Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Torts and Damages 1
Torts and Damages 1
VICTORIA
L.
BATIQUIN
and
ALLAN
BATIQUIN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
SPOUSES QUEDO D. ACOGIDO and FLOTILDE
G. VILLEGAS, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Throughout history, patients have consigned their fates and
lives to the skill of their doctors. For a breach of this trust, men
have been quick to demand retribution. Some 4,000 years ago,
the Code of Hammurabi[1] then already provided: "If a
physician make a deep incision upon a man with his bronze
lancet and cause the man's death, or operate on the eye socket
of a man with his bronze lancet and destroy the man's eyes,
they
shall
cut
off
his
hand."[2] Subsequently,
[3]
Hippocrates wrote what was to become part of the healer's
oath: "I will follow that method of treatment which according
to my ability and judgment, I consider for the benefit of my
patients, and abstain from whatever is deleterious and
mischievous . . . . While I continue to keep this oath unviolated
may it be granted me to enjoy life and practice the art,
respected by all men at all times but should I trespass and
violate this oath, may the reverse be my lot." At present, the
primary objective of the medical profession is the preservation
of life and maintenance of the health of the people.[4]
Needless to say then, when a physician strays from his
sacred duty and endangers instead the life of his patient, he
This is not to say that she was less than honest when she
testified about her findings, but it can also be said that she did
not take the most appropriate precaution to preserve that "piece
of rubber" as an eloquent evidence of what she would reveal
should there be a "legal problem" which she claim[s] to have
anticipated.[35]
Considering that we have assessed Dr. Kho to be a credible
witness, her positive testimony [that a piece of rubber was
indeed found in private respondent Villegas' abdomen] prevails
over the negative testimony in favor of the petitioners.
As such, the rule of res ipsa loquitur comes to fore. This
Court has had occasion to delve into the nature and operation
of this doctrine:
This doctrine [res ipsa loquitur] is stated thus: "Where the
thing which causes injury is shown to be under the
management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have
the management use proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant,
that the accident arose from want of care." Or as Black's Law
Dictionary puts it:
Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable
presumption or inference that defendant was negligent, which
arises upon proof that [the] instrumentality causing injury was
in defendant's exclusive control, and that the accident was one
which ordinary does not happen in absence of negligence. Res
ipsa loquitur is [a] rule of evidence whereby negligence of
DECISION
Melo,
ROMERO, J.:
To our mind, the better and more logical remedy under the
circumstances would have been to appeal the resolution of the
City Prosecutors dismissing the criminal complaint to the
Secretary of Justice under the Department of Justices Order
No. 223, [21] otherwise known as the 1993 Revised Rules on
Appeals
From
Resolutions
In
Preliminary
Investigations/Reinvestigations, as amended by Department
Order No. 359, Section 1 of which provides:
Puno,
Jr.,
on June 17, 1985 at 9:00 A.M.. Dr. Hosaka decided that she
should undergo a cholecystectomy operation after examining
the documents (findings from the Capitol Medical Center, FEU
Hospital and DLSMC) presented to him. Rogelio E. Ramos,
however, asked Dr. Hosaka to look for a good
anesthesiologist. Dr. Hosaka, in turn, assured Rogelio that he
will get a good anesthesiologist. Dr. Hosaka charged a fee
of P16,000.00, which was to include the anesthesiologists fee
and which was to be paid after the operation (TSN, October 19,
1989, pp. 14-15, 22-23, 31-33; TSN, February 27, 1990, p. 13;
and TSN, November 9, 1989, pp. 3-4, 10, 17).
A day before the scheduled date of operation, she was admitted
at one of the rooms of the DLSMC, located along E. Rodriguez
Avenue, Quezon City (TSN, October 19, 1989, p. 11).
