EN BANC

[G.R. No. 146319. October 26, 2001.]

BENJAMIN E. CAWALING, JR., Petitioner, v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
and Rep. Francis Joseph G. Escudero, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 146342. October 26, 2001.]
BENJAMIN E. CAWALING, JR., Petitioner, v. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, SECRETARY OF
THE

INTERIOR

AND

LOCAL

GOVERNMENT,

SECRETARY

OF

THE

DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, SOLICITOR GENERAL,

PROVINCE OF SORSOGON, MUNICIPALITY OF SORSOGON, MUNICIPALITY OF
BACON, Respondents.
DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us are two (2) separate petitions challenging the constitutionality of

Republic Act No. 8806 which created the City of Sorsogon and the validity of
the plebiscite conducted pursuant thereto.
On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A.
No. 8806, an "Act Creating The City Of Sorsogon By Merging The
Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And
Appropriating Funds Therefor." 1
Pursuant to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, 2 the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), on December 16, 2000, conducted a plebiscite in the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the matter for
ratification.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
On December 17, 2000, the Plebiscite City Board of Canvassers (PCBC)
proclaimed 3 the creation of the City of Sorsogon as having been ratified and
approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite. 4
Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer of the former Municipality of
Sorsogon, Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. filed on January 2, 2001 the present
petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 146319) seeking the annulment of the
plebiscite on the following grounds:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the required 120day period from the approval of R.A. 8806, in violation of Section 54 thereof;
and

B. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of twenty

(20) day extensive information campaign in the Municipalities of Bacon and
Sorsogon before conducting the plebiscite.
Two days after filing the said action, or on January 4, 2001, petitioner
instituted another petition (G.R. No. 146342), this time for prohibition
seeking to enjoin the further implementation of R.A. No. 8806 for being
unconstitutional, contending, in essence, that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates
Section 450(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (in relation to Section
10, Article X of the Constitution) which requires that only "a municipality or
a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city" ; and
2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of the City
of Sorsogon and the (b) abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon,
thereby violating the "one subject-one bill" rule prescribed by Section 26(1),
Article VI of the Constitution.
Hence, the present petitions which were later consolidated. 5
Significantly, during the pendency of these cases, specifically during the May
14, 2001 elections, the newly-created Sorsogon City had the first election of its
officials. Since then, the City Government of Sorsogon has been regularly
discharging its corporate and political powers pursuant to its charter, R.A.
No. 8806.
We shall first delve on petitioners constitutional challenge against R.A. No.
8806 in G.R No. 146342.
Every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. 6 This
presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins
upon the three coordinate departments of the Government a becoming
courtesy for each others acts. 7 The theory is that every law, being the joint
act of the Legislature and the Executive, has passed careful scrutiny to
ensure that it is in accord with the fundamental law. 8 This Court, however,
may declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional where a petitioner
has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a
doubtful or argumentative one. 9 In other words the grounds for nullity must

be beyond reasonable doubt, 10 for to doubt is to sustain. 11

This contention is devoid of merit.

Petitioner initially reject R.A. No. 8806 because it violates Section 10, Article
X of the Constitution which provides, inter alia:

Petitioners constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is erroneous.

The phrase "A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a
component city" is not a criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city
may be created. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, quoted earlier and
which petitioner cited in support of his posture, allows the merger of local
government units to create a province city, municipality or barangay in
accordance with the criteria established by the Code. Thus, Section 8 of the
Code distinctly provides:

"SECTION 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected." (Emphasis ours)
The criteria for the creation of a city is prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 (the Code), thus:
"SECTION 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may
be converted into a component city if it has an average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2)
consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following
requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the
Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as
certified by the National Statistics Office:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income
of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes
and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be
created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it
comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
exclusive of specific funds, transfers, and non-recurring income." (Emphasis ours)

Petitioner is not concerned whether the creation of Sorsogon City through

R.A. No. 8806 complied with the criteria set by the Code as to income,
population and land area. What he is assailing is its mode of creation. He
contends that under Section 450(a) of the Code, a component city may be
created only by converting "a municipality or a cluster of barangays," not by
merging two municipalities, as what R.A. No. 8806 has done.

"SECTION 8. Division and Merger. Division and merger of existing local government
units shall comply with the same requirements herein prescribed for their creation:
Provided, however, That such division shall not reduce the income, population, or land area
of the local government unit or units concerned to less than the minimum requirements
prescribed in this Code: Provided, further, That the income classification of the original local
government unit or units shall not fall below its current income classification prior to such
division. . . . ." (Emphasis ours)

Verily, the creation of an entirely new local government unit through a

division or a merger of existing local government units is recognized under
the Constitution, provided that such merger or division shall comply with the
requirements prescribed by the Code.
Petitioner further submits that, in any case, there is no "compelling" reason
for merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in order to create the
City of Sorsogon considering that the Municipality of Sorsogon alone already
qualifies to be upgraded to a component city. This argument goes into the
wisdom of R.A. No. 8806, a matter which we are not competent to rule. In
Angara v. Electoral Commission, 12 this Court, through Justice Jose P.
Laurel, made it clear that "the judiciary does not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation." In the exercise of judicial power,
we are allowed only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable," 13 and "may not annul an act of the
political departments simply because we feel it is unwise or impractical." 14
Next, petitioner assails R.A. No. 8806 since it contravenes the "one subjectone bill" rule enunciated in Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution, to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." (Emphasis ours)

plebiscite conducted by the COMELEC for the ratification of the creation of

Sorsogon City.

Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 8806 actually embraces two principal
subjects which are: (1) the creation of the City of Sorsogon, and (2) the
abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon. While the title of the
Act sufficiently informs the public about the creation of Sorsogon City,
petitioner claims that no such information has been provided on the abolition
of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Petitioner asserts that the plebiscite required by R.A. No. 8806 should be
conducted within 120 days from the "approval" of said Act per express
provision of its Section 54, viz:

The argument is far from persuasive. Contrary to petitioners assertion, there

is only one subject embraced in the title of the law, that is, the creation of the
City of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon due to their merger is not a subject
separate and distinct from the creation of Sorsogon City. Such
abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and inevitable consequence of
the merger. Otherwise put, it is the necessary means by which the City of
Sorsogon was created. Hence, the title of the law, "An Act Creating the City of
Sorsogon by Merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in the
Province of Sorsogon, and Appropriating Funds Therefor," cannot be said to
exclude the incidental effect of abolishing the two municipalities, nor can it be
considered to have deprived the public of fair information on this
consequence.
It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the
Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as
to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein. 15 The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive
enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, 16
and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope
and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. 17 Moreover, this
Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of
the rule "so as not to cripple or impede legislation." 18
Consequently, we hold that petitioner has failed to present clear and
convincing proof to defeat the presumption of constitutionality of R.A. No.
8806.
We now turn to G.R. No. 146319 wherein petitioner assails the validity of the

"SECTION 54. Plebiscite. The City of Sorsogon shall acquire corporate existence upon the
ratification of its creation by a majority of the votes cast by the qualified voters in a
plebiscite to be conducted in the present municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon within one
hundred twenty (120) days from the approval of this Act. . . . ." (Emphasis ours)

The Act was approved on August 16, 2000 by former President Joseph E.
Estrada. Thus, petitioner claims, the December 16, 2000 plebiscite was
conducted one (1) day late from the expiration of the 120-day period after the
approval of the Act. This 120-day period having expired without a plebiscite
being conducted, the Act itself expired and could no longer be ratified and
approved in the plebiscite held on December 16, 2000.
In its comment, the COMELEC asserts that it scheduled the plebiscite on
December 16, 2000 based on the date of the effectivity of the Act. Section 65
of the Act states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 65. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect upon its publication in
at least two (2) newspapers of general and local circulation."cralaw virtua1aw
library
The law was first published in the August 25, 2000 issue of TODAY a
newspaper of general circulation. Then on September 01, 2000, it was
published in a newspaper of local circulation in the Province of Sorsogon.
Thus, the publication of the law was completed on September 1, 2000, which
date, according to the COMELEC, should be the reckoning point in
determining the 120-day period within which to conduct the plebiscite, not
from the date of its approval (August 16, 2000) when the law had not yet been
published. The COMELEC argues that since publication is indispensable for
the effectivity of a law, citing the landmark case of Taada v. Tuvera, 19 it
could only schedule the plebiscite after the Act took effect. Thus, the
COMELEC concludes, the December 16, 2000 plebiscite was well within the
120-day period from the effectivity of the law on September 1, 2000.

