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TORTS AND DAMAGES

jump under the conditions that here confronted him. When the defendant
exposed the horse and rider to this danger he was, in our opinion, negligent
in the eye of the law.

BREACH OF DUTY OF CARE

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular

case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that which an ordinarily prudent person would have used
in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The question as
to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation
must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and
in view of the facts involved in the particular case. Stated in these terms, the
proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case
is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position
of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was
sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against
its consequences.

(WEEK THREE)

Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (G.R. No. L-12219)

DOCTRINE: the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a
given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the
position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was
sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its
consequences.
FACTS: It appears that upon the occasion in question the plaintiff was
riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across,
the defendant approached from the opposite direction in an automobile,
going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles per hour. As the defendant
neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give
warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken
the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the
man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road.
The plaintiff, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard the warning
signals. However, being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the
rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing
on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the
reason he did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get
over to the other side. As the automobile approached, the defendant guided
it toward his left, that being the proper side of the road for the machine. In
so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the
other side. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant,
instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing
down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution
of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of
the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned his
car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the
railing where it as then standing; but in so doing the automobile passed in
such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its
body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. In so doing, it was
struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb
was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence.
As a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received contusions
that caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for
several days.
ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car in the manner
above described was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil
obligation to repair the damage done.
HELD: Defendant is guilty.
As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that
the horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side; but as he moved
toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this
would not be done; and he must in a moment have perceived that it was too
late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the
nature of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was
yet some distance away; and from this moment it was not longer within the
power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place of
greater safety. The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the
defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop
or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other
side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of
collision. Instead of doing this, the defendant ran straight on until he was
almost upon the horse. He was, we think, deceived into doing this by the
fact that the horse had not yet exhibited fright. But in view of the known
nature of horses, there was an appreciable risk that, if the animal in
question was unacquainted with automobiles, he might get excited and

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Carlos v. Manila Electric (G.R. No. L-10838)

DOCTRINE: An electric company is not, as a rule, negligent in failing to shut off
its current upon its own initiative during a storm where it is shown that the
municipal authorities have general supervision and, in some particulars, a real
control over such a company and has designated one of its public officials to act in
such matters, and where such official has ordered the current to be shut off and the
company complied with the order immediately upon receipt of the same.
FACTS: Defendants street railway track was on the east side of the street
and its trolley wire over the track was consequently between the eastern
curb and it carried a current of high voltage. At the side of the street, carried
on posts, were the feed wires and other wires of the defendant, all of which
were insulated. Above these wires on another set of posts were the
insulated galvanized iron wires of the telephone company. A typhoon
occurred one of the trees was uprooted and fall which causes the damage of
the wires of telephone company. The free end of this wire, falling to the
street, was carried by the wind across the trolley wire of the defendant and,
striking the wet ground, established a circuit and became charged with the
dangerous current of the trolley wire. Neither the trolley wire nor any other
wire of the defendant was broken. A child passed by, struck the telephone
wire and was killed by electrical discharge. A policeman went to assistance
of the child was also killed by the current.
ISSUE: WON defendant is negligent in not cutting off its current upon its
own initiative on account of the danger from the unusual severity of the
storm
HELD: Article 1105 of the Civil Code provides that:
"No person shall be liable for events which could not be foreseen, or which
having been foreseen were inevitable, with the exception of the cases
expressly mentioned in the law or those in which the obligation so
declares."
We have, then, on the one hand, non-liability of the company for events
which could not be foreseen and, on the other hand, its liability where fault
or negligence may be attributed to it. It was not only the defendant's
privilege, but its duty under its franchise, to supply electric current to the
city and to keep its cars running as long as possible.
The people depend upon this service and would have just grounds for
complaint if the defendant were to discontinue its current without just
cause. While it is true that when an electric railway company is given
authority to use the public streets for its lines, the law implies a duty of
using a very high degree of care in the construction, operation, and
maintenance of its appliances, requiring it to employ every reasonable
precaution known to those possessed of the skill and knowledge requisite
to the safe conduct and control of such a dangerous agency for providing
against such dangers incident to its use, and holds it accountable for the
injury of any person due to the neglect of that duty that in the control and

