1AC Plan

The United States should significantly reduce its marine

presence in Okinawa.

1AC Advantage
The advantage is the alliance
An alliance crisis over Okinawa basing is inevitable and is
enough to destroy the alliancerecent election
demonstrates the anti-base movement is accelerating
Lind 15, associate professor of government at Dartmouth, Could Okinawa
Derail U.S.-Japan Relations?, April, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/couldokinawa-derail-us-japan-relations-12526?page=3
Though the March symposium showed that the allies have made
tremendous progress toward Reischauers goal of an equal
partnership, noticeable exclusions remain. Although in 1962 a bold
Tachiya brought the issue of Okinawa onto the stage, this time it wasnt
invited back. A second symposium panel focused on the theme of JFK and
foreign policy, but paid relatively little attention to contemporary alliance
challengesand no attention to Okinawa. Peculiar, for two reasons. First,
although the eventual return of Okinawa to Japan was legislated in 1971, it
was actually an important accomplishment of the Kennedy administration.
Reischauer believed that a crisis over Okinawa could happen at

any time, and would damage or even destroy the alliance. So

as ambassador he devoted tremendous energy to negotiating the reversion
of Okinawa with both the U.S. military and the Japanese. This effort
floundered for a while after the presidents assassination, and was not
realized until the Nixon years. But Reischauers contribution was an important
Kennedy-era legacy, and thus a strange omission from a panel on that topic.
But thats the problem with non-events; though always eager to assign blame
for a crisis that did happen, we forget to confer praise for one that didnt.
Okinawa also belonged on that stage because it still remains a vexing
challenge in the U.S.-Japan alliance. In the past few years, as Japans
dispute with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands grows more heated, with
aircraft and ships from each side circling around the disputed islands, Shinzo
Abes government has emphasized the dangers that Chinese military
modernization and territorial claims pose to Japan. In this environment, the
U.S.-Japan alliance and Okinawas bases acquire even more significance than
in the past. But also in the past few years, Okinawas anti-base
movement has accelerated , and in general alliance managers face a
more complex political environment . In fact, just a few days after the
symposium, Okinawas governor , Takeshi Onaga, brought the issue
back into the headlines . Japans Defense Ministry had begun preliminary
exploration and drilling on a facility that would replace the U.S. Marine base
at Futenma. Tokyo and Washington view the move as essential to create a
sustainable U.S. presence, because it moves the Marines out of a potentially
dangerous urban location. But Okinawans didnt want the facility

moved to a different part of Okinawathey wanted it off the island

completely , and elected Governor Onaga on that platform . On March
22 he issued a deadline of one week to stop the drilling, or lose the permit.
Tokyo ignored him, describing his demand as very regrettable, and
suspending the governors work stoppage order. Onaga responded by
vowing, I will knuckle down and respond to this in keeping with the
will of the Okinawans. What happens next? Once again , wrote DC
scribe Chris Nelson, the base relocation issue threatens to blow up in
our face . The Okinawans are , in Carol Fulps words, becoming
visible . Theyre shouting louder and louder and want to be
onstage too. Averting an alliance crisis over Okinawa was
Reischauer and Kennedys challenge. Averting another one is ours.

Anything short of getting rid of Futenma makes alliance

collapse inevitable and cooperation ineffectivekeeping
the base creates cycles of resentment
Eldridge 12

[2.3.12, Robert D. Eldridge is a former tenured associate professor at Osaka

University and deputy chief of staff, The Okinawa Base Problem Today,
http://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a00501/]
While the U nited S tates recognizes the political reasons and the practical
necessity of relocating Futenma, particularly as it is located in the middle of a crowded
city of 90,000, it is up to the central government and prefectural and local
governments to make it happen. Due to the finger-pointing among the
central government, Okinawa Prefectural Government, and Nago City, the planned location of Futenma
Replacement Facility,

there has been no movement in any direction in about

a decade. Indeed, one could argue that the situation has only gotten worse. If this remains the case,
the FRF could go the way of the early 1970s decision to relocate Naha Military Portat the time of this

the inability to follow through

on the relocation of Futenma compounds the other issues and
writing, the ports relocation remains incomplete. Indeed,

perceptions of those problems . This then causes the discussion

about Okinawa to become more contentious and emotional, and
turn into a vicious and endless cycle devoid of objectivity and
reason. It becomes nearly impossible to reach a middle ground or
look at the issues dispassionately and solutions open-mindedly.

Failure to give in to the public destabilizes the allianceit

creates a rift between Okinawa and the central
government that makes cooperation unsustainable
The Mainichi 14

[11/17/14, Mainichi is one of the Main Newspapers in Japan, Return Futenma

base relocation negotiations to square one,

http://mainichi.jp/english/english/perspectives/news/20141117p2a00m0na00
8000c.html]
If the central government ignores the results of the latest election
and goes ahead with the relocation as planned, the gap between
mainland Japan and Okinawa will only widen, and could produce a
decisive rift . Okinawa cannot accept an excessive burden of hosting
military bases while feeling that it is being discriminated against.
Conflicting positions are certain to destabilize the Japan-U.S.
security alliance . The central government has direct control over
security, but this doesn't mean that it can disregard the will of the
people . If security policies don't win understanding from locals or
the public as a whole, then they will not stand . In situations like
this, in which central government policy and the will of the people
clash, the government should make an effort to close the divide .
However, it has not sufficiently fulfilled its responsibility in this regard. On the contrary, Onaga's victory
was fueled by intense anger from people in Okinawa over the way
the administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has proceeded in connection with
the Futenma base issue. Nakaima was elected in the previous gubernatorial election after promising to
relocate the Futenma base outside Okinawa Prefecture. But at the end of last year, he approved the central government's
application to proceed with landfill work off Henoko in recognition of the government's economic stimulus measures -- a
violation of his public pledge.

The pride of the people in Okinawa was hurt by the

central government's tactics , under which the government

appeared to think it could win Okinawa over if it provided money in
the form of stimulus measures. With the problem having become so complicated, it is
unrealistic to adhere to the current relocation plans . This summer, the central
government started a drilling survey on the seabed off the coast of the Henoko district in line with its land refill plans. It
has indicated that it will go ahead with the relocation to Henoko regardless of the latest election results, but the survey

if the Henoko relocation plans are taken back to

the drawing board, this must not result in the Futenma base being
should be called off. However,

left where it is . The whole point of the Futenma relocation is to

remove the danger posed by the base, which, with its close proximity to residential
areas, has been described as the most dangerous in the world. The Abe
administration has promised to halt operations at Futenma within five years,
and it must make an effort to lighten the burden posed by hosting
U.S. military bases. At the same time, it must not cut back the yearly budget of over 300 billion yen that it
has promised to provide Okinawa in the form of stimulus measures. Eighteen years have passed since an agreement was
made on returning the Futenma base. It is probably no easy task to renegotiate an issue over which Japan and the U.S.
have made repeated agreements, but

if the Japanese and U.S. indeed see eye to eye

on the deep influence of public opinion in Okinawa, then discussions

will naturally progress to a new stage. The Japanese and U.S. governments say that
relocation of the Futenma base to Henoko is the "only solution." However, the view that this is unrealistic has emerged
within U.S. Congress. Senator John McCain and others proposed that Futenma be consolidated with the U.S. military's
Kadena air base. This summer, meanwhile, Joseph Nye, former U.S. deputy to the undersecretary of state for security
assistance, pointed out the weaknesses of U.S. military bases on Okinawa, and sought revisions to the deployment of U.S.
military forces in Japan. So even in the United States, objections have emerged. The role that the Japan-U.S. security
alliance has in providing stability for Japan and other countries in Asia is large .

Considering China's
military expansion and maritime advances, and the situation in

North Korea, it is necessary to maintain the deterrence provided by

U.S. military forces in Japan. The Japanese government must address
friction with Okinawa and seek new negotiations with the U.S. to
devise a solution -- even if this is for the worthy purpose of
smoothly operating the Japan-U.S. security alliance .

Independently, continued discontent over presence in

Okinawa saps focus from the alliance and trades off with
broader cooperation over other issues
Good citing Smith 13, political reporter for ABC News, Why the
Okinawa Base Relocation Matters,
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2013/12/why-the-okinawa-baserelocation-matters/

For 17 years, the U.S. and Japan have been haggling over a Marine
base in Okinawa . On Friday, the problem was solved, as the governor of
Okinawa prefecture approved a permit to begin construction of a
relocated base in a less-populated area, breaking tensions that have persisted since the 1995 rape of a
Japanese girl that reanimated opposition among residents to the presence of Marine Corps Air Station
Futenma. Read more: Okinawa Governor Gives Go-Ahead for New U.S. Base With the final legal hurdle
cleared (despite opposition from residents in Nago, where the new base will be built), Japan will construct
the new air base, and the Pentagon says it expects U.S. troops to move there in 2022, U.S. and Japanese
officials said. There is some optimism that the construction permit has cleared a logjam for President
Obama's strategic Asia "rebalance"-an oft-advertised, if not-so-often evidenced, refocusing of U.S.
diplomatic and military attention on that continent, away from a decade-long mire of conflict in the Middle
East and Afghanistan. Japan is a key ally in Asia, and the planned base relocation could ease tensions and
free up time for diplomats and military officials-some of whom have worked on the Futenma issue for 17
years-to look ahead at broader strategic problems. " This

issue has sucked a lot of

oxygen out of the alliance management for too many years, " a
Japanese official said, calling the base " one of the biggest issues
between Washington , D.C., and Tokyo " at times in years past. The U.S. and
Japan can move onto more "future-oriented work ,"
more: Obama Names China Envoy, Economic Ties in Mind

the official said. Read

Among those future-oriented

issues are Chinese territorial expansion , as seen in

the recent

announcement of an air-defense identification zone ( ADIZ );

maritime issues ; the threat of North Korea ; trilateral cooperation
with Japan and South Korea, two nations at odds with one another,
but which share a U.S. interest in North Korean containment ; and
negotiations for

a Trans-Pacific Trade Partnership (TPP).

All

of those

are major

elements of U.S. strategic maneuvering in Asia , and all require work

with Japan. Realigning U.S. forces in Japan is seen as " the spine of
the rebalance" to Asia, a senior U.S. defense official told reporters on a conference call Friday. " It
will free up a lot of senior-level attention, " including that of

President

Obama , Hagel , Kerry , and their Japanese counterparts, the defense official
said.

A "seemingly unsolvable" problem, the Futenma base has been a

" real thorn in the side of the alliance relationship ," said Sheila A. Smith, an
Asia-Pacific expert and senior fellow for Japanese Studies. "What

our government now

wants to do is focus more broadly on a host of strategic issues

between the U.S. and Japan that include not just force posture
issues , but how do Japan and the U.S. understand the changing
strategic environment in Asia ," Smith said. The relocation of Futenma will
allow 9,000 U.S. marines to move off Okinawa , with 5,000 of them moving to
Guam, the Associated Press reported,

fulfilling another element of the

"rebalance ," according to Smith : a more dispersed U.S. military posture in

the region, with Marines able to respond more readily to
humanitarian / environmental disasters and in the event of conflict
between North and South Korea . The relocation

of Marines

is

" absolutely critical to the United States' ongoing rebalance to the AsiaPacific region and our ability to maintain a geographically
distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable force
posture in the region, " Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said in a statement
Friday.

Japan is currently pushing for greater security autonomy

within the framework of the alliancethe plan allows
them to step up their role which is critically to a
sustainable and effective alliance
Envall 15
[2015, H.D.P. (David) Envall is a research fellow in the Department of
International Relations at the Australian National University, Clashing
Expectations, Chapter 4 in United States Engagement in the Asia Pacific:
Perspectives from Asia]
The approach adopted by Abes government since 2012 has been to
balance concerns over Japans security autonomy and equality
more clearly within the context of developing the alliance . Abe has
sought, in particular, to sideline comprehensive security thinking within
Japans security expectations and instead return to the hard-power
normalization agenda of the mid-2000 period (20042006). This shift has been
spurred on by the worsening of relations in Northeast Asia since 2010,
especially in terms of maritime disputes such as that over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. In late January 2013, these
tensions reached a near crisis-point when the Japanese government
alleged that a Chinese warship had targeted fire control" radar on a
Japanese destroyer near the Senkaku area, prompting Japan to lodge a
diplomatic protest with China.51 The result has been that Japanese strategic
thinking under Abe's LDP is now more threat-centric and China-focused,
although to some extent this trend was already underway under the Kan and
Noda administrations. This is illustrated by the DPJs development of the
dynamic defense force concept , whereby Japans defense forces

would have greater readiness. mobility, flexibility . sustainability,

and versatility.52 The dynamic defense approach, or something similar, has
persisted under the Abe administration. A central aim of the Abe
govemment, however, has been to make what it describes as a more
proactive contribution to peace,"53 in other words addressing the
free rider accusations that became such a prominent part of the
alliance debate in 2010. While aiming to reduce the US military base
burden on Okinawa, the government has also sought to ensure that
alliance priorities, such as the relocation of the Futenma airbase
within Okinawa, proceed. A revised NDPG and new National Security
Strategy similarly move Japan along a hard-power path of greater
alliance burden sharing. So far Japans more proactive approach has included a more engaged regional
diplomacy, increased defense spending, a new National Security Council (NSC), and constitutional reinterpretation. The
formation of the NSC is aimed at underpinning the central place of the prime minister and Cabinet in the decision-making
process as well as providing a location for managing crises and engaging in intelligence activities. On constitutional

the Abe government announced it was reinterpreting the

Constitution to give Japan the right to carry out collective selfdefense, albeit under certain conditions. Despite its great efforts at reorienting Japans
reform. In July 2014

strategic posture, the Abe government's struggles with the Constitution highlight the continuing tensions between
comprehensive security and normalization. Although Abe has got much closer to his goal of constitutional change, the
final outcome was not the amendment for which he argued in 2006-07 or again in 2012 (Le, one backed by votes in the
Diet and at a national referendum). But a more modest reinterpretation accompanied by several limitations. Abe's agenda
quickly proved controversial amongst the Japanese public and was watered down by the LDPs coalition partner, New
Komeito. to include constraints on how this new right might be exercised. The right to collective self-defense that emerged
from these negotiations is one that can only be exercised if Japan's survival is under threat, where there are no
altematives, and when only a minimum level of force is used. A further watering-down of the eventual legislation needed
to enact these principles may also occur in 2015. Clearly, Japan remains strongly attached to soft-power security norms
embedded in the comprehensive security idea and Yoshidas eschewing of hard-power ambitions. Meanwhile, Abe has
damaged Japans ability to reassure the region of its peaceful intentions, a key idea within globalist and comprehensive
security thinking and an important underpinning of the regional order during the Cold War. Abe has created this problem
in particular by linking in the regions minds his stance on collective self-defense with his denial over historical issues and
provocative visits to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine. Conclusion David Arase contends that Japan has been so
preoccupied with the challenges of developing hard power that it does not yet coordinate soft and hard power within an
overall foreign policy strategy."56 Under the Hatoyama administration, this characterization of Japanese power

upended. The country had failed to coordinate hard

and soft power, but not because of a preoccupation with the former.
Under Hatoyama, Japan became fixated more with soft power. The DPJ experience suggested,
moreover that Japan was struggling to find a new Goldilocks
consensus" or a grand strategy not too hard but not too soft, not
too Asian and not too Western, as suggested by Samuels.57 Japan under the DPJ did not
strike a balance between national strength and national autonomy
to create new security options for Japan." Instead, Gilbert Rozmans assessment of
coordination was in fact