The COMELEC is correct.

In addition, Section 10 of the Code provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 10. Plebiscite Requirement. No creation, division, merger,
abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units
shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. Such
plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections within one
hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the effectivity of the law or
ordinance affecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another
date." (Emphasis ours)
Quite plainly, the last sentence of Section 10 mandates that the plebiscite
shall be conducted within 120 days from the date of the effectivity of the law,
not from its approval. While the same provision allows a law or ordinance to
fix "another date" for conducting a plebiscite, still such date must be reckoned
from the date of the effectivity of the law.
Consequently, the word "approval" in Section 54 of R.A. No. 8806, which
should be read together with Section 65 (effectivity of the Act) thereof, could
only mean "effectivity" as used and contemplated in Section 10 of the Code.
This construction is in accord with the fundamental rule that all provisions of
the laws relating to the same subject should be read together and reconciled
to avoid inconsistency or repugnancy to established jurisprudence. As we
stated in Taada:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ARTICLE 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take
effect one year after such publication.

After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties,
both on the original petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the
conclusion, and so hold, that the clause unless it is otherwise provided refers
to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself,
which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any
other date, without its previous publication." (Emphasis supplied)
To give Section 54 a literal and strict interpretation would in effect make the

Act effective even before its publication, which scenario is precisely abhorred
in Taada.
Lastly, petitioner alleges that the COMELEC failed to conduct an extensive
information campaign on the proposed Sorsogon cityhood 20 days prior to the
scheduled plebiscite as required by Article 11 (b.4.ii), Rule II of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Code. However, no proof whatsoever was
presented by petitioner to substantiate his allegation. Consequently, we
sustain the presumption 20 that the COMELEC regularly performed or
complied with its duty under the law in conducting the plebiscite.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs
against petitioner.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25811 April 3, 1968
THE CENTRAL (POBLACION) BARRIO, CITY OF DAVAO,
represented by its BARRIO CAPTAIN, HONORIO B. GARCIA,
Petitioner-Appellant, vs. CITY TREASURER, MAXIMO ASISTIDO, THE
HON. CITY COUNCIL, THE HON. CITY AUDITOR, ATTY. FELIX
PEPITO and the HON. CITY MAYOR, CARMELO PORRAS,
respondents-appellees.
Jesus V. Occena, Rufino Mayor and Vicente C. Garcia for petitioner-appellant.
The City Attorney and Gonzalo Latorilla for respondents-appellees.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:chanrobles virtual law library
On August 29, 1962, the City of Davao passed Resolution No. 732 declaring as
officially and legally existing, pursuant to Republic Act 2370, the several
barrios of the city. Among these were barrios Agdao, Bucana and
Poblacion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Subsequently, barrio Poblacion, also called barrio Central, claiming that it
was created under Section 27 of the Code of Mindanao and Sulu, asked from
Davao City for its alleged 10% share in taxes collected on real property
located within the barrio, as provided in Section 23 of Republic Act 3590.
Davao City's Treasurer, however, refused to release the share for said barrio,
on the ground that the amount pertaining to said barrio, in relation to those

of barrios Agdao and Bucana, cannot be determined, because the respective

boundaries of said barrios were not yet fixed as required by
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Stated otherwise, Davao City's stand was that the amount covering the 10%
share of these three barrios combined has been allocated, but it cannot be
determined how much thereof pertains to each of said barrios, because their
boundaries not having been fixed as regards each other, it could not be
determined how much of the taxes were collected from real properties located
in
each
of
the
three
aforesaid
barrios,
taken
separately.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On September 3, 1964, however, the Secretary of Finance, acting on the
request of the same barrio Central or Poblacion for release of its 10% share in
real property taxes, stated that barrios Agdao and Bucana were created only
in 1963 in violation of Republic Act 2370 that prohibited creation of barrios
out of chartered cities, so that said barrios are not recognized under Republic
Act 3590 providing for the abovementioned share of 10% in realty taxes.
Accordingly, he ruled that the allocated 10% share of taxes for barrios Agdao,
Bucana and Central should accrue and be given to barrio Central only, after
all conditions therefor are met.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
On December 2, 1964, barrio Central filed in the Court of First Instance of
Davao, thru its barrio captain, a petition for declaratory relief with
mandamus, against Davao City's Treasurer, Council, Auditor and Mayor,
alleging the facts mentioned earlier in this decision. Among others, the
petition questioned the legality of Resolution No. 732 of Davao City's Council
creating barrios Agdao and Bucana; the actuations of the Auditor in passing
in audit an alleged expenditure of P50,000 out of the 10% fund; and the
failure of the council to delimit the territorial boundaries of the three barrios
concerned. And it prayed that the court order payment to petitioner by
respondents of its 10% share in realty taxes as provided by Republic Act
3590, declare illegal the creation of barrios Agdao and Bucana, and prohibit
the
Auditor
from
approving
expenditures
out
of
its
10%
share.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Respondents moved to dismiss but their motion was denied. On January 29,
1965, respondents answered, stating among other averments, that barrio
Central is inexistent or not a part of Davao City; that there are other barrios
claiming the 10% share in real property taxes corresponding to the territory
claimed by petitioner; that Republic Act 3590 providing for the 10% share
applies only to barrios in municipalities and municipal districts, not to those

