES:
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PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on 13 October 2016 at 10:00 AM, or as

soon thereafter as this matter may be heard in the above-entitled Court
located at the United States Courthouse, 312 N. Spring St., Los
Angeles, CA 90012, Courtroom 4, 2nd Floor, Chabad of Irvine and
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Alter Tenenbaum, the Defendants in this case, will move this Court for
Relief by Dissolving the Temporary Restraining Order, Opposing the
Plaintiffs Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, and Striking the Plaintiffs
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Complaint.
This motion is based on the Motion and Opposition Filed by the
Defendants, and on the Docket as Document Number 23, the complete
files and records in this action, and upon such oral and other evidence as
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may be allowed at the hearing of this motion. A complete copy of the

Motion and Opposition is attached hereto.
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This motion is made in response to the Courts Order requiring a

responsive Pleading be filed on or before 8:00 AM, 11 October 2016.
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Dated this 11 October 2016.
M Jones and Associates, PC

Attorneys for Defendants
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Michael Jones
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EXHIBIT A
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Prepared By:
Michael Jones, CA Bar No. 271574
M. Jones & Associates, PC
505 North Tustin Ave, Suite 105
Santa Ana, CA 92705
Telephone: (714) 795-2346
Facsimile: (888) 341-5213
Email: mike@MJonesOC.com
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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WESTERN DIVISION
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Case No.
8:16-CV-01810-AB-(GJSx)
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UNITED POULTRY CONCERNS,

Plaintiff,
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v.
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO
DISSOLVE TEMPORARY
CHABAD OF IRVINE; ALTER
RESTRAINING ORDER;
TENENBAUM, IN HIS
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS
INDIVIDUAL, CAPACITY; DOES 1 PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
THROUGH 50,
MOTION; AND MOTION TO
STRIKE THE COMPLAINT
Defendants
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HEARING SCHEDULED
DATE: OCTOBER 13, 2016
TIME: 10:00 AM
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ASSIGNED TO HON. ANDR

BIROTTE JR., District Judge;
HON. GAIL J. STANDISH, Magistrate
Judge
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DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISSOLVE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION MOTION; AND MOTION TO STRIKE
Defendants Chabad of Irvine and Alter Tenenbaum (collectively, Chabad)
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bring this emergency motion to dissolve the ex parte temporary restraining order
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(TRO), issued on October 7, 2016. The Chabad respectfully requests that the
TRO be dissolved today in time for Yom Kippur this evening, when the kaporos1
ceremony takes place. As explained further, the kaporos ceremony is humanely
performed in a manner consistent with federal and state animal slaughter laws and
is a centuries-old religious practice that is constitutionally protected. The United
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States Supreme Court has held unanimously that laws may not permit the
killing of animals for secular purposes while singling out for prohibition the
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killing of animals for religious purposes. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v.
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 537-38 (1993) (holding that First Amendment
precludes application of Floridas animal cruelty statute to religious sacrifice of
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animals). In the face of this holding, Plaintiff United Poultry Concerns

(Plaintiff) has not satisfied and cannot satisfy the requirements necessary for an
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ex parte TRO or a preliminary injunction to issue. To assist the Court, Chabad

moves for a telephonic hearing to take place today on the request to lift the TRO.
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Plaintiff has also failed to satisfy the requirements for obtaining a
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preliminary injunction. Plaintiff lacks standing to bring an action under

Californias Unfair Competition Law (UCL), as it alleges no cognizable injury
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Sometimes referred to as kaparot.

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as a result of the Chabads religious practices. What is more, the UCL, which is
directed at business and commercial conduct, does not apply to religious
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ceremonies. And, more basically, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any of the
traditional elements required to obtain injunctive relief, while the Chabad will
suffer irreparable harm if they are precluded, on the eve of Yom Kippur, from
practicing a ritual central to their faith. Accordingly, the Court should deny
Plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction.
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Finally, the Chabad moves to strike Plaintiffs Complaint as a violation of a
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California statute prohibiting strategic lawsuits against public participation (i.e.,
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the Anti-SLAPP statute).
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I.
Motion to Dissolve Ex Parte Temporary Restraining

Order
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The ex parte TRO must be dissolved because Plaintiff cannot and has not
satisfied its heavy burden for obtaining such extraordinary relief. Without any
notice or opportunity to be heard, the Chabad has been restrained from engaging
in a centuries old religious practice on the eve of one their faiths most holy days.
This affront to both First Amendment rights and basic due process principles
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cannot be allowed to stand.
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To support an ex parte TRO, the evidence must show that the moving
partys cause will be irreparably prejudiced if the underlying motion is heard
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according to regular noticed motion procedures. Second, it must be established

that the moving party is without fault in creating the crisis that requires ex parte
relief, or that the crisis occurred as a result of excusable neglect. Mission Power
Eng'g Co. v. Contl Cas. Co., 883 F. Supp. 488, 492 (C.D. Cal. 1995). As the
Ninth Circuit explained, circumstances justifying the issuance of an ex parte
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order are extremely limited. Reno Air Racing Assn v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126,
1131 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423
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(1974)). Such orders are rare because they deny parties essential procedural
safeguards. Granny Goose, 415 U.S. at 439 ([O]ur entire jurisprudence runs
counter to the notion of court action taken before reasonable notice and an
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opportunity to be heard has been granted both sides of a dispute.).

