ARTICLE VI THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

1. Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the

Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum.
a. Define legislative power
Basic concepts of the grant of legislative power:
1. it cannot pass irrepealable laws
2. principle of separation of powers
3. non-delegability of legislative powers
reason for principle that the legislature cannot pass irrepeablable laws
Separation of Powers
Read:
a. ANGARA VS. ELECTORAL COMMISSION, 63 Phil. 139
b. PLANAS VS. GIL, 67 Phil. 62
c. LUZON STEVEDORING VS. SSS, 34 SCRA 178
d. GARCIA VS. MACARAIG, 39 SCRA 106
e. Bondoc vs. HRET, Sept. 26, 1991
f. DEFENSOR SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106
b.

Nature of legislative power

c.

What are the limitations to the grant of legislative powers to the legislature?

d.

Explain the doctrine of non-delegation power.

e.

Permissive delegation of legislative power.

1) Sec. 23 (2) of Article VI (Emergency powers to the President in case

of war or other national emergency, for a limited period and subject to
such restrictions as Congress may provide, to exercise powers necessary
and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner
withdrawn by Resolution of Congress, such powers shall cease upon the
next adjournment thereof.
2) Sec. 28 (2) of Article VI. The Congress may by law, authorize the
President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations
and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the government.
Other exceptions: traditional
3.

Delegation to local governments

The reason behind this delegation is because the local government is deemed to
know better the needs of the people therein.
a.

See Section 5 of Article X

b.

Read:

aa. RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD, 39 Phil. 660

bb. PEOPLE VS. VERA, 65 Phil 56
A law delegating to the local government units the power to fund the salary of
probation officers in their area is unconstitutional for violation of the equal
protection of the laws. In areas where there is a probation officer because the
local government unit appropriated an amount for his salaries, convicts may avail
of probation while in places where no funds were set aside for probation officers,
convicts therein could not apply for probation.
a.

Reason for the delegation

4) Delegation of Rule-making power to administrative bodies

5) Delegation to the People (Section 2, Art. XVII of the Constitution and
Section 32, Article VIThe Congress shall, as early as possible, provide
for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom,
whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or
reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress of local
legislative body after the registration of a petition thereof signed by at
least 10% of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the registered
voters thereof.
f.
1)

Delegation of rule-making power to administrative bodies.

What is the completeness test? The sufficiency of standard test?

Read: 1.

PELAEZ VS. AUDITOR GENERAL, 15 SCRA 569

During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the
Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to
129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities.
The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:
Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed
except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.
Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same Section 3:
All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall come under the
provisions hereof.
Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected, a new barrio may
be created or the name of an existing one may be changed by the provincial
board of the province, upon recommendation of the council of the municipality or
municipalities in which the proposed barrio is stipulated. The recommendation of
the municipal council shall be embodied in a resolution approved by at least twothirds of the entire membership of the said council: Provided, however, That no
new barrio may be created if its population is less than five hundred persons.
Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became effective,
barrios may not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed
except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board upon petition

of a majority of the voters in the areas affected and the recommendation of the
council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is
situated. Petitioner argues, accordingly: If the President, under this new law,
cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of
several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?
Moreover, section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the
disputed executive orders are based, provides:
The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive order
define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality,
[township] municipal district, or other political subdivision, and increase or
diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or
more subprovinces, separate any political division other than a province, into
such portions as may be required, merge any of such subdivisions or portions
with another, name any new subdivision so created, and may change the seat of
government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare
may require: Provided, That the authorization of the (Philippine Legislature)
Congress of the Philippines shall first be obtained whenever the boundary of any
province or subprovince is to be defined or any province is to be divided into one
or more subprovinces. When action by the (Governor-General) President of the
Philippines in accordance herewith makes necessary a change of the territory
under the jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any judicial officer, the
(Governor-General) President of the Philippines, with the recommendation and
advice of the head of the Department having executive control of such officer,
shall redistrict the territory of the several officers affected and assign such
officers to the new districts so formed.
Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create municipalities under
this section does not amount to an undue delegation of legislative power, relying
upon Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binagonan (36 Phil. 547),
which, he claims, has settled it. Such claim is untenable, for said case involved,
not the creation of a new municipality, but a mere transfer of territory from an
already existing municipality (Cardona) to another municipality (Binagonan),
likewise, existing at the time of and prior to said transfer (See Govt of the P.I. ex
rel. Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality, of Binagonan [34 Phil. 518, 5195201) in consequence of the fixing and definition, pursuant to Act No. 1748, of
the common boundaries of two municipalities.
It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in
order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities,
may partake of an administrative nature involving, as it does, the adoption of
means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities the
authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature.
Although 1a Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the
power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a
law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers,
that said law:
(a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate and
(b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions.

Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect,

make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without
the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with
reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope
of his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not
only to make the law, but, also and this is worse to unmake it, by adopting
measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress,
thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our Republican
system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled
requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the
enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or
implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise
to avoid the evil effects above referred to. In this connection, we do not overlook
the fact that, under the last clause of the first sentence of Section 68, the
President:
may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such place
therein as the public welfare may require.
At any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as the case at bar is
concerned, even if we assumed that the phrase as the public welfare may
require, in said Section 68, qualifies all other clauses thereof. It is true that in
Calalang vs. Williams (70 Phil. 726) and People vs. Rosenthal (68 Phil. 328), this
Court had upheld public welfare and public interest, respectively, as sufficient
standards for a valid delegation of the authority to execute the law. But, the
doctrine laid down in these cases as all judicial pronouncements must be
construed in relation to the specific facts and issues involved therein, outside of
which they do not constitute precedents and have no binding effect. The law
construed in the Calalang case conferred upon the Director of Public Works, with
the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the power to
issue rules and regulations to promote safe transit upon national roads and
streets. Upon the other hand, the Rosenthal case referred to the authority of the
Insular Treasurer, under Act No. 2581, to issue and cancel certificates or permits
for the sale of speculative securities. Both cases involved grants to administrative
officers of powers related to the exercise of their administrative functions, calling
for the determination of questions of fact.
2
TUPAS VS. OPLE, 137 SCRA 108 (Most representative)
1.
US VS. ANG TANG HO, 43 Phil. 1
At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868,
entitled An Act penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in,
palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the
distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with the
consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations
therefor, and making an appropriation for this purpose, the material provisions of
which are as follows:
Section 1. The Governor-General is hereby authorized, whenever, for any cause,
conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or
corn, to issue and promulgate, with the consent of the Council of State,
temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purpose of this
Act, to wit:

(a) To prevent the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in, palay, rice or
corn.
August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at
which rice should be sold.
August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho,
charging him with the sale of rice at an excessive price as follows:
The undersigned accuses Ang Tang Ho of a violation of Executive Order No. 53 of
the Governor-General of the Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, in
relation with the provisions of sections 1, 2 and 4 of Act No. 2868, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 6th day of August, 1919, in the city of Manila, Philippine
Islands, the said Ang Tang Ho, voluntarily, illegally and criminally sold to Pedro
Trinidad, one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P.80), which is a price
greater than that fixed by Executive Order No. 53 of the Governor-General of the
Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, under the authority of section 1 of Act
No. 2868. Contrary to law.
Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five months
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500, from which he appealed to this court,
claiming that the lower court erred in finding Executive Order No. 53 of 1919, to
be of any force and effect, in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged,
and in imposing the sentence.
The official records show that the Act was to take effect on its approval; that it
was approved July 30, 1919; that the Governor-General issued his proclamation
on the 1st of August, 1919; and that the law was first published on the 13th of
August, 1919; and that the proclamation itself was first published on the 20th of
August, 1919.
The question here involves an analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, in so far
as it authorizes the Governor-General to fix the price at which rice should be sold.
It will be noted that section 1 authorizes the Governor-General, with the consent
of the Council of State, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the
price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and
emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act. By its very terms,
the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is left to the
discretion of the Governor-General. The Legislature does not undertake to specify
or define under what conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General shall
issue the proclamation, but says that it may be issued for any cause, and leaves
the question as to what is any cause to the discretion of the Governor-General.
The Act also says: For any cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary
rise in the price of palay, rice or corn. The Legislature does not specify or define
what is an extraordinary rise. That is also left to the discretion of the GovernorGeneral. The Act also says that the Governor-General, with the consent of the
Council of State, is authorized to issue and promulgate temporary rules and
emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of this Act. It does not
specify or define what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure, or how long
such temporary rules or emergency measures shall remain in force and effect, or
when they shall take effect. That is to say, the Legislature itself has not in any
manner specified or defined any basis for the order, but has left it to the sole
judgement and discretion of the Governor-General to say what is or what is not
a cause, and what is or what is not an extraordinary rise in the price of rice,
and as to what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure for the carrying out

the purposes of the Act. Under this state of facts, if the law is valid and the
Governor-General issues a proclamation fixing the minimum price at which rice
should be sold, any dealer who, with or without notice, sells rice at a higher price,
is a criminal. There may not have been any cause, and the price may not have
been extraordinary, and there may not have been an emergency, but, if the
Governor-General found the existence of such facts and issued a proclamation,
and rice is sold at any higher price, the seller commits a crime.
By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the Constitution of the United
States all powers are vested in the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary. It is the
duty of the Legislature to make the law; of the Executive to execute the law; and
of the Judiciary to construe the law. The Legislature has no authority to execute
or construe the law, the Executive has no authority to make or construe the law,
and the Judiciary has no power to make or execute the law. Subject to the
Constitution only, the power of each branch is supreme within its own jurisdiction,
and it is for the Judiciary only to say when any Act of the Legislature is or is not
constitutional. Assuming, without deciding, that the Legislature itself has the
power to fix the price at which rice is to be sold, can it delegate that power to
another, and, if so, was that power legally delegated by Act No. 2868? In other
words, does the Act delegate legislative power to the Governor-General? By the
Organic Law, all Legislative power is vested in the Legislature, and the power
conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to the
Governor-General, or any one else. The Legislature cannot delegate the
legislative power to enact any law. If Act no 2868 is a law unto itself and within
itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize the Governor-General to make
rules and regulations to carry the law into effect, then the Legislature itself
created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other
hand, if the Act within itself does not define crime, and is not a law, and some
legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of which
is vested in the Governor-General, then the Act is a delegation of legislative
power, is unconstitutional and void.
The act, in our judgment, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the
standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy
required to take the place of all others, without the determination of the
insurance commissioner in respect to maters involving the exercise of a
legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could
not possibly be put in use as an act in conformity to which all fire insurance
policies were required to be issued.
The result of all the cases on this subject is that a law must be complete, in all its
terms and provisions, when it leaves the legislative branch of the government,
and nothing must be left to the judgement of the electors or other appointee or
delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all
its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in futuro, if
necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
4. TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD, 151 SCRA 208
5. FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION, 108 SCRA 757 (Affecting
National interest)
6. PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ, December 18, 1989
Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained
only upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the
legislature in making the delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of
the delegated power. Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned,
respondent NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act must both be nonconfiscatory and must have been established in the manner prescribed by the
legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power

becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only

standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the
administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has
been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to
reasonableness, this standard may be implied.
It becomes important then to ascertain the nature of the power delegated to
respondent NTC and the manner required by the statute for the lawful exercise
thereof.
Pursuant to Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196, respondent NTC is empowered,
among others, to determine and prescribe rates pertinent to the operation of
public service communications which necessarily include the power to promulgate
rules and regulations in connection therewith. And, under Section 15(g) of
Executive Order No. 546, respondent NTC should be guided by the requirements
of public safety, public interest and reasonable feasibility of maintaining effective
competition of private entities in communications and broadcasting facilities.
Likewise, in Section 6(d) thereof, which provides for the creation of the Ministry
of Transportation and Communications with control and supervision over
respondent NTC, it is specifically provided that the national economic viability of
the entire network or components of the communications systems contemplated
therein should be maintained at reasonable rates.
II.
On another tack, petitioner submits that the questioned order violates
procedural due process because it was issued motu proprio, without notice to
petitioner and without the benefit of a hearing. Petitioner laments that said order
was based merely on an initial evaluation, which is a unilateral evaluation, but
had petitioner been given an opportunity to present its side before the order in
question was issued, the confiscatory nature of the rate reduction and the
consequent deterioration of the public service could have been shown and
demonstrated to respondents. Petitioner argues that the function involved in the
rate fixing-power of NTC is adjudicatory and hence quasi-judicial, not quasilegislative; thus, notice and hearing are necessary and the absence thereof
results in a violation of due process.
Respondents admit that the application of a policy like the fixing of rates as
exercised by administrative bodies is quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legislative:
that where the function of the administrative agency is legislative, notice and
hearing are not required, but where an order applies to a named person, as in
the instant case, the function involved is adjudicatory. Nonetheless, they insist
that under the facts obtaining the order in question need not be preceded by a
hearing, not because it was issued pursuant to respondent NTCs legislative
function but because the assailed order is merely interlocutory, it being an
incident in the ongoing proceedings on petitioners application for a certificate of
public convenience; and that petitioner is not the only primary source of data or
information since respondent is currently engaged in a continuing review of the
rates charged.
We find merit in petitioners contention.
In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission, we made a
categorical classification as to when the rate-filing power of administrative bodies
is quasi-judicial and when it is legislative, thus:
Moreover, although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates- when
such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind
throughout the Philippines-may partake of a legislative character, such is not the

nature of the order complained of. Indeed, the same applies exclusively to
petitioner herein. What is more, it is predicated upon the finding of fact-based
upon a report submitted by the General Auditing Office-that petitioner is making
a profit of more than 12% of its invested capital, which is denied by petitioner.
Obviously, the latter is entitled to cross-examine the maker of said report, and to
introduce evidence to disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or
complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusion drawn therefrom by the
respondent. In other words, in making said finding of fact, respondent performed
a function partaking of a quasi-judicial character, the valid exercise of which
demands previous notice and hearing.
This rule was further explained in the subsequent case of The Central Bank of
the Philippines vs. Cloribel, et al. to wit:
It is also clear from the authorities that where the function of the administrative
body is legislative, notice of hearing is not required by due process of law (See
Oppenheimer, Administrative Law, 2 Md. L.R. 185, 204, supra, where it is said: If
the nature of the administrative agency is essentially legislative, the
requirements of notice and hearing are not necessary. The validity of a rule of
future action which affects a group, if vested rights of liberty or property are not
involved, is not determined according to the same rules which apply in the case
of the direct application of a policy to a specific individual) It is said in 73 C.J.S.
Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure, sec. 130, pages 452 and 453: Aside
from statute, the necessity of notice and hearing in an administrative proceeding
depends on the character of the proceeding and the circumstances involved. In
so far as generalization is possible in view of the great variety of administrative
proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that notice and hearing are not
essential to the validity of administrative action where the administrative body
acts in the exercise of executive, administrative, or legislative functions; but
where a public administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and
its acts are particular and immediate rather than general and prospective, the
person whose rights or property may be affected by the action is entitled to
notice and hearing.
The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains
all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said
order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other. Further, it is premised on
a finding of fact, although patently superficial, that there is merit in a reduction of
some of the rates charged- based on an initial evaluation of petitioners financial
statements-without affording petitioner the benefit of an explanation as to what
particular aspect or aspects of the financial statements warranted a
corresponding rate reduction. No rationalization was offered nor were the
attending contingencies, if any, discussed, which prompted respondents to
impose as much as a fifteen percent (15%) rate reduction. It is not far-fetched to
assume that petitioner could be in a better position to rationalize its rates vis-avis the viability of its business requirements. The rates it charges result from an
exhaustive and detailed study it conducts of the multi-faceted intricacies
attendant to a public service undertaking of such nature and magnitude. We are,
therefore, inclined to lend greater credence to petitioners ratiocination that an
immediate reduction in its rates would adversely affect its operations and the
quality of its service to the public considering the maintenance requirements, the
projects it still has to undertake and the financial outlay involved. Notably,
petitioner was not even afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the inspector
who issued the report on which respondent NTC based its questioned order.

