PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
JOSE LUIS A. ALCUAZ, as NTC Commissioner, and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION,respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
This case is posed as one of first impression in the sense that it involves the public utility services of the petitioner
Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT, for short) which is the only one rendering such
services in the Philippines.
The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz
of the National Telecommunications Commission (hereafter, NTC), dated September 2, 1988, which directs the
provisional reduction of the rates which may be charged by petitioner for certain specified lines of its services by fifteen
percent (15%) with the reservation to make further reductions later, for being violative of the constitutional prohibition
against undue delegation of legislative power and a denial of procedural, as well as substantive, due process of law.
The antecedental facts as summarized by petitioner 2 are not in dispute. By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514,
PHILCOMSAT was granted "a franchise to establish, construct, maintain and operate in the Philippines, at such places
as the grantee may select, station or stations and associated equipment and facilities for international satellite
communications." Under this franchise, it was likewise granted the authority to "construct and operate such ground
facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications services from the communications satellite system and ground
terminal or terminals."
By designation of the Republic of the Philippines, the petitioner is also the sole signatory for the Philippines in the
Agreement and the Operating Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization
(INTELSAT) of 115 member nations, as well as in the Convention and the Operating Agreement of the International
Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT) of 53 member nations, which two global commercial telecommunications
satellite corporations were collectively established by various states in line with the principles set forth in Resolution
1721 (XVI) of the General Assembly of the United Nations.
or their predecessors-in-interest. The satellite services thus provided by petitioner enable said international carriers to
serve the public with indispensable communication services,
Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public Service
Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 issued on June 17, 1987,
petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent NTC, including all its facilities and
services and the fixing of rates. Implementing said Executive Order No. 196, respondents required petitioner to apply
for the requisite certificate of public convenience and necessity covering its facilities and the services it renders, as
well as the corresponding authority to charge rates therefor.
filed with respondent NTC an application 4 for authority to continue operating and maintaining the same facilities , to
continue providing the international satellite communications servicesand to charge the current rates applied for in
rendering such services. Pending hearing, it also applied for a provisional authority
On September 16, 1987, petitioner was granted a provisional authority to continue operating its existing facilities, to
render the services it was then offering, and to charge the rates it was then charging. This authority was valid for six

(6) months from the date of said order. 5 When said provisional authority expired on March 17, 1988, it was extended
for another six (6) months, or up to September 16, 1988.
The NTC order now in controversy had further extended the provisional authority of the petitioner for another six (6)
months, but it directed the petitioner to charge modified reduced rates through a reduction of fifteen percent (15%) on
the present authorized rates. Respondent Commissioner ordered said reduction on the following ground:
The Commission in its on-going review of present service rates takes note that after an initial
evaluation by the Rates Regulation Division of the Common Carriers Authorization Department of the
financial statements of applicant, there is merit in a REDUCTION in some of applicant's rates, subject
to further reductions, should the Commission finds (sic) in its further evaluation that more reduction
should be effected either on the basis of a provisional authorization or in the final consideration of the
case. 6
PHILCOMSAT assails the above-quoted order for the following reasons:
1. The enabling act (Executive Order No. 546) of respondent NTC empowering it to fix rates for public service
communications does not provide the necessary standards constitutionally required, hence there is an undue
delegation of legislative power, particularly the adjudicatory powers of NTC;
2. Assuming arguendo that the rate-fixing power was properly and constitutionally conferred, the same was exercised
in an unconstitutional manner, hence it is ultra vires, in that (a) the questioned order violates procedural due process
for having been issued without prior notice and hearing; and (b) the rate reduction it imposes is unjust, unreasonable
and confiscatory, thus constitutive of a violation of substantive due process.
I. Petitioner asseverates that nowhere in the provisions of Executive Order No. 546, providing for the creation of
respondent NTC and granting its rate-fixing powers, nor of Executive Order No. 196, placing petitioner under the
jurisdiction of respondent NTC, can it be inferred that respondent NTC is guided by any standard in the exercise of its
rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers. While petitioner in its petition-in-chief raised the issue of undue delegation of
legislative power, it subsequently clarified its said submission to mean that the order mandating a reduction of certain
rates is undue delegation not of legislative but of quasi-judicial power to respondent NTC, the exercise of which
allegedly requires an express conferment by the legislative body.
Whichever way it is presented, petitioner is in effect questioning the constitutionality of Executive Orders Nos. 546 and
196 on the ground that the same do not fix a standard for the exercise of the power therein conferred.
We hold otherwise.
Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the ground that some
standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has prescribed the manner of the
exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, respondent NTC in this case,
establishes a rate, its act must both be non- confiscatory and must have been established in the manner prescribed by
the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In
case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the
guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in
the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. 7
It becomes important then to ascertain the nature of the power delegated to respondent NTC and the manner required
by the statute for the lawful exercise thereof.

Pursuant to Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196, respondent NTC is empowered, among others, to determine and
prescribe rates pertinent to the operation of public service communications which necessarily include the power to
promulgate rules and regulations in connection therewith. And, under Section 15(g) of Executive Order No. 546,
respondent NTC should be guided by the requirements of public safety, public interest and reasonable feasibility of
maintaining effective competition of private entities in communications and broadcasting facilities. Likewise, in Section
6(d) thereof, which provides for the creation of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications with control and
supervision over respondent NTC, it is specifically provided that the national economic viability of the entire network or
components of the communications systems contemplated therein should be maintained at reasonable rates.
II. On another tack, petitioner submits that the questioned order violates procedural due process because it was
issued motu proprio, without notice to petitioner and without the benefit of a hearing. Petitioner laments that said order
was based merely on an "initial evaluation," which is a unilateral evaluation, but had petitioner been given an
opportunity to present its side before the order in question was issued, the confiscatory nature of the rate reduction
and the consequent deterioration of the public service could have been shown and demonstrated to respondents.
Petitioner argues that the function involved in the rate fixing-power of NTC is adjudicatory and hence quasi-judicial, not
quasi- legislative; thus, notice and hearing are necessary and the absence thereof results in a violation of due process.
Respondents admit that the application of a policy like the fixing of rates as exercised by administrative bodies is
quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legislative: that where the function of the administrative agency is legislative, notice
and hearing are not required, but where an order applies to a named person, as in the instant case, the function
involved is adjudicatory. 8 Nonetheless, they insist that under the facts obtaining the order in question need not be
preceded by a hearing, not because it was issued pursuant to respondent NTC's legislative function but because the
assailed order is merely interlocutory, it being an incident in the ongoing proceedings on petitioner's application for a
certificate of public convenience; and that petitioner is not the only primary source of data or information since
respondent is currently engaged in a continuing review of the rates charged.
We find merit in petitioner's contention.
In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission, 9 we made a categorical classification as to when the
rate-filing power of administrative bodies is quasi-judicial and when it is legislative, thus:
Moreover, although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates- when such rules and/or
rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines-may partake of a
legislative character.. In other words, in making said finding of fact, respondent performed a function
partaking of a quasi-judicial character, the valid exercise of which demands previous notice and
hearing.
This rule was further explained in the subsequent case of The Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Cloribel, et al. 10to
wit:
It is also clear from the authorities that where the function of the administrative body is legislative,
notice of hearing is not required by due process of law (See Oppenheimer, Administrative Law, 2 Md.
L.R. 185, 204, supra, where it is said: 'If the nature of the administrative agency is essentially
legislative, the requirements of notice and hearing are not necessary.: 'Aside from statute, the
necessity of notice and hearing in an administrative proceeding depends on the character of the
proceeding and the circumstances involved. In so far as generalization is possible in view of the great
variety of administrative proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that notice and hearing are
not essential to the validity of administrative action where the administrative body acts in the exercise
of executive, administrative, or legislative functions; but where a public administrative body acts in a
judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts are particular and immediate rather than general and

prospective, the person whose rights or property may be affected by the action is entitled to notice and
hearing. 11
The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial
adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other. Further, it is
premised on a finding of fact.. No rationalization was offered nor were the attending contingencies, if any, discussed,
which prompted respondents to impose as much as a fifteen percent (15%) rate reduction. It is not far-fetched to
assume that petitioner could be in a better position to rationalize its rates vis-a-vis the viability of its business
requirements. The rates it charges result from an exhaustive and detailed study it conducts of the multi-faceted
intricacies attendant to a public service undertaking of such nature and magnitude. We are, therefore, inclined to lend
greater credence to petitioner's ratiocination that an immediate reduction in its rates would adversely affect its
operations and the quality of its service to the public considering the maintenance requirements, the projects it still has
to undertake and the financial outlay involved. Notably, petitioner was not even afforded the opportunity to crossexamine the inspector who issued the report on which respondent NTC based its questioned order.
At any rate, there remains the categorical admission made by respondent NTC that the questioned order was issued
pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It, however, insists that notice and hearing are not necessary since the assailed
order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and, therefore, temporary in nature. This postulate is bereft of
merit.
While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application of petitioner, such rate-fixing
order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as
well as the requirement of reasonableness. In the case at bar, the applicable statutory provision is Section 16(c) of the
Public Service Act which provides:
Section 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing the Commission shall have
power, upon proper notice and hearing in accordance with the rules and provisions of this Act, subject
to the limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary:
(c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, ... which shall be imposed, observed and followed
thereafter by any public service; ...
There is no reason to assume that the aforesaid provision does not apply to respondent NTC, there being no limiting,
excepting, or saving provisions to the contrary in Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196.
It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order without first giving
petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made
upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the commission's own motion as in the present case. That such a
hearing is required is evident in respondents' order of September 16, 1987 in NTC Case No. 87-94 which granted
PHILCOMSAT a provisional authority "to continue operating its existing facilities, to render the services it presently
offers, and to charge the rates as reduced by them "under the condition that "(s)ubject to hearing and the final
consideration of the merit of this application, the Commission may modify, revise or amend the rates ..." 12
While it may be true that for purposes of rate-fixing respondents may have other sources of information or data, still,
since a hearing is essential, respondent NTC should act solely on the basis of the evidence before it and not on
knowledge or information otherwise acquired by it but which is not offered in evidence or, even if so adduced,
petitioner was given no opportunity to controvert.
Again, the order requires the new reduced rates to be made effective on a specified date. It becomes a final legislative
act as to the period during which it has to remain in force pending the final determination of the case. 13 An order of
respondent NTC prescribing reduced rates, even for a temporary period, could be unjust, unreasonable or even

