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    This article discusses dispersed models of state control as an alternative to traditional Weberian state models, using Kosovo as a case study. It argues that Kosovo's governance structure, outlined in the Ahtisaari plan, establishes an asymmetric decentralization model that grants particular powers to Serb-majority municipalities, defying a hierarchical view of state control. This functional model allocates governance based on issues rather than territory, showing how complex governance structures can deal with divided societies. The article analyzes how Kosovo's proposed structures move beyond traditional concepts of territory and hierarchy to address its demographic realities.

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    Stroschein

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    This article discusses dispersed models of state control as an alternative to traditional Weberian state models, using Kosovo as a case study. It argues that Kosovo's governance structure, outlined in the Ahtisaari plan, establishes an asymmetric decentralization model that grants particular powers to Serb-majority municipalities, defying a hierarchical view of state control. This functional model allocates governance based on issues rather than territory, showing how complex governance structures can deal with divided societies. The article analyzes how Kosovo's proposed structures move beyond traditional concepts of territory and hierarchy to address its demographic realities.

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    36 views21 pages

    American Political Science Association

    Uploaded by

    Esteban Gómez
    This article discusses dispersed models of state control as an alternative to traditional Weberian state models, using Kosovo as a case study. It argues that Kosovo's governance structure, outlined in the Ahtisaari plan, establishes an asymmetric decentralization model that grants particular powers to Serb-majority municipalities, defying a hierarchical view of state control. This functional model allocates governance based on issues rather than territory, showing how complex governance structures can deal with divided societies. The article analyzes how Kosovo's proposed structures move beyond traditional concepts of territory and hierarchy to address its demographic realities.

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    of 21

    Making or Breaking Kosovo: Applications of Dispersed State Control

    Author(s): Sherrill Stroschein


    Reviewed work(s):
    Source: Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Dec., 2008), pp. 655-674
    Published by: American Political Science Association
    Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20446821 .
    Accessed: 16/08/2012 14:22
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    http://www.jstor.org

    ARTICLES

    Making

    or Breaking

    of Dispersed

    State

    Kosovo:

    Applications

    Control

    SherrillStroschein
    In thisarticle,Imake a case fora dispersedstatecontrolmodel as an alternativeto theterritorial
    and hierarchicalprinciplesof the
    Weberian state.Rather thanallocatinggovernancepowers in termsof territory,
    dispersedstatecontrolsarebased on a functional
    principle,inwhich governanceisallocated tovarioussubunitsby issuearea or function.
    This examinationis informed
    by recent
    debates in international
    relationstheoryon contractualand imperialnetwork
    models of control,aswell aswork on non-territorial
    autonomyin the fieldsof nationalismand ethnicconflict.I examine thepracticalapplicationof a dispersedcontrolmodel in the
    contextof thegovernancestructure
    proposed forKosovo,which declared independencefromSerbia inFebruary2008. I conclude
    with an overviewof theadvantagesof creativedesigns forstatesthatmove beyond territory
    to dealwith complex
    and hierarchy,
    demographicand governingrealitiesin regionssuch as theBalkans.

    Kosovo's
    fromSerbia in
    declaration
    of independence
    February2008 splitthe international
    community.
    As of thiswriting,approximately
    40 states1have
    recognized
    or intendto formally
    recognize
    Kosovo as an
    independent
    state-a tallycodifiedon a website called
    Serbia has consistently
    kosovothanksyou.com.
    opposed
    Kosovo'sformalseparation
    fromSerbia,and continuesto
    enforcetiestoSerbs livinginKosovo-approximately7
    percentof Kosovo's population.2Given the Serbian
    government's
    stancein oppositiontoKosovo's indepen
    dence,itwas tobe expectedthatstates
    with close tiesto
    Serbia,such as Russia,mightwithhold formalrecogni
    tionof theentity.
    with theirown
    However,otherstates
    potentialseparatist
    movementshave also demonstrated
    reluctance
    regarding
    Kosovo'srecognition.
    Countriessuch
    as Slovakiaand Spain have citedKosovo's independence
    as settinga dangerousprecedent
    of redrawing
    bordersin
    theinternational
    system,
    via unilateraldecree.3

    This diverserangeofopinionson theKosovo issueposes


    an inconvenience
    to theUnited Statesand a numberof
    EU countriesthathave been articulating
    plans forthe
    region'sindependence.
    Long negotiations
    within theEU
    havefailedtobringallmemberstatesto fullagreement
    in
    support
    of independence.
    Moreover,theindependence
    issue
    has facedan embarrassing
    division
    within theUN Secu
    rity
    Council thatmakesKosovo's recognition
    fromthat
    bodyunlikelyforsome time.
    The unilateralnatureof Kosovo's independence
    has
    includedsome ratherstarkrhetoric
    by itssupporters,
    in
    an effort
    toobscuredissenton thematter.But thisrheto
    ric also obscuressomeof thecomplexities
    of Kosovo's
    intendedgovernancestructure,
    needlesslyratcheting
    up
    thedebate.U.S. President
    GeorgeBushhas statedcategor
    icallythatKosovo's"borders
    havebeen clearlydefined."4
    Kosovo'sborderscanbe clearly
    Certainly,
    drawnon amap.
    However,indefactoterms,thegovernance
    structures
    out
    linedforKosovowill be muchmore complexthanthe
    Weberian state
    typical
    model.
    The idealof a stateasoutlinedbyMaxWeber is thatof
    isLecturer(Assistant
    Sherrill
    Stroschein
    inPoli
    a sovereign
    Professor)
    administrative
    apparatusgoverning
    theuseof
    ticsat University
    CollegeLondonandDirectorof the
    force
    withina clearlydefinedterritory.
    But theAhtisaari
    Master'sPrograminDemocracy
    andDemocratization
    plan onwhichKosovo'sgovernanceis tobe based estab
    (s.stroschein@ucl.ac.
    uk).Shewishestothank
    lishesan asymmetric
    Stephen
    decentralization
    model,granting
    par
    MatthewNelson,Stefan
    Deets,
    Wolffand three
    anonymous ticularpowerstoSerb-majority
    municipalitiestogovern
    reviewers
    onpyevious
    FotiniChristia,
    forcomments
    their
    own affairs.5
    Similartogovernance
    inBel
    structures
    drafts;
    StacieGoddard,
    Daniel Nexon,Katia Papagianni,and
    gium,NorthernIreland/UK,
    andBosnia, itdevolvessub
    RogerPetersen
    forconversations
    relatedtothis
    piece;and to
    stantialpowersto substateunitsand even allows these
    theInternational
    Research
    and Exchanges
    Board (IREX)
    unitssomepowersofcross-border
    withotherstates
    linkages
    in theFederalRepublicofYugoslaviain
    forresearch
    support
    in therealmof specifiedissue-areas
    or functions.
    2001 and tothe
    HarvardAcademy
    forInternational
    and
    The strongdevolutionandweak centralauthorityin
    AreaStudies
    in2003-05.
    forsupport
    thesefunctional
    governance
    models defiesa traditional

    doi:1
    0.101
    7/S1
    537592708081
    84X

    December
    20081Vol.6/No.
    4 655

    ARTICLES

    IMaking or BreakingKosovo

    hierarchically
    arounda
    theundeniablerepression
    of theMilosevic regime,the
    viewof statecontrolas structured
    agitationof politicalrivalstoRugova,and a government
    center.
    Rather,Kosovo isan exampleof a grow
    powerful
    with complexgovernance
    structures collapseinAlbania in 1996-which producedchaoson
    ingnumberof states
    and facilitated
    accesstoarmaments.
    With
    to governdiverseethnicor religiouspopulations.First, Kosovo'sdoorstep
    thegrowthofAlbanian extremist
    activity,
    repression
    by
    model, such stateshave a
    in contrastto thehierarchical
    inwhich thecentralgovern Milosevic increased,
    drawingtheattentionof the inter
    controlstructure,
    dispersed
    powers. nationalcommunity.7
    ment isweak and substateunitshave substantial
    FollowingtheNATO intervention
    in1999, theUnited
    for
    premise gover
    Second, in contrastto a territorial
    nance and control,theyoperateon thebasisof a func NationshelddefactocontroloverKosovo,grantedbyUN
    unitsneed Security
    CouncilResolution1244.The Resolution
    thatsubstate
    denoted
    ofcontrol-meaning
    tionalpremise
    remaining
    under thecontrolof the
    As an example,Belgium'slinguistic Kosovo as officially
    not be territorial.
    theprov
    whichprevented
    on a functional FederalRepublicofYugoslavia,
    communities
    regulateeducationalaffairs
    incefromofficially
    or establish
    andFlem
    conductingitsownaffairs
    meaningthatboth theFrancophone
    principle,
    a de
    ingitsowndefensestructures.
    Kosovo thusremained
    withintheter
    governparticular
    schools
    ishcommunities
    may alsosigntreaties jurepartofSerbia,whileSerbiaheldno defactocontrolin
    These communities
    ritory
    ofBrussels.
    areas aftertheJune1999 settle
    on educationalpolicywith otherstates.Such an ability itsAlbanian-majority
    was insteadtheUN Mission in
    unitstoconductforeign
    policywithoutdirec ment.8The realauthority
    forsubstate
    but also
    tionfromthecenteris a seriousdeparturefromthetyp Kosovo (UNMIK). Itnotonlyprovidedsecurity,
    nullifiedparliamen
    proposedlegislation
    forparliament,
    state.
    icalmodel of a territorial
    hold promisefor tarydecisionson securityissues(overAlbanianprotests)
    While thesecomplexstatestructures
    visitorstoKosovo (overprotests
    from
    foreign
    of dividedsocieties,theyremainpoorly and regulated
    thegovernance
    The
    worldofpolicydiscourse.
    Belgrade).9
    understoodin theeveryday
    The international
    driveto resolve
    Koso
    community's
    by all sides
    surrounding
    Kosovo's independence
    rhetoric
    mean
    vo'sstatusacceleratedin thefallof2005.Althoughpolicy
    a zero-sum
    of the
    understanding
    has tendedtoreflect
    were open to a
    makesAlbaniansoverlyjoyful briefssoon afterthe 1999 intervention
    ingof statehood-one that
    to thecomplexinsti varietyof possibilitiesforKosovo, independenceslowly
    andSerbsoverly
    mournfulinrelation
    This
    structure.
    came to dominateall otheroptions-partlydue to the
    Kosovo'sgovernance
    tutionsthatcomprise
    In the vehemence
    of theinternational
    actorssupporting
    thisposi
    tocorrectthese
    misunderstandings.
    articleattempts
    Most of thesepolicydiscussionstookthelinethat
    tion.10
    sectionsthatfollow,I firstsketchtheconditionsinKos
    I then independence,
    overKos
    byestablishing
    clear"ownership"
    ovo thatwarranta complexgoverningstructure.
    and
    ovo,would solvethecomplexproblemof ethnicmixing
    model and theterritorial
    Weberian state
    considerthe
    SerbstoacceptAlbaniancontrolofKos
    solutionsthatit implies,
    notingwhy theyare bysimplyforcing
    hierarchical
    The Serbposition
    was that
    Kosovo should
    likelyto be inadequateforthiscase. I thenoutline the ovo'sterritory.11
    be grantedextensive
    within theboundariesof
    which pro
    autonomy
    governance,
    conceptualbases forfunctional
    ingar
    was generally
    unsuccessful
    to theWeberianmodel in termsof
    Serbia,but thisproposal
    vides an alternative
    Westernsupport.
    and analyzethenewKosovo
    nering
    andhierarchy,
    both territory
    InKosovo's first
    electionsinNovember
    parliamentary
    structures
    along theselines.Finally,I concludewith an
    of creativedesignsforstates 2001, theSerb coalitionPovratak(Return)was able to
    overviewof theadvantages
    to dealwith mobilize enoughof thevote to obtain 22 seats in the
    and hierarchy,
    thatmove beyond territory
    complexdemographicrealitiesin regionssuch as the 120-memberparliament,farabove theirguaranteed10
    How
    of a Serbboycott.12
    seats-in spiteof initialthreats
    Balkans.
    UN supportfortheAlba
    ever,as Serbsbegan toperceive
    nian positionon independence,theyslowlybegan to
    Background: Intractable Positions?
    fromparticipationin politicalinstitu
    withdrawfurther
    tions.
    Less
    one
    Kosovo
    was
    a
    than
    civil
    disobedi
    percentof eligibleSerbsvoted in the
    of
    the
    Duringmost
    1990s,
    a boycottendorsed
    auton
    2004
    of theprovince's
    October
    encesuccessstory.
    Aftertheremoval
    parliamentary
    elections,
    A
    in
    Milosevi6in1989, the
    majorityAlbanian by leaders Belgrade.13 Serbboycottof the2007 par
    omybySlobodan
    as only3 percent
    electionshad a similareffect,
    toBel
    ofpassiveresistance
    liamentary
    populationadopteda strategy
    Serbvoterswent to thepolls.14Serb repre
    of registered
    of Ibrahim
    Rugova.The Alba
    grade,undertheleadership
    after
    bothelectionsthusbecamelimitedto their
    niansmaintained a "shadow state"governmentthat sentation
    seats.The remaining
    Serb rep
    functioned
    at a numberof levels,includingthecollection quotaof 10 parliamentary
    resentatives
    withdrawntheirparticipa
    of someinfrastructure.6
    The
    haveoccasionally
    of taxesand thedevelopment
    of the tionas a formof boycottaswell.
    of violenceamongAlbanian extremists
    stirrings
    FollowingtheFebruary2008 independence
    declara
    Kosovo Liberation
    Army (KLA) in 1998were causedby
    wereheldbySerbsinKosovo and inSerbia.
    ofevents.
    Theseincluded tion,protests
    theconvergence
    ofa number
    656