At any rate, there remains the categorical admission made by respondent NTC
that the questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It,
however, insists that notice and hearing are not necessary since the assailed
order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and, therefore, temporary in
nature. This postulate is bereft of merit.
g. May rules and regulations promulgated by administrative bodies/agencies
have the force of law? penal law? In order to be considered as one with the force
and effect of a penal law, what conditions must concur? See U.S. vs. GRIMMAUD,
220 U.S. 506 (1911) or the 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION a reviewer
Primer by FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, 1987 edition.
5. PEO. VS. ROSENTHAL, 68 Phil. 328
6. US VS. BARRIAS, 11 Phil. 327
7. VILLEGAS VS. HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO, 86 SCRA 270
h.

Delegation to the people. See Section 2(1) of Art. XVII.

i. Classify the membership of the legislative department. Differentiate their

qualifications, elections/selections and as to the participation of the Commission
on Appointments in order to validate their membership.
j.

Manner of election and selection

1) Read again TUPAS VS. OPLE, 137 SCRA 108

2.
Sections 2.
The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four
Senators who shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of the
Philippines, as may be provided for by law.
3.
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least
35 years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident
of the Philippines for not less than 2 years immediately preceding the
day of the election.
4.
Section 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years
and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the
30th day of June next following their election.
No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
Qualifications, term of office, etc., of a senator or member of the House of
Representatives.
2.
Sections 5. [1] The House of representatives shall be composed
of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall
be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number
of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations.
[2] The party-list representatives shall constitute 20% of the total
number of representatives including those under the party-list. For three
(3) consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, of the
seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by
law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,

indigenous cultural communities, women youth, and such other sectors,

as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
[3] Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. Each city with a population
of at least one hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative.
[4] Within 3 years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on
standards provided in this section
Section 6. No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives
unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of
the election, is at least 25 years of age, able to read and write, and
except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in
which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less
than 1 year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Read:
1.
ANTONIO BENGSON III VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL and TEODORO CRUZ, 357 SCRA 545
Rep. Act No. 2630
Sec. 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine Citizenship by rendering service
to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after
separation from the Armed Forces of the United states, acquired US
citizenship, MAY REACQUIRE PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY TAKING AN OATH OF
ALLEGIANCE TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND REGISTERING THE
SAME WITH THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRY IN THE PLACE WHERE HE RESIDES OR
LAST RESIDED IN THE PHILIPPINES. The said Oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship.
2.

Section 2, Article IV, 1987 Philippine Constitution

Section 2. Natural born citizens are those citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform an act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
Those who elect Philippine Citizenship in accordance with par. 3* , Section 1 shall
be deemed natural born citizens.
OCAMPO VS. HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and MARIO CRESPO, a.k.a.
MARK JIMENEZ, June 15, 2004
Who takes the place of the winning candidate as a Member of the House of
Representatives who was disqualified after he was proclaimed as such?
Facts:
The petitioner and Mark Jimenez were candidates for Congressman of the
6th District of manila for the May 14, 2001 elections. Mark Jimenez won over the
petitioner with 32,097 votes as against petitioners 31,329 votes.
3.
Petitioner filed an electoral protest before the HRET based on the
following grounds: 1] misreading of ballots; 2] falsification of election returns;
3]substitution of election returns; 4] use of marked, spurious fake and stray
ballots; and 5] presence of ballots written by one or two persons.
4.
On March 6, 2003, the HRET issued its Decision in the case of
ABANTE, ET AL. VS. MARI CRESPO, a.k.a. MARK JIMENEZ, et al., declaring Mark
Jimenez ineligible for the Office of Representative of Sixth District of Manila for

lack of residence in the District. Mark Jimenez filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which was denied.
As a result of said disqualification of Jimenez, the petitioner claimed that all the
votes cast for the former should not be counted and since he garnered the
second highest number of votes, he should be declared winner in the May 14,
2001 elections and be proclaimed the duly elected Congressman of the 6 th District
of manila.
Issues:
Are the votes of Mark Jimenez stray votes and should not be counted?
Whether the petitioner as second places should be proclaimed winner since the
winner was disqualified?
Held:
1.
There must be a final judgment disqualifying a candidate in order that
the votes of a disqualified candidate can be considered stray. This final
judgment must be rendered BEFORE THE ELECTION. This was the ruling in the
case of CODILLA VS. DE VENECIA. Hence, when a candidate has not been
disqualified by final judgment during the election day he was voted for, the votes
cast in his favor cannot be declared stray. To do so would amount to
disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides. The reason behind
this is that the people voted for him bona fide and in the honest belief that the
candidate was then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the
exercise of the powers of government.
2.
The subsequent disqualification of a candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes does not entitle the second placer to be declared the winner. The
said principle was laid down as early as 1912 and reiterated in the cases of LABO
VS. COMELEC, ABELLA VS. COMELEC and DOMINO VS. COMELEC.
Section 7. The members of the House of Representatives shall be elected
for a term of 3 years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by
law, at noon on the 30th day of June next following their election.
No member of the House of Representative shall serve for a period
of more than 3 consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the
Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall be held
on the second Monday of May.
a. On the manner of nomination and appointment
representatives to the Hose of Representatives.
Read: 1. Exec. Order No. 198, June 18, 1987
2.. DELES
VS.
APPOINTMENTS,

COMMISSION

of

Sectoral

ON
September 4, 1989

b. On gerrymandering
Read: CENIZA vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 763
4. Section 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of
Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such vacancy in the
manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of
representatives thus elected shall serve only the unexpired term.

Read: 1. LOZADA vs. COMELEC, 120 SCRA 337

COMELEC cannot call a special election (for the legislative districts whose
Congressmen resigned or died while in office) without a law passed by Congress
appropriating funds for the said purpose.
2. RA 6645-RE: Filling up of Congress Vacancy, December 28, 1987
5. Section 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall be determined by law. No increase in said compensation
shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of
the Senate and the House of representatives approving such increase.
a. How much is the present salary of the members of Congress? P204,000.00
[P17,000.00 per month] as per Section 17, Art. XVIII of the Constitution. The
Presidents salary is P300,000.00 per annum, while the VP, Speaker, Senate
President and Chief Justice is P240,000.00 per annum. The Chairman of the
Constitutional Commissions salary is P204,000.00 and the members,
P180,000.00 per annum.
b.

Read:

1.
Section 17, Article 18) (P300,000.00 for the President; P240,000.00
for VP, Senate President; Speaker; Chief Justice; P204,000.00 for Senators,
Representatives, Chairmen of CC; P180,000.00 for members of the Constitutional
Commissions)
2.
PHILCONSA VS. JIMENEZ, 15 SCRA 479;
3.
LIGOT VS. MATHAY, 56 SCRA 823
6. Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of representatives shall, in all
offenses punishable by not more than 6 years imprisonment, be privileged from
arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be
held liable in any other place for any debate in the Congress or in any committee
thereof.
a.

Privilege from arrest

Read:
b.

Martinez vs. Morfe, MARTINEZ VS. MORFE, 44 SCRA 22

Freedom of Speech and debate

Read:
1)

OSMENA VS. PENDATUN, 109 Phil. 863

2) JIMENEZ VS. CABANGBANG, 17 SCRA 876
7. Section 12. All members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives shall, upon assumption of office, make a full disclosure
of their financial and business interests. They shall notify the House
concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise from the filing
of a proposed legislation of which they are authors.
8. Section 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
may hold any other office or employment in the government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including governmentowned and controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term
without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office
which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased
during the term for which he was elected.
Read:

1)
ADAZA vs. PACANA, 135 SCRA 431
After taking his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa (Congress) , he is
deemed to have resigned his position as Governor of Negros Oriental because as
a legislator, he is not allowed to hold any other office in the government.
2)
PUNZALAN vs. MENDOZA, 140 SCRA 153
A provincial governor who took his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa
as appointed member for being a member of the Cabinet is allowed to return to
his former position as Governor if he resigns from the Batasan. This is so
because he was just an appointed member as distinguished from the Adaza
Case. (Note: It appears that an appointed member of the Batasan is placed in a
better position than the elected members)
3) Compare with Section 10, Art. VIII of the 1973 Constitution
9. Section 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before
the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial bodies and other administrative
bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in
any contract with, or any franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including any government owned or controlled corporation, or its
subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter
before any office of the government for his pecuniary benefit or where
he may be called upon to act on account of his office.
Read:
1)

VILLEGAS vs. LEGASPI, 113 SCRA 39

2)

PUYAT vs. DE GUZMAN, 113 SCRA 31

What could not be done directly could not likewise be done indirectly. So a
member of Congress who is a stockholder of the corporation involved in a case is
not allowed to appear under the guise that he is appearing as such, not as
counsel for the corporation.
10.
Sections 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the
4th Monday of July for its regular season, unless a different date is fixed
by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it
may determine until 30 days before the opening of its next regular
session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The
President may call a special session at any time.
Section 16. [1] The Senate shall elect its President and the House
of Representatives, its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective
members.
Each house shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary.
[2] A majority of each house shall constitute a quorum to do
business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may
compel the attendance of absent members in such manner, and under
such penalties, as such House may provide.
[3] Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish
its members for disorderly behavior, and with the concurrence of 2/3 of
all its members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension,
when imposed, shall mot exceed sixty days.
NOTE: In the cases of:

1.

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN; and

2.

REP. PAREDES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN,

-the Supreme Court held that a member of Congress may also be suspended by
the Sandiganbayan in accordance with Section 13 of RA 3019. This preventive
suspension applies to all public officials, including members of Congress.
Otherwise, the same will be considered class legislation if Senators and
Congressmen who commit the same is exempt from the preventive suspension
imposed therein.
Other than the foregoing, a member of Congress can be suspended by the
Congress itself.
[4] Each House shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time
publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national
security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one fifth
of the members present, be entered in the journal.
Each House shall also keep a record of its proceedings.
[Neither House during the sessions of the Congress, shall without the consent of
the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any place than that which the
2 Houses shall be sitting.
Read:
1) AVELINO vs. CUENCO, 83 Phil. 17, Read also the motion for reconsideration
dated March 14, 1949
2)

Disciplinary measures on erring members

Read: OSMENA vs. PENDATUN, 109 Phil. 863

3)

Dual purpose for keeping a journal

4)

Journal entry and enrolled bill theories; which is conclusive over the other?

Read:
U.S. vs. PONS, 34 Phil. 729
The journal prevails over extraneous evidence like accounts of newspaper
journalists and reporters as to what the proceedings all about.
b. MABANAG vs. LOPEZ VITO, 78 Phil. 1
CASCO PHIL. VS. GIMENEZ, 7 SCRA 347
The enrolled bill prevails over the journal. If the enrolled bill provides that it is
urea formaldehyde is the one exempt from tax, and not urea and formaldehyde
which appears in the journal which was really approved, the former prevails and
only CURATIVE LEGISLATION COULD CHANGE THE SAME, NOT JUDICIAL
LEGISLATION.
d. MORALES vs. SUBIDO, 27 Phil. 131
e. ASTORGA vs. VILLEGAS, 56 SCRA 714
(NOTE: The journal prevails over the enrolled bill on all matters required to be
entered in the journals, like yeas and nays on the final reading of a bill or on any
question at the request of 1/5 of the members present. )
5) Differentiate a regular from a special session.
11. Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all election

contests relating to election, returns, and qualifications of their

respective members. Each Electoral tribunal shall be composed of 9
members, 3 of whom shall be justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief justice, and the remaining six shall be members
of the Senate or House of Representatives as the case may be, who shall
be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The senior justice in the Electoral tribunal
shall be its Chairman.
See Sec. 2 (2) of Art. IX-C and last par. Sec. 4, Art. VII
Read:
1)

LAZATIN VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 80007, January 25, 1988

2) FIRDAUSI ABBAS, ET AL. VS. THE SENATE ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL,October 27, 1988
3)ENRILE VS. COMELEC & SANCHEZ; ENRILE VS. COMELEC & RAZUL AND
SANCHEZ VS. COMELEC, Aug. 12, 1987, 153 SCRA 57
4. BONDOC VS. HRET, supra
11.
Section 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments
consisting of the Senate President, as ex-oficio chairman, 12 senators
and 12 members of the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The chairman of the commission
shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The commission shall act on all
appointments submitted to it within 30 session days of the Congress
from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority of all the
members.
Read:
1.
RAUL DAZA VS. LUIS SINGSON, December 21, 1989
If the changes in the political party affiliations of the members of Congress is
substantial so as to dramatically decrease the membership of one party while
reducing the other, the number of representatives of the different parties in the
Commission on Appointments may also be changed in proportion to their actual
memberships. (NOTE: In Cunanan vs. Tan, the membership of the Senators was
only temporary so as not to result in the change of membership in the
Commission on Appointments)
2.
GUINGONA VS. GONZALES, October 20, 1992
Since 12 Senators are members of the Commission on Appointments, in addition
to the Senate President as the head thereof, every two (2) Senators are entitled
to one (1) representative in the Commission. Parties, however, are not allowed to
round off their members, I.e., 7 Senators are entitled to 3 representatives in
the Commission on Appointments, not 4 since 7/2 is only 3.5.
Further, there is nothing in the Constitution which requires that there
must be 24 members of the Commission. If the different parties do not coalesce,
then the possibility that the total number of Senators in the CA is less than 12 is
indeed a reality. (Example: Lakas13 Senators; LDP11 Senators. In this case,
Lakas is entitled to 6 members in the CA (13/2= 6.5) while LBP would have 5
members (11/2= 5.5)
3. GUINGONA S. GONZALES, March 1, 1993 (Resolution of the Motion for
Reconsideration of the October 20, 1992 Decision)
To be discussed later together with Sec. 16, Art. VII.

