Social Security System is a govemment-controlled corporation with an original charter, its employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the memorandum of the Civil Service Commission prohibiting strikes. Since the terms and concitions of their employment are fixed by law, they cannot go on strike to secure concessions from their employer. While they may petition for better terms and conditions of employment, they cannot go on strike. Since the strike was illegal, an injunction may be issued to restrain it. (Social Security System Employees Association vs. Court of Appeals, 175 SCRA 686 [1989]) The Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over offenses committed by officers and employees of all government owned and controlled corporations. Article X!, Section 12 of the Constitution provides: The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, egency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof The above provision does not make any distinction as to which government-owned and controlled corporations are covered under the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. Case: International Towage and Transport Corporation (ITTC), a domestic corporation engaged in the lighterage or shipping business, entered into a one (‘}-year contract with Legaspi Oil Company, Inc. (LEGASPI OIL), Granexport Manufacturing Corporation (GRANEXPORT) and United Coconut Chemicals, inc. (UNITED COCONUT), comprising the Coconut Industry Investment Fund (ClIF) companies, for the transport of coconut oil in bulk through MT Transasia. The majority shareholdings of these CllF Companies are owned by the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) as administrator of the ClIF. Under the terms of the contract, either party could terminate the agreement provided a three (3)-month advance notice was given to the other party. However, prior to the expiration of the contract, the CIIF companies terminated the contract without the requisite advance Notice. Petitioner now sues the officers of the UCPB before the Ombudsman claiming that Supreme Court decisions have declared that the Coconut levy funds are public funds. He further asserts that since the funding or controlling interest of the companies being headed by private respondents was given or owned by the CIF as shown in the certification of their Corporate Secretary, it follows that they are government owned and/or controlled corporations. Therefore, respondents UCPB officers Antiporda and Torralba are public officers subject to the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. HELD: These jurisprudential rules invoiced by petitioner in 509support of his claira that the ClIF companies are government owned and/or controlled corporations are incomplete without resorting to the definition of “government owned or controlled carporation" contained in par. (13), Sec. 2, Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987. These include “any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Goverment directly or through its 'nstrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the exient of at least fifty-one (61) percent of its capital stock. The definition mentions three (3) requisites, namely, first, any agency organized as a siock or non-stock corporation; second, vested with functions relating io public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature; and, thirc, owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities eithar wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital 10x, In the preseni case, all three (3) corporations comprising the CIIF companies were organized @s stock corporations. The UCPB-CIIF owns 44.10% of the shares of LEGASPI OIL, 91.24% of the shares of GRANEXPORT, and 92.85% of the shares of UNITED COCONUT. Obviously, the below 51% shares of stock in LEGASPI OIL removes this firm from the definition of a government owned or controlled corporation. ur concern has thus been limited to GRANEXPORT and UNITED COCONUT as we go back to the second requisite. Unfortunately, itis in this regard that petitioner failed to substantiate his contentions. There is no showing that GRANEXPORT and/or UNITED COCONUT was vested with ‘unctions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature unlike PETROPHIL in Quimpo v. Tanodbayan, The Court thus concludes that the ClIF companies are, as found by public respondent, private corporations not within the scope of its jurisdiction (Leyson v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 134980, April 27, 2000). Case: Patitioner, an employee of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC), was charged before the Office of the Ombudsman for ‘malversation. She contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the controversy since the PNRC is allegedly a private voluntary organization. The following circumstances, she insists, are indicative of the private cheracter of the organization: (1) the PNRC does not receive any budgetary support from the goverment, and that all money given to it by the latter and its instrumentalities become private funds of the ‘organization; (2) funds for the payment of personne''s salaries and other emoluments come from yearly fund campaigns, private contributions and Fentals from its properties; and (3) it is not audited by the Commission on Audit, Petitioner states that the PNRC falls under the Intemational Federation of Red Cross, a Switzerland-based organization, and that the power to discipline employees accused of misconduct, malfeasance, or immorality belongs to the PNRC Secretary General by virtue of Section *G", Article IX of its by-laws. She threatens that "to classify the PNRC es a government-owned or controlled corporation would create a dangerous precedent as it would lose jis neutrality, independence and impartiality. 510HELD: As held in Camporedondo v. NLRG, G.R. No. 129049. August 6, 1999, the PNRC is a government owned and controlled corporation. Clearly then, public respondent has jurisdiction over the matter, pursuant to Section 18, of Republic Act No. 670, otherwise known es "The Ombudsman Act of 1989", to wit: "SECTION 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, 2s protectors of the people, shall act promotly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the Goverment, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned! or controlled corporations, and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in ever case where the evidence werrants in order tc promote efficient service by the Government to the people." (Baluyot v. Holganza, G.R. No, 136374. February $, 2000), Petitioner is an Assistant Manager of the Treasury Division of the pine National Construction Corporation (PNCG}. Together with wife, he was charged before the Ombudsman and the Sandigenbayan of estate through falsification of official documents. He questions the jurisdiction of said agencies claiming he is not @ public officer be: PNCC has no original charter. MELD: Inasmuch es the PNCC | original charter as it was incorporated under ihe general la corporations, it follows inevitably that petitioner is nct a public officer within the coverage of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. Thus, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over him. The only instance when the Sendiganbayan hes Jurisdiction over a private individual is when the complaint charges him either as co-principal, accomplice or accessory of 2 public officer who he been charged with 2 crime within the jurisdi ino v, Sandiganbayan, 376 SCRA 452 ( 4. Govermment-owned and controlled cheriers may not be directed by Omb expedite an act or duly required by iaw or to stop, pravent, correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties. Ti is so provided under Article XI, Section 13(2) as one of its powers, to wii Direct, upon complaint or at jis own instance, any public official or employee of the Govemment, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentally tiereof, as well as of any government-owned or controlied corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or Juty required by aw, or fo stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performence of duties. These govemment-owned and controlled corporations do not perform governmental functions and so are allowed greater Iseway in the manner they conduct their day-to-day business. sul5, While all government-owned and controlled corporations are subject to audit by the Commission on Audit, those with no original charters are only post-audited under Article IX-D, Section 2(1). “The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settie all accounts pertaining fo the revenue and receipts of, and expencitures or Uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and on @ post- audit basis: XXX “c. other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; 6. The Securities and Exchange Commission has jurisdiction over government-owned and controlled corporations established under the corporation code. Case: The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) ordered the holding of a shareholders’ meeting to elect a board of directors of the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC). The SEC order was questioned on the ground that the majority or controlling shares of the company are held by government which negates SEC jurisdiction over said corporation. HELD: The SEC has jurisdiction over corporations organized pursuant to the Corporation Code, even if the majority or controlling shares ~ are owned by the government. Hence, it can competently order the holding of a shareholders’ meeting for the purpose of electing the corporate board of directors. While the SEC may not have authority over government corporations with original charters or those created by special law, it does have jurisdiction over "acquired asset corporations" as defined in AO 59. Specifically, the Philippine National Construction Company (PNCC) may be ordered by SEC to hold a shareholders’ meeting to elect its board of directors in accordance with its Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws as well as with the Corporation Code. The chairman and the members of the PNCC Board of Directors hold office by virtue of their election by the shareholders, not by their appointment thereto by the President of the Republic. On the other hand, we have no doubt that over GOCCs established or organized under the Corporation Code, SEC can exercise Jurisdiction. These GOCCs are regarded as private corporations despite common misconceptions. That the government may own the controlling shares in the corporation does not diminish the fact that the latter owes its existence to the Corporation Code. More pointedly, Section 143 of the Corporation Code gives SEC the authority and power to implement its provisions, specifically for the purpose of regulating the entities created 512Pursuant to such provisions. These entities include corporations in which the controlling shares are owned by the government or its agencies [Philippine National Construction Corporation v. Pabion, G.R. No. 131718. December 8, 1999,] The Career and Non-career Service Positions in the Civil Service shall be classified into career service and non-career service. SECTION 7. Career Service. — The Career Service shall be characterized by (1) entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examination, or based on highly technical qualifications; (2) opportunity for aavancement to higher career positions; and (3) security of tenure. The Career Service shall include: (1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an appropriate examination is required; (2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nature; these include the facully and acadomic staff of state colleges and universities, and scientific and technical positions in scientific or research institutions which shall establish and maintain their own merit systems; (3) Positions - in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Depariment Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the President; (4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service, who are appointed by the President, such as the Foreign Service Officers in the Department of Foreign Affairs; (5) Commissioned officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which shall maintain a separate merit system; (6) Personne! of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether performing governmental or proprietary functions, who do not fall under the nan-career service; and (7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilledSECTION 8, Classe: Classes of requires examin follows: of Positions in the Career Service. — (1) ions in the career service appointment to which 1s shall be grouped into three major levels as (@) The shail include clerical, trades, crafts, and custodial service positions which involve non-professional or subprofessiona! work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity r2quiring fess than four years oF collegiate studios; {) The second feva! shall include professional, technical, end scientific positins which involve professionel, technical, or soientific work ia a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity sequiring at leesi iour yeers of college work up to Division Chiat lovel; and (0) The ‘hire tevel shal! cover positions in the Career Execut've Service Except ae herein otfenwise provided, entrence to the frst two levels shail bs through competitive examinations, which shi be open to those inside and outside tne service who meet in minimum quetiicaiton requirements. Entrance lo a- higher level Coes not require previous qualification in the lower level. Entranse {0 the third level shail be prescribed by the Career Executive Service Bosra. Within the same level, no civil service examinati> shail ke required for promotion to a higher position in one or mare relaied occupation groups. A candidate for promotion shouic, however, heve previously passed the examination for that level. SECTION 2. Non-¢ Service. — The Non-Career Service ‘shall be charecterized by (1) entrance on beses other than thoso of ihe usu! tests of merit and fitness utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which ‘s colerminous with thet of the appointing authority or subject to ris pleasure, or which fs limited {0 the duration of a particular project for which puracse employment was made. The Non-Carser Service shall include: (1) Elective ofticials and their personal or confidential staff (2) Secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the pleasure of the President and their personel or confidential stefi(s); (3) Chairman and members of commissions and boards with fixed terms of office end heir personal or confidential staff: 514(4) Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job, requiring special or technical skils not available in the employing agency, 0 be accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year, and performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own responsibilty with a minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring agency; and (5) Emergency and seasonal personnel, (The Administrative Code of 1987, Executive Order No. 292) Case: Respondent Atty. Jacob Montesa, who is not a Career Executive Service Officer (CESO) or a member of the Career Executive Service, was appointed as “Ministry Legal Counsel-CESSO IV in the Ministry of Local Government’ (now DILG) which position was later designated as Director 'll, Thereafter, Sec. Alunan Ill of DILG, citing as reason the interest of Public service and smooth flow of operations in the concemed offices, ‘issued Department Order No. 94-370, relieving Montesa of his current duties and responsibilities and reassigned him as director II of region Xi Respondent refused to accept the transfer claiming that his appointment as. Ministry Legal Counsel had attained permanency. Subsequently Pres. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 235 dropping Montesa from the roster of public servants. Montesa appealed to the Civil Service Commission, but the latter sustained his reassignment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Civil Sevice Commission and the President. HELD: The position of Ministry of Legal Counsel-CESO IV is. embraced in the career executive service. The appointee thereto to qualify should be a Career Executive Service eligible recommended by the board and said appointee must have passed the CES exeminaiion. in the case at bar, there is no question that Montesa does not have the CES eligibility Evidently, Montesa's appointment did not attain permanency and was consequently, merely temporary. Such being the case, he could be transferred or reassigned without violating the constitutionally guaranteed right to security of tenure. (Hon. Alma De Leon Vv. Court of Appeals, et, al., G.R, No. 127182, January 22, 2004) Case: Respondent was appointed by then President Fidel V. Ramos on August 26, 1996 as Regional Director of the Land Transportation Office (LTO) in Region V, a position equivalent to CES rank level V. He was re- appointed to the same position in 1999 by President Estrada. At the time of respondent's appointment in 1996 and 1999, he was not a CES eligible However, during his incumbency, or on August 13, 1999, he was conferred CES eligibility by the Career Executive Service Board. 'On September 7, 1999, petitioner General, who is not a CES eligible, was appointed by President Estrada as Regional Director of the LTO in Region V, the same Position being occupied by respondent. A Memorandum was issued directing petitioner General to assume the said offica immediately and for respondent Roco to report to the Office of the DOTC Sesretary “for further sis,instructions." Accordingly, petitioner General assumed office on September 16, 1998. Petitioner files suit alleging that he has already acquired security of tenure as ine is already a CES eligible. HELD: Two requisites must concur in order that an employee in the career executive service may attain security of tenure, to wit: a) CES eligibility; and b) Appointment to the appropriate CES rank. In the case at bar, there is no question that respondent Remon S. Roco, though a CES eligible, does not possess the appropriate CES rank, which is - CES rank level V, for the position of Regional Director of the LTO (Region V). Falling short of one of the qualifications that would complete his membership in the CES, respondent cannot successfully interpose violation of security of tenure. Accordingly, he could be valicly reassigned to other positions in the career executive service. Respondent further capitalizes on the fact that petitioner General is not a CES eligible. The absence, however, of such CES eligibility is of no moment. The law allows appointment of those who are not CES eligible, subject to the obtention of said eligibility, in the same manner that the appointment of respondent who does not possess the required CES rank (CES rank level V) for the position of Regional Director of the LTO, was Permitted in a temporary capacity. (General v. Roco, G.R. No. 143366, January 29, 2001) Conditions of Employment in the Civil Service Oath of allegiance to the Constitution All public officers and employees shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold and defend this Constitution, (Article IX- B, Section 4) Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance et all times, and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law. (Article XI, Section 18) While expatriation is a constitutionally recognized right, a public officer or employee whe seeks naturalization in another country may be dealt with by law. He may not, be prevented from changing his citizenship, but, at the same time, the State may not be forced to retain him in office. This should not be confused with dual allegiance in Article IV, Section 5. Dual allegiance contemplates a situation-where an alien who has been naturalized remains loyal to his country of origin to the extent of even serving in a public office there, 516Merit System Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according fo merit and fitness, which are to be determined, as far as practicable, by competitive examination, except to Positions which are (a) policy-determining (b) primarily confidential, and (o) highly technical. (Article (IX-B, Section 2(2)) As entrenched in the 1987 Constitution, the enhanced status of the civil service, with its attributes of independence and impartiality, is intended to make it the engine of good government. The framers clearly wanted to eradicate the system of making appointments based primarily on political considerations with its attendant evils, It also sought to eliminate as far as practicable the element of partisanship and personal favoritism in making appointments. The establishment of a system of merit and efficiency as the bases of appointments is meant to prevent discrimination in appointments ‘o Public service based on any consideration other than fitness to perform the duties. Thus, the requirement for standard competitive examinations hes been institutionalized. There are, however, three exceptions to this rule Policy determining, primarily confidential and highly technical positions. in a policy determining position like a Cabinet post, the main qualification of the appointee is his closeness to the appointing power and his views and opinions which the appointing power respects. in 2 primarily confidential Position like that of a personal secretary, the very confidence reposed is the merit of the appointee. In a highly technical position like a scientist or senior economist, the measure of the appointee’s worth is normally in his technical know-how. In these three instances, merit cannot simply be determined by Competitive examinations or standard tests. Just because an examination cannot be devised is no reason that merit is missing. The trusted view, the closeness, the confidence, and the technical know-how are merits that strengthen, and not derogate, the rule that appointment in the civil service be based on merit Policy Determining. A position is policy determining when it involves discretion in the drawing up and formulation of policies, programs and goals of government, as reflective of the executive prerogative to chart the course of national development. Except for members of the Cabinet who can be removed at the discretion of the President, being his bosom friends and alter egos in the particular field of which they are secretaries, most other officers holding policy determining positions are protected by security of tenure Primarily Confidential. A position is primarily confidential when it is based ot only on confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office, but principally on close intimacy which insures fraedom of intercourse 317ithout erebarrassment, or freedom ust or coniidential maiters of state. A position is not primarily confidential t because ihe sinployess handle confidential matters, even if they do so =i times, like physicians, judges, prosecutors and solicitors. There must be a showing that the wort cipally confidential. Officials and employees solding primarily confidential positions continue only so long as confidence in 2 endures. Termination can be justified on the ground of loss of confidence because their cessation from office involves no removal but merely the expiration of the (21m of office. The individual holding the primarily confidential position has an indefinite term, which becomes determined and ‘fixed only when the appsinting power expresses its decision to put an end to the services of the incurnhent. sgivings or betrayals of personal Case: Respondent was appointed by the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PASCOR) Chairman as intemal Security Staff (ISS) member and assigned to the casino at the Manila Pavilion Hotel. However, his employment was terminated by the Board of Directors of PAGCOR allegedly for loss of confidence, after a covert investigation conducted by the Intelligence Division of PAGCOR. The summary of intelligence information claimed that respondent was allegedly engaged in proxy betting. The petition seaks to nulify the decision of the Court of Appeals which set aside the Civii Service Commission (CSC) decision affirming the PAGCOR dismissal and ordered the reinstatement of herein private respondent with full back wages for having been illegally dismissed by the (PAGCOR). HELD: The Supreme Court has constantly held that whether or not a position is policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly ‘echnical, itis determined not by the title but by the nature of the task that is entrusted to it. Thus, the occupant of a perticular position could be considered 2 contidential employee if the predominant reason why ne was chosen by the appointing authority was, to repeat, the latter's belief that he can share @ close intimate relationship with the occupant which ensures freedom of discussion, without fear of embarrassment or misgivings of possible betrayal of personal trust or confidential matters of stale. Withal, where the position occupied is remote from that of the appointing authority, the element of trust between them is no longer predominant. His Position in PAGCOR does not involve "such close intimacy" between him and the appointing authority, that is, the Chairman of PAGCOR, as would ensure “iteedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust." The petition is denied. (CSC v. Salas, G.R. No. 123708, June 19, 1997). Case: Respondent, a Casino Operations Manager (COM) of pett‘oner, was charged with grave misconduct, dishonesty and loss of confidence for indorsing a check without authority and failing to stop a top-ranking officer from placing bets above the allowable limit. Respondent alleged that his indorsement was made only after he was assured by a co-COM that the check was good and that the top-ranking officer was not prohibited because the bet was made in behaif of a customer playing that time. PAGCOR Gismissed respondent, dui on appeal to the Civil Service Commission 518(CSC), was reversed and respondent was found gully of simple neglect of duty, thus was suspended for one month end one dey. PAGCOR appealed to the Court of Appeals, siguing that respondent, 2 primarily confidential employee, may be dismissed on the ground of lack of confidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the CSC. HELD: Respondent is a regular employee, hence, does noi inold oifice at the pleasure of the appointing power. Book V of the Adminisirative Code of 1987 provides that a policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly ‘technical position is determined, not by the title, but by the nature of the task that is entrusted to said position. In this case, the duties and responsibilities of respondent as COM show that he is a tier above the ordinary rank-and-file, and that faith and confidence in his ocmpetence to perform his assigned task are reposed upon him. But not the degree of confidence of the appointing power, which is that intimacy that insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of stale. In fact, he does not report directly to the appointing power, but fo a Branch Manager. The CSC was correct in finding respondent liable only for simple neglect of duty. It has been held in previous jurisprudence that misconduct that warranis removal from office must have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of official duties amounting to intentional neglect and failure to discharge the duties of the office. No evidence was shown to prove that respondent committed acis of dishonesty and misconduct. (PAGCOR v. Rilloraza, G. R. NO. 141744, June 25, 2001) Case: Petitioner was the duly appointed city legal officer. The new mayor terminated his services on the ground that his position was primarily Confidential and appointed respondent in his stead. Petitioner sued for reinstatement. on the ground that his dismissal was without just cause HELD: The position of a city legal officer is primarily confidential, The term of officials holding primarily confidential positions lasts only as long as Confidence in them endures. Their cessation does not involve removal but expiration of their term. The phrase ‘primarily confidential’ denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse, without embarrassment on freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust on confidential matters of state. (Cadiente vs. Santos, 142 SCRA 280 [1986)) Case: The governor terminated the services of the provincial attorney and the other legal officers based on loss of confidence. They impugned the validity of their termination. HELD: The functions of the provincial attorney are highly confidential. The tenure of the officer holding it ands upon loss of confidence. However, this confidential relationship does not extend to the legal sleff. Since the position of these subordinates are remote from that of the appointing authority, the element of trust between them is not predominant. The importance of the subordinates to the appointing authority lies in the contribution of their legal skills. The appointing authority can he protected, through the exercise of the power of review by the 519Provincial attorney. (Grific vs. Civil Service Commission, 194 SCRA 458 [i994)) Case: The Mayor of Caloocan City, terminated the services of respondent Assistant Secrstary to the Mayor on the ground of loss of confdenge Respondent protested on the ground that his position belonged to the classified service. HELD: The termination of respondent is void, Ass general rule, sositions in all branches of government belong to the competitive service. The position of Assistant Secretary to the Mayor Should be considered as belonging to the competitive service. it is the nature of the position which determines if it is primarily confidential, White Guties possibly involving confidential matters are sometimes handled by the Assistant Secretary to the Mayor, this does not necessarily transform the nature of the position itself as one that is primarily and highly confidential ‘The positions of Secretary fo the Mayor and Assistant Secretary to the mayor are two distinct positions. The latter is of a lower rank and is not primarily confidential An assistant secretary clffers from a secretary. An assistant secretary merely helps in a subordinate capacity the person clothed with the duties of a secretary, (Samson vs. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 654 [1985]) Case: Petitioner was employed as management and audit analyst at the Economic intelligence and investigation Bureau .(EIIB). Letter of Implementation No, 74 declared all positions in the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau as Confidential. Petitioners wrote a confidential report to the Office of the President denouncing an officer of the Economie intelligence and Investigation Bureau. After petitioner applied for a vacation leave and left for abroad without the requisite approval, he was terminated He now seeks reinstatement. HELD: Executive pronouncements that Position is primarily confidential are not conclusive. The position of Petitioner is not confidential. His duties relate to the study and analysis of organization structures and procedures. The fact that he may sometimes handle confidential matters does not suffice to characterize his position as primarily confidential. Hence, petitioner cannot be removed for loss of confidence. There was no legal cause for his removal. He was not completely without basis in believing that the approval of his application for leave by the central office would follow as a matter of course, since it had been approved by his immediate superiors, His act of submitting a Confidential report directly to the Office of the Fresident did not constitute a {2utul cause for his dismissal. it was an act of personal and civil courage (Triba vs. Sto. Tomas, 199 SCRA 833 [1994]) Highly Technical. A position is highly technical when the office requires the Possession of technical skill or training in the supreme or superior degree, a Certain skil that is not ordinary possessed by common man. The post of City Engineer may be technical, but is not highly so, because his duties are eminently administrative in character and so could be discharged even ®y non-technical men. One who has invested his talent, youth, time and 520effort in acquiring skills and has applied them to public use deserves even greater protection. Thus, loss of confidence is not ground for dismissing 2 person in such a highly technical position. Case: Petitioner, a Special Assistant to the Central Bank Governor and Head of the Export Division, was administratively charged but eventually cleared by an investigating committee. The Monetary Board, however, disregarded the committee's findings and dismissed petitioner based on loss of confidence. HELO: The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions (such as private secretaries of public functionaries) ends upon loss of confidence, because their term of office lasts only as long as confidence in them endures; and thus their cessation involves no removal. But the situation is different for those holding highly technical posts, requiring special skills and qualifications. The Constitution clearly distinguishes the primarily confidential from the highly technical, and to apply the loss of confidence rule to the latter incumbents is to ignore and erase the differentiation expressly made by our fundamental charter. Moreover, it is illogical that while an ordinary technician, say a clerk, stenographer, mechanic, or engineer, enjoys security of tenure and may not be removed at pleasure, a highly {echnical officer, such as an economist or a scientist of avowed attainments and reputation, should be denied security and be removable at any time, without right to 2 hearing or chance to defend himself. No technical man worthy of the name would be willing to accept work under such conditions. Ultimately, the rule advocated by the Bank would demand that highly technical positions be filled by persons who must labor always with an eye cocked at the humor of their superiors. it would signify that the so-called highly technical positions will have to be filled by incompetents and yes men, who must rely not on their own qualifications. and skill but on their ability to carry favor with the powerful The entire objective of the Constitution in establishing and dignifying the Civil Service on the basis of merit, would be thus negated. Petitioner is ordered reinstated. (Corpus v. Cuaderno. 13 SCRA 591 [1963]). Prohibitions and Limitations Appointment of Lameducks ‘No candidate who has lost in any election shail within one year after such election, be appointed to any office in the Government or any government-owned or controlled corporations or its subsidiaries. (Article iX- 8, Section 6) Appointment of elective officials No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity, to any public oifice or position, during his tenure. (Article IX-B, Section 7, par. 4) satAppointment of appointive officials Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary Junctions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the goverment, its sub‘lvisions or instrumentalities, including government. owned end controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. (Article £¢8, Section 7, par. 2) Standardization of pay Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government officials and employees, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, taking info account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to and qualifications required, for their positions, (Article IX-B, Section 5), This provision only applies to the regular agencies of government as well as government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters. ‘The compensation of personnel of goverment owned and controlled corporations organized under the Corporation Code is governed by the Labor Code and may be bargained for collectively ouble Compensation and Foreign Gift ‘No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall: @. Receive adtitional, double or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law. However, pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation. b. Accept without the consent of the Congress, any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind from any foreign government. (Article IX-B, Section 8), Case: Petitioner assails the decision of the Court of Appeals which held that his separation pay should be limited to the number of years of his service in the Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA) only, excluding his years of service as judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MéTC) of Quezon City for which he has already been given retirement gratuity and pension. Citing Chaves v. Mathay, the decision held that petitioner cannot be paid retirement benefits twice — one under R.A. No. 910, as amended, and another under R.A. No. 7924 — for the same services he rendered as MeTC Judge. HELD: After the approval of his optional retirement as a Judge, petitioner was fully paid of his retirement gratuity under R.A. No. 910, 522and five years thereafter he has been receiving a monthly pension. The petitioner cannot take refuge under the second paragraph of Section 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution, which provides: Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation. This provision simply means that a retiree receiving pension or gratuity can continue to receive such pension or gratuity even if he accepts another government position to which another compensation is attached. Indeed, the retirement benefits which petitioner had received or has been receiving under R.A. No. 910, as amended, do not constitute double compensation, He could continue receiving the same even if after his retirement he had been receiving salary from the defunct MMA as Director Ill thereof, This is but just because said retirement benefits are rewards for his services as MeTC Judge, while his salary was his compensation for his services as Director Il of the MMA..However, to credit his years of service in the Judiciary in the computation of his separation pay under RA. No. 7924 Notwithstanding the fact that he had received or has been receiving the tetirement benefits under RA. No. 910, as amended, would be to countenance double compensation for exactly the same services, ie., his services as MeTC Judge. Such would run counter to the policy of this Court against double compensation for exactly the same services. More important, it would be in‘ violation of the first paragraph of Section 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution, which proscribes additional, double, or indirect compensation. (Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139792, November 22, 2000.) Ban on partisan political activities No officer or employee in the civil service shall ‘engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign. (Article IX-B, Section 2(4). The AFP shail be insulated from partisan politics. No member of the military shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any partisan politcal activity, except to vote. (Article XVI, Section 5(3)). Case: Complainant filed charges in the Supreme Court with supporting affidavits against respondent judge for having delivered a speech al a Conference of barangay captains in the house of Mayor Proceso Maramag at Iguig Cagayan, advising them to support the leadership of Maramag and Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile. While respondent judge admitted having made a speech, he denied that he favored Maramag but stated that he enjoined the barangay captains to "follow the doctrine of the New Society" and to "vote honestly.” HELD: It was improper or indecorgus for respondent judge to have taken part in the political meeting “eld in Maramag's house which would render him vulnerable to the charge of electioneering under section 5, Art. XII(B) of the Constitution, ani section 36 (b) (26) of Presidential Decree No. 807, the Civil Service Decree of 323Philippines. This constitutes illegally engaging in partisan political activity. (Trinidad vs. Valle, 408 SCRA 606 [1981}) Case: While respondent was still a judge, he circulated a letter indicating his intention to run for congressman and inviting the addressees to attend a caucus. HELD: We find that Respondent had acted improperly when he sent out letters/nandbilis, manifesting his intention to run as a congressional candidate, addressed to electoral constituents of the second district of Bulacan as early as 10 February 1987, while still the incumbent MTC Judge of Guiguinto, Bulacan, and prior to the commencement of the campaign period on 24 March 1987. For holding himself out as a candidate while still a member of a bench, respondent must be pronounced guilty of gross misconduct. (Visten vs. Nicolas, 201 SCRA 524 [1991]) A department head is not embraced within the constitutional prohibition from engaging in partisan political activities. Under a presidential system of government set up under the Constitution, the department head is a member of the official family of the President and the extension of his personality. Thus, he is frequently called upon to disouss the issues before the people and defend the actuations of the administration to which he belongs. Moreover, not every kind of political activity comes within the meaning and intent of the prohibition, Thus, an officer or employee is not prohibited from expressing his views on current political problems or issues, oF from mentioning the names of candidates for public office whom he supports Removal or suspension only for cause. No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended, except for cause provided by law. (Article IX- B, Section 2(6)) All officers or employees, including those occupying positions which are policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical, cannot be removed or suspended unless for cause. Summary removal Section 40 of the Civil Service Act of 1978 (P. D. 807) provides for summary dismissal of government employees. The decree was repealed by Republic Act No. 6654 which was approved on May 20, 1988. The said provision, however, is reproduced verbatim in Section 50 of the chapter on the Civil Service Commission in the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292). 524Right to self-organization The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law, shall not be abridged. (Article Ill, Section 8). The right to self-organization shall’ not be denied to government-employees. (Article IX-B, Section 2(5)). Retirement and other benefits The State shall, from time to time, review to upgrade the pensions and other benefits due fo retirees of both the government and the private sectors, (Article XVI, Section 8). Powers and Functions. The ,Civil Service Commission is the central personnel agency of the government. As such, its functions and powers are: 1. Establish a career service. 2 Adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integriy, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. 3. Strengthen the merit and rewards system. 4, Integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks. 5. Institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability. 6. Submit to the President and Congress an annual report of its personnel programs. Case: Petitioner dismissed respondent for grave misconduct. The Civil Service Commission exonerated her and ordered her reinstatement Petitioner argued that under its charter it has instiiutional autonomy. HELD: The Civil Service Law vests the Civil Service Commission with appellate jurisdiction in administrative disciplinary cases involving members of the civil service. The civil service includes government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. As a government-owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, petitioner is part of the civil service. 