At around 7:30 A.M. of June 17, 1985 and while still in her
room, she was prepared for the operation by the hospital
staff. Her sister-in-law, Herminda Cruz, who was the Dean of
the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center, was also
there for moral support. She reiterated her previous request for
Herminda to be with her even during the operation. After
praying, she was given injections. Her hands were held by
Herminda as they went down from her room to the operating
room (TSN, January 13, 1988, pp. 9-11). Her husband,
Rogelio, was also with her (TSN, October 19, 1989, p. 18). At
the operating room, Herminda saw about two or three nurses
and Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez, the other defendant, who was to
administer anesthesia. Although not a member of the hospital
staff, Herminda introduced herself as Dean of the College of
Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center who was to provide
moral support to the patient, to them. Herminda was allowed to
stay inside the operating room.
she held the hand of Erlinda Ramos, she then saw Dr. Gutierrez
intubating the hapless patient. She thereafter heard Dr.
Gutierrez say, ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang
pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan (id., p. 17). Because of the
remarks of Dra. Gutierrez, she focused her attention on what
Dr. Gutierrez was doing. She thereafter noticed bluish
discoloration of the nailbeds of the left hand of the hapless
Erlinda even as Dr. Hosaka approached her. She then heard Dr.
Hosaka issue an order for someone to call Dr. Calderon,
another anesthesiologist (id., p. 19). After Dr. Calderon arrived
at the operating room, she saw this anesthesiologist trying to
intubate the patient. The patients nailbed became bluish and the
patient was placed in a trendelenburg position - a position
where the head of the patient is placed in a position lower than
her feet which is an indication that there is a decrease of blood
supply to the patients brain (Id., pp. 19-20). Immediately
thereafter, she went out of the operating room, and she told
Rogelio E. Ramos that something wrong was x x x happening
(Ibid.). Dr. Calderon was then able to intubate the patient
(TSN, July 25, 1991, p. 9).
Meanwhile, Rogelio, who was outside the operating room, saw
a respiratory machine being rushed towards the door of the
operating room. He also saw several doctors rushing towards
the operating room.When informed by Herminda Cruz that
something wrong was happening, he told her (Herminda) to be
back with the patient inside the operating room (TSN, October
19, 1989, pp. 25-28).
Herminda Cruz immediately rushed back, and saw that the
patient was still in trendelenburg position (TSN, January 13,
1988, p. 20). At almost 3:00 P.M. of that fateful day, she saw
the patient taken to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU).
admissibility of
but
after
the Motion
considering
for
the
However, much has been said that res ipsa loquitur is not a rule
of substantive law and, as such, does not create or constitute an
independent or separate ground of liability.[17] Instead, it is
considered as merely evidentiary or in the nature of a
procedural rule.[18] It is regarded as a mode of proof, or a mere
procedural convenience since it furnishes a substitute for, and
relieves a plaintiff of, the burden of producing specific proof of
negligence.[19] In other words, mere invocation and application
of the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof
of negligence. It is simply a step in the process of such proof,
permitting the plaintiff to present along with the proof of the
accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the
doctrine, creating an inference or presumption of negligence,
and to thereby place on the defendant the burden of going
forward with the proof.[20] Still, before resort to the doctrine
may be allowed, the following requisites must be satisfactorily
shown:
ATTY. PAJARES:
Q: From whom did you hear those words lumalaki ang tiyan?
Q: Do you know the reason why the patient was placed in that
trendelenburg position?
xxx
xxx
After hearing the phrase lumalaki ang tiyan, what did you
notice on the person of the patient?
ATTY. LIGSAY:
Q: When you said mahirap yata ito, what were you referring
to?
A: No.
Q: In other words, your knowledge about pentothal is based
only on what you have read from books and not by your own
personal application of the medicine pentothal?
A: Based on my personal experience also on pentothal.
Q: How many times have you used pentothal?
A: They used it on me. I went into bronchospasm during my
appendectomy.
Q: And because they have used it on you and on account of
your own personal experience you feel that you can testify on
pentothal here with medical authority?