12-a. Section 19. The electoral tribunals and the Commission on

Appointments shall be constituted within 30 days after the Senate and
the House of Representatives shall have been organized with the election
of the President and the Speaker. The Commission on Appointments
shall meet only while the Congress is in session, at the call of its
Chairman or a majority of all its members, to discharge such powers and
functions as are herein conferred upon it.
13. Sec. 20. The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be
preserved and be open to the public in accordance with law, and such
books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit which shall publish
annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses incurred for
each member.
14. Section 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
Read:
1) ARNAULT vs. NAZARENO, 87 Phil. 29
A witness who refuses to answer a query by the Committee may be detained
during the term of the members imposing said penalty but the detention should
not be too long as to violate the witness right to due process of law.
Power of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation; question hour
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN DRILON, ET AL., VS. EXEC. SEC. EDUARDO ERMITA, ET AL.,
G.R. No. 16977, April 20, 2006
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The Facts:
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its
various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of
legislation which call for,inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of
the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in
Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued
invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on
September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway
project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National
Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). The public
hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging
the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of
the contract covering the North Rail Project.
The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued
invitations dated September 22, 2005 to the following officials of the AFP: the
Commanding General of the Philippine Army, Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon;
Inspector General of the AFP Vice Admiral Mateo M. Mayuga; Deputy Chief of
Staff for Intelligence of the AFP Rear Admiral Tirso R. Danga; Chief of the
Intelligence Service of the AFP Brig. Gen. Marlu Q. Quevedo; Assistant
Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Brig. Gen. Francisco V.
Gudani; and Assistant Commandant, Corps of Cadets of the PMA, Col. Alexander
F. Balutan, for them to attend as resource persons in a public hearing scheduled
on September 28, 2005 on the following: (1) Privilege Speech of Senator Aquilino
Q. Pimentel Jr., delivered on June 6, 2005 entitled Bunye has Provided Smoking
Gun or has Opened a Can of Worms that Show Massive Electoral Fraud in the

Presidential Election of May 2005; (2) Privilege Speech of Senator Jinggoy E.

Estrada delivered on July 26, 2005 entitled The Philippines as the Wire-Tapping
Capital of the World; (3) Privilege Speech of Senator Rodolfo Biazon delivered on
August 1, 2005 entitled Clear and Present Danger; (4) Senate Resolution No.
285 filed by Senator Maria Ana Consuelo Madrigal Resolution Directing the
Committee on National Defense and Security to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of
Legislation, and in the National Interest, on the Role of the Military in the Socalled Gloriagate Scandal; and (5) Senate Resolution No. 295 filed by Senator
Biazon Resolution Directing the Committee on National Defense and Security to
Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, on the Wire-Tapping of the President of
the Philippines.
Also invited to the above-said hearing scheduled on September 28 2005 was the
AFP Chief of Staff, General Generoso S. Senga who, by letter dated September
27, 2005, requested for its postponement due to a pressing operational situation
that demands [his] utmost personal attention while some of the invited AFP
officers are currently attending to other urgent operational matters.
On September 28, 2005, Senate President Franklin M. Drilon received from
Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita a letter[1] dated September 27, 2005
respectfully request[ing] for the postponement of the hearing [regarding the
NorthRail project] to which various officials of the Executive Department have
been invited in order to afford said officials ample time and opportunity to study
and prepare for the various issues so that they may better enlighten the Senate
Committee on its investigation.
Senate President Drilon, however, wrote[2] Executive Secretary Ermita that the
Senators are unable to accede to [his request] as it was sent belatedly and
[a]ll preparations and arrangements as well as notices to all resource persons
were completed [the previous] week.
Senate President Drilon likewise received on September 28, 2005 a letter from
the President of the North Luzon Railways Corporation Jose L. Cortes, Jr.
requesting that the hearing on the NorthRail project be postponed or cancelled
until a copy of the report of the UP Law Center on the contract agreements
relative to the project had been secured.
On September 28, 2005, the President of the Philippines issued E.O. 464,
Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the
Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials
Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and
For Other Purposes, which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect
immediately. The salient provisions of the Order are as follows:
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. In
accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the
Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal branches
of the government, all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the
government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before
either House of Congress.
When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President
so states in writing, the appearance shall only be conducted in executive session.
SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege.
(a) Nature and Scope. The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege
is fundamental to the operation of government and rooted in the separation of
powers under the Constitution (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May

1995). Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides that Public Officials and
Employees shall not use or divulge confidential or classified information officially
known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public to
prejudice the public interest.
Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between the
President and the public officers covered by this executive order, including:
1.
Conversations and correspondence between the President and the
public official covered by this executive order (Almonte vs. Vasquez G.R. No.
95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July
2002);
2.
Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the
interest of national security should not be divulged (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R.
No. 95367, 23 May 1995;Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998).
3.
Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion
of treaties and executive agreements (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on
Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);
4.
Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v. Presidential
Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);
5.
Matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez v. Public
Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002).
(b) Who are covered. The following are covered by this executive order:
1.
Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the
department heads are covered by the executive privilege;
2.
Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the
executive privilege;
3.
Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief
superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief
of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege;
4.
Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National
Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and
5.
Such other officers as may be determined by the President.
SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. All
public officials enumerated in Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure prior consent of
the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress to ensure the
observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on
executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in
inquiries in aid of legislation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A transparent government is one of the hallmarks of a truly republican state.
Even in the early history of republican thought, however, it has been recognized
that the head of government may keep certain information confidential in pursuit
of the public interest. Explaining the reason for vesting executive power in only
one magistrate, a distinguished delegate to the U.S. Constitutional Convention
said: Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the
proceedings of one man, in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of
any greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these
qualities will be diminished.
Considering that no member of the executive department would want to appear
in the above Senate investigations in aid of legislation by virtue of Proc. No. 464,
the petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the same unconstitutional
because the President abused her powers in issuing Executive Order No. 464.

I S S U E S:
1. Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress;
2. Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern; and
3. Whether respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they
implemented E.O. 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation.
H E L D:
Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of E.O. 464,
ascertainment of whether the requisites for a valid exercise of the Courts power
of judicial review are present is in order.
Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review
is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must
have standing to challenge the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise
stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4)
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.[3]
Invoking this Courts ruling in National Economic Protectionism Association v.
Ongpin[4] andValmonte v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office,[5] respondents
assert that to be considered a proper party, one must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain direct
injury due to the enforcement of E.O. 464.[6]
The Supreme Court, however, held that when suing as a citizen, the interest of
the petitioner in assailing the constitutionality of laws, presidential decrees,
orders, and other regulations, must be direct and personal. In Franciso v. House
of Representatives,[7] this Court held that when the proceeding involves the
assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the
requirement of personal interest.
I
The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of
Article VI of the Constitution which reads:
SECTION 21.
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected. (Underscoring supplied)
The 1935 Constitution did not contain a similar provision. Nonetheless,
in Arnault v. Nazareno,[8] a case decided in 1950 under that Constitution, the
Court already recognized that the power of inquiry is inherent in the power to
legislate.
Arnault involved a Senate investigation of the reportedly anomalous purchase of
the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the Rural Progress Administration.
Arnault, who was considered a leading witness in the controversy, was called to
testify thereon by the Senate. On account of his refusal to answer the questions
of the senators on an important point, he was, by resolution of the Senate,
detained for contempt. Upholding the Senates power to punish Arnault for
contempt, this Court held:

Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either

House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the
end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such
power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other
words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the
legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not
infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often
unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate
or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.
[9] . . . (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive
branch may be deduced from the same case. The power of inquiry, the Court
therein ruled, is co-extensive with the power to legislate.[10] The matters which
may be a proper subject of legislation and those which may be a proper subject
of investigation are one. It follows that the operation of government, being a
legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation.
Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive
branch, it would be incongruous to hold that the power of inquiry does not extend
to executive officials who are the most familiar with and informed on executive
operations.
As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, with process to enforce it, is
grounded on thenecessity of information in the legislative process. If the
information possessed by executive officials on the operation of their offices is
necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress
has the right to that information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof.
For one, as noted in Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,[11] the inquiry
itself might not properly be in aid of legislation, and thus beyond the
constitutional power of Congress. Such inquiry could not usurp judicial
functions. Parenthetically, one possible way for Congress to avoid such a result
as occurred in Bengzon is to indicate in its invitations to the public officials
concerned, or to any person for that matter, the possible needed statute which
prompted the need for the inquiry. Given such statement in its invitations, along
with the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to
and in furtherance thereof, there would be less room for speculation on the part
of the person invited on whether the inquiry is in aid of legislation.
Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes crucial safeguards that proscribe the
legislative power of inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be done in
accordance with the Senate or Houses duly published rules of procedure,
necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without
duly published rules of procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition
that obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights.
A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the
question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question
hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation.
Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each
other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress.
One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the

aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the
other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is
to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are
implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not
as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such
department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty.
In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states
that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry
in which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of legislation under
Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.
[12]
In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory
process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is
consistent with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission.
Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials
under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the
principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal
branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by
refusing to comply with its demands for information.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads
to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not
exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one
executive official may be exempted from this power the President on whom
executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through
the power of impeachment.
Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the
Constitution and the absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation,
must be construed as limited in its application to appearances of department
heads in the question hour is therefore CONSTITUTIONAL.
It is different insofar as Sections 2 and 3 are concerned. Section 3 of E.O. 464
requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent
of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The
enumeration is broad. It covers all senior officials of executive departments, all
officers of the AFP and the PNP, and all senior national security officials who, in
the judgment of the heads of offices designated in the same section(i.e.
department heads, Chief of Staff of the AFP, Chief of the PNP, and the National
Security Adviser), are covered by the executive privilege.
The enumeration also includes such other officers as may be determined by the
President. Given the title of Section 2 Nature, Scope and Coverage of
Executive Privilege , it is evident that under the rule of ejusdem generis, the
determination by the President under this provision is intended to be based on a
similar finding of coverage under executive privilege.
While there is no Philippine case that directly addresses the issue of whether
executive privilege may be invoked against Congress, it is gathered
from Chavez v. PEA that certain information in the possession of the executive
may validly be claimed as privileged even against Congress. Thus, the case
holds:
There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is
privileged information rooted in the separation of powers. The information does
not cover Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during

closed-door Cabinet meetings which,like internal-deliberations of the Supreme

Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either house of
Congress, are recognized as confidential. This kind of informationcannot be pried
open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas
and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested
parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those
tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. This is not the
situation in the instant case.[13](Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is
thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing
precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled
with an announcement that the President has not given her consent. It is
woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of
information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely
frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress.
In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated.
2
E.O 464 likewise violates the constitutional provision on the right to information
on matters of public concern. There are clear distinctions between the right of
Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a
citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does
not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by
Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to
exact testimony from government officials. These powers belong only to
Congress and not to an individual citizen.
To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in
public, however, any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of
information in such investigations necessarily deprives the people of information
which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of
public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to information which they
can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress
opinions which they can then communicate to their representatives and other
government officials through the various legal means allowed by their freedom of
expression. Thus holds Valmonte v. Belmonte
It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be
maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to
the peoples will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that
the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only
when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access
to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.[14] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of
E.O. 464 is, therefore, in the sense explained above, just as direct as its violation
of the legislatures power of inquiry.
3
The implementation of Proc. 464 before it was published in the Official
Gazette as illegal.
Due process thus requires that the people should have been
apprised of this issuance before it was implemented. This is clear from the
doctrine laid down in the case of TANADA VS. TUVERA.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED.

Sections 2(b) and 3 of
Executive Order No. 464 (series of 2005), Ensuring Observance of the Principle
of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and
Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid
of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes, are declared
VOID.
Bengzon, Jr. vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, Nov. 20, 1991
This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or injunctive relief, to enjoin the respondent Senate Blue
Ribbon committee from requiring the petitioners to testify and produce evidence
at its inquiry into the alleged sale of the equity of Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez
to the Lopa Group in thirty-six (36) or thirty-nine (39) corporations.
Coming to the specific issues raised in this case, petitioners contend that (1) the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committees inquiry has no valid legislative purpose, i.e., it is
not done in aid of legislation; (2) the sale or disposition of hte Romualdez
corporations is a purely private transaction which is beyond the power of the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to inquire into; and (3) the inquiry violates their
right to due process.
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 1Thus, Section 21, Article VI
thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committee
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
not, therefore, absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the aforequoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation
must be in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure and that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected. It follows then that the rights of persons under the
Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the right
not to be compelled to testify against ones self.
The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations in specifically provided for
in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination of
any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of
future legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters vested by the
Constitution in Congress and/or in the Seante alone.
As held in Jean L. Arnault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al., 16 the inquiry, to be within
the jurisdiction of the legislative body making it, must be material or necessary to
the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate or to
expel a member.
Under Sec. 4 of the aforementioned Rules, the Senate may refer to any
committee or committees any speech or resolution filed by any Senator which in
its judgment requires an appropriate inquiry in aid of legislation. In order
therefore to ascertain the character or nature of an inquiry, resort must be had to
the speech or resolution under which such an inquiry is proposed to be made.

