Journal of Business Research 67 (2014) 648655

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Business Research

Cooperative learning in creating and managing joint ventures

Mara del Mar Benavides-Espinosa , Domingo Ribeiro-Soriano
Department of Business Administration, J.J. Renau Piqueras, University of Valencia, Avda. Els Tarongers s/n, 46022 Valencia, Spain

article info

abstract

Article history:
Received 1 August 2012
Received in revised form 1 November 2012
Accepted 1 December 2012
Available online 11 January 2013

This study examines how and under what conditions joint ventures facilitate cooperative learning. The study analyzes how a
joint-venture approach facilitates initial learning in the cooperative process and considers to what extent inter-organizational
factors such as commitment, trust, control and conflict resolution affect the partners involved. The study then compares these
hypotheses based on a sample of 74 international joint ventures (IJVs). The results provide empirical evidence to show that
commitment is both a significant and es-sential variable, yet they also illustrate that this type of cooperation is not enough on
its own for partners to learn how to cooperate effectively.

Keywords:
Cooperative learning
Joint venture
Commitment
Trust
Conflict
Control

2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

0148-2963/$ see front matter 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2012.12.017

1. Introduction
Traditionally, empirical studies on cooperation agreements treat the
relationships between partners in cooperation from a static per-spective;
directing analysis on individual cooperation agreements rather than on the
relationships that are created between the partners, and without taking into
account the relationships that are forged as a re-sult of repeated alliances and
the processes that emerge from these inter-actions ( BarNir, 2012; Bonzo,
Valadares de Oliveira, & McCormarck, 2012; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994).
Cooperation is a dynamic process that is essentially flexible. Progress made in
cooperation is the result of a com-bination of different changes for the
partners involved. These changes are both internal and external and therefore
result in changes to the part-ners' needs. The organizational decision
processes of IJVs are complex and dynamic with iterative steps, permitting all
phases to be observed in every time unit occurring during the process ( Baba
& HakemZadeh, 2012; Woodside & Kadik, 1991).
Studies on cooperation process learning are few and far between.
Extensive prior research probes into the determining factors of coop-eration
and/or the contractual cooperation relationships, whereas a gap in the
literature is noticeable with respect to studies focusing on how firms adapt
their learning processes for and in cooperation. Doz (1996) anticipates the
study of these processes by analyzing the progress of cooperation projects in
the context of major alliances.

The authors alone are responsible for all limitations and errors that may relate to the study
and the paper.
Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: maria.m.benavides@uv.es (M. del Mar Benavides-Espinosa),
Domingo.Ribeiro@uv.es (D. Ribeiro-Soriano).

The design and implementation of IJVs involve complex decision pro-cesses (

Woodside & Kadik, 1991; Woodside, Kadik, & Vyslozil, 1993).
Cooperation leads to learning about the process and enables the firm or
partner to be able to take part in future cooperation agreements. Failed
experiments and earlier cooperation can serve as valuable les-sons, helping to
prevent any potential difficulties and stopping partners from committing the
same mistakes. The best way to understand coop-eration is by cooperating.
The greater the partners' ability to cooperate, the more likely they are to meet
their objectives. Cooperating forces partners to develop skills that will
minimize the interpersonal and orga-nizational differences between them (
Cao & Xiang, 2012; Mahlendorf, Rehring, Schffer, & Wyszomirski, 2012).
Cooperative learning furthers the ability of partners. Partners acquire a level
of knowledge in cooper-ation that becomes an additional resource and
potentially gives them a competitive edge.

2. Cooperation process learning through joint ventures

The way in which partners establish alliances can be of huge impor-tance
to the success of any agreement, and the realization of present and future
goals ( Harrigan, 1988). Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman (1996) argue that
the structure of alliances often coincides with their content. The idea that
prioritizing the shape and structure of an alliance is not important is at best
misleading (and at worst dangerous). Priori-tizing the shape and structure of
an alliance does not guarantee success but does dramatically improve the
potential to succeed.

Using the classifications proposed by the authors

Killing (1988), Yoshino and Rangan (1995), and
Das and Teng (1998), among others, the
cooperation agreements are grouped into two
blocks: 1) structured agreements resulting in the
creation of a new entity, also known as joint

M. del Mar Benavides-Espinosa, D. Ribeiro-Soriano / Journal of Business Research 67 (2014) 648655

ventures; and 2) contractual agreements that do not result in the crea-tion of a

new entity, namely combined production agreements, R&D agreements,
marketing agreements and technical support contracts, which may have a
common organizational unit.
The definition of a joint venture is an agreement through which two or
more independent firms decide to create a new firm: a legal entity in its own
right with its own social capital. The firm is assigned the necessary resources
in order to operate effectively and, in return, receives the results generated by
the activity of said firm, while being subject to the competitive strategies of
the parent companies. A joint venture is considered to be international (i.e., an
IJV) when at least one of the partners has its central office outside of the
country where the joint business is set up, or where a significant amount of
activity is car-ried out in more than one country ( Geringer & Hbert, 1989).
When one partner gains experience by working with another, coop-eration
costs can fall if the partners create cooperation routines and es-tablish a
climate of trust. Firms learn the process of cooperation, that is to say, they
learn to interact in a cooperative way ( Kanter, 1994; Mousa
Wales, 2012), and they establish what the corresponding routines of the
partners are for and in cooperation through the experience gained. Routines
store knowledge and behavior regarding the cooperation of a partner in a way
that enables rapid changes to new situations and new partners. They also
increase the probability that present and future co-operation agreements will
function correctly given that routines estab-lish links between the partners.
This proactive strategic orientation, combined with expertise and experience,
is important for initiating fu-ture ventures ( Woodside, 2006). Therefore, a
partner, through multiple cooperation actions, develops a set of behaviors,
which is stored in the cooperation routines and can map out the direction of
any interaction, especially when a level of trust is established between the
partners ( Cambra-Fierro, Florin, Perez, & Whitelock, 2011; Das & Kumar,
2007; Gadde, Hjelmgren, & Skarp, 2012; Zollo, Reuer, & Singh, 2002).
Nevertheless, partners have a great deal to lose in a joint venture if their
behavior is opportunistic, since the level of resources committed are greater
than in other forms of cooperation. A high level of commit-ment means that
the partners involved in a cooperation agreement can achieve their objectives
by reducing their opportunistic behavior. Thus, the greater the commitment,
the more effort the partners will make in order to solve any cooperation issues
( Mohr & Spekman, 1994).
In cooperation, coordination must exist between all of the partic-ipants. Its
implementation provides the required learning on all levels so that protocols
can be developed. These protocols act as the infor-mation channels through
which knowledge and capabilities/abilities are exchanged, facilitating
communication between partners. Proto-cols restrict what partners can ask
each other and they define the limits between cooperation and competition (
Lai, 2011; Lei, Slocum,
Pitts, 1997; Siegel & Renko, 2012; Srivastava & Frankwick, 2011). As a
result, periodic checks are made on the situation throughout
the period that the agreement is in place. These checks act as formal control
mechanisms that examine the health of the agreement, and monitor its
progress, which creates cooperative learning. Through these checks, partners
are able to discern potential issues or conflicts, and the checks enable them to
resolve problems in real time (Benavides & Mohedano, 2011; Spekman,
Forbes, Isabella, & MacAvoy, 1998). This control system strengthens
relations between the partners and creates a greater level of trust. If, on the
other hand, no agreement exists, the joint venture may be dissolved. The
partners increasingly get to know one another better and they learn how to
work together given that each permanent change in each of the conditions in
the cooperation cre-ates cooperative learning.