A: No. That is why I used references to support my claims.[61]
An anesthetic accident caused by a rare drug-induced
bronchospasm properly falls within the fields of anesthesia,
internal medicine-allergy, and clinical pharmacology. The
resulting anoxic encephalopathy belongs to the field of
neurology. While admittedly, many bronchospastic-mediated
pulmonary diseases are within the expertise of pulmonary
medicine, Dr. Jamora's field, the anesthetic drug-induced,
allergic mediated bronchospasm alleged in this case is within
the disciplines of anesthesiology, allergology and
pharmacology. On the basis of the foregoing transcript, in
which the pulmonologist himself admitted that he could not
testify about the drug with medical authority, it is clear that the
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This
petition
for
review[1] assails
the 6
February
[2]
1998 Decision and 21 March 2000 Resolution[3] of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45641. The Court of Appeals
affirmed in toto the 22 November 1993 Decision[4] of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33, finding Dr. Oscar
Estrada solely liable for damages for the death of his patient,
Corazon Nogales, while absolving the remaining respondents
of any liability. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration.
The Facts
On the part of Dra. Ely Villaflor, she was only taking orders
from Dr. Estrada, the principal physician of Corazon
Nogales. She can only make suggestions in the manner the
patient maybe treated but she cannot impose her will as to do
so would be to substitute her good judgment to that of Dr.
Estrada. If she failed to correctly diagnose the true cause of the
bleeding which in this case appears to be a cervical laceration,
it cannot be safely concluded by the Court that Dra. Villaflor
had the correct diagnosis and she failed to inform Dr.
Estrada. No evidence was introduced to show that indeed Dra.
Villaflor had discovered that there was laceration at the
cervical area of the patients internal organ.
The victim was under his pre-natal care, apparently, his fault
began from his incorrect and inadequate management and lack
of treatment of the pre-eclamptic condition of his patient. It is
not disputed that he misapplied the forceps in causing the
delivery because it resulted in a large cervical tear which had
caused the profuse bleeding which he also failed to control
with the application of inadequate injection of magnesium
sulfate by his assistant Dra. Ely Villaflor. Dr. Estrada even
failed to notice the erroneous administration by nurse Dumlao
On the part however of Dra. Ely Villaflor, Dra. Rosa Uy, Dr.
Joel Enriquez, Dr. Lacson, Dr. Espinola, nurse J. Dumlao and
CMC, the Court finds no legal justification to find them civilly
liable.
SO ORDERED.[18]
The Court noted that Dr. Estrada did not appeal the decision of
the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Regional
Trial Court. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals,
affirming the trial courts judgment, is already final as against
Dr. Oscar Estrada.
The Issue
xxxx
xxxx
While the Court in Ramos did not expound on the control test,
such test essentially determines whether an employment
relationship exists between a physician and a hospital based on
the exercise of control over the physician as to
details. Specifically, the employer (or the hospital) must have
the right to control both the means and the details of the
process by which the employee (or the physician) is to
accomplish his task.[41]
in them; and (3) the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct
of the hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and
prudence.
The element of holding out on the part of the hospital does not
require an express representation by the hospital that the person
alleged to be negligent is an employee. Rather, the element is
satisfied if the hospital holds itself out as a provider of
emergency room care without informing the patient that the
care is provided by independent contractors.
The conception that the hospital does not undertake to treat the
patient, does not undertake to act through its doctors and
nurses, but undertakes instead simply to procure them to act
upon their own responsibility, no longer reflects the
fact. Present day hospitals, as their manner of operation
plainly demonstrates, do far more than furnish facilities for
treatment. They regularly employ on a salary basis a large
staff of physicians, nurses and internes [sic], as well as
administrative and manual workers, and they charge
patients for medical care and treatment, collecting for such
services, if necessary, by legal action. Certainly, the person
who avails himself of hospital facilities expects that the
b) Dr. Rosa Uy
The Court believes Dr. Uys claim that as a second year resident
physician then at CMC, she was merely authorized to take the
clinical history and physical examination of Corazon.
