Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Politics
Politics
Sources:http://www.claiminghumanrights.org/general_civil_political_rights.h
tml
VALUES OF DEMOCRACY
Common Good
When citizens are working for the good of the community as a whole.
Truth
We expect that the government will disclose information and not lie to us.
Equality
The differences in culture, dress, language, religion, etc., that aren't just
tolerated, but celebrated as a strength.
Life
The right to live without fear of injury or death by others or our government.
Liberty
The right to think, act, or behave without any interference from our
government.
Pursuit of Happiness
The right to seek pleasure in your own way as long as you don't violate the
rights of others.
Popular Sovereignty
The idea that citizens are the source of all governmental power.
Patriotism
Sources:http://www.democracybarometer.org/concept_en.html
Sources:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P
olitics_of_the_European_Union
One example of this is the neo-Marxist approach where the state and the
economy are viewed as a system of relationships. The state is in a contradictory
position as it needs both to spend to achieve its aims and to control its spending.
In this model there may be close links between the state bureaucracy and the
industries needing regulating, which may be reflected in the choice of policy
instruments. State subsidies may well be chosen as the appropriate instrument,
as these will not cause conflicts between the bureaucracy and the regulated
industry.
In between the rational choice and the systems models is the institutions
model. Here the emphasis is placed on the institutions in place in the society and
their influence on the groups pursuing environmental aims. The institutions in
society affect which policies are likely to be implemented. One example of an
institution is the capitalist corporation, and in the institutions approach, the
modern corporation may have different long-term aims from the neoclassical
profit-maximizing firm of the rational choice model. It may prefer certainty of
future operations to profit maximization and therefore prefer command-andcontrol instruments which are more likely to stabilize the market. In other words,
the institutional factors affect the objectives of polluters. These factors vary
between countries and may help to explain why different instruments are favored
by different countries.
We now concentrate on the rational choice model and see how it can be
applied to environmental policy. To do this we can begin by making a list of groups
of people who are affected by, or have an interest in, the choice of an
environmental policy and its associated policy instrument:
political parties
voters
All of these groups are acting in a political market which is similar to and linked to
the economic market. The political market can redistribute wealth and wealth
leads to economic power. The economic market can create wealth, which can then
enhance political power.
Each of these groups will have different objectives and will try to influence the
decision-making process so that the decision finally taken enables them to
achieve their objectives.
The rational choice model has led to other rational actor models which attempt to
explain how decisions are made. Two of these which you may find in the literature
are the clearing house model and the politician voter model, both of which
try to explain agricultural policy decisions.
Clearing house model - this concentrates on the interaction between pressure
groups, who are well informed, and voters, who are assumed to be ill-informed.
The pressure groups seek to achieve their own objectives, but face costs of
organization and communication, which may lead to free-rider problems if the
group becomes too large and dispersed. The government's role is as a clearing
house for the various pressure groups, and it is assumed to act in such a way as
to maximize the probability of its re-election.
Politician voter model (Downs 1957) - this model assumes that the influence of
pressure groups is not great, and concentrates on the link between politicians and
voters. Active politicians supply intervention as demanded by voters, who supply
political support to the politicians. The model assumes that voters have perfect
information.
We will now take each of the groups in the rational choice model in turn and try to
see what their objectives are and how they affect decisions.
Political parties
The aim of politicians is to win office, so they may support issues not for the sake
of the issue itself, but in order to win votes. That is, political parties will tend to
pursue policies that guarantee the maximum number of votes. Parties will be
responsive to changes in public opinion, and may be reluctant to commit
themselves too strongly to a particular policy, in case public opinion changes.
There have recently been examples of political parties founded specifically to
support environmental issues, for instance, the Green Party in the United
Kingdom, but these have not won wide support from the voters. To win support, a
party usually needs policies on a wide range of issues as voters have a wide range
of concerns.
Political parties may try to compensate those sectors of the economy whose
relative incomes fall, and they will try to avoid decreases in real incomes for
sectors whose representatives have strong political power. Thus, there may be
political resistance to drastic changes in policy, once a policy has been put in
place.