525Administrative cesee involving the discipline of its employees are under the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. (University of the Philippines vs, Regio, 224 SCRA 698 [1993]) Case: The City iayor extended a permanent appointment to petitioner as administrative cificer. The Civil Service Commission approved it as temporary, subject to the outcome of the protest of respondent. The Civil Service Commission decided that respondent was better qualified, revoked the appointment of petitioner, and ordered the appointment of respondent in his place. Petitioner argued that he could not be removed, since his appointment Wes permanent. Respondent replied that ‘since the appointment of patitioner was temporary, he could be removed at any time. HELD: Petitioner cannot be removed. His appointment was permanent, because the appointing authority indicated that it was permanent. The Civil Service Commission did not have the power to make it temporary. What was temporary was the approval of the appointment but not the appointment itself. The Civil Service Commission has no power to determine the nature of the appointment. its authority is limited to determining whether the appointee is qualified, Since petitioner possesses the qualifications prescribed by law, his appointment can not be faulted on the ground that there were others better qualified. (Luego vs. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327 [1986]) Case: Petitioner was appointed assistant bank physician by the Central Bank. She was qualified for the position. The Civil Service Commission ordered the revocation of her appointment and the appointment of the respondent on the ground that he was more qualified, HELD: The appointing authority is given ample discretion in the appointment of a Qualified person to a vacant position. The authority of the Civil Service Commission is limited to reviewing if the appointment complies with the requirements of the law. It is not disputed that petitioner is qualified. The Civil Service Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified. It has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. (Central Bank vs. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744 [1989]) 526XV. Commission on Elections (fama The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) first came into being by virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 607 enacted on August 22, 1940. Originally, the power to enforce election laws was vested. in the President and exercised through the Department of thé Interior. ee nsfer t ymthe COMELEC became a constitutional body by virtue of the 1940 amendments to the 1935 Constitution. It was granted the power to have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections. The 1973 Constitution further broadened the powers of COMELEC by making it the ‘golesjudge of all + tion, feturisMand qualificationsmer the national:legistature and) elective provincial and city officials. In brief, the COMELEC: W d is Under the 1987 Constitution ‘ipitiativesrereferendawanderecallse Election contests involving regional, provincial and city elective officials are under its exclusive original jurisdiction. All contests involving elective municipal and barangay officials are under its appellate jurisdiction 1. ‘Enforceelectioniaws Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscites, initiative, referendum, and recall (Article IX-C, Section 2 (1)) a) Todeclarerafailureofelections” Case: Petitioner assails the decision of the Comelec dismissing his petition for a declaration of Annulment of Election or Election Results andio: Declaration of Failure of Elections. He claims that the handwritten entries on 278 COMELEC copies of election returns were written by one and the same person in groups. HELD: The authority of the CONIELEC to deciare a failure of elections is derived from Section 4 of Reputslic Act No. 7166, otherwise known as The Synchronized Elections Law o* 1991. it provides. that the COMELEC sitting En Bane by a majority vote of its members may decide, among others, the declaration of failure of election and the calling of special elections as provided in Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code. 327uc eh that it including the preparation itioner’s relief was for COMELEC to order a recount of the votes cast, on account of the falsified election returns, which is properly the subject of an election contest. (Typoco v. Comelec, G.R. No. 136191, November 29, 1999.) Case: In a bid to improve our elections, Congress enacted RA. No. 8436 on December 22, 1897 prescribing the adoption of an automated election system. The new system was used in the May 11, 1998 regular elections held in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) which inoludes the Province of Sulu. During the automated counting of votes for {he local officials of Sulu, some election inspectors and watchers informed ‘he Comelec of discrepancies between the election retums and the votes cast for the mayoralty candidates. It appeared that there was a ‘misalignment in the printing of the local ballots as a result of which the automated machines failed to read them correctly. The Comelec ordered a anual recount that was questioned by the two losing candidates on the ground that itis illegal. HELD: The Commission on Elections, because of its ‘actfinding facilities, its contacts with politcal strategists, and its knowledge Gerived from actual experience in dealing with political controversies, is nr peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex political questions . qu it . Time_and Sioad-sovacnment. in the matter of the administration of laws relative to the Conduct of election, . we must not by any excessive zeal take avy from {ne Commission on Elections the initiative which by constitutional and legal mandates properly belongs to it. In the case at bar, the COMELEC order for & manual count was not only reasonable. It was the only way to count the Gecisive local votes in the six (6) municipalities of Pata, Talipzo, Siasi, Tudanan, Tapul and Jolo. The bottom line is that by means of the manual Count, the will of the voters of Sulu was honestly determined. We cannot kick away the will of the people by giving a literal interpretation to “eA 8436 ‘Goesiniotiwork, Counting is part and parcel of the conduct of an election 528qd) which is under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. It ought to be self-evident that the Constitution did not envision a COMELEC that cannot count the result of an election. (Loong v. Comelec, [G.R. No. 133676, April 14, 1999.] To cali forthe holding of special elections. Case: Petitioner challenges the Comelec resolution calling for the holding of a special election in only several municipalities of Lanao de! Sur. He claims that there was total failure of election in the entire province and thus the special election should be for all the municipalities, HELD: In fixing the dete for special elections the COMELEC should see to it that: @ itishould ‘ot be later than thirty (30), days after the cessation of the cause of the ‘Bostponementior’suspension’of the'election or the ‘failure tovelect; and, it “should ] n The first involves"@ question of fact. ‘The second mustibe:determined:in the:light of the"peculiar circumstances of ‘icase, Thus, the holding of elections within the next few months from the cessation of the cause of the postponement, suspension or failure to elect may stil be considered “reasonably close to the date of the election not held, it bears stressing that in the exercise of the plenitude of its powers to Protect the integrity of elections, the COMELEC should not and must not be straitjacketed by procedural rules in the exercise of ils discretion to resolve election disputes. Petitioner's argument that respondent COMELEC gravely abused its discretion by failing to declare a total failure of elections in the entire province of Lanao del Sur and to certify the same to the President and Congress so that the necessary legislation may be enacted for the holding of a special election, likewise fails to persuade. No less than petitioner himself concedes that there was total failure of elections in twelve (12) municipalities and partial failure in eleven (11). Yet he now insists a total failure of elections should have been declared in the entire province of Lanao del Sur. Suffice it to state that the propriety of declaring whether or Not there has been a total failure of elections in the entire province of Lanao del Sur is a factual issue which this Court will not delve into considering that the COMELEC, through its deputized officials in the field, is in the best Position to assess the actual conditions prevailing in that area. Absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion, the findings of fact of the COMELEC or any administrative agency exercising particular expertise in its field of endeavor, are binding on the Court. There is no cogent reason to depart from the general rule in this case. (Pangandaman v. Comelec, G.R. No. 134340. November 25, 1999.) Deny due course or. cancel a certificate ofjeandidacy, Case: Challenged in this case is the COMELEC decision deciaring petitioner disqualified as candidate for representative of the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani in the 11 May 1998 elections, The decision stemmed from a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy duly filed with the Commission which held 529that petitioner is not 2 resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani where he seeks election, HELD: As previously mentioned, the CCMELEC, under Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, has jurisdiction over ¢ petition to deny due course to or cancel itificate of candicacy. Such jurisdiction continues even after election, if no inal judgment of cisquelification is rendered before the election, and the candidate facing discusiification is voted for and receives the highest umber of voles end provided further that the winning candidate has not ‘seen prociaimed or -has taken his oath of office. In the instant case, petitioner was not proclaimed as Congressman-elect of the Lone Congressionai District of ihe Province of Sarangani by reason of a Supplemental Omnibus Resolution issued by the COMELEC on the day of ihe election ordering the suspension of DOMINO’s proclamation should he obtain the winning number of votes. This resolution was issued by the COMELEC in view of the non-finality of its 6 May 1998 resolution disqualifying DOMINO as candidate for the position. Considering that DOMINO has not been proclaimed as Congressman-elect in the Lone Congressional Districi of the Province of Sarangani he cannot be deerned a member of the House of Representatives. Hence, Iiisitti@iGOMELECrandis not the Electoral Tribunal qyhich@hasmjurisdictionsoversthewissuesofehis, idtates, The Comelec decision is hereby affirmed, No. 134045, July 19, 1999.) ©) Torcorrectimanifestverrors:initheicertificateroficanvass"orvelection wefurnsin case: The petition at bar assails the order of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc nullifying and setting aside the proclamation of petitioner Federico S. Sandoval as congressman-elect for the Malabon- Navotas legislative district. An issue raised is whether the COMELEC has the power to take cognizance of the earlier petitions filed before said body alleging the existence of manifest error in the certificate of canvass issued by the Malabon municipal board of canvassers and seeking to reconvene said board of canvassers to allow it to correct the alleged error. HELD: We uphold the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the petitions filed by private respondent. As a general rule, candidates and registered political parties involved in an election are allowed to file pre-proclamation cases before the COMELEC. Pre-proclamation cases refer to any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 236 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns. The COMELEC has exciusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation controversies, As an exception, however, to the general rule, Section 15 of Republic Act (RA) 7166 prohibits candidates in the presidential, vice- presidential, senatorial end congressional elections from filing pre- proclamation cases. it states: "SECTION 15, Pre-proclamation Cases. ‘Not Allowed in Elections for President, Vice-President, Senator, and 530 (Domino v. Comelec,Members of the House of Representatives, — For purposes of the elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or the certificates of canvass, as the case may be However, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns before it." The prohibition aims to avoid delay in the proclamation of the winner in the election, which delay might result in a vacuum in these sensitive posts. Skaamlem, The second sentence of Section 18 alows the fing of pttions for correction of manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns even in elections for president, vice-president and members of the House of Representatives for the simple reason that the correction of manifest error will not prolong the process of canvassing nor delay the proclamation of the winner in the election. (@ibis(FUlstisiconsistentiwithrandt Jurisdictionyover petitionsiseeking to correctithevalleged rahifesterror inthe ‘certificatemofecanvassimissued by the Malabon municipal board of canvassers. The authority to rule on petitions for correction of manifest error is vested in the COMELEC en bane. (Sandoval v. Gomelec, G.R. No. 133842. January 26, 2000.) © ‘Decide administrative questions affecting elections; except the righ’ i i i i it ‘towote. Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including determination of the number and location of polling pleces, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters. (Article IX-C, Section 2 (3) The right to vote being a political right that is constitutionally granted, the courts are the proper venue for such action, and not an administrative proceeding such as the one contemplated here.offensesand Tecommendhtorthe President thesremovalrof :or:imposition of anyrothendisciplinary action upon any officer or employee it has deputized ision. In addition, the omission also wasmirectstcontrobandsupervisions-oversallepersonnel, involvedrin the conduct of election Case: Petitioner was ordered by the Comelec to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt for having published in his newspaper article in the Manila Times entitled "Ballot Boxes Contract Hit", which accordirie to the Commission, tended to interfere and influence @ pending investigation before said body. Petitioner challenged the authority of the Comelec to punish him for contempt. HELD: The requisition and preparation of the necessary ballot boxes to be used in the elections is an imperative ministerial duty which the Commission is bound to perform if the elections are to be held. It did not exercise a judicial function. If a controversy atose among the suppliers, that again does not involve the exercise of a judicial function, The exercise of the power of contempt by an administrative body in the exercise of an administrative function is invalid. {Guevara v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-12596, July 31, 1958) fe, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters. (Article IK-C, Section 2 (6)) ‘Prosecute election law violators . Investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices. (Article IX-C, Section 2 (6)). The jurisdiction of the Commission to investigate and prosecute election law violators is exclusive, regardless of whether the violator is a private individual or a public officer performing his official duties. The proper venue for election offenses is the Regional Trial Court, whose jurisdiction is original and exclusive. Case: After the preliminary investigation, the Tanodbayan charged petitioner, an election registrar, before the Sandiganbayan with violations of the Election Code by registering voters on election day and tampering with returns to make it appear that there were more registered voters. Petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the Tanodbayan to investigate the case, and of the Sandiganbayan to try the case. HELD: Due to its power to enforce all election laws. to insure free, orderly and honest elections, the 932“investigate anc prosectite eecton ofenas 7 caves it of its aurenty iy SS anciprosecuten, y impair its effectiveness im explicily or implicitly grants the Sandiganbayan ‘andthe Tanodbayan jurisdiction over election offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office, as contra-distinguished from the provision of the Election Code giving the Commission on Elections and the regular courts jurisdiction over such cases. Repealsibyiimplicationaremobiavoreds Besides, as between’a predic and a ganeral slate, th former prevele, @aAMpaenannciciam concuciverto-avfar and: speedy administration of justice. The RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide such cases. It is not the character or personality of the offender (public official) but the crime committed (violation of election law) that determines jurisdiction (De Jesus vs. People, 120 SCRA 760 [1983]) Case: Based on the authorization given by the Commission on Elections, the provincial.election supervisor conducted a preliminary investigation and filed an information against respondent for violation of the Omnibus Election Code. The lower court dismissed the case on the ground that the case was filed without the written approval of the provincial fiscal. HELD: Under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, itis the Commission on Elections who has the power to investigate and prosecute violations of glection law. This power is scsi to the Commission on Elections steep em . (People vs. Inting, 187 SCRA 788 (1980) 5. Recommend:pardon;amnesty;/parole:on suspension of 'sentencetof election law violators No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension, of sentence for violation of election laws, rules and regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the Comelec. (Article IX-C, Section. 5). 6. Deputize law enforcement agencies and recommenditheir removal Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and instrumenialities of the » government, including the AFP, for the "exclusive" purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. (Article IX-C, Section 2 (4)} Recommend to the President the removal of, or imposition of any other disciplinary measure an, any officer or 333employee it has Ceputized, for the violation of disregard of, or disobedience fo, its directive, order or decision. (Article IX G, Section 2 (8) Case: After the preliminary investigation, the provincial fiscal filed three informations againist respondents for commission of election offenses. All HELD: Section 2, Article IX-C of the _ GommissionsonsElections;tordeputize law-enforcement agencies. Under Resolution No. 1882, the: ti s condu liminarysinvestige Ff el Sand to pros ‘thems, This power is not limited to the conduct of elections. The prompt investigation and prosecution of election offenses is an indispensable part of the task of insuring free, honest and orderly elections. (People vs. Basilla, 179 SCRA 86 [1989}) 7. sRegister political parties; organizations and.coalitions Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions, which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of government (Article IX-C, Section 2(6). The following shall not be registered: @. Religious denominations and sects. 5. Those seeking to achieve their goals through violence or” untawiul means, ¢. Those refusing to uphold and adhere to this Constitution. d. Those which are supported by any foreign government. Financial, contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties or candidates related to élections constitute ‘interference in national affairs, and when accepted, shall be an additional ground for » s cancellation of registration, in addition to other penaities the law may prescribe. (Article IX-C, Section 2 (8)) A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people subject to the provisions of this Article. (Section 6) 534No votes cast in favor of a political perty, organization, or coalition shail be valid, except for those registered under the party-list system, as provided in this Constitution. (Section 7) Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system shall not be represented in the voters registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. Howevert they 'shallbeventitied to appoint pol!® watehersiinaccordanceswithiawa(Articie IX-C, Section 8) ¢ ‘“Accredit citizensarme .--Acoredit citizens’ arms of the Commission on Elections . (Article IX-C, Section 2(5)). Republic Act No. 8173 (An Act Granting All Citizens’ Arms Equal Opportunity to be Accredited by the Commiscion on Elections) provides thet the sixth copy of the election retums shall be given to e cilizens’ arm authorized by the Commission to conduct an unofficial count. 10.Regulate public utilities and media of in‘ormation The Commission may, during the election period, tation nd cia of communication or information, and all grants, special privileges or concessions granted by the government, its agencies, and government-owned end controlled corporations and subsidiaries. Such supervision or regulation shall eim fo ensure equal opportunity, time and space, the right to reply, including reasonable equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and form among candidates, in connection with the objection of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. (Article IX C, Section 4) Unless otherwise fixed by the Comelec in special cases, the election period shall commence 20 days before the day of the election, and shall end 20 cays thereafter. (Article IX-C, Section 9) Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination. (Article iX- C, Section 10) 535Republic Act No. 9006, entitled “The Fair Election Act,” which was promulgated in time for the 2001 general elections, has lifted the ban on political advertising during elections subject to certain conditions and limitations. This effectively supercedes the decisions in Osmena v. Comelec (G.R. No. 132231. March 31, 1998) and National Press Club v. Comelec (207 SCRA + [1992}) and partly, the case of Telecomunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines v. Comeleo, 289 SCRA 337 (1998) Exercise exclusive original yurisdiction over all » contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of al! elective regional, provincial, and city officials and appellzie jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by tral courts or general Jurisciction, o° involving elective barangay officials decicied by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. The Comelec may sit en bane or in two divisions and shail promulgate its rules of procedure inorder to! expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. Al! such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decision shall be decided by the Comelec en banc. (Article 1X-C, Section 3) Case: Petitioners assert that the preparation of the retums had been marred by undue influence and intimidation, thus affecting their regularity, due execution and authenticity. They therefore question the inclusion in the canvass of votes in Sto. Tomas, Davao del Norte, of those 25 election returns which are claimed to have been prepared through threats and undue influence. HELD: This petition stemmed from a pre-prociamation controversy. In 2 long line of cases, we have consistently held that @ pre- proclamation controversy is limited to an examination of the election returns on their face. The COMELEC as a general rule need not go beyond the face of the returns and investigate alleged election irregularities. We see no reason to depart from this rule in this petition. There is no exceptional circumstance present in this controversy to justify the summary annulment of the canvass and the annulment of the proclamation. To require the COMELEC to examine the circumstances surrounding the preperation of election returns would run counter to the rule that a pre-prociamation controversy should be summarily decided, consistent with the law's desire that the canvass end proclamation be delayed as little as possible. That is 536Why such questions which require more deliberate and necessarily longer Consideration, are left for examination in the corresponding election protest." Where the resolution of the issues raised would require the COMELEC to “pierce the vell’ of election returns that appear prima facie regular, the remedy is @ regular election protest. (Sebastian v. Comelec, G.R. No. 139573, March 7, 2000) 337XVi. Commission on Audit The Commission on Audit has the authority to audit all expenditures of funds or property pertaining to, or held in trust by the Government. Under Article IX-B, Section 2(2), the Commission shall have exclusive authority to promulgate accouniing and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties. Powers and Functions. The Commission shall have the power, authority, and duty to: 1) Examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts, and expenditures or uses of funds and property owned, by, held in trust by, or pertaining to the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters (Article IX-D, Section 2 (1)). 2) Ona post-audit basis: a. Constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution b. Autonomous state colleges and universities 6. Other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries d. Such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through tho government, which are required by the law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. (Article IX-B, section 2(1)) Case: A public bidding was conducted by petitioner for the acquisition of a generator. The bid of the lowest qualified bidder was exclusive of customs duties and taxes. Petitioner submitted the documents to the auditor for pre- audit, and the auditor found that the award to the lowest bidder was in order. A new ausitor conducted a post-audit and disallowed the exclusion of customs duties and taxes, Petitioner claimed that since the contract had been approved during the pre-audit, it could no longer be submitted to a post-aucit, HELD; A pre-audit is an examination of financial transactions 538.before their consumption or payment and is’ basically a special development of the control aspect of accountancy as well as an integral part of the accounting and payment process. Thus, pre-audit seeks to determine that: 1. The proposed expenditure complies with an appropriation law or other specific statutory authority; 2. Sufficient funds are available for the purpose. 3. The proposed expenditure is not unreasonable or extravagant and the unexpended balance of appropriations where it will be charged to is sufficient to cover the entire amount thereof; and 4. The transaction is approved by proper authority and the claim is duly supported by authentic underlying evidences. The Commission on Audit is allowed by the Constitution to conduct a post-audit. There is nothing to preclude the Commission on Audit from conducting a post-audit of a pre-audited transaction. It is thus erroneous for DBP to claim that respondent Commission is estopped from questioning, in the process of post-aucit, the previous acts of its officials. Further, well-settled is the principle that estoppel does not lie against the government (Cruz, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 145 [1991]; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 290 [1990)), more so if they are erroneous, let alone irregular (Republic vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 208 SCRA 90 [1992], Sharp Intemational Marketing vs. Court of Appeals, 201 SCRA 299 [1991]). (Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Commission on Audit, 231 SCRA 202 [1994]) Where the intemal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such measures, including temporary on special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate fo correct the deficiencies, (Article IX-D, Section 2 ) It shall keep the general accounts of the Government and, for such period as may be provided by lew, preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto. (Article IX-D, Section 2 (1)) The Commission shall have exclusive authority; subject to limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable ‘expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties. (Article IX-D, Section 2 (2)) Case: The Commission on Audit withheld payment of the balance of the price of wheelbarrows and shovels a province purchased from petitioner and ordered him to make a refund on the ground that there was an overprice. Petitioner questioned the ruling on the ground that it impaired a perfected contract. HELD: in the exercise of the regulatory power vesied upon it by the Constitution, the Commission on Audit adheres to the policy 539{hal government funds and property should be fully protected and Spee {nat irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant GXPencllures or uses of such funds and property should be prevented. On {he proposition that improper or wasteful spending of public turds or rere gS? of government property, for being highly ireguier or gonecessary, oF scandalously excessive or extravagant, offends the there ree ee will it Behooves the Commission on Audit to put a stop thereto. Indeed, net only is the Commission on Auatt (COA) vested wath the Bowyer and authority, but is also charged with the duty to examine, audit and Settle all accounts pertaining to .. - the expenditure or uses of funds. gumed by: o periaining to, the Government or any of its subdivisions. Secttesog pstrumentalties (Article IX (0-1) Section 2(1), 1987 Constitution). Thet authority extends to the accounts of all persons ‘especting funds or properties received or held by them in any accountable. cera (Section 26, P.D. No, 1445). In the exercise ofits jurisdiction, it fetermines wether or not the fiscal responsibilty that rests directly with the head of the government agency has been properly. and effectively Gischarged (Section 25 (1) ibid), and whether or not there has been loss &, wastage of government resources. It