    Perspectives on Politics

    Serbiahasvehemently
    declaredthatitwill not recognize
    Kosovo as a state.Controversy
    has ragedwithinSerbia
    regarding
    how to treatthosestatesand international
    bod
    ies recognizing
    Kosovo. A disputewithin theSerbian
    state governmentregardingits stance toward the
    EU-given most EU countries'supportof Kosovo's
    to collapsea few
    independence-causedthegovernment
    weeks later,followedbyMay elections.15
    Kosovo'sindependence
    declarationisa claimfordejure
    controltobe officially
    allocatedtoKosovo, althoughthe
    international
    community
    will retaina strong
    defactogov
    erningroleforthenextseveralyears.The independence
    ameans
    planoutlines
    quitecomplexgovernance
    structures,
    toacknowledge
    thata simple
    Albaniandomination
    of the
    Serbs ingovernment
    would be problematic.In orderto
    extendpowersto theSerbs,theplan outlinesa detailed
    proposalfordecentralization,
    represented
    byArticle124
    intheConstitution.
    Itoutlinesenhancedgovernance
    pow
    which
    ers thatareallocatedto local levelmunicipalities,
    alsohave thepowertocollectand allocatetheirown rev
    enues.They alsohave theabilitytoengageincross-border
    ofmunici
    withSerbiaand toform
    associations
    cooperation
    reflect
    a
    As I outlinebelow,thesearrangements
    palities.16
    state
    that
    differs
    from
    the
    control
    model
    dispersed
    greatly
    Weberian idealtypeof a territorial,
    hierarchical
    state.

    Options forDivided Societies


    Weberian State Model

    in the

    ariescannoterasetheethnic,linguistic,
    and fam
    religious,
    ilynetworksthatmay crossrecognized
    stateboundaries.
    The Balkan regioncontainsparticularly
    strongexamples
    of suchnetworks,
    thoughtheycertainly
    appearelsewhere
    throughoutthe globe.21Under such circumstances,
    attemptstodrawand enforcesuchboundariesrequirea
    steadycommitment
    of resources
    topropup theterritorial
    edifice.
    state
    Kosovo'sindependence
    declaration
    reflects
    someof these
    territorial
    bordernorms.Soon aftertheindependence
    dec
    laration,
    theinternational
    community
    immediately
    moved
    tofortify
    itsnewstateborders-anactthatSerbsresponded
    to by vandalizingborderposts.22
    After thedeclaration,
    Serbs in theNorth, in cooperation
    with Serbia,began
    inpreparation
    localinstitutions
    strengthening
    fora poten
    tialpartitionof theSerbian-dominated
    North fromthe
    of Kosovo.23Evenwith theestablishment
    remainder
    of
    bordercontrols,
    these
    borders
    will remaininevitably
    porous,
    and surrounddiversepopulationsthatare connectedby
    networks.
    Suchnetworks
    oftenpose controlproblemsfor
    a centralized
    and hierarchical
    government
    structure.24
    There isan inherent
    incongruence
    betweenthese
    on-the
    ground realitiesand theattemptto endorsean inter
    nationalsystem
    of idealized"nation-states."
    A numberof
    in
    havebeenattempted thepursuitof increased
    strategies
    statecontrol.
    One historicalsolutiontopotential
    minor
    itychallengestocentralauthority
    has been therepression
    or removal
    ofminority
    or forced
    groupsviaethniccleansing
    Normativeshiftsin theinternational
    assimilation.25
    sys
    tem towardshuman and minorityrightsand towards
    democratization
    haveproblematized
    theseapproachesas
    More recently,
    scholarsand policymakers
    policyoptions.
    on attempts
    arefocusing
    todesignstateinstitutional
    struc
    turesinaway thatcanmore successfully
    poten
    regulate
    In thesectionsbelow,I first
    tialgroupconflicts.26
    outline
    threecategoriesof statestructure
    options thatremain
    Weberian idealsof territory
    foundedon the
    andhierarchy
    in statecontrol. I thendiscuss alternativeoptions
    foundedon a non-territorial
    foundationandwith dis
    persedcontrolstructures.

    The currentinternational
    systemisfoundedon thenorm
    of territorial
    the
    states,an orderthatispreserved
    through
    practiceofmutual recognition.17
    Max Weber's influential
    writingson thestatedescribeitas "ahumancommunity
    that(successfully)
    claimsthemonopolyof thelegitimate
    use of physicalforce
    within a given territory."'8
    These
    territorial
    lines
    may be grantedto thestateand recognized
    But it is leftto thatstate
    by theinternational
    community.
    as thesovereign,
    to assertitsown de factocontrol
    itself,
    within them,in theformof "physical
    force,"throughout
    thatterritory.
    Accordingto thesenorms,the"stateiscon
    sideredthesole sourceof the 'right'to use violence"for
    thepurposeof control.
    of
    However,thecomplexrealities
    diversepopulationscan producea divergence Independenceand Partitionas ConflictResolution
    governing
    fromthisidealtype-and awide gapbetweenrecognized Conflictswithin a statecan eitherbe resolvedby brute
    statebordersand actualcontrolon theground."9
    forceandmilitaryvictoryor by negotiatedsettlement.
    Given thepredominance
    of thenormof territorial
    state Militaryvictory
    may bemore likelytoproducea lasting
    controlininternational
    discourse
    and legalstructures,
    actual end to conflict,
    but at a sizeablecost to lifeand human
    a
    deviationsfromthis
    If
    istobe successful,
    model tendtobe treated
    settlement
    each
    by theinter
    negotiated
    rights.27
    nationalcommunity
    as temporary
    and unstablearrange sidemust believethattheotherisadheringto itsterms
    ments.Appellationssuchas "failedstates"
    or "statedeath" andwill not resume
    hostilitieswhat scholarsrefer
    toas a
    reflect
    thisunderstanding.
    Moreover,international
    policy potentialcommitmentproblem.28Negotiated settle
    oftenapproachessuchplaceswith a focuson thecreation ments thusoftenrequirethird-party
    enforcement
    topro
    of institutions
    to reflect
    theideal
    Weberian statemodel,
    videenforcement,
    orcredible
    commitments,
    thattheother
    or "state-building."20
    One of thedifficulties
    of applying sidewill be unlikelyto cheaton theagreement.29
    More
    thisidealis thattheactofdrawingand enforcing
    bound
    over,negotiatedsettlements
    shouldalso redefine
    conflicts
    December

