TABLE OF CONTENTS

Tarrosa v. Singson
Mendoza v. Allas
Soriano v. Laguardia

The SC called attention to the case of Calderon v.

Carale (1992), where it was ruled that Congress cannot
by law expand the confirmation powers of the
Commission on Appointments and require confirmation
of appointment of other government officials not
expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16
of Article VII of the Constitution.
Tarrosa v. Singson | Nice
ISSUE #2:
May 25, 1994

W/N Tarrosa had legal standing (NO)

JESUS ARMANDO A.R. TARROSA, petitioner, vs. GABRIEL C.
SINGSON
and
HON.
SALVADOR
M.
ENRIQUEZ
RATIO #2:
III, respondents.

The petition is in the nature of a quo warranto

QUIASON, J.
proceeding as it seeks the ouster of Singson and
alleges that the latter is unlawfully holding or exercising
NATURE: Petition for prohibition
the powers of Governor of the BSP.
SUMMARY: Gabriel Singson was appointed Governor of BSP.
o Such a special civil action can only be
Tarrosa filed a petition for prohibition which sought to stop
commenced by the Solicitor General or by a
Singson from assuming office and performing his duties. The SC
"person claiming to be entitled to a public office
denied the petition, holding that the petition was a quo warranto
or position unlawfully held or exercised by
suit, and Tarrosa was not the proper party to bring such suit.
another".
DOCTRINE: The SC called attention to the case of Calderon v.

In Sevilla v. Court of Appeals, the SC held that the

Carale (1992), where it was ruled that Congress cannot by law
petitioner, who did not aver that he was entitled to the
expand the confirmation powers of the Commission on
office of the City Engineer of Cabanatuan City, could not
Appointments and require confirmation of appointment of other
bring the action for quo warranto to oust the respondent
government officials not expressly mentioned in the first sentence
from said office as a mere usurper.
of Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution.

Likewise in Greene v. Knox, it was held that the question

FACTS:
of title to an office, which must be resolved in a quo

Gabriel Singson was appointed Governor of the Bangko

warranto proceeding, may not be determined in a suit to
Sentral by Pres. Ramos on July 2, 1993, effective on
restrain the payment of salary to the person holding
July 6, 1993.
such office, brought by someone who does not claim to

Tarrosa filed a petition for prohibition as a "taxpayer,"

be the one entitled to occupy the said office.
questioning the appointment of Singson for not having

To uphold the action would encourage every disgruntled

been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments
citizen to resort to the courts, thereby causing
(CA). He cites Section 6 of R.A. No. 7653 (the law
incalculable mischief and hindrance to the efficient
establishing BSP), which provides:
operation of the governmental machinery.
Sec. 6. Composition of the Monetary Board. The powers and functions of
Bangko
shall of
beTarrosa
exercised
by the There
Bangko
theHence,
theSentral
whole case
collapses.
is no
Sentral Monetary Board, hereafter referred to as the Monetary Board, composed
of
seven
(7)
members
appointed
by
the
President
need to resolve the question of whether the
of the Philippines for a term of six (6) years.
disbursement of public funds to pay the salaries and
The seven (7) members are:
emoluments of Singson can be enjoined.

The
also Board.
refrained from passing upon the
(a) The Governor of the Bangko Sentral, who shall be the Chairman
of the SC
Monetary
of Sectionby6,theR.A.
No. 7653
Sentral shall be head of a department and his appointment shall constitutionality
be subject to confirmation
Commission
on in
deference
to he
theshall
principle
that bars
a judicial
inquirytointo
Appointments. Whenever the Governor is unable to attend a meeting of
the Board,
designate
a Deputy
Governor
a constitutional question unless the resolution thereof is
act as his alternate: Provided, That in such event, the Monetary Board shall designate one of its members as acting
indispensable for the determination of the case.
Chairman.
DISPOSITION

He sought to enjoin Singson from the performance of

Petition denied.
his functions until his appointment is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, and stop disbursements
for his salaries.
Mendoza v. Allas | Kat

Singson, on the other hand, claims that Congress

1
1
3

exceeded its legislative powers in requiring the

confirmation by the CA of the appointment of the BSP
February 4, 1999
Governor. He contends that such is not among the
appointments which have to be confirmed by the CA,
PEDRO
MENDOZA, petitioner, vs.
RAY
ALLAS
and
citing Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution which
GODOFREDO
OLORES,
respondents.
provides that:
Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers
PUNO,of
J. the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law,
and thoseMendoza
whom he held
may be
law to appoint.
SUMMARY:
the authorized
position ofbyDirector
III of the
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower
in rank in
the President
in the courts,
or inLater,
the heads
Customs
Intelligence
andalone,
Investigation
Service.
he was
of department, agencies, commissions, or boards . . .
temporarily designated as Acting District Collector. He received a
ISSUE #1 (MAIN):
letter informing him that he was terminated from the BoC, in view

W/N the appointment of the Central Bank Governor

of Allas appointment as Director III by President Ramos. Thus, he
is subject to confirmation by the CA (NO)
filed a petition for quo warranto against Allas. RTC ruled in favor
RATIO #1:
of Mendoza. While Allas appeal in the CA was pending, Allas

(Note: The SC decided this case on the point of locus

was appointed as Deputy Commissioner of Customs for
standi. This is more of an afterthought.)
PUB OFF: WEEK 5A 1

Assessment and Operations. The CA, on motion of Mendoza,

dismissed the case. The order of dismissal became final.
Mendoza then filed with the RTC a Motion for execution of its
decision. This was denied since the position vacated by Allas
was now being occupied by Olores who was not a part to the quo
warranto petition. The CA and SC agreed with the RTC. The
petition for quo warranto was filed by Mendoza solely against
Allas. What was threshed out before the trial court was the
qualification and right of Mendoza to the contested position as
against Allas, not against Olores.