management of a dangerous agency such as electricity, the law exacts a

degree of skill and diligence commensurate with the danger involved; that a
corporation, in stringing wires of a dangerous voltage, must be regardful of
the presence of other wires and of the possibility of its own wires charging
or coming in contact with them; that the ownership of the wire is not
controlling as to the liability for an injury caused by coming in contact with
it; that an electric railway company or an electric light company is
responsible for an injury where it negligently permits its wires to come in
contact with another company's telephone or telegraph wires, which
transmits the current and thereby causes an accident; that the duty and
liability of electric companies is not limited to keeping their own wires out
of the streets, but extends to the prevention of the escape of the dangerous
force in their service through any wires brought in contact with their own
and of its transmission thereby to anyone using the streets.
In the case at bar, the accident did not occur at a place where the telephone
wire crossed the trolley wire, but at a place where the former was running
above the latter and parallel with it. The defendants trolley wires withstood
the severity of the storm and they, of themselves, were rendered in no way
dangerous. They were in their proper place, performing their necessary and
proper functions in the propulsion of the cars. The court concluded that the
record does not justify a holding that the defendant was negligent in failing
to place or string guard wires between its trolley wires and the wires of the
telephone company.
Culion Ice v. Philippine Motors (G.R. No. L-32611)
DOCTRINE: A person who holds himself out as being competent to do work
requiring special skill is guilty of negligence if he fails to exhibit the care a prudent
person would exhibit who is reasonably well skilled in the particular work
undertaken.
FACTS: Plaintiff and defendant are domestic corporations. Cranston was the
representative of the plaintiff in Manila. Plaintiff was the registered owner
of the motor schooner gwendoline, which was used in the fishing trade in
the Philippine Islands. Cranston decided to change the engine of the
Gwendoline to effect economy in the cost of running the boat. Cranston
went to Philippine Motors Corporation and the latter agreed to do the job.
The Philippine Motors is engaged in business as an automobile agency, but
it had authority to deal in all sorts of machinery engines and motors as well
as to build, operate, buy and sell the same and the equipment. The work
began and conducted with the supervision of Quest, the manager of
Philippine motors. Quest came to the conclusion that the principal thing
necessary to accomplish the end in view was to install a new carburetor,
and a Zenith carburetor was chosen as the one most adapted to the
purpose. After this appliance had been installed, the engine was tried with
gasoline as a fuel, supplied from the tank already in use. The result of this
experiment was satisfactory. The next problem was to introduce into the
carburetor the baser fuel, consisting of a low grade of oil mixed with
distillate, for this purpose a temporary tank to contain the mixture was
placed on deck above and at a short distance from the compartment
covering the engine. This tank was connected with the carburetor by a piece
of tubing, which was apparently not well fitted at the point where it was
connected with the tank. Owing to this fact the fuel mixture leaked from
the tank and dripped down into the engine compartment. In the course of
the preliminary work upon the carburetor and its connections, it was
observed that the carburetor was flooding, and that the gasoline, or other
fuel, was trickling freely from the lower part of the carburetor to the floor.
This fact was called to Quest's attention, but he appeared to think lightly of
the matter and said that, when the engine had gotten to running well, the
flooding would disappear. The boat was fired.
ISSUE: WON the loss of boat was due to the negligence and lack of skill of
Quest
HELD: The temporary tank in which the mixture was prepared was
apparently at too great an elevation from the carburetor, with the result that

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when the fuel line was opened, the hydrostatic pressure in the carburetor
was greater than the delicate parts of the carburetor could sustain. This was
no doubt the cause of the flooding of the carburetor; and the result was
that, when the back fire occurred, the external parts of the carburetor,
already saturated with gasoline, burst into flames, whence the fire was
quickly communicated to the highly inflammable material nearby.
Ordinarily a back fire from an engine would not be followed by any
disaster, but in this case the leak along the pipe line and the flooding of the
carburetor had created a dangerous situation, which a prudent mechanic,
versed in repairs of this nature, would have taken precautions to avoid.