    2008

    Vol. 6/No. 4

    657

    ARTICLES

    I Making or BreakingKosovo

    in a way thatconvinceseach side thatithas a stakein a


    and are thus limitedas a means to alleviateminority
    lasting
    concerns.
    peace.30
    Negotiatedsettlements
    may be difficult
    to implement
    and costlyforthirdpartiestomaintain,as heavytroop
    TerritorialAutonomy,
    Federalism,and
    presence
    may be requiredtopreventa recurrence
    of hos
    tilities.
    Some theorists
    havearguedthatconflicts
    between Decentralization
    of differ Socialismlefta legacyof verycentralized
    identity
    groupsare inevitable
    when individuals
    governments.
    entgroupsremain
    For thepast twodecades,
    mixed,becausethecommitment
    prob
    mostCentralandEasternEuro
    toattack pean stateshave embarkedon decentralizing
    lemimpliesthateach sidewill havean incentive
    reforms
    theother-an ethnicsecurity
    dilemma.31
    Followingthis the territorial
    devolutionof governmental
    powersfrom
    thecentralto a more local level.Devolution efforts
    logic, theypropose that theonlymeans to achievea
    are
    permanentend to hostilitiesis throughpartitionand
    foundedon thenormative
    principleof subsidiarity:
    "the
    todrawa
    populationtransfer:
    partitionor independence
    notionthatresponsibilities
    shouldbe assignedto thelow
    to removethe ele
    boundary,and population transfer
    est levelgovernment
    thatcan adequatelyperformthem,"
    mentofmixing.32
    tendstobe unpop
    asnotedbyRonaldWatts.39Naturally,theactofchoosing
    Populationtransfer
    ularamongpolicymakers,
    giventheobvioushumanrights what unit thislowestlevelshouldbe isoftenfraught
    with
    abuses involvedin such a policy.However,the logicof
    Contentionovertypes
    controversy.
    ofdecentralization
    was
    inpartitiondoes implythat indeedoneof theprimary
    "divideand quit"33inherent
    initialcausesof theinitial
    unrav
    minoritiesleft
    withina new stateor province
    would con
    ellingofYugoslaviain 1990 and 1991.4O
    This devolution
    tinueto facea serioussecurity
    dilemma-one potentially processcontinues,but isnow being implemented
    at far
    greaterthanbeforepartition.34Indeed, such circum more local levels.
    of
    stanceshaveoftenled to amilitaryormilitia removal
    While devolutionisa broadtermthatimpliesthetrans
    these
    minoritiespost-partition,
    as an effort
    bymajorities ferof power,termssuchas decentralization
    and federal
    ismusuallydenotea symmetric
    tohomogenizethenewly-partitioned
    unit.The Serbs in
    of
    dispersion powersamong
    Kosovo have repeatedly
    expressedfearsof suchpotential units.The United States is an exampleof a symmetric
    homogenizingactions,and therehas indeedbeen spo
    allocationof powersamong the50 statesof theunion.
    radicviolenceagainstthemover thepast severalyears.35 Autonomy,on theotherhand,consistsof an asymmetric
    ofpowerstoa specific
    a Serbunwillingness
    toparticipatein thesecu
    devolution
    withina state.41
    Reflecting
    minority
    thata particular
    rityapparatusof a new Kosovar state,soon afterthe Itcodifiestherecognition
    minoritygroup
    con
    independence
    declarationa numberof Serb police offi or historicalterritory
    mighthaveuniquegovernance
    cernsbeyond thoseof othergroups-as in thecase of
    cers inKosovo refusedto adhere toKosovarAlbanian
    in theUnited States,Que
    commanders-butratherattemptedtopledge loyaltyto NativeAmericanreservations
    UN forces.36
    bec inCanada,Catalonia inSpain,Crimea inUkraine,or
    The recognition
    of Kosovo's independence
    currently SouthTyrolin Italy.
    Autonomousunitstendtohavepow
    thepartitionissue. ersbeyond thoseof otherunits.42In addition,autono
    appliesa double standardregarding
    or non-territorial
    Kosovo has been effectively
    partitionedfromSerbia,but mous unitsmay taketerritorial
    forms;
    Serbproposalsfora territorial
    formsareaddressedhere,while non-territorial
    partitionofKosovo itself, territorial
    north fromPris
    formsare addressedin the followingsectionson func
    namelyto separatetheSerb-majority
    tina,have been officially
    rejectedby the same bodies, tionalgovernance
    principles.43
    on thegroundsthatitwould negatemultieth
    ironically
    Autonomy
    may be assignedtoa unitaspartof a useful
    In essence,itgivesconcessionsto
    But indepen post-conflict
    nicityand facilitate
    populationtransfer.37
    strategy.
    name-both partition eachside-it can satisfy
    aminorityenclave's
    dence issimply
    demandfora
    partition
    byanother
    and thecreationof new statesarebased on a territorial degreeof self-government
    withoutconcedingstatesover
    Autonomousstructures
    principleof allocatingcontrol.
    Minoritygroupswho find eignty.
    thusallowforthepossibil
    within thesenew territories
    haveunderstand ity thatgroupson different
    themselves
    sidesmay both perceive
    as advantageous;
    inacademicterms,
    institutions
    able concernsabout theirstatus.Such problemsarenot
    governing
    unique to theBalkans, as a similardynamicpersists theyare "multivocal,"
    allowingfordifferent
    interpreta
    The ambiguity
    between religiouscommunitiesin Iraq.38The act of
    of autonomyis a sourceof its
    tions.44
    and independence
    declara
    as itallowseach side toclaimsomevictoryina
    drawingbordersinpartitions
    strength,
    makeminorities
    about
    their
    for
    tionswill inevitably
    battle
    controlover a specificterritory.
    worry
    Up until the
    statusin a new entity.
    For thisreason,territorial
    auto
    Februaryindependence
    declaration,
    Belgradehad been
    outlined below, tend to proposingautonomyforKosovo, in a formthatwould
    nomy and decentralization,
    be viewed as more palatable options-as minorities haveallowedsignificant
    to theAlba
    governing
    authority
    remain
    within theprotection
    of a largerstate.However, nianswithin the territory
    ofKosovo,while at thesame
    theseoptionsarealso based inWeberian stateprinciples, timekeepingSerbia'sstateborders
    aroundKosovo intact.45
    658

    Perspectives on Politics

    Butmany international
    policymakers
    viewedtheproposal reflect
    groupproportions.50
    PR systems
    can also encour
    with suspicion,preferring
    insteada "clear"solutionin
    ageethnicparties.Serbiacontainsethnic
    minorityparties
    Kosovo.
    for
    Albanians(Presevo
    Valley),Muslims (Sandzak),
    Hun
    A disadvantage
    of territorial
    autonomyis thatonce ter
    garians(Vojvodina),
    andRomawhileKosovo containseth
    ritorial
    unitsarecreated,theycan alsoprovidea basisfor nicminoritypartiesforSerbsandRoma.Quotas arealso
    fromthestate.
    secession
    The propensity
    of territorial
    auton
    appliedtoguaranteerepresentation
    and voice for
    minor
    omy toencouragesecessionhasoccupiedtheattention
    of
    ities.Of the 120 seats in Kosovo's parliament,10 are
    severalanalystsin comparative
    forSerbsand 10 forotherminorities.
    politicsand international reserved
    Given con
    Autonomousunitsestablished
    on a territorial tinuedSerbboycotts
    relations.46
    ofKosovo'selections,their
    quotahas
    and institutionalize
    localcon
    principletendto legitimize
    servedas a usefulavenueforcontinuedrepresentation.
    trol
    withinparticular
    borders,and thuscan be perceived
    Minoritiesmay viewelectoralrepresentation
    as a small
    or usedby local leadersas a stepping-stone
    to statehood. allowance,because even quotas in parliamentcannot
    The alternative
    of functional
    autonomy,
    discussedfurther changethefactofminoritystatusin thedecision-making
    below,canmitigatetheseeffects
    by onlygivinggroups process.For thisreason,consociational
    inmany
    structures
    or functions,
    ratherthan dividedsocieties
    powerovercertaincompetencies
    means to integrate
    provideamore direct
    In this
    overa territory.
    way,itdoesnotcreate"mini-states" minoritiesinpolicydiscussions.In consociationalstruc
    potentially
    readyforsecession.
    tures,eachgroup isgivenvetopowers.InBelgium,Bos
    The most commonly-used
    forms
    of devolutionin the nia, and Northern Ireland,forexample,decisionson
    international
    systemtaketerritorial
    formsthatarevery important
    matterscannotbemade byone groupwithout
    much in linewith the
    In
    state
    model.
    Weberian
    addition, thepotentialforveto by othergroups.51
    Kosovo'snew
    thesesystems
    preserve
    hierarchical
    structures,
    providedthat governingstructureincludessome consociationalfea
    thecentral
    government
    retains
    powerstorestrict
    ornegate tures,but theydo not involvea strict
    minorityveto
    powersexercised
    at thesubstate
    unit level-also thecase partlydue to thedemographicimbalancein favorof the
    inmost devolvedsystems.47
    These territorial
    models tend Albanianmajority.
    Rather,thedecentralized
    structure
    pro
    to reserve
    powersoverforeign
    forthe videsthemechanismtoalleviate
    policyand security
    minorityconcerns.
    central
    of functional
    But systems
    government.
    One disadvantageof consociationalismis that it
    competen
    ciesmay allocate thesepowers to substateunits (as in
    includesgroupsin representation
    at thecostof govern
    BelgiumandBosnia),movingawayfromthetypical
    Webe
    ment efficiency.52
    Groups oftendisagree,producingfre
    riancentralized
    hierarchy.
    CurrentplansforKosovo'sgov
    quentstalemates.
    Belgiumthus
    maintainsamodifiedform
    ernancestructures
    ofallof theseelements, of consociational
    In Belgium,decisionson
    indudeamixture
    government.
    discussedinmore detail towardstheend of thearticle. particular
    mattersare relegatedto each group
    functional
    One more territorial
    menu optionfirst
    remainstobe dis
    in a processdiscussedbelow.This functional
    separately,
    in elections,representation,
    cussed:innovations
    and the innovation
    providesameans outof obviousstalemates
    in
    allocationofgoverning
    powers.
    advance-and in thisway stepsawayfromtheterritorial
    and hierarchical
    limitations
    of the
    Weberian statemodel.
    and Consociationalism
    Elections,Representation,
    The above sectionsillustrate
    how,under thepremiseof
    territorial
    minorities
    will tendtoperceivethat
    governance,
    theyare at a powerdisadvantagein relationtomajori
    Becausedemocracy
    codifiestheprinciple
    ofmajor
    ties.48
    ityrule,translating
    demographics
    intopoliticalpower,its
    can augmentthese
    implementation
    These
    minorityfears.
    effects
    arecompounded
    whereethnicor religious
    groups
    aremobilizedasethnicor religious
    a strong
    politicalparties,
    feature
    of theBalkans.49
    The majoritarianelectoralsys
    temsof theUnited Statesand GreatBritaindiscourage
    theformation
    ofsmallparties,
    suchasethnicparties.
    Major
    itariansystems
    thustendtohideethnicor religious
    polit
    ical divisions.In doing so theymay preventpolitical
    fragmentation,
    but also failtogivevoice tominoritiesin
    thepoliticalprocess.
    Proportional
    representation
    (PR) electoral
    systems,
    used
    inbothKosovo and Serbia,grant
    minoritiesthisvoice
    because in PR systemsseats in parliament
    more closely