confiscatory, especially if the rates are unreasonably low, since the utility permanently loses its just revenue during the
prescribed period. In fact, such order is in effect final insofar as the revenue during the period covered by the order is
concerned. Upon a showing, therefore, that the order requiring a reduced rate is confiscatory, and will unduly deprive
petitioner of a reasonable return upon its property, a declaration of its nullity becomes inductible, which brings us to the
issue on substantive due process.
III. Petitioner contends that the rate reduction is confiscatory in that its implementation would virtually result in a
cessation of its operations and eventual closure of business. On the other hand, respondents assert that since
petitioner is operating its communications satellite facilities through a legislative franchise, as such grantee it has no
vested right therein. What it has is merely a privilege or license which may be revoked at will by the State at any time
without necessarily violating any vested property right of herein petitioner.
There is no question that petitioner is a mere grantee of a legislative franchise which is subject to amendment,
alteration, or repeal by Congress when the common good so requires. 14 Apparently, therefore, such grant cannot be
unilaterally revoked absent a showing that the termination of the operation of said utility is required by the common
good.
The rule is that the power of the State to regulate the conduct and business of public utilities is limited by the
consideration that it is not the owner of the property of the utility, or clothed with the general power of management
incident to ownership, since the private right of ownership to such property remains and is not to be destroyed by the
regulatory power. The power to regulate is not the power to destroy useful and harmless enterprises, but is the power
to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with due regard for the interest, first and foremost, of the public, then
of the utility and of its patrons. Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property
or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the
constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws. 15
Hence, the inherent power and authority of the State, or its authorized agent, to regulate the rates charged by public
utilities should be subject always to the requirement that the rates so fixed shall be reasonable and just. A commission
has no power to fix rates which are unreasonable or to regulate them arbitrarily. This basic requirement of
reasonableness comprehends such rates which must not be so low as to be confiscatory, or too high as to be
oppressive. 16
What is a just and reasonable rate is not a question of formula but of sound business judgment based upon the
evidence 17 it is a question of fact calling for the exercise of discretion, good sense, and a fair, enlightened and
independent judgment. 18 In determining whether a rate is confiscatory, it is essential also to consider the given
situation, requirements and opportunities of the utility. A method often employed in determining reasonableness is the
fair return upon the value of the property to the public utility. Competition is also a very important factor in determining
the reasonableness of rates since a carrier is allowed to make such rates as are necessary to meet competition. 19
A cursory perusal of the assailed order reveals that the rate reduction is solely and primarily based on the initial
evaluation made on the financial statements of petitioner, contrary to respondent NTC's allegation that it has several
other sources of information without, however, divulging such sources. Furthermore, it did not as much as make an
attempt to elaborate on how it arrived at the prescribed rates.
. Reasonableness in the rates assumes that the same is fair to both the public utility and the consumer.
Consequently, we hold that the challenged order, particularly on the issue of rates provided therein, being violative of
the due process clause is void and should be nullified. Respondents should now proceed, as they should heretofore
have done, with the hearing and determination of petitioner's pending application for a certificate of public convenience
and necessity.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the order of respondents, dated September 2, 1988, in NTC Case
No. 87-94 is hereby SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued under our resolution of September 13, 1988,
as specifically directed against the aforesaid order of respondents on the matter of existing rates on petitioner's
present authorized services, is hereby made permanent.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 110280 October 12, 1993
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS and DR. OLIVIA C. CAOILI in her capacity as
Secretary of the Board, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ELSIE LIGOT-TELAN in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 87, Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City and RAMON P. NADAL, respondents.
In an effort to make the University of the Philippines (U.P.) truly the university of the people, the U.P. administration
conceptualized and implemented the socialized scheme of tuition fee payments through the Socialized Tuition Fee and
Assistance Program (STFAP), popularly known as the "Iskolar ng Bayan" program. Spawned by the public clamor to
overcome what was perceived as the sharpening elitist profile of the U.P studentry, the STFAP aspired to expand the
coverage of government educational subsidies so as to include the deserving in the lower rungs of the socio-economic
ladder.
President Jose V. Abueva, the U.P. Board of Regents issued on April 28, 1988 a Resolution establishing the STFAP. A
year later, it was granted official recognition when the Congress of the Philippines allocated a portion of the National
Budget for the implementation of the program.
In the interest of democratizing admission to the State University, all students are entitled to apply for STFAP benefits
which include reduction in fees, living and book subsidies and student assistantships which give undergraduate
students the opportunity to earn P12.00 per hour by working for the University.
Applicants are required to accomplish a questionnaire where, among others, they state the amount and source of the
annual income of the family, their real and personal properties and special circumstances from which the University
may evaluate their financial status and need on the basis of which they are categorized into brackets. At the end the
application form, the student applicant, as well as his parent, signs a sworn statement, as follows:
From the early stages of its implementation, measures were adopted to safeguard the integrity of the program. One
such precautionary measure was the inclusion as one of the punishable acts the deliberate falsification or
suppression/withholding of any material information required in the application form.
To further insure the integrity of the program, a random sampling scheme of verification of data indicated in a student's
application form is undertaken. Among those who applied for STFAP benefits for School Year 1989-90 was Ramon P.
Nadal, a student enrolled in the College of Law.conducted a home investigation at the residence of Nadal
, found discrepancies between the report and Nadal's application form.
Bella Villanueva wrote Nadal informing him that the investigation showed that he had failed to declare, not only the fact
that he had been maintaining a 1977 Corolla car which was owned by his brother but also the income of his mother
who was supporting his brothers Antonio and Federico. Nadal was likewise informed that the Diliman Committee had
reclassified him to Bracket 9 (from Bracket 4), retroactive to June 1989, unless he could submit "proofs to the
contrary." Nadal was required "to pay back the equivalent amount of full school fees" with "interest based on current
commercial rates." Failure to settle his account would mean the suspension of his registration privileges and the
withholding of clearance and transcript of records. He was also warned that his case might be referred to the Student
Disciplinary Tribunal for further investigation. 3

On July 12, 1991, Nadal issued a certification stating, among other things, that his mother migrated to the United
States in 1981 but because her residency status had not yet been legalized, she had not been able to find a "stable,
regular, well-paying employment." He also stated that his mother, jointly with his brother Virgilio, was shouldering the
expenses of the college education of his two younger brothers. 4
Noting further discrepancies between Nadal's application form and the certification, the U.P. charged Nadal before the
Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) on August 23, 1991 with the following:
(a) That he has and maintains a car (Toyota Corolla, Model 1977); and
(b) The income of his mother (Natividad Packing Nadal) in the U.S.A., in support of
the studies of his brothers Antonio and Federico,
which acts of willfully withholding information is tantamount to acts of dishonesty in relation to his
studies.
after hearing, the SDT 6 rendered a decision in SDT Case No. 91-026 exculpating Nadal of the charge of deliberately
withholding in his STFAP application form information that he was maintaining a Toyota Corolla car, but finding him
guilty of "wilfully and deliberately withholding information about the income of his mother which is tantamount to acts of
dishonesty in relation to his studies. As such, the SDT imposed upon Nadal the penalty of expulsion from the
University and required him to reimburse all STFAP benefits he had received but if he does not voluntarily make
reimbursement, it shall be "effected by the University thru outside legal action." 8
The SDT decision was thereafter automatically elevated to the Executive Committee of U.P. Diliman for review
pursuant to Sec. 20 of the U.P. Rules on Student Conduct and Discipline. affirmed the decision of the SDT;
whereupon, Nadal appealed to the Board of Regents (BOR).
Senator Leticia Ramos-Shahani wrote the BOR a letter expressing her view that, after a close review of Nadal s case
by her legal staff, "it is only fair and just to find Mr. Nadal's appeal meritorious and his arguments worthy of belief.
Consequently, he should be allowed to graduate and take the bar examinations this year." 10
At its meeting, the BOR affirmed the decision of the SDT but because "the Board was willing to grant a degree of
compassion to the appellant in view of the alleged status and predicament of the mother as an immigrant 'TNT' in the
United States," the penalty was modified "from Expulsion to One Year- Suspension, effective immediately, plus
reimbursement of all benefits received from the STFAP, with legal interest." The BOR also decided against giving
Nadal, a certification of good moral character. 11
Nadal forthwith filed a motion for reconsideration of the BOR decision, allegedly against the advice of his counsel. A
day before said date, Senator Shahani wrote the BOR another letter requesting that deliberation on Nadal's case be
deferred until such time as she could attend a BOR meeting.
U.P. filed an opposition to Nadal's motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, the BOR held a special meeting to
accommodate the request of Regent Shahani with Nadal's case as the sole item on its agenda. Again, Nadal's motion
for reconsideration was included in the agenda but in view of the absence of Senator Shahani, the decision thereon
was deferred.
At the special meeting of the BOR at the Board Room of the Manila Polo Club in Forbes Park, Makati, Regent Antonio
T. Carpio raised the "material importance" of verifying the truth of Nadal's claim that earlier, he was a beneficiary of a
scholarship and financial aid from the Ateneo de Manila University (AdeMU). Learning that the "certification issued by
the AdeMU that it had not given Nadal financial aid while he was a student there was made through a telephone call,"
Regent Carpio declared that there was as yet "no direct evidence in the records to substantiate the charge." According

