Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Topicality - Emory 2016
Topicality - Emory 2016
(2016-2017) Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic
and/or diplomatic engagement with the Peoples Republic of China.
Violations
Military isnt T
MILITARY CONTACTS
-Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa
-Arms transfers
-Military aid and cooperation
-Military exchange and training programs
-Confidence and security-building measures
-Intelligence sharing
ECONOMIC CONTACTS
-Trade agreements and promotion
-Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants
CULTURAL CONTACTS
-Cultural treaties
-Inauguration of travel and tourism links
-Sport, artistic and academic exchanges(n25)
Engagement is an iterated process in which the sender and target state develop a relationship of increasing interdependence, culminating in the
endpoint of "normalized relations" characterized by a high level of interactions across multiple domains. Engagement is a
quintessential exchange relationship: the target state wants the prestige and material resources that would accrue to it from
increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to modify the domestic and/or foreign policy behavior of the target state.
This deductive logic could adopt a number of different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.(n26) For instance, individual contacts can
be established by the sender state at either a low or a high level of conditionality.(n27) Additionally, the sender state can achieve its
objectives using engagement through any one of the following causal processes: by directly modifying
the behavior of the target regime; by manipulating or reinforcing the target states' domestic balance of
political power between competing factions that advocate divergent policies; or by shifting preferences at the grassroots
level in the hope that this will precipitate political change from below within the target state.
engagement promotes positive relations with an enemy as a means of changing the behavior or policies of a target
government. It accepts the legitimacy of that government and tries to shape its conduct. Engagement also
requires the establishment and continuance of political communication with
the target. In engaging the enemy, the state sees political polarization with target or isolation of the target country as undesirable.
is the lead foreign policy organization within the U.S. government, the Department of
Defense plays an increasingly important role in diplomacy largely through its a long tradition of international
engagement through shaping the security environment. With a forward presence, large planning staffs, and various engagement tools,
geographic combatant commanders pursue regional-level engagement by hosting international security conferences,
promoting transparency through military-to-military contacts, and providing American military training and equipment.
Throughout history, officers, such as Commodore Matthew Perry, General Tony Zinni, and Admiral Joseph Prueher, have played
critical roles in U.S. foreign policy formulation and implementation . Officers like these provide ready evidence that the
military does much more than fight the nations wars. This paper considers
become a favored venue for U.S. defense secretaries to explain U.S. policies and
initiatives. U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel used the June 2013 meeting to highlight the strong, continuing
U.S. commitment to regional security. He noted the Obama administrations strong support for ASEAN and ASEAN-led regional
groups. Secretary Hagel called attention to U.S. plans to host a meeting of the ASEAN defense ministers in Hawaii in 2014, and to U.S. support
for the ASEAN Defense Ministers Plus grouping that includes the United States in a variety of security-related discussions. The secretary
summarized the U.S. commitment by saying, Our relationships with ASEAN nations are critical.
U.S. engagement with China: At the same, the Obama administration has continued to engage Beijing at the highest
levels. In the first months of his second term, President Obama sent the secretaries of Treasury and State to China, along with the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Adviser. Beijing has welcomed these initiatives and the
continuation of more than 90 formal dialogues with the United States, including the annual Strategic and Economic Dialogue chaired by the U.S.
Treasury and State secretaries and their Chinese counterparts. As noted earlier, military-to-military exchanges also have
improved. Chinese officials and non-official commentators have been more inclined to emphasize the positive, following the announcement in
spring 2013 of the presidential summit in California in June.
Must be Unconditional
a foreign policy strategy of building close ties with the government and/or
civil society and/or business community of another state . The intention of this strategy is to undermine illiberal political and economic
practices, and socialise government and other domestic actors into more liberal ways. Most cases of engagement entail primarily
building economic links , and encouraging trade and investment in particular . Some observers have variously labelled this
strategy one of interdependence, or of oxygen: economic activity leads to positive political consequences.19
Conditionality, in contrast , is the linking, by a state or international organisation, of perceived benefits to another state
(such as aid or trade concessions) to the fulfilment of economic and/or political conditions . Positive conditionality
entails promising benefits to a state if it fulfils the conditions; negative conditionality involves reducing,
suspending, or terminating those benefits if the state violates the conditions (in other words, applying sanctions, or a
strategy of asphyxiation).20 To put it simply, engagement implies ties, but with no strings attached ;
conditionality attaches the strings . In another way of looking at it, engagement is more of a bottom-up strategy to
induce change in another country, conditionality more of a top-down strategy .
Must be Conditional
However, I concur with the view articulated by Randall Schweller that, while engagement can be classified in generic terms as a form of appeasement, an important
qualitative difference exists between the two: Engagement is more than appeasement, he says: It encompasses any attempt to socialize the dissatisfied power into
acceptance of the established order. In practice engagement
Resolution Definitions
Engagement Standards
Broad
Engagement is broad and poorly defined
Resnick 01 - Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at Columbia University, holds an
M.Phil. in Political Science and an M.A. in Political Science from Columbia [Evan
Resnick, University, 2001 (Defining engagement, Journal of International Affairs, Volume 54, Issue 2,
Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via ABI/INFORM Complete)]
While the term "engagement" enjoys great consistency and clarity of meaning in the discourse of romantic love, it enjoys neither in the discourse
of statecraft. Currently, practitioners and scholars of American foreign policy are vigorously debating the merits
of engagement as a strategy for modifying the behavior of unsavory regimes . The quality of this debate,
however, is diminished by the persistent inability of the US foreign policy establishment to advance a
coherent and analytically rigorous conceptualization of engagement. In this essay, I begin with a brief survey of the
conceptual fog that surrounds engagement and then attempt to give a more refined definition. I will use this definition as the basis for drawing a
sharp distinction between engagement and alternative policy approaches, especially appeasement, isolation and containment.
In the contemporary lexicon of United States foreign policy, few terms have been as frequently or as confusingly invoked
as that of engagement.(n1) A growing consensus extols the virtues of engagement as the most promising policy for
managing the threats posed to the US by foreign adversaries. In recent years, engagement constituted the Clinton administration's declared
approach in the conduct of bilateral relations with such countries as China, Russia, North Korea and Vietnam.