Critically, Plaintiffs application for a TRO did not put forth any reason
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justifying its late filing. This federal action and application for a TRO were filed
on September 29, 2016, just a few days before Rosh Hashanah and less than two
weeks before Yom Kippur, when kaporos ceremonies take place. Kaporos
ceremonies have been taking place for decades in this state and for centuries
around the world. Plaintiff alleges knowledge of the Chabads kaporos practice
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dating back to 2014. Compl. 26-27, Doc. 1. It was also conceded that Plaintiff

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has been monitoring the proceeding in state court against the Chabad, which has
been pending since September 14, 2015. Decl. Bryan Pease 12, Doc. 13. These
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concessions alone show that Plaintiff could have raised its claims earlier, without
prejudicing the Chabad or denying it an opportunity to be heard. To the extent
there is a crisis requiring relief and there is not it was one of Plaintiffs own
making in delaying the filing of their action until September 29th. At the same
time, Plaintiffs conduct has precipitated a crisis, requiring the Chabad to retain
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counsel and prepare this briefing in less than 24 hours. In short, the ex parte TRO
must be dissolved because Plaintiff created the crisis, prejudicing the Chabad.
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Further, circumstances usually justifying ex parte TROs are absent here.
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Such orders are often issued where the defendants are likely to destroy evidence or
take other actions to subvert the court system. See Reno Air, 452 F.3d at 1131.
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There are no such extraordinary circumstances here to justify this extraordinary

order. The TRO must be dissolved. As explained in the following section, the
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TRO also must be dissolved for the reasons the Plaintiffs motion for a
preliminary injunction must be denied.2
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The preliminary injunction legal standard is essentially the same as the standard
for temporary restraining orders.

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II.
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for a Preliminary

Injunction
Plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction must be denied. A
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preliminary injunction is also an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded

upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief. Winter v. NRDC,
Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22, (2008). It is never awarded as of right. Id. at 24. A
plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish [1] that he is likely to
succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence
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of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that
an injunction is in the public interest. Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d
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1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 24-25). Plaintiff cannot
make any of these showings here.
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A.
LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS
Plaintiff has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits for each
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of the reasons that follow. This list of reasons is non-exhaustive.

1.
Plaintiff Lacks Standing.
As an initial matter, Plaintiff cannot succeed on the merits because it has
failed to establish the standing requirements necessary to assert a UCL claim. In
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order to have standing to pursue a UCL claim, a plaintiff must (1) establish a loss
or deprivation of money or property sufficient to qualify as injury in fact, i.e.,
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economic injury, and (2) show that the economic injury was the result of, i.e.,
caused by, the unfair business practice or false advertising that is the gravamen of
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the claim. Kwitkset Corp. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 4th 310, 322 (2011)
(emphasis in original). Plaintiffs claim fails on both elements.
First, Plaintiff fails to identify any economic injury sufficient to qualify as
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injury in fact. The decision in Animal Legal Defense Fund v. LT Napa Partners
LLC offers no support to Plaintiff. 234 Cal. App. 4th 1270 (2015).3 In Napa
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Partners, the California Court of Appeal held that an organization has standing if
it can show harm caused by a diversion of resources and the frustration of
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plaintiffs advocacy efforts. Id. at 1283. Plaintiff has made no allegation that it
diverted resources from other activities. The only allegation is that STEINAUs
time working for Plaintiff was diverted to investigating and exposing these acts,
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and attempting to convince authorities to take action. Compl. 25. There is no

reference to the other activities in which Steinau was engaged. Unlike the plaintiff
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in Napa Partners who paid a private investigator, there is no allegation that
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Napa Partners potentially could provide an end run around the voters wishes to
restrict UCL claims were a plaintiff fails to establish an actual economic injury.
Proposition 64 was enacted to prohibit private attorneys from filing lawsuits for
unfair competition where they have no client who has been injured in fact under
the standing requirements of the United States Constitution. Kwikset, 51 Cal.4th
at 322.
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Steinau was compensated for the time spent at the ceremony. Nor is there any
allegation that Steinau paid to attend the ceremony. In fact, Plaintiff fails to show
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any economic harm at all. Because of this, Plaintiff cannot establish any loss or
deprivation of money or property sufficient to qualify as injury in fact. Kwitkset
Corp., 51 Cal. 4th at 322.
Plaintiff also lacks organizational standing because it fails to allege a
frustration of Plaintiffs mission. An organization can only establish an injury
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when it suffers both a diversion of its resources and a frustration of its mission.
La Asociacion de Trabajadores de Lake Forest v. City of Lake Forest, 624 F.3d
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1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added). The organization must show that it
would have suffered some other injury if it had not diverted resources to
counteracting the problem. Id.; see Scocca v. Smith, 2012 WL 2375203 (N.D.
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Cal. June 22, 2012). The alleged practices must prevent the plaintiff from
pursuing other preferred avenues to advance their mission. Animal Legal Defense
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Fund v. Great Bull Run, LLC, No. 14-CV-01171-MEJ, 2014 WL 2568685, at *4