in cities; and that the alleged expenditure in question was legal and not taken
from
the
10%
share
allocated
for
barrios.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
After issues were thus joined the case was set for trial. On August 2, 1965,
however, the Court, upon motion of the Fiscal, dismissed the case without
prejudice, on the ground that the issues were rendered academic by the
passage of Republic Act 4354, on June 19, 1965, amending the Charter of
Davao City. Petitioner, having failed in its motion for reconsideration, took
the present appeal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
At issue is the legal question of the propriety or correctness of the dismissal
order.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Republic Act 4354, in Section 2, enumerated the barrios comprising the City
of Davao. Petitioner barrio Central or Poblacion was not mentioned therein.
Accordingly, there prima facie arises the conclusion that said law abolished
barrio Central as part of Davao City. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The
court a quo had sufficient and tenable reason to dismiss the suit in the face of
said law, for being academic. A non-existent barrio, or a barrio not situated in
Davao City, cannot present a claim against it or its officials for a share in
taxes under Republic Act 3590. Said law must be presumed, until squarely
challenged and declared by the courts to be otherwise, as constitutional,
especially because the power to create or abolish municipal corporations
resides in Congress (Mendenilla v. Onandia, L-17803, June 30, 1962).
Petitioner may of course assail the constitutionality of said new law. The
present suit, however, is not for that purpose. Nothing in the pleadings
questions said law's validity, for the reason that said law came after the
pleadings were joined. Neither was there amendment to said pleadings. The
court a quo, therefore, rightly dismissed the present suit, without prejudice,
that is, not thereby precluding the filing of a suit to assail the validity of
Republic Act 4354.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of dismissal is hereby affirmed. No costs.
So ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and
Fernandez, JJ., concur.Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 165547 : January 24, 2007]
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, as represented by its Secretary, RENE
C. VILLA, Petitioner, v. SARANGANI AGRICULTURAL CO., INC., ACIL
CORPORATION, NICASIO ALCANTARA and TOMAS ALCANTARA, Respondents.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review 1 by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
seeking the reversal of the Decision and Resolution, dated July 19, 2004 and
September 24, 2004, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
79899, entitled "Sarangani Agricultural Co, Inc., et al. v. Hon. Manuel Domingo,
et al."
Respondents are the owners of the lands in question which have been reclassified
from agricultural into non-agricultural uses by virtue of a municipal zoning
ordinance, and are included in the comprehensive land use plan of the
Municipality of Alabel.
The antecedents are as follows:
The Province of Sarangani was created pursuant to Republic Act No. 7228 on
March 16, 1992, composed of seven (7) municipalities, namely, Alabel, Glan,
Maasin, Maitum, Malapatan, Malungon and Kiamba which were segregated from
the Province of South Cotabato. Under said Act, the Municipality of Alabel was
made the capital of the new province where the capitol building and all other
national and provincial offices shall be established.2
On February 14, 1997, the Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel passed Resolution No.
97-08 or "Resolution Adopting and Endorsing the Ten-Year Municipal
Comprehensive Development Plan (MCDP 1995-2005) of the Municipality of
Alabel and Its Land Use Development Plan and Zoning Ordinance for Adoption
and Approval of the Provincial Governor, Honorable Priscilla L. Chiongbian, Thru
The Honorable Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sarangani Province."
On January 30, 1998, pursuant to Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 08, Series of
1997, and to accelerate the development and urbanization of Alabel, the
Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel passed Resolution No. 98-03 reclassifying lots that
were located within the built-up areas, based on the 1995-2005 Land Use Plan of
the municipality, from agricultural to non-agricultural uses.3
On March 2, 1998, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sarangani approved
Resolution No. 98-018 or the "Resolution Adopting the Ten-Year Municipal
Comprehensive Development Plan (MCDP 1995-2205) and the Land Use
Development Plan and Zoning Ordinance of the Municipality of Alabel, Sarangani
Per Resolution No. 97-08 and Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08, S. of 1997 of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel." A portion of the area involving 376.5424 hectares,
however, was covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657)
commercial farms deferment scheme.4
The Zoning Certification issued by the office of the Municipal Planning and
Development Council (MPDC) showed that respondents' properties located at
Barangay Maribulan, Alabel were among those reclassified from agricultural and
pasture land to residential, commercial institutional, light industrial and open

space in the 1995-2005 land use plan of Alabel.5

On July 2, 1998, respondent Sarangani Agricultural Company, Inc. (SACI) filed an
application for land use conversion of the following parcels of land with an
aggregate area of 1,005 hectares:
Registered
Owner

TCT No.

Lot
No.

Area
(Ha.)

Area
Applied
(Ha.)

SACI

T-7207

1-C

52.4365

52.4365

SACI

T -48807 (T4807)

181.3353

181.3353

SAC I

T -48808 (T4808)

281.0874

281.0874

SACI

T -48809 (T4809)

241.7880

241.7880

SAC I

T-48810 (T-4810)

40.6738

40.6738

SACI

T -48811 (T4811)

137.0340

137.0340

SACI

T-48812 (T-4812)

12.3265

12.3265

Nicasio
Alcantara

T - (10885) T44538

10

20.9149

20.9149

SACI

T-9210

12.1425

12.1425

Tomas
Alcantara

T-14359 (T-1185)

39

10.9390

10.9390

Nicasio
Alcantara

Untitled

53

5.0672

5.0672

ACIL
Corporation

T - (41758) (T4150)

806

3.3115

3.3115

SACI

Untitled

807

6.7871

6.7871

Accompanying SACI's application for conversion were the documents required

under the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative Order No. 7,
Series of 1997.6
Subsequently, a Site Inspection Report was prepared by the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) Regional Office (Region XI) and was indorsed to
DAR Secretary Horacio R. Morales, Jr.
On March 16, 1999, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) and the

Provincial Land Use Technical Committee (PLUTC)7 conducted an inspection of

the subject properties. In a Memorandum dated July 9, 1999, the PLUTC
recommended that SACI's application be made subject to the following conditions:
1) presentation by SACI of its development plan; 2) submission of the lacking
documents; 3) re-survey and segregation of the property according to use or
project in coordination with the DAR Regional Office; and, 4) submission of the
resulting map indicating the technical description of the area per actual
use/project attested by the Regional Director.
Meanwhile, on March 22, 1999, members of the Sarangani Agrarian Reform
Beneficiaries Association, Inc. (SARBAI) sent a letter-petition to the DAR
Secretary oppposing the application for land use conversion filed by SACI.
SARBAI alleged that its members were merely forced to sign the waiver of rights,
considering that the commercial farm deferment period ended on June 15, 1998.
Later, an "Urgent Petition for the Denial of Land Use Conversion Application of
Banana Commercial Farm of SACI" was filed by SARBAI and was received by the
PARC Secretariat on July 14, 1999.
In the March 30, 2000 deliberation of the PLUTC, the committee agreed to
recommend the disapproval of 158.0672 hectares that had been planted with
bananas and coconuts. The committee noted that said portion of the property was
still viable for agriculture, irrigated, with Notice of Coverage, and under protest or
with opposition from SARBAI. It likewise recommended that the decision as to
the rest of the area applied for conversion shall be deferred subject to the
submission of the following within a period of thirty (30) days: 1) a five-year
comprehensive development plan; 2) a survey plan signed by the Regional
Technical Director of Land Management Service and noted by the DAR Regional
Director (Region XI); 3) SACI's proof of undertaking, which will contain the
package of benefits it intends to give to the affected farm workers except those
working in the banana plantation; 4) the concurrence of all the workers who
would be affected by the proposed conversion, which concurrence should be noted
by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) and acknowledged by a notary
public.
On its part, SACI contended that 1) its projects were aligned to address the
current and anticipated commercial and residential needs of Sarangani province,
and the removal of any portion of its property included in its comprehensive
development plan will affect the viability of the plan; 2) the banana plantations
will be transformed into a socialized housing subdivision which will be made
available to the displaced workers and the other low income earners of Alabel; 3)
the company will construct and install power generation facilities in the entire
area; 4) at the time the application for land use conversion was filed, no Notice of
Coverage was ever issued by DAR, and the subsequent issuance of such notice was
highly irregular because the same may be issued only after the final resolution of
the application for land use conversion; and 5) the previous Order of Deferment

