one of the worst disasters in Norwegian

waters since World War II.

ALEXANDER L KIELLAND:
A Successful Flashback of Failed
Engineering

The Alexander L Kielland was a

pentagon type; semi-submersible, mobile
drilling unit that was constructed at a French
shipyard in 1976.Numbered P89, the
Kielland was the seventh of the newly
designed pentagon types, constructed as a
consequence of a cooperative agreement
between the Institut Franais du Ptrole and
the Neptune (an oil exploration subsidiary of
the Schlumberger group). Although the rig
was constructed as a drilling unit, ironically,
it essentially served as a flotel (floating
hotel), providing accommodation to the
offshore workers stationed at Edda2/7C. The
rig
was
originally
designed
for
accommodation and evacuation of 80
persons. Subsequently, the facilities were
expanded stepwise over a period of time
through the addition of extra modules to
ultimately provide living quarters for 318
men, with a mess hall and two cinemas.

In engineering; if it looks
right, it will go wrong; and
if it looks wrong, it will
definitely

go

wrong.

- Alan J. Harper
-By Ruben Chatterjee

Twas a rumbling evening on the

27th March 1980, with driving rain and mist,
and winds gusting at 36-45 mph, creating
waves up to 12m high; when 130 (approx.)
out of the 212 men on the Kielland were
watching the last cinema of their lives. And
who could imagine that a small instrument,
that just looked right, would be responsible
for more than 246 crying eyes. The incident
stands testimony to the devastating effects
that can occur due to a small negligence by
engineers.
Named after one of the most famous
Norwegian realistic writers of the 19th
Century, the Alexander L Kielland was a
Norwegian semi-submersible drilling rig
designed to support the 212 offshore
workers stationed at the Edda 2/7C oil
production rig in the Ekofisk oil field,
situated approximately 320 km east of
Dundee, Scotland. The rig essentially
capsized while working, causing a death toll
of 123 persons and marking the incident as

[Fig1:- Diagrammatic Plan View of the Alexander L.

Kielland showing location of rescue equipment.][1]

The
rescue
and
evacuation
equipment consisted of 7 lifeboats, 16
launchable rafts and 12 throw overboard
1

rafts. Each lifeboat and liferafts could

accommodate 50 and 20 persons
respectively. This gives a theoretical
capacity of 910 persons [1]. Okay, so if there
were 212 workers on board and the rescue
equipment could accommodate 910 people,
how did 123 people end up dying?
Although this was the position at the time of
the accident, it is worthwhile to note that
four of the launchable rafts were ashore for
maintenance.

would essentially necessitate the use of

thicker plates in the affected areas [2]. At this
point, it is critically important to mention
that a Sonar Hydrophone was added to the
brace D-6 as a design modification, to assist
in accurate positioning of the rig with
respect to the well.

The platform consisted of five

columns which contributed as the major
buoyancy elements. Mounted on 22m
diameter pontoons, it has an overall height
of 35.6m. The columns and the deck on the
top were supported by braces. According to
the designers, diagonal and lower horizontal
braces were not fitted between columns B &
C, and C&D as they would hinder the
operations of the supply ships without
contributing significantly to stress reduction
in other braces [2].

[Fig3 (a):- Hydrophone fitting on brace D-6][1]

[Fig 3 (b):- sectional elevation with nominal dimensions.

Dimension A is the throat thickness of the attachment
weld, specified to be 6 mm] [1]

[Fig2:- Main arrangement

Kielland][2]

of the

Due to the poor weather, it was

decided to move the rig away from Edda
2/7C by means of winches. This was
accomplished without incident before
5.50pm [1]. At 6.30pm approximately, the
workers on board fell a sudden impact,
followed by trembling. Many thought it to
be an effect of the high waves caused by the
turbulent winds. But this was just the
beginning of a disastrous storm. Shortly
after the first impact, there was another and
soon the platform shook and started to heel.
The heeling continued until it reached an
angle of 35o , at which point the radio
operator sent out an emergency message,

Alexander L.