(N.D. Cal. June 6, 2014). Plaintiff has made no such showing. Plaintiff, instead,
merely states that Steinaus time working for Plaintiff was diverted to
investigating and exposing these acts, and attempting to convince authorities to
take action. Compl. 25. Just like the plaintiffs in La Asociacion, the complaint
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is devoid of any reference to a frustration of its purpose. La Asociacion, 624

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F.3d at 1089. The plaintiff in Bull Run alleged unlike Plaintiff here that the
diverted employees would have otherwise worked on projects to further
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Plaintiffs missions. Without sufficient allegations showing that Steinau was

diverted from other preferred avenues of advocacy, Plaintiff cannot establish an
injury in fact.
Plaintiff also fails the second prong of Kwitkset. Plaintiff alleges no facts
sufficient to show they have lost money or property caused by any alleged unfair
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competition. In fact, the complaint fails to identify any loss of money or property
let alone a loss of money or property caused by the Chabads conduct. Plaintiffs
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TRO application evidences the lack of harm because they fail to cite a single
allegation supporting the organizations standing. Because Plaintiff fails to
identify any loss of money or property, they must not be granted standing.
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2.
The Chabads Religious Ceremony is Not a Business Act

or Practice That Would Subject it to Californias UCL

Plaintiff fails to establish the Chabad engages in any business act or

practice as part of its kaporos ceremony. The UCL prohibits any unfair
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competition, which means any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or

practice. In re Pomona Valley Med. Grp., Inc., 476 F.3d 665, 674 (9th Cir.
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2007) (quoting Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200, et seq.). The UCL promotes fair
business competitions and governs both anti-competitive business practices and
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consumer injuries. Bull Run, 2014 WL 2568685, at *6. Plaintiff must show that
the act or practice was committed pursuant to business activity. Pinel v. Aurora
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Loan Servs., LLC, 814 F. Supp. 2d 930, 937 (N.D. Cal. 2011). That is because the
UCL is concerned with wrongful conduct in commercial enterprises. People v.
Natl Research Co. of Cal., 201 Cal. App. 2d 765, 770 (1962). The complaint fails
to allege that the Chabad was engaged in any business activity.
In an effort to assert a UCL claim, Plaintiff mischaracterizes a religious
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ceremony as a business practice to assert a UCL claim. The Chabad conducts the
kaporos ceremony in accordance with centuries-long Jewish custom. The
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donations the Chabad receives for the ceremony are, contrary to Plaintiffs
assertions, given to the poor.4 Plaintiffs allegation that the Chabad conducts the
kaporos ceremony for profit is thus false, and in any event fails to establish that
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the ceremony is part of any business activity or commercial enterprise simply

because money changes hands in the process. See Pinel, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 937;
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Natl Research Co. of Cal., 201 Cal. App. 2d at 770.

Plaintiff offers no authority for the notion that a religious ceremony is a
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business practice subject to the UCL. In fact, the cases cited by Plaintiff in its
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Chabad
of
Irvine,
Kaparot,
available
at
http://www.chabadirvine.org/holidays/JewishNewYear/template_cdo/aid/989585/j
ewish/Kaparot.htm (last visited October 11, 2016).
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TRO application establish that a religious institution may only be subject to the
UCL when it actually engages in business practices.
See Pl.s Ex Parte
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Application for TRO, Dkt. 2 at 8. Each case involves a practice that could
regularly be engaged in by any business. See Exec. Comm. Representing Signing
Petitioners of Archdiocese of Western U.S. v. Kaplan, 2004 WL 6084228 (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 17, 2004) (involving fundraising solicitations); Maktab Tarighe Oveyssi
Shah Maghsoudi, Inc. v. Kianfar, 179 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1999) (involving
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intellectual property rights not a UCL claim); Pines v. Tomson, 160 Cal. App. 3d
370 (1984) (involving a business telephone directory). None of these cases stands
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for the broad proposition that a religious ceremony is a business practice.

Plaintiffs proposed reading of the UCL would impermissibly broaden the
definition of business act or practice beyond recognition. Invoking the UCL
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when any pecuniary element is involved, would read the statutes requirement
that the conduct be a business act or practice out of the law. Even People v.
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McKale, cited by the Plaintiff, still requires the activity to be business conduct.
25 Cal.3d 626, 632 (1979). The kaporos ceremony is a religious rite conducted in
preparation for Yom Kippur. Clearly a religious ceremony of this nature cannot
be business conduct.
Furthermore, a synagogue conducting a religious
ceremony cannot be said to be engaged in a commercial enterprise.
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Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to satisfy an essential element of its UCL claim.

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3.
The Kaporos Ceremony Does Not Violate Californias Law
Against Animal Cruelty; the Religious Ritual Is Not Done
With Malicious Intent.