to Carpio, if it should be disclosed that Nadal Falsely stated that he received such financial aid, it would be a clear
case of gross and material misrepresentation that would even warrant the penalty of expulsion. Hence, he cast a
conditional vote that would depend on the verification of Nadal's claim on the matter.
U.P. President and concurrently Regent Jose V. Abueva countered by stating that "a decision should not be anchored
solely on one piece of information which he considered irrelevant, and which would ignore the whole pattern of the
respondent's dishonesty and deception from 1989 which had been established in the investigation and the reviews."
He added that "the respondent's eligibility for his AdeMU high school scholarship and financial assistance from 1979 to
1983 does not in any way establish that he is 'not guilty as charged' before the SDT," since the formal charges against
him do not include withholding of information regarding scholarship grants received from other schools.
At the said March 28, 1993 special meeting, the Board decided to go into executive session where the following
transpired:
A vote was held by secret ballot on whether Ramon P. Nadal was guilty or not guilty as charged of
willful withholding of information in relation to his application for Socialized Tuition and Financial
Assistance Program (STFAP) benefits which he filed for Schoolyears 1989-1990 and 1990-1991
which is tantamount to act of dishonesty in relation to his studies, in violation of paragraph (a), Section
2 of the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline, as amended.
The Chairman gave the following results of the Board action during the Executive Session: four (4)
voted guilty; three (3) voted not guilty; and three (3) gave conditional votes, pending verification with
Father Raymond Holscher of Ateneo de Manila University of Ramon P. Nadal's statement in his
STFAP application that he was granted scholarship while he was in high school. Should Ateneo
confirm that Nadal had not received financial assistance, then the conditional votes would be
considered as guilty, and if otherwise, then not guilty. the Chairman clarified that once the information
was received from Ateneo, there would be no need for another meeting to validate the decision.
The President reiterated his objections to the casting of conditional votes.
The Chairman himself did not vote.

13

In the morning of March 29, 1993, the AdeMU issued a certification to the effect that Nadal was indeed a recipient of a
scholarship grant from 1979 to 1983. That evening, the BOR met again at a special meeting at the Westin Philippine
Plaza Hotel. According to Regent Carpio, in executive session, the BOR found Nadal "guilty" as the members voted as
follows: six members guilty, three members not guilty, and three members abstained. 14Consequently, the BOR
imposed on Nadal the penalties of suspension for one (1) year effective March 29, 1993, non-issuance of any
certificate of good moral character during the suspension and/or as long as Nadal has not reimbursed the STFAP
benefits he had received with 12% interest per annum from march 30, 1993 and non-issuance of his transcript of
records until he has settled his financial obligations with the university. 15
On March 30, 1993, Nadal wrote President Abueva a handwritten letter stating that "after learning of the latest
decision" of the BOR, he had been "intensely concentrating on (his) job so that (he) can earn enough to pay for (his)
financial obligations to the University." Alleging that he was "now letting nature take its course," Nadal begged
President Abueva not to issue any press release regarding the case. 16
However, on April 22, 1993, Nadal filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for mandamus with
preliminary injunction and prayer for a temporary restraining order against President Abueva, the BOR, Oscar M.
Alfonso, Cesar A. Buenaventura, Armand V. Fabella and Olivia C. Caoili. The petition prayed:
After trial on the merits, judgment be rendered as follows:

a. Making the preliminary injunction permanent;

b. Ordering respondents 'to uphold and implement their decision rendered on 28 March 1993,
exonerating petitioner from all the charges against him, and accordingly dismissing SDT No. 91-026;
c. Ordering respondents jointly and severally to pay petitioner litigation expenses of at least
P150,000.00.
Other just and equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for. 17
The motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and the writ of preliminary injunction was immediately set
for hearing. At the May 10, 1993 hearing, the lower court declared that the only issue to be resolved was "whether or
not the respondents in Civil Case No. 93-15665 violated (Nadal's) right to due process when it rendered a decision
finding Nadal guilty of the charges against him" during the March 29, 1993 meeting. After the respondents had
presented their first witness, Dr. Olivia C. Caoili, the lower court asked respondents' counsel whether they were
amenable to maintaining the status quo. Said counsel replied in the negative, asserting the University's prerogative to
discipline students found guilty of violating its rules of discipline. 18
.
Thereafter, Nadal presented as witnesses Regents Emerenciana Y. Arcellana, Ariel P. Tanangonan, Leticia R. Shahani
and Antonio T. Carpio. The University, on the other hand, presented Dr. Olivia Caoili and Nadal himself as a hostile
witness. On May 29, 1993, the lower court issued the following Order:
The petitioner complains that he was not afforded due process when, after the Board Meeting on SDT
Case No. 91-026 on March 28, 1993 that resulted in a decision of "NOT GUILTY" in his favor, the
Chairman of the U.P. Board of Regents, without notice to the herein petitioner, called another meeting
the following day to deliberate on his (the Chairman's) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, which
this time resulted in a decision of "GUILTY." While the main issue of violation of due process raised in
the petition pends trial and resolution, the petitioner prays for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction prohibiting the respondents from further proceeding with SDT Case No. 21-026 and from
suspending the petitioner for one year.
It is a basic requirement in the issuance of the preliminary injunctive writ that there must be a right to
be protected. As the issue in the case at bar is due process in the March 29 Board meeting, there is,
indeed, a right to be protected for, in administrative proceedings, a respondent's right to due process
exists not only at the early stages but also at the final stage thereof.
"Damages are irreparable within the meaning of the rule where there is no standard
by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy. Where the
damage is susceptible of mathematical computation, it is not irreparable." (Social
Security Commission v. Bayona, et al., G.R. No. L-13555, May 30, 1962).
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and so as not to render moot the issues in the instant proceedings,
let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining the respondents, their officers, agent(s),
representatives, and all persons acting in their behalf, from further proceeding with SDT Case No. 91026, and from suspending petitioner, upon the latter's filing a bond in the amount of P3,000.00.IT IS
SO ORDERED. 20
Dispensing with the filing of a motion for reconsideration, the petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for the issuance of an injunction or temporary restraining order, raising the following issues:

whether or not Nadal was denied due process in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against him, and, whether
or not the respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in issuing the May 29, 1993 writ of preliminary injunction
thereby preventing the BOR from implementing the suspension penalty it had imposed on Nadal.
Before proceeding with the discussion of the merits of the instant petition, we shall confront a threshold issue raised by
private respondent, namely, that Dr. Caoili, not having been authorized by the Board of Regents as a collegial body to
file the instant petition, and Dr. Abueva, who verified the petition, not being the "Board of Regents" nor "the University
of the Philippines," they are not real parties in interest who should file the same. 21
A real party in interest is one "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or the party entitled to the avails
of the suit. 'Interest' within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by
the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest." 22 Undoubtedly,
the U.P. Board of Regents has an interest to protect inasmuch as what is in issue here is its power to impose
disciplinary action against a student who violated the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline by
withholding information in connection with his application for STFAP benefits, which information, if disclosed, would
have sufficed to disqualify him from receiving the financial assistance he sought. Such dishonesty, if left unpunished,
would have the effect of subverting a commendable program into which the University officials had devoted much time
and expended precious resources, from the conceptualization to the implementation stage, to rationalize the socialized
scheme of tuition fee payments in order that more students may benefit from the public funds allocated to the State
University.
Having specifically named Drs. Abueva and Caoili as respondents in the petition for mandamus that he filed below,
Nadal is now estopped from questioning their personality to file the instant petition. 23 Moreover, under Sec. 7 of the
U.P. Charter (Act 1870) and Sec. 11 of the University Code "all process" against the BOR shall be served on "the
president or secretary thereof'." It is in accordance with these legal provisions that Dr. Caoili is named as a petitioner.
Necessarily, Dr. Abueva, the University President and member of the BOR, has to verify the petition. It is not
mandatory, however, that each and every member of the BOR be named petitioners. As the Court has time and again
held, an action may be entertained, notwithstanding the failure to include an indispensable party where it appears that
the naming of the party would be but a formality. 24
No longer novel, as this is not a case of first impression, is the issue on the right of an academic institution to refuse
admission to a student arising from the imposition upon him of an administrative disciplinary sanction. In our recent
decision in Ateneo de Manila University v. Hon. Ignacio M. Capulong, 25 wherein certain law students were dismissed
for hazing resulting in the death of another, we held that the matter of admission of students is within the ambit of
academic freedom and therefore, beyond the province of the courts to decide. Certain fundamental principles bear
stressing.
One of the arguments of Nadal in his petition for mandamus below was that he was denied due process. To clarify, the
so-called lack of due process referred only to the March 29, 1993 meeting of the BOR. As stated by respondent's
counsel: "What was conceded by undersigned counsel was that Nadal was afforded due process from the start of the
administrative proceeding up to the meeting of the Board of Regents on March 28, 1993." 26
With respect to the March 29, 1993 meeting, respondent considers the same as "unquestionably void for lack of due
process" inasmuch as he was not sent a notice of said meeting. Counsel cites the ruling in Non v. Dames II27 that
imposition of sanctions on students requires "observance of procedural due process," 28 the phrase obviously referring
to the sending of notice of the meeting.
Nadal does not dispute the fact that his right to due process was held inviolate until the BOR decided to meet on
March 29, 1993 with his case as the sole item on the agenda.

