G.R. No.

186571

August 11, 2010

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari 2 under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005,
Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.4 Due to
work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the
wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but
was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and
disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior
Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for divorce on
December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006. 5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to
love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to
the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his
and Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an
official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage
between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the
foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine
court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned,
Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized
letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerberts petition and,
in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial
and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-ininterest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.

In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC
concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial
recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled
that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code,8 in order for him or her to be able to remarry under
Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the
enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by
the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;10 the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." 11
THE PETITION
From the RTCs ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief,
similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights
under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the
rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends
that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the
RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the
petition only to the Filipino spouse an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the
essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself
as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a
possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiance in the
Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil
Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective
Comments,14 both support Gerberts position.

Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURTS RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages void 15 and
voidable16 marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce,
on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising
after the marriage.17 Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino
citizens.18
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and
an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under
the Freedom Constitution,19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26
of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively
incorporated into the law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouses
assertion of marital rights after a foreign courts divorce decree between the alien and
the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed
the marital bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:

To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still
married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just.
[The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be
one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 22
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." 23 The legislative intent
is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the
doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her
marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial
recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely
for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance
to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing
the marital bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute
divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The
inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct
exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage
between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the
decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino
spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction,
however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already
established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by
his national law.26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the
applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only
the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code;
the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with
legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction

We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement
that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC.
In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for
the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven
according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of
Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the
effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of a judgment or final
order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final
order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final
order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final
order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient
to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the
recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less,
that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.27
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and
laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect
within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." 28 This
means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our
rules on evidence, together with the aliens applicable national law to show the effect of
the judgment on the alien himself or herself. 29 The recognition may be made in an action
instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the
foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.

In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the
alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a
sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This
Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the
officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not
kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as
well as the required certificates proving its authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of
the Canadian law on divorce.31 Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss
the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate
to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent
with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26
interests that will be served and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious conformity with
the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the
foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by
proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with
our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall
have the effect of res judicata32 between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39
of the Rules of Court.33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal
recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign
judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and
for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed
above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office
has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate
based on the mere presentation of the decree. 34We consider the recording to be legally
improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been
done.

Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning
the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the
entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching
upon a persons legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities
and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will,
such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not." 35
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a persons
legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on
Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the
civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for recording the civil status of
persons, in which shall be entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their
offices the following books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries
concerning the civil status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;

(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages
solemnized but also divorces and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization
register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law
and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the
decrees registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a
judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In
the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign
divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and
without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and
Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by
Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court
recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, 36 and Department of Justice
Opinion No. 181, series of 198237 both of which required a final order from a
competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be
registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree.
For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the
requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal
effect.1avvphi1
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may
extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of
the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the
proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of
entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed
or corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the
Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in
the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with
before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the
civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with
the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located; 38 that the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the
proceedings;39 and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a

newspaper of general circulation.40As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not

been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the
RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring
two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil
registry one for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for
cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of
special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding 41 by which the
applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of
jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the
October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well
as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for
further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be
furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

ROEHR V. RODRIGUEZ
G.R. No. 142820 June 20, 2003
FACTS:
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married
private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Hamburg,
Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Negros
Oriental. Out of their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra on November 18, 1981
and October 25, 1987, respectively.
On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition 5 for declaration of nullity of
marriage before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. Meanwhile, petitioner
obtained a divorce decree from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese,
promulgated on December 16, 1997. The parental custody of the children was granted
to the father.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she
assumed and retained jurisdiction over the present case despite the fact that petitioner
already has obtained a divorce decree from a German court.