A perusal of the speech of Senator Enrile reveals that he (Senator Enrile) made a
statement which was published in various newspapers on 2 September 1988
accusing Mr. Ricardo Baby Lopa of having taken over the FMMC Group of
Companies. As a consequence thereof, Mr. Lopa wrote a letter to Senator Enrile
on 4 September 1988 categorically denying that he had taken over the FMMC
Group of Companies; that former PCGG Chairman Ramon Diaz himself
categorically stated in a telecast interview by Mr. Luis Beltran on Channel 7 on 31
August 1988 that there has been no takeover by him (Lopa); and that theses
repeated allegations of a takeover on his (Lopas) part of FMMC are baseless as
they are malicious.
The Lopa reply prompted Senator Enrile, during the session of the Senate on 13
September 1988, to avail of the privilege hour, 17 so that he could repond to the
said Lopa letter, and also to vindicate his reputation as a Member of the Senate of
the Philippines, considering the claim of Mr. Lopa that his (Enriles) charges that
he (Lopa) had taken over the FMMC Group of Companies are baseless and
malicious. Thus, in his speech, 18 Senator Enrile said, among others, as
follows:
It appeals, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is
not really in aid of legislation because it is not related to a purpose within the
jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether
or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 RA
No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a matter that appears more
within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court
may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this
case. In John T. Watkins vs. United States, 20 it was held :
The power of congress to conduct investigations in inherent in the legislative
process. That power is broad. it encompasses inquiries concerning the
administration of existing laws as well as proposed, or possibly needed statutes.
It includes surveys of defects in our social, economic, or political system for the
purpose of enabling Congress to remedy them. It comprehends probes into
departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or
waste. But broad as is this power of inquiry, it is not unlimited. There is no
general authority to expose the private affairs of individuals without justification
in terms of the functions of congress. This was freely conceded by Solicitor
General in his argument in this case. Nor is the Congress a law enforcement or
trial agency. These are functions of the executive and judicial departments of
government. No inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to and in
furtherance of a legitimate task of Congress. Investigations conducted solely for
the personal aggrandizement of the investigators or to punish those
investigated are indefensible. (emphasis supplied)
Broad as it is, the power is not, however, without limitations. Since
congress may only investigate into those areas in which it may
potentially legislate or appropriate, it cannot inquire into matters which
are within the exclusive province of one of the other branches of the
government. Lacking the judicial power given to the Judiciary, it cannot
inquire into mattes that are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary.
Neither can it supplant the Executive in what exclusively belongs to the
Executive.
Moreover, this right of the accused is extended to respondents in administrative
investigations but only if they partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding or
analogous to a criminal proceeding. In Galman vs. Pamaran, 26 the Court
reiterated the doctrine in Cabal vs. Kapuanan (6 SCRA 1059) to illustrate the

right of witnesses to invoke the right against self-incrimination not only in

criminal proceedings but also in all other types of suit
We do not here modify these doctrines. If we presently rule that petitioners may
not be compelled by the respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce
evidence before it, it is only because we hold that the questioned inquiry is not in
aid of legislation and, if pursued, would be violative of the principle of separation
of powers between the legislative and the judicial departments of government,
ordained by the Constitution.
Investigation in aid of legislation; Executive Privilege
ROMULO L. NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF
PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON
TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL
DEFENSE AND SECURITY, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. (En Banc)
THE FACTS:
On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)
entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for
the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN)
Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos).
The Project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China. In connection
with this NBN Project, various Resolutions were introduced in the Senat
At the same time, the investigation was claimed to be relevant to the
consideration of three (3) pending bills in the Senate.
Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending invitations to
certain personalities and cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project.
Petitioner was among those invited. He was summoned to appear and testify on
September 18, 20, and 26 and October 25, 2007. However, he attended only
the September 26 hearing, claiming he was out of town during the other dates.
In the September 18, 2007 hearing, businessman Jose de Venecia III testified
that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence
to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. It appeared that the
Project was initially approved as a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) project but, on
March 29, 2007, the NEDA acquiesced to convert it into a government-togovernment project, to be financed through a loan from the Chinese
Government.
On September 26, 2007, petitioner testified before respondent Committees for
eleven (11) hours. He disclosed that then Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval
of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about
the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project,
petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he
refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed
up the NBN Project,[15][6] (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, [16][7]
and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. [17][8]
Unrelenting, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to
petitioner, requiring him to appear and testify on November 20, 2007.
However, in the Letter dated November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo R.
Ermita requested respondent Committees to dispense with petitioners testimony
on the ground of executive privilege. The pertinent portion of the letter reads:

With reference to the subpoena ad testificandum issued to Secretary Romulo Neri

to appear and testify again on 20 November 2007 before the Joint Committees
you chair, it will be recalled that Sec. Neri had already testified and exhaustively
discussed the ZTE / NBN project, including his conversation with the President
thereon last 26 September 2007.
Asked to elaborate further on his conversation with the President, Sec. Neri asked
for time to consult with his superiors in line with the ruling of the Supreme Court
in Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006).
Specifically, Sec. Neri sought guidance on the possible invocation of executive
privilege on the following questions, to wit:
a)
Whether the President followed up the (NBN) project?
b)
Were you dictated to prioritize the ZTE?
c)
Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project
after being told about the alleged bribe?
Following the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, the foregoing questions fall under
conversations and correspondence between the President and public officials
which are considered executive privilege (Almonte v. Vasquez, G.R. 95637, 23
May 1995; Chavez v. PEA, G.R. 133250, July 9, 2002).
The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information
sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations
with the Peoples Republic of China.
In light of the above considerations, this Office is constrained to invoke the
settled doctrine of executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has
advised Secretary Neri accordingly.
On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before respondent
Committees. Thus, on November 22, 2007, the latter issued the show
cause Letter requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in contempt.
The Letter reads:
Since you have failed to appear in the said hearing, the Committees on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon), Trade and
Commerce and National Defense and Security require you to show cause why you
should not be cited in contempt under Section 6, Article 6 of the Rules of the
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon).
The Senate expects your explanation on or before 2 December 2007.
On November 29, 2007, petitioner replied to respondent Committees,
manifesting that it was not his intention to ignore the Senate hearing and that he
thought the only remaining questions were those he claimed to be covered by
executive privilege, thus:
It was not my intention to snub the last Senate hearing. In fact, I have
cooperated with the task of the Senate in its inquiry in aid of legislation as shown
by my almost 11 hours stay during the hearing on 26 September 2007. During
said hearing, I answered all the questions that were asked of me, save for those
which I thought was covered by executive privilege, and which was confirmed by
the Executive Secretary in his Letter 15 November 2007. In good faith, after that
exhaustive testimony, I thought that what remained were only the three
questions, where the Executive Secretary claimed executive privilege. Hence, his
request that my presence be dispensed with.
In addition, petitioner submitted a letter prepared by his counsel, Atty. Antonio R.
Bautista, stating, among others that: (1) his (petitioner) non-appearance
was upon the order of the President; and (2) his conversation with President

Arroyo dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and diplomatic matters
relating to the impact of the bribery scandal involving high government officials
and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the
Philippines. The letter ended with a reiteration of petitioners request that he be
furnished in advance as to what else he needs to clarify so that he may
adequately prepare for the hearing.
On December 7, 2007, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition
for certiorariassailing the show cause Letter dated November 22, 2007.
Respondent Committees found petitioners explanations unsatisfactory. Without
responding to his request for advance notice of the matters that he should still
clarify, they issued theOrder dated January 30, 2008, citing him in contempt of
respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the
Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he would appear and give his
testimony. The said Order states:
ORDER
For failure to appear and testify in the Committees hearing on Tuesday,
September 18, 2007; Thursday, September 20, 2007; Thursday, October 25,
2007; and Tuesday, November 20, 2007, despite personal notice and Subpoenas
Ad Testificandum sent to and received by him, which thereby delays, impedes
and obstructs, as it has in fact delayed, impeded and obstructed the inquiry into
the subject reported irregularities, AND for failure to explain satisfactorily why he
should not be cited for contempt (Neri letter of 29 November 2007), herein
attached)ROMULO L. NERI is hereby cited in contempt of this (sic)
Committees and ordered arrested and detained in the Office of the
Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he will appear and give his
testimony.
The Sergeant-At-Arms is hereby directed to carry out and implement this Order
and make a return hereof within twenty four (24) hours from its enforcement.
On the same date, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the above Order.[18]
[9]
He insisted that he has not shown any contemptible conduct worthy of
contempt and arrest. He emphasized his willingness to testify on new matters,
however, respondent Committees did not respond to his request for advance
notice of questions. He also mentioned the petition for certiorari he filed on
December 7, 2007. According to him, this should restrain respondent Committees
from enforcing the show cause Letter through the issuance of declaration of
contempt and arrest.
In view of respondent Committees issuance of the contempt Order, petitioner
filed on February 1, 2008 a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (With Urgent
Application
for
TRO/Preliminary
Injunction), seeking
to
restrain
the
implementation of the said contemptOrder.
On
February
5,
2008,
the
Court
issued
a Status
Quo
Ante
Order
(a) enjoining
respondent
Committees
from
implementing
their contempt Order, (b) requiring the parties to observe the status
quo prevailing prior
to the issuance of the assailed order, and (c) requiring
respondent Committees to file their comment.
Petitioner contends that respondent Committees show cause Letter and
contempt Order were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. He stresses that his conversations with President
Arroyo are candid discussions meant to explore options in making policy
decisions. According to him, these discussions dwelt on the impact of the
bribery scandal involving high government officials on the countrys
diplomatic relations and economic and military affairs and the possible
loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines. He
also emphasizes that his claim of executive privilege is upon the order of the

President and within the parameters laid down inSenate v. Ermita[19]

[10]
and United States v. Reynolds.[20][11] Lastly, he argues that he is precluded
from disclosing communications made to him in official confidence under
Section 7[21][12] of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, and Section 24[22][13] (e)
of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Respondent
Committees
assert
the
contrary.
They
argue
that
(1) petitioners testimony is material and pertinent in the
investigation conducted in aid of legislation; (2)there is no valid justification for
petitioner to claim executive privilege; (3) there is no abuse of their authority to
order petitioners arrest; and (4) petitioner has not come to court with clean
hands.
I S S U E S:
1.
What communications between the President and petitioner Neri are
covered by the principle of executive privilege?
1.a Did Executive Secretary Ermita correctly invoke the principle of executive
privilege, by order of the President, to cover
(i) conversations of
the President in the exercise of her executive and policy decision-making
and (ii) information, which might impair our diplomatic as well as economic
relations with the Peoples Republic of China?
1.b. Did petitioner Neri correctly invoke executive privilege to avoid testifying on
his conversations with the President on the NBN contract on his assertions that
the said conversations dealt with delicate and sensitive national security
and diplomatic matters relating to the impact of bribery scandal
involving high government officials and the possible loss of confidence of
foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines x x x within the principles
laid down in Senate v. Ermita (488 SCRA 1 [2006])?
1.c Will the claim of executive privilege in this case violate the following
provisions of the Constitution:
Sec. 28, Art. II (Full public disclosure of all transactions involving
public
interest)
Sec. 7, Art. III (The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern
Sec. 1, Art. XI (Public office is a public trust)
Sec. 17, Art. VII (The President shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed)
and the due process clause and the principle of separation of powers?
2.
What is the proper procedure to be followed in invoking executive
privilege?
3.
Did the Senate Committees gravely abuse their discretion in ordering
the arrest of petitioner for non-compliance with the subpoena?
H E L D:
At the core of this controversy are the two (2) crucial queries, to wit:
First, are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered
by executive privilege?
And second, did respondent Committees commit grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the contempt Order?
There is merit in the petition.
At the outset, a glimpse at the landmark case of Senate v. Ermita[23][18] becomes
imperative. Senate draws
in
bold
strokes
the
distinction
between

the legislative andoversight powers of the Congress, as embodied under

Sections 21 and 22, respectively, of Article VI of the Constitution, to wit:
SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
SECTION 22. The heads of department may upon their own initiative, with the
consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, or as the rules of
each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any
matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to
the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at
least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be
limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the
security of the state or the public interest so requires and the President so states
in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
Senate cautions that while the above provisions are closely related and
complementary to each other, they should not be considered as pertaining to the
same power of Congress. Section 21 relates to the power to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation. Its aim is to elicit information that may be used for
legislation. On the other hand, Section 22 pertains to the power to conduct a
question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of
Congress oversight function.[24][19] Simply stated, while both powers allow
Congress or any of its committees to conduct inquiry, their objectives are
different.
This distinction gives birth to another distinction with regard to the use of
compulsory process. Unlike in Section 21, Congress cannot compel the
appearance of executive officials under Section 22. The Courts pronouncement
in Senate v. Ermita[25][20] is clear:
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are
implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not
as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such
department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In
such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that
Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in
which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of legislation under Section
21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.
I
The Communications Elicited by the Three (3) Questions are Covered by
Executive Privilege
We start with the basic premises where the parties have conceded.
The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is broad. This is
based on the proposition that a legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change. [26][21] Inevitably, adjunct thereto is the
compulsory process to enforce it. But, the power, broad as it is, has limitations.
To be valid, it is imperative that it is done in accordance with the Senate or House
duly published rules of procedure and that the rights of the persons appearing in
or affected by such inquiries be respected.
The power extends even to executive officials and the only way for them to be
exempted is through a valid claim of executive privilege. [27][22] This directs us to
the consideration of the question is there a recognized claim of executive
privilege despite the revocation of E.O. 464?
AThere is a Recognized Claim
of Executive Privilege Despite the

Revocation of E.O. 464

At this juncture, it must be stressed that the revocation of E.O. 464 does not in
any way diminish our concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept
has Constitutional underpinnings. Unlike the United States which has further
accorded the concept with statutory status by enacting the Freedom of
Information Act[28][23] and the Federal Advisory Committee Act, [29][24] the
Philippines has retained its constitutional origination, occasionally interpreted only
by this Court in various cases. The most recent of these is the case of Senate v.
Ermita where this Court declared unconstitutional substantial portions of E.O.
464. In this regard, it is worthy to note that Executive Ermitas Letter dated
November 15, 2007 limits its bases for the claim of executive privilege to Senate
v. Ermita, Almonte v. Vasquez,[30][25] and Chavez v. PEA.[31][26] There was never
a mention of E.O. 464.
While these cases, especially Senate v. Ermita,[32][27] have comprehensively
discussed the concept of executive privilege, we deem it imperative to explore it
once more in view of the clamor for this Court to clearly define the
communications covered by executive privilege.
The Nixon and post-Watergate cases established the broad contours of
the presidential communications privilege.[33][28] In United States v. Nixon,
[34][29]
the U.S. Court recognized a great public interest in preserving the
confidentiality of conversations that take place in the Presidents
performance of his official duties. It thus considered presidential
communications as presumptively privileged. Apparently, the presumption is
founded on the Presidents generalized interest in confidentiality. The
privilege is said to be necessary to guarantee the candor of presidential advisors
and to provide the President and
those who assist him with
freedom to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and
making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to
express except privately.
In In Re: Sealed Case,[35][30] the U.S. Court of Appeals delved deeper. It ruled
that there are two (2) kinds of executive privilege; one is the presidential
communications privilege and, the other is the deliberative process
privilege. The former pertains to communications, documents or other
materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations and
that the President believes should remain confidential. The latter
includes advisory
opinions,
recommendations
and
deliberations
comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and
policies are formulated.
Accordingly, they are characterized by marked distinctions. Presidential
communications
privilege applies
to decision-making
of
the
President while, the deliberative process privilege, to decision-making of
executive officials.
The first is rooted in the constitutional principle of
separation of power and the Presidents unique constitutional role;
the second on common law privilege. Unlike the deliberative process
privilege, thepresidential communications privilege applies to documents
in their entirety, and covers final and post-decisional materials as well as
pre-deliberative ones[36][31] As a consequence, congressional or judicial
negation of the presidential communications privilege is always subject to
greater scrutiny than denial of the deliberative process privilege.
Turning on who are the officials covered by the presidential communications
privilege, In Re: Sealed Case confines the privilege only to White House Staff
that has operational proximity to direct presidential decision-making. Thus, the
privilege is meant to encompass only those functions that form the core of
presidential authority, involving what the court characterized as quintessential
and non-delegable Presidential power, such as commander-in-chief power,
appointment and removal power, the power to grant pardons and reprieves, the

sole-authority to receive ambassadors and other public officers, the power to

negotiate treaties, etc.[37][32]
Majority of the above jurisprudence have found their way in our jurisdiction.
In Chavez v. PCGG[38][38], this Court held that there is a governmental privilege
against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military,
diplomatic and other security matters. InChavez v. PEA,[39][39] there is also a
recognition of the confidentiality of Presidential conversations, correspondences,
and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings. In Senate v. Ermita, the
concept of presidential communications privilege is fully discussed.
As may be gleaned from the above discussion, the claim of executive privilege is
highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power
textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of
military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the
repository of the commander-in-chief,[40][40] appointing,[41][41] pardoning,[42][42] and
diplomatic[43][43] powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers,
the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than
others.
The above cases, especially, Nixon, In Re Sealed Case and Judicial
Watch, somehow provide the elements of presidential communications
privilege, to wit:
1)
The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and nondelegable presidential power.
2)
The communication must be authored or solicited and received by
a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that
an advisor must be in operational proximity with the President.
3)
The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified
privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the
information sought likely contains important evidence and by the unavailability
of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.[44][44]
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive
privilege on the ground that the communications elicited by the three (3)
questions fall under conversation and correspondence between the President
and public officials necessary in her executive and policy decision-making
process and, that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China.
Simply put, the bases are presidential communications privilege and
executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications
elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential
communications
privilege. First,
the
communications
relate
to
a
quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the power to enter
into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President
to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature
has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. [45][45] Second, the
communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the
operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a
member of President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing
of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
The third element deserves a lengthy discussion.
United States v. Nixon held that a claim of executive privilege is subject
to balancing against other interest. In other words, confidentiality in

executive privilege is not absolutelyprotected by the Constitution. The U.S.