    An Alternative: Functional Rather


    Than TerritorialGovernance

    A territorial
    principleforcontrolassumessovereignty
    on
    thebasisof territory.
    A functional
    principleisinsteadcon
    cernedwith controloverparticularissues.Rather than
    over a particularterritory,
    allocatingsovereignty
    func
    tionalgovernance
    over
    com
    specifies
    sovereignty specified
    overwhat?Sovereignty
    todowhat?
    petencies:Sovereignty
    Functionalunitsof government
    thataredesignatedthese
    controlscan coexistand cooperate
    with territorial
    units.
    The Belgianfederation,
    forexample,consists
    of threeter
    ritorial
    and three
    non-territorial
    units.The non-territorial
    councilsadjudicate
    mattersof language,
    linguistic
    educa
    tion,and healthcare,while theterritorial
    regionsadjudi
    catemattersthataremore closelylinkedtOterritory,
    such
    as environment
    and economy.In a systemof"exclusive
    competencies,"
    policydecisionson languageand educa

    tionthuscomeunderthejurisdiction
    of thethree
    December

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    IVol. 6/No. 4

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    ARTICLES

    IMaking or BreakingKosovo

    trolstructures,
    such as themutuallyrecognized
    powers
    on foreign
    a formof "neomedieval
    of embassies
    territory,
    ism"thatcountersthehegemony
    of territoriality
    inworld
    In addition,globalizationprocessesare increas
    affairs.60
    inglychippingaway at the edificeof territorial
    gover
    nance, requiring
    new assumptions
    about theassessment
    of politicalcontrol.6'In addition,theestablishment
    of
    sharedcompetenciesacross the statesof theEuropean
    Union has produceda hybridsystemof territorial
    and
    functional
    governancestructures.62
    Anothercross-border
    innovationisNorthernIreland.
    AlthoughNorthernIre
    land is officially
    partof theUnitedKingdom,a North
    South councilwith Ireland allows for strongdirect
    with thisotherstate,and citizenship
    can be
    consultation
    sharedbetween theUK and Ireland.63
    The territorial
    strong.54
    As noted above,theBelgiangov
    model of the
    Weberian stateishardlyappropriate
    here.
    How can itdo this?
    International
    relationsscholarship
    has devotedsome
    suchthateachgroupmay veto
    ernmentisconsociational,
    inorderto
    Conso
    attentionto functional
    governance
    structures,
    proposalsby theother-a sourceof recentcrises.
    betterconceptualizethesedeviationsfromthesystem
    of
    ciationalism
    requiresthatelitescooperateinordertocre
    territorial
    states-as in recentapproachesto thestudyof
    ate policy.However, Belgium's consociationalismis
    with the complexfederalstructure
    out
    empires.
    Although thestudyof empiresand the study
    supplemented
    territorial
    andnon-territorial of statestendtobe analyzed
    within thedifferent
    fields
    of
    linedabove.In thisstructure,
    relations
    and comparative
    politics,their
    gov
    unitswith specificfunctional
    competenciestakespecific international
    ernancestructures
    are isomorphic,
    with similarforms
    policymattersoutsideof therealmof generaldebate.Bel
    as
    regardless
    of the levelof aggregation
    atwhich theyare
    giumthustakestwostepsawayfromconsociationalism
    it is usuallyapplied.First,thedivisionof competencies applied.Dynamicsof imperialcontroland dynamicsof
    an analy
    unitsmeans thatelitecooperationis domesticcontrolcanbothbe understood
    amongthedifferent
    through
    sisof potentially
    similarcontrolstructures.64
    not necessaryforseveraldecisionsto be made. Second,
    can be approachedfromsoci
    unitsof thefederation
    invokeaspectsof
    These controlstructures
    thenon-territorial
    a soci
    Viewed through
    regard ologicalor neoliberalviewpoints.
    collectiverightsforcommunitiesin governance,
    controlisexerted
    networks
    Some of
    ologicallens,functional
    lessof theactionsof elitesat thecentrallevel.55
    through
    as tiesand relationships
    formnon-territorial
    struc
    conduits
    theseinnovations
    appearin thenew governmental
    whichpowermay be exercised.
    as
    through
    Suchnetworks
    tureforKosovo.56Aftera sketchof theconceptualfoun
    Iwill outlinetheKosovo
    a basis forcontrolhavebeenexaminedacrossa variety
    of
    dationsof functional
    governance,
    settings(fromRenaissance Florence to old and new
    inmore detail.
    structures
    usedby leaderstoconsolidate
    empires)as a strategy
    power
    Viewed througha neoliberal
    overdiversepopulations.65
    Basics ofFunctionalControlStructures
    choicesinpolitics,func
    lens,
    whichemphasizesindividual
    tionalcontrolcan taketheformof contracting
    between
    serveas thedominantprinciple
    of
    Territory
    may currently
    In bothversionsof analysis,
    but
    self-interested
    con
    system
    basedon states,
    governanceinan international
    parties.66
    have thecapacityto exercisepower inde
    ithas not alwaysheld thisrole.57
    Variousnon-territorial trolstructures
    of territorial
    and independently
    controlstructures
    of
    and functional
    conductedthe tasksof
    pendently
    sovereignty,
    territory.
    governancelongbeforestatesbecamedominantunits in
    In theOttomanEmpire,for
    Functionalstructures
    of controlthusdifferfromthe
    the international
    system.58
    of their
    Weberianstate
    exer
    Ortho
    non-territorial
    unitscalledmilletsallowed
    model interms
    non-territorial
    example,
    fromthemodel in terms
    of
    dox and Jewishgroupsto administerfamilylawon the ciseof power.
    They alsodiffer
    itsemphasison centralized
    as thestructure
    ratherthanon the
    of
    basisof theirown religioustraditions,
    hierarchy,
    a networkor
    control
    basisof Islamiclaw.
    may bemore dispersedthroughout
    Membershipinmilletswas basedon
    setof contracts.
    As outlinedbyAlexanderCooley inhis
    a personalratherthana territorial
    principle;thusindivid
    topowerstructures,
    of firmtheory
    ualswithin thesamemilletmightbe dispersedthrough application
    powerrela
    or relationship
    tionsin a governancestructure
    out a territory.59
    may take
    forms
    or
    multi-divisional
    While
    Nor does territory
    hold exclusivereignin thecontem
    forms.
    unitary(U)
    (M)
    M
    in
    U
    forms
    are
    more
    hierarchical
    and
    the
    modern
    international
    systemindudes
    centralized, forms
    poraryera,as
    center
    is
    there
    more
    rules.
    the
    is
    to
    territorial
    weaker
    and
    governing
    autonomyallotted
    highlyvisibleexceptions
    non-territorial linguistic communities. This

    innovation

    removesdivisiveissuesfromthe realmof generalstate


    debateandadjudicatesthemseparately-ameans toavoid
    unnecessary
    conflicts
    betweengroups.53
    The centralgovernmentin Belgium does maintain
    allocationsto these
    powersoverbudgetary
    decision-making
    at
    be
    a
    source
    of a stalemate
    whichcan andhasbeen
    units,
    of theBelgian
    thecenter.
    But becausesomany functions
    units,a poten
    government
    aredevolvedto thesesubstate
    tialcrisisisnot perceivedas such. In fact,duringa long
    stalematein 2007 and early2008, inter
    governmental
    vieweesinBrusselsquipped thatthebusinessof gover
    center,
    nance simplycontinuedon withoutan effective
    unitsisso
    due to thefactthatdevolutionto thefederation

    con
    orfunctional
    John
    Ruggie
    callsthese
    non-territorial

    660

    Perspectives on Politics

    tOthesubunits-a
    dispersed
    control
    model.67
    Thedegree

    towhich a governancestructure
    reflects
    hierarchy
    versus
    of the
    dispersedcontrolsvariesaccordingto thestrength
    entities
    and thenetwork's
    isomorphic
    pattern.68
    As one exampleof a hierarchical
    arrangement,
    Cooley
    examines
    Russia'scontracts
    withCentralAsian republics
    extraction.
    Both parties
    forpurposesof resource
    may be
    insuchtransactions,
    willingparticipants
    eventhoughtheir
    interactions
    oftenreflect
    a hierarchical
    structure
    ofpower.69
    Anotherfruitful
    areafortheapplication
    of thesedynamics
    liesin thestudyof imperial
    As outlinedby
    management.
    net
    Daniel Nexon andThomasWright,a hub-and-spoke
    workpattern
    with littleconnectionbetweensubunitsisa
    more effective
    controlstructure
    thanotherformsforan
    empire,becauseit forcesall communication
    throughthe
    This hub-and-spoke
    center.70
    with littlesubunit
    pattern
    communication
    denotesa hierarchical
    focuson thecenter
    thatis not unlike thatof theWeberian state.A strong
    thandoes a cen
    empire
    may exerciselessdirectinfluence
    in aWeberianhierarchical
    tralgovernment
    state,but the
    twostructures
    reflect
    thesamegovernance
    pattern.Incon
    trast,a more dispersedcontrolstructure
    could allow for
    directlinksbetweentheunits,or fordirectlinksbetween
    theunitsand externalactors.In thesedispersedforms,
    controlsareallocatedto thesubunitsforpotentialinter
    actionsthatdo not involvethecenter.
    These deviations
    fromtheterritorial
    and hierarchical
    aspectsofWeberian
    statestructures
    showpromiseforaddressing
    governance
    problemsindividedsocieties.

    imizingdebateson issuesthataremost likelyto cause


    controversy
    betweengroups.In thisway,many potential
    aresimplyredirected
    disputes
    via institutional
    designbefore
    theycan become trulydivisive.73
    Normativetheorists
    toaddresstheseprob
    attempting
    lemshavenoted thatdemocraticdecisionsinparticular
    issue-areas
    neednot requireterritorial
    This lineof
    units.74
    thought
    was initially
    put forth
    a century
    ago byKarlRen
    nerandOtto Bauer,in theirattempttoaddressdilemmas
    ofminoritygovernance
    broughtaboutby thedemiseof
    the
    Austrian
    Empire.In their
    view,thenon-territorial
    prem
    isesof theOttomanmillet systemcould be applied to
    addressthismatterdirectly.75
    While theirinstrumental
    workson thissubject
    werenotput inpracticeat thetime,
    in thelastfewdecadesa literature
    has emergedon non
    territorial
    as ameans toaddress
    autonomy
    governance
    prob
    lemsfor
    minorities.
    Due toa diverserangeof scholarship
    on thisissue,these
    non-territorial
    structures
    arealsoreferred
    toas "personal"
    or "cultural"
    aswell asnational
    autonomy,
    culturalautonomy(NCA).
    These examinations
    of functional
    governance
    havebeen
    pursuedseparately
    fromtheinternational
    relations
    work
    on functional
    but the two literatures
    governance,
    have
    much incommon.In thedevelopment
    of theconceptof
    non-territorial
    autonomy,
    non-territorial
    unitshold juris
    dictionoverindividuals
    accordingtoa personalprinciple,
    and in relationto specific
    governance
    functions.
    Groups
    thus
    administer
    may
    themselves
    with regardtocompeten
    ciesthatcanbe separated
    fromterritory.76
    Such functions
    generallyincludethecultural,linguistic,
    ethnic,or reli
    and Functional
    Non-TerritorialAutonomy
    giousmattersof aminoritygroup.However,they
    might
    Governance
    also includeforeign
    policy,criminaljustice,andeconomic
    The primacyof territorial
    statesoverothertypesof rec
    policy.These foreign
    policypowersare evidentin Bel
    ognizedpoliticalorganizationinevitably
    producescon
    gium,where thelinguistic
    subunitshave thecapacityto
    As
    flictsbetweengroupsvyingfor the same territory.
    signtreaties
    with otherstatesonmattersrelatingtoedu
    notedbyGidon Gottlieb,thepremisethateachnation cation.Consistent
    with the logicsoutlinedin theinter
    shouldhavea stateof itsown isa good ideaonly in the national relationsliterature,
    non-territorial
    autonomy
    Given theseproblems,scholarsof national
    includestwoimportant
    abstract.7'
    components:1) decision-making
    ism,ethnicconflict,
    andgroupaccommodation
    havebeen bodies thatarenot territorial-such
    as councilselected
    engagedin theprojectof designingvariousinstitutional accordingto linguistic
    and 2) specificfunc
    affiliation,
    solutionsforgoverning
    complexsocieties.First,if terri tionalcompetencies
    thatareassignedto thosebodies. In
    tory
    posesa sourceof disputebetweengroups,thenature specifying
    functions
    forparticular
    particular
    councils,these
    of territory
    can be refrained.72
    NorthernIreland'sflexible structures
    reserve
    matterssuchas languageand education
    forinternal
    citizenshippolicy and North-Southcouncils takepre
    groupdebate,ratherthanallowingthemto
    ciselythesesteps.Second, ifa state'sgovernance
    hierarchy becomea boneof contention
    betweendifferent
    groups.
    posesa sourceof disputebetweengroups,thestatestruc
    Belgium isnot theonlyexampleof thistypeof non
    turecan be redesigned
    structures. territorial
    awayfromhierarchical
    governance.InHungary,non-territorial
    coun
    Belgium'snon-territorial
    federalstructure
    allowsFrench cilsfor
    in1993,primarily
    wereestablished
    minority
    groups
    and Flemishspeakersto administertheirown schools to administer
    mattersof culture.Similarto theBelgian
    of representatives
    cho
    withoutfearof involvement
    units,theHungarianbodiesconsist
    by theothergroup in edu
    cationalmatters.The factthateducationalmatterslie
    sen by theirethnicconstituents
    in non-territorial
    elec
    underthejurisdiction
    The RussianFederation
    of thenon-territorial
    federal
    units, tions.77
    passeda lawonNational
    thelinguistic
    communities,
    effectively
    takes
    them
    outof CulturalAutonomiesin 1996, as ameans toaddressthe
    the realmof generaldebate.This ishow thesystem
    of
    problemof recognized
    nationalminoritieslivingoutside
    divided
    competencies
    canreduce
    ethnic
    tensions,
    bymmn of territorial
    republics
    assignedto theirethnickin.These
    December