Despite Mendozas new assignment as Acting District

Collector, however, he continued to receive the salary
and benefits of the position of Director III.

September 1994: Mendoza received a letter from

Deputy Customs Commissioner Cesar Z. Dario,
informing him of his termination from the Bureau of
Customs, in view of Allas' appointment as Director
III by President Ramos.1 Attached to the letter was the
appointment of Ray Allas as "Director III, CIIS, Bureau
of Customs, vice Pedro Mendoza."

DOCTRINE: Ordinarily, a judgment against a public officer in

regard to a public right binds his successor in office. This rule,
however, is not applicable in quo warranto cases.

Mendoza wrote the Customs Commissioner demanding

his reinstatement with full back wages and without loss
of seniority rights. No reply was made.

December 2, 1994: Mendoza filed a petition for quo

warranto against Allas before the RTC.

RTC (September 11, 1995): granted petition. Mendoza

was illegally terminated from office without due process
of law and in violation of his security of tenure, and that
as he was deemed not to have vacated his office, the
appointment of Allas to the same office was void ab
initio. It ordered the ouster of Allas from the position of
Director III, and at the same time directed the
reinstatement of Mendoza to the same position with
payment of full back salaries and other benefits
appurtenant thereto.

Allas appealed to the Court of Appeals.

February 8, 1996: While the case was pending before

said court, Allas was promoted by President Ramos to
the position of Deputy Commissioner of Customs for
Assessment and Operations.

As a consequence of this promotion, Mendoza moved to

dismiss Allas appeal as having been rendered moot and
academic.

CA: granted the motion and dismissed the case

accordingly.

The order of dismissal became final and entry of

judgment was made on March 19, 1996.

May 9, 1996: Mendoza filed with the court a quo a

Motion for Execution of its decision.

A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the respondent's

successor in office, even though such successor may trace his
title to the same source. This follows from the nature of the writ of
quo warranto itself. It is never directed to an officer as such, but
always against the person to determine whether he is
constitutionally and legally authorized to perform any act in, or
exercise any function of the office to which he lays claim.

FACTS:

Pedro Mendoza joined the Bureau of Customs in 1972.

He held the positions of Port Security Chief from March
1972 to August 1972, Deputy Commissioner of Customs
from August 1972 to September 1975, Acting
Commissioner of Customs from September 1975 to
April 1977 and Customs Operations Chief I from
October 1987 to February 1988.
March 1, 1988: he was appointed Customs Service
Chief of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation
Service (CIIS).
1989: The position of Customs Service Chief was
reclassified by the Civil Service as "Director III" in
accordance with R.A. No. 6758 and National
Compensation Circular No. 50.
Mendozas position was thus categorized as "Director
III, CIIS" and he discharged the function and duties of
said office.

April 22, 1993: Mendoza was temporarily designated

as Acting District Collector, Collection District X,
Cagayan de Oro City.

In his place, Ray Allas was appointed as "Acting

Director III" of the CIIS.

1Effective March 4, 1994, Mr. Ray Allas was appointed Director III by President
Fidel V. Ramos and as a consequence, [petitioner's] services were terminated
without prejudice to [his] claim for all government benefits due [him].

PUB OFF: WEEK 5A 2

exercising the office,

rendered as follows:

RTC (July 24, 1996): denied the motion on the ground

that the contested position vacated by Allas was now
being occupied by Godofredo Olores who was not a
party to the quo warranto petition.

Mendoza filed a special civil action for certiorari and

mandamus with the CA questioning the order of the TC.

CA (November 27, 1997) dismissed the petition.

Hence, this recourse.

ISSUE #1: W/N Mendoza should be reinstated? NO

RATIO #1:
QUO WARRANTO

Quo warranto (Rule 66; special civil action) is a demand

made by the state upon some individual or corporation
to show by what right they exercise some franchise or
privilege appertaining to the state which, according to
the Constitution and laws of the land, they cannot legally
exercise except by virtue of a grant or authority from the
state.

In other words, a petition for quo warranto is a

proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use
or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder
from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if
he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege.
The action may be commenced for the Government by
the Solicitor General or the fiscal against individuals
who usurp a public office, against a public officer whose
acts constitute a ground for the forfeiture of his office,
and against an association which acts as a corporation
without being legally incorporated.
The action may also be instituted by an individual in his
own name who claims to be entitled to the public office
or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by
another.

If the court finds for the respondent, the

judgment should simply state that the
respondent is entitled to the office.

If, however, the court finds for the petitioner

and declares the respondent guilty of usurping,
intruding into, or unlawfully holding or

may

be

Sec. 10. Judgment where usurpation

found. When the defendant is
found guilty of usurping, intruding
into, or unlawfully holding or
exercising an office, position, right,
privilege, or franchise, judgment shall
be rendered that such defendant be
ousted and altogether excluded
therefrom, and that the plaintiff or
relator, as the case may be, recover
his costs. Such further judgment may
be
rendered
determining
the
respective rights in and to the office,
position, right, privilege, or franchise
of all the parties to the action as
justice requires.