2.1. Partner commitment

Partner commitment means taking the necessary measures to main-tain
the relationship by contributing the required staff, time and re-sources ( Mohr
& Spekman, 1994). This partnership means that the

649

firms that take these necessary steps can be sufficiently assured that their
partners will provide the time and resources required to maintain their
commitment. The partnership also means that the partners have to accept a
certain level of risk, which will increase as the level of invest-ment rises,
provided that the resources invested are valid ( Parkhe, 1993).
Borys and Jemison (1989) argue that joint commitment is a requi-site of
cooperation agreements. Each partner must pledge a high level of
commitment in order to maintain their high expectations and sub-sequently
achieve their objectives ( Doz, 1996). Partners achieve their objectives by
gaining greater experience through cooperating and learning. In other words,
the partners increase their chances of success by applying high levels of
commitment in an effective manner ( Kumar & Nti, 1998). A lack of
commitment, on the other hand, harms the rela-tionship between the partners
and has a negative effect on future rela-tions ( Ario & de la Torre, 1998).
A strong level of commitment is therefore required to overcome the
natural resistance to risk, to provide the necessary resources for this
cooperation, and to encourage sufficient levels of information ex-change (
Ario & Doz, 2000; Barnes, Pashby, & Gibbons, 2002; Lee, Olson, & Trimi,
2012; Sambasivan, Siew-Phaik, Mohamed, & Leong, 2011). A willingness on
the part of the partners to learn what the other parties can contribute and what
they want in return ( Ario & de la Torre, 1998; Doz, 1996) creates a capacity
to cooperate, which enables the development of cooperative learning through
trial and error.
H1. The commitment of the partners to a joint venture has a positive influence
on cooperative learning.
2.2. Partner trust
Trust between partners plays an essential role in cooperation agree-ments (
Van Aken & Weggeman, 2000). From an organizational per-spective, Axelrod
(1984) and Zucker (1987), together with other authors, see trust between
cooperating firms as an expression of assur-ance between the different parties
or an exchange of some sort (a type of trust that must not be jeopardized by
the actions of the other party).
A continuing level of trust is essential to guarantee the progress of the
cooperation so as not to expunge the efforts that may have been productive up
to that point ( Camn, Gottfridsson, & Rundh, 2011; Dulbecco, 1994). If the
partner responds to cooperation expectations, the level of joint trust will
gradually increase. In contrast, negative perceptions, surrounding the negative
or non-cooperative behavior of the partners, can destroy this trust. The lack of
a development of trust can lead partners to act defensively and can even result
in the termination of potential alliances ( Das & Teng, 1998, 2001). Control
measures are therefore put in place ( Inkpen & Currall, 2004; Snchez, Vlez,
& Ramn-Jernimo, 2012) in order to minimize the risk of opportunistic
behavior.
According to Inkpen and Currall (2004), when partners create a joint
venture and the initial conditions enable continuing cooperation, trust between
partners develops. Therefore, past actions generate trust and this trust provides
information depending on the level of commitment between the partners (
Kumar & Nti, 1998). An atmosphere of trust al-lows cooperation to take place
more easily and attempts to provide bet-ter solutions to problems that
suddenly arise. Trust between partners reduces the need to strictly supervise
the cooperation and cuts down the agreement renegotiation period ( Parise &
Sasson, 2002). Trust also curtails uncertainty in partner behavior and
eliminates the disadvan-tages of cooperation ( Hoffmann & Schaper-Rinkel,
2001). By developing a set of confident behaviors, management can reduce
this risk of oppor-tunism ( Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard, & Werner, 1998).
The parties in a partnership gradually acquire a certain level of cooperative learning, especially if cooperation agreements are repeated between
the same partners, something which leads to mutual under-standing and trust,
and enables the implementation of more flexible