Japanese strategic thinking provides a better characterization of the Hatoyama experience: Japan exhibited neither
realist thinking about maximizing power in an uncertain world nor idealist thinking about achieving some principles of
regional and global order."53 In developing a grand strategy with bilateral, multilateral. UN-centered, autonomous and

a key
challenge to finding a strategic balance is the difficulty involved in
Asia-oriented dimensions, Japan effectively chased too many hares."59 This chapters argument has been that

combining the two strategic concepts of comprehensive security

and normalization . The incremental addition of such concepts to the
US-Japan alliance since its inception has progressively exposed their
contradictions. Policymakers have at different stages been oveny
preoccupied with competing objectives: with balancing hard and soft
power, with widening autonomy and increasing equality while
minimizing obligations, or with providing reassurance to the region
while avoiding dependence on the alliance. Such messiness in security policy is not
necessarily unusual; after all. Many modern democracies struggle with the task of developing coherent national security

is faced with a complex regional environment. a

difficult history, and a convoluted web of domestic security norms .
Even with the passing of the DPJ, however, some of these contradictions remain. As Hughes points out. Japan is
still sandwiched between the United States and China.60 and it has
no easy way of harmonizing its various security interests. The
strategies. Moreover. Japan

contradictions in the expectations of Japan's own security role

continue to make it more difficult for the country to set coherent
expectations of the United States, which in turn undermines mutual
confidence . US arguments that a more limited bargain centered on "core expectations" might be preferable to a
complicated globalist agreement in part reflect ambitions to simplify the alliance. Some Japanese likewise argue that,
even

while bearing in mind the global significance of the US-Japan

alliance. there is also a need to focus efforts on deepening the
regional' side?"1 The problems of the Senkaku islands that have emerged since the Hatoyama administration,
and continue to plague the Abe administration, reinforce such views. The Hatoyama administration's travails, however,
may well signal the last major attempt at reconciling ideas of comprehensive security and normalization. The response of
the administrations led by Kan and Noda to these failures was to drop Hatoyama's ambitious strategic agenda and instead
pursue a low-key approach. Since 2012. the Abe administration has pursued a more ambitious reform program.

Where there have been attempts to balance comprehensive security

and normalization, they have come from the LDPs coalition partner,
New Komeito, rather than Abe and the LDP. Instead. Abe has sought to shift Japan's
strategic vision further away from the DPJ's globalist ambitions and back to the hard-power orientation established in the
mid-2000 period (2004-2006). Abes successors in the LDP may move even further away from comprehensive security

this trend also presents challenges. Equality within

the alliance may be improved by the Abe administrations attempts
to boost Japan's security capabilities, but so far this has occurred at
the expense of reassuring the region. A Japan less able to reassure
East Asia may become even more dependent on the alliance, more
vulnerable to entrapment and, in the end, less autonomous. Japans
and globalist thinking. But

clashing security expectations of its own security role and that of

the United States, remain unresolved.

Futenma relocation is a test case for Japans push for a

greater role in the alliancefailure to reduce US presence
and accommodate Okinawan pressure makes the alliance
ineffective and unsustainable in the long run
Bisbee 13
[2013, James Bisbee, Graduate Researcher at The Paul H. Nitze School Of
Advanced International Studies At Johns Hopkins University, THE UNITED
STATES AND JAPAN IN GLOBAL CONTEXT: 2013,
http://www.reischauercenter.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/08012013yearbook2013.pdf]
when Okinawans are asked about the functional aspects of U.S.
bases, specifically the future direction of the burden born by
Okinawa, the answers tell a different story. As depicted in Panel B, roughly 75% of
Yet,

Okinawans have consistently called for the complete removal or the

decrease of US bases over time . The contrast between the higher level strategic views regarding the U.S.
bases in Okinawa and the policy-relevant views on troop numbers and facilities underscores NIMBY politics at play. Although

Okinawans are sensitive to the larger strategic calculus involved in

maintaining the bases, they resist future scenarios that do not
include a reduction in troop presence. It is these sentiments that
the DPJ and Hatoyama captured in the election campaign in 2009. On the
Futenma relocation issue in particular, a gap between the views of mainland Japanese and Okinawan residents emerges. Over 70% of
Okinawans opposed the Nago City destination in 2012, compared to less than 50% of mainland Japanese (see Panel A). In detail, only 11% of
total respondents on the mainland strongly disagreed with the statement that Futenma Should be Relocated to Nago City while a full 40% of
Okinawans strongly disagreed. This contrast, combined with the 19% of mainland respondents who replied Dont Know / No Answer reinforces
NIMBY politics at play. When asked about these opinions in greater detail, those in support of the move predominantly cited safety concerns
relating to Futenmas current location in Ginowan City, followed by economic justifications (see Panel B). Mainland respondents, again
reflecting their lack of direct exposure to the issues at hand, responded much more strongly that the Henoko destination was the only option.
Interestingly, national defense was the lowest among both Okinawans and mainland Japanese, suggesting that, while the Alliance itself is still
viewed as necessary, the strategic rationale for Futenmas current location (i.e., co-location of troops and helicopters) does not resonate with
the public. Those against the move were also given a follow-up question, asking where else the base should be moved to. Among those
against the Nago City relocation destination, the majority of both mainlanders and Okinawans support either completely dismantling the base
with no replacement or moving the facilities overseas (see Panel C). Unsurprisingly, the third most popular option among mainlanders was to
leave the base in Futenma while the third most popular option among Okinawans was to move the base elsewhere in Japan (not Okinawa).
Also of note is that none of the Okinawan respondents either for or against the Nago City option replied dont know / no answer in the follow-

The opinion polls cited

above emphasize the dichotomy in public perception of the Futenma
relocation project against the more theoretical topic of the Alliance .
up questions, reflecting the relatively strong polarization of the issue on the island.

The motivating factors for opinions about the base are specific in nature, highlighting the role of NIMBY politics as the main source of

the rhetoric of Hatoyamas campaign and the appeal of

broader strategic considerations were significant, albeit short lived .
obstacles. However,

The data summarized below refer specifically to the DPJ efforts under Hatoyama to re-evaluate the existing relocation proposals. The questions
were broken down into two parts. The first asked whether the respondents approved the initial attempt to relocate the base outside of
Okinawa while the second asked whether the respondents approved the ensuing acceptance of the existing plan following Hatoyamas

In line with the results presented above, there is a clear gap

between Okinawan and mainland Japanese responses with
Okinawans vastly preferring the initial attempts to relocate the base
off the island. Conclusion: The Future of Futenma As of May 2013, the future of the FRF project remains elusive, with the ball
resignation.

now in Okinawas court: the governor now must sign off on an extensive environmental assessment report the last hurdle to actually starting

Optimistic projections peg the earliest potential

date for closing Futenma at 2023 (Travis Tritten and Chiyomi Sumida, 2013). With the return of the LDP to
power, its pro-active leader, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, reportedly is serious about resolving the
Okinawa basing issue during his term in office. Still, the history of
Futenma has been filled with disappointment for all parties, and
there is no reason yet to be even cautiously optimistic. Opposition
the construction at the Henoko site.

forces in Okinawa still have the lead and the momentum. The stillborn proposal agreed to in 2006 is a stark reminder of the
uncertainty springing from an increasingly volatile political
environment when it comes to the future of bases on Okinawa. Still, one
cannot dismiss the Abe administrations intention to resolve the Futenma issue by using traditional levels that seemed to work before. In the
words of one Japanese diplomat: Im sure the Abe administration will use all the tools it has in trying to persuade the Okinawan people that
the government and other parts of Japan are very supportive of Okinawa for their taking up the burden of accepting this replacement facility.
The benefit of accepting this replacement facility is not only the return of Futenma but also various other [means] of [economic] support
through economic stimulus packages for other parts of Okinawa. This quote emphasizes an important aspect of this papers analysis that
needs discussing: namely, the gap in political sensitivity between Tokyo and Okinawa. American officials are not the only ones who risk not
taking seriously a changing security perspective implied by the brash idealism demonstrated by the Hatoyama administration.

Traditional political and economic levers may no longer work.

Okinawans in this case are unlikely to be intimidated by political
sticks or pacified by additional carrots in the form of public works
spending and development packages. As described by Kent Calder in Embattled Garrisons (2007),
compensation politics is a very effective way to maintain smoothly
functioning bases as long as the negative and positive externalities
are clearly defined. Indeed, Calder uses the U.S. bases in Okinawa as an example of good base-politics management.
However, an evolving security perspective may threaten the positive
externalities afforded by the military bases, at least in the short run. If this is the case, the
standard compensation politics like those described in the officials statement above are less

likely to be effective. This is not to argue that a third dimension to Japans security perspective is threatening the
foundation of the Alliance. Rather, the key to maintaining alliance objectives, including
the U.S. military presence in Okinawa, may lie in modifying
traditional arguments in support of the Alliance to accommodate
growing support in Japan for a strategic-autonomy approach . As the
externalities associated with maintaining U.S. bases in Okinawa ,
particularly the argument for the provision of national security, are challenged, the number of
stakeholders in the discussion is likely to grow beyond the ability of
Tokyo to satiate with pork barrel legislation and local development
projects . Framed as such, Japans evolving national security perspective
presents an opportunity to restart and modernize the Alliance in a
way that the functional negotiations conducted in the Defense
Posture Review Initiative were unable to accomplish. Beyond modernizing the physical
military capabilities, the U.S.-Japan security arrangements should be refreshed
to acknowledge the growing public support of a new strategic
perspective that challenges the traditional arguments backing the
alliance relationship . Initiating these discussions at a time when the public has swung
back toward the traditional security framework allows Washington to negotiate from a
position of strength in which alternative arrangements can be
discussed insulated from popular discontent with the presence of foreign troops on Japanese
soil. The future of East Asian security need not cleave so closely to the
Cold War lines it inherited, and the growing skepticism toward traditional
justifications for the Alliance, as manifested in 2009, emphasizes the need to
find alternative arrangements that can satisfy both the security
and prosperity requirements of all parties . Summation The analysis presented here argues that
the basic security perspective of Japan has evolved since the end of
the Cold War to include a third option of strategic autonomy.

Unlike other

U.S. relationships in the broader Asia region (i.e., India), Japans historical legacy has stunted the political expression of this new option.

The long-term presence of U.S. bases and the heavily emphasized

geostrategic importance of Japan during the Cold War ensured that
viable alternatives to the Alliance were never seriously considered . This
suppression can be seen in the dominance of a single, U.S.-friendly political party throughout most of Japans postwar history and the

The
electoral reforms of the 1990s gave new outlets for public
expression, breathing life into a national security perspective that
attendant duality of Japans national security debate between the fear of entrapment and the fear of abandonment.

is less U.S.-centered.

Even the conservative LDP has favored a stronger autonomy for Japan within the Alliance

context. The analysis conducted above has traced the evolution of a new national security paradigm through the framework of a case-study
examination of the Futenma relocation issue. Dividing the research into three distinct periods (initial discussions over relocation, the Koizumi
Administration, and the Hatoyama Administration) charts a clear evolution of the new security paradigm over time. Figure V.1 below illustrates
this concept.

The evolution of Japans security perspective can be seen

most clearly through the lens of the FRF issue. Although the
intervening obstacles were consistently local politics and interest
groups, the phrasing of the larger arguments suggests a
fundamental shift away from NIMBY concerns and toward a
comprehensive reimagining of the Alliance.

Ironically, the ineptitude of the Hatoyama

medias
response in the spring of 2010 was to rearticulate the basic benefits
of the Alliance in security terms. Furthermore, 2012 opinion polls highlight a reversion to traditional security
Administration to effectively represent this new strategic perspective may have helped dampen its development. The

perspectives, likely stimulated by security concerns over Chinese activities in adjacent waters and North Koreas nuclear and missile threats.

the evidence presented above suggests that a third dimension to

Japans traditional dualityof-fears framework is neither brash nor
idealistic despite these adjectives being well-suited to describe its
first national political expression. A strategic autonomy strategy or
Still,

a hedging strategy is not intrinsically incongruous with Japans

national interests . As Chinese strength continues to increase
relative to that of the United States, strategic challenges to the
Alliance will grow . While Chinas recent territorial activism has
ensured that the traditional philosophy behind the security alliance
remains relevant, it ultimately may be the twists and turns in the
Futenma issue that portend the future course of the Alliance . As such, to
simply categorize the Hatoyama administrations term in office as
dominated by brash idealism is misleading. The DPJ ideas
challenging the very fabric of the Alliance, though poorly implemented by Hatoyama, are not
a deviation from mainstream thinking in Japan . Figure V.1 above, though stylized, places the
Hatoyama administration clearly on the trajectory that started with 1995s rape incident and the ensuing FRF plan. Future U.S.
diplomacy toward Japan should be sensitive to this trend and seek
to incorporate the security interests of the United States with those
of a Japan that increasingly questions the fundamental justification
for the traditional alliance. It appears that Washington has been afforded
some extra time to come to grips with the rise of a new security
perspective in Tokyo. The current Abe administrations security posture guarantees continuing tensions between Japan
and China that favor traditional U.S.-Japan security arrangements though the U.S. is in this case wary about getting dragged into an
unnecessary war between Japan and China over a territorial issue. In Northeast Asia, the anachronistic and saber-rattling government in
Pyongyang has managed to ensure that Cold War thinking is not forgotten in the region (Justin McCurry, 2013). An additional lesson can be
learned from the experience of the Hatoyama administration, namely, that the Japanese public is keenly sensitive to political ineptitude.
Hatoyama left office with a popularity of 19% or lower in the polls. In the case of Prime Minister Abe, he has been riding high with a popularity

. The public also seems to support

Abes call for a stronger national defense in view of the more
dangerous security environment in the region. But if his administration slips into nationalistic
of over 70% due mainly to his policies to reboot Japans economy

jargon that is perceived to be threatening regional stability or otherwise harm Japans core interests, the public will likely react in a similar
fashion as they did to Hatoyamas blunders. There is evidence, though, that Abe is aware of this vulnerability and will likely opt to be a safe

one cannot rule out another round of political

backlash against the LDP government if the economy suddenly turns south, Abes rhetoric on nationalistic issues stirs up Asian
neighbors, or Okinawa reacts sharply to perceived central government
strong-arming tactics on the basing issue. A casualty of that could
driver, at least for the time being. Still,

be views toward Japans security, the relevance of the Alliance, and

the presence of foreign troops on Japanese soil. Better that
Washington takes the sentiments expressed in 2009-2010 debacle
seriously now and prepares to deal with possible future challenges
to the bilateral relationship from the grass roots level.