is also empowered to review and evaluate contracts. (Section 18 (4), ibid). And, after an auult hae. bocn made, its auditors issue a certificate of settlement to each officer whose Cot fas been audited and settled in whole or in part, stating the balances found due thereon and certified, and the charges or differsnces seme tom the setlement by reason of disallowances, charges or ianemsions. The ruling of the Commission on Audit has legal basis (Sambeli vs. Province ef Isabela, 210 SCRA 80 [1992}) (ase: The petition seeks to nulify Commission on Audit (COA) Decision No, 2700 dated February 19, 1993, fining petitioner, then President sf ine National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC), liable for the the nt of P86,796,711.55 covering the payment of the loan proceeds for Henaet, aotuited by the Alyansang Maka-Maralitang Asosasyon at Kepatirang Organisasyon (AMAKO) which was disallowed in’ aude Pelitoner himself was the final approving authority of the transaction ih seer On and the officerslemployees who processed the same were direct under his supervision, The COA ruled that it cannot with expediency impossible, it would be improbable for him to check all the detais. and conduct physical inspection and verification of the application of AMAKO considerng the voluminous paperwork attendant to his office. He has to {el mainly on the certifications, recommendations and memoranda et He subordinates in approving the loan. The processing, review and evaluatins 540of the loan application passed through the responsible and authorized officers of the CMP Task Force. As admitted by the Director of the Corporate Audit Office, Emma M, Espina, the officers of the CMP Task Force erred in discharging these assigned duties. Moreover, the high appraisal of the subject property cannot be altributed to herein petitioner because the valuation of the said property is undertaken by the HIGC, an entity separate and distinct from the NHMFC and over which petitioner exercises no control or supervision. We have consistently held that every person who signs or initials documents in the course of transit through standard operating procedures does not automatically become a conspirator in a crime which transpired at a stage where he had no participation. His knowledge of the conspiracy and his active and knowing participation therein must be proved by positive evidence. The fact that such officer signs or initials a voucher as it is going the rounds does not necessarily follow that the said person becomes part of @ conspiracy in an illegal scheme. The guilt beyond reasonable doubt of each supposed conspirator rust be established. Additionally, the assailed decision failed to mention petitioner's direct participation in the fraudulent scheme. It merely held that petitioner be immediately and primarily held responsible for the disallowance, for the simple reason that, as the approving officer, any transaction presented to him for approval is subject to his discretion. His reliance on the supposed review and evaluation done by his subordinates is also discretionary on his part. The COA concluded that whatever misrepresentation and/or abuse in the performance of their duties made by the subordinates make petitioner, as head of the agency, also liable, considering that these people acted on his behalf and with his approval. There is no evidence on record to show that petitioner had knowledge of the fraudulent scheme perpetrated by some employees of the NHMFC. in fact, petitioner immediately filed a complaint before the Ombudsman against the subordinate employees who appeared to be responsible for the fraud, He also directed the filing of a civil case against the originator and other persons responsible for misrepresentation, All these acts are indicative that he had no knowledge of the fraudulent scheme perpetrated by certain officials or employees of his agency, The actions taken by petitioner involved the very functions he had to discharge in the performance of official duties. He cannot, therefore, be held civilly liable for such acts unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence. Inasmuch as no evidence was presented to show that petitioner acted in bad faith and with gross negligence in the performance of his official duty, he is presumed to have acted in the regular performance of his official duty. Similarly, it is a basic tenet of due process that the decision of a government agency mist state the facts and the law on which the decision is based. The COA decision merely stated conclusions of law. Facts and circumstances, as well as the why's, the what's and the how's of the disallowance, were patently missing, inaccurate or incomplete. The COA cannot just perform its constitutional function of disallowing expenditures of government funds at sheer discretion. There has to be factual basis why the expenditure is alleged to be fraudulent or why was there a misrepresentation. Liability depends upon the wiong committed and 541not solely by reassn of being the head of a government agency. The COA even mentioned ‘he anti-graft law which imputes liability for a grossly disadvantageous contract entered into by a government functionary, But as to why and how the disbursement of funds in this case was considered disadvantageous musi be duly supported by findings of facts, Consequently, respondent COA committed a grave abuse of its discretion when it held petitioner personally liable for the subject disallowance. (Albert ¥. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 126587. March 6, 2001) Case: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the letter-decision of the Chairman of the Commission on Audit (COA) and the letter-decision of the COA en bane, prohibiting the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) ‘rom hiring a privaie extemal auditor. This petition raises a question of first impression, whether or not the constitutional power of the COA to examine and audit the DBP is exclusive and precludes a concurrent audif of the DBP by a private external aucitor. in 1986, the Philippine government, under the administration of then President Corazon C. Aquino, obtained from the World Bank an Economic Recovery Loan ("ERL" for brevity) in the amount of US$310 million. The ERL was intended to support the recovery of the Philippine economy, at that time suffering severely from the financial crisis, that hit the country during the latter part of the Marcos regime. As a condition for granting the loan, the World Bank required the Philippine government to rehabilitate the DBP which was then saddled with huge non- performing loans. Accordingly, the government committed to rehabilitate the BP to meke it @ viable and self-sustaining financial institution in recognition of its developmental role in the economy. The DBP was expected to continue "providing principally medium and long-term financing © projects with risks higher than the private sector may be willing to accect under reasonable terms." The government's commitment was embodied in ihe Policy Statement for the Development Bank of the Philippines which stated in part: "4. Furthermore, like all financial institutions under Central Bank supervision, DBP will now be required to have a private external audit, On February 18, 1987, the Board of Directors of the DBP approved ine hiring of Joaquin Cunanan & Co, as the DBP's private external auditor ‘or calenclar year 1986 as required by Central Bank Circular No. 1124 and ihe World Bank. The DBP Board of Directors placed a ceiling on the amount of reimbursable out-of-pocket expenses that could be charged by she private auditor. However, the COA questioned the constitutionality of hing an external auditor, claiming that the COA has exclusive jurisdiction to audit government agencies. HELD: The resolution of the primordial issue of whether or not the COA has the sole and exclusive power to examine end audit goverment banks involves an interpretation of Section 2, Article 2X-D of the 1987 Constitution. This Section provides as follows: "Sec. 2. (1) Commission on Aucit shail have the power. authority and duty to amine, audit, and selile all accounts pertaining to the revenue and pendiiures or uses of funds and property, owned and = pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, mentelties, Including govemment-owned or controlled! xx. "(2) The Commission sii! iti ©the exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefore, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties.” (Emphasis supplied). The bare language of Section 2 shows that the COA's power under the first paragraph is not declared exclusive, while its authority under the second paragraph is expressly declared "exclusive." There is a significant reason for this marked difference in language. The clear and unmistakabie conclusion from a reading of the entire Section 2 is that the COA's power to examine and audit is non-exclusive. On the other hand, the COA's authority to define the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and regulations. and disallow unnecessary expenditures is exclusive. Moreover, as the constitutionally mandated auditor of all government agencies, the COA's findings and conclusions necessarily prevail over those of private auditors, at least insofar as government agencies and officials are concemed. The power of the COA to examine and audit government agencies, while non- exclusive, cannot be taken away from the COA. Section 3, Article IX-D of the Constitution mandates that: "Sec. 3. No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its subsidiary in any guise whatsoever, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the Commission’ on Audit." The mere fact that private auditors may audit government agencies does not divest the COA of its power to examine and audit the same government agencies. The COA is neither by-passed nor ignored since even with a private audit the COA will stil conduct its usual examination and audit, and its findings and conclusions will stil bind government agencies and their officials. A concurrent private audit poses no danger whatsoever. of public funds or assets escaping the usual scrutiny of a COA audil. Manifestly, the express language of the Constitution, and the clear intent of its framers, point to only one indubitable conclusion - the COA does not have the exclusive power to examine and audit government agencies. The framers of the Constitution were fully aware of the need to allow independent private audit of certain government agencies in addition to the COA audit, as when there is a private investment in a government- controlled corporation, or when a government corporation is privatized or Publicly listed, or as in the case at bar when the government borrows money from abroad In these instances the government enters the marketplace and competes with the rest of the world in attracting investments or loans. To succeed, the government must abide with the reasonable business practices of the marketplace. Otherwise no investor or creditor will do business with the government, frustrating government efforts to attract investments or secure loans that may be critical to stimulate moribund industries or resuscitate a badly shattered national economy as in the case at bar. By design the Constitution is flexible enough to meet these exigencies. Any attempt to nullify this flexibility in the instances mentioned, or in similar instances, will be ultra vires, in the absence of a statute limiting or removing such flexibility, There is another constitutional barrier to the COA's insistence of exclusive power to examine and audit all government 543agencies. The COA's claim clashes directly with the Central Bank's Constitutional power of "supervision" over banks under Section 20, Article Xil of the Constitution. This provision states as follows: "Sec. 20, The Congress shall establish an independent central monetary authority, the members of whose governing board must be natural-bom Filipino citizens, of known probity, integrity, and patriotism, the majority of whom shall come from the private sector. They shall also be subject to such other guaiications and disabilities as may be prescribed by law. The authority shall provide policy direction in the areas of money, banking, and credit. It Shall have supervision over the operations of banks and exercise such regulatory powers as may be provided by law over the operations of finance companies and other institutions performing similar functions." (Emphasis Supplied) Historically, the Central Bank has been conducting periodic and Special examination and audit of banks to determine the soundness of their Sperations and the safety of the deposits of the public. Undeniably, the Central Bank's power of "supervision" includes the power to examine and audit banks, as the banking laws have always recognized this power of the Central Bank. Henoe, the COA's power to examine and audit government ‘banks must be reconciled with the Central Bank's power to supervise the Same banks. The inevitable conclusion is that the COA and the Central Bank have concurrent jurisdiction, under the Constitution, to examine and audit government banks. However, despite the Central Bank's concurrent Jurisdiction over government banks, the COA's audit stil prevails over that ‘of the Central Bank since the COA is the constitutionally mandated auditor Of government banks.’And in matters falling under the second paragreph of Section 2, Article IX-D of the Constitution, the COA's jurisdiction is exclusive. Thus, the Ceniral Bank is devoid of authority to allow or disallow GxPenditures of government banks since this function belongs exclusively {0 the COA. The 1987 Constitution created an independent central monetary authority with substantially the same powers as the Central Bank under the 1973 Constitution and the Freedom Constitution. Section 20, Adicle Xil of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Monetary Board “shall have supervision over the operations of banks". The specific power of the Central Bank under the General Banking Act (RA No. 337) to require an independent audit of banks was re-enacted in Section 58 of the General Banking Law of 2000 (RA No. 8791). The power granted to the Central Bank t0 issue Circular No, 1124 with respect to the independent audit af banks is direct, unambiguous, and beyond dispute, The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, which succeeded the Central Bank, retained under the 1987 Constitution and the General Banking Law of 2000 (RA No. 8791) the same Constitutional and statutory power the Central Bank had under the Freedom Constitution and the General Banking Act (RA No. 337) with respect to the independent audit of banks. Circular No, 1124 has the force and effect of law. In a long line of decisions, this Court has held consistently that the tules and regulations issued by the