cannot be a legal barrier to the filing of an application for land use conversion.
On November 9, 2000, DAR Secretary Horacio R. Morales, Jr. denied SACI's
application for land use conversion. The pertinent portion of the Order reads:
'The proponent also submitted another DA certification stating that 12 parcels of
land (Lot Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 807, 53, 10, 39 and 806) with an area of 816.7401
hectares, located at Maribulan, Alabel, Sarangani are part of expansion for
urbanizing areas. Though discussed on several meetings, no decision was made on
the application since the applicant was not able to comply with the documentary
requirements and clarify the issues raised by the Committee.
[I]n [the] 30 March 2000 Meeting of the PLUTC, the Committee deliberated again
[on] the subject application and agreed to recommend the disapproval of 158.0672
hectares area planted to banana[s] and coconuts. The Committee noted that said
portion of the property is still viable for agriculture, irrigated, with Notice of
Coverage and with protest or opposition from SARBAI. The Committee also
agreed to request the DAR to determine the metes and bounds of the area planted
to banana[s] and coconuts vis - -vis areas devoted to other enterprises. Relative
to the rest of the area applied for conversion, the committee deferred its decision
subject to the submission of a 5-year comprehensive development plan, showing
among others, the schedule of development by phase, the specific lots involved and
the corresponding proposed use.
'The Committee acceded to the request of SACI and deferred its recommendation
to deny conversion of that portion of the property planted to banana[s] and
coconut[s] pending submission of a manifesto or SACI's proof of undertaking that
it will compensate farm workers affected by showing, among others, the schedule
of development by phase, the specific lots involved and the corresponding proposed
use [of] the conversion, concurred by the workers/oppositors, noted by the MARO
and duly notarized. The Committee also requested SACI to submit details of the
pomelo farm in Malandag being offered as a replacement farm for the relocation of
the farm workers. SACI was given a 30-day period to submit these documents.
SACI, however, failed to submit the oath of undertaking to pay disturbance
compensation to affected workers being required by the Committee and as
provided under DAR Administrative Order No. 01, Series of 1999. Instead, SACI
submitted an undertaking executed by the affected workers stating that they are
amenable to the package of benefits offered by the company. Nevertheless, those
who executed the deed of undertaking did not represent the majority of the farm
workers. Out of the 95 regular banana workers only 45 and eight (8) supervisors
including four (4) workers who were not included in the workers' master list of
SACI executed a deed of undertaking. As regards the 105-hectare pomelo farm,
SACI failed to affirm whether they are going to pursue their offer. Likewise, DAR
Region XI reported that coverage of the same area is on-going, and a different
group of potential beneficiaries have already been identified. Therefore, it could no
longer be offered as a relocation site. Foregoing considered, the Committee, during

its 18 August 2000 Meeting, sustained its earlier recommendation to deny the
conversion of that portion of the property planted to bananas and coconuts.
With regard to the rest. of the area, the Committee deferred its decision subject to
the delineation by the SACI of the total area that they can develop within the
allowed five' -year period. Likewise, the PLUTC is requesting the SACI to submit
a revised five-year development plan that will show the schedule of development
by phase, by year, and the proposed use for each parcel of land.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby ordered that:
1. The application filed by the Sarangani Agricultural Company, Inc. (SACI),
represented by Cynthia Adao-Prat, involving parcels of land planted to banana[s]
and coconut[s] and with Notice of Coverage identified as TCT Nos. T-10885
(20.9149 ha.), T-14359 (10.9390 ha.), T-41718 (3.3115 ha.), OCT No. V-19574 or T9210 (12.1425 ha.), Lot 807 (6.7871 ha.) and portion of P-V-125 (95.00 ha.) and
[an] area covered by Lot 53 (5.0672 ha.) with an aggregate area of 154.622
[actually it is 154.1622] hectares is hereby DENIED. The Dar Regional Office of
Region XI is hereby instructed to determine the metes and bounds of the area
subject for distribution to the qualified FWBs.
2. The resolution of the application involving the rest of the area applied for
conversion is DEFERRED pending submission by the applicant of a revised fiveyear development plan indicating the specific use of each parcel of land.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above decision but the same
was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution, dated September 24, 2004.
Their Motion for Reconsideration of the above Order having been denied,
respondents appealed to the Office of the President (O.P. Case No. 02-1-47.4,
alleging that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform committed serious errors in 1)
finding that a notice of coverage had been issued for the banana area of the
landholdings; 2) giving undue significance to the protest or opposition by SARBAI;
3) requiring a deed of undertaking even after applicant-appellant's written
commitment to pay whatever lawful obligation SACI may incur as a consequence
of the conversion; 4) holding that farms with commercial farm deferment cannot
be applied for conversion; 5) ruling that irrigated lands suitable for agriculture
were disqualified for conversion; and 6) ruling that applicant - 'appellant had not
submitted a five-year development plan.9
In a Decision dated June 30, 2003, the Office of the President through
Presidential Assistant Manuel C. Domingo dismissed the appeal and affirmed in
toto the challenged DAR Orders. Respondents' motion for reconsideration was
denied,10 so they filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review raising
substantially the same issues.
On July 19, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision granting the petition,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby GIVEN DUE

COURSE. Consequently, the assailed Decision and Order dated June 30, 2003
and September 12, 2003, respectively, of the Office of the President, as well as the
Orders dated November 9, 2000 and August 28, 2002 of the DAR Secretary are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the DAR directs the MARO of
Alabel, Sarangani to proceed with the distribution of the banana and coconut
areas subject of the June 16, 1998 Notice of Coverage. The Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby directed to issue a conversion order
covering the aforesaid area under the terms and conditions as provided in
pertinent guidelines of the department. As to the rest of the area applied for
conversion, action on which has been deferred, the DAR Regional Office (DAR
Region No. XI) is hereby DIRECTED to expedite the processing and evaluation of
petitioners' land use conversion application in accordance with the provisions of
DAR AO No.7, Series of 1997, and DAR AO No. 01-99 whenever the provisions of
the latter issuance are made applicable to those applications filed before its
effectivity.
The DAR Secretary and all officers and employees acting on his behalf are hereby
enjoined from proceeding with the distribution of petitioners' lands under
compulsory acquisition provided in Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 6657. Whatever actions
already taken in pursuance of the June 16, 1998 Notice of Coverage under CARP
are hereby nullified for DAR's failure to observe due process therein.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.11
Hence, this petition alleging that the Court of Appeals erred:
I
WHEN IT RULED THAT THE JUNE 16, 1998 NOTICE OF COVERAGE WAS
ILLEGAL AS DAR ALLEGEDLY FAILED TO OBSERVE DUE PROCESS.
II
WHEN IT RULED THAT DAR SHOULD USE THE COMPREHENSIVE LAND
USE PLANS AND ACCOMPANYING ORDINANCE OF THE LOCAL
SANGGUNIAN AS PRIMARY REFERENCE SO AS NOT TO DEFEAT THE
VERY PURPOSE OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT (LGU) CONCERNED
IN RECLASSIFYING CERTAIN AREAS TO ACHIEVE SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC BENEFITS IN PURSUANCE TO ITS MANDATE TOWARDS THE
GENERAL WELFARE.
III
WHEN IT FAILED TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE BASIC
PROVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF LAW WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO
THE
REQUIREMENTS
OR
PRECONDITIONS
FOR
LAND
CLASSIFICATION/CONVERSION AND THE BASIC MANDATE OF THE CARP.
With regard to the first issue on due process, this Court holds that, under the
circumstances, a notice of coverage is not an indispensable requirement before
DAR can acquire the subject lots or commercial farms, which are covered by a