Court held:
[N]either the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of
high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified
Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances.
The foregoing is consistent with the earlier case of Nixon v. Sirica,[46][46] where it
was held that presidential communications are presumptively privileged and
that the presumption can be overcome only by mere showing of public need by
the branch seeking access to conversations. The courts are enjoined to resolve
the competing interests of the political branches of the government in the
manner that preserves the essential functions of each Branch.[47][47] Here, the
record is bereft of any categorical explanation from respondent Committees to
show a compelling or citical need for the answers to the three (3) questions
in the enactment of a law. Instead, the questions veer more towards the
exercise of the legislative oversight function under Section 22 of Article VI rather
than Section 21 of the same Article. Senate v. Ermita ruled that the the
oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory
process only to the
extent that it is performed in pursuit of
legislation. It is conceded that it is difficult to draw the line between an
inquiry in aid of legislation and an inquiry in the exercise of oversight function of
Congress. In this regard, much will depend on the content of the questions and
the manner the inquiry is conducted.
Respondent Committees argue that a claim of executive privilege does not guard
against a possible disclosure of a crime or wrongdoing. We see no dispute on
this. It is settled inUnited States v. Nixon[48][48] that demonstrated, specific
need for evidence in pending criminal trial outweighs the Presidents
generalized interest in confidentiality. However, the present cases distinction
with the Nixon case is very evident. In Nixon, there is a pending criminal
proceeding where the information is requested and it is the demands of due
process of law and the fair administration of
criminal justice that the
information be disclosed. This is the reason why the U.S. Court was quick to
limit the scope of its decision. It stressed that it is not concerned here
with the balance between the Presidents generalized interest in
confidentiality
x
x
x
and
congressional
demands
for
information. Unlike in Nixon, the information here is elicited, not in a criminal
proceeding, but in a legislative inquiry. In this regard, Senate v. Ermita stressed
that the validity of the claim of executive privilege depends not only on the
ground invoked but, also, on theprocedural setting or the context in which the
claim is made. Furthermore, in Nixon, the President did not interpose any claim
of need to protect military, diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets. In
the present case, Executive Secretary Ermita categorically claims executive
privilege on the grounds of presidential communications privilege in relation
to her executive and policy decision-making process and diplomatic secrets.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioners claim of
executive privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people
to information on matters of public concern. [49][50] We might have agreed with
such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner
made himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was
questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his
willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only
of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation.
Section 7 of Article III provides:

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be

recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining
to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data
used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.
The provision itself expressly provides the limitation, i.e. as
may be
provided by law. Some of these laws are Section 7
of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 6713,[50][51] Article 229[51][52] of the
Revised
[52][53]
Penal
Code,
Section
3
(k)
of
R.A.
No.
3019,
[53][54]
and
Section 24(e)
of Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court. These are in addition to what our body of jurisprudence classifies as
confidential[54][55] and what our Constitution considers as belonging to the larger
concept of executive privilege. Clearly, there is a recognized public interest in the
confidentiality of certain information. We find the information subject of this case
belonging to such kind.
More than anything else, though, the right of Congress or any of its Committees
to obtain information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the peoples
right to public information. The former cannot claim that every legislative
inquiry is an exercise of the peoples right to information. The distinction between
such rights is laid down in Senate v. Ermita:
There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to
information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of people to
information on matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the
production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the
same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither
does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from
government officials. These powers belong only to Congress, not to an individual
citizen.
Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the
people, it does not follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in
every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are exercising their
right to information.
The members of respondent Committees should not invoke as justification in
their exercise of power a right properly belonging to the people in general. This is
because when they discharge their power, they do so as public officials and
members of Congress. Be that as it may, the right to information must be
balanced with and should give way, in appropriate cases, to constitutional
precepts particularly those pertaining to delicate interplay of executive-legislative
powers and privileges which is the subject of careful review by numerous decided
cases.
BThe Claim of Executive Privilege is Properly Invoked
We now proceed to the issue whether the claim is properly invoked by
the President.Jurisprudence teaches that for the claim to be properly invoked,
there must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department
which has control over the matter.[55][56]A formal and proper claim of executive
privilege requires a precise and certain reason for preserving their
confidentiality.[56][57]
The Letter dated November 17, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita satisfies the
requirement. It serves as the formal claim of privilege. There, he expressly
states that this Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of
executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised
Secretary Neri accordingly. Obviously, he is referring to the Office of the
President. That is more than enough compliance. In Senate v. Ermita, a less
categorical letter was even adjudged to be sufficient.

With regard to the existence of precise and certain reason, we find the
grounds relied upon by Executive Secretary Ermita specific enough so as not to
leave respondent Committees in the dark on how the requested information could
be classified as privileged. The case of Senate v. Ermita only requires that an
allegation be made whether the information demanded involves military or
diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc. The particular ground
must only be specified. The enumeration is not even intended to be
comprehensive.[57][58]
The following statement of grounds satisfies the
requirement:
The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information
sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations
with the Peoples Republic of China. Given the confidential nature in which these
information were conveyed to the President, he cannot provide the Committee
any further details of these conversations, without disclosing the very thing the
privilege is designed to protect.
At any rate, as held further in Senate v. Ermita, [58][59] the Congress must not
require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as
to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect.
This is a matter of respect to a coordinate and co-equal department.
II
Respondent Committees Committed Grave Abuse of Discretion in Issuing
the Contempt Order
It must be reiterated that when respondent Committees issued the show
cause Letter dated November 22, 2007, petitioner replied immediately,
manifesting that it was not his intention to ignore the Senate hearing and that
he thought the only remaining questions were the three (3) questions he claimed
to be covered by executive privilege. In addition thereto, he submitted Atty.
Bautistas letter, stating that his non-appearance was upon the order of the
President and specifying the reasons why his conversations with President Arroyo
are covered by executive privilege. Both correspondences include an
expression of his willingness to testify again, provided he be furnished
in advance copies of the questions. Without responding to his request for
advance list of questions, respondent Committees issued theOrder dated January
30, 2008, citing him in contempt of respondent Committees and ordering his
arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until such time
that he would appear and give his testimony. Thereupon, petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration, informing respondent Committees that he had filed
the present petition forcertiorari.
Respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
contempt Orderin view of five (5) reasons:
First, there being a legitimate claim of executive privilege, the issuance of the
contempt Order suffers from constitutional infirmity.
Second, respondent Committees did not comply with the requirement laid down
in Senate v. Ermita that the invitations should contain the possible needed
statute which prompted the need for the inquiry, along with the usual
indication of the subject of inquiry and thequestions relative to and in
furtherance thereof.
Compliance with this requirement is imperative, both
under Sections 21 and 22 of Article VI of the Constitution. This must be so to
ensure that the rights of both persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiry are respected as mandated by said Section 21 and by virtue of the
express language of Section 22. Unfortunately, despite petitioners repeated
demands, respondent Committees did not send him an advance list of questions.
Third, a reading of the transcript of respondent Committees January 30, 2008
proceeding reveals that only a minority of the members of the Senate Blue

Ribbon Committee was present during the deliberation. [59][61] Section 18 of

the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provides that:
The Committee, by a vote of majority of all its members, may punish for
contempt any witness before it who disobeys any order of the Committee or
refuses to be sworn or to testify or to answer proper questions by the Committee
or any of its members.
Clearly, the needed vote is a majority of all the members of the
Committee. Apparently, members who did not actually participate in the
deliberation were made to sign the contempt Order. Thus, there is a cloud of
doubt as to the validity of the contempt Order dated January 30, 2008.
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent
Committees likewise violated Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution,
requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the duly published rules of
procedure. We quote the OSGs explanation:
The phrase duly published rules of procedure requires the Senate of every
Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation
because every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it. Since
Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the Senates
membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each
term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not
having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of
legislation conducted by the 14 th Senate, are therefore, procedurally
infirm.
And fifth, respondent Committees issuance of the contempt Order is arbitrary
and precipitate. It must be pointed out that respondent Committees did
not first pass upon the claim of executive privilege and inform petitioner of their
ruling. Instead, they curtly dismissed his explanation as unsatisfactory and
simultaneously issued the Order citing him in contempt and ordering his
immediate arrest and detention.
A fact worth highlighting is that petitioner is not an unwilling witness. He
manifested several times his readiness to testify before respondent Committees.
He refused to answer the three (3) questions because he was ordered by the
President to claim executive privilege. It behooves respondent Committees to
first rule on the claim of executive privilege and inform petitioner of their finding
thereon, instead of peremptorily dismissing his explanation as unsatisfactory.
Undoubtedly, respondent Committees actions constitute grave abuse of
discretion for being arbitrary and for denying petitioner due process of law.
The same quality afflicted their conduct when they (a) disregarded petitioners
motion for reconsideration alleging that he had filed the present petition before
this Court and (b)ignored petitioners repeated request for an advance list of
questions, if there be any aside from the three (3) questions as to which he
claimed to be covered by executive privilege.
Even the courts are repeatedly advised to exercise the power of contempt
judiciously and sparingly with utmost self-restraint with the end in view of
utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, not
for retaliation or vindication. [60][63] Respondent Committees should have exercised
the same restraint, after all petitioner is not even an ordinary witness. He holds a
high position in a co-equal branch of government.
In this regard, it is important to mention that many incidents of judicial review
could have been avoided if powers are discharged with circumspection and
deference. Concomitant with the doctrine of separation of powers is the mandate
to observe respect to a co-equal branch of the government.
In this present crusade to search for truth, we should turn to the
fundamental constitutional principles which underlie our tripartite system of

government, where the Legislature enacts the law, the Judiciary interprets it
and the Executive implements it. They are considered separate, co-equal,
coordinate and supreme within their respective spheres but, imbued with a
system of checks and balances to prevent unwarranted exercise of power. The
Courts mandate is to preserve these constitutional principles at all times to
keep the political branches of government within constitutional bounds in the
exercise of their respective powers and prerogatives, even if it be in the search
for truth. This is the only way we can preserve the stability of our democratic
institutions and uphold the Rule of Law.
The respondents-Committees were therefore stopped from calling the petitioner
and ask the three(3) questions mentioned above in connection with his
conversations with the President being covered by the executive privilege rule.
Power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation; Right to Privacy;
Public disclosure of government transactions; right to information on matters of
public concern; right against self-incrimination;
CAMILO L. SABIO vs. GORDON, G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006, 504
SCRA 704
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
The Facts:
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine
Senate Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res. No. 455), [61][4] directing an inquiry in aid
of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to
the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of
Directors.
On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the authority of Senator
Richard J. Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG, one of the
herein petitioners, inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public
meeting jointly conducted by theCommittee on Government Corporations and
Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. The purpose of the public
meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455.[62][6]
On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior
commitment.[63][7] At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of
E.O.
No. 1 earlier quoted.
Unconvinced with the above Compliance and Explanation, the Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and the Committee on Public
Services issued an Order[64][13] directing Major General Jose Balajadia (Ret.),
Senate Sergeant-At-Arms, to place Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners under
arrest for contempt of the Senate. The Order bears the approval of Senate
President Villar and the majority of the Committees members.
On September 12, 2006, at around 10:45 a.m., Major General Balajadia arrested
Chairman Sabio in his office at IRC Building, No. 82 EDSA, Mandaluyong City and
brought him to the Senate premises where he was detained.
Hence, this petition.
I S S U E:
Crucial to the resolution of the present petitions is the fundamental issue of
whether Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is repealed by the 1987 Constitution.
On this lone issue hinges the merit of the contention of Chairman Sabio and his
Commissioners that their refusal to appear before respondent Senate Committees
is justified.