[62]
However, that routine internal examination did not ipso
facto make Dr. Uy liable for the errors committed by Dr.
Estrada. Further, petitioners imputation of negligence rests on
their baseless assumption that Dr. Uy was present at the
delivery room. Nothing shows that Dr. Uy participated in
delivering Corazons baby. Further, it is unexpected from Dr.
Uy, a mere resident physician at that time, to call the attention
Petitioners fault Dr. Joel Enriquez also for not calling the
attention of Dr. Estrada, Dr. Villaflor, and Nurse Dumlao about
their errors.[63] Petitioners insist that Dr. Enriquez should have
taken, or at least suggested, corrective measures to rectify such
errors.
f) Nurse J. Dumlao
In Moore v. Guthrie Hospital Inc.,[67] the US Court of Appeals,
Fourth Circuit, held that to recover, a patient complaining of
injuries allegedly resulting when the nurse negligently injected
medicine to him intravenously instead of intramuscularly had
to show that (1) an intravenous injection constituted a lack of
reasonable and ordinary care; (2) the nurse injected medicine
intravenously; and (3) such injection was the proximate cause
of his injury.
PROFESSIONAL
SERVICES,
INC., Petitioner,
vs.
NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE AGANA, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 126467
MIGUEL
vs.
NATIVIDAD
AGANA
AGANA, Respondents.
AMPIL, Petitioner,
and
ENRIQUE
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Hospitals, having undertaken one of mankinds most important
and delicate endeavors, must assume the grave responsibility of
pursuing it with appropriate care. The care and service
dispensed through this high trust, however technical, complex
and esoteric its character may be, must meet standards of
responsibility commensurate with the undertaking to preserve
and protect the health, and indeed, the very lives of those
placed in the hospitals keeping.1
Assailed in these three consolidated petitions for review on
certiorari is the Court of Appeals Decision2 dated September 6,
1996 in CA-G.R. CV No. 42062 and CA-G.R. SP No. 32198
affirming with modification the Decision3 dated March 17,
1993 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 96, Quezon
City in Civil Case No. Q-43322 and nullifying its Order dated
September 21, 1993.
The facts, as culled from the records, are:
On April 4, 1984, Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical
City General Hospital (Medical City Hospital) because of
difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal discharge. After
a series of medical examinations, Dr. Miguel Ampil, petitioner
in G.R. No. 127590, diagnosed her to be suffering from "cancer
of the sigmoid."
On April 11, 1984, Dr. Ampil, assisted by the medical staff 4 of
the Medical City Hospital, performed an anterior resection
surgery on Natividad. He found that the malignancy in her
sigmoid area had spread on her left ovary, necessitating the
removal of certain portions of it. Thus, Dr. Ampil obtained the
consent of Natividads husband, Enrique Agana, to permit Dr.
inches in width. He then assured her that the pains would soon
vanish.
Dr. Ampils assurance did not come true. Instead, the pains
intensified, prompting Natividad to seek treatment at the
Polymedic General Hospital. While confined there, Dr. Ramon
Gutierrez detected the presence of another foreign object in her
vagina -- a foul-smelling gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width
which badly infected her vaginal vault. A recto-vaginal fistula
had formed in her reproductive organs which forced stool to
excrete through the vagina. Another surgical operation was
needed to remedy the damage. Thus, in October 1984,
Natividad underwent another surgery.
On November 12, 1984, Natividad and her husband filed with
the RTC, Branch 96, Quezon City a complaint for damages
against the Professional Services, Inc. (PSI), owner of the
Medical City Hospital, Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes, docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-43322. They alleged that the latter are liable
for negligence for leaving two pieces of gauze inside
Natividads body and malpractice for concealing their acts of
negligence.