Robert Suettinger, a onetime member of the Clinton administration's National Security Council, remarked that the word
engagement has "been overused and poorly defined by a variety of policymakers and speechwriters" and
has "become shopworn to the point that there is little agreement on what it actually means."( n2) The Clinton
foreign policy team attributed five distinct meanings to engagement:(n3)
1) A broad-based grand strategic orientation: In this sense, engagement is considered synonymous with American internationalism and global
leadership. For example, in a 1993 speech, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake observed that American public opinion was divided into two
rival camps: "On the one side is protectionism and limited foreign engagement; on the other is active American engagement abroad on behalf of
democracy and expanded trade."(n4)
2) A specific approach to managing bilateral relations with a target state through the unconditional provision of continuous concessions to that
state: During the 1992 presidential campaign, candidate Bill Clinton criticized the Bush administration's "ill-advised and failed" policy of
"constructive engagement" toward China as one that "coddled the dictators and pleaded for progress, but refused to impose penalties for
intransigence."(n5)
3) A bilateral policy characterized by the conditional provision of concessions to a target state: The Clinton administration announced in May
1993 that the future extension of Most Favored Nation trading status to China would be conditional on improvements in the Chinese
government's domestic human rights record.(n6) Likewise, in the Agreed Framework signed by the US and North Korea in October 1994, the US
agreed to provide North Korea with heavy oil, new light-water nuclear reactors and eventual diplomatic and economic normalization in exchange
for a freeze in the North's nuclear weapons program.(n7)
4) A bilateral policy characterized by the broadening of contacts in areas of mutual interest with a target state: Key to this notion of engagement is
the idea that areas of dialogue and fruitful cooperation should be broadened and not be held hostage through linkage to areas of continuing
disagreement and friction. The Clinton administration inaugurated such a policy toward China in May 1994 by declaring that it would not tie the
annual MFN decision to the Chinese government's human rights record.(n8) Similarly, the administration's foreign policy toward the Russian
Federation has largely been one of engagement and described as an effort to "build areas of agreement and...develop policies to manage our
differences."(n9)
5) A bilateral policy characterized by the provision of technical assistance to facilitate economic and political liberalization in a target state: In its
1999 national security report, the White House proclaimed that its "strategy of engagement with each of the NIS [Newly Independent States]"
consisted of "working with grassroots organizations, independent media, and emerging entrepreneurs" to "improve electoral processes and help
strengthen civil society," and to help the governments of the NIS to "build the laws, institutions and skills needed for a market democracy, to fight
crime and corruption [and] to advance human rights and the rule of law."(n10)
Unfortunately, scholars have not fared better than policymakers in the effort to conceptualize engagement
because they often make at least one of the following critical errors: (1) treating engagement as a synonym
for appeasement; (2) defining engagement so expansively that it essentially constitutes any policy relying
on positive sanctions; (3) defining engagement in an unnecessarily restrictive manner.
sanctions risks lumping together a variety of discrete actions that could be analyzed by distinguishing
among them and comparing them as separate policies.
Limits Impact
Undefined engagement is expansive
Wallin 13 Fellow at American Security Project, Masters in Public Diplomacy @
USC [Matthew Wallin, Jun 11, 2013, Engagement: What does it Mean for Public Diplomacy?,
http://www.americansecurityproject.org/engagement-what-does-it-mean-for-public-diplomacy/] doa 4-2016
In recent years, diplomatic
If anything, using the term engagement can sometimes provide the user with a perceived ability to forgo
one of the most difficult parts of public diplomacythat is demonstrating metrics which indicate whether
or not ones efforts are succeeding at influencing the target audience. In other words, the user of engagement may
feel as though they neednt actually explain the effects of their activities because they are engaging by
nature of the word.
This is why analyzing the content of engagement is vital. Is a forum post engaging? Is a billboard
engaging? Is a TV advertisement engaging? This can be difficult to determine, and cannot be assumed.
have excessively narrowed the definition of engagement by defining it according to the ends
sought rather than the means employed. For example, Schweller and Wohlforth assert that if any distinction can be drawn between engagement and
appeasement, "it is that the goal of engagement is not simply tension-reduction and the avoidance of war but also an attempt to socialize [a] dissatisfied power into
acceptance of the established order."(n17) Such ends-based
Engagement is . . .
policy goals until he masters some key terms and better manages the
start with
engagement one of the trickiest terms in the policy lexicon.
expectations they convey. Given the furor that will surround the news of Americas readiness to hold talks with Iran, he could
The Obama administration has used this term to contrast its approach with its predecessors resistance to talking with adversaries and
troublemakers. His critics show that they misunderstand the concept of engagement when they ridicule it as making nice with nasty or hostile
regimes.
Lets get a few things straight. Engagement in statecraft is not about sweet talk. Nor is it based on the illusion that
our problems with rogue regimes can be solved if only we would talk to them. Engagement is not
normalization, and its goal is not improved relations. It is not akin to dtente, working for rapprochement, or appeasement.
So how do you define an engagement strategy? It does require direct talks. There is simply no better
way to convey authoritative statements of position or to hear responses. But establishing talks is just a first step. The goal of engagement is
to change the other countrys perception of its own interests and realistic options and, hence, to modify its
policies and its behavior.
Diplomatic engagement is proven to work in the right circumstances . American diplomats have used it to change
the calculations and behavior of regimes as varied as the Soviet Union, South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Cuba, China, Libya and,
intermittently, Syria.
There is no cookie-cutter formula for making it work, however. In southern Africa in the 1980s, we directed our focus toward stemming violence
between white-ruled South Africa and its black-ruled neighbors. This strategy put a priority on regional conflict management in order to stop
cross-border attacks and create better conditions for internal political change. The United States also engaged with the Cubans in an effort aimed
at achieving independence for Namibia (from South Africa) and at the removal of Cuban troops from Angola. In Mozambique, engagement meant
building a constructive relationship with the United States, restraining South African interference in Mozambiques internal conflicts and weaning
the country from its Soviet alignment.
More recently, the Bush administrations strategy for engagement with Libya ultimately led to the re-establishment of diplomatic relations and the
elimination of that countrys programs to develop weapons of mass destruction.
While the details differ, each case of engagement has common elements. Engagement is a process , not a destination.
It involves exerting pressure, by raising questions and hypothetical possibilities, and by probing the other
countrys assumptions and thinking. Above all, it involves testing how far the other country might be willing
to go. Properly understood, the diplomacy of engagement means raising questions that the other country may wish to avoid or be politically
unable to answer. It places the ball in the other countrys court.
rigid conceptual distinction can be drawn between engagement and appeasement. Whereas both
policies are positive sanctions--insofar as they add to the power and prestige of the target state--engagement does so in a
less direct and less militarized fashion than appeasement . In addition, engagement differs from appeasement by
establishing an increasingly interdependent relationship between the sender and the target state. At any juncture, the
sender state can, in theory, abrogate such a relationship at some (ideally prohibitive) cost to the target state .(n34)
Appeasement, on the other hand, does not involve the establishment of contacts or interdependence between the
appeaser and the appeased. Territory and/or a sphere of influence are merely transferred by one party to the other either unconditionally or in
exchange for certain concessions on the part of the target state.