In any event it is gross error to equate due process in the instant case with the sending of notice of the March 29, 1993
BOR meeting to respondent. University rules do not require the attendance in BOR meetings of individuals whose
cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board. This is not exclusive of students whose disciplinary cases
have been appealed to the Board of Regents as the final review body. At no time did respondent complain of lack of
notice given to him to attend any of the regular and special BOR meetings where his case was up for deliberation. He
would make an exception of the March 29, 1993 meeting for it was "supposed to reconsider the decision made on
March 28, 1993 exonerating respondent Nadal from all administrative charges against him." 29
Regent Antonio T. Carpio, in his testimony before the lower court on May 25, 1993 admitted that there was no final
verdict at the March 28, 1993 meeting in view of the conditional votes resulting from his assertion that he was "not
morally convinced that there was sufficient evidence to make a finding of guilty against Nadal because there was no
direct evidence that his mother received income from the United States and this income was sent to the Philippines to
support the studies of the children." 30 Two regents shared the view of Regent Carpio, with the following result: four
voted guilty, three, not guilty, and three cast conditional votes. The BOR agreed that, upon the suggestion of Regent
Carpio, they would still verify from the AdeMU about Nadal's alleged scholarship as a student in said institution.
Consequently, no definitive decision was arrived at by the BOR on March 28, 1993, Much less was a verdict of
exoneration handed down as averred by respondent.
At said meeting, six (6) regents voted to find respondent guilty, three (3) voted that he was not guilty and three (3)
abstained. As succinctly announced by Regent Carpio, the final decision was that which was rendered on March 29,
1993 as "no other decision was made by the Board with respect to the same issue." 32
Counsel for Nadal charged before the lower court that his client was "not given due process in the March 29 meeting
because the ground upon which he was again convicted was not the same as the original charge." 33Obviously, he was
referring to the basis of the conditional votes on March 28, i.e., whether or not Nadal was telling the truth when he
claimed that he received a scholarship grant from the AdeMU. However, Regent Carpio himself testified that the
charge considered was "exactly the same charge" of withholding information on the income of Nadal's mother. 34 It
should be stressed that the reason why Regent Carpio requested a verification of Nadal's claim that he was a scholar
at the AdeMU was that Regent Carpio was not "morally convinced" yet as to the guilt of Nadal. In other words, he
sought additional insights into the character of Nadal through the information that would be obtained from the AdeMU.
In this regard, we find such information to be irrelevant and a mere superfluity. In his July, 12, 1991 certification
aforementioned, Nadal admitted, although inconsistently, that his mother was a "TNT" who could not find a "stable,
regular, well-paying employment" but that she was supporting the education of his brothers with the help of another
son. To our mind, this constitutes sufficient admission that Nadal withheld information on the income, however measly
and irregular, of his mother. Unlike in criminal cases which require proof beyond reasonable doubt as basis for a
judgment, in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings, only substantial evidence is required, that which means more
than a mere scintilla or relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,
even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise. 35In light of the foregoing circumstances,
we find that Nadal has been sufficiently proven to have violated his undertaking to divulge all information needed when
he applied for the benefits of the STFAP.
Let it not be forgotten that respondent aspires to join the ranks of the professionals who would uphold truth at all costs
so that justice may prevail. The sentinels who stand guard at the portals leading to the hallowed Temples of Justice
cannot be overzealous in admitting only those who are intellectually and morally fit. In those who exhibit duplicity in
their student days, one spots the shady character who is bound to sow the seeds of chicanery in the practice of his
profession.
Having reached his senior year, respondent is presumably aware that the bedrock axiom, Canon I, Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility states: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct." Further on, Canon 7, Rule 7.01 provides: "A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false

statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar." (Emphasis
supplied for emphasis)
Surely, it is not too early to warn entrants to the noble profession of law that honesty and integrity are requirements no
less weighty than hurdling the Bar examinations. This is the reason why a certification of good moral character is one
of the documents that must be submitted in applying to take said examination. In fact, a charge of immoral or deceitful
conduct on the part of an applicant, when proved, is a ground for disqualifying him.
To revert to the instant case, inasmuch as it has been shown sufficiently that respondent has committed an act of
dishonesty in withholding vital information in connection with his application for STFAP benefits, all in blatant violation
of the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline of petitioner University, the latter's inherent power
and authority to impose disciplinary sanction may be invoked and rightfully exercised.
As a Bohemian proverb puts it: "A school without discipline is like a mill without water." Insofar as the water turns the
mill, so does the school's disciplinary power assure its right to survive and continue operating. In more relevant terms,
through its power to impose disciplinary sanctions, an educational institution is able to exercise its academic freedom
which is, in the case at bar, the right to suspend and refuse admission to a student who has subverted its authority in
the implementation of the critically important STFAP.
At the risk of being repetitious, the matter of admission to a University is encompassed by the right of academic
freedom. In Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology 36 the Court stated that a school
or college which is possessed of the right of academic freedom "decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best
to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for
some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students." Elucidating, in Ateneo
de Manila University v. Hon. Ignacio M. Capulong, 37 the Court further expounded:
Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, we have consistently upheld the salutary proposition that
admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon a school, the same being a privilege
on the part of the student rather than a right. While under the Education Act of 1982, students have a
right "to freely choose their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their course
therein up to graduation," such right is subject, as all rights are, to the established academic and
disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution.
For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and regulations for the admission,
discipline and promotion of students. This right . . . extends as well to parents . . . as parents are
under a social and moral (if not legal) obligation, individually and collectively, to assist and cooperate
with the schools.
Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation and indispensable to the successful
management of the college. The rules may include those governing student discipline." Going a step
further, the establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly those pertaining
to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, if not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of
the institution, but to its very survival.
On the second issue presented for adjudication, the Court finds that the lower court gravely abused its discretion in
issuing the writ of preliminary injunction of May 29, 1993. The issuance of the said writ was based on the lower court's
finding that the implementation of the disciplinary sanction of suspension on Nadal "would work injustice to the
petitioner as it would delay him in finishing his course, and consequently, in getting a decent and good paying job."
Sadly, such a ruling considers only the situation of Nadal without taking into account the circumstances clearly of his
own making, which led him into such a predicament. More importantly, it has completely disregarded the overriding

issue of academic freedom which provides more than ample justification for the imposition of a disciplinary sanction
upon an erring student of an institution of higher learning.
From the foregoing arguments, it is clear that the lower court should have restrained itself from assuming jurisdiction
over the petition filed by Nadal. Mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases, a showing of a clear and certain right on
the part of the petitioner being required. 38 It is of no avail against an official or government agency whose duty
requires the exercise of discretion or judgment. 39
Hence, by issuing the writ of preliminary injunction, the lower court dared to tread upon legally forbidden grounds. For,
by virtue of the writ, the University's exercise of academic freedom was peremptorily curtailed. Moreover, the door was
flung wide open for Nadal to do exactly what the decision of the BOR prohibited him from doing and that is, to violate
the suspension order by enrolling for the first semester of 1993-1994. It must have been with consternation that the
University officials helplessly watching him complete his academic requirements for taking the Bar. 40 In the event that
he be allowed to continue with his studies he would, in effect render moot and academic the disciplinary sanction of
suspension legally imposed upon him by the BOR's final decision of March 29, 1993. What is to prevent other
aspirants for STFAP scholarships from misleading the University authorities by misrepresenting certain facts or as in
instant case, withholding vital information and stating downright falsehoods, in their application forms with impunity?
Not only would this undermine the authority of the U.P. to discipline its students who violated the rules and regulations
of the institution but, more importantly, subvert the very concept and lofty intent to give financial assistance to poor but
deserving students through the STFAP which, incidentally, has not ceased refining and modifying it's operations.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the lower court is hereby ordered to DISMISS the petition
formandamus.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001]

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number, is self-protection. The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to self-preservation. With the end of maintaining
the integrity and cohesiveness of the body politic, it behooves the State to formulate a system of laws that would compel obeisance
to its collective wisdom and inflict punishment for non-observance.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and
Penalizing the Crime of Plunder),[1] as amended by RA 7659,[2] wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively
fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a
stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it
suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it
abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear
violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have transgressed constitutional boundaries are Secs.
1, par. (d), 2 and 4 which are reproduced hereunder:

Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise or material possession of any person
within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents,
subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit
from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the
public office concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees
and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his
family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or
acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the
aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of
participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be
considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets
including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State
(underscoring supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every
criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth,
it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy (underscoring supplied).
On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate Informations, docketed
as: (a) Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive,
for violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 ( Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act),respectively; (c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and,
(e) Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary
investigation with respect to specification "d" of the charges in the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for
reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an opportunity to file
counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised were only lack of
preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The
purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law under which they are charged were never raised in that Omnibus
Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that "a probable
cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001
petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan.