deferment period12 under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or

R.A. No 6657 upon its effectivity on June 15, 1998. The pertinent provision of the
law states:
Sec. 11. Commercial Farming. - Commercial farms, which are private agricultural
lands devoted to saltbeds, fruit farms, orchards, vegetables and cut-flower farms,
cacao, coffee and rubber plantations, shall be subject to immediate compulsory
acquisition and distribution after ten (10) years from the effectivity of this Act. 13
In the case of new farms, the ten-year period shall begin from the first year of
commercial production and operation, as determined by the DAR. During the tenyear period, the Government shall initiate steps necessary to acquire these lands,
upon payment of just compensation for the land and the improvements thereon,
preferably in favor of organized cooperatives or associations, which shall
thereafter manage the said lands for the workers-beneficiaries. (AS amended by
R.A. 7881; Rules and regulations on the acquisition, valuation compensation and
distribution of deferred commercial farms - DAR AO No. 09, s. 1998)
DAR Administrative Order No.9, Series of 1998,14 on the Rules and Regulations
on the Acquisition, Valuation, Compensation and Distribution of Deferred
Commercial Farms applies to all commercial farms as defined under Section 11 of
R.A. No. 6657:15
SEC. 2. Statement of Policies. - The acquisition, valuation, compensation,
distribution, operation and management of deferred commercial farms shall be
governed by the following policies:
(a) All commercial farms whose deferment expired as of June 15, 1998 shall be
subject to immediate acquisition and distribution under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Those whose deferments have yet to expire
will be acquired and distributed only upon expiration of their respective
deferment period as originally determined by the Department of Agrarian reform
(DAR), or earlier if the DAR determines that the purpose for which it was deferred
no longer exists and revokes its deferment;
The process of acquisition of these commercial farms by DAR is specifically
provided under Article III, Section 9 of the above administrative order, to wit:
SEC. 9. Procedure for Acquisition.' The acquisition of deferred commercial farms
shall be governed by the following procedures:
(a) Voluntary Offer to Sell/Compulsory Acquisition
1) The Order of Deferment previously issued over the landholding shall serve, upon
expiration of the deferment period of the subject commercial farm, as the Notice of
Coverage,[16] supported by the Compliance Work Program and Summary of
Exceptions (Form A) originally submitted with the approved deferment
application. However, for record purposes, the landowner shall be served a Notice
of Expiration of Deferment (Annex 2) which shall contain a reminder of his right
of retention, should he wish to exercise the same;
2) In general, the procedure for acquisition shall follow DAR Administrative Order

No. 01, Series of 1998, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 02, Series of
1996, entitled "Revised Rules and Procedures governing the Acquisition of
Agricultural Lands subject of Voluntary offer to Sell and Compulsory Acquisition
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657," subject to certain modifications intended to
expedite the process as provided herein.
Clearly, it was unnecessary for petitioner to issue a notice of coverage to
respondents in order to place the properties in question under CARP coverage.
Hence, the contention by respondents that due process was not duly observed by
petitioner must fail. Accordingly, the denial of the application for conversion must
be upheld.
As regards the second issue, DAR Administrative Order No. 7, Series of 1997, or
the Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands
to Non-agricultural Uses prescribes the guidelines for land use conversion:
VI. POLICIES AND GUIDELINES
A.'
B. General Guidelines
b) Conversion may be allowed if at the time of the application, the lands are
reclassified as commercial, industrial, residential or other non-agricultural in the
new or revised town plans promulgated by the local government unit (LGU) and
approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) or by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) after June 15, 1988, in accordance with Section
20 of R.A. No. 7160, as implemented by MC No. 54, and Executive Order No. 72,
Series of 199317 of the Office of the President.
In connection with the afore-stated administrative order, Section 20 of Republic
Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, empowers
the local government units to reclassify agricultural lands:
Sec. 20. Reclassification of Lands. - (a) A city or municipality may, through an
ordinance passed by the Sanggunian after conducting public hearings for the
purpose, authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands and provide for the
manner of their utilization or disposition in the following cases: (1) when the land
ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes as
determined by the Department of Agriculture or (2) where the land shall have
substantially greater economic value for residential, commercial, or industrial
purposes, as determined by the Sanggunian concerned: Provided, That such
reclassification shall be limited to the following percentage of the total agricultural
land area at the time of the passage of the ordinance:
(1) For highly urbanized and independent component cities, FIFTEEN PERCENT
(15%);
(2) For component cities and first to third class municipalities, ten percent (10%),
and
(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent (5%); Provided further,
That agricultural lands distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries pursuant to

Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as "The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law," shall not be affected by the said reclassification and the conversion of such
lands into other purposes shall be governed by Section 65 of said Act.
(c) The local government units shall in conformity with existing laws, continue to
prepare their respective comprehensive land use plans enacted though zoning
ordinances which shall be the primary and dominant bases for the future use of
land resources: Provided, That the requirements for food production, human
settlements, and industrial expansion shall be taken into consideration in the
preparation of such plans.rbl rl l lbrr
(e) Nothing in this section shall be construed as repealing, amending or modifying
in any manner the provisions of R.A. No. 6657.18
Memorandum Circular No. 54 "Prescribing the Guidelines Governing Section 20
of R.A. No. 7160 Otherwise Known as the Local Government Code of 1991
Authorizing Cities and Municipalities to Reclassify Agricultural Lands Into NonAgricultural Uses" issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 8, 1993 specified
the scope and limitations on the power of the cities and municipalities to
reclassify agricultural lands into other uses. It provided that all ordinances
authorizing reclassification of agricultural lands shall be subject to the review and
approval of the province in the case of component cities or municipalities, or by
the HLURB for highly urbanized or independent component cities in accordance
with Executive Order No. 72, Series of 1993, thus:
SECTION 4. Use of the comprehensive land use plans 19 and ordinances as
primary reference documents in land use conversions. - Pursuant to RA 6657 and
EO 129-A, actions on applications for land use conversions on individual
landholdings shall remain as the responsibility of DAR, which shall utilize as its
primary reference documents the comprehensive land use plans and
accompanying ordinance passed upon and approved by the LGUs concerned,
together with the National Land Use Policy.
Hence, with regard to agricultural lands that have been reclassified for nonagricultural uses by the local government unit concerned, the CA is correct in
declaring that DAR should refer to the comprehensive land use plans and the
ordinances of the Sanggunian in assessing land use conversion applications, thus:
Construing Sec. 20 of the Local Government Code and the subsequent
administrative issuances implementing the same, we are of the opinion that while
the DAR retains the responsibility for approving or disapproving applications for
land use conversion filed by individual landowners on their landholdings, the
exercise of such authority should be confined to compliance with the requirements
and limitations under existing laws and regulations, such as the allowable
percentage of agricultural [area] to be reclassified, ensuring sufficient food
production, areas non-negotiable for conversion and those falling under
environmentally critical areas or highly restricted for conversion under the NIPAS
law. Definitely, the DAR's power in such cases may not be exercised in such a

manner as to defeat the very purpose of the LGU concerned in reclassifying

certain areas to achieve social and economic benefits in pursuit of its mandate
towards the general welfare. Precisely, therefore, the DAR is required to use the
comprehensive land use plans and accompanying ordinances of the local
Sanggunian as primary references in evaluating applications for land use
conversion filed by individual landowners. In this case, petitioners have already
complied with the standard requirements laid down under the applicable rules
and regulations of the DAR....20
The conversion of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses shall be strictly
regulated and may be allowed only when the conditions prescribed under R.A. No.
6657 are present.21 In this regard, the Court agrees with the ratiocination of the
CA that DAR's scope of authority in assessing land use conversion applications is
limited to examining whether the requirements prescribed by law and existing
rules and regulations have been complied with. This holds true in the present
case where, because of the creation of the Province of Sarangani and in view of its
thrust to urbanize, particularly its provincial capital which is the Municipality of
Alabel, the local government has reclassified certain portions of its land area from
agricultural to non-agricultural. Thus, to reiterate, in accordance with E.O. No.
72, Series of 1993, and subject to the limitations prescribed by law, DAR should
utilize the comprehensive land use plans in evaluating the land use conversion
application of respondents whose lands have already been reclassified by the local
government for non - 'agricultural uses.
This is not to say, however, that every property of respondents which is included
in the comprehensive land use plan of the Municipality of Alabel shall be
automatically granted non-coverage. As mentioned earlier, said application is
subject to the limitations and conditions prescribed by law. One such limitation
that is present here is that a portion of respondents' property of 376.5424
hectares, a portion totaling 154.622 [or 154.1622] hectares which are planted to
bananas and coconuts, are covered by CARL's ten-year deferment scheme, which
has expired on June 15, 1998. By law, these lands are subject to redistribution to
CARP beneficiaries upon the lapse of the ten-year period, counted from the date of
the effectivity of the CARL or R.A. No. 6657 on June 15, 1988, which was way
before the creation of the Province of Sarangani and the eventual reclassification
of the agricultural lands into non-agricultural in the Municipality of Alabel where
respondents' properties are located.
In short, the creation of the new Province of Sarangani, and the reclassification
that was effected by the Municipality of Alabel did not operate to supersede the
applicable provisions of R.A. No. 6657.
Moreover, Section 20 of the LGC of 1991 on the reclassification of lands explicitly
states that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed as repealing, amending or
modifying in any manner the provisions of R.A. No. 6657." Thus, where the law
speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation.