A US-Japan alliance centered around a dynamic Japanese

defense is critical to Asian stability, but Okinawan
backlash collapses effective cooperation
Envall and Ng 13

[May 2013, David Envall is a research fellow in the Department of International Relations at The Australian National
University and Kerri Ng, Okinawa, the USJapan Alliance, and Asia-Pacific Security,
https://digitalcollections.anu.edu.au/bitstream/1885/14634/1/Envall%20and%20Ng%20Policy%20Background%20Paper
%2011%202013.pdf]

Recent tensions in Northeast Asia highlight the need for a stable

regional security architecture a role long played by the USJapan
alliance. In fact, the alliance has long been a core part of regional
security politics. The United States San Francisco, or hub-andspokes,
system of alliances has contributed much to Asias security and
economic development (Calder 2004; Tow and Envall 2011). Today, however, the US
Japan alliance is challenged not only by regional developments, such
as North Koreas saber-rattling and the Japanese dispute with China
over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands (Daily Yomiuri 15 December 2012), but also by
domestic concerns.

In the latter context,

the Japanese prefecture of

Okinawa and the presence of US military bases there continues to

be an irritant in USJapan relations . The ongoing distrust and
resentment of the US military presence by substantial sectors of the
Okinawan population is particularly problematic for alliance
stability . Our aim, in this extended ANUMASI Policy Background Paper, is to examine recent
developments in Okinawa in light of the two allies changing strategic aims and explore some potential

because many of the

alliances problems relating to Okinawa are political rather than
strategic, it is necessary to integrate these political considerations
more clearly into alliance relations. Although Japan should not unilaterally determine
approaches to addressing these challenges. We argue that,

basing issues, it should assume a greater role in addressing the political problems associated with them.
As Japan assumes greater responsibility in developing the US alliances strategic role, it should also seek to
provide Okinawa with greater historical and military reassurance. In particular, it should overcome what we
identify as the Japanese governments lack of credibility in the prefecture. This stems from the Japanese
governments historical failure to manage base and land issues, and to properly recognize issues of
identity and equality that are important to the Okinawan people. THE PIVOT AND DYNAMIC DEFENSE

The importance of the USJapan alliance, and of Okinawa, has been

recently underscored by American and Japanese attempts to refocus their attention on the new challenges in the Asia-Pacific
region . For the US, such efforts have emerged in the form of the pivot
strategy, while Japans approach is encapsulated in the dynamic
defense concept. The pivot strategy has been a prominent feature of Barack Obamas
administration since 2010. Its main aim is to resuscitate Americas military, economic, and political

A crucial aspect of the policy is to reinforce the US

Japan alliance within the wider context of strengthening and
diversifying Washingtons regional strategic partnerships (Clinton 2011).
Despite projected reductions in US spending on defense via sequestration, the alliance
engagement of the region.

remains the cornerstone of stability in Asia and the focus of

significant plans for US expansion of regional cooperation, including

joint intelligence sharing, surveillance, reconnaissance, and missile

defense (Clinton 2011; Panetta 2012). A common criticism of the pivot strategy, however, is that it
represents a direct and overt counter to the ongoing military buildup of the Peoples Republic of China
(PRC), intensifying an already acute regional security dilemma. Chinas maritime strategy has been defined
in terms of projecting power over successive island chains stretching from South Korea to Hawaii that are
seen in Beijing as being used by the US to constrain Chinese access into the West Pacific. The dispersion of
US forces away from simply Japan and South Korea to increasingly access such places as Australia, Guam,
and Singapore is viewed with suspicion by the PRC. Accordingly, Beijings recent shows of force (e.g. in the
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute), and its continued reluctance to cooperate over Iran and North Korea,
demonstrate that the pivot strategy is not universally acclaimed in the region (Ross 2012).

The

dynamic defense concept , meanwhile, is meant to allow Japan to develop

military forces that have the necessary readiness, mobility,
flexibility, sustainability, and versatility to deal with strategic
challenges in its neighborhood (MOD 2010, 7). A more flexible Japanese
defense force could play a more effective role in the dispersed
regional security system envisaged under Americas pivot strategy .
In particular,

it would allow Japan to respond better to the gray-zone

disputes currently emerging in East Asia, notably conflicts that

encompass differences over territory, sovereignty and economic
interests (MOD 2010, 3). Efforts from the mid-2000s to the latest White Paper (MOD 2012) to reform
the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) have been termed a compromise between the necessity of coping

Japanese strategic
thinkers have focused on developing a JSDF that would be more
multi-functional and more interoperable with the US (NIDS 2012; Takahashi, S.
2012; Yamaguchi 2012). A transformed JSDF would, therefore, be more capable of
responding to major disasters, would have improved force
attributes, and would provide more effective deterrence in the space
surrounding Japan. To date, however, Japan has made only moderate improvements to its
with new security challenges and a limited budget (Takahashi, T. 2012).

security capabilities. Institutionally, the countrys primary defense posture continues to be based around

The Japanese government maintains an

interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution such that force can
only be used to defend the country under certain conditions (MOD 2012,
strict limits on its capacity to defend itself.

109). The government also maintains that, although Japan theoretically has the right to collective defense,
the actual exercise of this right is not permissible under current Japanese law (MOD 2012, 110). Yet

change may be coming on this front . Recently elected Japanese Prime Minister Abe
Shinzo has indicated his support for modifying Article 9 so as to
enable Japan to engage in collective defense (Japan Times 11 April 2013). Tokyo
will still have to confront budgetary constraints and political resistance that have seen it allocate only

However, the announcement in

January 2013 to raise defense spending potentially signals a
limited resources into strengthening its defense capacity.

reversal of this trend, even if the increase remains marginal (IISS 2012;
Okinawa is
sometimes viewed as a third-order issue (e.g. Armitage and Nye 2012, 14). But
the prefecture nevertheless remains central to much of the new
Asahi Shimbun 30 January 2013). Compared to these wider strategic considerations,

strategic planning inherent to both the pivot and dynamic defense

concepts . This is especially true as Japan refocuses its national
security strategy southward. If the basing issue in Okinawa
destabilizes the alliance, it could undermine the development of

these strategies . Recent history suggests that the basing issue is indeed this
critical . In 200910, for example, Okinawa became a major source of tension
between the Hatoyama Yukio and Obama administrations over the
relocation of the Futenma airbase (Envall and Fujiwara 2012, 656). Base politics
resurfaced in 2012 to disrupt the alliance again, even as the US and
Japan agreed in April to delink a planned transfer of Marines out of
Okinawa from the plan to relocate Futenma (MOFA 2012). Early in the year, the
planned deployment of the MV-22 Osprey vertical take-off and
landing aircraft to Okinawa became the focus of large local
demonstrations due to concerns regarding the aircrafts safety . The
Osprey aircraft were dispatched to Okinawa as a replacement for the earlier CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters,
an aging fleet with a more limited flight range (Envall 2012). The newer Ospreys would be able to access
some of the main hotspots in the region, particularly the islands, as well as North Korea and Taiwan (Daily

many in Okinawa
quickly focused on recent accidents involving the Osprey in Morocco
and in the US (Kyodo News 12 July 2012). Then there was the alleged rape of
an Okinawan woman in October 2012 by two US sailors. The two sailors, who
Yomiuri 27 September 2012; Japan Times 3 October 2012). However,

had arrived in Japan earlier in October, were quickly apprehended and soon admitted their guilt to police
(The Mainichi 7 November 2012). The Japanese government responded by summoning the US ambassador
and lodging a complaint, while Okinawan officials, including Governor Nakaima Hirokazu and the
prefectural assembly, were highly critical of the US (Envall 2012). The US issued an official apology,
implemented a curfew on all military personnel in Japan, and subsequently banned the off-base purchase
and consumption of alcohol in Okinawa (The Mainichi 7 November 2012; Asahi Shimbun 3 December

The emotional impact of such crimes and accidents on

Okinawas population can act as a major driver of Japans security
politics. The prominent location of Americas bases in the prefecture,
and the newsworthy nature of any accidents that do occur, combine
2012).

to make the foreign presence more visible and controversial (The

the negative impact of such
crimes on the perceptions of Okinawans regarding US forces in Japan
consistently impedes the ability of US forces to promote the
Australian 15 November 2012; Watanabe 2012). Likewise,

constructive work they do in Japan, such as disaster relief

operations carried out during Operation Tomodachi following the
Tohoku disaster in March 2011 (Japan Times 3 March 2012). Such episodes
inevitably demand a response from the Japanese government . Prime
Minister Abe recently insisted that the government would make allout efforts to reduce the burden of US bases on Okinawa (Japan Times 20
March 2013). As he delivered this all-out statement, Abe also announced that the
central government would seek to gain approval from the
prefectural government to begin transforming work for the airstrip
at the replacement location for Futenma (Japan Times 20 March 2013). However,
many in Okinawa remain adamantly opposed to any such
development (Asahi Shimbun 5 April 2013), while Abes request that plans for
the return of land be fast-tracked was met with an ambiguous
response from the US (Japan Times 22 March 2013). Controversially, a recent agreement to

return land from Futenma by 2022 included the caveat or later (DOD 2013; Asahi Shimbun 6 April 2013).

The politicization of such issues, combined with the alliances

strategic importance, turn otherwise third-order issues into major
problems. These problems in turn create the potential for a vicious
and endless cycle of distrust and resentment over Okinawas

bases that could undermine the wider alliance (Eldridge 2012). Even
if the Ospreys had not been deployed, the Futenma basing
controversy would still be a powder keg threatening the Japan-US
security arrangements (Watanabe 2012).

Thats the only way to ensure stability in Asiadynamic

defense posture key to make deterrence in the region
effective
Sugio 12

[4/23/12, Takahashi Sugio is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for

Defense Studies Research Department. Graduated from George Washington
University. Joined the Institute for Defense Studies as assistant researcher in
1997 and has held his current position since April 2009, Japans Defense
Policy and the Future of the Japan-US Alliance, http://www.nippon.com/en/indepth/a00503/]
The National Defense Program Guidelines is the capstone document
of Japanese defense strategy and posture, presenting the governments analysis of the
security situation and specifying roles, missions, and capabilities of the Japan Self-Defense Forces and their
force structure. There have been four versions: 1976, during the Cold War; 1995, following the end of the
Cold War, 2004; after the 9/11 terrorist attacks of 2001; and most recently in December 2010.(*1)

The

most important point in the new guidelines is the creation of a

Dynamic Defense Force. The current NDPG document describes this
policy as follows: Clear demonstration of national will and strong
defense capabilities through such timely and tailored military
operations as regular intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
activities (ISR), not just maintaining a certain level of defense force, is a critical element
for ensuring credible deterrence and will contribute to stability in
the region surrounding Japan . . . To this end, Japan needs to achieve
greater performance with its defense forces through raising levels of
equipment use and increasing operations tempo, placing importance
on dynamic deterrence, which takes into account such an
operational use of the defense forces . . . Japan will develop a
Dynamic Defense Force that possesses readiness, mobility,
flexibility, sustainability, and versatility. These characteristics will be reinforced by
advanced technology based on the trends of levels of military technology and intelligence capabilities.

Key in understanding the Dynamic Defense Force

concept is the fact that the NDPG does not posit a dichotomy
Gray-Zone Deterrence

between peacetime deterrence and contingency response

the role of defense force. As the document notes, There

in considering

are a growing number of so-

called gray-zone disputes confrontations over territory,

sovereignty and economic interests that are not to escalate into
wars. In todays world, activities for the improvement of international
security are being conducted at all times; examples include
counterterrorism operations, peacebuilding in failed states, and
antipiracy patrols. In gray zones, which are neither at peace nor at
war, the need for less intense yet prolonged military operation is

increasing . A dynamic defense force that provides continuous

steady-state operations , rather than static deterrence against highend conventional conflict , is thus required in these areas . The shift
to a Dynamic Defense Force in the new NDPG reflects this change. The new
guidelines divide the role of force into three categories: effective deterrence and response, efforts to
further stabilize the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region, and efforts to improve the global
security environment. I will further explain effective deterrence and response, as it includes the new

While a large-scale conventional invasion

against Japan seems inconceivable, lively military activities are
being conducted in areas surrounding Japan, and there is friction in
concept of dynamic deterrence.

the East China Sea. The military activities in question clearly do not
represent the sort of aggression that is the object of deterrence as
traditionally defined . The concept of deterrence thus needs to be
overhauled , and dynamic deterrence is an orientation that has been
proposed for this purpose. Deterrence theory was developed to prevent the Cold War
between the United States and the Soviet Union from turning hotin other words, to prevent a tense

it was noted that deterrence would fail

to work in two cases: (1) the adoption of a fait accompli strategy, in
which the initiator acts to change the status quo without giving the
counterpart time to respond, and (2) the limited probe, in which the
initiator tries to determine the minimum threshold at which the
counterpart will activate its deterrent power. Dynamic defense aims
peace from escalating into an all-out war. But

mainly to deter the sorts of behavior corresponding to the above

two cases , in which the dichotomy between peacetime and war is
difficult to apply and traditional deterrence fails to operate. Specifically,
dynamic deterrence entails the seamless exercise of defensive force
both temporally and geographically to prevent the opposing country
from taking action. It includes surveillance, intelligence, training, and exercises, as well as
international peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Dynamic deterrence and dynamic
defense are the key concepts for the future evolution of the JapanUS alliance. Toward Bilateral Dynamic Defense The Japan-US alliance is an
important foundation supporting the US commitment to Asia , and ever
since the time it was established, through the Cold War years and on into the present, it
has played a major role in maintaining the peace and stability of the
Asia-Pacific region. Given the uncertain future of the Korean
Peninsula following the death of Kim Jong-il and the power shift caused by the
rapid economic growth of China, the alliance is becoming ever more
important . In order to enhance the strategic importance of the Japan-US alliance, it is
essential not only for the two countries to deal with the issues that
arise between them from time to time, such as the relocation of the
US Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Okinawa and relations
between the US forces in Japan and the local communities where
they are based, but also for them to work on the basis of a mediumto long-term perspective toward maintaining regional stability and
addressing global security issues, taking into account both the changes in the two

countries strategies and the fruits of bilateral cooperation.