In this connection it must be remembered that when a person holds himself

out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be
held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one
ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do. The proof
shows that Quest had had ample experience in fixing the engines of
automobiles and tractors, but it does not appear that he was experienced in
the doing of similar work on boats.
For this reason, possibly, the dripping of the mixture from the tank on deck
and the flooding of the carburetor did not convey to his mind an adequate
impression of the danger of fire. But a person skilled in that particular sort
of work would, we think, have been sufficiently warned from those
circumstances to cause him to take greater and adequate precautions
against the danger. In other words Quest did not use the skill that would
have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engines
on boats. There was here, in our opinion, on the part of Quest, a
blameworthy antecedent inadvertence to possible harm, and this constitutes
negligence. The burning of the Gwendoline may be said to have resulted
from accident, but this accident was in no sense an unavoidable accident. It
would not have occurred but for Quest's carelessness or lack of skill. The
test of liability is not whether the injury was accidental in a sense, but
whether Quest was free from blame.
Carillo v. People (G.R. No. 86890)
Doctrine: Simple negligence, penalized under what is now Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code, is "a mere lack of prevision in a situation where either the
threatened harm is not immediate or the danger not openly visible." The gravamen
of the offense the failure to exercise the diligence necessitated or called for the
situation which was not immediately life-destructive.
Facts: Petitioner Dr. Leandro Carillo, an anesthetist, seeks review of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals convicting him of simple negligence
resulting in homicide, for the death of his 13-year old patient, Catherine
Acosta.
Catherine complained to her father of pains in the lower part of her
abdomen. According to Dr. Emilio Madrid, she was suffering from
appendicitis. They were told to go to Baclaran General Hospital, where the
child was scheduled for operation at 5pm. The operation took place at
5:45pm because Dr. Madrid arrived only at that time.
When brought inside the operating room, the child was feeling very well
and they did not subject the child to ECG and X-ray.The appellant Dr.
Madrid operated on Catherine. He was assisted by appellant, Dr. Leandro
Carillo, an anesthesiologist. It was established that the deceased was not
weighed before the administration of anesthesia on her.
During the operation, while Yolanda Acosta, Catherine's mother, was
staying outside the operating room, she "noticed something very
unfamiliar." The three nurses who assisted in the operation were going in
and out of the operating room, they were not carrying anything, but in
going out of the operating room, they were already holding something.
At around 6:30 p.m., Dr. Madrid went outside the operating room and
Yolanda was allowed to enter the first door. When asked, the doctor told
them the child was already out of danger but the operation was not yet
finished. The operation was finished at 7:00 o'clock in the evening and when

the child was brought out from the operating room, she was observed to be
shivering (nanginginig); her heart beat was not normal; she was asleep and
did not wake up; she was pale; and as if she had difficulty in breathing and
Dr. Emilio Madrid suggested that she placed under oxygen tank; that
oxygen was administered to the child when she was already in the room.
A cardiologist told them that she suffered severe infection which went up to
her head. When Dr. Carillo arrived, he assured the mother that the child
will regain consciousness and if the child will not regain consciousness, he
will resign as a doctor. When Catherine remained unconscious until
noontime the next day, a neurologist examined her and she was diagnosed
as comatose. 3 days later, Catherine died.
The Court of Appeals held that Catherine had suffered from an overdose of,
or an adverse reaction to, anesthesia, particularly the arbitrary
administration of Nubain, a pain killer, without benefit of prior weighing of
the patient's body mass, which weight determines the dosage of Nubain
which can safely be given to a patient. The Court of Appeals held that this
condition triggered off a heart attack as a post-operative complication and
such cardiac arrest was the immediate cause of Catherine's death.
The Court of Appeals found criminal negligence on the part of petitioner
Dr. Carillo and his co-accused Dr. Madrid, holding that both had failed to
observe the required standard of diligence in: 1) administering Nubain
without first weighing Catherine; 2) failing to monitor Catherine's heartbeat
after the operation; and 3) leaving the hospital immediately after reviving
Catherine's heartbeat, depriving the latter of immediate and expert medical
assistance when she suffered a heart attack approximately 15 to 30 minutes
later.
Issue: Whether the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals adequately
support the conclusion that petitioner Dr. Carillo was, along with Dr.
Madrid, guilty of simple negligence which resulted in homicide.
Held: YES.
Simple negligence, penalized under what is now Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code, is "a mere lack of prevision in a situation where either the
threatened harm is not immediate or the danger not openly visible." The
gravamen of the offense the failure to exercise the diligence necessitated or
called for the situation which was not immediately life-destructive. Such
failure to exercise the necessary degree of care and diligence is a negative
ingredient of the offense charged. The rule in such cases is that while the
prosecution must prove the negative ingredient of the offense, it needs only
to present the best evidence procurable under the circumstances, in order to
shift the burden of disproving or countering the proof of the negative
ingredient to the accused, provided that such initial evidence establishes at
least on a prima facie basis the guilt of the accused. This rule is particularly
applicable where the negative ingredient of the offense is of such a nature
or character as, under the circumstances, to be specially within the
knowledge or control of the accused. In the instant case, the Court is bound
to observe that the events which occurred during the surgical procedure
were peculiarly within the knowledge and control of Dr. Carillo and Dr.
Madrid. It was, therefore, incumbent upon the two (2) accused to overturn
the prima facie case which the prosecution had established, by reciting the
measures which they had actually taken to prevent or to counter the
obviously serious condition of Catherine Acosta which was evident right
after surgery. This they failed or refused to do so.
The canons of medical ethics require a physician to "attend to his patients
faithfully and conscientiously." He should secure for them all possible
benefits that may depend upon his professional skill and care. The conduct
of Dr. Madrid and of the petitioner constituted inadequate care of their
patient in view of her vulnerable condition. Both doctors failed to
appreciate the serious condition of their patient whose adverse physical
signs were quite manifest right after surgery. And after reviving her
heartbeat, both doctors failed to monitor their patient closely or extend
further medical care to her; such conduct was especially necessary in view

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of the inadequate, post-operative facilities of the hospital. We do not, of

course, seek to hold petitioner responsible for the inadequate facilities of
the Baclaran General Hospital. We consider, however, that the inadequate
nature of those facilities did impose a somewhat higher standard of
professional diligence upon the accused surgeon and anesthetist personally
than would have been called for in a modern fully-equipped hospital.