Because the Chabads kaporos ceremony is done in a humane manner for a
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religious purpose, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a likelihood of success on its sole
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argument that the ceremony violates Californias animal cruelty statue. The
kaporos ceremony is a ritual in which participants seek atonement. Participants
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gently pass a chicken over ones head, reading the ceremonial text, and then
slaughter the animal in the humane manner of all kosher slaughter.5 As explained
on Chabads website, It is of utmost importance to treat the chickens humanely,
and not to, Gd forbid, cause them any pain or discomfort. Jewish law very clearly
forbids causing any unnecessary pain to any of Gd's creations. The repugnance of
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such an unkind act would certainly be amplified on this day, the eve of the day
when we beseech Gd for perhaps undeserved kindness and mercy.6 The
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Id.
Chabad
Irvine,
The
Kaparot
Ceremony,
available
at
ewish/Kaparot.htm
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chickens monetary worth [is] given to the poor, or, as is more popular today, the
chicken itself is donated to a charitable cause.7
California and federal law both specifically approve of such kosher
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slaughtering practices as humane. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 3, 1246.15(a) (Where a

method of slaughter is prescribed by Kosher or other rules of the Jewish faith,
Islamic and other faiths and causes the poultry to lose consciousness through
anemia of the brain resulting from the simultaneous severance of both carotid
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arteries with a sharp instrument, it shall be considered a humane method of

slaughter.); Cal. Food & Agric. Code 19501(b)(2) (The animal shall be
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handled, prepared for slaughter, and slaughtered in accordance with ritual

requirements of the Jewish or any other religious faith that prescribes a method of
slaughter whereby the animal suffers loss of consciousness by anemia of the brain
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caused by the simultaneous and instantaneous severance of the carotid arteries

with a sharp instrument.); 7 U.S.C. 1902(b) (finding slaughtering in
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accordance with the ritual requirements of the Jewish faith or any other religious
faith that prescribes a method of slaughter whereby the animal suffers loss of
consciousness by anemia of the brain caused by the simultaneous and
instantaneous severance of the carotid arteries with a sharp instrument and
handling in connection with such slaughtering to be humane); 7 U.S.C. 1906
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Id.
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(Nothing in this Act shall be construed to prohibit, abridge, or in any way hinder
the religious freedom of any person or group. Notwithstanding any other provision
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of this Act, in order to protect freedom of religion, ritual slaughter and the
handling or other preparation of livestock for ritual slaughter are exempted from
the terms of this Act.). The kaporos ceremonys slaughter is done in the humane
way that all kosher meat is slaughtered.
Californias animal cruelty statute, Penal Code Section 597(a), prohibits the
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malicious and intentional killing of an animal. Malice is an essential element of

the crime of animal cruelty. Ex parte Mauch, 134 Cal. 500, 500 (1901). It is
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defined as an intent to do a wrongful act. People v. Dunn, 39 Cal. App. 3d 418,
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421 (1974). Acts of willful and unlawful cruelty satisfy the malice standard. Ex
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parte Mauch, 134 Cal. at 501.8
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Participants in the kaporos ceremony do not have any intention to do a
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wrongful act. As noted above, the chicken is slaughtered in a manner deemed
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humane under both California state and federal law. Plaintiffs philosophical
disagreement with the ancient notion of substitutionary atonement that is central to
the faith of those practicing the kaporos ritual (see Compl. 22, Doc. 1,
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In the homicide context, the malice standard can be satisfied when the
circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart. Cal.
Penal Code 188.
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caricaturing the practice as taking out vengeance on an innocent animal) does

not render the practice inhumane or malicious. There is no cruelty or malice, as
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defined by law. Accordingly, there is no intention to do anything wrongful as a

matter of law.
Plaintiff has not cited any cases holding that kosher or other religious
slaughter violates Californias animal cruelty statute. The facts are distinctly
different from other actions brought under the animal cruelty statute. Courts have
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concluded that the malice standard is satisfied by: beating and torturing a dog, Ex
parte Mauch, 134 Cal. at 500; filming mice being tortured and crushed to death,
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People v. Thomason, 84 Cal. App. 4th 1064, 1066 (2000); stabbing an exgirlfriends dog to death out of spite, People v. Smith, 150 Cal. App. 4th 89, 94
(2007); or throwing rocks and shooting guns at animals to get them off ones land,
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Dunn, 39 Cal. App. 3d at 421. Plaintiff cites no cases using malicious to

describe participation in a religious atonement ceremony in accordance with
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federal and state law regarding the kosher slaughter of animals. This Court cannot
condemn the state of mind of asking for atonement as malicious nor can it
categorize the practice of kosher slaughter as inhumane.
4.
Enjoining the Chabads Kaporos Ceremony Violates the

Free Exercise Clause.