2. To whom should the custody of their children be awarded?

RULING: On the first issue, as a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in
other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on
custody, care and support of the children, must still be determined by our courts. Before
our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of
custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to
the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under
Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure).
Anent the second issue, we hereby declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over the
issue between the parties as to who has parental custody, including the care, support
and education of the children, namely Carolynne and Alexandra Roehr. Let the records
of this case be remanded promptly to the trial court for continuation of appropriate
proceedings.
Roehr v. Rodriguez
WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, vs. MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON.
JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch
149, respondents.
G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003
QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen, married private respondent Carmen
Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Germany. Their marriage was
subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Out of their
union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine.
Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Makati Regional
Trial Court (RTC). Wolfgang filed a motion to dismiss, but it was denied.
Meanwhile, Wolfgang obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of
Hamburg-Blankenese. Said decree also provides that the parental custody of the
children should be vested to Wolfgang.
Wolfgang filed another motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as a divorce decree had
already been promulgated, and said motion was granted by Public Respondent RTC
Judge Salonga.
Carmen filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case proceed
for the purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of
the properties between her and Wolfgang. Judge Salonga partially setting aside her
previous order for the purpose of tackling the issues of support and custody of their
children.

1st Issue: W/N Judge Salonga was correct in granting a partial motion for
reconsideration.
Ruling: Yes.
A judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has not yet attained finality, as
in the case at bar.
The Supreme Court goes further to say that the court can modify or alter a judgment
even after the same has become executory whenever circumstances transpire
rendering its decision unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances
justifying or requiring such modification or alteration transpired after the judgment has
become final and executory and when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of
justice or when supervening events warrant it.
2nd issue: W/N Judge Salonga's act was valid when she assumed and retained
jurisdiction as regards child custody and support.
Ruling: Yes.
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are
recognizable in our jurisdiction. But the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and
support of the children, must still be determined by our courts.
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the
award of custody to Wolfgang by the German court, it must be shown that the parties
opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds
allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure).
In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity
to challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that
judgment as res judicata with regard to the rights of Wolfgang to have parental custody
of their two children. The proceedings in the German court were summary. As to what
was the extent of Carmens participation in the proceedings in the German court, the
records remain unclear.
Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the
trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental
custody, care, support and education mindful of the best interests of the children.
G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988

YAO KEE, SZE SOOK WAH, SZE LAI CHO, and SY CHUN YEN, petitioners,
vs.
AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE, RODOLFO SY, and
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Montesa, Albon, & Associates for petitioners.
De Lapa, Salonga, Fulgencio & De Lunas for respondents.

CORTES, J.:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national. died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where he was
then residing, leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines worth
P300,000.00 more or less.
Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a
petition for the grant of letters of administration docketed as Special Proceedings Case
No. C-699 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XXXIII, Caloocan City. In
said petition they alleged among others that (a) they are the children of the deceased
with Asuncion Gillego; (b) to their knowledge Sy Mat died intestate; (c) they do not
recognize Sy Kiat's marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him; and, (d)
they nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales for appointment as administratrix of the intestate
estate of the deceased [Record on Appeal, pp. 4-9; Rollo, p. 107.]
The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen
who alleged that: (a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married on January
19, 1931 in China; (b) the other oppositors are the legitimate children of the deceased
with Yao Kee; and, (c) Sze Sook Wah is the eldest among them and is competent,
willing and desirous to become the administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat [Record on
Appeal, pp. 12-13; Rollo, p. 107.] After hearing, the probate court, finding among others
that:
(1) Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee [CFI decision, pp. 12-27; Rollo,
pp. 49-64;]
(2) Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sze Chun Yen are the legitimate
children of Yao Kee with Sy Mat [CFI decision, pp. 28-31; Rollo. pp. 6568;] and,