Nubain was an experimental drug for anesthesia and post-operative pain

and the medical literature required that a patient be weighed first before it
is administered and warned that there was no (or inadequate) experience
relating to the administration thereof to a patient less that 18 years of age.
Yet, the doctor's order sheet did not contain this precaution but instead
directed a reader to apply the drug only when warranted by the
circumstances. Since petitioner anesthesiologist entered subsequent
prescriptions or orders in the same order sheet he was in a position to
appreciate the dangers inherent in the prior prescription, which was within
his area of specialization, and to order measures to correct this anomaly
and protect his patient's well-being. So far as the condition of the evidence
shows, he failed to do so.
The chain of circumstances above noted, namely: (1) the failure of petitioner
and Dr. Madrid to appreciate the serious post-surgery condition of their
patient and to monitor her condition and provide close patient care to her;
(2) the summons of petitioner by Dr. Madrid and the cardiologist after the
patient's heart attack on the very evening that the surgery was completed;
(3) the low level of care and diligence exhibited by petitioner in failing to
correct Dr. Madrid's prescription of Nubain for post-operative pain; (4) the
extraordinary failure or refusal of petitioner and Dr. Madrid to inform the
parents of Catherine Acosta of her true condition after surgery, in disregard
of the requirements of the Code of Medical Ethics; and (5) the failure of
petitioner and Dr. Madrid to prove that they had in fact exercised the
necessary and appropriate degree of care and diligence to prevent the
sudden decline in the condition of Catherine Acosta and her death 3 days
later, leads the Court to the conclusion, with moral certainty, that petitioner
and Dr. Madrid were guilty of simple negligence resulting in homicide.
Lucas v. Tuano (G. R. No. 178763)
DOCTRINE: There is breach of duty of care, skill and diligence, or the improper
performance of such duty, by the attending physician when the patient is injured in
body or in health [and this] constitutes the actionable malpractice; In order that
there may be a recovery for an injury, it must be shown that the injury for which
recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the
connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural
sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causesthat is, the
negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury.
FACTS: Petitioner Peter Lucas (Peter) contracted "sore eyes" in his right eye.
Peter went to Dr. Prospero Ma. C. Tuano, M.D. (Dr. Tuano), an
ophthalmologist at St. Lukes Medical Center, for an eye consultation. Upon
consultation with Dr. Tuano, Dr. Tuano diagnosed that Peter was suffering
from "sore eyes." Dr. Tuano then prescribed Spersacet-C eye drops for Peter
and to return for follow-up. When Peter returned his eye sore disappeared
but his right eye developed a viral infection. Tuason prescribed Maxitrol to
remedy the problem. However, the problem kept on recurring without
getting any better despite Tuasons treatment and Peters eye intra-ocular
pressure was above normal levels.
In their Complaint, petitioners specifically averred that as the "direct
consequence of [Peters] prolonged use of Maxitrol, [he] suffered from
steroid induced glaucoma which caused the elevation of his intra-ocular
pressure. The elevation of the intra-ocular pressure of [Peters right eye]
caused the impairment of his vision which impairment is not curable and
may even lead to total blindness.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lucas has made out a case for medical negligence.
HELD: No case for medical negligence.

DE CASTRO, AKR | 2016

In a medical negligence suit, the patient is required to prove by

preponderance of evidence that the physician failed to exercise that degree
of skill, care, and learning possessed by other persons in the same
profession; and that as a proximate result of such failure, the patient or his
heirs suffered damages. For lack of a specific law geared towards the type of
negligence committed by members of the medical profession, such claim for
damages is almost always anchored on the alleged violation of Article 2176
of the Civil Code
In medical negligence cases, four essential elements i.e., (1) duty; (2) breach;
(3) injury; and (4) proximate causation, must be established by the
plaintiff/s. All the four (4) elements must co-exist in order to find the
physician negligent and, thus, liable for damages. The physician has the
duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably
competent physician would use to treat the condition under similar
circumstances. There is breach of duty of care, skill and diligence, by the
attending physician when the patient is injured in body or in health. The
negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. And the proximate
cause of an injury is that cause, which, in the natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred.
Medical negligence cases are best proved by opinions of expert witnesses
belonging in the same general neighborhood and in the same general line of
practice as defendant physician or surgeon. Expert testimony is
indispensable.
Absent a definitive standard of care or diligence required of Dr. Tuano
under the circumstances, we have no means to determine whether he was
able to comply with the same in his diagnosis and treatment of Peter. The
causation between the physicians negligence and the patients injury may
only be established by the presentation of proof that Peters glaucoma
would not have occurred but for Dr. Tuanos supposed negligent conduct.
Once more, petitioners failed in this regard.
Our disposition of the present controversy might have been vastly different
had petitioners presented a medical expert to establish their theory
respecting Dr. Tuanos so-called negligence. All told, we are hard pressed to
find Dr. Tuano liable for any medical negligence or malpractice where there
is no evidence, in the nature of expert testimony, to establish that in treating
Peter, Dr. Tuano failed to exercise reasonable care, diligence and skill
generally required in medical practice. Dr. Tuanos testimony, that his
treatment of Peter conformed in all respects to standard medical practice in
this locality, stands unrefuted.