There is only room for application.22

In view of the foregoing, the Court deems it unnecessary to discuss the third issue
presented in the petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED insofar as the issue on due
process is concerned. In connection with this, the denial by the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) of respondents' application for conversion with regard to
the 154.622 [or 154.1622] hectares, the deferment period of which has already
expired, is AFFIRMED; and the Orders of the DAR dated November 9, 2000 and
August 28, 2002, directing the MARO of Alabel, Sarangani to proceed with the
distribution of the banana and coconut areas subject of the June 16, 1998 Notice
of Coverage, are REINSTATED. The Decision and Resolution, dated July 19, 2004
and September 24, 2004, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
79899, are hereby MODIFIED accordingly.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Sec. 2. Province of Davao Occidental. There is hereby created a new province

from the present Province of Davao del Sur to be known as the Province of Davao
Occidental, consisting of the municipalities of Sta. Maria, Malita, Don Marcelino,
Jose Abad Santos and Sarangani. The territorial jurisdiction of the Province of
Davao Occidental shall be within the present metes and bounds of all the
municipalities that comprise the Province of Davao Occidental.
xxxx

EN BANC

G.R. No. 209185, October 25, 2013

MARC

DOUGLAS

ELECTIONS,

IV

C.

CAGAS,

REPRESENTED

BY

Petitioner,
ITS

v.

COMMISSION

CHAIRMAN,

ATTY.

ON

SIXTO

BRILLANTES, JR., AND THE PROVINCIAL ELECTION OFFICER OF

DAVAO DEL SUR, REPRESENTED BY ATTY. MA. FEBES BARLAAN,
Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:

This Resolution resolves the Petition for Prohibition,1 filed by Marc Douglas IV C.
Cagas (Cagas), in his capacity as taxpayer, to prohibit the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) from conducting a plebiscite for the creation of the
province of Davao Occidental simultaneously with the 28 October 2013 Barangay
Elections within the whole province of Davao del Sur, except in Davao City.
Cagas, while he was representative of the first legislative district of Davao del
Sur, filed with Hon. Franklin Bautista, then representative of the second
legislative district of the same province, House Bill No. 4451 (H.B. No. 4451), a
bill creating the province of Davao Occidental. H.B. No. 4451 was signed into law
as Republic Act No. 10360 (R.A. No. 10360), the Charter of the Province of Davao
Occidental.
Sections 2 and 7 of R.A. No. 10360 provide for the composition of the new
provinces of Davao Occidental and Davao del Sur:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Sec. 7. Legislative District. The Province of Davao Occidental shall have its own
legislative district to commence in the next national and local elections after the
effectivity of this Charter. Henceforth, the municipalities of Sta. Maria, Malita,
Don Marcelino, Jose Abad Santos and Sarangani shall comprise the Lone
Legislative District of the Province of Davao Occidental while the City of Digos
and the municipalities of Malalag, Sulop, Kiblawan, Padada, Hagonoy, Sta. Cruz,
Matanao, Bansalan and Magsaysay shall comprise the Lone Legislative District of
the Province of Davao del Sur.
xxxx
Section 46 of R.A. No. 10360 provides for the date of the holding of a plebiscite.
Sec. 46. Plebiscite. The Province of Davao Occidental shall be created, as
provided for in this Charter, upon approval by the majority of the votes cast by the
voters of the affected areas in a plebiscite to be conducted and supervised by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within sixty (60) days from the date of the
effectivity of this Charter.
The amount necessary for the conduct of the plebiscite shall be borne by the
COMELEC.chanrob1esvirtualawlibrary
R.A. No. 10360 was passed by the House of Representatives on 28 November 2012,
and by the Senate on 5 December 2012. President Benigno S. Aquino III approved
R.A. No. 10360 on 14 January 2013.2 R.A. No. 10360 was published in the
Philippine Star and the Manila Bulletin only on 21 January 2013. Considering
that R.A. No. 10360 shall take effect 15 days after its publication in at least two
newspapers of general and local circulation,3 COMELEC, therefore, only had until
6 April 2013 to conduct the plebiscite.4cralawlibrary
As early as 27 November 2012, prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 10360, the
COMELEC suspended the conduct of all plebiscites as a matter of policy and in
view of the preparations for the 13 May 2013 National and Local Elections. 5 On 9

July 2013, the COMELEC extendedb the policy on suspension of the holding of
plebiscites by resolving to defer action on the holding of all plebiscites until after
the 28 October 2013 Barangay Elections.6 During a meeting held on 31 July 2013,
the COMELEC decided to hold the plebiscite for the creation of Davao Occidental
simultaneously with the 28 October 2013 Barangay Elections to save on
expenses7. The COMELEC, in Minute Resolution No. 13-0926, approved the
conduct of the Concept of Execution for the conduct of the plebiscite on 6 August
2013.8 On 14 August 2013, Bartolome J. Sinocruz, Jr., the Deputy Executive
Director for Operations of the COMELEC, issued a memorandum furnishing a
copy of Minute Resolution No. 13-0926 to Atty. Remlane M. Tambuang, Regional
Election Director of Region XI; Atty. Ma. Febes M. Barlaan, Provincial Election
Supervisor of Davao del Sur; and to all election officers of Davao del Sur. On 6
September 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution Nos. 9771 9 and 9772.10
Resolution
No.
9771
provided
for
the
following
calendar
of
activities:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

46 of Republic Act No. 10360 by mere MINUTE RESOLUTION because it is only

CONGRESS who can validly amend, repel [sic] or modify existing laws, thus
COMELEC [sic] act in suspending the holding of a plebiscite is
unconstitutional;13cralawlibrary
2. COMELEC is without authority or legal basis to hold a plebiscite this coming
October 28, 2013 for the creation of the Province of Davao Occidental because
Section 46 of Republic Act [No.] 10360 has already lapsed;14 and
3. Petitioner has no other adequate remedy to prevent the COMELEC from
holding the Plebiscite on October 28, 2013 for the creation of the Province of
Davao Occidental except through the issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
and Preliminary Injunction because COMELEC had already commenced the
preparation for holding of the Plebiscite for the creation of the Province of [Davao]
Occidental synchronizing it with that of the Barangay and SK elections this
coming October 28, 2013.15
On 17 October 2013, we issued a Resolution requiring respondents COMELEC,
represented by its Chairperson, Hon. Sixto Brillantes, Jr., andn the Provincial
Election Officer of Davao del Sur, represented by Atty. Ma. Febes Barlaan, to file
their comment to Cagas petition not later than 21 October 2013.
The respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed their
comment on 21 October 2013. The OSG raises the following
arguments:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Resolution No. 9772, on the other hand, provided that copies of R.A. No. 10360 be
posted11 and that information campaigns be conducted prior to the
plebiscite.12cralawlibrary

The 1987 Constitution does not fix the period to hold a plebiscite for the creation
of a local government unit;
There was logistical and financial impossibility for the COMELEC to hold a
plebiscite at a mere two months notice;
Legislative intent is for R.A. No. 10360 to be implemented;
Public interest demands that the plebiscite be conducted; and
The COMELEC did not abuse its discretion in issuing the questioned
Resolutions.16

On 9 October 2013, Cagas filed the present petition for prohibition. Cagas cites
three causes of action:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

In this Resolution, we simplify the issues raised by the parties, thus: Did the
COMELEC act without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it resolved to hold the
plebiscite for the creation of the Province of Davao Occidental on 28 October 2013,
simultaneous with the Barangay Elections?