Polluters and polluters' organizations
We assume that the aim of polluters and their organizations is to maximize their
profits etc. They, like any other interest group, expend large amounts of money
on rent seeking, that is, on efforts to influence the outcomes of the legislative
process in a way that yields the highest possible benefits for them. Arguments
have been put forward that they will thus prefer subsidies to standards, and
standards to emission taxes, as these result in lower profit losses.
Most polluters' interest groups acknowledge the polluter pays principle, but reject
its application in their own country until it is also applied in other countries.
Polluters are likely to be relatively few in number, so will be more capable of
taking effective collective action than will the larger, more dispersed groups of
actors - voters, for instance. They may therefore have a significant influence on
the choice of policy instrument. This could be one reason for the widespread use
of standards as an instrument of environmental policy.
Regulators and other bureaucrats
The preferences of polluters may influence bureaucrats and politicians in their
choice of instrument, depending on the power that the groups of polluters can
exert. There may be collusion between the regulators and the regulated as these
groups have to work together and this will be easier with harmonious working
relationships. This is described in the literature as 'regulatory capture'.
But bureaucrats may also have their own objectives when deciding on policy
instruments and will be trying to achieve these objectives. These may include the
maximization of their own power, prestige, influence, involvement and room for
maneuver. These variables depend mainly upon the amount of the appropriated
budget and the scope of their responsibilities. Bureaucrats control much of the
relevant information on policies and also on their own activities, and may be able
to use this in a way to achieve their own objectives. The bureaucracy is supposed
to be scrutinized by the political decision-makers (the parliament), but this
monitoring is usually imperfect, given the informational deficiencies and
asymmetries involved.
On this basis, the bureaucrats may also prefer standards to the other policy
instruments as standards involve the highest degree of administrative
involvement and give them more direct control over polluters than do subsidies,
taxes or permits. Bureaucrats would probably prefer subsidies to taxes because
the former involve less potential for conflict and possibly higher administrative
involvement. They would probably rate permit systems last because this would
imply handing over the responsibility for the instrument to the market
mechanism.
Environmentalists
Environmentalists focus on the impact of environmental policy on the
environment. Environmental interest groups, like other interest groups, are rent
seeking and are trying to maximize benefits by influencing the outcome of
legislation. There are many influential interest groups in the environmental field,
including Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth. In the past, they have often
disapproved of incentive-based instruments such as subsidies and marketable
permits, as these infer that the polluter has some right to pollute. Permit systems,
in particular, have often been regarded as a 'sell-out' of the environment.
Although there is now a growing feeling that incentive-based instruments are
acceptable, the preferred policy instrument is still standards. This is because
standards offer the highest certainty that the environmental policy goal will
actually be achieved.
Voters
Voters, in the rational choice model, are considered to be rationally-acting
individuals who aim to maximize their utility. They have concerns about many
issues and decide to vote for the party whose 'package' gives them maximum
utility. Environmental concerns may not feature highly in these packages, and
voters may be more likely to concentrate on economic, health or education issues
when choosing the package.
Although the individual voters may not see themselves as having much influence
over national environmental policies they are more likely to get involved in local
issues, where the local benefits and costs are more apparent.
They may want environmental improvements in theory, but be reluctant to pay
the associated costs. In this respect, it is important to note that voters are usually
also taxpayers. However, as a country's income rises, its voters are more likely to
demand higher environmental quality. It has been suggested in the literature that
voters will tend to prefer standards to other instruments for the same reason as
environmentalists, that is, the higher certainty of achieving the environmental
policy goals.
Sources: http://www.soas.ac.uk/cedep-demos/000_P521_EEM_K3736Demo/unit1/page_20.htm
STRUCTURE
The Treaty has a complicated structure. Its preamble is followed by seven
titles. Title I contains provisions shared by the Communities, common
foreign policy, and judicial cooperation. Title II contains provisions amending
the EEC Treaty, while Titles III and IV amend the ECSC and EAEC Treaties
respectively. Title V introduces provisions concerning common foreign and
security policy (CFSP). Title VI contains provisions on cooperation in the
fields of justice and home affairs (JHA). The final provisions are set out in
Title VII.
EUROPEAN UNION
The Maastricht Treaty creates the European Union, which consists of three
pillars: the European Communities, common foreign and security policy and
police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.