(3) Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy

are the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of Sy Kiat with Asuncion
Gillego [CFI decision, pp. 27-28; Rollo, pp. 64- 65.]
held if favor of the oppositors (petitioners herein) and appointed Sze Sook Wah as the
administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased [CFI decision, pp. 68-69; Rollo, pp.
105-106.]
On appeal the Court of Appeals rendered a decision modifying that of the probate court,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower Court is hereby
MODIFIED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment rendered as follows:
(1) Declaring petitioners Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita SyBernabe and Rodolfo Sy acknowledged natural children of the deceased
Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego, an unmarried woman with whom he lived as
husband and wife without benefit of marriage for many years:
(2) Declaring oppositors Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chun Yen,
the acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with his
Chinese wife Yao Kee, also known as Yui Yip, since the legality of the
alleged marriage of Sy Mat to Yao Kee in China had not been proven to be
valid to the laws of the Chinese People's Republic of China (sic);
(3) Declaring the deed of sale executed by Sy Kiat on December 7, 1976
in favor of Tomas Sy (Exhibit "G-1", English translation of Exhibit "G") of
the Avenue Tractor and Diesel Parts Supply to be valid and accordingly,
said property should be excluded from the estate of the deceased Sy Kiat;
and
(4) Affirming the appointment by the lower court of Sze Sook Wah as
judicial administratrix of the estate of the deceased. [CA decision, pp. 1112; Rollo, pp. 36- 37.]
From said decision both parties moved for partial reconsideration, which was however
denied by respondent court. They thus interposed their respective appeals to this Court.
Private respondents filed a petition with this Court docketed as G.R. No. 56045 entitled
"Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy v. Court of
Appeals, Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen" questioning
paragraphs (3) and (4) of the dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' decision. The

Supreme Court however resolved to deny the petition and the motion for
reconsideration. Thus on March 8, 1982 entry of judgment was made in G.R. No.
56045. **
The instant petition, on the other hand, questions paragraphs (1) and (2) of the
dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals. This petition was initially
denied by the Supreme Court on June 22, 1981. Upon motion of the petitioners the
Court in a resolution dated September 16, 1981 reconsidered the denial and decided to
give due course to this petition. Herein petitioners assign the following as errors:
I. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF SY KIAT TO YAO YEE AS NOT HAVE
(sic) BEEN PROVEN VALID IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAWS OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
II. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
DECLARING AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SYBERNABE AND RODOLFO SY AS NATURAL CHILDREN OF SY KIAT
WITH ASUNCION GILLEGO. [Petition, p. 2; Rollo, p. 6.]
I. Petitioners argue that the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in accordance with Chinese
law and custom was conclusively proven. To buttress this argument they rely on the
following testimonial and documentary evidence.
First, the testimony of Yao Kee summarized by the trial court as follows:
Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat on January 19, 1931 in
Fookien, China; that she does not have a marriage certificate because the
practice during that time was for elders to agree upon the betrothal of their
children, and in her case, her elder brother was the one who contracted or
entered into [an] agreement with the parents of her husband; that the
agreement was that she and Sy Mat would be married, the wedding date
was set, and invitations were sent out; that the said agreement was
complied with; that she has five children with Sy Kiat, but two of them
died; that those who are alive are Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and Sze
Chun Yen, the eldest being Sze Sook Wah who is already 38 years old;
that Sze Sook Wah was born on November 7, 1939; that she and her
husband, Sy Mat, have been living in FooKien, China before he went to
the Philippines on several occasions; that the practice during the time of
her marriage was a written document [is exchanged] just between the
parents of the bride and the parents of the groom, or any elder for that

matter; that in China, the custom is that there is a go- between, a sort of
marriage broker who is known to both parties who would talk to the
parents of the bride-to-be; that if the parents of the bride-to-be agree to
have the groom-to-be their son in-law, then they agree on a date as an
engagement day; that on engagement day, the parents of the groom
would bring some pieces of jewelry to the parents of the bride-to-be, and
then one month after that, a date would be set for the wedding, which in
her case, the wedding date to Sy Kiat was set on January 19, 1931; that
during the wedding the bridegroom brings with him a couch (sic) where
the bride would ride and on that same day, the parents of the bride would
give the dowry for her daughter and then the document would be signed
by the parties but there is no solemnizing officer as is known in the
Philippines; that during the wedding day, the document is signed only by
the parents of the bridegroom as well as by the parents of the bride; that
the parties themselves do not sign the document; that the bride would
then be placed in a carriage where she would be brought to the town of
the bridegroom and before departure the bride would be covered with a
sort of a veil; that upon reaching the town of the bridegroom, the
bridegroom takes away the veil; that during her wedding to Sy Kiat
(according to said Chinese custom), there were many persons present;
that after Sy Kiat opened the door of the carriage, two old ladies helped
her go down the carriage and brought her inside the house of Sy Mat; that
during her wedding, Sy Chick, the eldest brother of Sy Kiat, signed the
document with her mother; that as to the whereabouts of that document,
she and Sy Mat were married for 46 years already and the document was
left in China and she doubt if that document can still be found now; that it
was left in the possession of Sy Kiat's family; that right now, she does not
know the whereabouts of that document because of the lapse of many
years and because they left it in a certain place and it was already eaten
by the termites; that after her wedding with Sy Kiat, they lived immediately
together as husband and wife, and from then on, they lived together; that
Sy Kiat went to the Philippines sometime in March or April in the same
year they were married; that she went to the Philippines in 1970, and then
came back to China; that again she went back to the Philippines and lived
with Sy Mat as husband and wife; that she begot her children with Sy Kiat
during the several trips by Sy Kiat made back to China. [CFI decision, pp.
13-15; Rollo, pp. 50-52.]
Second, the testimony of Gan Ching, a younger brother of Yao Kee who stated that he
was among the many people who attended the wedding of his sister with Sy Kiat and
that no marriage certificate is issued by the Chinese government, a document signed by