This is the most important

point of the moves that have been undertaken to deepen the JapanUS alliance in recent years .

Asian conflict is the most probable scenario for nuclear

escalation
Adams 14 Shar Adams, Reporter for the Epoch Times, Citing Desmond
Ball, Professor in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian
National University, Asian Cold War: Escalating Conflict in North-East Asia
Bigger Threat Than War on Terror, Epoch Times, 10-13,
http://m.theepochtimes.com/n3/1014683-asian-cold-war-escalating-conflictin-north-east-asia-bigger-threat-than-war-on-terror/
The world may be focused on the war on terror, but the arms build up in
North-East Asia poses a far greater threat to global stability , says
Professor Desmond Ball, a senior defence and security expert at the
Australian National University (ANU). A former head of ANUs Strategic &
Defence Studies Centre, Professor Ball is no lightweight when it comes to
security concerns. It is Professor Balls expertise in c ommand and
c ontrol systems, particularly in relation to nuclear war, that underlies his
concerns about North-East Asia. North-East Asia has now become the
most disturbing part of the globe , Prof Ball told Epoch Times in an
exclusive interview. China, Japan and South Korea countries that are
economic engines of the global economy are embroiled in an
arms race of unprecedented proportions , punctuated by very
dangerous military activities, he says. Unlike the arms race seen
during the Cold War, however, there are no mechanisms in place to
constrain the military escalation in Asia. Indeed, the escalation
dynamic could move very rapidly and strongly to large scale
conflict , including nuclear conflict , said Prof Ball. It is happening as
we watch. Arms Race Military spending in Asia has grown steadily
over the last decade. According to a 2013 Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute report, China is now the worlds second largest military
spender behind the United States, spending an estimated $188 billion in
2013. Japan and South Korea are also among the worlds top 10 military
spenders. When North Korea and Taiwan are included, North-East Asian
countries constitute around 85 per cent of military spending in Asia.
But what is more disturbing, Prof Ball says, is the motivation for the
acquisitions. The primary reason now for the acquisitions, whether they
are air warfare destroyers, missiles or defense submarines, is simply to
match what the other [countries] are getting, he said. While he
believes it is likely that Japan would have embarked on military
modernisation, he says it is Chinas military provocation of countries across
Asia that is fuelling the build-up. Since China lay claim to all of the South
China Sea, it has escalated territorial disputes with Vietnam, the
Philippines and Malaysia. What started with skirmishes between locals
and Chinese fishing boats or navy vessels has now become territorial

grabs island building on contested rocky outcrops. In a sign of things to

come, the South China Morning Post reported in June: China is looking to
expand its biggest installation in the Spratly Islands into a fully formed
artificial island, complete with airstrip and sea port, to better project its
military strength in the South China Sea. According to Filipino media, the
artificial island falls within the Philippines 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone.
Prof Ball says Chinas behaviour in the South China Sea is provocative, but in
the scale of what we are talking about, that is nothing compared with
conflicts in North-East Asia, where China and Japan are contesting claims
over the Tokyo-controlled Senkaku Islands (claimed as the Diaoyus by
China). Of the Senkakus conflict, Prof Ball says: We are talking about
actual footsteps towards nuclear war submarines and missiles.
Chinese and Japanese activity in the Senkakus region has escalated to the
point where sometimes there are at least 40 aircraft jostling over the
contested area, he said. Alarm bells were set off near the Senkakus in
January last year when a Chinese military vessel trained its fire-control radar
on a Japanese naval destroyer. The incident spurred the Japanese Defense
Ministry to go public about that event and reveal another incident from a few
days prior, when a Chinese frigate directed fire-control radar at a Japanese
military helicopter. Fire-control radars are not like surveillance or early
warning radars they have one purpose and that is to lock onto a target in
order to fire a missile. Someone does that to us, we fire back, Prof Ball said.
Counter Measures Needed Prof Ball is recognised for encouraging openness
and transparency, and for his advocacy of multilateral institutions. He has
been called one of the regions most energetic and activist leaders in
establishing forums for security dialogue and measures for building
confidence. In his experience visiting China over the years, however, Prof
Ball says gaining open dialogue and transparency with Chinese military
leaders is difficult . He recounted a private meeting with a Chinese admiral
shortly after the fire-control radar incident. Prof Ball had seen direct evidence
of the encounter tapes of the radar frequencies, the pulse rates and the
pulse repetition frequencies and wanted to know what had happened on
the Chinese side and why it took place. In a private meeting, I asked the
admiral why and he denied it to my face, Prof Ball said. The Chinese
admiral would not even concede that an incident had happened. I dont see
the point of this sort of dialogue, he added. With so many players in the
region and few barriers against conflict escalation , the North-East
Asian nuclear arms race is now far more complex and dangerous
than the Cold War, he says. In the Cold War, there were mechanisms
at each level of potential confrontation, including a direct hotline
between the US and Soviet leaders. Once things get serious here,
[there is] nothing to slow things down . On the contrary, you have all
the incentives to go first , he said.

Particularly, greater Japanese defense capabilities is

critical to prevent Chinese aggression by creating
incentives for responsible Chinese actionreducing our
Okinawa presence is key by creating more symmetrical
alliance obligations
Nye 14
[08/07/2014 , Joseph Nye is a Distinguished Service Professor, Harvard
University, Japan's Robust Self-Defense Is Good for Asia,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joseph-nye/japan-selfdefense_b_5658883.html]

Japan has been ruled by an

American-written "peace constitution," Article 9 of which prohibits
war and limits Japanese forces to self-defense. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is
now seeking legislation to enable Japan to reinterpret the
CAMBRIDGE, Mass. -- Since the end of World War II,

constitution to include "collective self-defense ," whereby the country

would enhance its security cooperation with other countries,
particularly its closest ally, the United States. Critics view this as a radical departure from
seven decades of pacifism. But Abe's central objectives -- improving Japan's
ability to respond to threats that do not amount to armed attack;
enabling Japan to participate more effectively in international
peacekeeping activities ; and redefining measures for self-defense
permitted under Article 9 -- are actually relatively modest. Fears that the move would lead
to Japanese involvement in distant U.S. wars are similarly overblown. Indeed, the rules have
been carefully crafted to prohibit such adventures, while allowing
Japan to work more closely with the U.S. on direct threats to
Japanese security. It is not difficult to see why Abe is pursuing broader rights to self-defense.
Japan lies in a dangerous region, in which deep-rooted tensions
threaten to erupt at any moment . Given that East Asia, unlike Europe
after 1945, never experienced full reconciliation among rivals, or
established strong regional institutions, it has been forced to
depend on the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty to underpin regional
stability. When U.S. President Barack Obama's administration announced its
"rebalancing" toward Asia in 2011, it reaffirmed the 1996 Clinton-Hashimoto Declaration, which
cited the U.S.-Japan security alliance as the foundation for stability -a prerequisite for continued economic progress -- in Asia. That declaration
served the larger goal of establishing a stable, albeit uneven, triangular relationship among the U.S.,
Japan, and China. Subsequent U.S. administrations have upheld this approach, and opinion polls show that
it retains broad acceptance in Japan -- not least owing to close cooperation on disaster relief following the

Japan remains extremely vulnerable .

The most immediate regional threat is North Korea, whose
unpredictable dictatorship has invested its meager economic
resources in nuclear and missile technology. A longer-term concern
is the rise of China -- an economic and demographic powerhouse whose expanding
Thoku earthquake and tsunami of 2011. But

military capacity has enabled it to take an increasingly assertive

stance in territorial disputes, including with Japan in the East China

Sea. China's territorial ambitions are also fueling tensions in the
South China Sea , where sea-lanes that are vital to Japanese trade are located.
Complicating matters further is the fact that China's political
evolution has failed to keep pace with its economic progress . If the
Chinese Communist Party feels threatened by a public frustrated
with insufficient political participation and enduring social
repression, it could slip into competitive nationalism, upending the
already-delicate regional status quo. Of course, if China becomes
aggressive, Asian countries like India and Australia -- which are already disturbed by China's
assertiveness in the South China Sea -- will join Japan in the effort to offset China's
power. But, as things stand, a strategy of containment would be a mistake .
After all, the best way to engender enmity is to treat China as an enemy .
A more effective approach, spearheaded by the U.S. and Japan,
would focus on integration, with a hedge against uncertainty .
American and Japanese leaders must shape the regional
environment in such a way that China has incentives to act
responsibly, including by maintaining strong defense capabilities .
Meanwhile, the U.S. and Japan must rethink the structure of their
alliance. While the expected revisions to Japan's defense framework
are a positive development, many Japanese still resent the lack of
symmetry in the alliance obligations . Others chafe at the burden of
U.S. bases, particularly on the island of Okinawa . A longer-term goal
should thus be for the U.S. gradually to transfer its bases to
Japanese control, leaving American forces to rotate among them. In
fact, some bases -- notably, Misawa Air Base north of Tokyo -- already fly Japan's flag, while hosting
American units.

China war will go nuclearthere are very few checks

Lowther & Littlefield 8-11, Dr. Adam Lowther is Director, School of

Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies, Air Force Global Strike Command, Alex
Littlefield is a professor at Feng Chia University, Taiwan and the Prospects for
War Between China and America, http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/taiwanand-the-prospects-for-war-between-china-and-america/
For the United States and its allies and partners in Asia, Chinas aggressive
efforts to assert questionable claims in the South and East China Sea, enforce
a disputed Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), build the rocket/missile and
naval capabilities needed to invade Taiwan, and build a substantial ballistic
missile capability all work to create a situation where conflict between the
U.S. and the PRC could occur and rapidly escalate. Given that
American political and military leaders have a poor understanding of
Chinese ambitions and particularly their opaque nuclear thinking,
there is ample reason to be concerned that a future conflict could
escalate to a limited nuclear conflict. Thus, it is worth taking a look at the PRC with an eye toward
offering insight into Chinese motivation and thinking when it comes to how a possible crisis over Taiwan could escalate to the use of nuclear
weapons. Chinese Capabilities In their latest estimate, Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris assess that the Second Artillery Corps
possesses forty long-range nuclear missiles that can strike the United States if fired from Chinas eastern seaboard and an additional twenty
that could hit Hawaii and Alaska. The challenge for China, is reaching the East Coast home to the nations capital and largest economic
centers. To overcome this challenge China is also developing its JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) which is a sea-based variant

of the DF-31 land-mobile long-range missile that will go to sea on Jin-class submarines. China may also be developing a new mobile missile,
the DF-41, which will carry multiple warheads, giving the Chinese a way to potentially defeat an American ballistic missile defense system. It is
worth noting that the quantity, though not the quality, of Chinas nuclear arsenal is only limited by its dwindling stock of weapons grade
plutonium. This raises the question; to what end is China developing and deploying its nuclear arsenal? Chinese Motivation The textbook
answer is straightforward. China seeks a secure second (retaliatory) strike capability that will serve to deter an American first strike. As China
argues, it has a no-nuclear-first policy which makes its arsenal purely defensive while its other capabilities such as cyber are offensive.

Potential nuclear adversaries including Russia, India, and the United States
are fully aware that Chinas investment in advanced warheads and
ballistic missile delivery systems bring Delhi, Moscow, and, soon,
Washington within reach of the East Wind . While not a nuclear peer
competitor to either Russia or the U.S., China is rapidly catching up as it
builds an estimated 30-50 new nuclear warheads each year. While American
leaders may find such a sentiment unfounded, the PRC has a strong fear
that the United States will use its nuclear arsenal as a tool to blackmail
(coerce) China into taking or not taking a number of actions that are
against its interests. Chinas fears are not unfounded. Unlike China, the
United States maintains an ambiguous use-policy in order to provide
maximum flexibility. As declassified government documents from the 1970s clearly show, the United States certainly planned

to use overwhelming nuclear force early in a European conflict with the Soviet Union. Given American nuclear superiority and its positioning of
ballistic missile defenses in Asia, ostensibly to defend against a North Korean attack, China sees its position and ability to deter the United
States as vulnerable. Possible Scenario While there are several scenarios where conflict between the United States and China is possible, some

a conflict over Taiwan remains the most likely place where

the PRC and the U.S. would come to blows. Beijing is aware that any coercive action on its part to
analysts believe that

force Taiwan to accept its political domination could incur the wrath of the United States. To prevent the U.S. from intervening in the region,
China will certainly turn to its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy, beginning with non-lethal means and non-lethal threats to discourage

If thwarted in its initial efforts to

stop Chinese aggression against Taiwan, the United States may be
tempted to resort to stronger measures and attack mainland China.
A kinetic response to a cyber-attack, for example, although an
option, would very likely lead to escalation on the part of the
Chinese. Given the regimes relative weakness and the probability
that American attacks (cyber and conventional) on China will include
strikes against PLA command and control (C2) nodes, which mingle
conventional and nuclear C2, the Chinese may escalate to the use of
a nuclear weapon (against a U.S. carrier in Chinas self-declared waters for
example) as a means of forcing de-escalation. In the view of China, such a
strike would not be a violation of its no-first-use policy because the strike
would occur in sovereign Chinese waters, thus making the use of nuclear
weapons a defensive act. Since Taiwan is a domestic matter, any U.S.
intervention would be viewed as an act of aggression. This, in the minds of
the Chinese, makes the United States an outside aggressor, not China. It is
also important to remember that nuclear weapons are an asymmetric
response to American conventional superiority. Given that China is
incapable of executing and sustaining a conventional military
campaign against the continental United States, China would clearly
have an asymmetry of interest and capability with the United States
far more is at stake for China than it is for the United States. In
essence, the only effective option in retaliation for a successful U.S.
conventional campaign on Chinese soil is the nuclear one. Without
making too crude a point, the nuclear option provides more bang for
the buck, or yuan. Given that mutually assured destruction (MAD) is not
part of Chinas strategic thinking in fact it is explicitly rejected the
PRC will see the situation very differently than the United States.
the American public from supporting the use of force in support of Taiwan.