Biliran where he ran and subsequently lost; then he was offered a position
at the Philippine Stock Exchange as head of the Compliance and
Surveillance Division which he accepted; his time and attention was spent
in the performance of his demanding job at the PSE as well as in the
preparation ofhis testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee in
connection with the B W scam; anent the case of herein complainant, he
offered on several occasions to withdraw as one of the defense counsel of
the complainant even to the extent of offering to return his acceptance fee
which the latter however refused.
RTC referred the case to IBP
IBP ruled against respondents

Perea v. Almadro (A.C. No. 5246)

FACTS: Pera was charged with Frustrated Homicide and respondent
Almadro was his lawyer. The said RTC issued an order granting Atty.
Almadros motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence within ten (10)
days from said date. All the while, complainant thought that respondent
filed said demurrer and the case against him dismissed. In 1999,
complainant discovered that the demurrer was not filed. The trial court
ordered Perea to present evidence in his defense and later, a warrant was
issued against him for his arrest and post bail. Perea suffered emotionally
and financially due to respondents neglect of his duties. Respondent
lawyer has not attended any of his hearings which led to Perea to change his
counsel. The respondent explained that two days after the RTC granted the
manifestation of defense to file motion for leave to file demurrer to
evidence, he had finished the draft of the motion and the accompanying
pleading which he stored in a magnetic computer diskette intended for
editing prior to its submission in court; a few days before the deadline,
herein respondent tried to retrieve the draft from the diskette but said
drafts were nowhere to be found despite efforts to retrieve them; this led
him to believe that the drafts have been finalized and the edited versions
accordingly filed since it is his practice to expunge from the diskette drafts
that were already finalized and acted upon; meanwhile, the presiding judge
of the RTC retired, as a consequence, actions on pending cases were held in
abeyance; moreover, communications with the herein complainant had
become rarer; thereafter, towards the end of 1997 up to the next five months
of 1998, respondent was preoccupied with the congressional elections in

FACTS: FFCCI opened a savings/current account and dollar savings

account with PNB. FFCCIs president and secretary were named signatories
for the accounts. The said signatories left for USA. While they were out of
the country, applications for cashiers and managers checks bearing
Felipes signature were presented to PNB which they approved. When the
secretary returned in the country, it examined the PNB statements of
account of FFCCI and she noticed that there are deductions. FFCCI claimed
that such deductions was unauthorized and fraudulently made, so it
requested PNB to credit back the amount lost. PNB refused which led to the
filing of suit for damages against the bank and its own accountant. PN
alleged that it exercised due diligence in handling the account of FFCCI.
The applications for managers check have passed through the standard
bank procedures and it was only after finding no infirmity that these were
given due course. In fact, it was no less than Caparas, the accountant of
[FFCCI], who confirmed the regularity of the transaction. The delay of
[FFCCI] in picking up and going over the bank statements was the
proximate cause of its self-proclaimed injury. Had [FFCCI] been
conscientious in this regard, the alleged chicanery would have been
detected early on and Caparas effectively prevented from absconding with
its millions.

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ISSUE: WON respondent lawyer is guilty of negligence

HELD: It is plain from the records that respondent lawyer failed to submit a
demurrer to evidence for which he had earlier asked permission from the
trial court and which his client, herein complainant was relying on. More
than that, he failed to contact his client and to apprise the latter about the
developments of the case leaving complainant completely surprised and
without any protection when years later, he received summons from the
trial court asking him to present evidence in his defense and, not long after,
the trial court issued a warrant for his arrest. Respondents negligence is
compounded by his attempt to have this tribunal believe the story of how
his draft, stored in a magnetic diskette, mysteriously disappeared and how
the absence of such file in his diskette led him to believe that the same was
already filed in court. In his Answer, he even tried to \depict himself as a
conscientious lawyer by stating that he was actually mulling on the
procedural steps he would undertake regarding complainants case when
instead he received a copy of this complaint for disbarment. Such story, as
observed by the IBP, is not only outrageous but is contemptuous as it makes
a mockery of the Court. Respondent would have this Court believe a very
preposterous story of how his draft disappeared, all the time avoiding the
simple fact that he failed to submit the necessary pleading before the trial
court. Such behavior cannot be countenanced and deserves stern penalty
therefor.
NB v. FF Cruz & Co. (G.R. No. 173259)
DOCTRINE: Where the banks negligence is the proximate cause of the loss and the
depositor is guilty of contributory negligence, we allocated the damages between the
bank and the depositor on a 6040 ratio.