the parents or elders of the parties being sufficient [CFI decision, pp. 15-16; Rollo, pp.
52-53.]
Third, the statements made by Asuncion Gillego when she testified before the trial court
to the effect that (a) Sy Mat was married to Yao Kee according to Chinese custom; and,
(b) Sy Kiat's admission to her that he has a Chinese wife whom he married according to
Chinese custom [CFI decision, p. 17; Rollo, p. 54.]
Fourth, Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien issued in Caloocan City on October 3,
1972 where the following entries are found: "Marital statusMarried"; "If married give
name of spousesYao Kee"; "Address-China; "Date of marriage1931"; and "Place of
marriageChina" [Exhibit "SS-1".]
Fifth, Sy Kiat's Alien Certificate of Registration issued in Manila on January 12, 1968
where the following entries are likewise found: "Civil statusMarried"; and, 'If married,
state name and address of spouseYao Kee Chingkang, China" [Exhibit "4".]
And lastly, the certification issued in Manila on October 28, 1977 by the Embassy of the
People's Republic of China to the effect that "according to the information available at
the Embassy Mr. Sy Kiat a Chinese national and Mrs. Yao Kee alias Yui Yip also
Chinese were married on January 19, 1931 in Fukien, the People's Republic of China"
[Exhibit "5".]
These evidence may very well prove the fact of marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat.
However, the same do not suffice to establish the validity of said marriage in
accordance with Chinese law or custom.
Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed
(practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory" [In the Matter of the Petition
for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name "Ozaeta, Romulo, de Leon, Mabanta
and Reyes", July 30, 1979, SCRA 3, 12 citing JBL Reyes & RC Puno, Outline of Phil.
Civil Law, Fourth Ed., Vol. 1, p. 7.] The law requires that "a custom must be proved as a
fact, according to the rules of evidence" [Article 12, Civil Code.] On this score the Court
had occasion to state that "a local custom as a source of right can not be considered by
a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like
any other fact" [Patriarca v. Orate, 7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907).] The same evidence, if not
one of a higher degree, should be required of a foreign custom.
The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil Code which states
that:

Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance

with the laws in force in the country where they were performed and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous,
Polygamous, or incestuous marriages, as determined by Philippine law.
(Emphasis supplied.) ***
Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid foreign
marriage two things must be proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a
question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence [Adong v.
Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 49 (1922).]
In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of Court. With respect to
an unwritten foreign law, Rule 130 section 45 states that:
SEC. 45. Unwritten law.The oral testimony of witnesses, skilled therein,
is admissible as evidence of the unwritten law of a foreign country, as are
also printed and published books of reports of decisions of the courts of
the foreign country, if proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.
Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for under Rule 132 section
25, thus:
SEC. 25. Proof of public or official record.An official record or an entry
therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is
not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his office.
The Court has interpreted section 25 to include competent evidence like the testimony
of a witness to prove the existence of a written foreign law [Collector of Internal
Revenue v. Fisher 110 Phil. 686, 700-701 (1961) citing Willamette Iron and Steel Works
v. Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471 (1935).]
In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law
and custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be
considered as proof of China's law or custom on marriage not only because they are