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California already recognizes that [w]here a method of slaughter is
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prescribed by Kosher or other rules of the Jewish faith, Islamic and other faiths
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and causes the poultry to lose consciousness through anemia of the brain resulting
from the simultaneous severance of both carotid arteries with a sharp instrument,
it shall be considered a humane method of slaughter. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 3,
1246.15(a). Plaintiffs failure to bring this regulation to the Courts attention in its
application for the TRO casts a shadow over that proceeding. More importantly,
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that regulation precludes the granting of a preliminary injunction, as Plaintiffs

cannot prevail on their claim in the face of that law. What is more, enjoining the
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kaporos ceremony would violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution.
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a)
Strict Scrutiny Applies
By its terms, the First Amendment protects the free exercise of religion.
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Plaintiffs request relief runs headlong into the First Amendments protection,
seeking prohibit an activity that is at the core of the exercise of Defendants
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faith.
It is true that an across-the-board criminal prohibition on a particular form
of conduct does not violate the Free Exercise Clause simply because it has an
adverse impact on a religious practice. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 884 (1990). But California Penal Code Section 597(a) on which Plaintiff
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premises its UCL action is not an across-the-board criminal prohibition on the

killing on animals. As one would expect, there are a host of exceptions to Section
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597(a) found in California Penal Code Section 599(c). As the Supreme Court has
explained, when a law, on what seems to be a per se basis, deems hunting,
slaughter of animals for food, eradication of insects and pests as exemptions to
the supposed general rule, then the law is not generally applicable. Church of
Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 537 (1993). This is so
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because exceptions to the general rule require[e] an evaluation of the particular

justification for the killing and thus represent[t] a system of individualized
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governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct. Id. at 537
(quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 884). Thus, in circumstances in which individualized
exemptions from a general requirement are available, the government may not
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refuse to extend that system to cases of religious hardship without compelling

reason. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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Section 599c exempts all game laws within California a robust set of
regulations allowing for the killing of various species. Second, Section 599c
exempts laws for or against the destruction of certain birds. Third, Section 599c
exempts the killing of animals known to be dangerous. Fourth, Section 599c
exempts the killing of all animals used for food. Fifth, Section 599c exempts
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animals slaughtered for scientific experiments or investigations for academic

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purposes. Any of these exceptions to Section 597(a) undermine Plaintiffs

argument that Smiths general rule applies.
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The Chabad is not challenging Section 597(a) on its face and need not prove
a discriminatory intent. See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 516, at 956 (3d ed. 2000) (Under Smith, a law that is not neutral or that is not
generally applicable can violate the Free Exercise Clause without regard to the
motives of those who enacted the measure.). Instead, the Chabad is challenging
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Plaintiffs request that this Court enforce Section 597(a) in a manner that prohibits
the killing of animals in a humane manner for religious purposes pursuant to a law
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that permits the humane killing of animals for any number of secular reasons. As
the Supreme Court has noted, [a]ll laws are selective to some extent, but
categories of selection are of paramount concern when a law as the incidental
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effect of burdening a religious practice. Church of Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 542. For
the Court to determine that Section 597(a) prohibits Chabads kaporos ceremony
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but not other secularly motivated animal killings, the Court would be engaging in
the prohibited act of deciding that secular motivations are more important than
religious motivations. Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359,
365 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064, 1079 (9th
Cir. 2015) (A law is not generally applicable if its prohibitions substantially
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underincluded non-religiously motivated conduct that might endanger the same

governmental interest that the law is designed to protect.).
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The purpose and intent of Section 597(a) is irrelevant. What is relevant is

that there are secular exceptions, and because there are secular exemptions, strict
scrutiny applies. See Tenafly Eruv Assn v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 168
(3d Cir. 2002) (Just as the exemptions for secularly motivated killings in Lukumi
indicated that the city was discriminating against Santeria animal sacrifice, and
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just as the medical exemption in Fraternal Order of Police indicated that the police
department was discriminatingthe Boroughs invocation [of the ordinance]
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against conduct motivated by Orthodox Jewish beliefs[leads to the conclusion]

that we must apply strict scrutiny.). Thus, [f]or laws that are not neutral or not
generally applicable, strict scrutiny applies. Stormans, 794 F.3d at 1076; see
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Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531-32 (A law failing to satisfy these requirements must be
justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to
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advance that interest.).

b)
There is no compelling governmental interest to ban
the kaporos ceremony.

Plaintiff bears the burden of justifying the enforcement of Section 597(a)
against the Chabad as a matter of law. It is clearly established in our strict
scrutiny jurisprudence that a law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest of
the highest orderwhen it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital
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interest unprohibited. Church of Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 547 (internal quotation and
citation omitted). The exceptions listed in Section 599c simply doom any claim
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that enforcing Section 597(a) is a compelling interest. Plaintiff has not and cannot
explain the difference between the humane killing of an animal as part of a
religious ceremony and the robust list of permitted animal killings in Section
599c.
c)
Banning the traditional kaporos ceremony practiced

for at least 1,100 years is not the least restrictive
means for furthering any interest.

In order to satisfy the strict scrutiny applicable to laws that burden religious
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practice, Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that there is no less restrictive
means of accomplishing the governmental interest at issue. Plaintiff attempts to
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flip this analysis on its head by claiming the Defendants can exercise their faith in
another manner, pointing to some Jewish congregations that do not use chickens
as part of kaporos. This analysis misplaces the burden of proof and was flatly
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rejected by the Supreme Court. See Hernandez v. Commr, 490 U.S. 680, 699
(1989) (It is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular
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beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants interpretations

of those creeds.). Defendants are entitled to exercise their religion in the manner
they deem appropriate, not in the manner that other religious adherents or the
Plaintiffs would prefer. See Lukumi Babalu, 508 U.S. at 531 (Although the

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practice of animal sacrifice may seem abhorrent to some, religious beliefs need
not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit
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First Amendment protection. (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Here, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that there is no other means to
achieve any purportedly compelling governmental interest short of a Preliminary
Injunction prohibiting a ceremony that produces a result (the humane death of a
animal) that is no different than if the chicken were killed under one of the
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permitted purposes under Section 599c. That other congregations may engage in a
different ceremony is irrelevant. The Court may not assess the merits of Chabads
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claim that it must adhere to at least 1100 years of religious tradition.
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5.
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Free Speech Clause.