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    ARTICLES

    IMaking or BreakingKosovo

    and
    servefunctions
    of linguistic,
    cultural,
    entities
    officially
    In addition,courtstoadjudi
    religious
    administration.78
    with regardto fam
    catemattersusingShari'alaw(usually
    ilylaw)appear in a numberof diversestates,including
    Nigeria,India,andGreece.79
    2002MinoritiesLaw induded
    Closer toKosovo,Serbia's
    provisionsfor
    minoritycouncilsfundedby thestatebud
    media,
    getand designedtoprotectlanguage,education,
    struc
    Such pro-minority
    and cultureforminorities.80
    a vastdeviationfrompastSerbianpolicies,arecom
    tures,
    inHungary,
    Russia
    structures
    parabletothenon-territorial
    andBelgium.Moreover,theMinoritiesLaw providesfor
    of a particular
    minority
    towns
    with highconcentrations
    allowingfora looseorganization
    grouptowork together,
    orAlbanian-strong
    townsand regions.
    ofHungarian-strong
    The Hungarianminorityin Serbia,whichwas particu
    larlyinvolvedindesigningthisportionof thelegislation,
    someof thesestructures.
    The law
    has alreadyestablished
    was partiallydesignedwith Kosovo inmind. Indeed,as
    inKosovo beganfollow
    earlyas 2003, Serbcommunities
    ingthis
    model in theformof aUnion ofSerbMunicipal
    ities,a loose organizationheaded by a presidentand
    executive
    board.81
    Kosovo'sNew Structures
    constitution
    Kosovo'scurrent
    emergedfromtheAhtisaari
    quitesimilarto
    plan from2007,82and indudesstructures
    to
    addressminorityconcerns
    thoseoutlined above
    especiallyfortheSerbs.MinoritiesinKosovo aregranted
    concessionsin theareasof representation
    and
    particular
    which
    discussedhere.The constitution,
    decentralization,
    morevaguewording
    on June15 2008, utilizes
    tookeffect
    to outlinedecentralization
    provisionsthantheprevious
    constitutional
    draftand theAhtisaariplan.However,their
    with someof thedifferences
    between
    basic logicremains,
    versionsnoted in thecomingdiscussion.83
    both thepreviouspro
    With regardto representation,
    codifythe10-seatquota
    posalsand currentconstitution
    forSerbs in theKosovarparliament(Article
    64) thathas
    been ongoingpracticein recentyears.Otherminorities
    are also grantedseats.In addition,thereis a permanent
    of minoritiesin
    Committee to representthe interests
    on issuesof "vitalinterest"to
    parliament,particularly
    78 and 81). Finally,at the
    thosecommunities(Articles
    municipal level,minoritiesare guaranteeda representa
    tivevoicewhere theycompriseover 10 percent(Article
    structures
    might
    glance,theserepresentation
    62).84At first
    However,theconstitu
    appearsomewhatconsociational.
    tiondoes not giveminoritiesa veto on decisions,thus
    model.85Rather,the
    stoppingshortof a consociational
    operativepowers forminoritiesappear in the highly
    devolvedstatestructure.
    the initialprovisions
    With regardto decentralization,

    regardto references
    toSerb interests.
    As statedexplicitly
    in theAhtisaariplan'sexecutivesummary(2007):
    The Settlementprovidesa wide-rangingdecentralization pro
    posal,which is extensivein scope and intended to promote
    good governance, transparencyand effectivenessin public
    service.The proposal focusesinparticularon thespecificneeds
    and concernsof theKosovo Serb community,
    whichwill have a
    high degreeof controlover itsown affairs.86

    In the2008 finalconstitution,
    thedecentralization
    lan
    in thediscussion
    guage ismore vague,but is represented
    of the"highdegreeof localself-governance"
    and "extended
    and delegatedcompetencies"
    outlinedformunicipalities
    inArticle124.87
    The Ahtisaariplanof2007 ismore explicitinoutlining
    for
    specific
    competencies
    municipalitiesinareasofhigher
    educationand healthcare,similarto theBelgianmodel.
    The 2007 plan also proposesextensivefinancialauton
    in theform
    ofblockgrants,includ
    omyfor
    municipalities
    ingthe"abilitytoaccepttransparent
    fundingfromSerbia
    fora broad rangeofmunicipalactivities
    and purposes."
    The final2008 Constitutionomitsexplicitreferences
    to
    due toAlbaniansensitivities,
    but retainsthese
    Serbia,likely
    provisionsin the formofmunicipalpowersfor"cross
    bordercooperation,"(Article124) and in the rightsof
    ethnicand nationalcommunitiesto establishandmain
    taintheirown schools(Article59).88
    Inaddition,following
    a pattern
    established
    by the2002
    Serbianminoritieslaw,Serb-majority
    municipalitiesare
    withother
    able toestablish
    partnerships
    municipalities
    most likelytobe otherSerb-majority
    entities(Artide124).
    with theirpowersof cross-border
    Taken in conjunction
    can
    with otherstates,Serbianmunicipalities
    cooperation
    a rangeof agreements
    connec
    thusestablish
    and financial
    tionswith othermunicipalities
    and Serbia,on particular
    to theSer
    matersof governancethatremainof interest
    bian community.89
    These decentralization
    plans are particularly
    intrigu
    ing in relationto thedemographicdispersionof the
    ethnicpopulationsinKosovo.While theplan officially
    a concentration
    of
    avoidsoutliningterritorial
    autonomy,
    Serbiancommunitiesin thenorth,combinedwith the
    municipalstructures,
    givesa wide degreeof defactoter
    of inde
    ritorial
    autonomyto thisarea. In theaftermath
    pendence,Serbiahas been using thisfactas thebasis for
    an alternative
    plan forthepotentialterritorial
    partition
    of Kosovo. However,Serbia'sattemptsat partitionare
    Serbmunicipal
    of several
    problematized
    by theexistence
    itiesoutsideof thisregion,to theeast.The Ahtisaariplan
    outlined extensiveautonomy to theseSerb-majority
    aswell,whicharepointsdispersedthrough
    municipalities
    areas.In addition,thedividedcity
    outAlbanian-majority
    ofMitrovica,with a Serbmajorityin theNorth and an
    Albanianmajorityin theSouth,may be governedby two

    werequitespecific
    with ethnic
    municipal
    entities.90
    for
    Kosovo's
    devolved
    structure