The first pillar consists of the European Community, the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC) and Erratum and concerns the domains in which
the Member States share their sovereignty via the Community institutions.
The process known as the Community method applies in this connection, i.e.
a proposal by the European Commission, its adoption by the Council and the
European Parliament and the monitoring of compliance with Community law
by the Court of Justice.
The second pillar establishes common foreign and security policy (CFSP),
enshrined in Title V of the Treaty on European Union. This replaces the
provisions of the Single European Act and allows Member States to take joint
action in the field of foreign policy. This pillar involves an intergovernmental
decision-making process which largely relies on unanimity. The Commission
and Parliament play a modest role and the Court of Justice has no say in this
area.
The third pillar concerns cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs
(JHA), provided for in Title VI of the Treaty on European Union. The Union is
expected to undertake joint action so as to offer European citizens a high
level of protection in the area of freedom, security and justice. The decisionmaking process is also intergovernmental.
INSTITUTIONS
In the wake of the Single European Act, the Maastricht Treaty also expands
the role of the European Parliament. The scope of the cooperation procedure
and the assent procedure has been extended to new areas. Besides, the
trans-European networks
industrial policy
consumer protection
youth
Culture
the
second
stage
began
on
1 January 1994
and
provides
for
The third stage should begin by the latest on 1 January 1999 with the
creation of a single currency and the establishment of a Central European
Bank (CEB).
Thanks to the social protocol annexed to the Treaty, Community powers are
broadened in the social domain. The United Kingdom is not a signatory of
this protocol. Its objectives are:
promotion of employment;
social dialogue;
CITIZENSHIP
One of the major innovations established by the Treaty is the creation of
European citizenship over and above national citizenship. Every citizen who
is a national of a Member State is also a citizen of the Union. This citizenship
vests new rights in Europeans, viz.:
PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY
The Treaty on European Union has established the principle of subsidiarity as
a general rule, which was initially applied to environmental policy in the
Single European Act. This principle specifies that in areas that are not within
its exclusive powers the Community shall only take action where objectives
can best be attained by action at Community rather than at national level.
Article A provides that the Union shall take decisions as close as possible to
the citizen.
POST-MAASTRICHT
The Maastricht Treaty represents a key stage in European construction. By
establishing the European Union, by creating an economic and monetary
union and by extending European integration to new areas, the Community
has acquired a political dimension.
Aware of the progress of European integration, future enlargement and the
need for institutional changes, the Member States inserted a revision clause
in the Treaty. To this end, Article N provided for an Intergovernmental
Conference to be convened in 1996.
This conference culminated in the signature of the Amsterdam Treaty in
1997.
AMENDMENTS MADE TO THE TREATY
This Treaty has also been amended by the following treaties of accession:
the
number
of Member
States
of the
European
Community to fifteen.
Malta,
Poland,
the
Czech
Republic,
Slovakia
and
References
Treaties of Accession
Date of
Entry into
signature
force
7.2.1992
1.11.1993
(Treaty on Maastricht)
Treaty of Amsterdam
Official Journal
OJ C 191 of
29.7.1992
2.10.1997
1.5.1999
OJ C 340 of
10.11.1997
Treaty of Nice
26.2.2001
1.2.2003
OJ C 80 of
10.3.2001
Treaty of Lisbon
13.12.2007
1.12.2009
OJ C 306 of
17.12.2007
Treaty of Accession
Date of
Entry into
Official
signature
force
Journal
24.6.1994
1.1.1995
OJ C 241 of
29.8.1994
16.4.2003
1.5.2004
Treaty of Accession of
OJ L 236 of
23.9.2003
25.4.2005
1.1.2007
Sources: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?
uri=URISERV:xy0026
OJ L 157 of
21.6.2005
charged that the high taxes needed to pay for them discouraged investment
and initiative. Political candidates like Margaret Thatcher in Britain (197994) won elections by promising to limit social spending, lower taxes on the
wealthy, and privatize national industries.
I.
B.
C.
II.
2.
2.
3.
2.
B.
2.
C.
III.
1.
2.
2.
3.
2.