RTC ruled that both FFCCI and PNB is negligent

CA - The appellate court ruled that PNB was negligent in not properly
verifying the genuineness of the signatures appearing on the two
applications for managers check as evidenced by the lack of the signature

of the bank verifier thereon. Had this procedure been followed, the forgery
would have been detected. Also held that FFCCI is guilty of contributory
negligence
ISSUE: WON PNB should be held liable for the damages caused to FFCCI
HELD: PNB is guilty of negligence. First, oral testimony is not as reliable as
documentary evidence. Second, PNBs own witness, San Diego, testified that
in the verification process, the principal duty to determine the genuineness
of the signature devolved upon the account analyst. However, PNB did not
present the account analyst to explain his or her failure to sign the box for
signature and balance verification of the subject applications for managers
check, thus, casting doubt as to whether he or she did indeed verify the
signatures thereon. Third, we cannot fault the appellate court for not giving
weight to the testimonies of Gallego and San Diego considering that the
latter are naturally interested in exculpating themselves from any liability
arising from the failure to detect the forgeries in the subject transactions.
Fourth, Gallego admitted that PNBs employees received training on
detecting forgeries from the National Bureau of Investigation. However,
Emmanuel Guzman, then NBI senior document examiner, testified, as an
expert witness, that the forged signatures in the subject applications for
managers check contained noticeable and significant differences from the
genuine signatures of FFCCIs authorized signatories and that the forgeries
should have been detected or observed by a trained signature verifier of any
bank. As we have often ruled, the banking business is impressed with
public trust. A higher degree of diligence is imposed on banks relative to
the handling of their affairs than that of an ordinary business enterprise.
Thus, the degree of responsibility, care and trustworthiness expected of
their officials and employees is far greater than those of ordinary officers
and employees in other enterprises. In the case at bar, PNB failed to meet
the high standard of diligence required by the circumstances to prevent the
fraud.
PROXIMATE CAUSE
Del Prado v. Manila Electric, 7 March 1929
DOCTRINE: It is obvious that the plaintiff's negligence in attempting to board the
moving car was not the proximate cause of the injury. The direct and proximate
cause of the injury was the act of appellant's motorman in putting on the power
prematurely. A person boarding a moving car must be taken to assume the risk of
injury from boarding the car under the conditions open to his view, but he cannot
fairly be held to assume the risk that the motorman, having the situation in view,
will increase his peril by accelerating the speed of the car before he is planted safely
on the platform.
FACTS: Appellant Meralco, is engaged in operating street cars for
conveyance of passengers. Teodorico Florenciano was assigned as
motorman of one car. An action to recover damages was filed by Ignacio del
Prado for personal injuries allegedly caused by the negligence of the
defendant Meralco, in the operation of one of its street cars. After the car
had stopped at its appointed place for taking on and letting off passengers,
just east of the intersection, it resumed its course at a moderate speed under
the guidance of the motorman. The car had proceeded only a short
distance, however, when the plaintiff, Ignacio del Prado, ran across the
street to catch the car, his approach being made from the left. The car was of
the kind having entrance and exit at either end, and the movement of the
plaintiff was so timed that he arrived at the front entrance of the car at the
moment when the car was passing.
ISSUE: WON Meralco is liable
HELD: There is no obligation on the part of a street railway company to
stop its cars to let on intending passengers at other points than those
appointed for stoppage. In fact it would be impossible to operate a system
of street cars if a company engaged in this business were required to stop
any and everywhere to take on people who are too indolent, or who
imagine themselves to be in too great a hurry, to go to the proper places for