On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts
alleged therein did not constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and
that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 21 June 2001 the Government filed
its Opposition to the Motion to Quash, and five (5) days later or on 26 June 2001 petitioner submitted his Reply to the
Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.
As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September 2001, the issues for resolution in the instant
petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for
proving the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process; and, (c) Whether Plunder as
defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it.
Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is predicated on the basic principle
that a legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the Constitution.[3] Courts invariably train their sights on this
fundamental rule whenever a legislative act is under a constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional
adjudication. This strong predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the
government to encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is based on the
deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate branch - the legislature.
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must assume that the legislature is ever
conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the
purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the
legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and
forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a
measure of last resort. In construing therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation is
fairly possible to sidestep the question of constitutionality.
In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon[4] we held that as long as there is some basis for the decision of the court, the
constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched and the case will be decided on other available grounds. Yet the force of
the presumption is not sufficient to catapult a fundamentally deficient law into the safe environs of constitutionality. Of course,
where the law clearly and palpably transgresses the hallowed domain of the organic law, it must be struck down on sight lest the
positive commands of the fundamental law be unduly eroded.
Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party challenging the validity of the statute. He
must
demonstrate
beyond
any tinge
of
doubt
that
there
is indeed
an
infringement
of
the
constitution, for absent such a showing, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, will hardly
suffice. As tersely put by Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain."[5] And petitioner has miserably failed in the instant case to
discharge his burden and overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the
accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and
conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus 1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;
2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of the following overt or criminal
acts: (a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, ormalversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by
receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from
any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public
officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by
obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation
including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial
or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular
persons or special interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to
unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of
the Philippines; and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.

As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct
would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained . It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the
counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed
conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in
amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at leastP50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1,
par. (d), of the Plunder Law.
In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various
elements of the offense which petitioner is alleged to have committed:
"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses
former PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' and
a.k.a. 'JOSE VELARDE,' together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma
Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane
Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as
follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY,
RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER
PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP,
CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY
HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR
BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE
PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING
HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR Aseries of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR
SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE
AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM
ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connection with co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy'
Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION
OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR
THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS
(P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (P200,000,000.00) tobacco
excise tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself and/or in connivance with co-accused
Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND
OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE DOES; (italic supplied).
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System
(SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF
MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED
FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS
(P744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY
SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
(P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR
IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF
SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION
SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION
WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE
VELARDE;'

(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY
FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE
OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE
SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE' AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is obviously none - that will confuse petitioner
in his defense. Although subject to proof, these factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood
and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is
completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the
terms "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and
Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for
being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process.
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general
terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them; [6] much less do we have to define every
word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every
word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words
employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or
at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain
and ordinary acceptation and signification,[7] unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to
those words.[8] The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to usestatutory
phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly
accepted definition of the words "combination" and"series:"
Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To combine is to bring into such close
relationship as to obscure individual characters.
Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and temporal succession.
That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their popular meanings is pristinely
evident from the legislative deliberations on the bill which eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law:
DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7 May 1991
REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF
OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we actually mean
to say, if there are two or more means, we mean to say that number one and two or number one and something else are included,
how about a series of the same act? For example, through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these be included also?
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.
REP. ISIDRO: Series.
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.
REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that REP. GARCIA: Two.
REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of one enumeration.
REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.

REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?

REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination, two acts.
REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, thats it. When we say combination, we mean, two different acts. It cannot be a repetition of
the same act.
REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.
REP. GARCIA: A series.
REP. ISIDRO: Thats not series. Its a combination. Because when we say combination or series, we seem to say that two or
more, di ba?
REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very good suggestion because
if it is only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts. So x x x x
REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....
SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term series?
REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two misappropriations....
REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be combination. Series.
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
SEN. TANADA: Two different.
REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.
REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...
DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989
SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes one or maybe even two acts may already result in such
a big amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider deleting the words a series of overt or, to read, therefore: or
conspiracy COMMITTED by criminal acts such as. Remove the idea of necessitating a series. Anyway, the criminal acts
are in the plural.
SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this.
THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....
SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because a series implies several or many; two or more.
SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime. But when we say acts of
plunder there should be, at least, two or more.
SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. President.
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling under different categories
of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent
conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).

On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category
of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall
under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and
"series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan [9] that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in
relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in
subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards
a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly,
there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the term
'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which the principal accused and public officer and others
conniving with him follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where
the schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a
common goal.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to
penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine
has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must
define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by
the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be
clarified either by a saving clause or by construction.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In suchinstance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it
leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.[10] But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but which
nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to
certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the
second whenever directed against such activities.[11] With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is
clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently
definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. [12] It must be stressed,
however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute
precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible
as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have
been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be
impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes.
Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza during the deliberations of the
Court that the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due
process of law."[13] The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."[14]
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect"
upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction
suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the
person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow
specificity."[15] The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the
possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible
inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very
existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the
validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an
'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment."[16] In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,[17] the Court ruled that
"claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken
words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws
that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is
the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under
which the Act would be valid."[18] As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if
it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of
the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others."[19]
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces"
statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service
when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of a
statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to
other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional."[20] As has been pointed out, "vagueness
challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found
vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant."[21] Consequently, there is no
basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to
parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. [22] It constitutes a departure from the case and
controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile
abstract contexts.[23] But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris[24]
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the
statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the
controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the
required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding
constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be
employed "sparingly and only as a last resort,"[25] and is generally disfavored.[26] In determining the constitutionality of a statute,
therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which
the defendant is charged.[27]
In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimed
and argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined than real.Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts
and words in the statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the law. Every provision of the
law should be construed in relation and with reference to every other part. To be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to overturn
the well-entrenched presumption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot feign ignorance
of what the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted for its passage, petitioner must be aware that the law
was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its appropriate committees by reason of which he even registered his
affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutional anchorage.
The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan[28] must be mentioned if only to illustrate and emphasize the point that courts
are loathed to declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the law itself is so imperfect and deficient in its details, and is
susceptible
of
no
reasonable
construction
that
will
support
and
give
it
effect. In
that
case,
petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act for being vague. Petitioners posited, among others, that the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise and elastic with no
common law meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or administrative precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e),
violates due process in that it does not give fair warning or sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Petitioners further argued
that the Information charged them with three (3) distinct offenses, to wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through manifest
partiality; (b) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through evident bad faith; and, (c) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through gross

inexcusable negligence while in the discharge of their official function and that their right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against them was violated because they were left to guess which of the three (3) offenses, if not all, they were
being charged and prosecuted.
In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer
from the constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable
negligence" merely describe the different modes by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the statute may be
committed, and the use of all these phrases in the same Information does not mean that the indictment charges three (3) distinct
offenses.
The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized (Webster, Third
International Dictionary, p. 2514); or without justification or adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. US Dept. of
Justice, C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual Pocket
Part, p. 19).
The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act consider a corrupt practice and make unlawful the act of the
public officer in:
x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative
or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, x x x (Section 3 [e], Rep. Act
3019, as amended).
It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal provisions penalize is the act of a public officer, in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions, in giving any private party benefits, advantage or preference which is
unjustified, unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.
In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in the use of the term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3,
par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which was understood in its primary and general acceptation. Consequently,
in that case, petitioners' objection thereto was held inadequate to declare the section unconstitutional.
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the
immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder
when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every
criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it
being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme
or conspiracy.
The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all
other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and
unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal.[29] The use of the "reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community
in the application of criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of criminal law be not diluted by a standard of proof that leaves
people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual going
about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a
proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty. This "reasonable doubt" standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm
of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.[30] The following exchanges
between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo Garcia on this score during the deliberations in the floor of the House of
Representatives are elucidating DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9 October 1990
MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law that what is alleged in the information must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt. If we will prove only one act and find him guilty of the other acts enumerated in the
information, does that not work against the right of the accused especially so if the amount committed, say, by