Although one of the most important and ubiquitous terms in the Asia-Pacific security discourse, engagement is
generally under-theorized. Most of the literature on the term is either descriptive or prescriptive. There is little agreement about the meaning of
engagement and considerable inconsistency in its use. The New York Times noted that "there are many definitions of
engagement" and described it as a "moving target".2 This indeterminacy has prompted a host of scholars
and officials to offer their own modified interpretations of engagement, for example deep engagement or
conditional engagement. These, in turn, have arguably made for less, rather than greater conceptual
clarity.
Government to Government
With the government not trade OR private
Daga, 13 - director of research at Politicas Publicas para la Libertad, in Bolivia, and a visiting senior
policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation (Sergio, Economics of the 2013-2014 Debate Topic:
U.S. Economic Engagement Toward Cuba, Mexico or Venezuela, National Center for Policy Analysis,
5/15, http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/Message_to_Debaters_6-7-13.pdf)
Economic engagement between or among countries can take many forms, but this document will focus on government-togovernment engagement through 1) international trade agreements designed to lower barriers to trade;
and 2) government foreign aid; next, we will contrast government-to-government
economic engagement with private economic engagement through 3) international
investment, called foreign direct investment; and 4) remittances and migration by individuals. All of these areas are
important with respect to the countries mentioned in the debate resolution; however, when discussing economic
engagement by the U.S. federal government, some issues are more important with respect to
some countries than to others.
engagement promotes positive relations with an enemy as a means of changing the behavior or policies of a target
government. It accepts the legitimacy of that government and tries to shape its conduct. Engagement also
requires the establishment and continuance of political communication with
the target. In engaging the enemy, the state sees political polarization with target or isolation of the target country as undesirable.
Scholars have usefully distinguished between two types of economic engagement: conditional policies that require an
explicit quid-pro-quo on the part of the target country, and policies that are unconditional . Conditional policies,
sometimes called linkage or economic carrots, are the inverse of economic sanctions. Instead of threatening a target country with a sanction absent a change in
policy, conditional
engagement policies promise increased economic flows in exchange for policy change .
Drezners (1999/2000) analysis of conditional economic inducements yields a set of highly plausible expectations
concerning when conditional strategies are likely to be employed, and when they are likely to succeed. Specifically, he suggests that
reasons exist to believe, a priori, that policies of conditional engagement will be less prevalent than economic
sanctions. First, economic coercion is costly if it fails (sanctions are only carried out if the target country fails to change policy), while conditional engagement is
costly if it succeeds (economic payoffs are delivered only if the target country does change policy). Second, states may be reluctant to offer economic inducements
with adversaries with whom they expect long-term conflict, as this may undermine their resolve in the eyes of their opponent while also making the opponent stronger.
Third, the potential for market failure in an anarchic international setting looms large: both the initiating and the target states must be capable of making a credible
commitment to uphold their end of the bargain. These factors lead Drezner to hypothesize that the use of economic carrots is most likely to occur and succeed between
democracies (because democracies are better able to make credible commitments than non-democracies), within the context of international regimes (because such
regimes reduce the transactions costs of market exchange), and, among adversaries, only after coercive threats are first used. Unconditional
engagement strategies are more passive in that they do not include a specific quid-pro-quo. Rather, countries
deploy economic links with an adversary in the hopes that economic interdependence itself will, over
time, effect change in the targets foreign policy behavior and yield a reduced threat of military conflict at the bilateral level. How
increased commercial and/or financial integration at the bilateral level might yield an improved bilateral
political environment is not obvious. While most empirical studies on the subject find that increased economic ties tend to be associated with a
reduced likelihood of military violence, no consensus exists regarding how such effects are realized . At a minimum, two causal
pathways exist that state leaders might seek to exploit by pursuing a policy of unconditional engagement: economic interdependence can act as a constraint on the
foreign policy behavior of the target state, and economic interdependence can act as a transforming agent that helps to reshape the goals of the target state. Perhaps the
most widely accepted theoretical link between economic integration and a reduced danger of military violence centers on the constraints imposed on state behavior by
increasing economic exchange. Once established, a disruption in economic relations between countries would be costly on two levels. First, firms might lose assets
that could not readily be redeployed elsewhere. For example, direct investments cannot easily be moved, and may be lost (i.e. seized or destroyed) if war breaks out.
Second, firms engaged in bilateral economic exchange would be forced to search for next-best alternatives, which could impose significant costs on an economy as a
whole if bilateral commercial ties are extensive. In short, economic interdependence makes war more costly, meaning that states will be less likely to initiate armed
conflict against countries with which they are integrated economically. Constraining effects of economic interdependence may also arise more indirectly: as economic
integration between two countries increases, an increasing number of economic actors within those two countries benefit directly from bilateral economic ties, who in
turn are likely to supportand lobby forstable bilateral political relations. Economic integration, in other words, creates vested interests in peace (Hirschman 1945;
Russett and Oneal 2001; Levy 2003). These interests are likely to become more influential as economic ties grow (Rogowski 1989), suggesting that leaders will pay
increasing domestic political costs for implementing policies that destabilize bilateral political relations. Domestic political institutions might act as important
intervening variables here. For example, these effects may be most likely to take effect in democracies, which provide actors who benefit from trade clear paths
through which to influence the political process (Papayoanou 1999; Gelpi and Grieco 2003; Russett and Oneal 2001). Democracies, of course, likely vary in the
influence they give to commercial interests, as do authoritarian polities (e.g. Papayoanou and Kastner 1999/2000). Recently, scholars have questioned whether the
increased costs of military conflict associated with economic interdependence necessarily act as a constraint on state leaders. Indeed, without further assumptions, the
effects appear indeterminate: while economic interdependence increases the costs of conflict for the target state, it also increases those costs for the engaging state. On
the one hand, increased costs for the target might make it less willing to provoke conflict, but on the other hand, the increased costs for the engaging state may
paradoxically embolden the target state, believing it could get away with more before provoking a strong response (Morrow 1999, 2003; Gartzke 2003; Gartzke et al.