If it is found that the respondent or defendant is

usurping or intruding into the office, or unlawfully holding
the same, the court may order:
o

(1) The ouster and exclusion of the defendant

from office;

(2) The recovery of costs by plaintiff or relator;

(3) The determination of the respective rights in

and to the office, position, right, privilege or
franchise of all the parties to the action as
justice requires.

The character of the judgment to be rendered in quo

warranto rests to some extent in the discretion of the
court and on the relief sought.

CASE AT BAR

Mendoza prayed for the following relief:

o

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that

respondent (Allas) be ousted and altogether
excluded from the position of Director III,
Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service
of the Bureau of Customs, and petitioner
(Mendoza) be seated to the position as the
one legally appointed and entitled thereto.

Other reliefs, just or equitable in the premises,

are likewise prayed for.

Where the action is filed by a private person, he must

prove that he is entitled to the controverted position,
otherwise respondent has a right to the undisturbed
possession of the office.
o

judgment

In granting the petition, the trial court ordered that:

PUB OFF: WEEK 5A 3

WHEREFORE, viewed in the light of the

foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
granting this petition for quo warranto by:

1. Ousting and excluding respondent

Ray Allas from the position of Director
III,
Customs
Intelligence
and
Investigation Service of the Bureau of
Customs; and
2. Reinstating petitioner Pedro C.
Mendoza, Jr. to the position of
Director III, Customs Intelligence and
Investigation Service of the Bureau of
Customs with full back wages and
other monetary benefits appurtenant
thereto from the time they were
withheld until reinstated.

The trial court found that Allas usurped the position of

"Director III, Chief of the Customs Intelligence and
Investigation Service." Consequently, the court ordered
that Allas be ousted from the contested position and that
Mendoza be reinstated in his stead. Although Mendoza
did not specifically pray for his back salaries, the court
ordered that he be paid his "full back wages and other
monetary benefits" appurtenant to the contested
position "from the time they were withheld until
reinstated."

The decision of the trial court had long become final and
executory, and Mendoza prays for its execution.

Mendoza: he should have been reinstated despite

Olores' appointment because the subject position was
never vacant to begin with. Mendozas removal was
illegal and he was deemed never to have vacated his
office when Allas was appointed to the same. Allas'
appointment was null and void and this nullity allegedly
extends to Olores, his successor-in-interest.

Ordinarily, a judgment against a public officer in

regard to a public right binds his successor in
office.
o

This rule, however, is not applicable in quo

warranto cases.

A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the

respondent's successor in office, even though such
successor may trace his title to the same source.
o

This follows from the nature of the writ of

quo warranto itself.

It is never directed to an officer as such, but

always against the person to determine

whether he is constitutionally and legally

authorized to perform any act in, or
exercise any function of the office to which
he lays claim.

CAB: The petition for quo warranto was filed by

Mendoza solely against Allas. What was threshed
out before the trial court was the qualification and
right of Mendoza to the contested position as
against Allas, not against Olores.

The Court of Appeals did not err in denying execution of

the trial court's decision.

ISSUE #2: W/N Mendoza can claim salaries and other benefits?
NO
RATIO #2:

Mendoza has apprised this Court that he reached the

compulsory retirement age of 65 years on November
13, 1997. Reinstatement not being possible, Mendoza
now prays for the payment of his back salaries and
other benefits from the time he was illegally dismissed
until finality of the trial court's decision.

Allas cannot be held personally liable for Mendoza's

back salaries and benefits. He was merely appointed to
the subject position by the President of the Philippines
in the exercise of his constitutional power as Chief
Executive.

Neither can the Bureau of Customs be compelled to pay

the said back salaries and benefits of Mendoza. The
Bureau of Customs was not a party to the petition
for quo warranto.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition denied; CA affirmed.

Soriano v. Laguardia | Joan

April 29, 2009
ELISEO F. SORIANO, PETITIONER, VS. MA. CONSOLIZA P.
LAGUARDIA, IN HER CAPACITY AS CHAIRPERSON OF
MTRCB,
et
al,
RESPONDENTS.
ELISEO F. SORIANO, PETITIONER, VS. MTRCB et al,
RESPONDENTS.
VELASCO JR., J.
SUMMARY: Soriano was initially preventively suspended by
MTRCB for making obscene remarks in his TV program, Ang
Dating Daan, alluding to a member of INC. He was also
subsequently suspended for three months, along with his
program. Soriano argues that MTRCB is not authorized to
suspend him, also invoking his constitutional rights due
process, equal protection, religious freedom and freedom of
speech and expression. SC ruled in favor of MTRCB and HELD
that 1) MTRCB is authorized to suspend him, applying the
doctrine of necessary implication, and 2) his constitutional rights
are
not
violated.
PUB OFF: WEEK 5A 4

DOCTRINE (guys di ako sure kung san topic under tong case,
so not sure sa doctrine): The power of the MTRCB to regulate
and supervise the exhibition of TV programs carries with it or
necessarily implies the authority to take effective punitive action
for violation of the law sought to be enforced.

FACTS:

2004: 10:00 p.m., Soriano, as host of the program Ang

Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made the following
remarks:
o Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling;
Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa
putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang
gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay
Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O,
masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola
ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra
ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.

Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost

identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie
Galapon (and 7 others), all members of INC.

Respondent Michael Sandoval, who felt directly alluded

to in Soriano's remark, was then a minister of INC and a
regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.

MTRCB sent Soriano a notice of the hearing.

After a preliminary conference in which Soriano

appeared, MTRCB preventively suspended the showing
of Ang Dating Daan for 20 days, in accordance with
Section 3(d) of PD 1986 (MTRCB charter) + IRR +
Rules of Procedure. It was also set for preliminary
investigation.

Soriano filed MR, bit subsequently withdrew it and

instead filed petition with SC. (1st GR)

In the MTRCB proceedings, Soriano was held liable for

his utterances and his program was suspended for 3
months. Soriano thus filed another petition. (2nd GR)

ISSUES:
1st petition
1 Whether or not MTRCB can validly issue preventive
suspension (YES)
2 Whether or not the equal protection clause was violated
(NO)
3 Whether or not theres a violation of Sorianos religious
freedom (NO)
Joint issue of 1st and 2nd petition
4 Whether or not the suspension violates Sorianos right
to freedom of speech and expression (NO)
5 Whether or not the 3-month suspension was a form of
prior
restraint
or
subsequent
punishment
(SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT)
6 Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative
powers (NO, but suspension limited only to the program,
not to Soriano himself)
RATIO:
1) MTRCBS POWER OF SUSPENSION

Administrative agencies have powers and functions

which may be administrative, investigatory, regulatory,
quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix of the five, as
may be conferred by the Constitution or by statute. They
have in fine only such powers or authority as are
granted or delegated, expressly or impliedly, by law. And
in determining whether an agency has certain powers,
the inquiry should be from the law itself. But once
ascertained as existing, the authority given should be
liberally construed.

MTRCB's basic mandate under PD 1986 reveals the

possession by the agency of the authority, albeit
impliedly, to issue the challenged order of
preventive suspension. And this authority stems
naturally from, and is necessary for the exercise of, its
power of regulation and supervision.2 (Sec. 3(d))
The power to issue preventive suspension forms part of
the MTRCB's express regulatory and supervisory
statutory mandate and its investigatory and disciplinary
authority subsumed in or implied from such mandate.
Any other construal would render its power to regulate,
supervise, or discipline illusory.
Preventive suspension is not a penalty by itself, being
merely a preliminary step in an administrative
investigation. And the power to discipline and impose
penalties, if granted, carries with it the power to
investigate administrative complaints and, during such
investigation, to preventively suspend the person
subject of the complaint.
Preventive suspension authority of the MTRCB springs
from its powers conferred under PD 1986.
The MTRCB did not, as Soriano insinuates, empower
itself to impose preventive suspension through the
medium of the IRR of PD 1986. It is true that the matter
of imposing preventive suspension is embodied only in
the IRR of PD 1986.3
Sec. 3 of the IRR neither amended PD 1986 nor
extended the effect of the law. The preventive
suspension was actually done in furtherance of the law,
imposed pursuant to the MTRCB's duty of regulating or
supervising
television
programs,
pending
a
determination of whether or not there has actually been
a violation.
Soriano's restrictive reading of PD 1986, limiting the
MTRCB to functions within the literal confines of the law,
would give the agency little leeway to operate, stifling
and rendering it inutile, when Sec. 3(k) of PD 1986
clearly intends to grant the MTRCB a wide room for
flexibility in its operation. (See previous footnote) When
a general grant of power is conferred or a duty enjoined,
every particular power necessary for the exercise of one

Section 3. Powers and Functions.The BOARD shall have the following

functions, powers and duties: c) To approve or disapprove, delete objectionable
portions x x x, which, in the judgment of the board applying contemporary Filipino
cultural values as standard, are objectionable for being immoral, indecent, contrary
to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the
Philippines or its people, or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the
commission of violence or of wrong or crime such as but not limited to: vi) Those
which are libelous or defamatory to the good name and reputation of any person,
whether
living
or
dead;
(d) To supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, permits for the x x x
production, copying, distribution, sale, lease, exhibition, and/or television
broadcast of all motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials, to the
end that no such pictures, programs and materials as are determined by the
BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be x x x
produced, copied, reproduced, distributed, sold, leased,exhibited and/or
broadcast by television;
k) To exercise such powers and functions as may be necessary or incidental to the
attainment of the purposes and objectives of this Act x x x.

3
Sec. 3. PREVENTION SUSPENSION ORDER.Any time during the pendency of
the case, and in order to prevent or stop further violations or for the interest and
welfare of the public, the Chairman of the Board may issue a Preventive
Suspension Order mandating the preventive x x x suspension of the permit/permits
involved x x x

PUB OFF: WEEK 5A 5

or the performance of the other is also conferred by

necessary implication. (Angara v. Electoral Commission)
Re: scope of authority: The scope of the MTRCB's
authority extends beyond motion pictures. What the
acronym MTRCB stands for would suggest as much.
And while the law makes specific reference to the
closure of a television network, the suspension of a
television program is a far less punitive measure that
can be undertaken, with the purpose of stopping further
violations of PD 1986.
Re: lack of hearing: MTRCB handed out the assailed
order after Soriano, in response to a written notice,
appeared before that Board for a hearing. No less than
Soriano admitted that the order was issued after the
adjournment of the hearing. The suspension was done
after MTRCB duly apprised Soriano of his having
possibly violated PD 1986 and of the administrative
complaints filed against him. At any event, that
preventive suspension can validly be meted out even
without a hearing.