Ranged against it is Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution granting

respondent Senate Committees the power of legislative inquiry. It reads:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with
its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in
or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
On the other arm of the scale is Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limiting such power of
legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any
judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding, thus: No member or staff of
the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any
judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters
within its official cognizance.
The Congress power of inquiry has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions long
before it reached our shores through McGrain v. Daugherty,[65][15] cited in Arnault
v. Nazareno.[66][16] In those earlier days, American courts considered the power
of inquiry as inherent in the power to legislate.
In Arnault, the Supreme Court adhered to a similar theory. Citing McGrain, it
recognized that the power of inquiry is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function, thus:
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either
House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the
end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such
power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other
words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential
and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body
cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or
change; and where the legislation body does not itself possess the
requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be
had to others who possess it.
Dispelling any doubt as to the Philippine Congress power of inquiry, provisions on
such power made their maiden appearance in Article VIII, Section 12 of the 1973
Constitution.[67][18] Then came the 1987 Constitution incorporating the present
Article VI, Section 12. What was therefore implicit under the 1935 Constitution,
as influenced by American jurisprudence, became explicit under the 1973 and
1987 Constitutions.[68][19]
Notably, the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of investigation, not just of
Congress, but also of any of its committee. This is significant because it
constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory power upon the committees
and it means that the mechanisms which the Houses can take in order to
effectively perform its investigative function are also available to the committees.
[69][20]

It can be said that the Congress power of inquiry has gained more solid
existence and expansive construal. The Courts high regard to such power is
rendered more evident inSenate v. Ermita,[70][21] where it categorically ruled
that the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the
executive
branch.
Verily,
the
Court
reinforced
the
doctrine
in Arnault that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject
for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation and that the power
of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate.
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, Section 4(b) is directly repugnant
with Article VI, Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and
staff from the Congress power of inquiry. This cannot be countenanced.
Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such exemption. The
Congress power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns

the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed

statutes.[71][22] It even extends to government agencies created by
Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress
to regulate or even abolish.[72][23] PCGG belongs to this class.
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of
Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis.
Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI,
Section 1 of the
Constitution stating that: Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives.
The provision presupposes that since an incumbent of a public office is invested
with certain powers and charged with certain duties pertinent to sovereignty, the
powers so delegated to the officer are held in trust for the people and are to
be exercised in behalf of the government or of all citizens who may need
the intervention of the officers. Such trust extends to all matters within
the range of duties pertaining to the office. In other words, public
officers are but the servants of the people, and not their rulers. [73][24]
Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the
principle of public accountability. It places the PCGG members and staff
beyond the reach of courts, Congress and other administrative bodies. Instead
of encouraging public accountability, the same provision only
institutionalizes irresponsibility and non-accountability. In Presidential
Commission on Good Government v. Pea,[74][25] Justice Florentino P. Feliciano
characterized as obiter the portion of the majority opinion barring, on the basis
of Sections 4(a) and (b) of E.O. No. 1, a civil case for damages filed against the
PCGG and its Commissioners.
He eloquently opined:
The above underscored portions are, it is respectfully submitted, clearly obiter. It
is important to make clear that the Court is not here interpreting, much
less upholding as valid and constitutional, the literal terms of Section 4
(a), (b) of Executive Order No.1. If Section 4 (a) were given its literal import
as immunizing the PCGG or any member thereof from civil liability for anything
done or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by this Order, the
constitutionality of Section 4 (a) would, in my submission, be open to most
serious doubt. For so viewed, Section 4 (a) would institutionalize the
irresponsibility and non-accountability of members and staff of the PCGG, a
notion that is clearly repugnant to both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution and a
privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic under the 1987
Constitution. x x x.
x

It would seem constitutionally offensive to suppose that a member or

staff member of the PCGG could not be required to testify before the
Sandiganbayan or that such members were exempted from complying
with orders of this Court.
Chavez v. Sandiganbayan[75][26] reiterates the same view. Indeed, Section 4(b)
has been frowned upon by this Court even before the filing of the present
petitions.

2)
NEGROS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE VS. SANGGUNIANG
PANGLUNGSOD OF DUMAGUETE CITY, G.R. No. 72492, Nov. 5, 1987, 155 SCRA
421
Petitioners contend that the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete
is bereft of the power to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses, nor
the power to order the arrest of witnesses who fail to obey its subpoena. It is
further argued that assuming the power to compel the attendance and testimony
of witnesses to be lodged in said body, it cannot be exercised in the investigation
of matters affecting the terms and conditions of the franchise granted to NORECO
II which are beyond the jurisdiction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod.
Respondents, for their part, claim that inherent in the legislative functions
performed by the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod is the power to conduct
investigations in aid of legislation and with it, the power to punish for contempt in
inquiries on matters within its jurisdiction (Rollo, p. 46). It is also the position of
the respondents that the contempt power, if not expressly granted, is necessarily
implied from the powers granted the Sangguniang Panlungsod (Rollo, pp. 48-49).
Furthermore, the respondents assert that an inquiry into the installation or use of
inefficient power lines and its effect on the power consumption cost on the part of
Dumaguete residents is well-within the jurisdiction of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod and its committees.
1.
A line should be drawn between the powers of Congress as the repository
of the legislative power under the Constitution, and those that may be exercised
by the legislative bodies of local government unit, e.g. the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Dumaguete which, as mere creatures of law, possess delegated
legislative power. While the Constitution does not expressly vest Congress with
the power to punish non-members for legislative contempt, the power has
nevertheless been invoked by the legislative body as a means of preserving its
authority and dignity (Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29 [1950]); Amault v.
Balagtas, 97 Phil. 358 [1955]), in the same way that courts wield an inherent
power to enforce their authority, preserve their integrity, maintain their dignity,
and ensure the effectiveness of the administration of justice. (Commissioner v.
Cloribel, 127 Phil. 716, 723 [1967]; In re Kelly 35 Phil. 944 950 [1916], and
other cases). The exercise by Congress of this awesome power was questioned
for the first time in the leading case of Arnault v. Nazareno, (87 Phil. 29 [1950])
where this Court held that the legislative body indeed possessed the contempt
power.
But no person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before either House,
unless his testimony is required in a matter into which that House has jurisdiction
to inquire. (Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 26, L.ed., 377.)
The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish
recalcitrant witnesses is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be
considered implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative power. How could a
legislative body obtain the knowledge and information on which to base intended
legislation if it cannot require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge and
information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its power and authority?
When the framers of the Constitution adopted the principle of separation of
powers, making each branch supreme within the real of its respective authority, it
must have intended each departments authority to be full and complete,
independently of the others authority or power. And how could the authority and
power become complete if for every act of refusal every act of defiance, every act
of contumacy against it, the legislative body must resort to the judicial
department for the appropriate remedy, because it is impotent by itself to punish

or deal therewith, with the affronts committed against its authority or dignity. . .
(Arnault v. Balagtas, L-6749, July 30, 1955; 97 Phil. 358, 370 [1955]).
The aforequoted pronouncements in the two Arnault cases, supra, broke ground
in what was then an unexplored area of jurisprudence, and succeeded in
supplying the raison d etre of this power of Congress even in the absence of
express constitutional grant. Whether or not the reasons for upholding the
existence of said power in Congress may be applied mutatis mutandis to a
questioned exercise of the power of contempt by the respondent committee of a
city council is the threshold issue in the present controversy.
3.
The exercise by the legislature of the contempt power is a matter of selfpreservation as that branch of the government vested with the legislative power,
independently of the judicial branch, asserts its authority and punishes contempts
thereof. The contempt power of the legislature is, therefore, sui generis, and local
legislative bodies cannot correctly claim to possess it for the same reasons that
the national legislature does. The power attaches not to the discharge of
legislative functions per se but to the character of the legislature as one of the
three independent and coordinate branches of government. The same thing
cannot be said of local legislative bodies which are creations of law.
4.
To begin with, there is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution
or in the Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) granting local
legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and the power to punish
non-members for contempt. Absent a constitutional or legal provision for the
exercise of these powers, the only possible justification for the issuance of a
subpoena and for the punishment of non-members for contumacious behaviour
would be for said power to be deemed implied in the statutory grant of delegated
legislative power. But, the contempt power and the subpoena power partake of a
judicial nature. They cannot be implied in the grant of legislative power. Neither
can they exist as mere incidents of the performance of legislative functions. To
allow local legislative bodies or administrative agencies to exercise these powers
without express statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine of separation of
powers.
These cannot be presumed to exist in favor of the latter and must be considered
as an exception to Sec. 4 of B.P. 337 which provides for liberal rules of
interpretation in favor of local autonomy. Since the existence of the contempt
power in conjunction with the subpoena power in any government body inevitably
poses a potential derogation of individual rights, i.e. compulsion of testimony and
punishment for refusal to testify, the law cannot be liberally construed to have
impliedly granted such powers to local legislative bodies. It cannot be lightly
presumed that the sovereign people, the ultimate source of all government
powers, have reposed these powers in all government agencies. The intention of
the sovereign people, through their representatives in the legislature, to share
these unique and awesome powers with the local legislative bodies must
therefore clearly appear in pertinent legislation.
There being no provision in the Local Government Code explicitly granting local
legislative bodies, the power to issue compulsory process and the power to
punish for contempt, the Sanggunian Panlungsod of Dumaguete is devoid of
power to punish the petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt. The Ad-Hoc
Committee of said legislative body has even less basis to claim that it can
exercise these powers.
11.
Sections 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative,
with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the
Rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on

any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted

to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the HR at least 3 days before
their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written
questions, but may not cover matter matters related thereto. When the security
of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in
writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
12.
Section 23 [1] The Congress, by a vote of 2/3 of both Houses in a
joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to
declare the existence of a state of war.
[2] In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress
may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to
such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and
proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn
by a resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.
a.

Note the limitations and restrictions for the delegation.

b.

Note also that it could be withdrawn by mere resolution.

c.

What is referred to by the phrase next adjournment?

d.

Read:

1)

ARANETA VS. DINGLASAN, 84 Phil. 369

the first emergency powers cases
2) RODRIGUEZ VS. GELLA, 92 Phil. 603
the second emergency powers cases.
3) Republic Act No. 6826, Dec.20, 1989 which grants emergency
powers to President Aquino.
13.
Sections 24. All appropriations, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing
increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall
originate exclusively in the House of representatives, but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments.
NOTE: In Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, the Supreme Court held that the EVAT Law is constitutional even if the same was the VERSION which came from
the Senate, not from the House of Representatives. This is so because the Senate
is allowed to propose amendments to bills which must exclusively originate
from the House of Representatives.
14.
Section 25 [1] The Congress may not increase the appropriation
recommended by the President for the operation of the government as
specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation of
the budget shall be prescribed by law.
[2
No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general
appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular
appropriation therein. Any provision or enactment shall be limited in its
operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
[3] The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress
shall strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other
departments and agencies.
[4] A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which
it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as
certified by the national treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding
revenue proposal therein.
[5] No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the house of Representatives, the Chief justice of the

Supreme Court, and the heads of the constitutional commissions may, by

law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations
law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.
[6] Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be
disbursed only for the purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers
and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law.
[7] If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed
to pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the
general appropriations law for the preceding year shall be deemed
reenacted and shall remain in force and effect until the general
appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.
Read: DEMETRIA vs. ALBA, 148 SCRA 208
17.
Section 26. [1] Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
[2] No bill shall be passed unless it has passed 3 readings on
separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been
distributed to its members 3 days before its passage, except when the
President certifies as to its necessity of its immediate enactment to meet
a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of the bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken
immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
Read:
1)

TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD, 151 SCRA 208

2) DE LA CRUZ VS. PARAS, 123 SCRA 569
3) INSULAR LUMBER VS. CTA, 104 SCRA 710
4)
LIDASAN VS. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 496

The case questions the law entitled An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton
in the Province of Lanao del Sur, but which includes barrios located in another
province Cotabato to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional
mandate that No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than
one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill?
Doubtless, as the statute stands, twelve barrios in two municipalities in the
province of Cotabato are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This
brought about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces.
Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the Office of the President,
through the Assistant Executive Secretary, recommended to Comelec that the
operation of the statute be suspended until clarified by correcting legislation.
Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own interpretation,
declared that the statute should be implemented unless declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
It may be well to state, right at the outset, that the constitutional provision
contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain from
conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title
of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and
the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.
Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be
expressed in the title of the bill. This constitutional requirement breathes the
spirit of command.
Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the

Constitution does not

deliberations the entire
which became Republic
its final approval in the
application, originated.

exact of Congress the obligation to read during its

text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247,
Act 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to
House of Representatives where the bill, being of local

Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an
enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all
the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve
the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the
persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope
and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them
to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate
action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.
The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which
technical accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated in express
terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so
uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the
purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is
misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or
different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or
indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.
In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance rather than its form
should be considered, and the purpose of the constitutional requirement, of
giving notice to all persons interested, should be kept in mind by the court.
With the foregoing principles at hand, we take a hard look at the disputed
statute. The title An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of
Lanao del Sur 8 projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del
Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there
that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this
new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase in the Province of Lanao del Sur, read
without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the
known fact is that the legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in one
statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one
barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del
Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province
different from Lanao del Sur.
The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to
perceive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact
of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in
Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being
taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of
Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were
actually affected by the bill. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against
the constitutionality of Republic Act 4790.
5) ALALAYAN VS. NAPOCOR, 24 SCRA 172
6)
CORDERO VS. CABATUANDO, 6 SCRA 418
7)
TATAD VS. SECRETARY OF ENERGY, November 5, 1997, 281 SCRA
333
18.
Section 27. [1] Every bill passed by Congress shall, before it
becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same,
he shall sign it, otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his

objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the

objections at large in its journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after
such consideration , 2/3 of all the members of such House shall agree to
pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections , to the other
House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by 2/3
of all the members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such
cases, the votes of each house shall be determined by yeas or nays, and
the names of the members voting for or against shall be entered in its
journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the
House where it originated within 30 days after the date of receipt
thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he signed it.
[2] The President shall have the power to veto any particular item
or items in an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill, but the veto shall not
affect the item or items to which he does not object.
1)

Read:

a. BENGZON VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, 62 Phil. 912

b. BOLINAO ELECTRONICS VS. VALENCIA, 11 SCRA 486
c. NEPTALI GONZALES VS. MACARAIG, November 19, 1990
Section 55 of the Appropriations Act of 1989 (Section 55 [FY 89] hereinafter),
which was vetoed by the President, reads:
SEC. 55.
Prohibition Against the Restoration or Increase of Recommended
Appropriations Disapproved and /or Reduced by Congress: No item of
appropriation recommended by the President in the Budget submitted to
Congress pursuant to Article VII, Section 22 of the Constitution which has been
disapproved or reduced in this Act shall be restored or increased by the use of
appropriations authorized for other purposes by augmentation. An item of
appropriation for any purpose recommended by the President in the Budget shall
be deemed to have been disapproved by Congress if no corresponding
appropriation for the specific purpose is provided in this Act.
We quote below the reason for the Presidential veto:
The provision violates Section 25 (5) of Article VI of the Constitution. If
allowed, this Section would nullify not only the constitutional and
statutory authority of the President, but also that of the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, and Heads of Constitutional Commissions, to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective
offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriation. A
careful review of the legislative action on the budget as submitted shows
that in almost all cases, the budgets of agencies as recommended by the
President, as well as those of the Senate, the House of Representatives,
and the Constitutional Commissions, have been reduced. An unwanted
consequence of this provision is the inability of the President, the
President of the Senate, Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional
Commissions to augment any item of appropriation of their respective
offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations
even in cases of calamity or in the event of urgent need to accelerate the
implementation of essential public services and infrastructure projects.
I am vetoing this provision for the reason that it violates Section 25 (5)
of Article VI of the Constitution in relation to Sections 44 and 45 of P.D.
No. 1177 as amended by R.A. No. 6670 which authorizes the President to

use savings to augment any item of appropriations in the Executive

Branch of the Government.
The fundamental issue raised is whether or not the veto by the President of
Section 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill (Section 55 FY89), and subsequently
of its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Section 16 FY90), is
unconstitutional and without effect.
The focal issue for resolution is whether or not the President exceeded the item
veto power accorded by the Constitution. Or differently put, has the President the
power to veto provisions of an Appropriations Bill?
Petitioners contend that Section 55 FY 89) and Section 16 (FY90) are
provisions and not items and are, therefore, outside the scope of the
item veto power of the President.
The veto power of the President is expressed in Article VI, Section 27 of
the 1987 Constitution reading, in full, as follows:
Sec. 27.
(2)
The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in
an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or
items to which he does not object.
Paragraph (1) refers to the general veto power of the President and if
exercised would result in the veto of the entire bill, as a general rule.
Paragraph (2) is what is referred to as the item veto power or the lineveto power. It allows the exercise of the veto over a particular item or
items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill. As specified, the
President may not veto less than all of an item of an Appropriations Bill.
In other words, the power given the Executive to disapprove any item or
items in an Appropriations Bill does not grant the authority to veto a part
of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item.
It is to be noted that the counterpart provision in the 1987 Constitution (Article
VI, Section 27 [2], supra), is a verbatim reproduction except for the public official
concerned. In other words, also eliminated has been any reference to the veto of
a provision. The vital question is: should this exclusion be interpreted to mean as
a disallowance of the power to veto a provision, as petitioners urge?
The terms item and provision in budgetary legislation and practice are concededly
different. An item in a bill refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and
severable parts . . . of the bill (Bengzon, supra, at 916). It is an indivisible sum of
money dedicated to a stated purpose (Commonwealth v. Dodson, 11 S.E., 2d
120, 124, 125, etc., 176 Va. 281). The United States Supreme Court, in the case
of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice (299 U.S. 410, 414, 57 S.Ct 252, 81 L. Ed.,
312) declared that an item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item
which in itself is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of
law, which happens to be put into an appropriation bill.
It is our considered opinion that, notwithstanding the elimination in
Article VI, Section 27 (2) of the 1987 Constitution of any reference to the
veto of a provision, the extent of the Presidents veto power as
previously defined by the 1935 Constitution has not changed. This is
because the eliminated proviso merely pronounces the basic principle
that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a
separate veto (Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 62 Phil., 912, 916