2001). This critique suggests that for
transformed, and they certainly dont want to be replaced. Faced with likely resistance, initiating states pursuing this strategy must be prepared to open economic
links unilaterally (i.e. without the cooperation of the target), hoping that the prospect of bilateral economic ties will generate a latent coalition of groups desiring a
peaceful environment in which they could take advantage of those ties, and that eventually a political entrepreneur will mobilize this latent coalition in an effort to
challenge the existing order. Because transformational strategies may require long time horizons and may also incur repeated disappointments, they are perhaps most
likely to be successful when a broad and stable consensusone able to withstand changes in governing partyexists within the country initiating such a strategy (see,
for example, Davis 1999).
Engagement is Unconditional
Conditionality can be defined as an agreement between two actors, in which actor 1 offers a reward to
actor 2 .11 This reward is granted if actor 2 fulfils certain conditions . In the case the conditions are not
met by actor 2 the reward is simply withheld ( positive conditionality ) or punishment follows ( negative
conditionality ). To exert conditionality as a reward-based policy between two actors, asymmetric
negotiation power has to be in place: actor 1 has to be able to offer attractive incentives which actor 2
wants to have and cannot achieve easily otherwise .
When analysing social interaction from an incentives- and interest-based position, conditionality is first of all understood as a mode of action. Additionally, it
can be used purposely as a political strategy to exert a reward-based policy between two political actors
and to institutionalize asymmetric interaction. Conditionality can be used to promote democracy by combining attractive rewards with
certain conditions of democratic development. In this case, this study will adopt the term democratic conditionality.
to whether the two strategies of engagement and conditionality are incompatible or mutually
reinforcing, important questions to consider are whether the strategies are to be applied by the same actor
(the EU, in our case) or by different [end page 26] international actors (the EU and the US, say), and whether both
strategies are to be used on the same target country, or within the same region (south-eastern Europe, the former Soviet
Union, the Mediterranean), or globally. We already have several cases in which the EU and the US have used different
strategies towards the same country: Cuba , Iran , and Libya spring to mind. The US has tried to asphyxiate
all three countries, the EU has taken a much softer stance in particular offering engagement, but
with conditions attached . Granted, there is little coordination between the US and EU over strategies, but in none of those cases can we categorically
say that the combination of strategies has been mutually reinforcing which does not augur well for the use of both by the same actor towards the same country.
There are also clear difficulties in using both strategies within the same region or even globally. This is
because, inevitably, some target countries will question why they are subjected to conditionality while others
are not. Unless this can be justified to outsiders (as well as to any domestic critics) the impact of both strategies could
be diminished : in one case because conditionality could spark resistance , in the other because
engagement could be seen by the target government as implying it has a free hand to do as it pleases.
is a policy of deliberate expanding economic ties with an d adversary in order to change the
behaviour of target state and improve bilateral relations. (p523-abstact). It is an intentional economic strategy that expects bigger
benefits such as long term economic gains and more importantly; political gains. The main idea behind the engagement motivation is stated by Rosecrance (1977) in a
way that the direct and positive linkage of interests of states where a change in the position of one state affects the position of others in the same direction.
But regardless
of why there is the reluctance to use negative conditionality, the outcome is inconsistent . Yet
arguably, you cannot use positive conditionality exclusively : once carrots are consumed (the benefits offered and
taken up), there must be a way to keep up the pressure on third countries to continue with or at least not reverse
reforms. Conditionality, in other words, is necessarily one coin with two sides .
can allow trade and investment to proceed unhindered even with quite despicable regimes .
But there is another, more practical problem with engagement: such a strategy will work only if domestic
actors want to trade, invest, engage with the target state. Where practices are so illiberal as to make the
economic environment unattractive, or where conditions are impossible (in war-torn states, for example), or where the
general state of development or level of natural resources is low, engagement does not seem likely to
work well .
A strategy of conditionality has the potential to be quite effective if the target state wants the benefits on
offer or fears losing them. Some observers have argued that conditionality is of most use in encouraging
countries to improve their human rights records or implement specific economic reforms, but is not well
suited for grander objectives such as encouraging democracy (which depends overwhelmingly on local conditions and cannot be
imposed by outsiders). But there are serious drawbacks to using conditionality, and negative conditionality in particular.
Engagement is Conditional
EE must be Conditional
Economic engagement must be conditional
Shinn 96 [James Shinn, C.V. Starr Senior Fellow for Asia at the CFR in New York City and director of
the councils multi-year Asia Project, worked on economic affairs in the East Asia Bureau of the US Dept
of State, Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China, pp. 9 and 11, google books]
In sum, conditional
engagement consists of a set of objectives, a strategy for attaining those objectives, and
tactics (specific policies) for implementing that strategy.
The objectives of conditional engagement are the ten principles, which were selected to preserve American vital interests in Asia while accommodating
Chinas emergence as a major power.
The overall strategy of conditional engagement follows two parallel lines: economic engagement, to
promote the integration of China into the global trading and financial systems; and security
engagement, to encourage compliance with the ten principles by diplomatic and military means when
economic incentives do not suffice, in order to hedge against the risk of the emergence of a belligerent China.
The tactics of economic engagement should promote Chinas economic integration through
negotiations on trade liberalization, institution building, and educational exchanges. While a
carrots-and-sticks approach may be appropriate within the economic arena, the use of trade sanction to achieve
short-term political goals is discouraged.
The tactics of security engagement should reduce the risks posed by Chinas rapid military expansion, its lack of transparency, the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, and transnational problems such as crime and illegal migration, by engaging in arms control negotiations, multilateral
efforts, and a loosely-structured defensive military arrangement in Asia.8
[To footnotes]
8. Conditional engagements recommended tactics of tit-for-tat responses are equivalent to using
carrots and sticks in response to foreign policy actions by China. Economic
engagement calls for what is described as symmetric tit-for-tat and security engagement for asymmetric tit-for-tat. A
symmetric response is one that counters a move by China in the same place, time, and manner; an asymmetric response might occur in another place at another time,
and perhaps in another manner. A symmetric tit-for-tat would be for Washington to counter a Chinese tariff of 10 percent on imports for the United States with a tariff
of 10 percent on imports from China. An asymmetric tit-for-tat would be for the United States to counter a Chines shipment of missiles to Iran with an American
shipment of F-16s to Vietnam (John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy. New York: Oxford
University Press, (1982). This is also cited in Fareed Zakaria, The Reagan Strategy of Containment, Political Science Quarterly 105, no. 3 (1990), pp. 383-88).
Many different types of engagement strategies exist, depending on who is engaged, the kind of incentives employed and the sorts of objectives pursued.
Engagement may be conditional when it entails a negotiated series of exchanges , such as where the US extends positive
inducements for changes undertaken by the target country. Or engagement may be unconditional if it offers modifications in US
policy towards a country without the explicit expectation that a reciprocal act will follow . Generally, conditional
engagement is geared towards a government; unconditional engagement works with a countrys civil
society or private sector in the hopes of promoting forces that will eventually facilitate cooperation.