650

M. del Mar Benavides-Espinosa, D. Ribeiro-Soriano / Journal of Business Research 67 (2014) 648655

control structures ( Ring & Van de Ven, 1992, 1994). Therefore, increased
trust results in a greater understanding of the partners and yields a higher
quality experience in cooperation, which, in turn, develops the ability to
cooperate with one another. The creation of trust between part-ners, therefore,
provides increased cooperative learning.
H2. Trust between partners in a joint venture has a positive effect on
cooperative learning.
2.3. Partner control
Control is a key variable in cooperation between firms ( Beamish, 1988;
Sohn, 1994). According to Das and Teng (1998), partner control is a
regulatory process through which the elements of a system are made more
predictable. This is achieved by establishing a standard for the pur-suit of
objectives or desired states, where the control level is the result of the control
process. Establishing the appropriate control mechanism means assigning
desired objectives, which can be predicted. Therefore, clear objectives not
only help to establish cooperation agreements, but they also enable the
creation of specific rules and regulations (Das et al., 1998; Parnell, Lester,
Long, & Kseoglu, 2012; Rondn-Catalua, Navarro-Garca, GmezGonzlez, & Rodrguez-Rad, 2012).
In joint ventures, an added control objective is property control ( Aulakh,
Kotabe, & Sahay, 1997; Das & Teng, 1998). Joint venture property control is
basically determined by the share percentage in the property. The general
premise is that joint ventures comprising two partners, each with a share of
50% guarantee equal cooperation and protect the interests of both partners;
however, such an equal share can cause control issues, which may result in
decisions being blocked due to the lack of a majority rule.
Authors such as Birnberg (1998) and Inkpen and Currall (2004) believe
that learning to cooperate with a partner is the opposite con-cept to that of
control. Thus, in the context of a joint venture, the sub-ject of control often
acts as a source of conflict between partners. Cooperative learning with a
partner is a mutual process and not an asymmetric one. Cooperation process
learning provides the mechanism through which an inverse relationship is
established between trust and control in a joint venture.
Joint venture control does not have to be especially strict and can be
replaced by a greater level of trust in the sense that partners gradu-ally
achieve more experience through cooperation and they understand the
practices of their partners to such an extent that, in the end, a part-ner will
choose between the implementation of control measures, or learning with and
about their partner ( Harris & Ogbonna, 2011; Inkpen & Currall, 2004).
Taking all of this into account, the conclusion is that partner control in a joint
venture does not make cooperative learning easier, but rather more difficult.
H3. Partner control in a joint venture has a negative effect on cooperative
learning.
2.4. Resolved conflicts between partners
Das and Teng (2002) acknowledge that conflicts between partners are an
important aspect of cooperation. A conflict can arise either from the different
characteristics of the partners or from the context of the cooperation
agreement, which is why management conflict is a key aspect in maintaining
equality and efficiency throughout the dura-tion of the agreement. A conflict is
a multi-dimensional construct, consisting of at least two dimensions: a) workrelated conflicts, and b) relationship conflicts. Some conflicts, so-called
functional conflicts, maintain the group's objectives and improve
performance, whereas dysfunctional conflicts obstruct group performance.
Communication helps partners to clarify the contributions of each other
during conflict management ( Farins, Herrero, & Latorre, 2011; Kale, Singh,
& Perlmutter, 2000; Park, 2011; Welbourne, Neck, &

Meyer, 2012), which is why identifying the reasons behind the con-flict in
order to find a resolution is so important. The seriousness of the conflict is
determined largely by the reasons that provoke the dis-harmony. As the
cooperation process progresses, relational, human and cultural problems are
likely to arise, which endanger the cooper-ation if not dealt with quickly.
These problems can often bring about change and the partners have to be
aware that such changes can alter the initial conditions of the cooperation,
meaning they will have to be reassessed in order to adapt the agreement
accordingly.
If conditions do change during the cooperation period, discrepan-cies may
arise between the partners that could affect the rapport and lead to con flict in
their relationship ( Heavey & Murphy, 2012; Kumar & Nti, 1998). Conflicts
are inevitable and often prove to be legitimate and sometimes even desirable
within the organization, provided that they do not harm or jeopardize the
agreement. Conflicts create change, or at least force a re-think of the current
situation. Conflicts have a pos-itive aspect and a negative angle. The question
is not how to remove but rather how to deal with con flicts conveniently
without losing sight of the fact that any conflict can cause serious problems
for any organiza-tion. Redirecting the conflict is essential in order to
maximize the ben-efits and minimize the damage.
Authors such as Ario and de la Torre (1998), Kale et al. (2000) and
Mohr and Spekman (1994) state that the manner in which a conflict is
resolved will have an impact upon the success of the cooperation, whereby an
unsatisfactory resolution will have a negative effect on the success of the
agreement.
In a joint venture context, conflict resolution is a question of rela-tionship
satisfaction between partners. As conflicts arise, partners will have to
determine how to resolve them appropriately which, in turn, will continually
develop their ability to build a relationship with the other partner and their
ability to cooperate. The same characteristic that stimulates learning can be
vital for the success of the cooperation by identifying the discrepancies that
create conflicts in cooperation management ( Kumar & Nti, 1998). Therefore,
the deadlock that the conflict has created is broken ( Chao, 2011; Lin &
Germain, 1998) and the cooperation continues.
A continuing agreement will depend on the partners' ability to adapt their
cooperation behavior and routines ( Ario & de la Torre, 1998; Doz, 1996).
Furthermore, whilst the cooperation continues, the partners are gaining
experience in cooperation and understanding each other better, consequently
improving their capacity to cooperate.
H4. Resolved conflicts between partners in a joint venture have a positive
effect on cooperative learning.
3. Method
The comparison of the hypotheses consists of a quantitative study using
the ZEPHYR database. The study adjusts and refines the data-base to the
objectives herein by selecting firms that have undergone joint ventures. The
general sample includes 1837 firms spread across several continents. In
conjunction with this database the study uses other business analyses and
search tools such as SABI, Amadeus, and Thomson One Banker, and also
checks the information of each firm on their web pages.

Two problems that limit the data set size arose in

the data collection: a) through incorrect or missing
data, 231 of the firms were impossible to contact;
and b) 396 firms decided that they did not fit the
joint ven-ture profile as defined in the letter that
accompanied the questionnaire. The questionnaire
was sent via mail and e-mail in three languages: English, Spanish and French. The number of firms that

was reachable was 1210, and the final sample used

was 74 firms. Other empirical studies on
cooperation and learning have sample sizes similar
to this study; for example, Colombo (2003) using
67 firms, Lane and Lubatkin (1998) 69 firms, and
Lane, Salk, and Lyles (2001) 78 firms. As quantitative studies are fairly rare this study creates its
own unique scales

M. del Mar Benavides-Espinosa, D. Ribeiro-Soriano / Journal of Business Research 67 (2014) 648655

that enable the determination of the scope and dimensionality of

each construct.