2) NO VIOLATION OF EP CLAUSE

Soriano: Owing to the preventive suspension order, he

was unable to answer the criticisms coming from the
INC ministers [thru his TV program].

HELD: The EP clause demands that "all persons

subject to legislation should be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both in the privileges
conferred and liabilities imposed." Surely, Soriano
cannot place himself in the same shoes as the INC
ministers, who, for one, are not facing administrative
complaints before the MTRCB. For another, he offers no
proof that the said ministers, in their TV programs, use
language similar to that which he used in his own,
necessitating the MTRCB's disciplinary action. The
circumstances of Soriano, as host of Ang Dating Daan,
on one hand, and the INC ministers, as hosts of Ang
Tamang Daan, on the other, are simply too different to
even consider whether or not there is a prima
facie indication of oppressive inequality.
3) NOT IN EXERCISE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Soriano: What he uttered was religious speech; words

like "putang babae" were said in exercise of his religious
freedom. (AYNAKO)

HELD: NO. Its not within the pale of Sec. 5, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution on religious freedom.4 There is
nothing in Soriano's statements subject of the
complaints expressing any particular religious belief,
nothing furthering his avowed evangelical mission. The
fact that he came out with his statements in a televised
bible exposition program does not automatically accord
them the character of a religious discourse. We cannot
accept that Soriano made his statements in defense of
his reputation and religion, as they constitute no
intelligible defense or refutation of the alleged lies being
spread by a rival religious group. They simply illustrate
that Soriano had descended to the level of name-calling
and foul-language discourse. Soriano could have
chosen to contradict and disprove his detractors, but
opted for the low road.

4
No law shall be made respecting the establishment of a religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious
test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

4) NO VIOLATION OF RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

Soriano: The 20-day preventive suspension order is
an unconstitutional abridgement of the freedom of
speech and expression and an impermissible prior
restraint. This subsequent 3-month suspension also
violates said right.
HELD: NO. Expressions by means of newspapers,
radio, television, and motion pictures come within the
broad protection of the free speech and expression
clause, but tend to present its own problems in the area
of free speech protection, with broadcast media, of all
forms of communication, enjoying a lesser degree of
protection. Restrictions, be it in the form of prior
restraint, e.g., judicial injunction against publication or
threat of cancellation of license/franchise, or subsequent
liability, whether in libel and damage suits, prosecution
for sedition, or contempt proceedings, are anathema to
the freedom of expression.
The freedom of expression, as with the other freedoms
encased in the Bill of Rights, is, however, not absolute.
The constitutional guarantee "obviously was not
intended to give immunity for every possible use of
language." (Justice Holmes)
A speech would fall under the unprotected type if the
utterances involved are "no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value
as a step of truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality." Sorianos speech falls under this.
o Unprotected speech or low-value expression
refers to libelous statements, obscenity or
pornography,
false
or
misleading
advertisement, insulting or "fighting words",
i.e., those which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
peace and expression endangering national
security.

Soriano's statement can be treated as obscene, at

least with respect to the average child. Hence, it is, in
that context, unprotected speech.

There is no perfect definition of "obscenity" but the basic

guidelines are, to wit: (a) whether to the average
person, applying contemporary standards would find the
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as
a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.5
o CAB: In the context they were used, Sorianos
words may not appeal to the prurient interests
of an adult. The problem is that they were
uttered in a TV program that is rated "G" or for
general viewership, and in a time slot that
would likely reach even the eyes and ears of
children.

Children could be motivated by curiosity and ask the

meaning of what Soriano said, also without placing the
phrase in context. They may be inquisitive as to why
Sandoval is different from a female prostitute and the
reasons for the dissimilarity.

5
Fernando v. CA

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In a 1978 American landmark case6 where indecent

speech without prurient appeal component comes under
the category of protected speech depending on the
context within which it was made, still, within a particular
context, an indecent speech may validly be categorized
as unprotected, ergo, susceptible to restriction.
Content based v. Content neutral: A content-based
restraint is aimed at the contents or idea of the
expression, whereas a content-neutral restraint intends
to regulate the time, place, and manner of the
expression under well-defined standards tailored to
serve a compelling state interest, without restraint on
the message of the expression. Courts subject contentbased restraint to strict scrutiny.
o CAB: The suspension MTRCB imposed under
the premises was, in one perspective,
permissible restriction. First, the indecent
speech was made via television, a pervasive
medium;second, the broadcast was aired at
the time of the day when there was a
reasonable risk that children might be in the
audience; and third, Soriano uttered his
speech on a "G" or "for general patronage"
rated program. The words Soriano used were,
by any civilized norm, clearly not suitable for
children. Where a language is categorized as
indecent, as in Soriano's utterances on a
general-patronage rated TV program, it may be
readily proscribed as unprotected speech.
Unprotected speech is not exclusive or carved in stone.
The application of the clear and present danger test is
uncalled for under the premises. Under the doctrine,
freedom of speech and of press is susceptible of
restriction when and only when necessary to prevent
grave and immediate danger to interests which the
government may lawfully protect. As it were, said
doctrine evolved in the context of prosecutions for
rebellion and other crimes involving the overthrow of
government. As a standard of limitation on free speech
and press, however, the clear and present danger test is
not a magic incantation that wipes out all problems and
does away with analysis and judgment in the testing of
the legitimacy of claims to free speech and which
compels a court to release a defendant from liability the
moment the doctrine is invoked, absent proof of
imminent catastrophic disaster.
Using the balancing-of-interests test, SC rules that
the government's interest to protect and promote the
interests and welfare of the children7 adequately
buttresses the reasonable curtailment and valid restraint
on Soriano's prayer to continue as program host of Ang
Dating Daan during the suspension period. The welfare
of children and the State's mandate to protect and care
for them, as parens patriae, constitute a substantial and
compelling government interest in regulating Soriano's
utterances in TV broadcast as provided in PD 1986.