Sources: http://www.uky.edu/~popkin/105Nov27.htm
Sources:http://www.pass.va/content/dam/scienzesociali/pdf/acta6/acta6schmidt.pdf
The alternative of developing broad arguments about how welfare state regimes affect
contemporary politics is more easily applied to cross-national comparisons. EspingAndersen has developed propositions that link welfare state structures to cross-national
variation in occupational [End Page 154] structures and, in turn, to contemporary
political cleavages. He suggests, for example, that social democratic welfare states like
Sweden will face growing clashes between public and private sector workers, while
conservative welfare states like Germany will produce a divide between labor market
"insiders" and "outsiders." Such an approach offers the tantalizing promise of linking the
evident significance of large welfare state structures to clear propositions about political
change. Unfortunately, the argument does not work. As I will document in the next
section, the hypothesized political cleavages emerge in only muted forms and have
failed to generate a sustained backlash against the welfare state. The flaw in these
broad arguments about welfare state regimes is that they greatly underestimate the
difficulty of assembling and sustaining proretrenchment coalitions.
New institutionalist arguments have contributed greatly to our understanding of welfare
state politics. Moreover, unlike arguments about the role of organized labor, there is no
reason to think that the importance of institutional structures and the legacies of
previous policy choices has declined. These arguments cannot simply be transferred
from one context to another, however; they must be recast to apply to the specific
settings and strategic problems that are characteristic of retrenchment politics.
Sources:
http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~iversen/PDFfiles/48.2pierson.html
The model of welfare production and the virtuous circle In order to perform a
country-by-country comparison of various features of social security systems
both in terms of the resources they require and the type of institutions that
implement them as well as from the perspective of the citizens, we need a
theoretical framework a model that allows both macro- and microlevel
analysis. For this, we turn to the model of welfare production designed by
Hill and Bramley (1986). In this model, effectiveness and efficacy both factor
into the process of production in which inputs are translated into outputs.
Together with some other factors, these outputs then influence the wellbeing of society and of individual citizens. Mitchell (1991) aligned the
comparative welfare state research approach with this model, and Hagfors et
al. (2003) used it as the structural underpinning of their study on the
economic security of pensioners. Kuivalainen (2004) used the model to
compare the income protection systems of six countries. The idea in this
model is to proceed by stages through the process of welfare production. A
rough outline of the model is presented in Figure 1, in which the model is
applied to the comparison of social security systems. By virtue of its
structure, the model of welfare production makes it possible to undertake
systematic classifications in comparative welfare state research (see Mitchell
1991, 153199). In Figure 1, the topmost box represents politics, including
descriptions of social security systems at the general level and the
institutional features and historical trends of such systems. The extensive
studies of the features of Western welfare states conducted by P. Flora
(1986) have been seen as representative examples of this approach. Moving
on to the actual process of production, the first issue we encounter is the
amount and the type of resources used for the implementation of social
policy. Comparisons focusing on this aspect represent a resource-centred
approach that looks at the issue from the welfare effort perspective. In
Figure 1, this approach is represented by the box entitledinputs. A typical
Another central concept in this study is the virtuous circle. We use it here to
refer to the propensity of actions with positive effects to function in a selfreinforcing manner. In the welfare state context, this means that to the
extent that a welfare effort has a positive effect on well-being and the
reduction of inequality, the citizens are willing to maintain and even to
intensify such an effort. Reference to this idea is made in such documents as
the 2006 World Development (chapter 6, page 108). The virtuous circle is
represented schematically in Figure 2. In Figure 2, the virtuous circle is
portrayed as a construct consisting of two concentric circles. This is central
to the purposes of our study. The inner circle can be seen as a kind of core
which reflects indirect effects to the outer circle. The key components of the
welfare state located on the outer circle have a more direct effect on general
welfare. Our purpose in this study is to concentrate on the functioning of the
inner circle, without ignoring the significance of the outer circle to the
2D:
international comparison and international organizations
all the rights found in the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU;
data protection;
Transparent administration.
The Charter is consistent with the European Convention on Human
Rights adopted in the framework of the Council of Europe: when the
Charter contains rights that stem from this Convention, their
meaning and scope are the same.
When the Charter applies
The provisions of the Charter are addressed to:
the institutions and bodies of the EU with due regard for the principle
of subsidiarity; and
In cases where the Charter does not apply, the protection of fundamental
rights is guaranteed under the constitutions or constitutional traditions
of EU countries and international conventions they have ratified.