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boarding the cars, Nevertheless, although the motorman of this car was not
bound to stop to let the plaintiff on, it was his duty to do no act that would
have the effect of increasing the plaintiff's peril while he was attempting to
board the car. The premature acceleration of the car was, in our opinion, a
breach of this duty. The relation between a carrier of passengers for hire
and its patrons is of a contractual nature; and a failure on the part of the
carrier to use due care in carrying its passengers safely is a breach of duty
(culpa contractual) under articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the Civil Code.
Furthermore, the duty that the carrier of passengers owes to its patrons
extends to persons boarding the cars as well as to those alighting therefrom.
As to the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, we are of the opinion that
it should be treated, as in Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil.,
359), as a mitigating circumstance under article 1103 of the Civil Code. It is
obvious that the plaintiff's negligence in attempting to board the moving car
was not the proximate cause of the injury.
The direct and proximate cause of the injury was the act of appellant's
motorman in putting on the power prematurely. A person boarding a
moving car must be taken to assume the risk of injury from boarding the
car under the conditions open to his view, but he cannot fairly be held to
assume the risk that the motorman, having the situation in view, will
increase his peril by accelerating the speed of the car before he is planted
safely on the platform. Again, the situation before us is one where the
negligent act of the company's servant succeeded the negligent act of the
plaintiff, and the negligence of the company must be considered the
proximate cause of the injury.
The rule here applicable seems to be analogous to, if not identical with that
which is sometimes referred to as the doctrine of "the last clear chance." In
accordance with this doctrine, the contributory negligence of the party
injured will not defeat the action if it be shown that the defendant might, by
the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the
consequences of the negligence of the injured party
La Mallorca v. de Jesus, 14 May 1966
DOCTRINE: The proximate cause in the accident is that the inner tube of the left
front tire was pressed between the inner circle of the left wheel and the rim which
had slipped out of the wheel. That it can be avoided if the bus undergone rigid
check-up before it was deployed.
FACTS: A collision happened between Pampanga Bus and a truck which
lead to the death of Lolita de Jesus, 20-year old daughter of Valentin de
Jesus and wife of Manolo Tolentino. The immediate cause of the collision
was the fact that the driver of the bus lost control of the wheel when its left
front tire suddenly exploded. Valentin De Jesus and Manolo Tolentino filed
a suit for damages against petitioners. Petitioner maintains that a tire
blowout is a fortuitous event and gives rise to no liability for negligence.
ISSUE: WON the cause of the accident is due to negligence on the part of
petitioners and not a fortuitous event
HELD: The inner tube of the left front tire, according to petitioners own
evidence and as found by the Court of Appeals, was pressed between the
inner circle of the left wheel and the rim which had slipped out of the
wheel. This was, said Court correctly held, a mechanical defect of the
conveyance or a fault in its equipment which was easily discoverable if the
bus had been subjected to a more thorough or rigid check-up before it took
to the road that morning.
Then again both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found as a fact that
the bus was running quite fast immediately before the accident.
Considering that the tire which exploded was not newpetitioner
describes it as hindi masyadong kalbo, or not so very worn out the plea of
caso fortuito cannot be entertained.
Teh Le Kim v. Philippine Aerial Taxi, 24 November 1933
DOCTRINE: The proximate cause of plaintiffs accident is his own negligent act
alone.

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FACTS: Plaintiff The Le Kim bought a passenger ticket for a flight to Iloilo in
one of defendant companys hydroplanes starting from Madrigal Field in
Pasay. The engine of the plane (Mabuhay) was not in good condition so
plaintiff needs to wait for some time. While the engine was being tested, the
plaintiff saw how it was started by turning the propeller repeatedly and
how the man who did it ran away from it each time in order not to be
caught by the said propeller. Before the plane Mabuhay was put in good
condition, plaintiff was put in another plane (Taal) that arrived. The plaintiff
and his companion were carefully carried from the beach to the plane,
entering the same by the rear or tail end, and were placed in their seats to
which they were strapped. Later, they were shown how the straps could be
tightened or loosened in case of accident and were instructed further not to
touch anything in the plane. The plane landed on the waters of Guimaras
Strait, in front of Iloilo, and slowly down toward the beach until its
pontoons struck bottom, when the plane stopped. The pilot shut off the
gasoline feed pipe, permitting the engine, to continue to function until the
gasoline was drained. This is necessary in order to avoid danger of fire in
the plane. There was a banca approaching on the right side of the plane, the
pilot sent signal to the banca to warn because he feared that it might collide
with the plane. While doing the signaling, he heard that the pontoon strike
something. It was found out that the plaintiff The Le Kim unfastened its
seatbelt, climbed over the door of the plane, went down the ladder and
walked along the pontoon toward the revolving propeller. Plaintiff Teh Le
Kim raised his arm and it was caught by the revolving blades and resulted
into injury.
ISSUE: whether or not the defendant entity has complied with its
contractual obligation to carry the plaintiff-appellant Teh Le Kim safe and
sound to his destination
HELD: It is not difficult to understand that the plaintiff-appellant acted
with reckless negligence in approaching the propeller while it was still in
motion, and when the banca, was not yet in a position to take him. That the
plaintiff-appellant's alone was the direct cause of the accident, is so clear
that it is not necessary to cite authoritative opinions to support the
conclusion that the injury to his right arm and the subsequent amputation
thereof were due entirely and exclusively to his own imprudence and not to
the slightest negligence attributable to the defendant entity or to its agents.
Therefore, he alone should suffer the consequences of his act.
Imperial v. Heald Lumber, 30 September 1961
DOCTRINE: The proximate cause is the fact that one of the pilots took the risk and
let the pilot trainee to drive the helicopter. That they deviated from the original path
in order to reach the destination which resulted them to have longer travel and
unfortunately the helicopter has fully consumed the gasoline capacity.
FACTS: A helicopter (PIC361) of the Philippine Air Lines, Inc. (PAL), which
had been chartered by the Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., took off from
Nichols Fields, in Makati, Rizal, headed for Mankayan, Mt. Province, via
Rosales, Pangasinan. On board the helicopter is Capt. Hernandez and Lt.
Rex Imperial. The helicopter reached Rosales, Pangasinan but on its way to
Mankayan, the helicopter crashed. The body of Capt. Hernandez and Lt.
Imperial was found within the lumber concession of Heald Lumber. Three
complaints was filed against defendant by PAL, widow of Capt. Hernandez
and widow of Lt. Imperial on the ground that the mishap was due to the
fact that the helicopter had collided with defendants tramway steel cables
strung in parallel of approximately 3,000 yards in length between the
mountains approximately 3,000 to 5,000 feet high in the vicinity of
defendants logging area in Ampusungan, Mountain Province. Defendant
endeavored to prove that the mishap had been due to two (2) causes,
namely: (1) exhaustion of the fuel; and (2) negligence of the pilot.
ISSUE: WON pilots are negligent