6
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation where the written message was "Fuck the Draft"

7
State is also mandated to recognize and support the vital role of the youth in nation
building as laid down in Sec. 13, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution

The remarks Soriano uttered on prime-time television

are blatantly indecent if not outright obscene. It is the
kind of speech that PD 1986 proscribes necessitating
the exercise by MTRCB of statutory disciplinary
powers. It is the kind of speech that the State has the
inherent prerogative, nay duty, to regulate and prevent
should such action served and further compelling state
interests. One who utters indecent, insulting, or
offensive words on television when unsuspecting
children are in the audience is, in the graphic language
of FCC, a "pig in the parlor." Public interest would be
served if the "pig" is reasonably restrained or even
removed from the "parlor."
Ergo, Soriano's offensive and indecent language can be
subjected to prior restraint.
5) SUSPENSION IS SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT

Soriano: The three (3)-month suspension is either

prior restraint or subsequent punishment that, however,
includes prior restraint, albeit indirectly.

HELD: What MTRCB imposed on Soriano is an

administrative sanction or subsequent punishment
for his offensive and obscene language in Ang Dating
Daan.

To clarify, statutes imposing prior restraints on speech

are generally illegal and presumed unconstitutional
breaches of the freedom of speech. The exceptions to
prior restraint are movies, television, and radio
broadcast censorship in view of its access to numerous
people, including the young who must be insulated from
the prejudicial effects of unprotected speech. PD 1986
was passed creating the Board of Review for Motion
Pictures and Television (now MTRCB) and which
requires prior permit or license before showing a
motion picture or broadcasting a TV program. The
Board can classify movies and television programs and
can cancel permits for exhibition of films or television
broadcast.

Fr. Bernas: Under the decree a movie classification

board is made the arbiter of what movies and television
programs or parts of either are fit for public
consumption. It decides what movies are "immoral,
indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious
to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its
people," and what "tend to incite subversion,
insurrection, rebellion or sedition," or "tend to undermine
the faith and confidence of the people in their
government and/or duly constituted authorities," etc.
Moreover, its decisions are executory unless stopped by
a court.

The three (3) months suspension in this case is not a

prior restraint on the right of Soriano to continue with
the broadcast of Ang Dating Daan as a permit was
already issued to him by MTRCB for such broadcast.
Rather, the suspension is in the form of permissible
administrative sanction or subsequent punishment
for the offensive and obscene remarks he uttered. It
is a sanction that the MTRCB may validly impose under
its charter without running afoul of the free speech
clause.

And the imposition is separate and distinct from the

criminal action the Board may take pursuant to Sec.
3(i) of PD 1986 and the remedies that may be availed of
by the aggrieved private party under the provisions on
libel or tort, if applicable. The imposition of sanctions on
broadcasters who indulge in profane or indecent
broadcasting does not constitute forbidden censorship.

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More importantly, Soriano is deemed to have yielded his

right to his full enjoyment of his freedom of speech to
regulation under PD 1986 and its IRR as television
station owners, program producers, and hosts have
impliedly accepted the power of MTRCB to regulate the
broadcast industry.
NOT a prior restraint on future speech: Suspension is
in the nature of an intermediate penalty for uttering an
unprotected form of speech. It is definitely a lesser
punishment than the permissible cancellation of
exhibition or broadcast permit or license. The
suspension sought to penalize past speech made on
prime-time "G" rated TV program; it does not bar future
speech of Soriano in other television programs; it is a
permissible subsequent administrative sanction; it
should not be confused with a prior restraint on speech.
The MTRCB, as a regulatory agency, must have the
wherewithal to enforce its mandate, which would not be
effective if its punitive actions would be limited to mere
fines. Television broadcasts should be subject to some
form of regulation, considering the ease with which they
can be accessed, and violations of the regulations must
be met with appropriate and proportional disciplinary
action. The suspension of a violating television
program would be a sufficient punishment and serve as
a deterrent for those responsible. The prevention of the
broadcast of Soriano's television program is justified,
and does not constitute prohibited prior restraint. =
Soriano, in questioning the three-month suspension,
also invokes freedom of religion and violation of right to
due process and EP. SC sees no need to address anew
the repetitive arguments on religious freedom. As to due
process and equal protection of the law, SC has at
length debunked similar arguments in the first petition.

6) NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS

Soriano: There has been undue delegation of

legislative power, as PD 1986 does not provide for the
range of imposable penalties that may be applied with
respect to violations of the provisions of the law.