While the upper and diagonal braces

were designed to be watertight, all lower
level horizontal braces were free flooding.
Closed braces would have resulted in
increased loads due to buoyancy, which
2

Mayday , Mayday, Kielland is capsizing [1].

Although the initial collapse occurred in a
minute, the platform kept floating for 20
minutes or so. During this time, quite a few
attempts were made to launch the lifeboats,
with only two out of seven launched
successfully. Three of the lifeboats were
smashed against the rigs legs due to the
storm winds and waves whilst lowering,
leading to a number of casualties [3]. As the
water kept flowing in through the ventilators
and other openings on the deck, the last
anchor wire attached to Column B strained
leading the platform to overturn and float on
the water upside down.

[Fig 4:- Location of fractures of the braces connected to

the Column D.][2]

The crack initiated at 12o clock and

6o clock positions, looking at the
hydrophone fitting with the brace horizontal.
Due to lateral contraction the crack further
propagated along the circumference of the
brace until the remaining ligament was too
small to sustain the applied stress [1]. Due to
this impulsive parting of the ligament, the
braces connecting to column D were
subjected to dynamic loading which rather
amplified the loads compared to static
conditions.

Soon
after
the
disaster,
a
Commission of Enquiry was appointed
through Royal Decree to investigate the
accident [2]. Although it was evident that
Column D had failed, the Commission
further carried out an investigation to clearly
determine the physical causes of the
accident. The investigations among other
things included chemical, mechanical and
fracture analysis of the structure. In addition,
specialists appointed by the commission
carried out hydrodynamic, strength and
stability calculations to get a concrete report
for the cause of the disaster.

At this point, it is important to point out a

significant flaw in the design of the
platform. The design was essentially flawed
as there was an absence of structural
redundancy, that is, a fail-safe mechanism.
The remaining braces were not designed to
operate in the absence of brace D6. Hence,
the domino effect.

The report concluded that the rig

collapsed due to the domino effect triggered
by the fatigue failure of brace D6. This
failure of the brace essentially, initiated at
the toe of the 6mm fillet weld which joined
a
non-load-bearing
flange
plate
(hydrophone) to brace D6. The following
diagram shows the location of the fractures
on different braces that connected column D
to the rest of the structure.

A study of the first examination of

the brace stub attached to column D
revealed traces of sharp, clean fractures with
almost negligible plastic deformation and
therefore, in essence, the fracture of brace
D6 could be concluded as a brittle fracture.
However, the fracture of the remaining
braces and the subsequent structure was
3

concluded as mainly ductile overload failure

[2]
.

Further, a thick layer of corrosion

products and traces of biological activity on
the fracture surfaces indicated parts of
fracture around the circumference of the
hydrophone support were much older than
the D6 fracture. Further, the age of the
fractures around the inner weld were
substantiated by paint on the fracture
surfaces which indicated that this weld
cracked over a length of 70mm during
fabrication [2]. Although the weld thickness
matched the general specified minimum
weld throat thickness of 6mm, the weld
penetration into the hydrophone tube
material was inadequate. The low
penetration depth increases the probability
of defects. Further, it makes the material
more susceptible to lamellar tearing.

[Fig 5:- Surface appearance of fracture in brace D6][1].

A microscopic study of the fractures

indicated a surface marked with periodic
striations. This represents a slight change in
the direction of the crack or a change in the
crack growth rate. The study showed that
the appearance of the fracture changed after
the initial 0.3m or so; giving a coarse and
fibrous structure. This indicates that the
crack propagation was not uniform and that
it was growing in leaps. Further, some of the
cracks had paint on the surface, which
further indicates that the cracks could have
been introduced during the welding process.

The above diagram shows the

fracture in brace D6. As shown, there were
two independent initiation sites, No I from
the outer fillet weld of the hydrophone
mount and No II at the inner fillet weld.
Such points of initiation of fatigue cracking
are typical of a fillet welded joint exposed to
alternating tensile stress. Although welded
joints are more economical and may provide
rigidity, poor profile of fillet welds may
increase stress concentration, thereby
reducing fatigue strength. Further, a crack or
a slag filled intrusion, commonly up to
0.5mm in depth, is usually visible at the toe
of the fillet. This defect plays a major role in
reducing the fatigue life and hence, it is a
current practice to grind the toe of the fillet
welds in critical areas to remove such
defects [1].

