11 WHAT'S REALLY WRONG WITH ADULTERY Michael J. Wren Wilt philosophers are probably as literature on the topic is somewhat scarcer than that on golden ‘mountains or unicorns. To my knowledge, only one paper devoted exclusively to the topic, Richard Wasserstrom’s “Is Adult , contrary to Wasserstrom’s admittedly . we do in fact have good grounds for thinking prima facie wrong. Before I present my argument, though, a definition of adultery is in order. Wasserstrom defines adultery as “any case of extramarital ith “case” here apparently referring to a particu nurse, whether heterosexual or homosexual. My this definition is a minor one, though one which, Will be seen, will make a difference in the argument which follows. A Biven “case” of adultery could involve extramarital sex on the part of ‘one partner but not on the part of the other, namely if the second Reprinted with the permission of the editor, Elion Gohen, and the author, from {meratinl ral of Applied Philsapy 3, no. 2 (1986): 45-49. The autor has made some changes. 179180 Contemporary Issues partner isn't married at all. So, I prefer to define adultery in terms of a particular individual's engaging in a particular act of sexual inter- course with another: X's engaging in sexual intercourse with Y at time tis an act of adultery if and only if either X or Y is married at time t, and X and Y are not ‘married to each other at that time.* Why then is adultery wrong? Wasserstrom argues that although many, many cases of adultery involve promise breaking, deception, ‘or hurting others, not all do, and so none can serve as a reason for her reasons for thinking that adultery Ives a breach in the relations betwee: sex and feelings of deep affection tens the development and maintenance re little better, according to Wasserstrom, may be both possible and desirable, and so adultery not immoral. ‘And, as for the preservation of the nuclear family: this argument is predicated on the nuclear family’s being desirable, but whether it really is such is is. The key concept is marriage, in the common necessarily the legal sense of the term, Marriage, on newly wedded, elderly couples incapable of sexual intercourse, and those married for convenience’s sake married. It captures the common view that marriage is com: specifically the com- mitment to be and love as one, and explains why non-consummation, to sexual exclusivity that is important here> Whats Really Wong with Adultery 181 Let us assume for the present, then, that marriage involves a commitment to exclusivity as far as sexual intercourse is concerned. If so, then there does seem to be something wrong with adultery. For, first, such a commitment is, or at least entails, the adoption of a policy, namely the policy to have sexual congress only with a single, particular person of the opposite sex (the example of standard monogamy being used here for simplicity’s sake). And secondly, the concept of adultery is logically parasitic on that of marriage; it is defined in terms of marriage, and adulterous behavior logically impossible in the absence of marriage. Given these facts, and given what adultery is, adultery necessarily involves a contradiction in the rr, to be more accurate (and Kantian), a contradiction in con- ion of a policy of sexual ; and adultery, by definition, isa violation of that policy, an 1¢ of the conceptual cornerstones of marriage itself. The inconsistent to adopt both a of engaging in sexual inter- the original policy when, for whatever reason, that seems to be a good idea. Let me put the point part, to adopt the maxim “Whenever I hall do so with person X,” while to adopt the maxim “Whenever I engage do so for such-and-such or so-and-so reasons, regardless of my sexual commitments.” The policies repre- sented by these maxims are internally inconsistent. The immorality— irrationality, in Kant’s terms—lies in the contradictoriness of the policies, indeed, the necessary contradictoriness of the policies, not in some other fact. A succint way to put this point is the following. Adultery is and (ing commitment of the very institution on which it itself is tic. Adultery may not be, as jealousy is, a “green-eyed monster,” does, conceptually and morally, “mock the meat which it feeds It will be noticed that this is a formalist, Kantian objection to sry. If a good objection, it holds even if the spouse of an rer knows of and condones his/her spouse's adulterous behav- jor. The fact that they are married is sufficient for such behavior to be wrong. (But, it could be replied, a spouse who knows of and condones adulterous behavior is a spouse only in the legal sense of the term. Morally speaking, it could be argued that helshe is no182 Contemporary Issues dat all, since he/she has released hisyher spouse from a ent to exclusivity. However, given the place of marriage in the architectonics of human value, it is doubtful that a commitment to sexual exclusivity is s0 easily banished.) ‘The above argument, however, would seem to apph adulterers; and, as I've