HELD: NO MERIT. It is a fundamental principle flowing

from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress
may not delegate its legislative power to the two other
branches of the government, subject to the exception
that local governments may over local affairs participate
in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the
authority under the Constitution to make laws and to
alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of
the statute in all its term and provisions when it
leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine
whether or not there is an undue delegation of
legislative power, the inquiry must be directed to the
scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The
legislature does not abdicate its functions when it
describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and
what is the scope of his authority. For a complex
economy, that may indeed be the only way in which the
legislative process can go forward. A distinction has
rightfully been made between:
o delegation of power to make laws which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it
shall be, which constitutionally may not be
done, AND
o delegation of authority or discretion as to
its execution to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law, to which no valid
objection can be made. The Constitution is
thus not to be regarded as denying the

legislature the necessary resources of flexibility

and practicability. (Edu v. Ericta)
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be
a standard, which implies at the very least that the
legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays
down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of
complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard
thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out
its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply
it. It indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion
by which legislative purpose may be carried out.
Thereafter, the executive or administrative office
designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines
promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.
CAB: Soriano's thesis is that MTRCB, in promulgating
the IRR of PD 1986, prescribing a schedule of penalties
for violation of the provisions of the decree, went
beyond the terms of the law. This posture is flawed by
the erroneous assumptions holding it together.
o MTRCB, by express and direct conferment of
power and functions, is charged with
supervising and regulating, granting, denying,
or canceling permits for the exhibition and/or
television broadcast xxx. Complementing this
provision is Sec. 3(k) of the decree authorizing
the MTRCB "to exercise such powers and
functions as may be necessary or incidental to
the attainment of the purpose and objectives of
[the law]." As earlier explained, the investiture
of supervisory, regulatory, and disciplinary
power would surely be a meaningless grant
if it did not carry with it the power to
penalize the supervised or the regulated as
may be proportionate to the offense
committed, charged, and proved. When a
general grant of power is conferred or duty
enjoined, every particular power necessary for
the exercise of the one or the performance of
the other is also conferred. x x x When the
statute does not specify the particular method
to be followed or used by a government
agency in the exercise of the power vested in it
by law, said agency has the authority to adopt
any reasonable method to carry out its
function. (Chavez v NHA)
The power of the MTRCB to regulate and supervise the
exhibition of TV programs carries with it or necessarily
implies the authority to take effective punitive action for
violation of the law sought to be enforced. And would it
not be logical too to say that the power to deny or
cancel a permit for the exhibition of a TV program or
broadcast necessarily includes the lesser power to
suspend?
MTRCB promulgated the IRR of PD 1986, and Chapter
XIII, Sec. 1 of the IRR providing that any violation of
PD 1986 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations governing motion pictures, television
programs, and related promotional materials shall
be penalized with suspension or cancellation of
permits and/or licenses issued by the Board x x x =
o This is, in the final analysis, no more than a
measure to specifically implement the
aforequoted provisions of Sec. 3(d) and (k).
Contrary to what Soriano implies, the IRR does
not expand the mandate of the MTRCB under
the law or partake of the nature of an
unauthorized administrative legislation. The
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MTRCB cannot shirk its responsibility to

regulate the public airwaves and employ such
means as it can as a guardian of the public.
In Sec. 3(c), one can already find the permissible
actions of the MTRCB, along with the standards to be
applied to determine whether there have been statutory
breaches. The lawmaking body cannot possibly provide
for all the details in the enforcement of a particular
statute. The grant of the rule-making power to
administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of
separation of powers and is an exception to the nondelegation of legislative powers. Administrative
regulations or "subordinate legislation" calculated
to promote the public interest are necessary
because of "the growing complexity of modern life,
the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulations, and the increased difficulty of
administering the law." Allowing the MTRCB some
reasonable elbow-room in its operations and, in the
exercise of its statutory disciplinary functions, according
it ample latitude in fixing, by way of an appropriate
issuance, administrative penalties with due regard for
the severity of the offense and attending mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, as the case may be, would
be consistent with its mandate to effectively and
efficiently regulate the movie and television industry.

BUT SUSPENSION MUST BE MODIFIED

Even as we uphold the power of the MTRCB to review

and impose sanctions for violations of PD 1986, its
decision to suspend Soriano must be modified, for
nowhere in that issuance, particularly the powerdefining Sec. 3 nor in the MTRCB Schedule of
Administrative Penalties effective January 1, 1999 is
the Board empowered to suspend the program host
or even to prevent certain people from appearing in
television programs. The MTRCB, to be sure, may
prohibit the broadcast of such television programs or
cancel permits for exhibition, but it may not suspend
television personalities, for such would be beyond its
jurisdiction.

The MTRCB cannot extend its exercise of regulation

beyond what the law provides. Only persons, offenses,
and penalties clearly falling clearly within the letter and
spirit of PD 1986 will be considered to be within the
decree's penal or disciplinary operation. And when it
exists, the reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor
of the person charged with violating the statute and for
whom the penalty is sought.

The suspension should cover only the television

program on which Soriano appeared and uttered the
offensive and obscene language, which sanction is
what the law and the facts obtaining call for.
DISPOSITION: Affirmed with modification.Suspension limited to
the
program,
Ang
Dating
Daan.
SEPARATE OPINION, CORONA, J.:

Of all forms of communication, it is broadcasting

that has received the most limited [free speech]
protection. Indeed, an unabridgeable right to broadcast
is not comparable to the right of the individual to speak,
write or publish. Moreover, it is the right of the viewers
and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters,
which is paramount.