The Charter does not extend the competence of the EU to matters not
included by the Treaties under its competence.
How the Charter became part of the EU Treaties
The Charter was initially solemnly proclaimed at the Nice European Council
on 7 December 2000. At that time, it did not have any binding legal effect.
On 1 December 2009, with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the
Charter became legally binding on the EU institutions and on
national governments, just like the EU Treaties themselves.
For the first time, members of the College of Commissioners swore a solemn
declaration to uphold the Charter as well as the Treaties in May 2010.
The Charter strengthens the protection of fundamental rights by making
those rights more visible and more explicit for citizens.
Sources: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamentalrights/charter/index_en.htm
Many cities in the United States have areas referred to as Little Italy or
Chinatown, where people from those countries keep their cultural traditions.
JoAnnes parents are from Lebanon, and though JoAnne has grown up
in the United States, she embraces her Lebanese roots. She has lived in
Lebanon and often cooks traditional Lebanese meals.
Amish people live alongside those who are not Amish, but travel by
horse and buggy, do not have electricity, and have established stores,
schools, and other organizations that are used by members of the Amish
community.
The United States has been referred to as a melting pot, where people
of different cultural backgrounds have come to live but are able to keep alive
their own cultural traditions.
When environmental groups decide that there is a need for a new law
regulating some form of pollution, they seek compromises from chemical
companies. People from the public voice their opinions, as does the
Environmental Protection Agency and members of Congress. Any law that
follows is a result of various groups speaking up and is an exercise in
pluralism.
In ancient Rome, people worshipped many gods, and were left to their
own religious practices if they were not considered threats to the Roman
rulers.
When Britain occupied India, both British Christian and Indian Hindu
traditions were practiced side by side.
http://www.wikipedia.com
3C: the practice of the pluralist society
I. Removed from our land we are literally removed from ourselves. Mick
Dodson, Australian indigenous leader and Member of the Permanent Forum
Opportunities However, migration can also be a positive experience,
providing more and better opportunities for indigenous peoples in the area of
employment and education, with income generated by urban indigenous
peoples often used to support families in their communities of origin. In
some instances, indigenous peoples have been able to adapt and improve
their situations, preserving their indigenous identities while maximizing the
benefits of urban society. Using the term edgewalkers to describe such
youth in the Pacific region, one indigenous author explained: [Edgewalkers]
are part of a generation of Pacific peoples who have mastered skills that
have enabled them to adopt situational identities that allow them to weave
between traditional indigenous contexts and the technological and
information worlds.
IV. In Africa, forced migration to urban areas has often resulted from land
loss due to the creation of wildlife reserves and the construction of dams,
mining projects or other development projects. In Tanzania, 90 per cent of
Masaai men who have migrated to the capital city, Dar es Salaam, end up
working as security guards, earning around $40 per month and are often
only able to afford to live in slums on the outskirts of the city.
VII. with reasons given for their migration including family and housing, as
well as education (for those migrating from reserves) and employment (for
those migrating between cities). There is a high level of mobility among the
Aboriginal population from city to city and between cities and reserves,
which can have a disruptive effect on the provision of social programs such
as health, education and family support
Sources:
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/6_session_factsheet2.pdf
ground between the weak redistribution of the liberal model and the strong
redistribution of the social democratic model, has been the most influential.2
We therefore hypothesize that citizens in countries with the alternative types
of capitalism i.e. the liberal and social democratic typeswill be less
supportive of European integration. Political-economic models assume that
citizens are well-informed about the economic consequences of alternative
institutional arrangements (McLaren 2002). Given the lack of even
rudimentary knowledge of the EU on the part of many, even most, citizens
(Anderson 1998; Wessels 1995a), we need to explore further to find the
sources of their support or opposition. In the next section, we examine
political cues, which frame how citizens regard European integration, and in
the following section we examine how support for European integration
depends on basic identities. Political Cues Cognitive and social psychologists
have shown that human capacity for calculation is far more limited than
utilitarian models presume (Chong 2000; Kinder 1998; Simon 1985). This
has directed attention to cognitive short-cuts and emotive anchors that
provide essential and prior cues that help a person decide what is in his or
her interest. Extending preexisting values or identities to new objects can be
understood as rationalist aids to cognition and as the expression of a
psychological need for consistency (Conover and Feldman 1984; Feld and
Grofman 1988; Feldman 1988; George 1979; Jennings 1992; Sears 1993;
Sears and Funk 1991). 2 This is consistent with the median voter theorem.