    662

    Perspectives on Politics

    At first
    glance,onemightsaythatthese
    municipalenti
    repression.
    Governancedilemmasareunfoldingin a vast
    tiescould be unitswith territorial
    autonomy.
    But this rangeof places,fromEurope toAfricaand theMiddle
    is a combinationof territorial
    configuration
    and non
    East.As a result,
    more analysts
    are turning
    theirattention
    territorial
    controls.
    intheEast
    Serb-majority
    to theneed to thinkcreatively
    municipalities
    about thedesignof insti
    canworkclosely
    with theSerb-majority
    areaintheNorth,
    tutionstomanage them.94
    and both can formclose linksto Serbia.Moreover,the
    Ahtisaariplan forKosovo explicitly
    outlinedthepotential The Precedent Issue and Kosovo's
    forSerbianstateinstitutions
    tocontribute
    funding
    towards Neighbors
    thegovernance
    of theseSerb-majority
    in
    areas Kosovo, to
    What will happennext?Severalstategovernments
    have
    supplementtheirown revenues,
    an
    formally
    recognizing
    expressed
    fearsthatKosovo'sindependence
    will encourage
    ongoingpractice.
    The linkednetworkstructure
    of Serb
    other separatist
    movements throughouttheglobe
    communities
    createsa defactonon-territorial
    of
    network
    movementsthatmay view it as establishingan inter
    governance
    overcertainissueareas,particularly
    language,
    nationalprecedentforothersto follow.95
    But proponents
    culture,education,and healthcare in cooperation
    with
    ofKosovo's independence
    arguethatit is a unique case
    While both the2007 plan and thecon
    theSerbianstate.
    thatwill not setan exampleelsewhere.96
    How mightwe
    stitution
    omit theestablishment
    of ameso-level
    officially
    conceptualizepotentialrippleeffectsin the immediate
    Serb representative
    body, the systemof linksimpliesa
    region,
    and howmightpotentialeffects
    be contained?
    whole thatisgreaterthanthesumof itsparts-a network
    The impactof Kosovo on separatist
    will
    movements
    structure
    not unlikethemedievalHanseaticLeaguewith
    likelydependon theabilityforextremist
    wingsof sepa
    overparticular
    competencies
    Even thepoliceforce,
    areas.9"
    ratist
    groupsto successfully
    employitas evidenceor sup
    therepresentative
    of statecontrolin the
    Weberianmodel,
    portfortheir
    ownclaims.As outlinedbyRogersBrubaker
    is tobe quitedecentralized
    inKosovo.92
    inhis triadic
    nexusmodel, thispotentialiscontingent
    on
    Both groupsareawarethatthisstrong
    decentralization
    thesetof interactive
    between
    relationships
    host
    minorities,
    reducesthepotentialforterritorial
    and hierarchical
    con
    states,and kin states-and theextremist
    andmoderate
    trolinKosovo, takingit severalstepsfromthe
    Weberian
    elements
    within theseentities.97
    Romania and Slovakia,
    statemodel.Albanians,as themajority,
    would prefera
    forexample,containsignificant
    Hungarianminorities.In
    more hierarchical
    model,while theSerbminorityprefers
    the fewyearsbeforeKosovo's independence,
    articlesin
    amoredispersed
    control
    model.Thus, thestronglevels
    of
    both theethnicHungarianand titular
    pressinRomania
    decentralization
    were opposed by the
    formunicipalities
    and Slovakia invokedKosovo as a potential
    model for
    Albanianmajority,
    which can explaintheshifttovague
    ethnicHungarianminorities.
    The minorityHungarian
    on theseprovisions
    betweentheinitial
    language
    plansand
    presshas viewedKosovo independence
    inquitepositive
    thefinal
    Constitution.
    inKos
    But theSerbiancommunity
    while theRomanianandSlovakpresshaveopposed
    terms,
    ovouesesthesedecentralized
    structures
    to theirfullpoten
    it.98It shouldthuscome as no surprise
    that
    Hungaryhas
    tial,andwill verylikelycontinueto do so.The strong
    recognized
    Kosovo,whileRomaniaandSlovakiahavebeen
    cross-border
    linksthatcan be established
    betweenSerb
    reluctant
    todo so.99
    majority
    municipalities
    and Serbia,includingthereceipt
    The recognition
    issuealso poses seriousproblemsfor
    of Serbianstatefundingfortheiractivities,
    contravenes
    statessuchasBosnia andMacedonia,wheredifferent
    eth
    thenormof a territorial
    state
    with theabilityto regulate
    nic groupsmay espousedifferent
    viewson whetherto
    itsown affairs.
    The proposalappearstobe at leastaspow
    recognize
    Kosovo.This section
    outlineshowKosovo'sinde
    erfulasNorthernIreland's
    North-Southcouncilsin this
    pendencemightplayout in lightof theon-the-ground
    The dispersionof strongcompetenciesto these
    respect.
    of someof itsneighbors.
    As much policy
    complexities
    municipalitiesalso represents
    a quite dispersedcontrol
    rhetoric
    on theBalkansappearstooverlooksomeof the
    ratherthana hierarchical
    structure,
    model forgover
    of thisregion,thepotentialimplications
    complexity
    for
    nance. In addition,thenetworklinksthat
    municipalities
    thesecountries
    and regions
    meritsomeattention.
    can form
    with eachotherandwithSerbiaadd an element
    of non-territorial
    as a defacto
    autonomyto thestructure,
    networkentityiscreatedindependent
    governing
    of terri Bosnia
    mattersof ethnicSerbianinterest.
    toryto regulate
    The 1995Dayton agreementthatended thebrutalcivil
    Kosovo isthusinessencepushingtheboundary
    ofwhat war betweengroupsestablished
    a statedividedintotwo
    itmeans tobe a state-unlessone iswillingtomove away main parts:theRepublikaSrpska(RS), inhabited
    primar
    fromthestandard
    Weberiandefinition
    of states.93
    Indeed, ilybySerbs,and theGroat-Muslim
    Federation.
    AsMon
    itmay be timeto re-think
    thisstandard
    understanding
    of
    tenegroheld a successfulreferendum
    on independence
    how statesshould be configured,as democratization fromSerbia inMay of 2006, BosnianSerbsbegan tocall
    throughout
    theglobe fostersincreasedinvolvement
    of
    fora similarindependence
    referendum
    fortheRS. In spite
    minoritygroups in politics- ratherthan simplytheir of an immediate
    EU rejection
    of thereferendum
    request,
    December

    2008

    IVol. 6/No. 4

    663

    ARTICLES

    I Making or BreakingKosovo

    theseSerbiandemandsbecame louderas thepush for


    Kosovo'sindependence
    accelerated.
    As of this
    writing,
    Serbs
    continue to threatento declare independencefor the
    RepublikaSrpskafrom
    Bosnia.100
    Macedonia
    Until theKosovo crisisin 1999, theFormerYugoslav
    RepublicofMacedonia (FYROM)was an oft-cited
    exam
    ple of ethniccoexistence.
    Albanian partieshave been a
    rather
    constant
    presencein thecountry's
    coalitiongovern
    ment since itsfirstfreeelectionsin 1994.Macedonians,
    who areSlavs,constitutethemajorityof thepopulation.
    Officialcensusfigures
    denotetheAlbaniansat23 percent,
    Albanianleadersthere
    havearguedthattheyinstead
    though
    compriseclose to40 percent.
    Other populationgroups,
    Serbs,andRoma,areestimated
    at roughly
    indudingTurks,
    In 1999, theethnicbalancewas changed
    10 percent.101
    somewhat
    with thearrivalof a vastnumberofAlbanian
    refugees
    fleeing
    Milosevic's
    military
    driveandethnicdeans
    inginKosovo.
    But in 2001, violenceeruptedinMacedonia aswell.
    AlbaniansandSerbswithinSerbia
    Someviolencebetween
    and refugees
    acrosstheborder
    broughtboth extremists
    into
    Macedonia. Initialgunfire
    on theKosovo-Macedonian
    Albanianmilitantsand
    bordergrewintodashes between
    Macedonian police,and armswere regularly
    transported
    As theconflict
    from
    Kosovo into
    grew,civil
    Macedonia.102
    iansinevitably
    becamecaughtin thefray.
    By June,
    more
    left
    Macedonia
    for
    revers
    than33,000 refugees
    had
    Kosovo,
    in 1999.103
    ingthepathwalkedbyKosovar refugees
    Intervention
    fromtheinternational
    community
    quickly
    broughtan end to theviolenceand producedtheOhrid
    betweengroups.However,scarsof fearand
    agreement
    Recentdisruptionsin theimplementa
    suspicionremain.
    tionof theOhrid agreement
    demonstrate
    thatin spiteof
    there
    Macedonia'ssuccesses,
    could
    peacefulethnicrelations
    intheregion
    Albaniannetworks
    be easilydisrupted.
    Strong
    Albanianextremists,
    make itpossiblethat
    emboldenedby
    Kosovo's independence,
    could renewan attempttoannex
    townsinMacedonia toKosovo, similartoefforts
    bysome
    inSerbia.
    Albanianextremists
    Macedo
    Moreover,because
    Kosovo to thesouth,itwould be a likelydes
    nia borders
    tinationforSerbianrefugees
    fromKosovo ifthey
    might
    eth
    be forcedto leave-further
    disruptingthecountry's
    nic balance.In addition,theissueofMacedonian recog
    nitionforKosovo remainsinternally
    divisive,and could
    becomea sourceofpoliticalcontention
    betweengroups.104
    Vojvodina inSerbia
    Vojvodina is locatedin thenorthof Serbia.Unlike the
    southern
    portion,itwas partofHungarybefore1920. For
    decades,ithas beenKosovo's sisterprovince,as the two
    regionshavehistorically
    held thesameautonomouslegal
    status
    withinSerbia.Milosevic revokedtheautonomyof
    664

    Perspectives on Politics

    in 1989, butVojvodina's
    both provincessimultaneously
    territorial
    in2002.105
    autonomy
    was reinstated
    Although
    Vojvodinahas fewer
    autonomous
    powersthanitdidbefore
    1989, the2002MinoritiesLaw providesfortheestablish
    mentofnon-territorial
    minoritycouncils.106
    Many of the
    province'sresidents
    of a varietyof ethnicities
    argue that
    any independence
    forKosovo impliesa parallelconsider
    ationofVojvodina's
    potentialindependence.
    Pro-Vojvodina
    parties,theleadersofwhich areSerbs,area strongpolit
    icalpresence-and theprovince's
    own blue,yellow,and
    greenflagisubiquitous.
    Multiethnicsupportfor
    Vojvod
    ina'sincreased
    governing
    powersisbasedon theprovince's
    wealth in relationto therestof Serbia,aswell as itssepa
    ratehistoricalidentity.107
    Vojvodinacontainsa populationthatis17percent
    Hun
    garian,alongwith amixtureofothergroups.EthnicSerbs
    constitute
    approximately
    57 percentof thepopulation.108
    In additionto thepro-Vojvodina
    parties,ethnicHungar
    ianand radicalSerbpartiesare themost visible.Among
    theprovince's
    groups,theHungarianshavebeen themost
    in
    active establishing
    thenon-territorial
    councilsendorsed
    MinoritiesLaw.109Increasedautonomyfor
    by the
    Vojvo
    dina hasnotdeterredtheactionsof localSerbextremists,
    who categorically
    oppose any furtherseparationfrom

    Belgrade.

    Unfortunately,
    Vojvodinaisrarely
    mentionedinreports
    on Kosovo, and thelegalrelationship
    betweenthetwo is
    oftendismissed
    of eventson
    withoutmuch consideration
    theground.110
    In fact,inJuly1999,whenU.S. Secretary
    ofDefenseWilliam Cohen visited
    Min
    Hungary'sPrime
    ister
    ViktorOrbaln to thankhim forhis assistanceon
    whenOrbainproposedauton
    Kosovo, he was surprised
    omyfor
    Vojvodinaas a properthank
    you.Cohen described
    theHungarianplan as thelastthinghewished todiscuss
    in thewake of theKosovo

    conflict."' But the notion of

    even fiurther
    governing
    powersfortheprovincehas not
    12and thepro-Vojvodina
    gone away,"
    partiesthereremain
    vocal.
    Serbia'sPreJevoValleyand theSand?ak
    ofAlbanians liveinSerbia'sPresevo
    Largeconcentrations
    Kosovo'seast.A sizeablecommunity
    of
    Valley,bordering
    SlavicMuslims inhabitsthenearbySandzakregion,
    which
    Kosovo'snorthwest."13
    These regions
    borders
    havenotbeen
    immunetoviolence-eventsinKosovo havehad undeni
    able spillover
    in theseareasof Serbia. In themost
    effects
    recent
    ofhow eventsinKosovo andSerbia
    demonstration
    areentwined,
    mosques inseveralcitiesaroundSerbiawere
    seton firefollowing
    someviolenceagainstSerbs inKos
    ovo in2004. 14
    These incidents
    were not thefirsttimethateventsin
    Kosovo ignitedtensionsinSerbia. In Februaryof 2001,
    AlbanianmilitantsandSerbianpolicetook
    clashesbetween

    placeinthePresevo
    Valley.
    After
    theKosovoconflict
    in

    1999,NATO had establisheda 5-kilometer


    buffer
    zone
    betweenSerbiaandKosovo. Itwas in thisarmy-free
    buffer
    zone that
    Albanianmilitants,callingthemselves
    theLib
    eration
    Armyof Presevo,
    Medveda, andBujanovac,were
    able togathertheirforces.
    These 500-800militants
    mod
    elledthemselves
    on theKLA andwereequipped
    withweap
    ons fromKosovo.With a statedgoal of attachingthree
    townsinSerbiatoKosovo,they
    Albanian-majority
    attacked
    localSerbpolice and a bus convoy,aswell asmoderate
    Albanianpoliticians.
    ByMay of 2001,NATO began to
    allowSerbarmyunitsintothezone inan effort
    toroutthe
    Albanianextremists-though
    at large.'15
    Kos
    manyremain
    ovo'sindependence
    more lifeintothisgoal
    couldbreathe
    ofannexing
    AlbanianmunicipalitiestoKosovo."16
    More
    over,both thePresevoValley and theSandzak border
    Kosovo. In theeventof a potentialdepartureof Serbs
    fromKosovo, thesealreadytenseareascould be among
    their
    An influx
    destinations.
    of individuals
    primary
    escap
    ingviolentconditions
    would be highlylikelytodisrupt
    regionsthatalreadyfeaturea delicatebalance between
    ethnicities-asshownby the2001Macedonia violence.