Therefore, the use of the public airwaves for

broadcasting purposes (that is, broadcasting television

programs over the public electromagnetic spectrum) is a

privilege, not a right.
What specific rights of viewers are relevant vis--vis the
right of broadcasters to speak? Considering the
uniquely pervasive presence of broadcast media in the
lives of Filipinos, these rights are as follows (J. Corona
discussed every right, but please see actual for the
discussion):
o the right of every person to dignity;
o the natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral
character;
o the right of the youth to the promotion and
protection by the State of their moral, spiritual,
intellectual and social well-being
o the right to privacy.
MTRCB has power to suspend, and no grave abuse of
discretion can be attributed to it.

CONCURRING OPINION, TINGA, J.

I have no doubt that suspending the Soriano will inhibit

his speech, even if such ban is enforced in the name of
subsequent punishment rather than prior restraint. Such
a penalty must endure strict scrutiny since it is related to
the exercise of that fundamental guarantee of free
speech. However, it is extremely material to my view the
fact that the obscene utterances were made on
television, and that the penalty imposed relates to the
right of Soriano to broadcast on television. If the current
concern pertained to speech in a different medium, such
as the print media or the Internet, then I would be much
less tolerant over the penalties imposed corresponding
to the exercise of speech. Yet the fact is, broadcast
media enjoys a lesser degree of protection than
expression in other mediums, owing to the unique
nature of broadcasting itself.

With respect to the merits of these petitions, my views

are simply this. There is no question that Soriano's
remarks are inherently obscene, and certainly potential
cause for a libel suit. These remarks were made on
broadcast media, which the State inherently has the
right to regulate. The State has the right to prevent the
sort of language used by Soriano on the airwaves that it
owns, as well as the right to punish broadcasters who
do make such remarks. Pres. Decree No. 1986, as it
stands, accommodates these particular concerns and
imposes corresponding sanctions which I deem
appropriate on broadcasters whose transgressions are
as grave as that of Soriano. While I may have serious
reservations on several other aspects of Pres. Decree
No. 1986, a relic of the dictatorship era, that law as
applied to this particular case operates in a way that I
believe is constitutionally permissible.
DISSENTING OPINION, CARPIO, J.

Freedom of expression is always under threat even in a

democracy. Those who wish to enjoy freedom of
expression must steadfastly defend it whenever and
wherever it is threatened. The lesson that history
teaches us is clear - defend freedom of expression, or
lose it.

I dissent because the three-month suspension of

Soriano's TV program Ang Dating Daan constitutes an
unconstitutional prior
restraint on
freedom
of
expression. The suspension prevents Soriano from
even reciting the Lord's Prayer, or even saying
"hello" to viewers, in his TV program. The
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suspension bars the public airing of Soriano's TV

program regardless of whatever subject matter Soriano,
or anyone else, wishes to discuss in Soriano's TV
program.
This is like suspending the publication of the Philippine
Daily Inquirer for three months if its editorial describes a
private person as "masahol pa sa putang babae."
The remedy of any aggrieved person is to file a libel or
tort case after the utterance or publication of such
cusswords. Our libels laws punish with fine,
imprisonment or damages libelous language already
uttered or published. Our tort laws also allow recovery
of damages for tortious speech already uttered or
published. However, both our libel and tort laws never
impose a gag order on future expression because that
will constitute prior restraint or censorship. Thus, our
libel and tort laws do not allow the filing of a suit to
enjoin or punish an expression that has yet to be uttered
or written.
Indeed, there can never be a prior restraint on future
expression, whether for fear of possible libelous
utterance or publication, or as a punishment for past
libelous utterance or publication.
In this jurisdiction, we recognize only four exceptions,
namely:
pornography,false
or
misleading
advertisement, advocacy of imminent lawless action,
[7]
and danger to national security. Only in these
instances may expression be subject to prior
restraint. All other expression is not subject to prior
restraint.
The test to determine the constitutionality of prior
restraint on pornography, advocacy of imminent lawless
action, and expression endangering national security is
theclear and present danger test.
The rule is also well-settled that expression cannot be
subject to subsequent punishment. The exceptions start

with the four types of expression that may be subject to

prior
restraint.
Two
other
exceptions
are
defamation, which includes libel and slander, and
tortious speech.
If profane or vulgar language like "Fuck the draft" is
not subject to subsequent punishment, then with
more reason it cannot be subject to prior restraint.
Without a law punishing the actual utterance or
publication of an expression, an expression cannot be
subject to prior restraint because such expression is not
unlawful or illegal.
Three-Month Suspension is a Prohibited Prior
Restraint. Obviously, what Soriano uttered does not fall
under any of the four types of expression that may be
subject to prior restraint. The majority opinion, which
imposes a prior restraint on expression, is totally
bereft of any discussion that Soriano's ranting
poses a clear and present danger to the State that is
grave and imminent. The three-month suspension
cannot be passed off merely as a preventive suspension
that does not partake of a penalty. The actual and real
effect of the three-month suspension is a prior restraint
on expression in violation of a fundamental
constitutional right.
In conclusion, Soriano's ranting may constitute, at
most, defamatory or tortious speech. Even then,
such expression can never be subject to prior restraint
like a three-month suspension of Soriano's TV program.
The remedy of private respondents is to seek
subsequent punishment, that is, file complaints for
defamation or tortious speech against Soriano.

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