(1926); 2 BERNAS, Joaquin, S.J., The Constitution of the Republic of the

Philippines, 1st ed., 154-155, [1988]).
The restrictive interpretation urged by petitioners that the President may not veto
a provision without vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle
that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto
but also overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any provision in the general
appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein
and that any such provision shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation
to which it relates (1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 25 [2]). In other words,
in the true sense of the term, a provision in an Appropriations Bill is limited in its
operation to some particular appropriation to which it relates, and does not relate
to the entire bill.
But even assuming arguendo that provisions are beyond the executive
power to veto, we are of the opinion that Section 55 (FY 89) and Section
16 (FY 90) are not provisions in the budgetary sense of the term. Article
VI, Section 25 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 25
(2)
No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general
appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation
therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the
appropriation to which it relates.
Explicit is the requirement that a provision in the Appropriations Bill should relate
specifically to some particular appropriation therein. The challenged
provisions fall short of this requirement. Firstly, the vetoed provisions do not
relate to any particular or distinctive appropriation. They apply generally to all
items disapproved or reduced by Congress in the Appropriations Bill. Secondly,
the disapproved or reduced items are nowhere to be found on the face of the Bill.
To discover them, resort will have to be made to the original recommendations
made by the President and to the source indicated by petitioners themselves, i.e.,
the Legislative Budget Research and Monitoring Office (Annex B-1 and B-2,
Petition). Thirdly, the vetoed Sections are more of an expression of Congressional
policy in respect of augmentation from savings rather than a budgetary
appropriation. Consequently, Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90)
although labelled as provisions, are actually inappropriate provisions that should
be treated as items for the purpose of the Presidents veto power. (Henry v.
Edwards [1977] 346 S Rep. 2d, 157-158).
Just as the President may not use his item-veto to usurp constitutional powers
conferred on the legislature, neither can the legislature deprive the Governor of
the constitutional powers conferred on him as chief executive officer of the state
by including in a general appropriation bill matters more properly enacted in
separate legislation. The Governors constitutional power to veto bills of general
legislation cannot be abridged by the careful placement of such measures in a
general appropriation bill, thereby forcing the Governor to choose between
approving unacceptable substantive legislation or vetoing items of expenditure
essential to the operation of government. The legislature cannot by location ot a
bill give it immunity from executive veto. Nor it circumvent the Governors veto
power over substantive legislation by artfully drafting general law measures so
that they appear to be true conditions or limitations on an item of appropriation.
Otherwise, the legislature would be permitted to impair the constitutional
responsibilities and functions of a co-equal branch of government in
contravention of the separation of powers doctrine We are no more willing to
allow the legislature to use its appropriation power to infringe on the Governors
constitutional right to veto matters of substantive legislation than we are to allow

the Governor to encroach on the constitutional powers of the legislature. In order

to avoid this result, we hold that, when the legislature inserts inappropriate
provisions in a general appropriation bill, such provisions must be treated as
items for purposes of the Governors item veto power over general appropriation
bills.
Petitioners maintain, however, that Congress is free to impose conditions
in an Appropriations Bill and where conditions are attached, the veto
power does not carry with it the power to strike them out, citing
Commonwealth v. Dodson (11 SE 2d 130, supra) and Bolinao Electronics
Corporation v. Valencia (No. L-20740, June 30, 1964, 11 SCRA 486). In
other words, their theory is that Section 55 (FY89) and Section 16
(FY90) are such conditions/restrictions and thus beyond the veto
power.
There can be no denying that inherent in the power of appropriation is the power
to specify how money shall be spent; and that in addition to distinct items of
appropriation, the Legislature may include in Appropriation Bills qualifications,
conditions, limitations or restrictions on expenditure of funds. Settled also is the
rule that the Executive is not allowed to veto a condition or proviso of an
appropriation while allowing the appropriation itself to stand (Fairfield v. Foster,
supra, at 320). That was also the ruling in Bolinao, supra, which held that the
veto of a condition in an Appropriations Bill which did not include a veto of the
items to which the condition related was deemed invalid and without effect
whatsoever.
The Power of augmentation and The Validity of the Veto
The President promptly vetoed Section 55 (FY89) and Section 16 (FY90)
because they nullify the authority of the Chief Executive and heads of different
branches of government to augment any item in the General Appropriations Law
for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations, as guaranteed by Article VI, Section 25 (5) of the Constitution.
Said provision reads:
Sec. 25.
(5)
No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by
law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations
law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations. (Emphasis ours).
If, indeed, the Legislature believed that the exercise of the veto
powers by the Executive were unconstitutional, the remedy laid down by
the Constitution is crystal clear. A Presidential veto may be overriden by
the votes of two-thirds of members of Congress (1987 Constitution,
Article VI, Section 27[l], supra). But Congress made no attempt to
override the Presidential veto. Petitioners argument that the veto is
ineffectual so that there is nothing to override (citing Bolinao) has lost
force and effect with the executive veto having been herein upheld.
b.
BENGZON VS. DRILON, April 15, 1992
In the case at bar, the veto of these specific provisions in the General
Appropriations Act is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how its funds
should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. The freedom of
the Chief Justice to make adjustments in the utilization of the funds appropriated
for the expenditures of the judiciary, including the use of any savings from any

particular item to cover deficits or shortages in other items of the Judiciary is

withheld. Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy
freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law. It
knows its priorities just as it is aware of the fiscal restraints. The Chief Justice
must be given a free hand on how to augment appropriations where
augmentation is needed.
Furthermore, in the case of Gonzales v. Macaraig (191 SCRA 452 [1990]), the
Court upheld the authority of the President and other key officials to augment
any item or any appropriation from savings in the interest of expediency and
efficiency. The Court stated that:
There should be no question, therefore, that statutory authority has, in fact, been
granted. And once given, the heads of the different branches of the Government
and those of the Constitutional Commissions are afforded considerable flexibility
in the use of public funds and resources (Demetria v. Alba, supra). The doctrine
of separation of powers is in no way endangered because the transfer is made
within a department (or branch of government) and not from one department
(branch) to another.
The Constitution, particularly Article VI, Section 25(5) also provides:
Sec. 25.
(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by
law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations
law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.
In the instant case, the vetoed provisions which relate to the use of savings for
augmenting items for the payment of the pension differentials, among others, are
clearly in consonance with the abovestated pronouncements of the Court. The
veto impairs the power of the Chief Justice to augment other items in the
Judiciarys appropriation, in contravention of the constitutional provision on fiscal
autonomy.
III
Finally, it can not be denied that the retired Justices have a vested right to the
accrued pensions due them pursuant to RA 1797.
The right to a public pension is of statutory origin and statutes dealing with
pensions have been enacted by practically all the states in the United States
(State ex rel. Murray v, Riley, 44 Del 505, 62 A2d 236), and presumably in most
countries of the world. Statutory provisions for the support of Judges or Justices
on retirement are founded on services rendered to the state. Where a judge has
complied with the statutory prerequisite for retirement with pay, his right to retire
and draw salary becomes vested and may not, thereafter, be revoked or
impaired. (Gay v. Whitehurst, 44 So ad 430)
Thus, in the Philippines, a number of retirement laws have been enacted, the
purpose of which is to entice competent men and women to enter the
government service and to permit them to retire therefrom with relative security,
not only those who have retained their vigor but, more so, those who have been
incapacitated by illness or accident. (In re: Amount of the Monthly Pension of
Judges and Justices Starting From the Sixth Year of their Retirement and After

the Expiration of the Initial Five-year Period of Retirement, (190 SCRA 315
[1990]).
As early as 1953, Rep. Act No. 910 was enacted to grant pensions to retired
Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals.
This was amended by RA 1797 which provided for an automatic adjustment of
the pension rates. Through the years, laws were enacted and jurisprudence
expounded to afford retirees better benefits.
P.D. No. 1438, for one, was promulgated on June 10, 1978 amending RA 910
providing that the lump sum of 5 years gratuity to which the retired Justices of
the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals were entitled was to be computed on
the basis of the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, living and
representation allowances each Justice was receiving on the date of his
resignation. The Supreme Court in a resolution dated October 4, 1990, stated
that this law on gratuities covers the monthly pensions of retired Judges and
Justices which should include the highest monthly aggregate of transportation,
living and representation allowances the retiree was receiving on the date of
retirement. (In Re: Amount of the Monthly Pension of Judges and Justices,
supra).
The rationale behind the veto which implies that Justices and Constitutional
officers are unduly favored is, again, a misimpression.
Immediately, we can state that retired Armed Forces officers and enlisted men
number in the tens of thousands while retired Justices are so few they can be
immediately identified. Justices retire at age 70 while military men retire at a
much younger age some retired Generals left the military at age 50 or earlier.
Yet the benefits in Rep. Act No. 1797 are made to apply equally to both groups.
Any ideas arising from an alleged violation of the equal protection clause should
first be directed to retirees in the military or civil service where the reason for the
retirement provision is not based on indubitable and constitutionally sanctioned
grounds, not to a handful of retired Justices whose retirement pensions are
founded on constitutional reasons.
The provisions regarding retirement pensions of justices arise from the package
of protections given by the Constitution to guarantee and preserve the
independence of the Judiciary.
The Constitution expressly vests the power of judicial review in this Court. Any
institution given the power to declare, in proper cases, that act of both the
President and Congress are unconstitutional needs a high degree of independence
in the exercise of its functions. Our jurisdiction may not be reduced by Congress.
Neither may it be increased without our advice and concurrence. Justices may not
be removed until they reach age 70 except through impeachment. All courts and
court personnel are under the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court.
The President may not appoint any Judge or Justice unless he or she has been
nominated by the Judicial and Bar Council which, in turn, is under the Supreme
Courts supervision. Our salaries may not be decreased during our continuance in
office. We cannot be designated to any agency performing administrative or
quasi-judicial functions. We are specifically given fiscal autonomy. The Judiciary is
not only independent of, but also co-equal and coordinate with the Executive and
Legislative Departments. (Article VIII and section 30, Article VI, Constitution).
Any argument which seeks to remove special privileges given by law to former
Justices of this Court and the ground that there should be no grant of distinct

privileges or preferential treatment to retired Justices ignores these provisions

of the Constitution and, in effect, asks that these Constitutional provisions on
special protections for the Judiciary be repealed. The integrity of our entire
constitutional system is premised to a large extent on the independence of the
Judiciary. All these provisions are intended to preserve that independence. So are
the laws on retirement benefits of Justices.
One last point.
The Office of the Solicitor General argues that:
. . . Moreover, by granting these benefits to retired Justices implies that public
funds, raised from taxes on other citizens, will be paid off to select individuals
who are already leading private lives and have ceased performing public service.
Said the United States Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Miller: To
lay with one hand the power of the government on the property of the citizen,
and with the other to bestow upon favored individuals . . . is nonetheless a
robbery because it is done under the forms of law . . . (Law Association V.
Topeka, 20 Wall. 655) (Comment, p. 16)
The above arguments are not only specious, impolite and offensive; they
certainly are unbecoming of an office whose top officials are supposed to be,
under their charter, learned in the law.
Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon and Chief Justice Querube Makalintal, Justices J.B.L.
Reyes, Cecilia Muoz Palma, Efren Plana, Vicente Abad Santos, and, in fact, all
retired Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals may no longer be
in the active service. Still, the Solicitor General and all lawyers under him who
represent the government before the two courts and whose predecessors
themselves appeared before these retirees, should show some continuing esteem
and good manners toward these Justices who are now in the evening of their
years.
All that the retirees ask is to be given the benefits granted by law. To characterize
them as engaging in robbery is intemperate, abrasive, and disrespectful more
so because the argument is unfounded.
If the Comment is characteristic of OSG pleadings today, then we are sorry to
state that the then quality of research in that institution has severely
deteriorated.
In the first place, the citation of the case is, wrong. The title is not LAW
Association v. Topeka but Citizens Savings and Loan Association of Cleveland,
Ohio v. Topeka City (20 Wall. 655; 87 U.S. 729; 22 Law. Ed. 455 [1874]. Second,
the case involved the validity of a statute authorizing cities and counties to issue
bonds for the purpose of building bridges, waterpower, and other public works to
aid private railroads improve their services. The law was declared void on the
ground that the right of a municipality to impose a tax cannot be used for private
interests.
The case was decided in 1874. The world has turned over more than 40,000
times since that ancient period. Public use is now equated with public interest.
Public money may now be used for slum clearance, low-cost housing, squatter
resettlement, urban and agrarian reform where only private persons are the
immediate beneficiaries. What was robbery in 1874 is now called social
justice. There is nothing about retirement benefits in the cited case. Obviously,
the OSG lawyers cited from an old textbook or encyclopedia which could not even

spell loan correctly. Good lawyers are expected to go to primary sources and to
use only relevant citations.
The Court has been deluged with letters and petitions by former colleagues in the
Judiciary requesting adjustments in their pensions just so they would be able to
cope with the everyday living expenses not to mention the high cost of medical
bills that old age entails. As Justice Cruz aptly stated in Teodoro J. Santiago v.
COA, (G.R. No. 92284, July 12, 1991);
Retirement laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the retiree because
their intention is to provide for his sustenance, and hopefully even comfort, when
he no longer has the stamina to continue earning his livelihood. After devoting
the best years of his life to the public service, he deserves the appreciation of a
grateful government as best concretely expressed in a generous retirement
gratuity commensurate with the value and length of his services. That generosity
is the least he should expect now that his work is done and his youth is gone.
Even as he feels the weariness in his bones and glimpses the approach of the
lengthening shadows, he should be able to luxuriate in the thought that he did
his task well, and was rewarded for it.
For as long as these retired Justices are entitled under laws which continue to be
effective, the government can not deprive them of their vested right to the
payment of their pensions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned veto is SET ASIDE
as illegal and unconstitutional. The vetoed provisions of the 1992 Appropriations
Act are declared valid and subsisting. The respondents are ordered to
automatically and regularly release pursuant to the grant of fiscal autonomy the
funds appropriated for the subject pensions as well as the other appropriations
for the Judiciary. The resolution in Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA dated
November 28, 1991 is likewise ordered to be implemented as promulgated.
2)

What is a pocket veto?