1. COMELEC is without authority or legal basis to AMEND or MODIFY Section

We answer in the negative.

The COMELECs power to administer elections

includes the power to conduct a plebiscite
beyond the schedule prescribed by law.
The conduct of a plebiscite is necessary for the creation of a province. Sections 10
and 11 of Article X of the Constitution provide that:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Sec. 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political
subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The
component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall
be entitled to their own local executive and legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction
of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be created shall be limited to basic
services requiring coordination.
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution emphasizes the direct exercise by the
people of their sovereignty. After the legislative branchs enactment of a law to
create, divide, merge or alter the boundaries of a local government unit or units,
the people in the local government unit or units directly affected vote in a
plebiscite to register their approval or disapproval of the change.17cralawlibrary
The Constitution does not specify a date as to when plebiscites should be held.
This is in contrast with its provisions for the election of members of the
legislature in Section 8, Article VI 18 and of the President and Vice- President in
Section 4, Article VII.19 The Constitution recognizes that the power to fix the date
of elections is legislative in nature, which is shown by the exceptions in previously
mentioned Constitutional provisions, as well as in the election of local government
officials.20cralawlibrary
Section 10 of R.A. No. 7160 furnishes the general rule as to when a plebiscite may
be held:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Sec. 10. Plebiscite Requirement. No creation, division, merger, abolition, or
substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect
unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the
purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be

conducted by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred

twenty (120) days from the date of effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such
action, unless said law or ordinance fixed another date.
Section 46 of R.A. No. 10360, however, specifically provides that the plebiscite for
the creation of the province of Davao Occidental be held within 60 days from the
effectivity of R.A. No. 10360, or until 6 April 2013.21 Cagas claims that R.A. No.
10360 did not confer express or implied power to COMELEC to exercise
discretion when the plebiscite for the creation of the Province of Davao Occidental
will be held. On the contrary, said law provides a specific period when the
COMELEC should conduct a plebiscite.22 Cagas views the period 60 days from
the effectivity in R.A. No. 10360 as absolute and mandatory; thus, COMELEC
has no legal basis to hold a plebiscite on 28 October 2013.
The Constitution, however, grants the COMELEC the power to [e]nforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.23 The COMELEC has exclusive
charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections. 24 The text
and intent of Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) is to give COMELEC all the necessary
and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections.25cralawlibrary
Sections 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (B.P. Blg. 881) the Omnibus Election
Code, provide the COMELEC the power to set elections to another date.
Sec. 5. Postponement of election. - When for any serious cause such as violence,
terrorism, loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force majeure,
and other analogous causes of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and
honest election should become impossible in any political subdivision, the
Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified petition by any interested party, and
after due notice and hearing, whereby all interested parties are afforded equal
opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election therein to a date which
should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which
resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of
the cause for such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
Sec. 6. Failure of election.- If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud, or other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been
held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the
transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such

election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or
suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission
shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due
notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the
date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but
not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or
suspension of the election or failure to elect.
The tight time frame in the enactment, signing into law, and effectivity of R.A. No.
10360 on 5 February 2013, coupled with the subsequent conduct of the National
and Local Elections on 13 May 2013 as mandated by the Constitution, rendered
impossible the holding of a plebiscite for the creation of the province of Davao
Occidental on or before 6 April 2013 as scheduled in R.A. No. 10360. We also take
judicial notice of the COMELECs burden in the accreditation and registration of
candidates for the Party-List Elections.26 The logistic and financial impossibility of
holding a plebiscite so close to the National and Local Elections is unforeseen and
unexpected, a cause analogous to force majeure and administrative mishaps
covered in Section 5 of B.P. Blg. 881. The COMELEC is justified, and did not act
with grave abuse of discretion, in postponing the holding of the plebiscite for the
creation of the province of Davao Occidental to 28 October 2013 to synchronize it
with the Barangay Elections.
The
OSG
illustrated
the
manner:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

COMELECs

predicament

in

this

To be sure, at the time R.A. No. 10360 was approved, the COMELEC had to
deliver and accomplish the following, among many others, for the May 2013
National and Local Elections:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
1. Preparation of the Project of Precincts indicating the total number of
established precincts and the number of registered voters per precincts [sic] in a
city or municipality.
2. Constitution of the Board of Election Inspectors including the precincts where
they will be assigned and the barangay where the precinct is located.
3. Inspection, verification and sealing of the Book of Voters containing the
approved voter registration records of registered voters in the particular precinct
which must be inspected, verified, and sealed.
4. Finalization and printing of the computerized voters list for use on election day.

5. The preparation, bidding, printing and distribution of the voters information.

6. Configuration, testing, and demonstration of the PCOS machines and their
distribution to the different precincts.
To comply with the 60-day period to conduct the plebiscite then, as insisted,
petitioner would have the COMELEC hold off all of its above tasks. If COMELEC
abandoned any of its tasks or did not strictly follow the timetable for the
accomplishment of these tasks then it could have put in serious jeopardy the
conduct of the May 2013 National and Local Elections. The COMELEC had to
focus all its attention and concentrate all its manpower and other resources on its
preparation for the May 2013
National and Local Elections, and to ensure that it would not be derailed, it had to
defer the conduct of all plebiscites including that of R.A. No. 10360.
Parenthetically, for the COMELEC to hold the plebiscite for the ratification of
R.A. No. 10360 within the fixed period, it would have to reconfigure for said
purpose some of the PCOS machines that were already configured for the May
2013 National and Local Elections; or in the alternative, conduct the plebiscite
manually.
However, conducting the plebiscite manually would require another set of ballots
and other election paraphernalia. Besides, another set of election materials would
also require additional logistics for printing, checking, packing, and deployment
thereof. Lest it be forgotten, that all of these things should undergo public
bidding.
Since the plebiscite would be a separate undertaking, the COMELEC would have
to appoint separate sets of board[s] of election inspectors, tellers, and other
personnel to canvass the result of the plebiscite all of which would have entailed
further cost for the COMELEC whose budget had already been overly stretched to
cover the May 2013 National and Local Elections.
More importantly, it bears stressing that the COMELEC was not given a special
budget to defray the cost of the plebiscite. In fact, the COMELEC had to take P11
million from its savings and from the Barangay Elections budget to finance the
plebiscite to ratify R.A. No. 10360 on October 28, 2013.
The COMELECs questioned Resolution then directing the holding of the
plebiscite for the ratification of R.A. No. 10360 simultaneously with the Barangay