Meanwhile, Enrique Agana also filed with the Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC) an administrative complaint for
gross negligence and malpractice against Dr. Ampil and Dr.
Fuentes, docketed as Administrative Case No. 1690. The PRC
Board of Medicine heard the case only with respect to Dr.
Fuentes because it failed to acquire jurisdiction over Dr. Ampil
who was then in the United States.
On February 16, 1986, pending the outcome of the above
cases, Natividad died and was duly substituted by her abovenamed children (the Aganas).
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, PSI, Dr. Fuentes and Dr. Ampil interposed an
appeal to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
42062.
Incidentally, on April 3, 1993, the Aganas filed with the RTC a
motion for a partial execution of its Decision, which was
granted in an Order dated May 11, 1993. Thereafter, the sheriff
levied upon certain properties of Dr. Ampil and sold them for
P451,275.00 and delivered the amount to the Aganas.
Following their receipt of the money, the Aganas entered into
an agreement with PSI and Dr. Fuentes to indefinitely suspend
any further execution of the RTC Decision. However, not long
thereafter, the Aganas again filed a motion for an alias writ of
execution against the properties of PSI and Dr. Fuentes. On
September 21, 1993, the RTC granted the motion and issued
the corresponding writ, prompting Dr. Fuentes to file with the
Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with
prayer for preliminary injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
32198. During its pendency, the Court of Appeals issued a
Resolution5 dated October 29, 1993 granting Dr. Fuentes
prayer for injunctive relief.
On January 24, 1994, CA-G.R. SP No. 32198 was consolidated
with CA-G.R. CV No. 42062.
Meanwhile, on January 23, 1995, the PRC Board of Medicine
rendered its Decision6 in Administrative Case No. 1690
dismissing the case against Dr. Fuentes. The Board held that
the prosecution failed to show that Dr. Fuentes was the one
who left the two pieces of gauze inside Natividads body; and
that he concealed such fact from Natividad.
solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil; and (3) it is not entitled to its
counterclaim against the Aganas. PSI contends that Dr. Ampil
is not its employee, but a mere consultant or independent
contractor. As such, he alone should answer for his negligence.
In G.R. No. 126467, the Aganas maintain that the Court of
Appeals erred in finding that Dr. Fuentes is not guilty of
negligence or medical malpractice, invoking the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur. They contend that the pieces of gauze are prima
facie proofs that the operating surgeons have been negligent.
Finally, in G.R. No. 127590, Dr. Ampil asserts that the Court of
Appeals erred in finding him liable for negligence and
malpractice sans evidence that he left the two pieces of gauze
in Natividads vagina. He pointed to other probable causes,
such as: (1) it was Dr. Fuentes who used gauzes in performing
the hysterectomy; (2) the attending nurses failure to properly
count the gauzes used during surgery; and (3) the medical
intervention of the American doctors who examined Natividad
in the United States of America.
For our resolution are these three vital issues: first, whether the
Court of Appeals erred in holding Dr. Ampil liable for
negligence and malpractice; second, whether the Court of
Appeals erred in absolving Dr. Fuentes of any liability; and
third, whether PSI may be held solidarily liable for the
negligence of Dr. Ampil.
I - G.R. No. 127590
Whether the Court of Appeals Erred in Holding Dr. Ampil
Third, after the operation, two (2) gauzes were extracted from
the same spot of the body of Mrs. Agana where the surgery was
performed.
x x x
she left for the United States, private respondent executed the
corresponding Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of petitioner.
This case, entitled Norma Ebersole del Mar represented by
Gerald del Mar vs. Roberto del Mar and the Register of Deeds,
Province of Isabela was filed before the Regional Trial Court
of Santiago City, Branch 35 and docketed as Civil Case No.
2373.
6. In his Answer, x x x petitioner claimed that x x x private
respondent and her co-owner, Florence Ebersole Finch, sold x
x x said properties to him before the former left for the United
States. Moreover, the properties were transferred for good,
sufficient and valuable consideration, hence the sale was lawful
and valid.