Hedging is necessary to stop conflict with China, even if

its provocativeChinas assertive posture, ideological
commitments, and leadership all prove theyre realist
Pei 14, Professor of Government at Claremont McKenna College, How China

and America See Each Other And Why They Are on a Collision Course,
http://www.ou.edu/uschina/gries/articles/texts/Pei.2014.FA.Hachigan.pdf
The worrying dynamics on display in Debating China should tip the
scales in favor of the realist view. The liberal assumption seemed
more valid when China was relatively weak and lacked the ability to
directly challenge the U.S.-led order. But what many liberals have
overlooked is that China's current acquiescence in this order does not
add up to an endorsement of it. Given the incompatibilities between
the defining characteristics of the international system (namely,
openness and rule-governed behavior) and those of China's domestic
regime (closed politics and the arbitrary exercise of power), it is
doubtful that Chinese elites will ever view the Western order as
legitimate, even if they concede its practical usefulness. As a result,
as China continues to grow stronger, it will seek either to modify the
existing order or, if such an endeavor proves too risky or too costly, to
construct a parallel order more to its liking. Such an order would not
necessarily stand in direct conflict with the U.S.-led order, in the way that the
Soviet bloc did, but it would have its own rules, exclude the West, and allow
China to play a dominant role. Indeed, Beijing's investments in the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the planned BRIcs
development bank (a joint financial institution to be established by Brazil,
Russia, India, China, and South Africa) suggest that China is already
moving down this path. China's controversial establishment last
November of an air defense identification zone that overlaps with those of
Japan and South Korea dramatically raised the risks of conflict with
the United States and its allies. And it has further vindicated the realists'
warning that China will not hesitate to challenge the Western order
once it has the ability to do so. The best American response to such
behavior would be to continue its policy of strategic hedging-an
approach, as explained by Michael Green of the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, that backstops engagement by "shoring up
relations with key maritime allies and partners and ensuring that
states within the region are not easily intimidated by growing Chinese
power." Strategic hedging can reassure China's neighbors and make
Beijing think twice about advancing its interests through coercion.
Meanwhile, liberalism offers no plausible alternative to such a policy,
especially given how well versed in realism and balance-of-power
tactics China's current leaders are. Of course, a policy of hedging, as
typified by the pivot to Asia, will only confirm Beijing's long-held
suspicion that Washington's liberal rhetoric masks a hard-nosed
determination to perpetuate U.S. dominance. But that is a price the
United States must be prepared to pay. Until now, U.S. policymakers have
relied on a two-pronged approach of hedging and engagement, drawing on
both realist and liberal ideas about China. But as Chinese power continues to
grow, maintaining such a balance will become harder than ever.

Withdrawal is necessaryrelocation within Japan

escalates backlashthe plan improves power projection
Sugawa 13
[12/06/13, Kiyoshi Sugawa worked as special researcher at the Office of Prime
Minister from October 2009 to December 2012, What to Do About U.S.
Marines in Japan,
http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2013/12/06/what_to_do_about_us_m
arines_in_japan_106992.html]
Regardless of the decision by the Okinawa governor, however, the
fundamental question will remain . Why should we consume money
and energy for unpopular , expensive , and ineffective basemoving when the security environment and fiscal condition is so
severe ? Drawbacks of the Current Plan The current FRF plan has
serious flaws . The most obvious problem is political feasibility .
Okinawans' opposition to a new base is stronger than ever . Even if
Prime Minister Abe Shinzo succeeds in gaining approval for a landfill permit
from the Okinawa governor, the FRF will still not win the support of the
majority of Okinawans. Lack of support from the local community
would eventually weaken the basis of the alliance. The financial
costs of the realignment plan for the US bases in Japan also weigh heavily on
Japan and the United States. The General Accounting Office reported that the
costs for military construction in Guam will be more than $23.9 billion. The
estimated price for the landfill and construction of the FRF is almost $4
billion, although the real figure would be easily doubled as is often the case
for this kind of public works project. In addition to the FRF, the Japanese
government will have to pay another $20 billion or so in total. From a
strategic point of view, the present US base realignment initiative fails to
meet today's most important security challenge in East Asia - the rise of
China. The shift of Marines from Okinawa would presumably weaken the
deterrent capability of the alliance. Under current plans, approximately 9,000
III Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) personnel are to deploy to Guam and
other places. The new airfield at Henoko, which is to be shortened from the
current 2,740 meters at MCAS Futenma to 1,800 meters, will not be able to
accommodate the same range of aircraft. Ironically, the costs of the FRF and
other replacement facilities are likely to undermine the ability of the Japanese
government to fund much more vital defense spending, including new forces
to deal with China's maritime buildup in the region. Basic Principles of a New
Initiative To overcome these drawbacks, Japan and the United States
need to reset the current plan and work on a new initiative that is
acceptable , affordable , and strategically effective. Four basic
principles should be kept in mind. First and foremost, Japan and the United
States must fulfill their promise to return MCAS Futenma to the
Okinawan people. Withdrawing the promise or postponing the

return indefinitely will make them feel betrayed and their confidence
in the alliance will be lost . Furthermore, the present situation where the
MCAS Futenma has potentially endangered the lives of Okinawans can never
be justified. Second, the present realignment plan for US bases in
Okinawa other than MCAS Futenma should be downsized. Although the
FRF has attracted a great deal of attention, even bigger projects such as the
relocation of Naha military port remain to be carried out under the current
agreement. Unlike Futenma, however, these bases do not pose immediate
danger to the residents of Okinawa. The less ambitious plan will enable the
Japanese government to use the saved money for the modernization of SDF
weaponry. Additional funds could also be allocated to share the costs of
rotational training by the US Marine Corps on Okinawa. Third, most of the
Marines need to be relocated outside Japan, not just Okinawa . The
viability of the large-scale Marine infantry deployment depends on
access to air fields, along with vast training space, to accommodate
the helicopters and transport aircraft they need to fulfill their
missions. Without a replacement for Futenma, large numbers of
Marines cannot remain on Okinawa . And the reality is no other area
of mainland Japan is prepared to house such a presence and the
Okinawa public refuses to accept any other site for the FRF in the
prefecture . While smaller crisis response elements of the III MEF can
remain on the island, the entire division needs to relocate .

Due to financial difficulties, the US government may want to bring them back
to Hawaii and California rather than relying so much on Guam. Fourth, it is
important that the departure of the majority of Marines based on
Okinawa not be read as a retreat or a sign of decline of the
alliance . Japan and the United States can create a framework to
substantially compensate for the losses of deterrent capability . As a
part of such efforts, US scholars Mike Mochizuki and Michael O'Hanlon
have suggested a new strategy to assure the swift and robust
projection of the Marine Corps across the Pacific at a significantly
lower cost.

2AC

Case
Japanese military developments are primarily defensive
no risk of broader militarization
Schreer 13

[7/1/13, Benjamin Schreer is a senior analyst at ASPI, Not really more

assertive: Japans defence policy, http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/not-reallymore-assertive-japans-defence-policy/]
The notion that Japans defence policy is becoming increasingly
assertive in the face of a rising China is gaining traction in Western media and some elite
circles. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe promotes the normalisation of Japans foreign and security policy,
including a change of the pacifist constitution and exercising the right of collective self-defence. For the
first time in 11 years, Japans defence budget increased in 2013. As well, the Japanese Self-Defense Force
(JSDF) has intensified joint exercises with the US; most recently simulating retaking an occupied offshore
island during Dawn Blitz 2013, a major US-led amphibious exercise off the coast of Southern California.
Finally, at the end of this year the government will adopt new National Defense Program Guidelines

Analysts speculated that the new guidelines might bring Japan

closer to even developing a pre-emptive strike capability , particularly
(NDPG).

after Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera publicly claimed that Japan had the right to develop the ability to
make a pre-emptive strike against an imminent attack. Undoubtedly, Tokyo is deeply worried about
Chinas strategic trajectory and PLA Navy activities around the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and within
Japans Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). ASPIs recent 1.5 track dialogue with Japanese think-tank
analysts and officials in Tokyo (conducted in cooperation with the Japan Institute for International Affairs)
confirmed the strong focus on Chinas anti-access/ area-denial threat and a desire on the Japanese behalf
for a more proactive defence policy, including participation in the emerging US AirSea Battle concept and

its important to
keep things in perspective . In fact, whats happening in Tokyos current
defence policy is more the result of a long-term development, rather
than sweeping changes. And its not clear that the moneys there for a
growing wish list of military capabilities. The 2010 NDPG of the
previous Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government already
introduced key conceptual changes such as the Dynamic Defense
adopting a offensive defence posture (without specifying what that meant). But

concept which aims to make the SDF more agile and rapidly
deployable . The aim of being able to defend Japans southwestern
islands goes even further back to 2004; only now is it finally being
underpinned by a stronger amphibious capability, as well as enhanced ISR and
air combat capability. In fact, the 2010 document is in such high regard with Japanese analysts and

Its
more to do with domestic politics than a drastically changed
strategic environment, which is the key justification provided by the government. Moreover,
major changes in Japans defence policy will probably come from
defence officials, that the Abe government has been at pains to justify why a new NDPG is needed.

further strengthening the US alliance

in areas such as ballistic and cruise missile

defence, joint ISR and integrating existing forces into an AirSea Battle framework. Both sides are currently
working on revising the 1997 Guidelines for JapanU.S. Defense Cooperation, which will probably further
increase operational cooperation. As for the Japanese pre-emptive strike capability, theres much more
rhetoric than hard reality. Abes Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) proposal for the new NDPG only talks about
starting considerations of possessing strike capability under appropriate USJapan role sharing, a very
vague formulation. Theres also no indication that the SDF is seriously considering the acquisition of landor sea-based missiles for strategic strike. And Japan has decided to acquire the conventional take-off and
landing variant of its new Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) combat aircraft; making the emergence of a tactical
Japanese carrier for offensive strike an even more distant possibility. Indeed, as long as Japan remains
comfortable under the US security umbrella its unclear what the SDF would gain from a capability which

would only further complicate its strategic relationship with China. Finally, unless Abenomics pulls the
country out of its dire economic predicament, the gap between ambitious defence programs and financial
means will remain significant. The 2013 Defence Budget shows that the hype about this years rise failed
to recognise at least two key points. This chart shows that defence spending is still nowhere near where it
was in previous years: And its unclear that this unhappy situation will be rectified anytime soon. Secondly,
a breakdown of the budget shows that while more money was spend on new aircraft (partly to replace
fighters lost during the 2011 earthquake), shipbuilding actually experienced a decline. Already, the Navy is
pessimistic about its ability to maintain the current fleet built around 48 destroyers, given the ever rising
unit costs of modern warships. The result could be a shrinking Japanese Navy, and planners have started
to talk about smaller, more cost effective platforms such as the US Navys new Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).
In sum, while lots of ink is spilled on Japans new military assertiveness the reality is far more subtle. Most
likely, the upcoming NDPG will confirm incremental rather than revolutionary defence policy changes.

Security K
Debate over international policy is necessary to solve global
crises and provides an essential counterweight to government
propaganda that enables a reckless foreign policy
Walt 11, Profess of IR at Harvard (Stephen, International Affairs and the
Public Sphere, publicsphere.ssrc.org/walt-international-affairs-and-the-publicsphere/)
There is today no shortage of global problems that social scientists should study in
depth: ethnic and religious conflict within and between states, the challenge of
economic development, terrorism, the management of a fragile world economy,
climate change and other forms of environmental degradation, the origins and
impact of great power rivalries, the spread of weapons of mass destruction

, just to mention a few. In this

complex and contentious world, one might think that academic expertise about global affairs would be a highly valued commodity. Scholars would strive to produce useful knowledge, students would flock to courses that helped them understand the world in which they will live and
work, and policymakers and the broader public would be eager to hear what academic experts had to say. One might also expect scholars of international relations to play a prominent role in public debates about foreign policy, along with government officials, business interests,
representatives of special interest groups, and other concerned citizens. Social scientists are far from omniscient, but the rigor of the scientific process and the core values of academia should give university-based scholars an especially valuable role within the broader public discourse
on world affairs. At its best, academic scholarship privileges creativity, validity, accuracy, and rigor and places little explicit value on political expediency. The norms and procedures of the academic profession make it less likely that scholarly work will be tailored to fit pre-conceived
political agendas. When this does occur, the self-correcting nature of academic research makes it more likely that politically motivated biases or other sources of error will be exposed. Although we know that scholarly communities do not always live up to this ideal picture, the existence
of these basic norms gives the academic world some important advantages over think tanks, media pundits, and other knowledge-producing institutions. Yet the precise role that academic scholars of international affairs should play is not easy to specify. Indeed, there appear to be two
conflicting ways of thinking about this matter. On the one hand, there is a widespread sense that academic research on global affairs is of declining practical value, either as a guide to policymakers or as part of broader public discourse about world affairs. Former policymakers complain
that academic writing is either irrelevant or inaccessible to policy-makers. . . locked within the circle of esoteric scholarly discussion. This tendency helps explain Alexander Georges recollection that policymakers eyes would glaze as soon as I used the word theory.[1] As Lawrence
Mead noted in 2010: Todays political scientists often address very narrow questions and they are often preoccupied with method and past literature. Scholars are focusing more on themselves, less on the real world. . . . Research questions are getting smaller and data-gathering is
contracting. Inquiry is becoming obscurantist and ingrown.[2] Within the field of international affairs, this trend has led to repeated calls to bridge the gap between the ivory tower and the policy community.[3] Consistent with that aim, a number of prominent scholars have recently
organized workshops or research projects seeking to challenge this cult of irrelevance and deprogram its adherents, although it is not clear whether these efforts will succeed in reversing the current drift.[4] This online symposium reflects a similar concern: how can the academic
world contribute to a healthy public conversation about our collective fate, one that leads to more effective or just solutions to contemporary problems and helps humankind avoid major policy disasters? On the other hand, closer engagement with the policy world and more explicit
efforts at public outreach are not without their own pitfalls. Scholars who enter government service or participate in policy debates may believe that they are speaking truth to power, but they run the risk of being corrupted or co-opted in subtle and not-so-subtle ways by the same
individuals and institutions that they initially hoped to sway. Powerful interests are all-too-willing to use the prestige associated with academic scholars to advance particular policy goals, and scholars are hardly immune to temptations that may cloud their judgment or compromise their
objectivity. Furthermore, scholars who embrace the role of a public intellectual may be tempted to sensationalize their findings to attract a larger audience or find themselves opining on topics on which they have no particular expertise. Instead of improving the quality of public
discourse, such behavior may actually degrade it. The remainder of this essay explores these themes in greater detail. I begin by discussing the unique contributions that academic scholars could make to public discourse on world affairsat least in theoryhighlighting their capacity to
serve as an authoritative source of knowledge about the world and as an independent voice in debates about contemporary issues (Why Is Academic Scholarship Valuable?). I then consider why there is a growing gap between university-based scholars and both the policy world and
the public sphere, and suggest that this trend is due largely to the professionalization of academic disciplines and the concomitant rise of a quasi-academic community of think tanks with explicit political agendas (Why Is There a Gap between Academia and the Public Sphere?). Next, I
identify some of the pitfalls that scholars face when they become more active participants in the public sphere (The Pitfalls of Engagement). I conclude by proposing several reforms that could help the social sciences make a more vital contribution to public understanding and policy
formation in the broad domain of global affairs (What Is To Be Done?). Why Is Academic Scholarship Valuable? Academics can make at least three distinct contributions to public discourse on global affairs. First, although the digital revolution has made a wealth of information from
around the world accessible on a near real-time basis, most of us still lack both extensive direct data on events in far-flung areas and the background knowledge necessary to understand what new developments mean. If our towns school district is troubled or the local economy is
suffering, we can observe that for ourselves and make reasonably well-informed judgments about what might be done about it. But if the issue is the war in Afghanistan, an uprising in Yemen, a naval confrontation in the South China Sea or the prospects that some battered economy
will be bailed out successfully, most of us will lack the factual knowledge or conceptual understanding to know what is really going on. Even when basic information is readily available, it may be hard for most of us to put it in the appropriate context or make sense of what it means.
When citizens and leaders seek to grasp the dizzying complexity of modern world politics, therefore, they must inevitably rely upon the knowledge and insights of specialists in military affairs, global trade and finance, diplomatic/international historians, area experts, and many others.
And that means relying at least in part on academic scholars who have devoted their careers to mastering various aspects of world affairs and whose professional stature has been established through the usual procedures of academic evaluation (e.g., peer review, confidential