falsification is less than P100 million, but the totality of the crime committed is P100 million since there is malversation,
bribery, falsification of public document, coercion, theft?
MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What is
required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime charged. For example, Mr. Speaker, there is
an enumeration of the things taken by the robber in the information three pairs of pants, pieces of jewelry. These need not
be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but these will not prevent the conviction of a crime for which he was charged just
because, say, instead of 3 pairs of diamond earrings the prosecution proved two. Now, what is required to be proved
beyond reasonable doubt is the element of the offense.
MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime of plunder the totality of the amount is very
important, I feel that such a series of overt criminal acts has to be taken singly.For instance, in the act of bribery, he was
able to accumulate only P50,000 and in the crime of extortion, he was only able to accumulate P1 million. Now, when we
add the totality of the other acts as required under this bill through the interpretation on the rule of evidence, it is just one
single act, so how can we now convict him?
MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an essential element of the crime, there is a need to
prove that element beyond reasonable doubt. For example, one essential element of the crime is that the amount involved
is P100 million. Now, in a series of defalcations and other acts of corruption in the enumeration the total amount would
be P110 or P120 million, but there are certain acts that could not be proved, so, we will sum up the amounts involved in
those transactions which were proved. Now, if the amount involved in these transactions, proved beyond reasonable
doubt, is P100 million, then there is a crime of plunder (underscoring supplied).
It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner refashion the standard quantum of proof in the
crime of plunder. The burden still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary
to constitute the crime.
The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime suffers from a dismal misconception
of the import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to
form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no
need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the accused
is charged in an Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public
treasury. The prosecution need notprove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the raids
beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they amounted to at least P50,000,000.00.[31]
A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion that "pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden
wealth. Stated otherwise, such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as
defined in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the predicate acts. This conclusion is consistent with
reason and common sense. There would be no other explanation for a combination or series of overt or criminal acts to
stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill gotten wealth." The prosecution is
therefore not required to make a deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily follows with the establishment of
a series or combination of the predicate acts.
Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that "pattern" is "a very important
element of the crime of plunder;" and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of
the crime," such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be convicted under the Plunder Law without applying Section 4
on the Rule of Evidence if there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of the acts complained of?
ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes enumerated in the Revised Penal Code, but not plunder.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the crime are proved beyond reasonable doubt without applying
Section 4, can you not have a conviction under the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in convicting an accused charged for violation of the
Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down a substantive element of the law x x x x

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of Section 4 when there is proof beyond reasonable doubt on the
acts charged constituting plunder?
ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it contains a rule of evidence and it contains a substantive
element of the crime of plunder. So, there is no way by which we can avoid Section 4.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofar as the predicate crimes charged are concerned
that you do not have to go that far by applying Section 4?
ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a very important element of the crime of plunder and that
cannot be avoided by the prosecution.[32]
We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood from
its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause
of Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal:
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder x x x x
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely
procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in
furtherance of a remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a
conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral
certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for the
sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed from the rest
of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the law; after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4
more than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a separability clause Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance
is held invalid, the remaining provisions of this Act and the application of such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall
not be affected thereby.
Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from being declared invalid as a result of the nullity of some of
its provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is not really so, all the provisions thereof should accordingly be treated
independently of each other, especially if by doing so, the objectives of the statute can best be achieved.
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of
criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for
plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and
criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is
void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Taada made during the deliberation on S.B. No. 733:
SENATOR TAADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him would not be evidence for each and every
individual criminal act but only evidence sufficient to establish the conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of plunder.[33]
However, Senator Taada was discussing 4 as shown by the succeeding portion of the transcript quoted by petitioner:
SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in Section 4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the
Gentleman's view, would provide for a speedier and faster process of attending to this kind of cases?
SENATOR TAADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .[34]
Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and
every criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt
or ciminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned,
however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.

Indeed, 2 provides that Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall
likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating
and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder
Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined
by his criminal intent. It is true that 2 refers to "any person who participates with the said public officer in the commission of an
offense contributing to the crime of plunder." There is no reason to believe, however, that it does not apply as well to the public
officer as principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with
what they omit, but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean." [35]
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by
the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Other heinous
crimes are punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to these groups of heinous crimes, this Court held
in People v. Echegaray:[36]
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the
scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for
its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and
impoverished the population, the Philippine Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption,
dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the
populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of
misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in
turn, the very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects and repercussions of
crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees or
officers, that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts
punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they aremala in se[37] and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a
special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat
prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an
ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.
To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional
grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect this long dead issue, the same having been
eternally consigned by People v. Echegaray[38] to the archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein that
RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in the
Constitution now as an integral part of it.
Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in high places which
have shaken its very foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has become more elaborate in the corridors of time as
unscrupulous people relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the government. Drastic and radical
measures
are
imperative
to
fight
the
increasingly
sophisticated,
extraordinarily
methodical
and
economically catastrophic looting of the national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially designed to disentangle those
ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which, if left unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the
moral and institutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of the legislature to ultimately
eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against the avarice and other venalities in public office.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659,
is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Lochner v. New York

No. 292

Argued February 23, 24, 1905

Decided April 17, 1906

198 U.S. 45

ERROR TO THE COUNTY COURT OF ONEIDA COUNTY,

STATE OF NEW YORK

Syllabus

The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, and this includes the right to purchase and sell labor, except as controlled by the State in the legitimate
exercise of its police power.

Liberty of contract relating to labor includes both parties to it; the one has as much right to purchase as the other to
sell labor.

There is no reasonable ground, on the score of health, for interfering with the liberty of the person or the right of free
contract, by determining the hours of labor, in the occupation of a baker. Nor can a law limiting such hours be justified
a a health law to safeguard the public health, or the health of the individuals following that occupation.

Section 110 of the labor law of the State of New York, providing that no employes shall be required or permitted to
work in bakeries more than sixty hours in a week, or ten hours a day, is not a legitimate exercise of the police power of
the State, but an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right and liberty of the individual to
contract in relation to labor, and, as such, it is in conflict with, and void under, the Federal Constitution.

This is a writ of error to the County Court of Oneida County, in the State of New York (to which court the record had
been remitted), to review the judgment of the Court of Appeal of that State affirming the judgment of the Supreme
Court, which itself affirmed the judgment of the County Court, convicting the defendant of a misdemeanor on an
indictment under a statute of that State, known, by its short title, as the labor law. The section of the statute under
which the indictment was found is section 110, and is

reproduced in the margin, * (together with the other sections of the labor law upon the subject of bakeries, being sections 111 to
115, both inclusive). The indictment averred that the defendant

"wrongfully and unlawfully required and permitted an employee working for him in his biscuit, bread and cake bakery and
confectionery establishment, at the city of Utica, in this county, to work more than sixty hours in one week,"

after having been theretofore convicted of a violation of the same act, and therefore, as averred, he committed the crime or
misdemeanor, second offense. The plaintiff in error demurred to the indictment on several grounds, one of which was that the
facts stated did not constitute a crime. The demurrer was overruled, and the plaintiff in error having refused to plead further, a plea
of not guilty was entered by order of the court and the trial commenced, and he was convicted of misdemeanor, second offense,
as indicted, and sentenced to pay a fine of $50 and to stand committed until paid, not to exceed fifty days in the Oneida County
jail. A certificate of reasonable doubt was granted by the county judge of Oneida County, whereon an appeal was taken to the
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, Fourth Department, where the judgment of conviction was affirmed. 73 App.Div.N.Y. 120.
A further appeal was then taken to the Court of Appeals, where the judgment of conviction was again affirmed. 177 N.Y. 145.

MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, after making the foregoing statement of the facts, delivered the opinion of the court.

The indictment, it will be seen, charges that the plaintiff in error violated the one hundred and tenth section of article 8, chapter 415, of
the Laws of 1897, known as the labor law of the State of New York, in that he wrongfully and unlawfully required and permitted an
employee working for him to work more than sixty hours in one week. There is nothing in any of the opinions delivered in this case, either
in the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals of the State, which construes the section, in using the word "required," as referring to any
physical force being used to obtain the labor of an employee. It is assumed that the word means nothing more than the requirement
arising from voluntary contract for such labor in excess of the number of hours specified in the statute. There is no pretense in any of the
opinions that the statute was intended to meet a case of involuntary labor in any form. All the opinions assume that there is no real
distinction, so far as this question is concerned, between the words "required" and "permitted." The mandate of the statute that "no
employee shall be required or permitted to work," is the substantial equivalent of an enactment that "no employee shall contract or agree
to work," more than ten hours per day, and, as there is no provision for special emergencies, the statute is mandatory in all cases. It is
not an act merely fixing the number of hours which shall constitute a legal day's work, but an absolute prohibition upon the employer's
permitting, under any circumstances, more than ten hours' work to be done in his establishment. The employee may desire to earn the
extra money which would arise from his

working more than the prescribed time, but this statute forbids the employer from permitting the employee
to earn it.