7. During the pre-trial conference, neither x x x petitioner nor
his counsel, Atty. Federico Abuan, appeared, by reason of
which the trial court issued an order declaring petitioner as in
default. The non-appearance was due to the failure of Atty.
Abuan, Jr. to inform petitioners attorney-in-fact, Angelita
Austria, of the scheduled hearing. Said petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration but the same was denied, and x x x private
respondent was allowed to adduce her evidence ex-parte. On
the same day that x x x said motion was denied, the trial court
rendered its October 21, 1997 [D]ecision in favor of x x x
private respondent and against x x x petitioner, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered against [petitioner] and
in favor of [private respondent], as follows:
1. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Ilagan, Isabela to cancel
Titles Nos. T-82257; T-82261, T-82260, T-82263, T-82264, T234664, T-116117 and T-822659;
First Issue:
Effect of Failure to File a Brief
Petitioner argues that the CA gravely abused its discretion in
dismissing his appeal for his mere failure to file his Brief
within the reglementary period.
We disagree. Rule 50, Section 1(e) of the Revised Rules of
Court, expressly authorizes the CA to dismiss an appeal
for, inter alia, failure of appellant to serve and file the required
number of copies of his brief or memorandum within the time
provided by these Rules.
Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of when the
following requisites concur: (a) a tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or in excess of jurisdiction; and (b) there is no appeal or plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for
annulling or modifying the proceeding.[14]
Petitioner claims that Atty. Abuans failure to file the required
pleading constituted fraud against him, and that his absence
from the country while the appeal was pending constituted a
mistake that was excusable.
We disagree. It is well-settled that the negligence of counsel
binds the client.[15] Exceptions to this rule arise when (1) such
negligence is so gross, palpable, reckless and inexcusable that
the client is deprived of the due process of law; and (2) the
application of such due process results in the outright
deprivation of ones property through a technicality.[16]
The negligence of Atty. Abuan does not fall under these
exceptions. His negligence in this case was his inexcusable
Petitioner avers that he has in his favor the following valid and
meritorious defenses: (1) valid purchase of the disputed lots,
(2) acquisitive prescription, and (3) prescription and laches
barring private respondents action. He proposes to prove these
arguments with the following documents: (1) an alleged Deed
of Sale dated January 29, 1975 purportedly signed by private
respondent on her own behalf and as the agent of her sister
Florence; (2) a Confirmation of Sale allegedly signed by
Florence; and (3) an alleged Certificate of Authentication of the
confirmation issued by a Philippine vice consul in New York,
USA.
Assuming arguendo that this Petition is granted and the CA is
required to pass upon the RTCs judgment, how can the CA give
any probative value to the above documents, when they were
not presented before the trial court? Be it remembered that
petitioner had been declared in default, and that he did not even
ask for the lifting of the Default Order. Hence, the grant of the
Petition will be not only legally unsound, but also practically
useless. It will just clog the CAs docket.