Examination revealed that some area

of the fractures indicated traces of lamellar
tearing. These fractures could have occurred
during the welding process, as they were
consistent with the poor through thickness
properties of the material in the hydrophone
tube. Further, the shape of the weld beads
was unsatisfactory with weld flanks angles
4

up to 90o. Also, most of the cracks,

including the ones contaminated by paint
showed a rough fibrous surface. Such
defects are typical to lamellar tearing,
caused by the combination of shrinkage
strain and during the cooling of the weld
with low through thickness ductility in the
steel.

not accounted for in the material

specifications. Further, it may be reasonable
to conclude that the low quality of steel for
the hydrophone fitting could be one of the
most critical factors for the premature failure
of the D6 brace.
The ultimate strength in the throughthickness direction of the hydrophone
support was 398MPa and hence below the
in-plane tensile strength which was specified
490-608MPa for the brace material [2]. The
cold cracks in the weld along with the
increased stress concentrations, due to the
weakened flange plate and poor weld
profile; in combination with cyclical
stresses, which are rather common in the
North Sea due to the turbulent wind, led to
the failure of the brace and consequently the
collapse of the rig.

Although the failure of brace D6

could be concluded as brittle fracture, the
fracture of the remaining members of the
structure connected to column D were
mainly ductile overload fractures with a
fibrous surface appearance. Most of the
fractures were relatively flat with small or
non-existing shear lips [2].
At this note it is also important to
throw a little light on the material properties
of the braces and the hydrophone support.
The material was carbon-manganese
structural steel with specified minimum
yield strength of 355MPa [2]. Extensive
material testing, post-accident, using
extracted specimens from the brace and the
hydrophone bearing essentially confirmed
that the materials used had their material
properties within the specified range with
respect to chemical composition, in-plate
tensile properties, Charpy notch toughness,
etc. Although this may sound really good,
the through thickness ductility of the
material, which was not specified, was not
adequate.

It is indeed natural to question the

design specifications and the control system,
especially, when a disaster of such
magnitude is caused by material failure and
engineering negligence. If we were to hold
someone accountable for this disaster, we
may like to point our fingers at the two
primary parties. Firstly, the design engineers
at the Institut Franais du Ptrole and the
Neptune, for neglecting the hydrophone
from the design specifications. Further, we
may even consider
the
classification
society for incorrectly reviewing the design
and carrying out the inspection during the
construction phase.

It is a usual industrial practice to

have an area reduction of 15-30% to avoid
lamellar tearing. Since the hydrophone was
added as a design modification, the non-load
bearing flange plate was not considered a
part of the primary structure, and hence, was

In historical perspective, this period

had
considerable
developments
in
understanding, especially in quantitative
terms, the effect of fillet welded joints on
the fatigue strength of steels. It is rather
5

depressing to note that the classification

society decided not to incorporate any
provisions for design against fatigue, even
though it was known that welded joints
reduced the fatigue life. It may be even be
noteworthy to consider that the British
Welding Institute had gathered the data on
fatigue strengths and these resulted in
certain proposals for design rules. At that
time, it was generally assumed that the
fatigue limit of carbon steel was about half
of the tensile strength. Hence, any factor of
safety greater than two could be considered
safe [1]. Similarly, there was no
consideration towards controlling the
through thickness ductility of the steel plate.
Although, lamellar tearing had been
encountered, it was only in heavy plate
fabrication.
Evidently,
the
potential
consequences of welding a small element
such as the sonar hydrophone were certainly
not understood.