The statute necessarily interferes with the right of contract between the employer and employes
concerning the number of hours in which the latter may labor in the bakery of the employer. The general
right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578. Under that
provision, no State can deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law. The right
to purchase or to sell labor is part of the liberty protected by this amendment unless there are
circumstances which exclude the right. There are, however, certain powers, existing in the sovereignty of
each State in the Union, somewhat vaguely termed police powers, the exact description and limitation of
which have not been attempted by the courts. Those powers, broadly stated and without, at present, any
attempt at a more specific limitation, relate to the safety, health, morals and general welfare of the public.
Both property and liberty are held on such reasonable conditions as may be imposed by the governing
power of the State in the exercise of those powers, and with such conditions the Fourteenth Amendment
was not designed to interfere. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623; In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436; Crowley
v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86; In re Converse, 137 U. S. 624.

The State therefore has power to prevent the individual from making certain kinds of contracts, and, in
regard to them, the Federal Constitution offers no protection. If the contract be one which the State, in the
legitimate exercise of its police power, has the right to prohibit, it is not prevented from prohibiting it by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Contracts in violation of a statute, either of the Federal or state government, or a
contract to let one's property for immoral purposes, or to do any other unlawful act, could obtain no
protection from the Federal Constitution as coming under the liberty of person or of free contract.
Therefore, when the State, by its legislature, in the assumed exercise of its police powers, has passed an
act which seriously limits the right to labor or the right of contract in regard to their means of livelihood
between persons who are sui juris(both employer and employee), it becomes of great importance to
determine which shall prevail -- the right of the individual to labor for such time as he may choose or the
right of the State to prevent the individual from laboring or from entering into any contract to labor beyond
a certain time prescribed by the State.

This court has recognized the existence and upheld the exercise of the police powers of the States in many
cases which might fairly be considered as border ones, and it has, in the course of its determination of
questions regarding the asserted invalidity of such statutes on the ground of their violation of the rights secured
by the Federal Constitution, been guided by rules of a very liberal nature, the application of which has resulted,
in numerous instances, in upholding the validity of state statutes thus assailed. Among the later cases where
the state law has been upheld by this court is that of Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366. A

provision in the act of the legislature of Utah was there under consideration, the act limiting the
employment of workmen in all underground mines or workings to eight hours per day "except in cases of
emergency, where life or property is in imminent danger." It also limited the hours of labor in smelting and
other institutions for the reduction or refining of ores or metals to eight hours per day except in like cases
of emergency. The act was held to be a valid exercise of the police powers of the State. A review of many
of the cases on the subject, decided by this and other courts, is given in the opinion. It was held that the
kind of employment, mining, smelting, etc., and the character of the employes in such kinds of labor,
were such as to make it reasonable and proper for the State to interfere to prevent the employees from
being constrained by the rules laid down by the proprietors in regard to labor. The following citation from
the observations of the Supreme Court of Utah in that case was made by the judge writing the opinion of
this court, and approved:

"The law in question is confined to the protection of that class of people engaged in labor in underground
mines and in smelters and other works wherein ores are reduced and refined. This law applies only to the
classes subjected by their employment to the peculiar conditions and effects attending underground
mining and work in smelters and other works for the reduction and refining of ores. Therefore it is not
necessary to discuss or decide whether the legislature can fix the hours of labor in other employments."

It will be observed that, even with regard to that class of labor, the Utah statute provided for cases of
emergency wherein the provisions of the statute would not apply. The statute now before this court has no
emergency clause in it, and, if the statute is valid, there are no circumstances and no emergencies under
which the slightest violation of the provisions of the act would be innocent. There is nothing

in Holden v. Hardy which covers the case now before us. Nor does Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207, touch
the case at bar. The Atkincase was decided upon the right of the State to control its municipal
corporations and to prescribe the condition upon which it will permit work of a public character to be done
for a municipality. Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U. S. 13, is equally far from an authority for this
legislation. The employees in that case were held to be at a disadvantage with the employer in matters of
wages, they being miners and coal workers, and the act simply provided for the cashing of coal orders
when presented by the miner to the employer.

The latest case decided by this court involving the police power is that of Jacobson v. Massachusetts, decided
at this term and reported in 197 U. S. 197 U.S. 11. It related to compulsory

vaccination, and the law was held valid as a proper exercise of the police powers with reference to the
public health. It was stated in the opinion that it was a case

"of an adult who, for aught that appears, was himself in perfect health and a fit subject for vaccination, and yet,
while remaining in the community, refused to obey the statute and the regulation adopted in

execution of its provisions for the protection of the public health and the public safety, confessedly
endangered by the presence of a dangerous disease."

That case is also far from covering the one now before the court.

Petit v. Minnesota, 177 U. S. 164, was upheld as a proper exercise of the police power relating to the
observance of Sunday, and the case held that the legislature had the right to declare that, as matter of
law, keeping barber shops open on Sunday was not a work of necessity or charity.

It must, of course, be conceded that there is a limit to the valid exercise of the police power by the State.
There is no dispute concerning this general proposition. Otherwise the Fourteenth Amendment would
have no efficacy, and the legislatures of the States would have unbounded power, and it would be enough
to say that any piece of legislation was enacted to conserve the morals, the health or the safety of the
people; such legislation would be valid no matter how absolutely without foundation the claim might be.
The claim of the police power would be a mere pretext -- become another and delusive name for the
supreme sovereignty of the State to be exercised free from constitutional restraint. This is not contended
for. In every case that comes before this court, therefore, where legislation of this character is concerned
and where the protection of the Federal Constitution is sought, the question necessarily arises: is this a
fair, reasonable and appropriate exercise of the police power of the State, or is it an unreasonable,
unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty or to enter
into those contracts in relation to labor which may seem to him appropriate or necessary for the support
of himself and his family? Of course, the liberty of contract relating to labor includes both parties to it. The
one has as much right to purchase as the other to sell labor.

This is not a question of substituting the judgment of the court for that of the legislature. If the act be
within the power of the State, it is valid although the judgment of the court might be totally opposed to the
enactment of such a law. But the question would still remain: is it within the police power of the State?,
and that question must be answered by the court.

The question whether this act is valid as a labor law, pure and simple, may be dismissed in a few words. There
is no reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty of person or the right of free contract by determining the
hours of labor in the occupation of a baker. There is no contention that bakers as a class are not equal in
intelligence and capacity to men in other trades or manual occupations, or that they are able to assert their
rights and care for themselves without the protecting arm of the State, interfering with their independence of
judgment and of action. They are in no sense wards of the State. Viewed in the light of a purely labor law, with
no reference whatever to the question of health, we think that a law like the one before us involves neither the
safety, the morals, nor the welfare of the public, and that the

interest of the public is not in the slightest degree affected by such an act. The law must be upheld, if at all, as
a law pertaining to the health of the individual engaged in the occupation of a baker. It does not affect any other
portion of the public than those who are engaged in that occupation. Clean and wholesome bread does not
depend upon whether the baker works but ten hours per day or only sixty hours a week. The limitation of the
hours of labor does not come within the police power on that ground.

It is a question of which of two powers or rights shall prevail -- the power of the State to legislate or the
right of the individual to liberty of person and freedom of contract. The mere assertion that the subject
relates though but in a remote degree to the public health does not necessarily render the enactment
valid. The act must have a more direct relation, as a means to an end, and the end itself must be
appropriate and legitimate, before an act can be held to be valid which interferes with the general right of
an individual to be free in his person and in his power to contract in relation to his own labor.

This case has caused much diversity of opinion in the state courts. In the Supreme Court, two of the five
judges composing the Appellate Division dissented from the judgment affirming the validity of the act. In
the Court of Appeals, three of the seven judges also dissented from the judgment upholding the statute.
Although found in what is called a labor law of the State, the Court of Appeals has upheld the act as one
relating to the public health -- in other words, as a health law. One of the judges of the Court of Appeals,
in upholding the law, stated that, in his opinion, the regulation in question could not be sustained unless
they were able to say, from common knowledge, that working in a bakery and candy factory was an
unhealthy employment. The judge held that, while the evidence was not uniform, it still led him to the
conclusion that the occupation of a baker or confectioner was unhealthy, and tended to result in diseases
of the respiratory organs. Three of the judges dissented from that view, and they thought the occupation
of a baker was not to such an extent unhealthy as to warrant the interference of the legislature with the
liberty of the individual.

We think the limit of the police power has been reached and passed in this case. There is, in our judgment, no
reasonable foundation for holding this to be necessary or appropriate as a health law to safeguard the public
health or the health of the individuals who are following the trade of a baker. If this statute be valid, and if,
therefore, a proper case is made out in which to deny the right of an individual, sui juris, as employer or
employee, to make contracts for the labor of the latter under the protection of the provisions of the Federal
Constitution, there would seem to be no length to which legislation of this nature might not go. The case differs
widely, as we have already stated, from the expressions of this court in regard to laws of this nature, as stated
in Holden v. Hardy and Jacobson v. Massachusetts, supra.