Finally, after the CA denied his Motion for Reconsideration,
petitioner allowed the reglementary period for filing an appeal
to lapse, opting instead to file this Petition for Certiorari. Wellsettled is the rule that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost
appeal.[20] Even if for this reason alone, the Petition should not
be given due course.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
DOMINGO
DE
GUZMAN, petitioner,
vs. THE
SANDIGANBAYAN (Second Division) and the PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; RULES OF PROCEDURE; MAY BE
LIBERALLY CONSTRUED TO SERVE THE END OF
JUSTICE. - The power of this Court to suspend its own rules
or to except a particular case from its operations whenever the
purposes of justice require it, cannot be questioned. In not a
few instances, this Court ordered a new trial in criminal cases
on grounds not mentioned in the statute, viz: retraction of
witness, negligence or incompetency of counsel, improvident
plea of guilty, disqualification of an attorney de officio to
represent the accused in trial court, and where a judgment was
rendered on a stipulation of facts entered into by both the
prosecution and the defense. Similarly, in a considerable host
of cases has this prerogative been invoked to relax even
procedural rules of the most mandatory character in terms of
compliance, such as the period to appeal. Let us not forget that
the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed
to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always
be avoided. Even the Rules of Court envision this
liberality. This power to suspend or even disregard the rules
can be so pervasive and encompassing so as to alter even that
which this Court itself has already declared to be final, as we
are now compelled to do in this case.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICABLE IN CASE A PARTY WAS
PENALIZED DUE TO THE NEGLIGENCE OF HIS
COUNSEL. - Petitioners present dilemma is certainly not
something reducible to pesos and centavos. No less than his
liberty is at stake here. And he is just about to lose it simply
because his former lawyers pursued a carelessly contrived
procedural strategy of insisting on what has already become an
The Court in its June 16, 1994 En Banc Resolution [1] denied
with finality petitioners motion for reconsideration of the
Courts April 12, 1994 Decision[2] affirming his conviction by
the Sandiganbayan[3] of violation of Section 3(e) of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act[4] for his alleged failure to
account for P200,000.00 received for certain official training
programs of the Department of Agriculture. Entry of judgment
was ordered to be made in due course. [5] Six (6) years and one
(1) month as minimum, to nine (9) years and one (1) day as
maximum in jail await petitioner.
As the Sandiganbayan and the Court saw it then, petitioners
guilt was duly established by 1) lone prosecution witness
Josephine Angeles[6] testimony that no such training programs
were held at the designated places,[7] and 2) petitioners failure
to present a single receipt to support due disbursement of the
P200,000.00, resulting from his former lawyers insistence in
filing a demurrer to evidence despite prior leave for that
purpose having been denied by the Sandiganbayan.
To avert his looming imprisonment and with full awareness
that he has nothing in our Rules of Court to rely on, petitioner
takes a novel recourse by filing the instant Omnibus Motion
For Leave to Vacate First Motion For Reconsideration In The
Light Of The Present Developments And To Consider Evidence
Presented Herein And To Set Aside Conviction. [8] This was
filed on petitioners behalf by a new counsel, as shown by the
Entry of Appearance and Motion For Leave To Submit
Attached Omnibus Motion filed on June 27, 1994[9] after
petitioners former lawyers withdrew their appearance.[10]
In this Omnibus Motion, petitioner, for the first time, seeks to
be relieved from what he considers as the serious and costly
mistake of his former lawyers[11] in demurring to the
prosecution evidence after court leave was denied, the effect of
November 3, 1930
for
appellant.
STREET, J.:
This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Manila by the Culion Ice, Fish & Electric Co., Inc., for the
purpose of recovering from the Philippine Motors Corporation
the sum of P11,350, with interest and costs. Upon hearing the
cause the trial court gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff to
recover of the defendant the sum of P9,850, with interest at 6
per centum per annum from March 24,1927, the date of the
filing of the complaint, until satisfaction of the judgment, with
costs. From this judgment the defendant appealed.
The plaintiff and defendant are domestic corporations; and at
the time of the incident with which we are here concerned,
H.D. Cranston was the representative of the plaintiff in the City
of Manila. At the same time the plaintiff was the registered
owner of the motor schooner Gwendoline, which was used in
the fishing trade in the Philippine Islands. In January, 1925,
Cranston decided, if practicable, to have the engine on
the Gwendoline changed from a gasoline consumer to a crude
oil burner, expecting thereby to effect economy in the cost of
intended to spare the jewelry shop of the task but she did
not. Instead, petitioner was charged P400 for the job order
which was readily accepted. Thus, a perfected contract to reset
the pair of diamond earrings arose between the petitioner,
through Payag, and Dingdings Jewelry Shop, through Marilou.