Elections was not an abuse of its discretion, as alleged, but simply an exercise of
prudence, because as the COMELEC itself noted, doing so will entail less
expense than holding it separately. [p. 9, Resolution No. 13-0926, Annex B,
Petition.]
The determination of the feasibility of holding a plebiscite on a given date is
within the competence and discretion of the COMELEC. Petitioner cannot
therefore simply insist that the COMELEC should have complied with the period
specified in the law when doing so would be virtually impossible under the
circumstances.27
This Court has rejected a too literal interpretation of election laws in favor of
holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
In Pangandaman v. COMELEC,28 Lining Pangandaman (Pangandaman) filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction to challenge the Omnibus Order of the COMELEC En
Banc. The COMELEC En Banc ordered the conduct of special elections in certain
municipalities in Lanao del Sur on 18 and 25 July 1998, or more than 30 days
after the failure of elections on 11 May 1998. Like Cagas, Pangandaman insisted
on a strict compliance with the schedule of the holding of special elections.
Pangandaman asserted that COMELECs authority to call a special election was
limited by the 30-day period and that Congress had the power to call a special
election after the 30th day. We admonished Pangandaman against a too literal
interpretation of the law, and protected COMELECs powers against the
straitjacketing by procedural rules.
It is a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted
in harmony with the Constitution and that the spirit, rather than the letter of the
law determines its construction; for that reason, a statute must be read according
to its spirit and intent. Thus, a too literal interpretation of the law that would
lead to absurdity prompted this Court to
x x x [a]dmonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict
rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That
intention is usually found not in the letter that killeth but in the spirit that
vivifieth x x x
Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad
power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall. There can hardly be
any doubt that the text and intent of this constitutional provision is to give
COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective
of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.

Pursuant to this intent, this Court has been liberal in defining the parameters of
the COMELECs powers in conducting elections. As stated in the old but
nevertheless
still
very
much
applicable
case
of
Sumulong
v.
COMELEC:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Politics is a practical matter, and political questions must be dealt with
realistically not from the standpoint of pure theory. The Commission on
Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts with political
strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing with
political controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex
political questions x x x. There are no ready made formulas for solving public
problems. Time and experience are necessary to evolve patterns that will serve
the ends of good government. In the matter of the administration of laws relative
to the conduct of election x x x we must not by any excessive zeal take away from
the Commission on Elections that initiative which by constitutional and legal
mandates properly belongs to it.
More pointedly, this Court recently stated in Tupay Loong v. COMELEC, et al.,
that [O]ur elections are not conducted under laboratory conditions. In running
for public offices, candidates do not follow the rules of Emily Post. Too often,
COMELEC has to make snap judgments to meet unforeseen circumstances that
threaten to subvert the will of our voters. In the process, the actions of COMELEC
may not be impeccable, indeed, may even be debatable. We cannot, however, engage
in a swivel chair criticism of these actions often taken under very difficult
circumstances.
The purpose of the governing statutes on the conduct of elections
x x x [i]s to protect the integrity of elections to suppress all evils that may violate
its purity and defeat the will of the voters. The purity of the elections is one of the
most fundamental requisites of popular government. The Commission on
Elections, by constitutional mandate, must do everything in its power to secure a
fair and honest canvass of the votes cast in the elections. In the performance of its
duties, the Commission must be given a considerable latitude in adopting means
and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it
was created to promote free, orderly, and honest elections. The choice of means
taken by the Commission on Elections, unless they are clearly illegal or constitute
grave abuse of discretion, should not be interfered with.
Guided by the above-quoted pronouncement, the legal compass from which the
COMELEC should take its bearings in acting upon election controversies is the
principle that clean elections control the appropriateness of the remedy.
In fixing the date for special elections the COMELEC should see to it that: 1.] it
should not be later than thirty (30) days after the cessation of the cause of the

postponement or suspension of the election or the failure to elect; and, 2.] it

should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which
resulted in the failure to elect. The first involves a question of fact. The second
must be determined in the light of the peculiar circumstances of a case. Thus, the
holding of elections within the next few months from the cessation of the cause of
the postponement, suspension or failure to elect may still be considered
reasonably close to the date of the election not held.
In this case, the COMELEC can hardly be faulted for tardiness. The dates set for
the special elections were actually the nearest dates from the time total/partial
failure of elections was determined, which date fell on July 14, 1998, the date of
promulgation of the challenged Omnibus Order. Needless to state, July 18 and 25,
the dates chosen by the COMELEC for the holding of special elections were only a
few days away from the time a total/partial failure of elections was declared and,
thus, these were dates reasonably close thereto, given the prevailing facts herein.
Furthermore, it bears stressing that in the exercise of the plenitude of its powers
to protect the integrity of elections, the COMELEC should not and must not be
straitjacketed by procedural rules in the exercise of its discretion to resolve
election disputes.29
In Sambarani v. COMELEC,30 petitioners were candidates for punong barangay
in different barangays in Lanao del Sur. There was a failure of elections in the 15
July 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Elections,
and special elections were set on 13 August 2002 in the affected barangays. No
special elections were held on 13 August 2002, so petitioners asked the
COMELEC to declare a failure of elections in their barangays and to hold another
special election. The COMELEC, however, directed the Department of Interior
and Local Government to appoint the Barangay Captains, Barangay Kagawads,
SK Chairmen, and SK Kagawads in the affected barangays. The COMELEC
stated that it is no longer in a position to call for another special election since
Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that special elections shall be
held on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, but not later
than thirty days after cessation of the cause of such postponement.
We directed the COMELEC to conduct special elections and stated that the
deadline cannot defeat the right of suffrage of the people.
The prohibition on conducting special elections after thirty days from the
cessation of the cause of the failure of elections is not absolute. It is directory, not
mandatory, and the COMELEC possesses residual power to conduct special
elections even beyond the deadline prescribed by law. The deadline in Section 6
cannot defeat the right of suffrage of the people as guaranteed by the

Constitution. The COMELEC erroneously perceived that the deadline in Section 6

is absolute. The COMELEC has broad power or authority to fix other dates for
special elections to enable the people to exercise their right of suffrage. The
COMELEC may fix other dates for the conduct of special elections when the same
cannot be reasonably held within the period prescribed by law.31cralawlibrary
It is thus not novel for this Court to uphold the COMELECs broad power or
authority to fix other dates for a plebiscite, as in special elections, to enable the
people to exercise their right of suffrage. The COMELEC thus has residual power
to conduct a plebiscite even beyond the deadline prescribed by law. The date 28
October 2013 is reasonably close to 6 April 2013, and there is no reason why the
plebiscite should not proceed as scheduled by the COMELEC. The OSG points out
that public interest demands that the plebiscite be conducted.
At this point, there is nothing more for the COMELEC to do except to hold the
plebiscite as scheduled on October 18, [sic] 2013. In fact, the COMELEC already
scheduled the shipment and deployment of the election paraphernalia to all the
precincts in Davao del Sur, except Davao City.chanrob1esvirtualawlibrary
The COMELEC had put so much work and effort in its preparation for the
conduct of the plebiscite. A substantial amount of funds have also been defrayed
for the following election undertakings:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Bidding for election paraphernalia;
Cleansing of voters' registration list;
Preparation, bidding, printing and distribution of the voters' information;
Preparation and completion of the projects of precincts;
Printing of ballots;
Constitution of the Board of Election Inspectors;
Training and assignment of personnel; [and]
Information dissemination I campaign.
To demand now that the COMELEC desist from holding the plebiscite would be
an utter waste of time, effort and resources, not to mention its detriment to public
interest given that public funds are involved.32
In election law, the right of suffrage should prevail over mere scheduling mishaps
in holding elections or plebiscites. Indeed, Cagas' insistence that only Congress
can cure the alleged legal infirmity in the date of holding the plebiscite for the
creation of the Province of Davao Occidental fails in light of the absence of abuse
of discretion of the COMELEC. Finally, this Court finds it unacceptable to utilize
more of our taxpayers' time and money by preventing the COMELEC from
holding the plebiscite as now scheduled.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.