periodically
during
its
operation.
Theoretically, the inspection should cover a
thorough visual examination of the complete
structure that is, including the weld joints.
The sheer negligence on part of the
inspectors and the authority carrying out the
inspections, to detect the fairly significant
cracks at the hydrophone support on brace
D6 can be attributed to the lack of attention.
This could be considered to be majorly
responsible for the collapse of the rig, and
loss of 123 precious lives. The remains of
this specimen of failed engineering lie under
the Nedstrand Fjord

Another design flaw was the absence

of a structural redundancy. That is
essentially a fail-safe mechanism that would
support the system in case a major
component failed. Due to the lack of
structurally redundant components, as the
major load carrying brace failed, the other
members were overloaded, leading to an
evitable collapse. Ironically, at the time
pentagon rigs were designed, it was a
standard practice in some areas of
engineering to design a mechanism to
protect against such an outcome.

In order to avoid engineering

disasters such as the Alexander L Kielland, it
is essential to realize the significance of
safety management through risk reduction
actions. This could be implemented through
a thorough calculation of risk during the
design phase. Increasing margins of safety
factors by a small fraction could have a
significant impact on the lives of many
employees. Individual and organizational
knowledge, skills and attitudes towards
adopting a safety culture and regulated
quality control checks may contribute
towards reduction of errors and omission of
significant data during the design,
fabrication and operation phase. Further,
research and development should be carried
out towards uncertain phenomena that may
challenge the design and structural integrity
of critical engineering structures, such as oil
and gas rigs [4].

It is rather interesting to note that as

per the requirements of the classification
society, the Alexander L Kielland had been
inspected during fabrication, and further,

A concrete step towards the positive

direction could be the implementation of
robust design techniques. A robust design
aims at obtaining a design that is most
6

insensitive to uncertainties. One such

suggested technique is the Allowable Load
Set (ALS) in which, unlike the usual
structural design, wherein a load is given at
a point and the size and shape of the
structure is to be found to support the
structure; the ALS supports design engineers
to determine a set of load that are safe to a
given structure [5].

escape ways and coverage of equipment for

safety and life, such as lifeboats and survival
suits, should be an integral part of the design
of the rig.
The lesson that still needs to be
remembered is that human factors play a
decisive role in safety and, that proper safety
culture and management are required in the
involved organisations [6]. It is of utmost
importance to realise that proper material
supply, adequate inspection standards,
operator conduct and robust engineering
designs can have disastrous consequences if
ignored or left unaddressed. Fundamental
things such as avoiding errors on assembly,
design and material problems, and providing
adequate worker training and safety
education can help convert a devastating
accident into a successful endeavour.
Mankind has had a perpetual habit of
learning from its mistakes. What we can
only hope after a dark and stormy night is a
pleasant day with a bright sunshine.

Engineering failures could be

calamitous
and
pose
devastating
consequences to the society at large. It is
therefore suggested to incorporate improved
design criteria to reduce, if not eliminate
fabrication defects, fatigue and damage to
the integrity of the structure due to corrosion
and chemical wear. Further, periodic
inspections should be carried out in order to
determine the ultimate progressive failure of
structures at the initiating event. It is not
only important to have such criteria, but it is
even more important to practice these
criteria. Also, regular quality checks can
help in controlling and mitigating hazards at
an early stage before escalation. At this note,
it is also important to incorporate an
effective escape and evacuation procedure
and system that can help fight against such
accidents.
This could include a total
assessment of hazards that can cause failure.
Special care should be taken for operations
in the Arctic region that involve cold climate
and ice loading. There should be a thorough
emergency preparedness for the area. This
may involve a rescue helicopter stationed
along the coast and a standby vessel in the
field. Also, periodic training sessions must
be provided to all employees to ensure they
know how to react in case of such disastrous
accidents.
Construction of emergency

References & Bibliography:

1.

2.
3.
4.

Engineering Catastrophes: Causes

and Effects of Major Accidents, by J.
F. Lancaster
Case
Histories
in
Offshore
Engineering, edited by G. Maier
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http://www.psa.no/getfile.php/PDF/
Konstruksjonsseminar%20aug2010/
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5.
6.
7.

8.

9.

10.

http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1
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