an independent academic community is an essential

counterweight to official efforts to shape public understanding of key foreign policy
issues. Governments enjoy enormous information asymmetries in many areas of
political life, but these advantages are especially pronounced when dealing with
international affairs. Much of what we know about the outside world is
assessments by senior scholars, the give-and-take of scholarly debate, etc.). Second, and more importantly,

ultimately derived from government sources (especially when dealing with

national security affairs), and public officials often go to considerable lengths
to shape how that information is reported to the public. Not only do
governments collect vast amounts of information about the outside world, but
they routinely use secrecy laws to control public access to this information.
Government officials can shape public beliefs by leaking information
strategically, or by co-opting sympathetic journalists whose professional
success depends in part on maintaining access to key officials.[6] Given these
information asymmetries and their obvious interest in retaining public support for
their preferred policies, it is hardly surprising that both democratic and nondemocratic leaders use their privileged access to information to build support for
specific policies, at times by telling outright lies to their own citizens.[7] This

situation creates few problems when the policies being sold make good
strategic sense, but the results can be disastrous when they dont. In such
cases, alternative voices are needed to challenge conventional wisdoms
and official rationales, and to suggest different solutions to the problem(s)
at hand. Because scholars are protected by tenure and cherish the principle of
academic freedom, and because they are not directly dependent on
government support for their livelihoods, they are uniquely positioned to
challenge prevailing narratives and policy rationales and to bring their
knowledge and training to bear on vital policy issues . If we believe that

unfettered debate helps expose errors and correct missteps, thereby

fostering more effective public policies , then a sophisticated, diverse and

engaged scholarly community is essential to a healthy polity. Third, the scholarly

world also offers a potentially valuable model of constructive political

disagreement. Political discourse in many countries (and especially the United
States) has become increasingly personal and ad hominem, with little
attention paid to facts and logic; a trend reinforced by an increasingly
competitive and loosely regulated media environment. Within academia, by
contrast, even intense disputes are supposed to be conducted in accordance
with established canons of logic and evidence. Ad hominem attacks and other
forms of character assassination have no place in scholarly discourse and are
more likely to discredit those who employ them than those who are attacked.
By bringing the norms of academic discourse into the public sphere,
academic scholars could help restore some of the civility that has been lost in
recent years. For all of these reasons, it is highly desirable for university-based
scholars to play a significant role in public discourse about key real-world issues

and to engage directly with policymakers where appropriate. As I have

argued elsewhere, academic research can provide policymakers with relevant
factual knowledge, provide typologies and frameworks that help policymakers
and citizens make sense of emerging trends, and create and test theories that
leaders can use to choose among different policy instruments. Academic theories can
also be useful when they help policymakers anticipate events, when they identify
recurring tendencies or obstacles to success, and when they facilitate the
formulation of policy alternatives and the identification of benchmarks that can guide
policy evaluation. Because academic scholars are free from daily responsibility for
managing public affairs, they are in an ideal position to develop new concepts and
theories to help us understand a complex and changing world.

Their epistemology K is flawed social constructions are

knowable they pre-exist individuals and constrain action in
predictable ways prefer the specificity of the aff to broad
philosophical indictments
Fluck, PhD in International Politics from Aberystwyth, 10

(Matthew, November, Truth, Values and the Value of Truth in Critical

International Relations Theory Millennium Journal of International Studies,
Vol 39 No 2, SagePub)
Critical Realists arrive at their understanding of truth by inverting
the post-positivist attitude; rather than asking what knowledge is
like and structuring their account of the world accordingly, they
assume that knowledge is possible and ask what the world must be
like for that to be the case. 36 This position has its roots in the realist philosophy of science,
where it is argued that scientists must assume that the theoretical entities
they describe atoms, gravity, bacteria and so on are real, that they exist
independently of thoughts or discourse. 37 Whereas positivists identify causal laws with
recurrent phenomena, realists believe they are real tendencies and mechanisms. They argue that the
only plausible explanation for the remarkable success of science is that
theories refer to these real entities and mechanisms which exist
independently of human experience. 38 Against this background, the Critical Realist
philosopher Roy Bhaskar has argued that truth must have a dual aspect. On the one hand, it must refer to
epistemic conditions and activities such as reporting judgements and assigning values. On the other
hand, it has an inescapably ontic aspect which involves designating the states of affairs expressed and in
virtue of which judgements are assigned the value true. In many respects the epistemic aspect must
dominate;

we can only identify truth through certain epistemic procedures and from

within certain social contexts. Nevertheless, these procedures are

oriented towards independent reality. The status of the conclusions they lead
us to is not dependent on epistemic factors alone, but also on
independently existing states of affairs. For this reason, Bhaskar argues that truth
has a genuinely ontological use. 39 Post-positivists would, of course, reply that whilst such
an understanding of truth might be unproblematic in the natural sciences, in the social sciences
the knower is part of the object known. This being the case, there cannot be an ontic aspect
to the truths identified. Critical Realists accept that in social science there is interaction between subject

however, that
it does not follow that the structures in question are the creations of
social scientists or that they are simply constituted through the ideas shared within society at a
given moment. 41 According to Bhaskar, since we are born into a world of
structures which precede us, we can ascribe independent existence
to social structures on the basis of their pre-existence. We can recognise that they
are real on the basis of their causal power they have a constraining
effect on our activity. 42 Critical Realists are happy to agree to an epistemological
relativism according to which knowledge is a social product created from a pre-existing
set of beliefs, 43 but they maintain that the reality of social structures means
that our beliefs about them can be more or less accurate we must distinguish
between the way things appear to us and the way they really are. There are procedures
which enable us to rationally choose between accounts of reality and
and object; social structures involve the actions and ideas of social actors. 40 They add,

thereby arrive at more accurate understandings; epistemological relativism does not preclude judgemental

It therefore remains possible to pursue the truth about

social reality.
rationalism. 44

Alliance system key to limit intervention retrenchment is worse

Beckley 15
Michael, research fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard
Kennedy Schools Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,
International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4, Spring 2015, pp. 1-47, Entangling
Alliances?: Assessing the Security Risks of Americas Defense Pacts,
http://media.wix.com/ugd/f835cb_59cf17b7d155469e8d6dcc0af623ef50.pdf
In sum, the empirical record shows that the risk of entanglement is
real but manageable and that, for better or worse, U.S. security policy lies
firmly in the hands of U.S. leaders and is shaped primarily by those leaders

perceptions of the nations core interests. When the United States has overreached militarily, the main
cause has not been entangling alliances but rather what Richard Betts calls self-entrapmentthe
tendency of U.S. leaders to define national interests expansively, to exaggerate the magnitude of foreign
threats, and to underestimate the costs of military intervention.188 Developing a disciplined defense
policy therefore will require the emergence of prudent leadership, the development (or resurrection) of
guidelines governing the use of force,189 the establishment of domestic institutional constraints on the
presidents authority to send U.S. forces into battle, or some combination of these.190

Scrapping

alliances , by contrast, will simply unleash the U nited S tates to act on its
interventionist impulses while leaving it isolated diplomatically and
militarily.

To be sure, certain alliances may need to be revised or dissolved as circumstances

change. Past performance is no guarantee of future results, and U.S. entanglement risk may shift over
time. For example, Chinas development of antiaccess/area-denial capabilities may substantially increase
the risks to the United States of maintaining alliance commitments in East Asia.191 Conversely, U.S.
allies may be able to use similar capabilities to defend themselves and thereby allow the United States to
maintain alliance commitments while limiting risks to U.S. forces.192 This study does not account for such
emerging trends and, therefore, cannot rule out the possibility that the U.S. alliance network will need to
be revised in the future. What this study does suggest, however, is that such

revisions should

be modest. The historical record shows that allies often help keep U.S.
troops at home not only by bearing some of the burden for U.S.
wars, but also by encouraging the United States to stay out of wars
altogether. Large-scale retrenchment would sacrifice these and other
benefits of alliances while doing little to compel U.S. leaders to
national interests modestly or

choose military interventions selectively.

define

How to

accomplish those goals will continue to be the subject of debate, but those debates will be more
productive if they focus on domestic culprits rather than foreign friends.

Deterrence doesnt make securitization inevitable it can break

cycles of hostility and generates cooperation
Lupovici 8 Post-Doctoral Fellow Munk Centre for
International Studies University of Toronto (Amir, Why
the Cold War Practices of Deterrence are Still Prevalent:
Physical Security, Ontological Security and Strategic
Discourse, http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers2008/Lupovici.pdf

Since deterrence can become part of the actors identity,

it is also involved in the actors will to achieve ontological
security, securing the actors identity and routines. As McSweeney
explains, ontological security is the acquisition of confidence in the routines
of daily lifethe essential predictability of interaction through which we feel
confident in knowing what is going on and that we have the practical skill to
go on in this context. These routines become part of the social structure that
enables and constrains the actors possibilities (McSweeney, 1999: 50-1, 1545; Wendt, 1999: 131, 229-30). Thus, through the emergence of the
deterrence norm and the construction of deterrence identities, the
actors create an intersubjective context and intersubjective
understandings that in turn affect their interests and routines. In
this context, deterrence strategy and deterrence practices are
better understood by the actors, and therefore the continuous
avoidance of violence is more easily achieved. Furthermore, within
such a context of deterrence relations, rationality is (re)defined,
clarifying the appropriate practices for a rational actor, and this, in
turn, reproduces this context and the actors identities.
Therefore, the internalization of deterrence ideas helps to explain
how actors may create more cooperative practices and break away
from the spiral of hostility that is forced and maintained by the
identities that are attached to the security dilemma, and which lead to
mutual perception of the other as an aggressive enemy. As Wendt for
example suggests, in situations where states are restrained from using
violencesuch as MAD (mutual assured destruction)states not only
avoid violence, but ironically, may be willing to trust each other
enough to take on collective identity. In such cases if actors believe
that others have no desire to engulf them, then it will be easier to trust them
and to identify with their own needs (Wendt, 1999: 358-9). In this
respect, the norm of deterrence, the trust that is being built between
the opponents, and the (mutual) constitution of their role identities

may all lead to the creation of long term influences that preserve the
practices of deterrence as well as the avoidance of violence. Since a
basic level of trust is needed to attain ontological security, 21 the
existence of it may further strengthen the practices of deterrence
and the actors identities of deterrer and deterred actors. In this
respect, I argue that for the reasons mentioned earlier, the practices
of deterrence should be understood as providing both physical and
ontological security, thus refuting that there is necessarily tension
between them. Exactly for this reason I argue that Rasmussens (2002: 3312) assertionaccording to which MAD was about enhancing ontological over
physical securityis only partly correct. Certainly, MAD should be understood
as providing ontological security; but it also allowed for physical security,
since, compared to previous strategies and doctrines, it was all about
decreasing the physical threat of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the ability
to increase one dimension of security helped to enhance the other,
since it strengthened the actors identities and created more stable
expectations of avoiding violence.