    function.
    The examinationhere is informed
    by recent
    debatesin international
    relationstheoryon contractual
    and imperial
    network
    models of control,aswell aswork
    on non-territorial
    autonomyin thefieldsof nationalism
    and ethnicconflict.
    LikeNorthernIreland's
    North-South
    councils,
    Kosovo'snew structures
    allow substateunitsto
    createformallinks,includingfinanciallinks,
    withSerbia.
    With thiscomponent,aswell as itsnon-territorial
    struc
    tures,
    Kosovomoves away fromthe typicalhierarchical
    premises
    of the
    Weberian state.Like Belgium's
    model of
    dividedcompetencies
    forterritorial
    andnon-territorial
    units
    within thefederation,
    thestructures
    plannedforKosovo
    aim to removesomeof themost controversial
    mattersof
    governance
    fromtherealm
    Indoing
    ofpubliccontestation.
    so, theyreducethepotentialforgroupconflict
    bymoving
    awayfroma hierarchical
    state
    model todispersed
    controls.
    The dispersedstatecontrol
    model offers
    much promise
    inaworldofdiversely-populated
    states.
    Ratherthanforc
    ingethnicor religious
    minoritiestoconformto thewill of
    themajoritybecausetheyfindthemselves
    withina partic
    ularterritory,
    control
    dispersed
    state
    modelsestablish
    non
    territorial
    institutions
    bywhichminorities
    mightcontrol
    of concernto them.
    specificfunctions
    The "deciders"
    of
    Overview
    Kosovo'sfatehavedonewell toestablisha dispersedstate
    As theseexamples
    make clear,theterritory
    of theBalkans
    model forcontrol
    within itsnew structure.
    It canonlybe
    isnot composedof a setof atomizedunit statesfirmly
    hoped thatthepolicyrhetoric
    of theinternational
    com
    separated
    by clearlineson a map. Evenwithoutthefor
    munitywill catchup to theserealities.
    Complex societies
    mal cross-border
    in the
    institutional
    provisionsinherent
    requirecomplexgovernance
    solutions.
    newKosovo, thefatesof thevariousregions
    within the
    Balkansare thicklyintertwined
    with networks-ethnic,
    religious,trade(legaland illegal),and family
    networks. Notes
    The presence
    of thesenetworks
    twomech
    mightfacilitate
    1 The United Nations contains 192 members.
    anismsthatcould increase
    thelikelihood
    of regionalinsta
    2 Kosovo contains an Albanian majority that is ap
    Kosovo's independence:
    bilityfollowing
    emulationand
    proximately 90 percent of the population, and Serbs
    effects.
    Such networkdynamicsarequite com
    spillover
    are
    approximately 7 percent, and likelydecreasing.
    mon acrossthebordersof diversestates,and canwork
    Other ethnicities include Roma, Bosniaks, and
    againstthelogicsof statecontrol-KurdsinTurkeyand
    Turks. Ethnic Albanians have consistently supported
    ofPalestine/Israel,
    Iraq,borders
    andTutsi inRwandaand
    full independence, while Serbs have categorically
    Burundiarejusta fewsuchexamples.
    The Balkansdisplay
    it.
    opposed
    similarcomplexities.
    Rather thanestablishing
    formsof
    BBC
    News
    Online 2008b. Arguments thatKosovo is
    3
    thatignoretheserealities,
    government
    itisimportant
    that
    a unique case (International Crisis
    Group 2007) seem
    institutions
    embracethem.
    The Ahtisaari
    model,usedas a
    to be based on wishful
    thinking ratherthan an under
    foundation
    forKosovo'snew government,
    isa good step
    of
    standing ethnicdynamics.As one example, thisauthor
    in thisdirection.
    However,theinternational
    community
    was contacted by aKurdish newspaper in
    Iraq to com
    actorsinKosovomust implement
    theseprovisions
    as they
    ment on the implications ofKosovo for
    "Iraqi Kur
    were intended,
    of
    ratherthanfalling
    backon therhetoric
    extreme elements
    distan." Each
    country has more
    among
    atomizedand hierarchical
    stateunits.
    ethnicminorities who are certainly invoking theKos

    Conclusion
    This articlehasoutlineda case fordispersedstatecontrol
    models as an alternative
    to theterritorial
    andhierarchical
    principles
    Weberian state.Rather thanallocating
    of the
    governance
    of territory,
    theseinnovative
    powersin terms
    arebasedon a functional
    structures
    principle,inwhich
    governance
    isallocatedtovarioussubunits
    by issueareaor

    ovo

    case

    as

    support

    for their own?discourse

    in

    Hungarian circles inRomania has reflected these


    aspects aswell; InternationalHerald Tribune 2008.
    4 RFE/RL Newsline, February 25 2008.
    5 Austin 2007. As he argues, "anyone who suggests that
    Kosovo is set to become simply another Albanian
    state in the Balkans has not read the fine print."
    6 Schmidt 1993, Juviler and Stroschein 1999.
    December

    2008

    Vol. 6/No. 4

    665

    IMaking or BreakingKosovo

    ARTICLES

    7 Greenhill 2003.
    8 United Nations Security Council, 1999. A good
    discussion of the differences between de jure and de
    facto controls appears in Jackson and Rosberg 1982.
    9 Alexandris 2004. For an overview of powers, see

    in

    InterimAdministration Mission

    United Nations
    Kosovo

    2001/2002.
    10 International Crisis Group 2002a and 2002b con
    tainmore subdued language than the 2005a and
    2006 reports; see also Kupchan 2005.
    11 International Crisis Group 2005a and 2006,
    Kupchan 2005, and Moore 2006a and 2006b.
    12 RFE/R Newsline, November 15 and 26, 2001.
    13 BBC News Online,
    Institute 2004.

    2004e, National Democratic

    14 RFE/RL Newsline, November

    19 2007.
    15 RFE/RL Newsline, March 10 2008, Beaumont 2008.
    16 The initialAhtisaari plan included provisions for
    block grants tomunicipalities, while the final ver
    sion leaves these provisions more vague: United
    Nations Office for the Special Envoy of Kosovo
    2007a and 2007b; Constitutional
    (UNOSEK)
    Commission, Government of Kosovo, 2008a and
    2008b.
    1946, Spruyt 1994, Ansell 2004, Thomas

    17 Weber
    2004.
    18Weber

    1946, p. 78.
    19 Jackson and Rosberg 1982, Spruyt 1994.
    20 Another proposal would make such units official
    protectorates ofmore powerful states, along the lines
    of "shared sovereign/'; Krasner 2004. This notion
    bears more resemblance to colonial rule than the
    non-territorial

    structures

    governance

    in this

    outlined

    article.Not only would ongoing resource commit

    ments
    over

    make
    time,

    Krasner's

    shared

    a stated

    but

    sovereignty
    to
    commitment

    impractical
    democracy

    by theworlds leadersmakes such relationships


    inherentlyproblematic. A sincere attempt to stabi
    lize states from the inside requires some serious
    thought regarding institutions of functional, rather
    than

    just

    territorial,

    governance.

    21 Examples abound inAfrica and theMiddle East,


    but are certainly not confined there.
    22 RFE/RL Newsline, February 20, 2008.
    23 Meanwhile, other states openly opposed indepen
    dence for fear that itmight give rise to further sepa
    ratistmovements elsewhere.While realist views of
    international

    relations

    continue

    to

    analyze

    the

    state

    system as if it consisted of autonomous units, in fact


    the international order is better understood as an
    ecosystem

    of relations,

    where

    changes

    reverberate

    throughout network ties and globalized discourse:


    Bull 1977, Goddard and Nexon 2005.
    24 Jackson and Rosberg 1982, Herbst 1996/1997.
    25 Licklider 1995.
    666

    Perspectives on Politics

    26 An excellent, concise overview of these options


    appears in Sisk 1996.

    27 Licklider1995.
    28 Fearon 1998.
    29 Walter 2002.
    30 Goddard2006.
    31 Posen 1993.

    32 Kaufmann, 1996 and 1998, and Downes


    33 Kumar 1997; emphases original.
    34 Kaufmann 1996 and 1998.

    2001.

    35 Most notably in 2004, when many Serbs were


    forced out of certain areas and their homes were
    burned: BBC News Online, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c,
    2004d, Hayton 2004, Thorpe 2004, Bardos 2005
    and 2006. There are also ongoing sporadic attacks;

    International Crisis Group 2007.


    36 Associated VresslNew York Times 2008, BBC News
    Online 2008d. In addition, ethnic Serbian railroad
    officials facilitated Serbia's brief takeover of a rail line
    in northern Kosovo, later regained by theUN;
    Kristic 2008, BBC News Online 2008e.
    37 Sletzinger and Gelazis 2005, Bilefsky 2008a, BBC
    News Online 2008a and 2008c.
    38 See Diamond

    2005, Cordesman 2006, and the


    Roundtable published inForeign Affairs by Diamond
    et al., 2006.

    39 Watts 1998.
    40 For a theoretical treatment, see Cooley
    126-36.
    41 Watts 1998 and Hale
    these

    terms

    are not

    2004.

    always

    2005;

    In practice, however,

    used

    consistently.

    "Devo

    lution" in theUK refers to an asymmetric allocation


    of powers, and the Belgian "federation" has an asym
    metric structure thatwill be examined later in this
    article.