noted, not all adulterers are the non-married person who engages in adultery? Does he/she anything wrong? I think so; I think the above argument applies ‘one remove to non-married adulterers, at least in most cases. For if such a person accepts the institution of marriage at all, then his/her act of adultery involves a similar contradiction in conception, one between a policy which accepts marriage, and so is committed honoring the marital commitments of others, and a policy permits him/her to engage in sexual i such or so-and-so reasons obtain, regat ments of his/her partner. The first policy here commits one respecting marriage commitments; the second allows one to disregard them; and the result is a contradiction in conception similar to that of a married adulterer. But, of course, a non-married adulterer may not accept th is possible to reject the institution altogether. In that case, then, there would seem to be nothing wrong with adultery as such. Rebels of the above sort, though, are, like Cartesian madmen, more the product of the philos- opher’s imagination than the stuff of flesh and blood people. ‘One objection to the above argument is that it depends on a false premise: viz., that a commitment to sexual exclusivity is a necessary condition for being married. Wasserstrom, for instance, holds that is doubtful that there are many, if any, necesary con marriage; but even if there are, a commitment to sexual exch not such a condition” (p. 2 “counterexamples satisfying (such a] condi iy to married "are no such count ‘examples, as Wasserstro I recognizes, because these are not Societies in which “sex is permitted with someone other than one of ‘concubines, and homosexual lovers” (p. 5 of the other indicia of marriage were present [—if] srsons were of the opposite sex . . . and had the capacity and desire Whats Really Wrong with Adultery 183 to have intercourse with each other. . . and participated in a formal ceremony in which they understood themselves to be entering into a relationship with each other in which substantial mutual commit- ments were assumed [—then} we would not be in any doubt as to whether the two persons were married, even though they had not taken on a commitment to sexual exclusivity and even though they had agreed that extramarital sexual intercourse was permissible be- havior for each to engage in” (pp. 217-218). Neither of these counterarguments convinces me, however. To take the second one first: I do doubt that such a couple is married. From ‘Wasserstrom’s description, what I would conclude is that the two people have entered in a public, formalized contractual agreement, one apparently regarding sexual intercourse, i., they had agreed to have sexual intercourse with each other, and, important business matters as well—at least “bt comes to mind most readily, given that the “substantial mutual com- mitments” assumed don't include a commitment to sexual exclusivity. Wasserstrom’s description, in short, is one of contractual sex plus other mutual services. A formalized, extended pi lationship, one which also included, say, health ca extensive home repair, as well as sex for money, satisfies his descrip- tion, as does any formalized, sex-plus contractual relationship. AAs for societies “in which it is permissible for married persons to have sexual relations with persons to whom they are not married . .. temple prostitutes, concubines, and homosexual lovers"—and, per- haps, geisha girls: in and of itself this does not show that marriage does not involve a commitment to sexual exclusivity in such societies. is that even if marriage does involve a commitment. ion is legal—and legal not just for the unmarried. There might be any number of reasons why a society condones or even encourages extramarital sex. Legal moralism might be thought objectionable; there might be laws against adultery, but, society might, for whatever reason, “look the other way” whenever ions occur, e.g., violations might be pervasive but not harm the to any appreciable extent (as is the case with widespread Violations of anti-jay-walking laws in the United States); tax revenues might be needed (as is the case with legalized, state regulated prosti- tution in Mexico and Nevada); the general populace might be indif- ferent to the practice of adultery; and s0 on184 (Contemporary Issues ‘Asa matter of fact, there are even sub-sectors of societies in which, for cultural reasons, the practice of “the big house” and “the little house” obtains and is enthusiastically supported.