***Even if their links are right our specific scenario planning is

key combating international violence and inaugurating an ethical
response to IR conflictsthey cant win a case turn and voting aff
is the best way to solve their impact arguments.
Ole Wver, IRUniversity of Copenhagen, 2000 International relations
theory and the politics of European integration, p. 284-285
The other main possibility is to stress' responsibility. Particularly in a field like security one has to
make choices and deal with the challenges and risks that one
confronts and not shy away into long-range or principled transformations. The meta political line risks (despite the theoretical
commitment to the concrete other) implying that politics can be
contained within large 'systemic questions. In line with the classical revolutionary tradition, after the
change (now no longer the revolution but the meta-physical transformation), there will be no more problems whereas in our situation (until the change)

the ethical
demand in post-structuralism (e.g. Derrida's 'justice') is of a kind that can never
be instantiated in any concrete political order It is an experience of
the undecidable that exceeds any concrete solution and reinserts
politics. Therefore, politics can never be reduced to meta-questions
there is no way to erase the small, particular, banal conflicts and
controversies. In contrast to the quasi-institutionalist formula of radical democracy which one finds in the 'opening' oriented version
of deconstruction, we could with Derrida stress the singularity of the event. To take a
position, take part, and 'produce events' (Derrida 1994: 89) means to get
involved in specific struggles. Politics takes place 'in the singular
event of engagement' (Derrida 1996: 83). Derrida's politics is focused on the calls that demand response/responsibility
we should not deal with the 'small questions' of politics, only with the large one (cf. Rorty 1996). However,

contained in words like justice, Europe and emancipation. Should we treat security in this manner? No, security is not that kind of call. 'Security' is

Security is a much more situational concept

oriented to the handling of specifics. It belongs to the sphere of how
to handle challenges and avoid 'the worst' (Derrida 1991). Here enters again the possible
not a way to open (or keep open) an ethical horizon.

pessimism which for the security analyst might be occupational or structural. The infinitude of responsibility (Derrida 1996: 86) or the tragic nature
of politics (Morgenthau 1946, Chapter 7) means that one can never feel reassured that by some 'good deed', 'I have assumed my responsibilities ' (Derrida
1996: 86). If I conduct myself particularly well with regard to someone, I know that it is to the detriment of an other; of one nation to the detriment of
my friends to the detriment of other friends or non-friends, etc. This is the infinitude that inscribes itself within responsibility; otherwise
there would he no ethical problems or decisions. (ibid.; and parallel argumentation in Morgenthau 1946; Chapters 6 and 7) Because of this
there will remain conflicts and risks - and the question of how to handle them. Should developments be securitized (and if so, in what
terms)?

Often, our reply will be to aim for de-securitization and then

politics meet meta-politics; but occasionally the underlying

pessimism regarding the prospects for orderliness and compatibility
among human aspirations will point to scenarios sufficiently
worrisome that responsibility will entail securitization in order to
block the worst. As a security/securitization analyst, this means
accepting the task of trying to manage and avoid spirals and
accelerating security concerns, to try to assist in shaping the
continent in a way that creates the least insecurity and violence even if this occasionally means invoking/producing `structures' or
even using the dubious instrument of securitization. In the case of the current
European configuration, the above analysis suggests the use of securitization at
the level of European scenarios with the aim of preempting and avoiding
numerous instances of local securitization that could lead to security
dilemmas and escalations, violence and mutual vilification.

Theyre biased to underestimate the China threatrecent

aggression proves theyre realist and only U.S. power
prevents escalation
Khoo 14, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Politics at the University of

Otago, New Zealand, Is Realism Dead? Academic Myths and Asias

International Politics, http://www.otago.ac.nz/politics/otago077521.pdf
Conclusion If what has been argued in this article seems like common sense,
it should be noted that this has been in rather short supply in recent years. As
we have shown, an influential group of scholars in the United States and Asia
have promulgated perspectives that obfuscate rather than illuminate the
realpolitik features that characterize inter-state behavior in the
Asia-Pacific region. An appropriate attention to the empirical facts has
not accompanied this fashionably abstract theorizing. Meanwhile,
regional states have prioritized economics over the dictates of strategy and
politics. In the process, they have underestimated the security dilemmas
that could affect the region deleteriously. Lulled by a decade and a half
of post-Asian Financial Crisis economic growth, regional elites developed a
form of collective amnesia. Recent events in the East and South China Seas
have rudely awakened them to the verities of power politics . Power
balances power. Judiciously applied U.S. pressure could persuade the
Chinese leadership to resolve regional conflict, rather than embark
on an ultimately futile policy of expanding its influence at its
periphery. If Chinas rise and Asias future is to be peaceful and prosperous, it
requires a more realist appreciation of power and its contemporary
application to the Asian sphere than currently exists among both
scholars and the regions political elites.

Our understanding of China is accurate and maintaining

hedging is critical
Wang 4, Assistant Professor in the Department of Diplomacy, National
Chengchi University, Taipei, Offensive Realism and the Rise of China,
http://homepages.wmich.edu/~ymz8097/articles/Wang-offensive%20realism
%20and%20china.pdf
Because realism contains a diverse body of competing theories, not all of them will be equally valid. Thus, the failure of a particular realist
theory should not be treated as refutation of the entire paradigm. Balancing vs. Buck-Passing Waltz elevated the balancing of power to law-like
status: "If there is any distinctly political theory of international politics, balance-of-power theory isit." In an anarchic system populated by

states wishing to survive, states would adopt both internal and external measures to balance the power of the stronger side. Thus, "[b]alances

critics of realism, including

Chan, point to the historical record to show that balances of power do not
recurrently form, and use this evidence as a refutation of the entire realist
research program. 15 Offensive realism does not share Waltz's position, however, because the logic of
balancing ignores the problem of collective action. Faced with a rising power,
threatened states have incentives to let others bear the costs of balancing
the aggressor. Balancing, therefore, is often inefficient (except in a situation of bipolarity, in which there is
of power recurrently form." 13 Although not all realists agree with Waltz's claim, 14

no one to whom the buck can be passed). International relations literature tends to view bandwagoning as the opposite strategy to balancing.
Offensive realism argues otherwise. When faced with an aggressor, the choice for a great power is not between balancing and bandwagoning,
but between balancing and buck-passing. This is because bandwagoning (joining the stronger side) violates realism's central tenets by
conceding power to the aggressor. As Mearsheimer points out, "[b]andwagoning ... is not a productive option in a realist world, for although
the bandwagoning state may achieve more absolute power, the dangerous aggressor gains more. The actual choice in a realist world is
between balancing and buck-passing, and threatened states prefer buck-passing to balancing whenever possible." He further explainsthat
"[b]uck-passing is preferred over balancing because the successful buck-passer does not have to fight the aggressor if deterrence fails." 16
Whether a great power will balance or buck-pass depends on the distribution of power and geography. Great powers are more likely to buckpass during the existence of multipolarity and when they do not share a border with the aggressor. A balancing coalition is harder to form in
multipolarity because of the allure of buck-passing. I believe that Chan's articulation misses the mark by focusing criticism of realism on the
balance of power and by asserting that states do not always balance. Contrary to Chan's assertions, realism does not predict that all states will
invariably balance or that they will balance efficiently. Balancing is not the only behavior predicted by realism. Defensive realism, for instance,
tends to give balancing a greater role in countering aggression, while offensive realism emphasizes the appeal of buck-passing when a state
faces an aggressor. Power transition theory argues that power asymmetry preserves peace and predicts that war becomes more likely as the
gap between the dominant power and the rising challenger narrows. 17 Although realism does not claim to predict all behavior, various
strands of 16Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 139-40, 267. 17A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago:
Chicago University Press, 1982); and Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981). ISSUES &
STUDIES 180 March 2004 realism do have a set of boundary conditions for their predictions. Offensive realism, for example, sees geography
and the distribution of power as the two major influences on a great power's choice between balancing and buck-passing. Unfortunately, Chan
largely ignoresthese factorsin his brief survey of European history. Even if his description of history were correct, "the failure of a particular
realist theory does not discredit the entire paradigm, especially since realism deals with a very wide variety of international phenomena." 18
Revisionist Intentions The distinction between status-quo and revisionist states has a long and rich history in international relations
scholarship. The fundamental logic underpinning such a division is whether the intentions of states matter in international politics. 19 For
defensive realism, great powers can divine benign and malign intentions from a variety of factors such as offensedefense balance as well as
other behavioral indicators. 20 These powers can then formulate cooperative or conflictual policies based on their beliefs about intentions. For
offensive realism, all great powers harbor revisionist intentions until they have achieved hegemony. Capabilities, rather than intentions, are
whatmatter because states cannot be certain about the intentions of others. Intentions are extremely difficult to know, and, even if known,
there is no guarantee that they remain constant. 21 Prudent leaders 18Walt, "The Progressive Power of Realism," 933. 19The debate over
intentions vs. capabilities is a fundamental issue in international relations literature. Almost all strands of international relations theory take a
stand on this issue. Democratic peace theory, for example, is based on the belief that states can discern benign intentions according to regime
type. 20Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics 30, no. 2 (1978): 167-214; and Charles Glaser, "Realists as
Optimists: Cooperation as Self-help," International Security 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/95): 50-90. 21Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power
Politics, 31. See also Copeland's critique of Alexander Wendt's constructivism: Dale C. Copeland, "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural
Realism: A Review Essay," International Security 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000): 187- 212. I&S Debate Forum March 2004 181 should therefore pay
attention to the capabilities of potential rivals rather than their intentions. Since states cannot rely on the good will of others, the best way to
ensure security isto accumulate as much power as possible over potential rivals. States change the existing balance of power in their favor if
the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. Therefore, all states are revisionist, unless they achieve hegemony. "Realism, Revisionism, and the
Great Powers" charges that such a view is "rather incongruous with the basic premise of offensive realism, which argues that states are driven
to seek more power even if they have satisfied their immediate security needs." This statement misinterprets offensive realismby suggesting
thatstates maximize absolute power. What offensive realism suggests is that states maximize relative power, not absolute power. As
Mearsheimer writes: States that maximize relative power are concerned primarily with the distribution of material capabilities. In particular,
they try to gain as large a power advantage as possible over potential rivals... Thus, states motivated by relative power concerns are likely to
forgo large gains in their own power, if such gains give rivalstates even greater power, for smaller national gains that nevertheless provide
them with a power advantage over their rivals. States that maximize absolute power, on the other hand, care only about the size of their own
gains, not those of other states... They would jump at the opportunity for large gains, even if a large rival gained more in the deal. Power,
according to this logic, is not a means to an end (survival), but an end in itself. 22 Chan's misinterpretation of offensive realism leads him to
deduce the wrong "critical test." He mistakenly claims that "[o]ffensive realism will be vindicated if the United States continues to seek power
after its survival is reasonably assured." Such a view assumesthat states maximize power power here is seen as an end in itself, not a
means. Offensive realism does not hold this view. Rather, power is a means to an end (i.e., survival). A state's survival is assured when it has
achieved the dominant status in its region of the world. A regional hegemon such as the United States will seek to maintain the existing
balance of power so that no other 22Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 36. ISSUES & STUDIES 182 March 2004 state will
become a competitor. 23 Recognizing that the United States might present a hard case for offensive realism, "Realism, Revisionism, and the
Great Powers" wonders why Mearsheimer excludes the United States "from the logic of his own theory." This is puzzling because Mearsheimer
does include the United Statesin his chap. 7 case study. Mearsheimer recognizesthat the American (as well as British) case "might appear to
provide the strongest evidence against my claim" 24 and examines American behavior from 1800 to 1990. As an offshore balancer, America
has adopted a foreign policy designed to maintain the balance of power in both Europe and Asia. The United States buck-passed when a rising
power threatened to upset the regional balance of power, and actively intervened when the local powers failed to check the aggressor. The

To show that China is not a revisionist

state, Chan examines China's adherence to international rules and norms and
finds that China not only has refrained from exercising its veto power in the UN
Security Council but also has ratified a number of major human rights instruments.
China's military expenditures as a percentage of gross national product (GNP)
have declined from 3.4 percent in 1989 to 2.3 percent in 1999. Chan concludes that, compared to the
United States, "China's conduct and experience do not quite qualify it for revisionism
when viewed in a comparative context." Nonetheless, such a conclusion
confuses revisionist behavior with intentions. For offensive realism, revisionism
refers to intentions, not behavior. A revisionist state is one that
harbors malign intentions and is "inclined to look for opportunities
American case, according to Mearsheimer, passes this critical test.

to gain more power." 25 A state does not necessarily exhibit revisionist

behavior because it may not have the capacity to do so, 23The White House's 2002
National Security Strategy is telling: "Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military buildup in
hopes of surpassing, or equaling, that power of the United States." See George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of

Should the
opportunity arise, states will seek to revise the balance of power in their favor
if the expected benefits outweigh the costs. China's current power does not qualify it as a potential
America (Washington, D.C.: White House, September 2002). 24Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 234.

hegemon. According to the World Bank, the GDP of the United States in 2002 was US$10.4 trillion, comprising 32.29 percent of the world's
total output. China's GDP was US$1.24 trillion, about 12 percent of the size of the American economy. 27 China's defense expenditures lag far
behind those of the United States. In that same year, the United States spent US$335.7 billion on defense, comprising 42.81 percent of the
world's total defense expenditures, while China spent US$31.1 billion, about 9 percent of the U.S. total. 28 Given this great disparity in power,

great powers facing

powerful opponents will be less inclined to consider offensive action
and more concerned with defending the existing balance from
threats by their more powerful opponents. Let there be an opportunity for
those weaker states to revise the balance in their own favor, however, and
they will take advantage of it." 29 Can Realism Explain the Chinese
Experience? Although the bulk of Chan's article aims to discredit realism, the real payoff of his critique liesin its implicationsfor the
rise of China. Analysts pessimistic about the future of U.S.-China relations tend to follow realist interpretations. Critics counter by
arguing that, when applied to Asia, realist theories "do a poor job." 30 If such an approach is
China is ill-poised to challenge the United States at this point in time. As Mearsheimer points out, "

problematic, analysts should discard realism and embrace non-realist approaches that generally see more room for cooperation. Therefore,
contrary to realist predictions, a rich and powerful China is not necessarily at odds with U.S. interests. Chan contends that realism is ill-suited
for Western experience, let alone Asia. As mentioned above, he conflates the realist paradigm with particular realist theories, thus ignoring

question remains: can theories derived

from European experience be fruitfully applied to Asia, an area with a
different history and culture? As I seek to demonstrate below, realism does a reasonably good
job in explaining the behavior of Asian states during the historical periods I cover.
Although the European and Asian state systems existed separately throughout
most of history, the behavior of Asian states exhibited qualities similar
to those of the Europeans. Like their Western counterparts, leaders of imperial
China had been sensitive to the balance of power, and flexibly
adjusted policy according to their assessment of the strategic situation.
Historically, Chinese policymakers have sought to maximize China's relative
power until the country achieved a preponderant position in East
Asia. I present evidence from two major periods in Chinese history, the Song Dynasty (, 960-1279) and the
Ming Dynasty (, 1368-1644), to illustrate my point about the explanatory power of
realism. 31 The Northern Song (, 960-1127) Medieval China during the Song Dynasty coexisted with several states, forming a multiother realist theories that can explainWestern experience. The

state system. Unlike most other periods in Chinese history, there was no single state powerful enough to dominate the system. China was a
"lesser empire" in the interstate system. 32 It was under constant military threats from the Liao (), "the most powerful state in East Asia at

As
expected by realism, the pursuit of power was the major concern of states .
Throughout this period, these East Asian states balanced against
larger powers, formed alliances, employed military means to resolve
conflicts, and sought to conquer more territory. 34 Northern Song
leaders frequently looked for opportunities to weaken their
adversaries. When a weakness in an opponent was found, usually in the form of domestic
instability, the Chinese leaders would be predisposed to go on the offensive. For
example, the Northern Song took advantage of the disarray in Liao domestic
politics and launched an offensive in 986. A century later, the Northern Song
again launched a major offensive in 1081 when the Xi Xia state was embroiled in
a leadership crisis. China's offensive motivation, however, was mediated by a
keen awareness of the balance of power. If the balance was judged to be favorable, the Song leaders would
the time," 33 and later from the Xi Xia state (). The system was largely bipolar, with the Song and the Liao as the two major powers.

usually take military actions against adversaries. As its power grew, the Song became more aggressive. The decisions to attack Northern Han
() in 979 and Xi Xia in 1081 were predicated on the assessment that Chinese power had grown either by conquest or domestic reform. In
addition, Song leaders had been aware of itsrelative power position and adopted measuresto strengthen the country. Wang Anshi's ()
New Policies (1069-1073), an internal balancing effort, aimed to "deliver the benefit to the battleground in north China."