Certainly it does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign policy instruments such as sanctions or military force; in practice, there is often considerable
distinguishing
feature of American engagement strategies is their reliance on the extension or provision of incentives
to shape the behavior of countries with which the U.S. has important disagreements.
overlap of strategies, particularly when the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive inducement. The
U.S. policy of economic engagement with a country does not mean endorsement of its
different from countries, such as France and Japan, which often practice
a policy of unlimited economic engagement based on the rationale that unfettered trade and investment
best promotes democratic values for the targeted nation, and financial success for themselves. By contrast, U.S.-"style"
engagement must be coupled with a range of policy tools that includes the targeted use of economic restrictions. In
other words, it is a variation of the traditional carrot and stick approach rather than one or the other.
regime. In fact, the U.S. version of engagement is
Our knowledge of the workings of economic engagement is still at a fairly preliminary stage. What we do know thus far
leads, at best, to an assessment of cautious optimism. A recent series of case studies suggests that economic engagement can be effective as in
instrument of statecraft. States have managed in certain situations to use economic relations to influence the foreign
Economic Engagement is
for a target state to provide more economic benefits in return for the desired political
change. Thus, in this case economic ties are developed depending on changes in the target states behaviour.99
Unconditional economic engagement is more moderate form of engagement. Engagement applying state while developing economic relations
with an adversary hopes that the resulting economic dependence over time will change foreign policy course of
the target state and reduce the likelihood of armed conflict. Theorists assume that economic dependence may act as a restriction of target states foreign policy
or as transforming factor that changes target states foreign policy objectives.100
Thus, economic engagement focuses solely on economic measures (although theorists do not give a more
detailed description), on strategically important actors of the international arena and includes other types of engagement, such as the conditional-unconditional
economic engagement.
Economic engagement policies are strategic integration behaviour which involves with the target state.
Engagement policies differ from other tools in Economic Diplomacy. They target to deepen the economic
relations to create economic intersection, interconnectness, and mutual dependence and finally seeks
economic interdependence. This interdependence serves the sender stale to change the political behaviour of target stale. However they cannot be
counted as carrots or inducement tools, they focus on long term strategic goals and they are not restricted with short term policy changes.(Kahler&Kastner,2006) They
can be unconditional and focus on creating greater economic benefits for both parties. Economic engagement targets to seek deeper economic linkages via promoting
institutionalized mutual trade thus mentioned interdependence creates two major concepts. Firstly it builds strong trade partnership to avoid possible militarized and
Kahler and
Kastner define the engagement policies as follows "It is a policy of deliberate expanding economic ties
with and adversary in order to change the behaviour of target state and improve bilateral relations " .(p523non militarized conflicts. Secondly it gives a leeway lo perceive the international political atmosphere from the same and harmonized perspective.
abstact). It is an intentional economic strategy that expects bigger benefits such as long term economic gains and more importantly; political gains. The main idea
behind the engagement motivation is stated by Rosecrance (1977) in a way that " the direct and positive linkage of interests of stales where a change in the position of
one state affects the position of others in the same direction.
EEState Dept
Economic engagement includes IPR, Terrorist finance, trade, remittances, and FDI
prefer our government definition
State Department, 2001 [The part of the Govt. in charge of the topic, Memo on the role of the
economic Engagement Bureau, http://2001-2009.state.gov/e/eeb/92986.htm]
What is Total Economic Engagement?
Total Economic Engagement seeks to integrate and coordinate all U.S. economic instruments
and programs into our regional and country strategies. The Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business
Affairs (EEB) broad cross-section of economic disciplines, interagency contacts, and expertise in such
areas as trade, finance, energy, development, transportation, and telecommunications help ensure this
coordination.
EEB is actively involved in the entire range of international economic issues affecting Americas security
and well-being. Our priorities extend from securing reliable, sustainable energy supplies to increasing
market access for U.S. goods and services. Protection of American interests, such as intellectual
property rights, fair play in international business, and shutting down terrorist access to
financial networks, is not only part of our work, it is the foundation on which our
efforts rest.
But promoting U.S. economic and security interests is not a short-term endeavor; dealing creatively with
emerging markets and alleviating poverty are priorities that are even more important in the era of rapid
globalization than they were in the wake of World War II.
To quote Franklin D. Roosevelt: True individual freedom cannot exist without economic security and
independence. People who are hungry and out of a job are the stuff of which dictatorships are made.
Poverty and political unrest walk hand-in-hand, and too many countries economic situations offer little
hope to their citizens. However, the economic landscape does not need to remain dormant. We believe,
the crop of economic security, individual prosperity and political stability can be grown through total
economic engagement.
Total economic engagement looks beyond the current practice of using financial development
assistance as the only ox at the plow. We know that developing countries own the keys to their own
economic success. Just as democracy relies on the educated and active common man, so a healthy
economy rests on the liberated individual. Ronald Reagan summed it up well: We who live in free
market societies believe that growth, prosperity and ultimately human fulfillment, are created from the
bottom up, not the government down. Only when the human spirit is allowed to invent and create, only
when individuals are given a personal stake in deciding economic policies and benefiting from their
success Only then can societies remain economically alive, dynamic, progressive, and free.
Our goal, therefore, must be the creation of the right conditions for individual economic growth and
success. We must cultivate conditions for private sector growth, investment and trade. This cannot be
accomplished through Official Development Assistance (ODA) funds alone. Foreign assistance must
support a developing countrys own effort to improve their economic climate.
Total economic engagement is putting all of the players to the same plow.
EEB is harnessing trade and economic policy formation, proper governance, and ODA activities together.
The bureau also integrates the American individual. Working with U.S. citizen-partners participating in
developing economies abroad is a key element of total economic engagement.
An accurate accounting of a nations total engagement must include economic policies as well as,
trade, remittances, and foreign direct investment. In these areas, the U.S. leads the
world in total economic engagement with the developing world. The private donations of American
citizens, military emergency aid and peacekeeping and government assistance provide the primary
sources for development financing.
In all of EEBs endeavors with State regional bureaus, the White House, and other economic agencies
(e.g., USTR, Treasury), we promote Total Economic Engagement as the standard for assessing our
country and regional economic strategies because we have seen that this holistic economic strategy
delivers tangible results.
EETied to political
Economic engagement is a policy of deliberately expanding economic ties in order to
improve political relationsexcludes negative actions.