* In some Latin ‘American countries (or at least parts of those countries) a man is not only expected to marry and maintain a “big house” for his wife their legitimate offspring; he is also expected—and virtually social required—to have at least one mistress and to maintain a “I house,” which may include supporting illegitimate offspring. practice may not be publicly proclaimed and applauded, but itis as ‘obvious to, and as accepted by, everyone in such subsectors as the sky. Indeed, the practice is so d not have a mistress, his wife is acquires one—machismo is that important, and that accepted, a cultural concept in such subsectors. Societies, like people, are complex—far too complex to infer, as Wasserstrom apparently does, that because extramarital sexual intercourse is permitted in some age does not involve a commitment to sexual exch societies. ‘A seemingly stronger counterexample, though not one mentioned by Wasserstrom, is provided by “certain cultures {which] permit ‘extramarital sexuality [sexual intercourse, I take it] by married per- sons with friends, guests, or in-laws." Although the author of this passage does not provide any details, or ite any sources, regarding r that matter—stories of guests being his host’s wife, in the tales European exploration of (and imperialism in) the South Pacific, true, do we have a genuine counterexample of requires? ‘marriage a family resemblance concept, as Wa: hink not. Although the point is not gen¢ recognized, the notion of a family resemblance concept can be it preted, and so can cut, in either of two ways: to show that a given ‘concept, C, has no necessary conditions, this being based on the (alleged) fact that Cs resemble each other only in there being of similarity, but nothing common, among Cs;? or—and this is the bears a family resemblance to other concepts. C’, C”, which are in the near vicinity and may well be known, for by the same sobriquet as C. Which of the two routes it is in a given case may well depend on a number of factors, but among What's Really Wrong with Adultery 185 them are undoubtedly the conceptual entrenchment of a putatively necessary condition, N, for C, the strength of our intuitions regarding N, the place of N in to other concepts, and the importance of N and C in the South Sea Islanders in question are m: the term. Family resemblance concepts, in the second sense of the necessary blood connections, they succeed to no thrones. ‘Two other objections to my argument can be more briefly stated ularly immoral about conduct which entails a contradiction in concep- tion. Contradictions in conception can arise in relation to purely prudential behavior; hence, the question of whether adultery is immoral remains unanswered. Seco! wrgued that there be morally permissible or even ol engage in adull igatory (or judgment would seem to be true). For example, a yr woman might be experiencing sexual dysfunction, ight realize that the dysfunctional partner's engag- srcourse with another would help remedy the dys- the long run, strengthen the marriage and make well as personal, commitment to a second part are, ot at least are close to, the paradigm of moral relations! adequately answered by noting that if my is the prima face wrong 1d to most ‘moral philosophers (but not to Kant, of no more than the prima facie wrongness of a course of ind prima ‘facie wrongness can be overridden in some circumstances, such as, in the case of adultery, those indicated above. Indeed, all the argument shows is that adultery is prima facie wrong. Ihave only grazed the issue of how prima facie wrong it is, and a full186 Contemporary Issues moral assessment of adultery would require a determination of that, among many other things. Is the prima facie wrongness of adultery hard Wasserstrom, ed., Tiday’s Moral Problems Robert Baker and Frederick NY: Prometheus Books, ilosophy and Sex and are 207-221. Subsequent in parentheses. nuld probably be supplemented with the clauses that ould be aware, of his/her own and the other person's each has given hisher consent to engage in sexual and 30 on. Through necessary conditior ikery. 3. And which I need to, and will, defend below. 4. Virusally the same argument is offered for a second time on p. 218. resemblance concept in the philosophy of Resemblances and Generalization Concerning the Arts,” reprinted in Dickie and Richard Sclafani, eds., Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), pp. 500-515. 8. My thanks to Walter L. Weber for reading an earlier draft of this paper and keeping me out of the doghouse. 12 ADULTERY Bonnie Steinbock A carting 1 2 1980 survey in Compalon, 54 percent of Ameri can wives have had extramarital affairs; a study of 100,000 married women by the considerably tamer Redbook magazine found 1.40 percent of the wives over 40 had been unfaithful. While such -selecting—those who do it are more reported the results of the is increase in infidelity among Cosmopolitan survey, suggests that married women represents not so much a deviation from traditional standards of fidelity as a break with the old double standard.” Studies show that men have always strayed in significant numbers. ‘Yet 80 percent of “COSMO girls” did not appr: wished their own husbands and lovers would be “coveting your neighbor's spouse” as: almost nobody approves of adultery, men have always done it, and ‘women are catching up. The increase in female adultery doubtless has to do with recent Reprinted, with the permission ofthe author and ofthe Tnstuue for Philosophy and