self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are competent
to testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and
consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the
marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
Petitioners contend that contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling they are not duty bound
to prove the Chinese law on marriage as judicial notice thereof had been taken by this
Court in the case of Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia [16 Phil. 137 (1910).]
This contention is erroneous. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that
Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and
proved as any other fact [Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46, 48 (1915);
Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 (1930).]
Moreover a reading of said case would show that the party alleging the foreign marriage
presented a witness, one Li Ung Bieng, to prove that matrimonial letters mutually
exchanged by the contracting parties constitute the essential requisite for a marriage to
be considered duly solemnized in China. Based on his testimony, which as found by the
Court is uniformly corroborated by authors on the subject of Chinese marriage, what
was left to be decided was the issue of whether or not the fact of marriage in
accordance with Chinese law was duly proven [Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia, supra., at p.
160.]
Further, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Court has indeed taken
judicial notice of the law of China on marriage in the aforecited case, petitioners
however have not shown any proof that the Chinese law or custom obtaining at the time
the Sy Joc Lieng marriage was celebrated in 1847 was still the law when the alleged
marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee took place in 1931 or eighty-four (84) years later.
Petitioners moreover cite the case of U.S. v. Memoracion [34 Phil. 633 (1916)] as being
applicable to the instant case. They aver that the judicial pronouncement in the
Memoracion case, that the testimony of one of the contracting parties is competent
evidence to show the fact of marriage, holds true in this case.
The Memoracion case however is not applicable to the case at bar as said case did not
concern a foreign marriage and the issue posed was whether or not the oral testimony
of a spouse is competent evidence to prove the fact of marriage in a complaint for
adultery.
Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be
presumed that it is the same as ours *** [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21076,

March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 552, 555.] Since Yao Kee admitted in her testimony that
there was no solemnizing officer as is known here in the Philippines [See Article 56,
Civil Code] when her alleged marriage to Sy Mat was celebrated [CFI decision, p. 14;
Rollo, p. 51], it therefore follows that her marriage to Sy Kiat, even if true, cannot be
recognized in this jurisdiction [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, supra., pp. 555-556.]
II. The second issue raised by petitioners concerns the status of private respondents.
Respondent court found the following evidence of petitioners' filiation:
(1) Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien where the following are
entered: "Children if any: give number of childrenFour"; and, "NameAll
living in China" [Exhibit "SS-1";]
(2) the testimony of their mother Yao Kee who stated that she had five
children with Sy Kiat, only three of whom are alive namely, Sze Sook Wah,
Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chin Yan [TSN, December 12, 1977, pp. 9-11;] and,
(3) an affidavit executed on March 22,1961 by Sy Kiat for presentation to
the Local Civil Registrar of Manila to support Sze Sook Wah's application
for a marriage license, wherein Sy Kiat expressly stated that she is his
daughter [Exhibit "3".]
Likewise on the record is the testimony of Asuncion Gillego that Sy Kiat told her he has
three daughters with his Chinese wife, two of whomSook Wah and Sze Kai Choshe
knows, and one adopted son [TSN, December 6,1977, pp. 87-88.]
However, as petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Mat
according to the laws of China, they cannot be accorded the status of legitimate children
but only that of acknowledged natural children. Petitioners are natural children, it
appearing that at the time of their conception Yao Kee and Sy Kiat were not disqualified
by any impediment to marry one another [See Art. 269, Civil Code.] And they are
acknowledged children of the deceased because of Sy Kiat's recognition of Sze Sook
Wah [Exhibit "3"] and its extension to Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen who are her sisters
of the full blood [See Art. 271, Civil Code.]
Private respondents on the other hand are also the deceased's acknowledged natural
children with Asuncion Gillego, a Filipina with whom he lived for twenty-five (25) years
without the benefit of marriage. They have in their favor their father's acknowledgment,
evidenced by a compromise agreement entered into by and between their parents and
approved by the Court of First Instance on February 12, 1974 wherein Sy Kiat not only