Kahler and Kastner, 2006 [ Miles Kahler Scott L. Kastner Department of Government and
Politics University of Maryland Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies
University of California, San Diego STRATEGIC USES OF ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE:
ENGAGEMENT POLICIES IN SOUTH KOREA, SINGAPORE, AND TAIWAN Journal of peace
reseach vol 43 number 5]
Economic engagementa policy of deliberately expanding economic ties with an
adversary in order to change the behavior of the target state and effect an improvement in bilateral
political relationsis the subject of growing, but still limited, interest in the international relations
literature. The bulk of the work on economic statecraft continues to focus on coercive policies such
as economic sanctions. The emphasis on negative forms of economic statecraft is not without
justification: the use of economic sanctions is widespread and well-documented, and several quantitative
studies have shown that adversarial relations between countries tend to correspond to reduced, rather than
enhanced, levels of trade (Gowa 1994; Pollins 1989). At the same time, however, relatively little is
known about how widespread strategies of economic engagement actually are: scholars disagree on this
point, in part because no database cataloging instances of positive economic statecraft exists (Mastanduno
2003). Furthermore, beginning with the classic work of Hirschman (1945), most studies in this regard
have focused on policies adopted by great powers. i But engagement policies adopted by South Korea and
the other two states examined in this study, Singapore and Taiwan, demonstrate that engagement is not a
strategy limited to the domain of great power politics; instead, it may be more widespread than previously
recognized.
EEIncludes Conditions
Economic Engagement includes conditional actions
Kahler and Kastner, 2006 [ Miles Kahler Scott L. Kastner Department of Government and
Politics University of Maryland Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies
University of California, San Diego STRATEGIC USES OF ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE:
ENGAGEMENT POLICIES IN SOUTH KOREA, SINGAPORE, AND TAIWAN Journal of peace
reseach vol 43 number 5]
ECONOMIC ENGAGMENT: STRATEGIES AND EXPECTATIONS
Scholars have usefully distinguished between two types of economic engagement: conditional
policies that require an explicit quid-pro-quo on the part of the target country, and policies that are
unconditional.ii Conditional policies, sometimes called linkage or economic carrots, are the inverse
of economic sanctions. Instead of threatening a target country with a sanction absent a change in policy,
conditional engagement policies promise increased economic flows in exchange for policy change.
Drezners (1999/2000) analysis of conditional economic inducements yields a set of highly plausible
expectations concerning when conditional strategies are likely to be employed, and when they are likely
to succeed. Specifically, he suggests that reasons exist to believe, a priori, that policies of conditional
engagement will be less prevalent than economic sanctions. First, economic coercion is costly if it fails
(sanctions are only carried out if the target country fails to change policy), while conditional engagement
is costly if it succeeds (economic payoffs are delivered only if the target country does change policy).
Second, states may be reluctant to offer economic inducements with adversaries with whom they expect
long-term conflict, as this may undermine their resolve in the eyes of their opponent while also making
the opponent stronger. Third, the potential for market failure in an anarchic international setting looms
large: both the initiating and the target states must be capable of making a credible commitment to uphold
their end of the bargain. These factors lead Drezner to hypothesize that the use of economic carrots is
most likely to occur and succeed between democracies (because democracies are better able to make
credible commitments than non-democracies), within the context of international regimes (because such
regimes reduce the transactions costs of market exchange), and, among adversaries, only after coercive
threats are first used.
EE = Unconditional
Economic engagement is not conditionalit is a long term strategy to create
interdependence, not a specific policy tool.
elik, 2011 [Arda Can, PHD student @ Uppsala University,also, according to his Fa-Bo, like
swimming and coffee. Economic Sanctions and Engagement Policies: A review on coercive and noncoercive diplomatic action , on the google books, P 11]
Economic engagement policies are strategic integration behaviour which involves the target
state. Engagement policies differ from other tools in economic diplomacy. They target to deepen the
economic relations to create economic intersection, interconnectedness, and mutual dependence and
finally seeks economic interdependence. This interdependence serves the sender state to change the
political behaviour of target state4. However they cannot be counted as carrots or inducement tools,
they focus on long term strategic goals and they are not restricted with short term policy
changes (Kahler & Kastner, 2006). They can be unconditional and focus on creating greater economic
benefits for both parties. Economic engagement targets to seek deeper economic linkages via promoting
institutionalized mutual trade thus mentioned interdependence creates two major concepts. Firstly it
builds strong trade partnership to avoid possible militarized and nonmilitarized conflicts. Secondly it
gives a leeway to perceive the international political atmosphere from the same and harmonized
perspective. Kahler and Kastner define the engagement policies as follows, "It is a policy of deliberate
expanding economic ties with an adversary in order to change the behaviour of target state and improve
bilateral relations " (p. 523/abstract). It is an intentional economic strategy that expects bigger benefits
such as long term economic gains and more importantly, political gains. The main idea behind the
engagement motivation is stated by Rosencrance (1977) in a way that "the direct and positive
linkage of interests of states where a change in the position of one state affects the position of others in
the same direction."
EEJust Economic
Economic engagement is exlusively economicnot political
Jaktait, 2010 [Gerda , Doctoral Candidate Vytautas Magnus University Faculty of Political
Sciences and Diplomacy, containment and engagement as middle-range theories, Baltic Journal of Law
and Politics Vol 3 # 2]
Economic Engagement
The approach to engagement as economic engagement focuses exclusively on economic
instruments of foreign policy with the main national interest being security. Economic engagement
is a policy of the conscious development of economic relations with the adversary in order to change
the target states behaviour and to improve bilateral relations .94
Economic engagement is academically wielded in several respects. It recommends that the state engage
the target country in the international community (with the there existing rules) and modify the target
states run foreign policy, thus preventing the emergence of a potential enemy.95 Thus, this strategy aims
to ensure safety in particular, whereas economic benefit is not a priority objective.
Objectives of economic engagement indicate that this form of engagement is designed for relations with
problematic countries those that pose a potential danger to national security of a state that implements
economic engagement. Professor of the University of California Paul Papayoanou and University of
Maryland professor Scott Kastner say that economic engagement should be used in relations with the
emerging powers: countries which accumulate more and more power, and attempt a new division of
power in the international system i.e., pose a serious challenge for the status quo in the international
system (the latter theorists have focused specifically on China-US relations). These theorists also claim
that economic engagement is recommended in relations with emerging powers whose regimes are not
democratic that is, against such players in the international system with which it is difficult to agree on
foreign policy by other means.96 Meanwhile, other supporters of economic engagement (for example,
professor of the University of California Miles Kahler) are not as categorical and do not exclude the
possibility to realize economic engagement in relations with democratic regimes.97
Proponents of economic engagement believe that the economy may be one factor which leads to closer
relations and cooperation (a more peaceful foreign policy and the expected pledge to cooperate) between
hostile countries closer economic ties will develop the target state s dependence on economic
engagement implementing state for which such relations will also be cost-effective (i.e., the mutual
dependence).