Whenever

having accumulated enough power, the Song usually went on the offensive , as
it did in 1081 against the Xi Xia. The objectives of these campaigns were not simply to
repulse or deter enemies, but rather to destroy them, thus eliminating the threat to Chinese security.
However, when offensive campaigns failed to achieve this goal, the Northern Song government bought off adversaries by making annual
payments and acknowledged its inferior status in the bilateral relationship, as done in the Treaty of Shanyuan () of 1005. The weaker Song
bribed the Liao again in 1042 when the latter threatened war. The Southern Song (, 1127-1279) In many respects, the Southern Song
Dynasty was a continuation of the Northern Song. The structure of the system remained essentially bipolar, dominated by the Song and the Jin
(). Xi Xia ceased to be an important player in the multi-state system, and remained for the most time a vassal state of the Jin. The Southern
Song regime inherited a much smaller territory and a formidable adversary. Accordingly, Song policy toward the Jin was often conciliatory,
even concluding a humiliating peace treaty with the Jin in 1141 when the Song was faced with growing domestic problems. Despite several
peace overtures, the Southern Song still harbored hopes of annihilating the Jin, and launched a major offensive in 1206, taking advantage of
the declining power of the Jin state. In general, once perceiving an increase in relative power, Southern Song leaders became more aggressive
and went on the offensive to attack their adversary. The Southern Song's later alliance with the Mongols was aimed at destroying the Jin,

The Ming Dynasty faced a

perennial threat from the Mongols in the north. Given that the Mongols conquered China in the
thirteenth century, the specter of Mongol conquest was a powerful source of fear for the Ming leaders. Debates over how to
deal with the Mongol threat consequently dominated China's national
security decision-making for the next two hundred years. The Ming was
most aggressive at the height of its power, and initiated fewer
conflicts as its power declined. Unable to weaken the Mongols, the Ming government constructed the Great
although this move led to China's conquest by the Mongols. The Ming Dynasty (1368-1644)

Wall to defend against attacks from its archrival in the north. 36 Perennial conflicts drained state capacity and compelled the Ming government

Policy discussions revealed a clear inclination toward the

use of force, mediated by the leaders' assessment of relative power . Chinese strategy
to make peace with the Mongols.

went through three stages: from offensive, to defensive, and then to appeasement. This shift correlates with the balance of power between the
Ming and the Mongols. The Ming was most powerful from 1368 to 1449, and consequently during this period adopted an offensive strategy vis-vis the Mongols. As the balance shifted to the disadvantage of the Ming after the Tumu () debacle in 1449, the Ming chose to build the
Great Wall along the northern frontiers from 1450 to 1548. Ming power reached rock bottom from 1549 to 1644, when the Ming, forced to
appease the Mongols, accepted their demands for trade and tribute.

The aff resolves the worst example of the link ending

indefinite detention is preventative security because it
structurally reduces the magnitude and risk of war
through global liberal norms the alternative is reactive
security which responds to flash-point crises through Iraqstyle intervention or sanctions on proliferating countries
causes greater levels of conflict and structural violence
policymakers will inevitably make predictions failure to
use explicit risk calculation causes poor decision-making
Fitzsimmons, Defence Analyst, 7 (Michael, Winter, The Problem
of Uncertainty in Strategic Planning Survival)

In defence of prediction Uncertainty is not a new phenomenon for strategists. Clausewitz knew that
many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain. In
coping with uncertainty, he believed that what one can reasonably ask of an officer is that he should
possess a standard of judgment, which he can gain only from knowledge of men and affairs and from
common sense. He should be guided by the laws of probability.34 Granted, one can certainly allow for
epistemological debates about the best ways of gaining a standard of judgment from knowledge of men
and affairs and from common sense. Scientific inquiry into the laws of probability for any given strategic question may not always be possible or appropriate. Certainly, analysis cannot and should not be
presumed to trump the intuition of decision-makers. Nevertheless, Clausewitzs implication seems to be

the burden of proof in any debates about planning should belong

to the decision-maker who rejects formal analysis, standards of
evidence and probabilistic reasoning. Ultimately, though, the value of
prediction in strategic planning does not rest primarily in getting
the correct answer, or even in the more feasible objective of bounding the range of correct
answers. Rather, prediction requires decision- makers to expose, not only
to others but to themselves, the beliefs they hold regarding why a
given event is likely or unlikely and why it would be important or
unimportant. Richard Neustadt and Ernest May highlight this useful property of probabilistic
that

reasoning in their renowned study of the use of history in decision-making, Thinking in Time. In discussing
the importance of probing presumptions, they contend: The need is for tests prompting questions, for
sharp, straightforward mechanisms the decision makers and their aides might readily recall and use to
dig into their own and each others presumptions. And they need tests that get at basics somewhat by
indirection, not by frontal inquiry: not what is your inferred causation, General? Above all, not, what are
your values, Mr. Secretary? ... If someone says a fair chance ... ask, if you were a betting man or
woman, what odds would you put on that? If others are present, ask the same of each, and of yourself,
too. Then probe the differences: why? This is tantamount to seeking and then arguing assumptions
underlying different numbers placed on a subjective probability assessment. We know of no better way to
force clarification of meanings while exposing hidden differences ... Once differing odds have been
quoted, the question why? can follow any number of tracks. Argument may pit common sense against
common sense or analogy against analogy. What is important is that the experts basis for linking if with
then gets exposed to the hearing of other experts before the lay official has to say yes or no.35 There
are at least three critical and related benefits of prediction in strate- gic planning. The first reflects

prediction enforces a certain level of discipline in

making explicit the assumptions, key variables and implied causal
relationships that constitute decision-makers beliefs and that
might otherwise remain implicit. Imagine, for example, if Shinseki and
Wolfowitz had been made to assign probabilities to their opposing
expectations regarding post-war Iraq. Not only would they have had
to work harder to justify their views, they might have seen more
clearly the substantial chance that they were wrong and had to
make greater efforts in their planning to prepare for that
contingency. Secondly, the very process of making the relevant
factors of a decision explicit provides a firm, or at least transparent, basis for
making choices. Alternative courses of action can be compared and assessed in like terms.
Third, the transparency and discipline of the process of arriving at
the initial strategy should heighten the decision-makers sensitivity
toward changes in the environment that would suggest the need for
adjustments to that strategy. In this way, prediction enhances rather
than under-mines strategic flexibility. This defence of prediction does not imply that
Neustadt and Mays point

great stakes should be gambled on narrow, singular predictions of the future. On the contrary, the central
problem of uncertainty in plan- ning remains that any given prediction may simply be wrong. Preparations
for those eventualities must be made. Indeed, in many cases, relatively unlikely outcomes could be
enormously consequential, and therefore merit extensive preparation and investment. In order to
navigate this complexity, strategists must return to the dis- tinction between uncertainty and risk.

While the complexity of the international security environment may

make it somewhat resistant to the type of probabilistic thinking
associated with risk, a risk-oriented approach seems to be the only
viable model for national-security strategic planning. The alternative
approach, which categorically denies prediction, precludes strategy. As Betts argues, Any

assumption that some knowledge, whether intuitive or explicitly formalized, provides guidance about what
should be done is a presumption that there is reason to believe the choice will produce a satisfactory
outcome that is, it is a prediction, however rough it may be. If there is no hope of discerning and
manipulating causes to produce intended effects, analysts as well as politicians and generals should all
quit and go fishing.36 Unless they are willing to quit and go fishing, then, strategists must sharpen their
tools of risk assessment. Risk assessment comes in many varieties, but identification of two key
parameters is common to all of them: the consequences of a harmful event or condition; and the
likelihood of that harmful event or condition occurring. With no perspective on likelihood, a strategist can
have no firm perspective on risk. With no firm perspective on risk, strategists cannot purposefully
discriminate among alternative choices. Without purposeful choice, there is no strategy. * * * One of the
most widely read books in recent years on the complicated relation- ship between strategy and
uncertainty is Peter Schwartzs work on scenario-based planning, The Art of the Long View. Schwartz
warns against the hazards faced by leaders who have deterministic habits of mind, or who deny the
difficult implications of uncertainty for strategic planning. To overcome such tenden- cies, he advocates
the use of alternative future scenarios for the purposes of examining alternative strategies. His view of
scenarios is that their goal is not to predict the future, but to sensitise leaders to the highly contingent
nature of their decision-making.37 This philosophy has taken root in the strategic-planning processes in
the Pentagon and other parts of the US government, and properly so. Examination of alternative futures
and the potential effects of surprise on current plans is essential. Appreciation of uncertainty also has a
number of organisational impli- cations, many of which the national-security establishment is trying to

take to heart, such as encouraging multidisciplinary study and training, enhancing information sharing,
rewarding innovation, and placing a premium on speed and versatility. The arguments advanced here
seek to take nothing away from these imperatives of planning and operating in an uncertain environment.

Questioning assumptions is
critical, but assumptions must be made in the end. Clausewitzs standard of
But appreciation of uncertainty carries hazards of its own.

judgment for discriminating among alternatives must be applied. Creative, unbounded speculation must

unchecked
scepticism regarding the validity of prediction can marginalise
analysis, trade significant cost for ambig- uous benefit, empower parochial interests
in decision-making, and undermine flexibility . Accordingly, having fully
resolve to choice or else there will be no strategy. Recent history suggests that

recognised the need to broaden their strategic-planning aperture, national-security policymakers would
do well now to reinvigorate their efforts in the messy but indispensable business of predicting the future.

Rejection of current IR paradigm magnifies hierarchy

emancipation rhetoric gives powerful states a basis for
intervention and robs the Third World of agency traditional
security models solve their impacts better
McCormack 10 Lecturer in International Politics
Tara McCormack, is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of
Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of
Westminster. 2010, Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to
emancipatory approaches, pg. 127-129
The following section will briefly raise some questions about the rejection of
the old security framework as it has been taken up by the most powerful
institutions and states. Here we can begin to see the political limits to
critical and emancipatory frameworks. In an international system
which is marked by great power inequalities between states, the
rejection of the old narrow national interest-based security framework
by major international institutions, and the adoption of ostensibly
emancipatory policies and policy rhetoric, has the consequence of
problematising weak or unstable states and allowing international
institutions or major states a more interventionary role, yet without
establishing mechanisms by which the citizens of states being
intervened in might have any control over the agents or agencies of
their emancipation. Whatever the problems associated with the
pluralist security framework there were at least formal and clear
demarcations. This has the consequence of entrenching international
power inequalities and allowing for a shift towards a hierarchical
international order in which the citizens in weak or unstable states
may arguably have even less freedom or power than before. Radical
critics of contemporary security policies, such as human security and
humanitarian intervention, argue that we see an assertion of Western power
and the creation of liberal subjectivities in the developing world. For example,
see Mark Duffields important and insightful contribution to the ongoing
debates about contemporary international security and development. Duffield
attempts to provide a coherent empirical engagement with, and theoretical
explanation of, these shifts. Whilst these shifts, away from a focus on state
security, and the so-called merging of security and development are often
portrayed as positive and progressive shifts that have come about because of
the end of the Cold War, Duffield argues convincingly that these shifts are

highly problematic and unprogressive. For example, the rejection of

sovereignty as formal international equality and a presumption of
nonintervention has eroded the division between the international and
domestic spheres and led to an international environment in which Western
NGOs and powerful states have a major role in the governance of third world
states. Whilst for supporters of humanitarian intervention this is a good
development, Duffield points out the depoliticising implications, drawing on
examples in Mozambique and Afghanistan. Duffield also draws out the
problems of the retreat from modernisation that is represented by sustainable
development. The Western world has moved away from the development
policies of the Cold War, which aimed to develop third world states
industrially. Duffield describes this in terms of a new division of human life
into uninsured and insured life. Whilst we in the West are insured that is
we no longer have to be entirely self-reliant, we have welfare systems, a
modern division of labour and so on sustainable development aims to teach
populations in poor states how to survive in the absence of any of this. Third
world populations must be taught to be self-reliant, they will remain
uninsured. Self-reliance of course means the condemnation of millions to a
barbarous life of inhuman bare survival. Ironically, although sustainable
development is celebrated by many on the left today, by leaving
people to fend for themselves rather than developing a society wide
system which can support people, sustainable development actually
leads to a less human and humane system than that developed in
modern capitalist states. Duffield also describes how many of these
problematic shifts are embodied in the contemporary concept of human
security. For Duffield, we can understand these shifts in terms of Foucauldian
biopolitical framework, which can be understood as a regulatory power that
seeks to support life through intervening in the biological, social and
economic processes that constitute a human population (2007: 16).
Sustainable development and human security are for Duffield technologies of
security which aim to create self-managing and self-reliant subjectivities in
the third world, which can then survive in a situation of serious
underdevelopment (or being uninsured as Duffield terms it) without causing
security problems for the developed world. For Duffield this is all driven by a
neoliberal project which seeks to control and manage uninsured populations
globally. Radical critic Costas Douzinas (2007) also criticises new forms of
cosmopolitanism such as human rights and interventions for human rights as
a triumph of American hegemony. Whilst we are in agreement with critics
such as Douzinas and Duffield that these new security frameworks
cannot be empowering, and ultimately lead to more power for
powerful states, we need to understand why these frameworks have the
effect that they do. We can understand that these frameworks have political
limitations without having to look for a specific plan on the part of current
powerful states. In new security frameworks such as human security
we can see the political limits of the framework proposed by critical
and emancipatory theoretical approaches.