acknowleged them as his children by Asuncion Gillego but likewise made provisions for
their support and future inheritance, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
2. The parties also acknowledge that they are common-law husband and
wife and that out of such relationship, which they have likewise decided to
definitely and finally terminate effective immediately, they begot five
children, namely: Aida Sy, born on May 30, 1950; Manuel Sy, born on July
1, 1953; Teresita Sy, born on January 28, 1955; Ricardo Sy now
deceased, born on December 14, 1956; and Rodolfo Sy, born on May 7,
1958.
3. With respect to the AVENUE TRACTOR AND DIESEL PARTS
SUPPLY ... , the parties mutually agree and covenant that
(a) The stocks and merchandize and the furniture and
equipments ..., shall be divided into two equal shares
between, and distributed to, Sy Kiat who shall own
one-half of the total and the other half to Asuncion Gillego
who shall transfer the same to their children, namely, Aida
Sy, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo Sy.
(b) the business name and premises ... shall be retained by
Sy Kiat. However, it shall be his obligation to give to
the aforenamed children an amount of One Thousand Pesos
( Pl,000.00 ) monthly out of the rental of the two doors of the
same building now occupied by Everett Construction.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) With respect to the acquisition, during the existence of the
common-law husband-and-wife relationship between the parties, of the
real estates and properties registered and/or appearing in the name of
Asuncion Gillego ... , the parties mutually agree and covenant that the
said real estates and properties shall be transferred in equal shares to
their children, namely, Aida Sy, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo Sy,
but to be administered by Asuncion Gillego during her lifetime ... [Exhibit
"D".] (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx

This compromise agreement constitutes a statement before a court of record by which a

child may be voluntarily acknowledged [See Art. 278, Civil Code.]
Petitioners further argue that the questions on the validity of Sy Mat's marriage to Yao
Kee and the paternity and filiation of the parties should have been ventilated in the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
Specifically, petitioners rely on the following provision of Republic Act No. 5502, entitled
"An Act Revising Rep. Act No. 3278, otherwise known as the Charter of the City of
Caloocan', with regard to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court:
SEC. 91-A. Creation and Jurisdiction of the Court.
xxx xxx xxx
The provisions of the Judiciary Act to the contrary notwithstanding, the
court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the
following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Cases involving custody, guardianship, adoption, revocation of
adoption, paternity and acknowledgment;
(3) Annulment of marriages, relief from marital obligations, legal
separation of spouses, and actions for support;
(4) Proceedings brought under the provisions of title six and title seven,
chapters one to three of the civil code;
xxx xxx xxx
and the ruling in the case of Bartolome v. Bartolome [G.R. No. L-23661, 21 SCRA 1324]
reiterated in Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R. No. L-42615, 72 SCRA 307.]
With the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts were
abolished. Their functions and jurisdiction are now vested with the Regional Trial Courts
[See Section 19 (7), B.P. Blg. 129 and Divinagracia v. Belosillo, G.R. No. L-47407,
August 12, 1986, 143 SCRA 356, 360] hence it is no longer necessary to pass upon the
issue of jurisdiction raised by petitioners.

Moreover, even without the exactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 we find in Rep. Act
No. 5502 sec. 91-A last paragraph that:
xxx xxx xxx
If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as an
incident in any case pending in the ordinary court, said incident shall be
determined in the main case.
xxx xxx xxx
As held in the case of Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R. No. L42615. August 10, 1976, 72
SCRA 307]:
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that under the aforequoted section 1 of Republic Act No.
4834 **** a case involving paternity and acknowledgment may be
ventilated as an incident in the intestate or testate proceeding (See
Baluyot vs. Ines Luciano, L-42215, July 13, 1976). But that legal provision
presupposes that such an administration proceeding is pending or existing
and has not been terminated. [at pp. 313-314.] (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
The reason for ths rule is not only "to obviate the rendition of conflicting rulings on the
same issue by the Court of First Instance and the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court" [Vda. de Baluyut v. Luciano, G.R. No. L-42215, July 13, 1976, 72 SCRA 52, 63]
but more importantly to prevent multiplicity of suits. Accordingly, this Court finds no
reversible error committed by respondent court.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.