Of course, the outcomes in question are contested (Hooghe and Marks
1999). Several areas of economic integration have been characterized by
negative integration biased towards the removing of barriers and the
introduction of market competition akin to the liberal model (Scharpf
1999). A weaker version of our argument would be that citizens, including
those in countries with liberal or social democratic types of capitalism,
perceive that their institutions are peripheral, and respond to European
23.40 (nat) CALCULATE (EU) .17.21 (EU) 59% correct (EU) a Satisfaction
with national democracy. b Voted for establishment party. c (1) EU
government responsible to EU Parliament? (2) More power for EP good/bad?
(3) EP more/less important role? d Level of EU support among political
parties, constituting a cue to party supporters. e Minorities abuse social
benefits. f Religious practices of minorities threaten our way of life. g EU
threatens national identity; language. h Interaction: national pride +
exclusive national identity. i Local, regional, national, European. 11 the cause
of Euroskepticism (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002; Taggart 1998). We
detect a corresponding turn in the analysis of public opinion, and a greater
sensitivity to the view, espoused by a scholar sympathetic to rational
calculus, that, Individual preferences are guided by both [pre]dispositions
and incentives. This means that, in selecting between any set of alternatives,
an individual may, by virtue of his group identifications and values, be
predisposed to favor one alternative independently of the current incentives
associated with the alternatives (Chong 2000, 74; see also Citrin, Reingold,
and Green 1990; Sears and Funk 1991). In a longitudinal analysis of twentyfive years of EU public opinion, Bernhard Wessels concludes that, the
impact of stratifying characteristicseducation and occupationon attitudes
towards the EC has declined, while that of political values such as left/right,
postmaterialism, and party identification has increased (Wessels 1995a,
135). Sean Careys identity model (2002) elaborates different measures of
regional, national and European identity, and finds that they powerfully
structure EU public opinion. Lauren McLarens cultural threat model
demonstrates that attitudes toward the European Union tend to be based in
great part on a general hostility toward other cultures (2002, 564). Several
models root public opinion towards European integration in the domestic
political context. Andersons national proxies model (1998), Carrubba
(2001), Rohrschneiders democratic performance model (2002) and
Steenbergen and Jones party cue model (2002) all draw attention to
national political-institutional variables, of which party support or party cue
appear especially powerful. Analysts have sought in different ways to handle
the multi-level structure of the data. All are aware, of course, that public
opinion varies across countries as well as across individuals. One approach is
to run the same model for as many countries as there are in the data set
(Rohrschneider 2002; Anderson 1998). Another is to deal with one level only
or with each level separately (Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996; Bosch and
Newton 1995; Carrubba 2001; Dalton and Eichenberg 1998; Eichenberg and
Dalton 1993; Sanchez-Cuenca 2000; Wessels 1995a). A standard strategy is
to absorb clustering of residuals by country in a series of dummy variables
(e.g. Gabel 1998a). Such variables are sphinx-like in that they increase the
variance explained by the model, but tell us little or nothing substantively.
Finally, there are two analyses that, like the analysis of this paper, use multilevel analysis. Both are represented in Table 1. Models that account for the
most variance sometimes rely on independent variables that appear
uncomfortably close to the dependent variable. Most writers, including those
selected here, face up explicitly to the problem of establishing direction of
causality. One may ask whether evaluations of the extent to which
respondents feel represented by the 12 European Parliament influence
support for European integration or result from it?3 Given the welldocumented lack of knowledge of the European Parliament among most EU
citizens, it seems possible that responses to a question about whether the
European Parliament protects ones interests may issue from more diffuse
attitudes, including those towards the European Union generally. Similarly, it
seems strained to consider the perception of whether ones country has
benefited from integration as an independent variable, especially because it
is sometimes used together with membership as indicator for support. The
authors listed in Table 1 have evidently thought through such concerns. In