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Enjoining the Chabads Kaporos Ceremony Violates the
As explained further in Part III, enjoining the Chabads kaporos ceremony

also violates other First Amendment rights, such as the right to free speech.
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B.
LIKELIHOOD OF IRREPARABLE HARM
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Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that it would be harmed without a preliminary

injunction, and Plaintiff cannot meet its burden of showing a likelihood of
irreparable harm. In Plaintiffs Ex Parte Application for a TRO, Plaintiff alleges
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that harm to the animals is irreparable harm. However, the legal standard is

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whether [the plaintiff] is likely to suffer irreparable injury. Klein v. City of San
Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196, 1207 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added). Plaintiff next
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asserts that it and the public are subjected to significant public health risks and
thousands of dollars in unnecessary costs. Pl.s Ex Parte App. at 10, Doc. 2. The
TRO does not clarify either of those unsupported allegations. It nowhere else
mentions health risks, and it is unclear why Plaintiff alleges thousands of dollars
in costs. In any event, monetary damages alone are not irreparable. L.A. Meml
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Coliseum Com. v. Natl Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 1980).
Plaintiff has not demonstrated that it would be injured, and any harm caused is far
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outweighed by the guaranteed irreparable harm that the TRO or a preliminary

injunction would inflict on the Chabads religious exercise.
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C.
BALANCE OF EQUITIES
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Because the kaporos ceremony occurs once per year during Yom Kippur,
the ex parte TRO threatens to bar this ceremony completely, without granting the
Chabad opportunity to be heard. The preliminary injunction could similarly bar
this constitutional religious practice in future years. The Ninth Circuit has
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repeatedly held that [t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal
periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury. Thalheimer v. City
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of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109, 1128 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Klein, 584 F.3d at
1208; Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)).
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Even the mere threat to constitutional rights can constitute irreparable

injury. [T]he fact that a case raises serious First Amendment questions compels a
finding that there exists the potential for irreparable injury, or that at the very
least the balance of hardships tips sharply in [Appellants] favor. Sammartano v.
First Judicial Dist. Court, 303 F.3d 959, 973 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Viacom
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12
Int'l, Inc. v. FCC, 828 F. Supp. 741, 744 (N.D. Ca. 1993)). In the Ninth Circuit, a
party seeking preliminary injunctive relief in a First Amendment context can
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16
establish irreparable injury sufficient to merit the grant of relief by demonstrating

the existence of a colorable First Amendment claim." Id.
Plaintiff argues that the harm to the Chabad is minimal because Judaism,
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properly construed, does not require slaughtering of chickens. See Pl.s Motion Ex
Parte TRO at 7 (Defendants religion does not actually require them to kill and
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dispose of chickens. . . The only real harm to Defendants would be economic.). It

is wholly inappropriate for Plaintiff to dictate to the Chabad what the Chabads
religion commands. And it would be even more inappropriate for the Court to put
its seal of approval on Plaintiffs interpretation of the Chabads religion. It would
be unconstitutional for the Court to dismiss the burden on the Chabad by
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disagreeing about the proper interpretation of religious doctrine. See Hernandez,

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490 U.S. at 699 (It is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of
particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants
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4
interpretations of those creeds.).
D.
PUBLIC INTEREST
Because the TRO threatens to eliminate the Chabads ability to perform a
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9
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religious rite on Yom Kippur this year and the preliminary injunction threatens
this right in future years, they conflict with the publics interest in protecting the
free exercise of religion. Courts considering requests for preliminary injunctions
have consistently recognized the significant public interest in upholding First
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Amendment principles. Thalheimer, 645 F.3d at 1129 (quoting Sammartano, 303

F.3d at 974). [I]t is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a
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partys constitutional rights. Sammartano, 303 F.3d at 974 (quoting G&V

Lounge, Inc. v. Mich. Liquor Control Com'n, 23 F.3d 1071, 1079 (6th Cir. 1994)).
Therefore, Plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction must be denied.
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III.
Chabads Motion to Strike the Complaint Under Californias

Anti-Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation Statute

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The Chabad further moves to strike Plaintiffs complaint under Californias

anti-Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (Anti-SLAPP) statute, found
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at California Code of Civil Procedure 425.16. Californias Anti-SLAPP statute

provides that the Court should strike any cause of action against a person arising
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from any act of that person in furtherance of the persons right of petition or free
speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in
connection with a public issue, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has
established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.
Cal. Code Civ. P. 425.16(b)(1). Because Plaintiffs claim implicates the
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Chabads free speech rights under both the United States Constitution and the
California Constitution, the burden shifts to the Plaintiff to show that it will likely
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16
prevail on the merits, which it cannot do.