However, there are some important conditions for the economic factor in engagement to be effective and
bring the desired results. P. Papayoanou and S. Kastner note that economic engagement gives the most
positive results when initial economic relations with the target state is minimal and when the target states
political forces are interested in development of international economic relations. Whether economic
relations will encourage the target state to develop more peaceful foreign policy and willingness to
cooperate will depend on the extent to which the target state s forces with economic interests are
influential in internal political structure. If the target countrys dominant political coalition includes the
leaders or groups interested in the development of international economic relations, economic ties
between the development would bring the desired results. Academics note that in non-democratic
countries in particular leaders often have an interest to pursue economic cooperation with the powerful
economic partners because that would help them maintain a dominant position in their own country.98
EE = can be condo
Economic engagement can be linked or unconditionalthere isnt a scholarly
consensus
Jaktait, 2010 [Gerda , Doctoral Candidate Vytautas Magnus University Faculty of Political
Sciences and Diplomacy, containment and engagement as middle-range theories, Baltic Journal of Law
and Politics Vol 3 # 2]
Proponents of economic engagement do not provide a detailed description of the means of this form
of engagement, but identify a number of possible variants of engagement: conditional economic
engagement, using the restrictions caused by economic dependency and unconditional economic
engagement by exploiting economic dependency caused by the flow. Conditional economic engagement,
sometimes called linkage or economic carrots engagement, could be described as conflicting with
economic sanctions. A state that implements this form of engagement instead of menacing to use
sanctions for not changing policy course
promises for a target state to provide more economic benefits in return for the desired political change.
Thus, in this case economic ties are developed depending on changes in the target state s behaviour.99
Unconditional economic engagement is more moderate form of engagement. Engagement applying state
while developing economic relations with an adversary hopes that the resulting economic dependence
over time will change foreign policy course of the target state and reduce the likelihood of armed conflict.
Theorists assume that economic dependence may act as a restriction of target state s foreign policy or as
transforming factor that changes target states foreign policy objectives.100
Diplomatic Engagement
engagement. Diplomacy is likely to be a painstaking process and it may not work with
not to transform adversaries into allies, but to seek
adjustments in their behavior and ambitions. North Korea, Cuba, Syria, and Iran would be offered a path toward realizing their
every targeted nation. However, the purpose of such a policy is
essential national interests should they conform to global conventions on issues such as terrorism and proliferation.
Is Diplomatic Interaction
Engagement is diplomatic relations
Maller, 9 research fellow in the National Security Studies Program at the New America Foundation
(Tara, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, The Dangers of Diplomatic Disengagement in
Counterterrorism, DOI: 10.1080/10576100902888479)
Different forms of non-engagement have been employed throughout history. Haas
on their definition of engagement, the present author defines non-engagement as a foreign policy strategy that depends to a significant degree on punitive measures, a
lack of positive incentives, and a general aversion to diplomatic interaction with a state to achieve foreign policy objectives. Non-engagement strategies typically are
characterized by punitive strategies across the military, economic, and diplomatic realms. This article will focus specifically on the diplomatic component of nonengagement, which is characterized by severing formal diplomatic ties with a country or significantly downgrading ties from the normal level of diplomatic activity
for foreign policy purposes. 3 It is also worth noting that in most cases of U.S.-initiated diplomatic sanctions, there may also be economic sanctions aimed at the
economic isolation of the target state. In addition, once diplomatic ties with a state have been severed, the United States still faces choices about the degree to which it
is willing to engage with a severed or downgraded state. Third party state actors may be used as a diplomatic go between for states without diplomatic relations and
there may be very little face-to-face interaction between U.S. officials and officials of the target state. In some cases, certain types of diplomacy may be permissible
(i.e., multiparty talks), whereas other forms of direct talks are not (i.e., bilateral talks). Regardless of the acceptable threshold for communication, cutting diplomatic
ties with a state and opting for diplomatic disengagement sends a strong signal about U.S. willingness and desire to communicate and creates substantial barriers to
doing so.
Generic Words
Colon Definitions
The colon is meaningless everything after it is whats important
Websters Guide to Grammar and Writing 2k
(http://ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/marks/colon.htm)
Use of a colon before a list or an explanation that is preceded by a clause that can stand by itself. Think of
the colon as a gate, inviting one to go on If the introductory phrase preceding the colon is very brief
and the clause following the colon represents the real business of the sentence, begin the clause after the
colon with a capital letter.
The colon just elaborates on what the debate community was resolved to debate:
Encarta World Dictionary, 07
(http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/dictionary/DictionaryResults.aspx?refid=1861598666)
colon (plural colons)
noun
Definition:
1. punctuation mark: the punctuation mark (:) used to divide distinct but related sentence components
such as clauses in which the second elaborates on the first, or to introduce a list, quotation, or speech. A
colon is sometimes used in U.S. business letters after the salutation. Colons are also used between
numbers in statements of proportion or time and Biblical or literary references.
describing feelings. 5 used in a clause with that expressing purpose. 6 (in the first person) expressing a
polite request or acceptance. 7 (in the first person) expressing a conjecture or hope.
Should is used to express probability or expectation
WEBSTER'S II, 1984, p. 1078
Should - used to express probability or expectation. They should arrive here soon.
Substantial
Substantial = Contextual
Substantially should be defined by context
Devinsky, 2 (Paul, IP UPDATE, VOLUME 5, NO. 11, NOVEMBER 2002, Is Claim "Substantially" Definite?
Federal Circuit instructed that "resolution of any ambiguity arising from the claims and specification may be aided
by extrinsic evidence of usage and meaning of a term in the context of the invention." The Federal Circuit remanded the case to the
district court with instruction that "[t]he question is not whether the word 'substantially' has a fixed meaning as
applied to 'constant wall thickness,' but how the phrase would be understood by persons experienced in this field of
mechanics, upon reading the patent documents."
Increase
Increase is quantitative
Increase means to become bigger or larger in number, quantity, or degree.
Encarta World English Dictionary, 7 (Increase, 2007,
http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/dictionary/DictionaryResults.aspx?refid=1861620741)
Increase
transitive and intransitive verb (past and past participle increased, present participle increasing, 3rd
person present singular increases)
Definition:
make or become larger or greater: to become, or make something become, larger in number, quantity, or
degree
Its
Its = Possesive
A. Its is a possessive pronoun showing ownership
Glossary of English Grammar Terms, 2005
(http://www.usingenglish.com/glossary/possessive-pronoun.html)
Mine, yours, his, hers, its, ours, theirs are the possessive pronouns used to substitute a noun and to show
possession or ownership.