We think that there can be no fair doubt that the trade of a baker, in and of itself, is not an unhealthy one
to that degree which would authorize the legislature to interfere with the right to labor, and with the right of

free contract on the part of the individual, either as employer or employee. In looking through statistics
regarding all trades and occupations, it may be true that the trade of a baker does not appear to be as
healthy as some other trades, and is also vastly more healthy than still others. To the common
understanding, the trade of a baker has never been regarded as an unhealthy one. Very likely, physicians
would not recommend the exercise of that or of any other trade as a remedy for ill health. Some
occupations are more healthy than others, but we think there are none which might not come under the
power of the legislature to supervise and control the hours of working therein if the mere fact that the
occupation is not absolutely and perfectly healthy is to confer that right upon the legislative department of
the Government. It might be safely affirmed that almost all occupations more or less affect the health.
There must be more than the mere fact of the possible existence of some small amount of unhealthiness
to warrant legislative interference with liberty. It is unfortunately true that labor, even in any department,
may possibly carry with it the seeds of unhealthiness. But are we all, on that account, at the mercy of
legislative majorities? A printer, a tinsmith, a locksmith, a carpenter, a cabinetmaker, a dry goods clerk, a
bank's, a lawyer's or a physician's clerk, or a clerk in almost any kind of business, would all come under
the power of the legislature on this assumption. No trade, no occupation, no mode of earning one's living
could escape this all-pervading power, and the acts of the legislature in limiting the hours of labor in all
employments would be valid although such limitation might seriously cripple the ability of the laborer to
support himself and his family. In our large cities there are many buildings into which the sun penetrates
for but a short time in each day, and these buildings are occupied by people carrying on the business of
bankers, brokers, lawyers, real estate, and many other kinds of business, aided by many clerks,
messengers, and other employs. Upon the assumption of the validity of this act under review, it is not
possible to say that an act prohibiting lawyers' or bank clerks, or others from contracting to labor for their
employers more than eight hours a day would be invalid. It might be said that it is unhealthy to work more
than that number of hours in an apartment lighted by artificial light during the working hours of the day;
that the occupation of the bank clerk, the lawyer's clerk, the real estate clerk, or the broker's clerk in such
offices is therefore unhealthy, and the legislature, in its paternal wisdom, must therefore have the right to
legislate on the subject of, and to limit the hours for, such labor, and, if it exercises that power and its
validity be questioned, it is sufficient to say it has reference to the public health; it has reference to the
health of the employees condemned to labor day after day in buildings where the sun never shines; it is a
health law, and therefore it is valid, and cannot be questioned by the courts.

It is also urged, pursuing the same line of argument, that it is to the interest of the State that its population
should be strong and robust, and therefore any legislation which may be said to tend to make people healthy
must be valid as health laws, enacted under the police power. If this be a valid argument and a justification for
this kind of legislation, it follows that the protection of the Federal Constitution from undue interference with
liberty of person and freedom of contract is visionary wherever the law is sought to be

justified as a valid exercise of the police power. Scarcely any law but might find shelter under such
assumptions, and conduct, properly so called, as well as contract, would come under the restrictive sway
of the legislature. Not only the hours of employees, but the hours of employers, could be regulated, and
doctors, lawyers, scientists, all professional men, as well as athletes and artisans, could be forbidden to
fatigue their brains and bodies by prolonged hours of exercise, lest the fighting strength of the State be
impaired. We mention these extreme cases because the contention is extreme. We do not believe in the
soundness of the views which uphold this law. On the contrary, we think that such a law as this, although
passed in the assumed exercise of the police power, and as relating to the public health, or the health of
the employees named, is not within that power, and is invalid. The act is not, within any fair meaning of
the term, a health law, but is an illegal interference with the rights of individuals, both employers and
employees, to make contracts regarding labor upon such terms as they may think best, or which they may
agree upon with the other parties to such contracts. Statutes of the nature of that under review, limiting
the hours in which grown and intelligent men may labor to earn their living, are mere meddlesome
interferences with the rights of the individual, and they are not saved from condemnation by the claim that
they are passed in the exercise of the police power and upon the subject of the health of the individual
whose rights are interfered with, unless there be some fair ground, reasonable in and of itself, to say that
there is material danger to the public health or to the health of the employees if the hours of labor are not
curtailed. If this be not clearly the case, the individuals whose rights are thus made the subject of
legislative interference are under the protection of the Federal Constitution regarding their liberty of
contract as well as of person, and the legislature of the State has no power to limit their right as proposed
in this statute. All that it could properly do has been done by it with regard to the conduct of bakeries, as
provided for in the other sections of the act above set forth. These several sections provide for the
inspection of the premises where the bakery is carried on, with regard to furnishing proper wash-rooms
and water-closets, apart from the bake-room, also with regard to providing proper drainage, plumbing and
painting; the sections, in addition, provide for the height of the ceiling, the cementing or tiling of floors,
where necessary in the opinion of the factory inspector, and for other things of that nature; alterations are
also provided for and are to be made where necessary in the opinion of the inspector, in order to comply
with the provisions of the statute. These various sections may be wise and valid regulations, and they
certainly go to the full extent of providing for the cleanliness and the healthiness, so far as possible, of the
quarters in which bakeries are to be conducted. Adding to all these requirements a prohibition to enter
into any contract of labor in a bakery for more than a certain number of hours a week is, in our judgment,
so wholly beside the matter of a proper, reasonable and fair provision as to run counter to that liberty of
person and of free contract provided for in the Federal Constitution.

It was further urged on the argument that restricting the hours of labor in the case of bakers was valid because
it tended to cleanliness on the part of the workers, as a man was more apt to be cleanly when

not overworked, and, if cleanly, then his "output" was also more likely to be so. What has already been
said applies with equal force to this contention. We do not admit the reasoning to be sufficient to justify
the claimed right of such interference. The State in that case would assume the position of a supervisor,
or pater familias, over every act of the individual, and its right of governmental interference with his hours
of labor, his hours of exercise, the character thereof, and the extent to which it shall be carried would be
recognized and upheld. In our judgment, it is not possible, in fact, to discover the connection between the
number of hours a baker may work in the bakery and the healthful quality of the bread made by the
workman. The connection, if any exists, is too shadowy and thin to build any argument for the
interference of the legislature. If the man works ten hours a day, it is all right, but if ten and a half or
eleven, his health is in danger and his bread may be unhealthful, and, therefore, he shall not be permitted
to do it. This, we think, is unreasonable, and entirely arbitrary. When assertions such as we have
adverted to become necessary in order to give, if possible, a plausible foundation for the contention that
the law is a "health law," it gives rise to at least a suspicion that there was some other motive dominating
the legislature than the purpose to subserve the public health or welfare.

This interference on the part of the legislatures of the several States with the ordinary trades and
occupations of the people seems to be on the increase. In the Supreme Court of New York, in the case of
People v. Beattie, Appellate Division, First Department, decided in 1904, 89 N.Y.Supp. 193, a statute
regulating the trade of horseshoeing, and requiring the person practicing such trade to be examined and
to obtain a certificate from a board of examiners and file the same with the clerk of the county wherein
the person proposes to practice his trade, was held invalid as an arbitrary interference with personal
liberty and private property without due process of law. The attempt was made, unsuccessfully, to justify it
as a health law.

The same kind of a statute was held invalid (In re Aubry) by the Supreme Court of Washington in
December, 1904. 78 Pac.Rep. 900. The court held that the act deprived citizens of their liberty and
property without due process of law and denied to them the equal protection of the laws. It also held that
the trade of a horseshoer is not a subject of regulation under the police power of the State as a business
concerning and directly affecting the health, welfare or comfort of its inhabitants, and that, therefore, a
law which provided for the examination and registration of horseshoers in certain cities was
unconstitutional as an illegitimate exercise of the police power.

The Supreme Court of Illinois in Bessette v. People, 193 Illinois 334, also held that a law of the same nature,
providing for the regulation and licensing of horseshoers, was unconstitutional as an illegal interference with
the liberty of the individual in adopting and pursuing such calling as he may choose, subject only to the
restraint necessary secure the common welfare. See also Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. St. 431, 437; Low
v. Rees Printing Co., 41 Nebraska 127, 145. In these cases, the

courts upheld the right of free contract and the right to purchase and sell labor upon such terms as the parties may agree to.

It is impossible for us to shut our eyes to the fact that many of the laws of this character, while passed under what is claimed to be
the police power for the purpose of protecting the public health or welfare, are, in reality, passed from other motives. We are
justified in saying so when, from the character of the law and the subject upon which it legislates, it is apparent that the public
health or welfare bears but the most remote relation to the law. The purpose of a statute must be determined from the natural and
legal effect of the language employed, and whether it is or is not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States must be
determined from the natural effect of such statutes when put into operation, and not from their proclaimed purpose. Minnesota v.
Barber, 136 U. S. 313; Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U. S. 78. The court looks beyond the mere letter of the law in such cases. Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356.

It is manifest to us that the limitation of the hours of labor as provided for in this section of the statute under which the indictment
was found, and the plaintiff in error convicted, has no such direct relation to, and no such substantial effect upon, the health of the
employee as to justify us in regarding the section as really a health law. It seems to us that the real object and purpose were simply
to regulate the hours of labor between the master and his employees (all being men sui juris) in a private business, not dangerous
in any degree to morals or in any real and substantial degree to the health of the employees. Under such circumstances, the
freedom of master and employee to contract with each other in relation to their employment, and in defining the same, cannot be
prohibited or interfered with without violating the Federal Constitution.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals of New York, as well as that of the Supreme Court and of the County Court of Oneida County,
must be reversed, and the case remanded to the County Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed.

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