The Anti-SLAPP statute is meant to dismiss actions that masquerade as
ordinary lawsuits but are intended to deter ordinary people from exercising their
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political or legal rights or to punish them for doing so. Makaeff v. Trump Univ.,
LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 261 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). To
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prevail on an anti-SLAPP motion, the moving defendant must make a prima facie
showing that the plaintiffs suit arises from an act in furtherance of the defendants
constitutional right to free speech. Id. The burden then shifts to the plaintiff
to establish a reasonable probability that it will prevail on its claim in order for
that claim to survival dismissal. Id. Although framed as a rule of state procedure,
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Californias Anti-SLAPP statute protects substantive rights and thus applies in

federal court. Newsham v. Lockheed, 190 F.3d 963, 973 (9th Cir. 1999).
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Courts do not take a formalistic approach as to what causes of action arise

from acts in furtherance of petition or free speech rights, because they construe
the anti-SLAPP statute broadly to protect the constitutional rights of petition and
free speech. Anderson v. Geist, 236 Cal. App. 4th 79, 84 (2015). Thus, for a
cause of action to be considered arising from an act in furtherance of free speech
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rights, courts look to the defendants activity, rather than the plaintiffs claims. See
Navellier v. Sletten, 52 P.3d 703, 711 (Cal. 2002) (The anti-SLAPP statutes
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definitional focus is not on the form of the plaintiffs cause of action but, rather,
the defendants activity that gives rise to his or her asserted liabilityand whether
that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning.). It is thus legally
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irrelevant that Plaintiff brought a claim for Illegal Business Practices in Violation
of the Unfair Competition Law. The underlying conduct in Plaintiffs complaint is
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the ritual sacrifice of chickens in the Kaparot ceremony. If that act is done in
furtherance of free speech rights, then Plaintiffs complaint puts forward a cause
of action against Defendants that arises from an act in furtherance of Defendants
free speech rights for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.
And Supreme Court precedent is clear that Defendants act here does in fact
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implicate free speech rights. The Supreme Court has recognized that while the

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First Amendment literally forbids the abridgement only of speech, conduct

may be sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall within the
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9
scope of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,
404 (1989) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974)). In
deciding whether particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements
to bring the First Amendment into play, the Court looks at whether an intent to
convey a particularized message was present, and whether the likelihood was great
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12
that the message would be understood by those who viewed it. Id. (internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted). The kaporos ceremony meets both
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16
prongs: the ceremony is meant to communicate substitutionary atonement, see

Chabad
Irvine,
The
Kaparot
Ceremony,
available
at
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ewish/Kaparot.htm (We ask of G-d that if we were destined to be the recipients

of harsh decrees in the new year, may they be transferred to this chicken in the
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merit of this mitzvah of charity.), and assists any viewers by communicating that
message with certain spoken language, see id. ([W]ave the chicken over your
head in circular motions three timesonce while saying, This is my exchange,
again when saying This is my substitute, and again when saying, This is my
expiation.). The ceremony is thus expressive conduct, meaning that Plaintiffs
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cause of action arises from an act by Defendants in furtherance of their free speech
rights. 9
Finally, in order to qualify under the anti-SLAPP statute, these free speech
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9
rights must be exercised in connection with a public issue. California courts

distinguish between wholly private matter[s] and matters that are connected to a
public issue. Moore v. Shaw, 116 Cal. App. 4th 182, 196 (2004). The kaporos
ceremony is not a wholly private matter; it is a public ceremony that allows
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members of a religious community to celebrate together. The Plaintiffs complaint

thus is a SLAPP action of exactly the type against which the anti-SLAPP statute is
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14
meant to protect against.

Because Defendants have met the first prong of the anti-SLAPP statute, the
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burden shifts to the Plaintiff to prove that there is a probability that it will prevail
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on the claim. The Plaintiff must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally
sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a
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There is no appreciable difference between the kaporos ceremony and other
ceremonies, such as a wedding ceremony, in that they both are a form of speech
conveying messages. See Kaahumanu v. Hawaii, 682 F.3d 789, 799 (9th Cir.
2012) (We have no difficulty concluding that wedding ceremonies are protected
expression under the First Amendment). Thus, the kaporos ceremony is equally
protected.

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favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.