Table 2
Confirmatory factor analysis.
Variable

3.1. Studying the reliability of the measuring instrument

Normally, in the field of Business Management, not one but sever-al
constructs appear. Cronbach's alpha for each separate factor, for ex-ample,
does not take into account the reliability of the rest of the constructs. This is
why Fornell and Larcker (1981) propose calculating the composite reliability
index (CRI) and the variance extracted index (VEI) ( Uriel & Alds, 2005)
which the study also employs.
The cooperation learning scales have a Cronbach's alpha of 0.90. The
cooperation learning scales follow the same technique as the rest of the scales
that appear in the model used. The summary in Table 1 simplifies the
presentation of the various scales exhibiting the results obtained for all of the
factors after having eliminated the items that did not exceed a Cronbach's
alpha of 0.70. The model shows that all of the scales apart from one had a
Cronbach's alpha greater than 0.70. The conflict resolu-tion scale, which had a
value of less than 0.53, was maintained as an ex-ploratory scale because using
this scale the study can perform many more tests.
As Table 1 demonstrates, the composite reliability indices for all of the
factors are greater than 0.70, which is why the study keeps the conflict
resolution scale as the scale had a composite reliability index (CRI) of more
than 0.70 and the CRI is a more powerful index than the Cronbach's alpha.
The study also calculates the average variance extracted index (VEI). In
general, the VEI results, which are also set out in Table 1, are quite
satisfactory. The results all record figures higher than 0.50, which is why the
comparison includes all of the scales.
3.2. Analyzing the validity of the measuring instrument
In terms of the criteria used to determine when a measurement has
reached content validity, the study examines a number of theoretical and, in
particular, empirical studies to try to understand what the di-mensions of each
scale are.
In order to analyze the convergent validity, the study carries out a
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and eliminates the insignificant items. The
cooperation learning factor uses the first seven items on the scale. The factors
of commitment, trust, control, and conflict reso-lution use all of the items
available up to that point.
The CFA model results, as Table 2 shows, point to very good estima-tions
with a high level of significance (all of the t statistics are greater than 3.29
and, as a consequence, are significant for pb 0.001) and stan-dardized with
high values.
Alternatively, the goodness of fit statistics generally attain values above
0.9. The goodness of fit indicators for cooperation learning reach the desired
values except in the case of AGFI, which reaches a value of 0.78. The
independent variables of commitment, trust, con-trol, and conflict resolution
generally have a good fit apart from the SRMR, which slightly exceeds 0.05.
In summary, the measuring model has a good fit and, therefore, confirms
convergent validity.
Table 3 shows the analysis of the discriminant validity. The table lays out
a comparison matrix showing the correlations of the Cronbach's alpha and
VEI values.

Standardized

Cooperation learning (F1)

V01 F1
2.90 *** 11.78
V02 F1
3.02 *** 10.83
V03 F1
3.13 *** 10.34
V04 F1
2.17 ***
7.74
V05 F1
2.47 ***
7.18
V06 F1
3.24 *** 10.34
V07 F1
3.10 ***
9.58

Factors or scales

No. of items Cronbach's alpha

No. of items

CRI

VEI

Cooperation learning
Partner commitment
Partner trust
Partner control
Conflict resolution

16
3
4
2
2

7
3
2
2
2

0.93
0.87
0.89
0.78
0.70

0.66
0.69
0.80
0.66
0.58

Goodness of fit level

2 (14 degrees of freedom)=45.35

0.92
0.88
0.85
0.70
0.66
0.85
0.81

BBNFI=0.91
BBNNFI=0.91
CRI=0.94
GFI=0.89
AGFI=0.78
SRMR=0.04

Commitment (F2), trust (F3) control (F4) and conflict resolution (F5)
2 (9 degrees of freedom)=13.16
V08 F2
3.37 ***
6.91 0.84
V09 F2
3.97 ***
7.64 0.91
BBNFI=0.95
V10 F2
3.11 ***
5.66 0.72
BBNNFI=0.90
V11 F3
3.51 *** 10.45 0.90
CRI=0.96
V12 F3
3.38 *** 10.19 0.89
GFI=0.94
V13 F4
1.95 ***
4.40 0.57
AGFI=0.88
V14 F4
3.59 *** 10.00 1.00
SRMR=0.06
V15 F5
2.25 *** 13.93 1.00
V16 F5
1.07 ***
4.09 0.40
* pb0.05; t>1.964.
* pb0.01; t>2.585.
*

pb0.001; t>3.291.

The highest correlation in this matrix is that which corresponds to F3 and

F2, which has a value of 0.64. The square of this value is 0.41, which is less
than the F2 VEI (0.68) and the F3 VEI (0.80). These results confirm the
discriminant validity of the measuring instrument the model uses. Fi-nally, the
structural model sets out an analysis of the causal relationships, which are the
relationships determined in the formulation of the hypoth-eses. This part of
the analysis uses structural equation models (SEMs).

3.3. Details of the structural model

The goodness of fit indicators in the theoretical model do not reach the
desired levels, as shown in Table 4, which is why the study con-tinues with
the model analysis.
Two relationships arise when analyzing the theoretical model with regard
to the commitment variable and a further one with respect to the influence of
trust on other independent variables. The Lagrange multiplier, which is a
theoretically justified model, provides the proof of these relationships and, as
a result, the model includes this method.
The existence of the relationships mentioned above calls for a
readjustment of the theoretical model to include these relationships within the
model, and this modification of the specification changes the original model to
the newly titled revised model. As shown in Table 4, the goodness of fit
indicators are improved and now repre-sent acceptable values. Below, Fig. 1
sets out the revised model.
The following section compares the hypotheses tested in the model.

Table 3
Correlation matrix, Cronbach's alpha and VEI.
F5

Table 1
Scale reliability.

0.90
0.85
0.86
0.73
0.53

651

F5
F4
F3
F2
F1
Cronbach's alpha
VEI
* pb0.05; t>1.964.
* pb0.01; t>2.585.
* pb0.001; t>3.291.