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HELD: Yes, The helicopter had a main tank and an auxiliary tank with a
capacity of twenty-seven (27) and fifteen (15) gallons of fuel, respectively. In
order to transfer gasoline from the latter to the former, it was necessary to
land the helicopter. The maximum flight endurance of the helicopter was
two hours and fifty minutes including the auxiliary tank. The estimated
flying time from Nichols Field to Rosales was one (1) hour and forty-two
(42) minutes, and from Rosales to Mankayan, one (1) hour and twenty-nine
(29) minutes, or an aggregate estimated flying time of three (3) hours and
eleven (11) minutes, or twenty-one (21) minutes longer than the estimated
maximum flight endurance of the helicopter.
The accident took place in the area in which the helicopter was to have fully
consumed its entire supply of gasoline, thus justifying the belief that it was
forced to land in Ampusungan due to lack of gasoline, and that, as the
engine ceased to function, its maneuverability must have become impaired,
in view of which it crashed, thus causing it to fall into a ravine in
defendants concession.
The foregoing considerations suggest that Capt. Hernandez and Lt.
Imperial had acted recklessly in undertaking the flight with a supply of fuel
hardly sufficient to enable them to reach their destination. Additionally, it
appears that during the flight from Rosales to Mankayan, the helicopter had
deviated from one to three miles from the course plotted by Capt.
Hernandez. The pilot, Lt. Imperial, was not a licensed helicopter pilot and
was merely in the initial stage of his training as such pilot. Had Capt.

Hernandez been piloting the machine from Rosales to Mankayan, he would

have had no reason to deviate from the course planned by him.

Vda. De Bataclan v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181, 22 October 1957

When a vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the
leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that
the coming of the men with lighted torch was in response to the call for
help, made not only by the passenger, but most probably by the driver and
the conductor themselves, and that because it was very dark (about 2:30 in
the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them; and coming as
they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available,
they had to use a torch the most handy and available; and what was more
natural, than that said rescuers should innocently approach the overturned
vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them, Held:
That the proximate cause of the death of B was the overturning of the
vehicle thru the negligence of defendant and his agent.
Sabido v. Custodio, 31 August 1966
Where the carrier (LTB) bus and its driver were clearly guilty of
contributory negligence for having allowed a passenger to ride on the
running board of the bus, and where the driver of the other vehicle was also
guilty of contributory negligence, because that vehicle was running at a
considerable speed, despite the fact that it was negotiating a sharp curve,
and, instead of being close to its right side of the road, it was driven on its
middle portion thereof and so near the passenger bus coming from the
opposite direction as to sideswipe a passenger on its running board, the
owners of the two vehicle are liable solidarily for the death of the passenger,
although the liability of one arises from a breach of contract, whereas that
of the other springs from a quasi-delict.
Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission of two more
persons, although acting independently of each other, are, in combination,
the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, and it is
impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury,
either is responsible for the whole injury, even though his act alone might
not have caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have resulted
from the acts of the other tortfeasor

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