EG. This is your disk and that's mine. (Mine substitutes the word disk and shows that it belongs to me.)
Its means possession
Encarta, 9 (Encarta World English Dictionary,
http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/dictionary/DictionaryResults.aspx?refid=1861622735)
its [ its ]
adjective Definition: indicating possession: used to indicate that something belongs or relates to
something
The park changed its policy.
Its must exclusively refer to the preceding subject to make any sense
Manderino, 73 (Justice for the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Sigal, Appellant, v. Manufacturers Light
and Heat Co., No. 26, Jan. T., 1972, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 450 Pa. 228; 299 A.2d 646; 1973 Pa.
LEXIS 600; 44 Oil & Gas Rep. 214, lexis)
On its face, the written instrument granting easement rights in this case is ambiguous. The same sentence which refers to the right to lay a 14 inch pipeline (singular)
The
writing is additionally ambiguous because other key words which are "also may change the size of its pipes" are dangling in that the
possessive pronoun "its" before the word "pipes" does not have any subject preceding, to which the possessive
pronoun refers. The dangling phrase is the beginning of a sentence, the first word of which does not begin with a capital letter as is customary in normal
has a later reference to "said lines" (plural). The use of the plural "lines" makes no sense because the only previous reference has been to a "line" (singular).
English [***10] usage. Immediately preceding the "sentence" which does not begin with a capital letter, there appears a dangling [*236] semicolon which makes no
The above
deviations from accepted grammatical usage make difficult, if not impossible, a clear understanding of the
words used or the intention of the parties. This is particularly true concerning the meaning of a disputed phrase in the instrument which states
sense at the beginning of a sentence and can hardly relate to the preceding sentence which is already properly punctuated by a closing period.
that the grantee is to pay damages from ". . . the relaying, maintaining and operating said pipeline. . . ." The instrument is ambiguous as to what the words ". . .
relaying . . . said pipeline . . ." were intended to mean.
of or relating to it or itself especially as possessor, agent, or object of an action <going to its kennel> <a child
proud of its first drawings> <its final enactment into law>
belonging to or associated with a thing previously mentioned or easily identified: turn the camera on its side
he chose the area for its atmosphere
Its China
Its China
Random House 16 [Dictionary.com Unabridged, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/people-srepublic-of-china]
People's Republic of China noun
1. People's Republic of China, a country in E Asia. 3,691,502 sq. mi. (9,560,990 sq. km).
Capital: Beijing.
2. Republic of China. Also called Nationalist China. a republic consisting mainly of the island of Taiwan
off the SE coast of mainland China : under Nationalist control since 1948 but claimed by the People's
Republic of China. 13,885 sq. mi. (35,960 sq. km).
Capital: Taipei.
Lots of Provinces
PRC has multiple provinces, regions, and cities
China Culture 03 - People's Republic of China
[http://www.chinaculture.org/gb/en_aboutchina/2003-09/24/content_22844.htm]
People's Republic of China
The People's Republic of China is the third-largest country in the world in terms of area (9.6 million square kilometers) and the
largest in terms of population (1.2 billion). China has shared its borders for centuries with Korea, the former Soviet Union, Afghanistan,
Pakistan, India, Nepal, Skim, Bhutan, Burma, Laos and Vietnam.
Under the central government there are 23 provinces, five autonomous regions -- Inner Mongolia, Ningxia,
Xinjiang, Guangxi and Tibet -- and four cities -- Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing. China's topography varies from mountainous
regions with towering peaks to flat, featureless plains. The land surface, like a staircase, descends from west to east. Melting snow from the
mountains of western China and Tibet -- the Qinghai Plateau -- is the main water resource for many of the country's largest rivers, such as the
Yangtze and the Yellow rivers. Across the mountains on the eastern edge are the plains of the Yangtze River Valley and northern and eastern
China. As the homeland of the Han Chinese, the plains, known as the Middle Kingdom or Zhongguo, are the most important agricultural areas
and the most heavily populated.
Excludes Taiwain
Taiwan is distinct
Guide to Taipei 16 [Is Taiwan part of China?, https://guidetotaipei.com/article/is-taiwan-part-ofchina] doa 4 19 16
Is Taiwan part of China or not?
At present, the nation of "China"
Taiwan is distinct
Diffen c. 13 [People's Republic Of China vs. Republic Of China,
http://www.diffen.com/difference/People's_Republic_Of_China_vs_Republic_Of_China] doa 4-19-16
The People's Republic of China is commonly known as China and the Republic of China is commonly
known as Taiwan. These are separate states with a shared history; China claims sovereignty over Taiwan.
After the Kuomintang reunified China in 1928, most of mainland China was governed by the Republic of China (ROC). The island of Taiwan
was under Japanese rule at the time. At the end of World War II in 1945, Japan surrenedered Taiwan to the Republic of China. In 1949, there was
a civil war in China and the government (ROC) lost control of mainland China to the Communist Party, which established the People's Republic
of China (PRC) and took control of all of mainland China. Only the island of Taiwan remained under the control of the ROC.
Since then, both the ROC and the PRC have been claiming to represent all of "China", and both officially claim each other's territory. In the 1992
consensus, both governments agreed that there is only one "China" but each claimed to be the sole representative of the sovereignty of undivided
China. The PRC's (China's) official policy is to reunify Taiwan with mainland China under the formula of "one country, two
systems" and refuses to renounce the use of military force, especially if Taiwan seeks a declaration of independence.
In Taiwan political opinion is divided into two camps: the Pan-Blue Coalition (majority Kuomintang) believes that the ROC is the sole legitimate
government of "China" but supports eventual Chinese reunification. The opposition Pan-Green Coalition (majority Democratic Progressive Party)
regards Taiwan as an independent state and seeks wide diplomatic recognition and an eventual declaration of formal Taiwanese independence.
Xi is President
Xi is the President
White House 9 25 15 [Vice President Biden Hosts a Luncheon for President Xi of the Peoples
Republic of China, September 25, 2015 | 34:08 | Public Domain, https://www.whitehouse.gov/photosand-video/video/2015/09/25/vice-president-biden-hosts-luncheon-president-xi-people-s-republic] doa 419-16
Vice President Joe Biden
and Secretary of State John Kerry will host a lunch in honor of President President Xi of the
Peoples Republic of China at the Department of State. September 25, 2015.
ii