1
0.12
0.24
0.14
0.22
0.53
0.58

F4
1
0.02
0.09
0.07
0.73
0.66

F3

F2

F1

1
0.63**
0.42**
0.86
0.80

1
0.49**
0.85
0.68

1
0.90
0.66

652

M. del Mar Benavides-Espinosa, D. Ribeiro-Soriano / Journal of Business Research 67 (2014) 648655

Table 4
Comparison of the goodness of fit indices for both models.
2

Theoretical model
Revised model

gl

GFI

AGFI

SRMR

32.66
8.12

5
4

0.001
0.05

0.90
0.99

0.65
0.95

0.08
0.05

GFI: close to 0.9.

AGFI: close to 0.9.
SRMR: less than 0.05.

4. Results
Table 5 sets out the results from testing the hypotheses, as well as the
relationships that arise among them. In terms of the first hypothesis, the
results provide evidence that commitment has a direct, positive and significant
influence on the partners in cooperation learning. The results show that t has a
value of 3.63, meaning that the model proves the va-lidity of the first
hypothesis (H1).
Furthermore, the results show an unforeseen relationship with re-gard to
trust; a result the theoretical model did not predict and which improved this
model significantly. This relationship, R1, reveals a very significant influence
in trust (t =7.99); as higher commitment thrives among partners, greater trust
develops among them as well. This is consistent with other studies such as
those by Das and Teng (1998), and Ring and Van de Ven (1992). Therefore,
commitment, aside from directly influencing cooperation learning, also has an
indirect effect through this trust variable.
Recent articles that deal with quantitative empirical studies using
structural equations, such as Wu and Cavusgil (2006), confirm that
commitment is a resource that has a positive influence on cooperation
learning. Commitment is a necessary condition, although this condition alone
is not sufficient to stimulate cooperation learning.
The findings do not support H2, in keeping with the views of the
empirical study by Lane et al. (2001), which does not find any signif-icant
relationship between trust and learning through joint ventures. The findings, in
accordance with Robson, Skarmeas, and Spyropoulou (2006), show that
studies on strategic alliances have underestimated the importance of
commitment and overestimated trust as determi-nants in cooperation.
Validated items question whether managers were certain that their partners
were going to demonstrate a satisfactory level of cooperative behavior before
and during the joint venture. By using these specifica-tions and not just the
hypothesis itself, the results confirm that previous trust is less important than
in other types of cooperation because trust does not simply exist, but rather is
an element that develops during the cooperation period. Partners need to
generate a certain amount of re-lationship trust between them in order for the
cooperation to progress.

According to the theoretical framework, trust between partners is vital in

reducing the risk of opportunistic behavior in cooperation ( Gulati, 1995).
This risk diminishes in situations where the partners have previous experience
of developing cooperation agreements, es-pecially between the same partners,
as this past experience together generates mutual understanding and trust,
which fosters the creation of more flexible control structures in future
cooperation ( Gulati, 1995; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992, 1994; Rodenbach &
Brettel, 2012). Van Aken & Weggeman, 2000 state that informal cooperation
agree-ments are based more on trust and mutual understanding than on legal
obligations. Therefore, a certain amount of existing previous trust among
partners is necessary in creating cooperation agreements with more flexible
structures. The existence of trust can depend on the type of cooperation
structure. Langfield (2008) agrees with this statement and points out that the
level of partner trust can affect the choice of organizational structure in an
agreement.
Thus, when previous trust is non-existent or scarce because the parties do
not share past experience or because one of the partners' reputations is
unknown, a joint venture is appropriate for learning to cooperate. For this
reason, trust is not as crucial at the beginning of the cooperation process in a
joint venture as in other types of coop-eration agreements.
However, trust is generated if the relationship between the part-ners
develops satisfactorily, and if the trust in the relationship is suf-ficient for the
partnership to reach its objectives. When partners create trust between
themselves, they are able to establish future cooperation agreements that are
less structured.
Trust does not have to be a necessary factor at the start of a joint ven-ture,
but this trust becomes vital for the joint venture to continue over time ( Ring
& Van de Ven, 1994). Trust does not naturally exist by itself; this level of
mutual understanding and confidence is generated during partner interaction
and in the development and progress of the cooperation.
The control variable between partners in a joint venture presents an
insignificant relationship with regard to cooperation learning, since t has a
value of less than 1.96 (as seen in Table 5), which is why the find-ings
support rejecting H3.
The analysis of control between partners in a joint venture is scarce and
contradictory, despite the importance of the issue. The available analysis
focuses more on the control of the joint venture's activities or the property
between the partners. The existence of a joint venture al-ready encompasses
control of the property and activity of the partner-ship ( Audretsch, 2012;
Aulakh et al., 1997; Das & Teng, 1998), which is why control between
partners does not appear to be so vital, given that the activity of the
cooperation is channeled though a separate entity. The fair distribution of
capital encourages cooperative behavior; as

Trust

R1+

H2+
R3+

Commitment

R2+

Cooperation
learning

H1+
H4+

Resolved
conflicts

H3

Control

Fig. 1.

Revised
model.

M. del Mar Benavides-Espinosa, D. Ribeiro-Soriano / Journal of Business Research 67 (2014) 648655

653

Table 5
Estimated parameters in the revised model.
Hypotheses

Influence

Standardized
loads

H1. Partner commitment in a joint venture has a positive effect on cooperation learning. H2. Trust
among partners in a joint venture has a positive effect on cooperation learning. H3. Partner control
in a joint venture has a negative effect on cooperation learning.
H4. Resolved conflicts between partners in a joint venture have a positive effect on cooperation learning.

Commitment in cooperation learning

Trust in cooperation learning
Control in cooperation learning

0.38
0.00
0.13

3.63
0.00
1.46

0.31

3.84

Relationships
R1. Partner commitment in a joint venture has a positive effect on the trust between them.

Conflicts in cooperation learning

R2. Partner commitment in a joint venture has a positive effect on the conflict resolution

Commitment in trust
Commitment in conflict
resolution

R3. Trust among partners in a joint venture has a negative effect on conflict resolution.