3)

What are the three ways by which a bill becomes a law?

3.
PHILCONSA VS. ENRIQUEZ, 235 SCRA 506
What is the so-called executive impoundment?
It means that although an item of appropriation is not vetoed by the President,
he however refuses for whatever reason, to spend funds made possible by
Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type.
Proponents of impoundment have invoked at least three (3) principal sources of
authority of the President. [1] authority to impound given to him by Congress,
either expressly or impliedly; [2] the executive power drawn from his power as
Commander-in-chief; and [3] the Faithful execution clause of the Constitution.
Note that in this case the SC held that the Countryside Development Fund (CDF)
of Congressmen and Senators is CONSTITUTIONAL because the same is set
aside for infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and computers and other
priority projects and activities, and credit facilities to qualified beneficiaries as
proposed and identified by said Senators and Congressmen.
19.
Section 28. [1] The rule of taxation shall be uniform and
equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
[2] The Congress, may by law, authorize the President to fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may
impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage

dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the government.
[3] Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents
appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands,
buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for
religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from
taxation.
[4] No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the
concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress.
Section 29. (1) No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid or employed
directly or indirectly for the benefit, use, or support of any sect, denomination, or
system of religionexcept when such preacher, priest is assigned to the AFP, or
to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
All money collected on any tax for a special purpose shall be treated as a special
fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund
was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be
transferred to the general funds of the Government.
Read:
1. Garcia vs. Executive Sec., 211 SCRA 219
1-a) PEPSI COLA VS. THE CITY OF BUTUAN, 24 SCRA 789
2) PROVINCE OF ABRA VS. HERNANDO, 107 SCRA 104
3) APOSTOLIC PREFECT OF BAGUIO VS. TREASURER, 71 Phil. 547
4) PASCUAL VS. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS, 110 Phil. 331
4)

AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ, 64 Phil. 201

5)

MANUEL ALBA VS. PEREZ, G.R. No. 65917, Sept. 24, 1987

Respondent Dr. Francisco A. Perez was named outstanding Health Worker for
1980 by the Ministry of Health on January 22, 1981. Being such an awardee, Dr.
Perez was granted by the Ministry of Health a two-step salary increase in
accordance with the merit increase program as enunciated in Letter of
Instructions (LOI) No. 562. Thereafter, the Ministry of Health requested the
Sangguniang Panglunsod of San Pablo City, which is paying Dr. Perez salary in
full to appropriate the amount corresponding to the merit increase in its current
budget. For lack of legal basis, the Bureau of Local Government opposed the
proposed merit increase because the provisions of LOI No. 562 apply only to
officials/employees in the national government, and consequently, awardee Dr.
Perez was not entitled thereto, since he is an employee of the local government
as provided for in the charter of San Pablo City. This prompted Dr. Perez to
request the Ministry of Health to make the corresponding allocation to issue a
notice of salary adjustment effective January 1, 1981. The Minister of Justice,
upon a query made by the Ministry of Health, in his Opinion No. 177, Series of
1981, dated November 20, 1981, acknowledged that the merit increase program
applies only to the officials/employees of the national government but declared
Dr. Perez as one such official or employee and concluded that the Ministry of
Health should pay the merit increase to him. Relying on such opinion, the
Ministry of Health issued to respondent Dr. Perez on December 1, 1981 a notice
of salary adjustment which release of the amount was denied by the Office of the
Budget and Management which insisted that the awardee is an employee of the
local or city government who is not covered by the merit increase program. Dr.

Perez made his appeal therefrom to the Ministry of Health who forwarded it,
recommending favorable action thereon to the Office of the President of the
Philippines. The latter referred the appeal to the Minister of the Budget who
affirmed his earlier decision of disallowing the merit increase and reiterating the
same reasons. A petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the Budget and
Management to pay the merit increase was filed by Dr. Perez before the lower
court which granted the aforementioned favorable decision, subject matter of the
present petition for review on certiorari before Us by petitioners arguing that:
1.
The position of private respondent as the City Health Officer of San Pablo
City is embraced in Sec. 7 of Pres. Decree (P.D.) No. 1136 which states among
other things that the salary plan provided for in Sec. 8 of the same decree shall
cover the City Officer, among other officials, whose salary shall be paid out of city
funds and therefore a local government employee whose position does not
appear in the list of national government employees defined under another law
(P.D. 985).
2.
The constitution provides that no money shag be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. Since there is no such
appropriation, the Minister of the Budget cannot be compelled to release the
amount for the payment of the merit salary increase because such allocation
entails the exercise of judgment and discretion of the Minister of the Budget
which cannot be controlled by mandamus.
3.
The decision declaring respondent Dr. Perez as an employee of the national
government would have far reaching effects such that all other city health officers
and local officials similarly situated would also be so entitled to an personal
benefits given to national employee. Dr. Perezs exemplary accomplishment which
merited for him the grant to a two-step increase must yield to the overriding
economic consideration of availability of funds which the government must set
aside for the purpose.
We do not agree with the arguments set down by petitioners. Private respondent
invites Our attention to the City Charter of San Pablo City (CA #5201, Sec. 87,
May 7, 1940) more specifically, Art. IV thereof, which provides that the position
of a City Health Officer is not included among the heads of the regular
departments of the city but included among the national officials performing
municipal functions under the direct control of the Health Minister and not the
city mayor as provided for in Art. XIV of the same charter. Such principle is
reiterated in the Decentralization Act of 1967 which shows that the appointing
authority is the Health Minister and not the local officials. Petitioner Minister of
the Budget admitted thru the testimony of its representative, Alice S. Torres,
chief of the Compensation and Position Classification and a specialist thereon that
the City Health Officer is under the administrative and technical supervision of the
Ministry of Health (p. 69, tsn, June 16, 1983, p. 72, Rollo). Be it noted that,
Section 7 of PD 1136 relied upon by petitioners provides that the basic salary of
the City Health Officer is paid from city funds. However, the last paragraph of the
same Sec. 7, excludes the city health officer from the classification of local
government official as can be gathered from the phrase except those occupied
by (a) officials whose compensation is fixed in the constitution, Presidential
Decrees and other laws and (b) officials and employees who are under the direct
supervision and control of the National Government or its agencies and who are
paid wholly or partially from national funds.
Provincial and city health officers are all considered national government officials
irrespective of the source of funds of their salary because the preservation of
health is a national service. Also their positions are partially funded by the

national government. Some are receiving one-half of their salary from the
national funds and the other one-half from local funds.
We cannot likewise ignore the opinions of the Ministry of Justice cited by private
respondent to wit: 1) Opinion No. 26, Series of 1976 which categorically rules
that Officials and employees of provincial and city health offices render service
as officials and employees of the Bureau of Health (Ministry of Health) and they
are for that reason not local but national officials under the direct supervision and
control of the Ministry of Health; 2) Opinion No. 177, Series of 1981, which is
specific and definitive that the private respondent is a national government
employee and the Ministry of Health should pay the merit increase awarded to
him. In this 1981 opinion, it was explained in detail how the said funds
corresponding to his merit increase could be legally disbursed contrary to the
unfounded speculations expressed by the petitioners.
Lastly, there is no basis in petitioners allegations that they cannot be compelled
by mandamus as the appropriation is not authorized by law and it is discretionary
on the part of the Ministry of the Budget whether or not to allocate. Respondent
Dr. Perez has been proven to be a national government official, hence covered by
the merit promotion plan of the government more particularly the Health Ministry
wherein private respondent is its lone beneficiary for the year 1980 in Region IV.
It thus becomes the ministerial duty of the Budget Minister to approve the
request for allotment. Having failed to do so, he could be compelled by
mandamus.
20.
Section 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution without
its advice and concurrence.
TERESITA FABIAN VS. HONORABLE ANIANO DESIERTO, G.R. No. 129742,
September 16, 1998)
Regalado, J.
Section 27 of RA 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides:
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a
petition for Certiorari within 10 days from receipt of the written notice of the
order, directive or decision or denial of the Motion for Reconsideration in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
Issue:
Is Section 27 of RA 6770 constitutional?
Held:
Section 27 of RA 6770 is unconstitutional since it increases the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without its advice and consent as provided
under Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. As explained in FIRST
LEPANTO CERAMICS INC. VS. CA, 237 SCRA 519, the aforesaid constitutional
provision was intended to give the Supreme Court a measure of control over
cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the enactment of
legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the
Court.
Appeal of cases decided by the Office of the Ombudsman covered by Section 27
of RA 6770 shall be filed with the Court of Appeals.
Read:

MANUEL ALBA VS. PEREZ, G.R. No. 65917, Sept. 24, 1987

21.
Sections 32. The Congress, shall, as early as possible, provide for a
system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the
people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any law or part
thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a
petition therefore signed by at least 10% of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of
the registered voters thereof.
Read again RA 6735 & SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC & PIRMA
Reference:
Political Law Reviewer by Atty. Larry D. Gacayan
College of Law, University of the Cordilleras
Baguio City
* Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
[1]
Annex B, id. at 52.
[2]
Annex C, id. at 53.
[3]
Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10,
2003, 415 SCRA 44, 133.
[4]
G.R. No. 67752, April 10, 1989, 171 SCRA 657.
[5]
G.R. No. 78716, September 22, 1987 (res).
[6]
Rollo (G.R. No. 169777), p. 117.
[7]
Supra note 39 at 136.
[8]
87 Phil. 29 (1950).
[9]
Supra at 45, citing McGrain v. Daugherty 273 US 135, 47 S. Ct. 319, 71
L.Ed. 580, 50 A.L.R. 1 (1927).
[10] Id. at 46.
[11] G.R. 89914, Nov. 20, 1991, 203 SCRA 767.
[12] Supra.
[13] Supra note 82 at 189.
[14] G.R. No. 74930, February 13, 1989, 170 SCRA 256.
[15][6]
Transcript of the September 26, 2007 Hearing of the respondent
Committees, pp.91-92.
[16][7]
Id., pp. 114-115.
[17][8]
Id., pp. 276-277.
[18][9]
See Letter dated January 30, 2008.
[19][10] 488 SCRA 1 (2006).
[20][11] 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
[21][12]
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to
acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the
Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and
transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be
unlawful: x x x
(c) Disclosure and/or misuse of confidential information.
Public officials and employees shall not use or divulge, confidential or classified
information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made
available to the public, either:
(1) To further their private interests, or give undue advantage to anyone; or
(2) To prejudice the public interest.
[22][13] SEC.
24.
Disqualification
by
reason
of
privileged
communication. The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in
confidence in the following cases. (e) A public officer cannot be examined during
his term of office or afterwards, as to communications made to him in official

confidence, when the court finds that the public interest would suffer by
disclosure.
[23][18]
Supra.
[24][19]
Ibid.
[25][20]
Ibid.
[26][21]
Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil 32 (1950)
[27][22]
Senate v. Ermita, p. 58.
[28][23] 5 U.S. C. 552
[29][24]
51 U.S. C. app.
[30][25] 433 Phil. 506 (2002).
[31][26]
G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998, (360 SCRA 132 ).
[32][27] Supra.
[33][28]
CRS Report for Congress, Presidential Claims of Executive
Privilege: History, Law, Practice and Recent Developments at p. 2.
[34][29]
418 U.S. 683.
[35][30] In Re: Sealed Case No. 96-3124, June 17, 1997.
[36][31]
Id.
[37][32]
CRS Report for Congress, Presidential Claims of Executive
Privilege: History, Law, Practice and Recent Developments at pp. 18-19.
[38][38] 360 Phil. 133 (1998).
[39][39]
Supra.
[40][40]
Section 18, Article VII.
[41][41]
Section 16, Article VII.
[42][42]
Section 19, Article VII.
[43][43]
Section 20 and 21, Article VII.
[44][44] CRS Report for Congress, Presidential Claims of Executive Privilege:
History, Law Practice and Recent Developments, supra..
[45][45] Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines,
A Commentary, 2003 Ed. p. 903.
[46][46] 159 U.S. App. DC. 58, 487 F. 2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
[47][47] U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)
[48][48]
Supra.
[49][50] Citing Section 7, Article 3 of the Constitution.
[50][51] Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and
omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution
and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions
of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful: x x x
( c) Disclosure and/or misuse of confidential information.
Public officials and employees shall not use or divulge, confidential or
classified information officially known to them by reason of their office
and not made available to the public, either:
(1) To further their private interests, or give undue advantage to
anyone; or
(2) To prejudice the public interest.
[51][52] Article 229. Revelation of secrets by an officer. Any public
officer who shall reveal any secret known to him by reason of his official capacity,
or shall wrongfully deliver papers or copies of papers of which he may have
charge and which should not be published, shall suffer the penalties of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods, perpetual special
disqualification and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos if the revelation of such
secrets or the delivery of such papers shall have caused serious damage to the
public interest; otherwise, the penalties of prision correccional in its minimum
period, temporary special disqualification and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos
shall be imposed.
[52][53] Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to
acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the

following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
(k) Divulging valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his
office or by him on account of his official position to unauthorized persons, or
releasing such information in advance of its authorized release date.
[53][54]
Sec. 24.
Disqualification by reason of privileged
communications. The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned
in confidence in the following case: x x x
(a) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards,
as to communications made to him in official confidence, when the court finds
that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure.
[54][55]
In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, supra., the Supreme Court
recognized matters which the Court has long considered as confidential such as
information on military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting national
security, and information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies
before the prosecution of the accused. It also stated that presidential
conversations, correspondences, or discussions during close-door cabinet
meetings which, like internal deliberations of the Supreme Court or other
collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either House of Congress, are
recognized as confidential. Such information cannot be pried-open by a co-equal
branch of government.