    42 Hannum

    1996; Heintze 1998, 7, and 2002, Thorn


    See also Baubock 2001. The term feder
    1998.
    berry
    acy might be used to express a loosely-connected
    autonomy, as in Puerto Ricos relationship to the
    United States; see Rezvani 2007a and 2007b, and

    McGarry 2007a and 2007b. As defined by Rezvani,


    a federacy is "a territory
    within the international
    a state that has been allocated
    of
    boundaries
    legal
    some entrenched [. . .] final
    decision-making powers
    without being a member unit of a federation";
    2007a, 117.
    43 A good overview of these principles can be found in
    Ansell 2004 and inCaporaso and Jupille 2004.
    44 Padgett and Ansell
    Wright 2007.

    45 Judah2005.

    1993, Tilly 2002; Nexon

    and

    46 Roeder 1991, Lapidoth 1997, Bunce 1999, Mozaf


    far and Scarritt 1999, Rothchild and Hartzell 1999,
    Sambanis 2000, Hale 2000 and 2004, Stewart 2001,
    Hughes and Sasse 2001, Sasse 2002, Cornell 2002,

    Gorenburg 2003, Laitin 2001, Jenne 2004, Lustick,


    Miodownik, and Eidelson 2004.
    47 This view differs from that of Cooley 2005, 27,
    who does not view federations as hierarchies. Here
    I argue that it is the functional content of powers
    that determines this question. As military power
    and foreign policy tend to be regarded as crucial
    powers for a central government to exercise in
    order

    to

    appear

    as a state

    in theWeberian

    sense,

    to a substate unit would remove


    devolving these
    this element of hierarchial authority.A good
    discussion of these issues appears inHaydens 1999
    discussion of theDayton structure established
    for Bosnia.

    48 Unless it is theminorities who hold themeans of


    coercion, as was the case in colonial Rwanda and in
    South Africa until 1994.
    49 See Horowitz 1985 on census voting.
    50 A broad treatment of these electoral systems appears
    in Sartori 1994, Sisk 1996, and Reilly 2001.

    51 Lijphart1968 and 1977,Lustick1979,Andeweg


    2000, Wolff 2004. Consociationalism could be
    understood as a form of corporatism because it
    includes columns of strong representation?but

    for ethnic,

    rather

    than

    economic

    On

    groups.

    it is

    corpo

    ratism, see Schmitter 1974.


    52 On this tradeoff,see Diamond
    1993.
    53 Hooghe 1993, Van Parijs 2000, Jacobs 2000, Lau
    vaux 2001, Leton 2001, Jacobs and
    Swyngedouw
    2003, Stroschein, 2003 and 2006, Farrell and Van
    Langenhove 2005, Nimni 2005, and Lidstr?m
    2007. Some theoretical foundations appear inRug

    gie 1993andAnsell2004.

    54 Rumors of Belgium's imminent collapse fail to ad


    dress the issue of how the stickypoint of Brussels
    governance might be resolved if the state dissolves
    into

    two

    parts.

    55 Nimni 2005, especially 8-10.


    56 See especially Pettifer 2006.
    57 Weber 1946, Ansell 2004, Thomas
    58

    These

    works

    are numerous.

    Some

    2004.
    more

    recent

    ex

    amples include Tilly 1992, Padgett and Ansell 1993,


    Ruggie 1993, Spruyt 1994, Sassen 2006, and Nexon
    andWright 2007, and Nexon forthcoming.
    59 Ra-anan 1991, Nimni 2005.

    60 Ruggie 1993.

    61 Friedrichs 2001, Ansell 2004, Deets 2008, Agnew


    2005, Adamson 2006, Etzioni 2006, Sassen 2006.
    62 Jacobson 1997, Brenner 1998, Aalberts 2004, Ansell
    2004, Di Palma 2004, Caporaso and Jupille 2004,
    Stone Sweet 2004.

    63 O'Leary2002.
    64 Tilly 1998, Nexon andWright 2007, Nexon 2009.
    65 Some of thiswork leans toward a constructivist vein
    as well.
    Padgett and Ansell 1993, Ruggie 1993,

    Wendt
    Nexon

    and Friedheim 1995, Jackson and


    1999, Tilly 2004, Hobson and Sharman

    2005, Goddard and Nexon 2005, Nexon and


    Wright 2007, and Nexon 2009.
    66 Lake 1996, and Cooley 2000/01 and 2005. See also
    Baumgartner, Buckley, and Burns 1975.

    67 Cooley 2005, esp. pp. 4-6.


    68 The content of the relationsmay also affect this
    power dynamic, but this issue is beyond the scope of
    the present analysis. See among othersMannheim
    1955, Foucault 1980, and Shotter 1993.
    While
    notions of contracting vs. hierarchymay
    69
    appear to be contradictory, this dilemma tends to

    reflect the nature of principal-agent problems in


    such interactions.On this point, see Cooley 2005.
    70 Nexon andWright 2007, Nexon 2009.
    71 Gottlieb 1994, 101; Heintze 2002; Brooks 2005;
    Nootens 2006.
    72 For an excellent treatment of reframingdisputes, see
    Goddard 2006.
    73 Van Parijs 2000.
    74 Walzer
    2006.

    1992, Gould

    2006, Gould

    and Macleod

    75 See Renner inNimni

    1899/2005.
    1994, Eide, Greni, and Lundberg 1998,
    Bowring 2002, Nimni 2005, introduction and
    conclusion, Baubock inNimni 2005.

    76 Coakley

    77 Eide, Greni and Lundberg 1998, Deets 2002, Deets


    and Stroschein 2005.
    78 Bowring 2002. However, similar to theHungarian
    bodies, they sometimes lack appropriate funds to

    carry out their dutues.


    79 I am grateful to Katerina Mantouvalou, Fatima
    Kazim Olubodun, and StefanWolff for these points.
    It should also be noted that Shari'a law has even
    been proposed for someMuslim communities in the
    United Kingdom; Burns 2008, Liptak 2008.
    80 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 2002; Organization
    for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 2002.
    81 RFE/RL Newsline, February 11, 18, and 25, 2003;
    Naegele 2003.
    82 Mustafa 2008, Foniq-Kabashi, 2008, as well as
    RFE/RL Newsline articles on theKosovar

    parliament's approval of these plans for a constitu


    tion inApril, 2008.

    83 Bilefsky 2008b, Moore 2008b.


    84 Constitutional Commission, Government of Kos
    ovo, 2008a and 2008b; in 2008a (Draft) especially
    Chapter X, article 12, and articles 62 and 64. It is
    notable that the European standard forminority
    concessions at the local level is 20 percent. Initial
    versions of the plan proposed electoral solutions,
    such as a double majority requirement for pariamen
    tary legislation on issues pertaining tominorities, as
    mentioned

    in theAhtisaari plan, United Nations


    December

    2008

    1Vol. 6/No. 4

    667

    ARTICLES

    IMaking or BreakingKosovo

    Office for the Special Envoy ofKosovo (UNOSEK)


    2007b, under constitutional provisions.
    85 In fact, article 149 explicitly removes the possibility
    for a minority veto (Constitutional Commission,
    Government of Kosovo, 2008b). Indeed, this arti
    cle could cause trouble between communities if it
    is used by themajority to hinder municipal powers

    over the affairsoutlined here.


    86 United Nations Office for the Special Envoy of
    Kosovo (UNOSEK):
    Comprehensive Proposal for the
    Kosovo Status Settlement. Section 2, 2007. Emphasis
    original.
    87 United Nations Office for the Special Envoy of
    Kosovo (UNOSEK)
    2007b; Constitutional Com
    mission, Government of Kosovo, 2008b.

    88 Ibid.

    89 The Ahtisaari plan, United Nations Office for the


    2007a and
    Special Envoy of Kosovo (UNOSEK),
    on
    sections
    decentralization.
    2007b, especially
    90 International Crisis Group 2007, which includes
    useful maps.
    91 As of June 2008, Serbs inMitrovica began to take
    some actions toward establishing a meso-level of
    government, in the form of a parliament for Serbs

    (Moore 2008a, Kristic 2008). This development


    could in fact fitwithin the provisions of the plan,
    actors.
    on the
    depending
    approaches of the various
    92 United Nations Office for the Special Envoy of
    Kosovo (UNOSEK):
    Comprehensive Proposal for the
    Kosovo Status Settlement, and International Crisis
    care is also
    Group 2007. It is notable that health
    administered non-territorially in Belgium. The
    Serb municipalities represent a form of collective
    crosses borders: Pettifer 2007;
    rights for Serbs that
    see also Austin 2007. On theHanseatic League, see

    Spruyt 1994.
    93 See Laughland 2008, who employs phrases such as
    "polyvalent sovereignty" and "postnational state
    hood" to describe Kosovo.
    1996/1997, Ben-Porat 2005, Schwartz and
    J?tersonke 2005. See also Bowring 2002.
    95 Petrov 2006, BBC News Online 2008b, Inter
    national Herald Tribune 2008.

    94 Herbst

    International Crisis Group 2007.


    97 Brubaker 1996.
    98 Articles especially in the summer of 2007. On
    Kosovo s independence and its implications for an
    enthusiastic Hungarian enclave inRomania, see
    International Herald Tribune 2008.

    96

    99 Kosovothanksyou.com, and BBC News Online


    2008b.
    100 Wood 2006, RFE/RL Newsline, August 25 and 28,
    and September 1, 5, 14, and 15, 2006.
    101 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Eu
    rope 1998; Freedom House

    668

    Perspectives on Politics

    1997 and 1999-2000;

    International Crisis Group 2005b; Pettifer 2006;


    and Lobiakas 2008.
    102 Associated VrcsslNew York Times 2001a; Radio Free
    name to
    Europe Daily Report 2001 (later changed

    RFE/RL
    Newsline);Moore 2001a and 2001b;

    Glenny2001.
    103 Associated Vress/New York Times 2001a and 2001b,
    Gall 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2001d.
    104 Whitmore 2008.
    105 RFE/RL Newsline, October 23 and December 18,
    2001, and January 24 and 29, 2002, VecernjeNo
    vosti 2002.
    106 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 2002; Alliance of
    Vojvodina Hungarians (VMSz) 1999 and 2002.
    107 Puzigaca and Molnar 2001, Social Democratic

    League ofVojvodina (LSV) 2001, and interviews


    conducted by author,Novi Sad, July 2001.
    108 Kocsis and Kocsis-Hodosi
    1998.
    109 The foundations for theHungarian councils were
    established even before the passage of the Law.
    Alliance ofVojvodina Hungarians (VMSz) 1999,
    N?pszabads?g 2003, and interviews conducted by
    author,Novi Sad, July2001.

    110 Teleki2002.
    111N?pszabads?g1999a and 1999b.

    112 In interviewswith local elites supporting Vojvodi


    nas independence in the summer of 2001, they
    continually invoked their legal similaritywith

    Kosovo.

    113 International Crisis Group 2005c


    on

    this area.

    is a good source

    114 BBC News Online

    2004a.
    115 Anderson 2001, Partos 2001.

    116 Joseph2005, Bardos2005, 35.


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