Trust in conflict resolution

0.62

7.99

0.48

4.02

0.45

4.68

* pb0.05; t>1.964.
* pb0.01; t>2.585.
*

pb0.001; t>3.291.

inequality in capital share increases, the minority partners have more incentive not to cooperate.
In joint ventures with only two partners, the need for control is less than in
joint ventures with more partners. In joint ventures with more than two
partners, partner control measures need to be put into prac-tice. A total of 65%
of the sample used in this study were joint ventures with only two partners.
A very positive and significant relationship exists between the con-flict
resolution variable and cooperation learning through joint ventures as Table 5
shows, where t reaches a value of 3.84. For this reason, the findings prove the
fourth hypothesis (H4) to be valid.
Furthermore, these results bring to light a second relationship, R2, where
commitment has a positive influence on conflict resolution, since t is very
significant (t =4.03). This relationship means that a high level of commitment
is necessary for conflicts to be resolved ad-equately and to ensure that these
conflicts do not impede cooperation or make cooperation between the partners
difficult. The more commit-ment that exists in this type of partnership, the
more interested the partners will be in resolving conflicts adequately when
they arise ( Mohr & Spekman, 1994).
Finally, the results reveal another relationship, R3, which implies that
partner trust has a negative effect on conflict resolution (t = 4.68). In effect, an
atmosphere of trust enables cooperation to flow more freely with fewer
conflicts, and this environment attempts to provide better solutions to
unforeseen problems that appear ( Hoffmann & Schaper-Rinkel, 2001;
Woodside, Ko, & Huan, 2012). Creating trust fosters desirable behavior,
which in turn, improves conflict resolution ( Anderson, Dodd, & Jack, 2012;
Mohr & Spekman, 1994; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). Therefore, the existence
of trust be-tween partners lowers the level of conflict ( Aulakh et al., 1997;
Renko, Shrader, & Simon, 2012) or, in other words, this trust reduces the
impact and importance of a conflict between partners.
Problems that arise and have been foreseen will be solved in ac-cordance
with the established protocols. However, when unpredicted differences and
conflicts emerge, the resultant problems have to be solved appropriately so
that the joint venture can continue under the initially established conditions.
The important issue is not so much the conflicts themselves, but rather the
manner in which the parties resolve these conflicts. For this reason, the
attitudes and values of the partners are vital for the outcome of the conflict,
which is why a conflict managed in the ap-propriate manner will encourage
cooperation learning. Positive con-flict resolution is a question of maintaining
satisfaction in the partner relationship throughout the joint venture, which
generates the capacity for cooperation learning.

5. Conclusions
The objective of this research is the analysis of joint ventures as an
instrument for cooperation learning, the identification of the

variables that have an influence on said learning, and how to manage them
conveniently.
In order for cooperation learning through joint ventures to take place,
relationships between the partners must be established. These re-lationships
are based on the commitment of the partners. Commitment is a variable that
directly affects cooperation learning, whereas trust in-directly affects this
relationship. Commitment creates trust among part-ners provided that the
cooperation continues to develop satisfactorily. Commitment also has an
influence on conflict resolution. Higher levels of commitment create more
interest in solving conflicts satisfactorily.
The evidence from the study is insufficient to confirm that trust, or
previous trust at least, is necessary to create a joint venture. That is to say, the
lack of trust is what makes a joint venture a suitable partnership, and once the
partners develop this trust, they are capable of undergoing more flexible forms
of cooperation in the future. Generating trust means that the parties place less
importance on conflicts themselves and more importance on solving the
conflicts in a more satisfactory way.
Partner control in joint venture cooperation proves to be an irrele-vant
variable, given that this aspect tends to center on controlling the activity of the
joint venture instead of the cooperation itself. In this type of cooperation,
control over results and processes is more worri-some than behavior control
since behavior is regulated by existing com-mitment and trust in the joint
venture. This is especially prevalent if only two partners make up the joint
venture.
However, as all types of cooperation agreements progress, foreseen and
unforeseen problems arise, which create conflicts. Here, the issue is not that
these conflicts occur, rather how they are resolved. Looking for solutions to
conflicts implies learning from the process of how to coop-erate with the
partner in order to avoid these conflicts happening or minimizing them as
much as possible. As long as conflicts are being re-solved satisfactorily, the
consequences for cooperation learning will be positive and not the contrary.
The commitment variable acts as the driving force in joint venture development. That is to say, this force propels cooperation learning in such a
way that commitment becomes a necessary variable, although insuffi-cient on
its own in ensuring that cooperation learning can take place.
Joint ventures are established when the active parties have little or no
experience of cooperating before, or when a partner is not well known and/or
not enough trust can be placed in the partner. There-fore, they learn to
cooperate by collaborating and a joint venture is a way of initiating
cooperation learning with unknown possibilities. This form of cooperation is
less risky than others, since the process is essentially trial and error.
Difficulty in contacting the appropriate person in the firm be-longing to the
joint venture is one of the limitations of this study. On the other hand,
although the methodology defines unique mea-suring scales for the variables
involved in this type of learning and approaches the definitions of these scales
with care, these scales, as with other similar studies, are only an
approximation for the latent variables.

654

M. del Mar Benavides-Espinosa, D. Ribeiro-Soriano / Journal of Business Research 67 (2014) 648655

Finally, a necessary comment is to point out that only one of the partners
involved in this type of cooperation provided the informa-tion gathered on
joint ventures for this study, which is a limitation that is common in joint
venture studies and cooperation agreements in general. This limitation is
difficult to overcome and can affect the results of the study.
Future research will extend this study to other types of cooperation and
compare these types of cooperation in order to analyze how they may have
varied effects on cooperation and, therefore, on cooperation learning.