DArrigo Bros. of Ca. v. United Farmworkers of Am., 224 Cal. App. 4th 790, 800
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4
5
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7
(2014) (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added). As shown above, the
Plaintiffs complaint is legally deficient. Plaintiff thus cannot meet its burden
under the anti-SLAPP statute and its complaint must be struck.
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IV.
Conclusion
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For the foregoing reasons, the Chabad moves for the TRO to be dissolved
immediately to enable its constitutional kaporos ceremony to continue.
Additionally, the Chabad requests that the Court deny Plaintiffs motion for a
preliminary injunction and the Court strike the Complaint as a violation of
Californias anti-SLAPP statute.
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Dated: October 11, 2016
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M Jones and Associates, PC

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Michael Jones
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Matthew T. Martens*
matthew.martens@wilmerhale.com
Gregory Boden
gregory.boden@wilmerhale.com
California Bar Number 301779
Kevin Gallagher*
kevin.gallagher@wilmerhale.com
WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE
AND DORR LLP
1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20006
Telephone: (202) 663-6921
Fax: (202) 663-6363
Hiram S. Sasser, III*
hsasser@firstliberty.org
Jeremy Dys*
jdys@firstliberty.org
Stephanie N. Phillips
staub@firstliberty.org
California Bar No. 301324
FIRST LIBERTY INSTITUTE
2001 West Plano Parkway,
Suite 1600
Plano, TX 75075
Telephone: (972) 941-4444
Facsimile: (972) 941-4457
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*To be admitted Pro Hac Vice
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28

30

United Poultry Concerns v. Chabad of Irvine - Motion To Dissolve TRO

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United Poultry Concerns v. Chabad of Irvine - Motion To Dissolve TRO

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Case 8:16-cv-01810-AB-GJS Document 24 Filed 10/11/16 Page 1 of 34 Page ID #:177

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED POULTRY CONCERNS,

ASSIGNED TO HON. ANDR

NOTICE OF DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISSOLVE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

Case 8:16-cv-01810-AB-GJS Document 24 Filed 10/11/16 Page 2 of 34 Page ID #:178

TO THE HONORABLE ANDR BIROTTE JR., AND ALL INTERESTED

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on 13 October 2016 at 10:00 AM, or as

Angeles, CA 90012, Courtroom 4, 2nd Floor, Chabad of Irvine and

may be allowed at the hearing of this motion. A complete copy of the

This motion is made in response to the Courts Order requiring a

NOTICE OF DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISSOLVE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

Case 8:16-cv-01810-AB-GJS Document 24 Filed 10/11/16 Page 3 of 34 Page ID #:179

Dated this 11 October 2016.

M Jones and Associates, PC

NOTICE OF DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISSOLVE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

Case 8:16-cv-01810-AB-GJS Document 24 Filed 10/11/16 Page 4 of 34 Page ID #:180

Case 8:16-cv-01810-AB-GJS Document 24 Filed 10/11/16 Page 5 of 34 Page ID #:181

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED POULTRY CONCERNS,

ASSIGNED TO HON. ANDR

DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISSOLVE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS

Case 8:16-cv-01810-AB-GJS Document 24 Filed 10/11/16 Page 6 of 34 Page ID #:182

Defendants Chabad of Irvine and Alter Tenenbaum (collectively, Chabad)

animals). In the face of this holding, Plaintiff United Poultry Concerns

ex parte TRO or a preliminary injunction to issue. To assist the Court, Chabad

Plaintiff has also failed to satisfy the requirements for obtaining a

preliminary injunction. Plaintiff lacks standing to bring an action under

Sometimes referred to as kaparot.

Case 8:16-cv-01810-AB-GJS Document 24 Filed 10/11/16 Page 7 of 34 Page ID #:183

Finally, the Chabad moves to strike Plaintiffs Complaint as a violation of a

California statute prohibiting strategic lawsuits against public participation (i.e.,

the Anti-SLAPP statute).

Motion to Dissolve Ex Parte Temporary Restraining

cannot be allowed to stand.

DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISSOLVE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS

Case 8:16-cv-01810-AB-GJS Document 24 Filed 10/11/16 Page 8 of 34 Page ID #:184

according to regular noticed motion procedures. Second, it must be established

opportunity to be heard has been granted both sides of a dispute.).

DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISSOLVE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS

Case 8:16-cv-01810-AB-GJS Document 24 Filed 10/11/16 Page 9 of 34 Page ID #:185

Further, circumstances usually justifying ex parte TROs are absent here.

There are no such extraordinary circumstances here to justify this extraordinary

for temporary restraining orders.

Case 8:16-cv-01810-AB-GJS Document 24 Filed 10/11/16 Page 10 of 34 Page ID #:186

Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for a Preliminary

preliminary injunction is also an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded

LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS

of the reasons that follow. This list of reasons is non-exhaustive.

Case 8:16-cv-01810-AB-GJS Document 24 Filed 10/11/16 Page 11 of 34 Page ID #:187

First, Plaintiff fails to identify any economic injury sufficient to qualify as

and attempting to convince authorities to take action. Compl. 25. There is no

in Napa Partners who paid a private investigator, there is no allegation that

Case 8:16-cv-01810-AB-GJS Document 24 Filed 10/11/16 Page 12 of 34 Page ID #:188

Fund v. Great Bull Run, LLC, No. 14-CV-01171-MEJ, 2014 WL 2568685, at *4

is devoid of any reference to a frustration of its purpose. La Asociacion, 624

DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISSOLVE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS

Case 8:16-cv-01810-AB-GJS Document 24 Filed 10/11/16 Page 13 of 34 Page ID #:189

Plaintiffs missions. Without sufficient allegations showing that Steinau was

The Chabads Religious Ceremony is Not a Business Act

Plaintiff fails to establish the Chabad engages in any business act or