References
Anderson, A. R., Dodd, S. D., & Jack, S. L. (2012). Entrepreneurship as connecting: Some
implications for theorising and practice. Management Decision, 50(5), 958971.
Ario, A., & de la Torre, J. (1998). Learning from failure: Towards an evolutionary model of
collaborative ventures. Organization Science, 9(3), 306325.
Ario, A., & Doz, Y. (2000). Rescuing troubled alliances Before it's too late. European
Management Journal, 18(2), 173182.
Audretsch, D. (2012). Entrepreneurship research. Management Decision, 50(5), 755764.
Aulakh, P. S., Kotabe, M., & Sahay, A. (1997). Trust and performance in cross-border marketing
alliances. In P. W. Beamish, & J. P. Killing (Eds.), Cooperative Strategies. North American
Perspectives, vol. 1. (pp. 163196) San Francisco: New Lexington
Press.
Axelrod, R. (1984). The evolution of cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
Baba, V. V., & HakemZadeh, F. (2012). Toward a theory of evidence based decision making.
Management Decision, 50(5), 832867.
Barnes, T., Pashby, I., & Gibbons, A. (2002). Effective universityindustry interaction: A multicase evaluation of collaborative R&D projects. European Management Journal, 20(3), 272
285.
BarNir, A. (2012). Starting technologically innovative ventures: Reasons, human capital, and
gender. Management Decision, 50(3), 399419.
Beamish, P. W. (1988). Multinational joint venture in developing countries. London: Routledge.
Birnberg, J. (1998). Control in interfirm relationships. Journal of Management Studies, 35, 421
428.
Bonzo, P., Valadares de Oliveira, P., & McCormarck (2012). Planning, capabilities, and
performance: An integrated value approach. Management Decision, 50(6), 10011021.
Borys, B., & Jemison, D. B. (1989). Hybrid arrangements as strategic alliances: Theoretical issues in organizational combinations. Academy of Management Review, 14(5), 234249.
Cambra-Fierro, J., Florin, J., Perez, L., & Whitelock, J. (2011). Inter-firm market orientation as
antecedent of knowledge transfer, innovation and value creation in networks.
Management Decision, 49(3), 444467.
Camn, C., Gottfridsson, P., & Rundh, B. (2011). To trust or not to trust?: Formal contracts and
the building of long-term relationships. Management Decision, 49(3), 365383.
Cao, Y., & Xiang, Y. (2012). The impact of knowledge governance on knowledge sharing.
Management Decision, 50(4), 591610.
Chao, Y. C. (2011). Decision-making biases in the alliance life cycle: Implications for alliance
failure. Management Decision, 49(3), 350364.
Colombo, M. G. (2003). Alliance form: A test of the contractual and competence per-spectives.
Strategic Management Journal, 24, 12091229.
Das, T. K., & Kumar, R. (2007). Learning dynamics in the alliance development process.
Management Decision, 45(4), 684707.
Das, T. K., & Teng, B. (1998). Between trust and control: Developing confidence in part-ner
cooperation in alliances. Academy of Management Review, 23(3), 491512.
Das, T. K., & Teng, B. (2002). The dynamics of alliance conditions in the alliance devel-opment
process. Journal of Management Studies, 39(5), 725746.
Doz, Y. L. (1996). The evolution of cooperation in strategic alliances: Initial conditions or
learning processes? Strategic Management Journal, 17, 5583.
Dulbecco, P. (1994). La coopration comme mcanisme de coordination temporelle. Une
relecture des travaux de G.B. Richardson. Revue d'conomie Politique, 104(4), 517537.
Farins, J. E., Herrero, B., & Latorre, M. A. (2011). Corporate entrepreneurship and
acquisitions: Creating firm wealth. International Entrepreneurship and Management
Journal, 7(3), 325339.
Fornell, C., & Larcker, D. F. (1981). Evaluating structural equation models with unobservable
variables and measurement error. Journal of Marketing Research, 18, 3950.
Gadde, L. E., Hjelmgren, D., & Skarp, F. (2012). Interactive resource development in new
business relationships. Journal of Business Research, 65, 210217.
Geringer, J. M., & Hbert, L. (1989). Control and performance of international joint ven-ture.
Journal of International Business Studies, 20(2), 235254.
Gulati, R. (1995). Does familiarity breed trust? The implications of repeated ties for contractual
choice in alliances. Academy of Management Journal, 38, 85112.
Harrigan, K. R. (1988). Strategic alliances and partner asymmetries. Management Inter-national
Review, 28, 5373 (special issue).
Harris, L. C., & Ogbonna, E. (2011). Antecedents and consequences of management-espoused
organizational cultural control. Journal of Business Research, 64, 437445.
Heavey, C., & Murphy, E. (2012). A proposed cooperation framework for organisations and
their leaders. Management Decision, 50(6), 9931000.
Hoffmann, W. H., & Schaper-Rinkel, W. (2001). Acquire or ally? A strategy for deciding between acquisition and cooperation. Management International Review, 41(2), 131159.
Inkpen, A. C., & Currall, S. C. (2004). The coevolution of trust, control and learning in joint
venture. Organization Science, 15(5), 586599.

Kale, P., Singh, H., & Perlmutter, H. (2000). Learning and protection of proprietary as-sets in
strategic alliances: Building relational capital. Strategic Management Journal, 21(3), 217
237.
Kanter, R. M. (JulyAugust). Collaborative advantage: The art of alliances. Harvard Business
Review, 96108.
Killing, J. P. (1988). Understanding alliances: The role of task and organizational complexity. In
F. J. Contractor, & P. Lorange (Eds.), Cooperative strategies in international business. Joint
ventures and technology alliance between firms (pp. 5567).Lexington Books.
Kumar, R., & Nti, K. O. (1998). Differential learning and interaction in alliance dynamics: A
process and outcome discrepancy model. Organization Science, 9(3), 356367.
Lai, W. H. (2011). Willingness-to-engage in technology transfer in industryuniversity
collaborations. Journal of Business Research, 64, 12181223.
Lane, P. J., & Lubatkin, M. (1998). Relative absorptive capacity and interorganizational
learning. Strategic Management Journal, 19(5), 461478.
Lane, J. L., Salk, J. E., & Lyles, M. A. (2001). Absorptive capacity, learning, and performance in
international joint ventures. Strategic Management Journal, 22, 11391161.
Langfield, K. (2008). The relations between transactional characteristics, trust and risk in the
start-up phase of a collaborative alliance. Management Accounting Research, 19, 344364.
Lee, S. M., Olson, D. L., & Trimi, S. (2012). Co-innovation: Convergenomics, collaboration,
and co-creation for organizational values. Management Decision, 50(5), 87831.
Lei, D., Slocum, J. W., & Pitts, R. A. (1997). Building cooperative advantage: Managing
strategic alliance to promote organizational learning. Journal of World Business, 32(3),
203223.
Lin, X., & Germain, R. (1998). Sustaining satisfactory joint venture relationships: The role of
conflict resolution strategy. Journal of International Business Studies, 29(1), 179196.
Mahlendorf, M. D., Rehring, J., Schffer, U., & Wyszomirski, E. (2012). In fluencing foreign
subsidiary decisions through headquarter performance measurement systems. Man-agement
Decision, 50(4), 688717.
Mohr, J., & Spekman, R. (1994). Characteristics of alliance success: Alliance attributes,
communication behavior, and conflict resolution techniques. Strategic Management
Journal, 15, 135152.
Mousa, F. T., & Wales, W. (2012). Founder effectiveness in leveraging entrepreneurial
orientation. Management Decision, 50(2), 305324.
Mowery, D. C., Oxley, J. E., & Silverman, B. S. (1996). Strategic alliances and interfirm
knowledge transfer. Strategic Management Journal, 17, 7791 (winter special issue).
Parise, S., & Sasson, L. (2002). Leveraging knowledge management across. Ivey Business
Journal, 66(4), 4147.
Park, B. I. (2011). Differences in knowledge acquisition mechanisms between IJVs with
Western vs Japanese parents: Focus on factors comprising absorptive capacity.
Management Decision, 49(3), 422443.
Parkhe, A. (1993). Strategic alliance structuring: A game the theory and transaction cost
examination of interfirm cooperation. Academy of Management Journal, 36, 794829.
Parnell, J. A., Lester, D. L., Long, Z., & Kseoglu, M. A. (2012). How environmental uncertainly affects the link between business strategy and performance in SMEs. Man-agement
Decision, 50(4), 546568.
Renko, M., Shrader, R. C., & Simon, M. (2012). Perception of entrepreneurial opportunity: A
general framework. Management Decision, 50(7), 12331251.
Ring, P. S., & Van de Ven, A. H. (1992). Structuring cooperative relationships between
organizations. Strategic Management Journal, 13, 483498.
Ring, P. S., & Van de Ven, A. H. (1994). Developmental processes of cooperative
interorganizational relationships. Academy of Management Review, 19(1), 90118.
Robson, M. J., Skarmeas, D., & Spyropoulou, S. (2006). Behavioural attribute and perfor-mance
in international strategic alliances; review and future directions. Interna-tional Marketing
Review, 23(6), 585609.
Rodenbach, M., & Brettel, M. (2012). CEO experience as micro-level origin of dynamic
capabilities. Management Decision, 50(4), 611634.
Rondn-Catalua, F., Navarro-Garca, A., Gmez-Gonzlez, J., & Rodrguez-Rad, C. (2012).
Content analysis and assessment of international codes of franchising asso-ciations.
Management Decision, 50(4), 635650.
Sambasivan, M., Siew-Phaik, L., Mohamed, Z. A., & Leong, Y. C. (2011). Impact of
interdependence between supply chain partners on strategic alliance outcomes: Role of
relational capital as a mediating construct. Management Decision, 49(4), 548569.
Snchez, J. M., Vlez, M. L., & Ramn-Jernimo, M. A. (2012). Do suppliers' formal con-trols
damage distributors' trust? Journal of Business Research, 65, 896906.
Siegel, D. S., & Renko, M. (2012). The role of market and technological knowledge in
recognizing entrepreneurial opportunities. Management Decision, 50(5), 797816.
Sohn, J. H. D. (1994). Social knowledge as control system: A proposition and evidence from the
Japanese FDI behavior. Journal of International Business Studies, 24, 295324.
Spekman, R. E., Forbes, T. M., III, Isabella, L. A., & MacAvoy, T. C. (1998). Alliance
management: A view from the past and a look to the future. Journal of Manage-ment
Studies, 35(6), 749772.
Srivastava, P., & Frankwick, G. L. (2011). Environment, management attitude, and organizational learning in alliances. Management Decision, 49(1), 156166.
Uriel, E., & Alds, J. (2005). Anlisis multivariante aplicado. Thomson.
Van Aken, J. E., & Weggeman, M. P. (2000). Managing learning in informal innovation networks: Overcoming the Daphne-dilemma. R & D Management, 30(2), 139149.
Welbourne, T. M., Neck, H., & Meyer, G. D. (2012). The entrepreneurial growth ceiling.
Management Decision, 50(5), 778796.
Whitener, E. M., Brodt, S. E., Korsgaard, M. A., & Werner, J. M. (1998). Managers as initiators
of trust: An exchange relationship framework for understanding managerial trustworthy
behavior. Academy of Management Review, 23(3), 513530.

Woodside, A. G. (2006). Making sense of

implemented strategies in new venture hospi-

tality management. An American-AustrianHungarian case research study. Tourism

Management, 27, 342349.

M. del Mar Benavides-Espinosa, D. Ribeiro-Soriano / Journal of Business Research 67 (2014) 648655

Woodside, A. G., & Kadik, J. (1991). Decision-processes in strategic alliances: Designing and
implementing international joint ventures in Eastern Europe. Journal of Euromarketing,
1(1/2), 151189.
Woodside, A. G., Kadik, J., & Vyslozil, W. (1993). Designing and implementing interna-tional
joint marketing ventures: Case research studies on new retail enterprises in Hungary.
Journal of Euromarketing, 3(1), 4359.
Woodside, A. G., Ko, E., & Huan, T. C. (2012). The new logic in building isomorphic theory of
management decision realities. Management Decision, 50(5), 765777.

655

Wu, F., & Cavusgil, S. T. (2006). Organizational learning, commitment, and joint value creation
in interfirm relationships. Journal of Business Research, 59, 8189.
Yoshino, M. Y., & Rangan, U. S. (1995). Strategic alliances. An entrepreneurial approach to
globalization. Harvard Business School Press.
Zollo, M., Reuer, J. J., & Singh, H. (2002). Interorganizational routines and performance in
strategic alliances. Organization Science, 13(6), 701713.
Zucker, L. G. (1987). Institutional theories of organization. Annual Review of Sociologic, 13,
443464.