Central Bank pursuant to its supervisory and regulatory powers have the force and effect of law. The DBP, being a bank under the constitutional and statutory supervision of the Central Bank, was under a clear legal obligation to comply with the requirement of Circular No. 1124 on the private audit of banks. Refusal by the DBP to 546comply with the Circular would have rendered the DBP and its officers liable to the penal provisions of the General Banking Act, as well as the administrative and penal sanctions under the Central Barik Act. The hiring of a private auditor by the DBP being a condition of the US$310 milion World Bank loan to the Philippine government, the fees of such private auditor are in reality part of the government's cost of borrowing from the World Bank. The audit report of the private auditor is primarily intended for the World Bank's information on the financial status of the DBP whose rehabilitation was one of the objectives of the loan. An annual private audit fee of about half a milion pesos added to the interest on a US$310 million loan would hardly make the cost of borrowing excessive, extravagant or unconscionable. Besides, the condition imposed by a lender, whose money is at risk, requiring the borrower or its majority-owned subsidiaries to submit to aucit by an independent public accountant, is a reasonable and normal business practice. (DBP v. COA, G.R. No. 88435, January 16, 2002) No exemption from audit requirement. No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit (Article IX-D, Section 3). Case: A motor vehicle was assigned to petitioner for his use by the National Power Corporation. He also asked for transportation allowance. The Commission on Audit disallowed the claim pursuant to a circular prohibiting an official granted @ transportation allowance from using a government vehicle. Petitioner argued that the Commission on Audit cannot go against the decisions of the board of directors of the National Power Corporation allowing the transportation allownace. HELD: The board of directors of a government-owned corporation can not nullify the duty of the Commission on Audit to safeguard the proper use of government property We cannot sustain petitioner's contention that the Commission, in the exercise of its power granted by the Constitution, usurped the statutory functions of the NPC, Board of Directors for it leads to the absurd conclusion that a mere Board of Directors of @ government-owned and controlled corporation, by issuing a resolution, can put to naught 2 constitutional provision which has been ratified by the majority of the Filipino people. if we will not sustain the Commission's power and duty to examine, audit and settle accounts pertaining to this particular expenditure or use of funds and property, owned or held in trust by this government- owned and controlled corporation, the NPC, we will be rendering inutile this Constitutional Body which has been tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and ultimately, the people's property. (Bustamante vs. Commission on Audit, 216 SCRA 135 [4992)) 545‘tl, ANTI-GRAFT BODIES Sandiganbayan The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its Jurisdiction 28 now or hereafter may be provided by law. (Ariicie Xi, Section 4) The present Sandiganbayan was created by Presidential Decree No. 1606 which decree was amended by Republic Act Nos. 7975 and 8249. It is composed of a Chairman and fifteen Members, with the rank and level of justices of the Court of Appeals, sitting in five divisions of three members each. “The first three divisions shail be stationed in the Metro Manila area, the fourth division shall be in Cebu City for cases coming from the Visayas region, and the fifth division shall be in Cagayan De Oro City for cases coming ‘rom the Mindanao region. "Three Justices shall constitute a quorum for sessions in divisions: Provided, That when the required quorum for the particular division cannot be had due fo the ‘egal disqualification or temporary disability of @ Justice or of a vacancy occurring therein, the Presiding Justice may designate an Associate Justice of the Court, io be determined by strict rotation on the basis of the reverse order of prececence, to sit as a special member of said division with all the rights and prerogatives of a regular member of said division in the trial and determination of a case or cases assigned there(o, unless the operation of the court wil) be prejudiced thereby, in which case the President shall, yoon the recommendetion of the Presiding Justice, designate any Justice or Justices of the Court of Appeals to sit temporarily therein. (Section 1, Republic Act No. 7975). In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, subject to certain exceptions. Deeisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 546Jurisdiction "Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: "A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter I, Section 2, Titie Vil, Book Il of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the govemment, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: “{1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: "(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalewigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; "(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; “(c) Officials of the diplo natic service occupying the position of consul and higher; “(d) Philiopine army’ and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; "(e)_ Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and these holding the rank of senicr superintended or higher; "f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of ine Ombudsman and special prosecutor; “(@) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government: owned or conirolled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. fembers of Congress and oificieis iherec! classified es ede '27' and up under ihe Compensation and Position Clessification Act of 1989;"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; "(4) Chairmen end members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and “() All other national and local officials classified as Grade '27' and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, "b. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees ‘mentioned in. subsection a of this section in relation to their office. "c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuent to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. "In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding fo Salary Grade '27' or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officer mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Big. 129, as amended, “The Sanciganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or order of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. “The Sandigenbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warrant, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 7, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court. (Republic Act No. 8249) Under its rules, it has jurisdiction not only over public officers and employees charged with any of the crimes falling under its jurisdiction, but also over private individuals charged together with a public officer or employee as co-principal, accomplice or accessory. In all cases, the institution of the criminal action carries with it the institution of the civil action To render a decision, the unanimous vote of three justices is required. If the required unanimity cannot be reached, the Presiding Justice designates two 548,other justices to sit temporarily in a division of five until a decision is rendered with the concurrence of three justices. Judgments of conviction can be appealed to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari on a question of law or the substantiality of the evidence. Case: The law creating the Sandiganbayan was questioned as being violative of the due process and equal protection. Petitioners claim that private persons charged with estafa or malversation are guaranteed the right to appeal first to the Court of Appeals and thereafter to the Supreme Court, while private persons charged together with public officers before the Sandiganbayan are allowed only one appeal, and that is to the Supreme Court. it was also contended that there was a violation of the prohibition against ex post facto legislation. HELD: There is no violation of equal protection since unlike in ordinary cases where the guilt or innocence of the accused is determined by one judge, in the Sandiganbayan, it is determined by at least three judges who must vote unanimously. In case of conviction, there is an appeal before the Supreme Court on questions of law or the substantiality of the evidence, It is not true that there is no review of facts in the Supreme Court, since in determining whether to give due course to a petition for review of a decision of the Sandiganbayan, it must be convinced that the constitutional presumption of innocence has been overcame. On the contention that there is a violation of the ex post facto law, it was noted that an accused has no vested right to certain particular modes of procedure. (Nunez v. Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433 [1983]) Office of the Ombudsman The Office of Ombudsman was known as the Tanodbayan under the 1973 Constitution. The Tanodbayan is now the Special Proséctifor. The new faw providing for the functions and structure of the Office of thé Ombudsman is Republic Act No. 6770 promulgated on November 17, 1989. 1. Composition There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Depuly each for Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be appointed. (Article XI, Section 5) SECTION 3. Office of the Ombudsman. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall include the Office of the Overall Deputy, the Office of the Deputy for Luzon, the Office of the Deputy for the Visayas, the Office of the Depuly for Mindanao, the Office of the Deputy for the Armed Forces, and the Oifice of 549the Special Prosecutor. The President may appoint other Deputies as the necessity for it may arise, as recommended by the Ombudsman. (R.A. No. 6770) 2. Qualifications, Disqualifications, and Prohibitions a) 5) 9 d) 2) 8 Natural-born citizens At least 40 years at the time of appointment Of recognized probity and independence Members of the Philippine Bar Must not have been candidates for any elective office in the immediately preceding election. In the case of the Ombudsman, must have, for 10 years or more, been and judge or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines. (Article XI, Section 8) During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same cisqualifications and prohibitions as Constitutional. Commission members provided in Article IX- A, Section 2 (Article XI, Section 8) The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall not be qualified to run for any office in the election immediately ‘succeeding their cessation from office. (Article XI, Section 1) 3. Appointment, Term, and Removal The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least 6 nominees prepared by the judicial end Bar Council, and from a list of 3 nominees for every vacancy thereafter. Such appointments shall require no confirmation, All vacancies shall be filled within 3 months after they occur. (Article XI, Section 9) The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall serve for a term of 7 tears without reappointment. (Article XI, Section 11) The Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers (Deputies) may be removed from office as provided by law, but nol by impeachment. (Article Xi, Section 2) 5504. Rank and salary The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have the rank of Chairman and Members, respectively, of the Constitutional Commissions, and they shall receive the same salary, which shall not be decreased during their term of office. (Article XI, Section 10) Until the Congress provides otherwise, the chairman shall receive an annual salary of P204,000, and the members of the Constitutional Commissions, P180,000. (Article XVill, Section 17) 5. Jurisdiction The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shail act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, its subdivisions or agencies, including SOCCs, and shell, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof. (Article XI, Section 12) The Ombudsman has jurisdiction over all government-owned or controlled corporations, whether created under a special law or under a general law. The only limitation to this jurisdiction is the lack of power of the Office of Ombudsman “to direct to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties" for in this case, the Constitution explicitly specifies the need for original charter. The rationale for this is explained in the case of Quimpo v. Tanodbayan,' a case involving violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act by two officials of Petrophil, a corporation organized under the Corporation Code. In granting jurisdiction to the Tanodbayan (now Ombudsman) to investigate and prosecute the case, and the Sandiganbayan, to try it, it noted the incongruity that would result if the case were otherwise. A government-owned and controlled corporation could create as many subsidiary corporations under the Corporation Code as it wishes, which would then be free from strict accountability and could escape the liabilities and responsibilities provided by law. When Petrophil was subsequently acquired by the government using public funds, while it retained its own corporate existence, it became a government-owned and controlled corporation and its employees therefore became public servants 'G.R.No. 72653. December 2, 1960 551falling within the investigatory and prosecutory jurisdiction of the Tanodbayan for purposes of the anti-graft laws. 6. Powers and Functions a) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by another, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when ‘such appears io be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. ) Direct on its own instance or upon complaint, any public official or employee of the government, its subdivisions or agencies, ‘including government owned and controlled corporations with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required »y law, or stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties ©) Direct the officer concerned to (a) take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fauit, and (b) recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and (¢) ensure compliance therewith. Direct the officer concerned to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transaction entered into by his office, involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the COA for appropriate action. €) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents. 1) Publicize maiters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant, and with due prudence. 9) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the Government, and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency. ‘h) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law. (Article XI, Section 13) Case: Petitioners were charged before the Ombudsman for violation of Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in connection with the irregularities in the purchase of fire trucks for the Philippine National Police The Ombudsman dismissed the charges. Upon motion of some PNP Generals, however, the Ombudsman conducted a reinvestigation of the case, and thereafter filed an amended information with the Sandiganbayan $52against them. This was questioned by the petitioners. HELD: Consistent with its independence as protector of the people and as prosecutor to ensure accountability of public officers, the Ombudsman may conduct a reinvestigation to assure that the guilty do not go unpunished. This is part of its investigatory and prosecutory functions. The Ombudsman is not and should not be limited in its review by the action or inaction of the complainants. (Roxas v. Hon. Vasquez, G.R. No. 114944 June 19, 2004) Case: Administrative Order No.13 creating the Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Loans was tasked to inventory all behest loans, determine the parties involved and recommend whatever appropriate actions to be pursued thereby. Among the accounts investigated was the joan of the Basay Mining Corporation (BMC) from the Philippine National Bank (PNB). The loan was classified as behest, prompting the PCGG to file a complaint with the office of the Ombudsman against Cuenca of BMC. for Violation of Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019. It was alleged that in 1977, BMC then still known as CDCP Mining Corp (CDP), obtained a loan from PNB by way of stand-by Letters of Credit through PNB Board Resolution with a collateral. CDCP was able to further obtain an additional loan per a marginal note of then President Ferdinand Marcos on the letter of Cuenca asking for financial assistance for CDCP. The respondents failed to submit any responsive pleading before the Ombudsman, prompting Graft Investigation Officer Diaz-Salcedo to resolve the case based on the evidence on record. In her assailed reslution she recommended the dismissal of the case. The recomendation was eporoved by Desierto.Diaz- Salcedo issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the PCGG. Held: The disquisition of Diaz-Salcedo recommending the dismissal of the case is quite exhaustive. As bore out by the records, the total value of CDCP's properties far exceeded the real loan. Aside from this, the loans obtained by CDCP were used in the purchase of equipment and plant construction, These properties which formed part of the collateral were more than enough to secure the real loan. To qualiiy as a behest loan, two or more of the criteria mentioned under Memorandum Order No. 61 must be present. The allegation that the loan was under collateralized was not established since it was proved that there was sufficient collateral to cover the loan. In deciding whether or not the loan was behest, the purpose for which loan was approved should also be taken into consideration. The purpose of the loan was to save CDCP and prevent further loss on its part without necessarily favoring Cuenca. The presence of tie endorsement of Marcos would not qualify the loan as behest absenceof any of the other criteria set by Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No.61 The Court has more than once declared its reluctance to interfere in the investigatory and prosecutory powers of the Ombudsman absent any compelling reason. The petition for certiorari is dismissed. (PCGG v Desierto, G.R. No. 140232, January 19, 2001) 5537, Fiscal Autonomy and Appointment of Personnel The Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Its approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released, (Article Xi, Section 14) The officials and employees of the Office of Ombudsman, other than the Deputies, shall be appointed by the Ombudsman according to the Civil Service Law. (Article XI, Section 6) Office of the Special Prosecutor The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the Office of the Special Prosecutor. It shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law, except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under this Constitution. (Article Xi, Section 7) 354XVII. ECONOMIC AGENCIES Central Monetary Authority 4. Composition and qualifications of members The Congress shall establish an independent central monetary authoriy...Unless the Congress otherwise provides, the Central Bank of the Philippines, operating under existing laws, shall function as the central monetary authority (Article Xil, Section 20) The members of its governing board must be: a) Natural-born citizens b) Of known probity, integrity, and patriotism c) Majority shall come from the private sector They shall also be subject to such otver qualifications and disabilities as may be prescnbed law. (Article Xi, Section 20) 2. Functions 1) Provide policy direction in the areas of money, banking, and credit. 2) Supervise the operations of banks. 3) Exercise such regulatory powers (that is, control) as may be provided by law over the operations of finance companies and other institutions performing similar functions.(Article XI, Section 20) 4) Pass regulations conceming the incurring of foreign loans, and (Article Xl, Section 21) 5) Concur with the President, through the Monetary Board, on all foreign loans subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. 6) Report to Congress, within 30 days from ihe end of every quarter of the calendar year, on its decisions on applications 555for loans lo be contracted or guaranteed by the Government or government owned or controlled corporations which would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, (Article Vil, Section 20) The Central Bank of the Philippines (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas), through the Central Monetary Authority, is the government agency charged with the responsibility of administering the monetary, banking and credit system of the country and is granted the power of supervision and examination over banks and non-bank financial institutions performing quasi- banking functions including savings and loan associations." Economic and Planning Agency 4. Composition The Congress may establish an independent economic and planning agency headed by the President. Until the Congress provides otherwise, the National Economic and Development Authority shall function as the independent planning agency of the government. (Article Xil, Section 9) 2. Functions 1) After consultations with the appropriate public agencies, various private sectors, and local government units, recommend to Congress, and implement, continuing integrated and coordinated programs and policies for national development. (Article Xii, Section 9) 2) Recommend to Congress, when the national interest dictates, the passage of a law reserving certain areas of investment to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least 60% Filipino capital, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe. (Article Xil, Section 10) * Busuego v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No, 95326, March 11, 1999 556XIX. NATIONAL COMMISSIONS, A) Commission on Human Rights 1, Composition and qualification of members There is hereby created an independent office called the Commission on Human Rights. (Article Xill, Section 17(1) Until this Commission is constituted, the existing Presidential Committee on Human Rights shall continue to exercise its present functions and powers. (Article Xill, Section 17 (3)) The Commission shall be composed of @ Chairman and 4 members, (Article Xi, Section 17 (2)) They must be: 1) Natural-born citizens 2). Majority must be members of the Philippine Bar. The term of office and other qualifications and disabilities of the members of the Commission shall be provided by law. (Article Xill, Section 17 (2)) 2. Powers and functions 1) Investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. 2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof according to the Rules of Court. 3) Provide appropriate legal measures to protect the human rights or all persons in the Philippines as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and Provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection. 3574) Exercise visitorial power over jails, prisons, or detention facilties, 5) Esteblish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primary of humman rights, 6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures io promote human rights and Provide for compensation io victims of violations of human rights, or their families. The lew shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for ‘human rights violations as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar, practices, and their families. (Article Ill, Section 12 (4)) 7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights 8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or possession of evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority. 9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions. 10) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided law. 11) Recommend to Congress those other cases of violations of human rights to fall within its authority.(Article Xi, Section 12-13) 3. Autonomy The Commission on Human Rights shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. The approved annual appropriations of the Commission shall be automatically and regularly released. (Article XI, Section 17(4)) The Commission shall have the power to appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law. (Article Xill, Section 18 (10) Case: The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power under the Constitution to act like a court of justice, or quasi-judicial agency, with jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the 558Power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or politcal rights HELD: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power, and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjucicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact- finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals ‘or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. The proposition is made clear by the consiitutional provisions specifying the powers of the Commission on Human Rights. The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as an independent office. The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human tights violations involving civil and political tights. It can exercise that power on its ‘own initiative oF on complaint of any person. But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as “courts of justice, or even quasijudicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge (Carino v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 96681. December 2, 1991) B) National Language Commission The Congress shall establish a national language commission composed of representatives of various regions and disciolines. It shall undertake, coordinate, and promote researches for the development, propagation, and preservation of Filipino and other languages. (Article XIV, Section 9) C) National Police Commission The State shall establish end maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character. Law shall provide the authority of local executives over police units in their jurisdiction, 559{t shall be administered and controlled by @ national Police commission. (Article XVI. Section 6) Case: The central issue posed in the present case is the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8551 (RA 8551), otherwise known as the "Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998," by virtue of which Petitioners herein, who were all members of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), were separated from office. Petitioners claim that such law Violates their constitutionally guaranteed right to ‘security of tenure. The NAPOLCOM was originally created under Republic Act No 6075 (On March 8, 1898, RA 8551 took effect; it declared that the terms of the current Commissioners were deemed as expired upon its effectivity. Petitioners argue that their removal from office by virtue of section 8 of RA 8551 violates ‘heir security of tenure. Public respondents insist that the express Geciaration in section 8 of RA 8551 that the terms of petitioners’ offess are deemed expired discloses the legislative intent to impliedly abolish the introduced by RA 8551 in the functions, composition and character of the NAPOLCOM as proof of Congress’ intention to abolish the body created under RA 6975 in order to replace it with a new NAPOLCOM which ie more ewlian in nature, in comoliance with the constitutional mandate. Under RA 68975, the NAPOLCOM was described as a collegial body within the Department of the Interior and Local Government, (Department) whereas under RA 8551 it is made "an agency attached to the Department for policy and Program coordination.” HELD: Contrary to what public respondents would have us believe, this does not result in the creation of an entirely new Offce. It will be noted that the organizational structure of the NAPOLCOM, & provided in section 20 of RA 6975 as amended by section 10 of RA 8551, remains essentially the same and that, except for the addition of the PNP Chief as excofficio member, the composition of the NAPOLCOM is aise Substantially identical under the two laws. Also, under both laws, the Secretary of the Department shall act as the ex-officio Chairman of the Commission and the Vice-Chairman shall be one of the Commissioners designated by the President. Finally, the powers and duties of the NAPOLCOM remain basically unchanged by the amendments. No bova fide pearganization of the NAPOLCOM having been mandated by Congress, RA B561, insofar as it declares the terms of office of the incumbent Commissioners, petitioners herein, as expired and resulting in their removal from ofice, removes civil service employees from office without legal cause ee must therefore be struck down for being constitutionally. infin, Pelitioners are thus entitled to be reinstated to office. It is of no moment thet there are now new appointees to the NAPOLCOM. It is a well entrenched Principle that when a regular government employee is illegally dismissed, his position never became vacant under the law and he is considered as not having left his office. The new appointments made in order to replace Petitioners are not valid. [Canonizado v. Aguirre, GR. No, 135132, January 25, 2000] 560D) Commission on Indigenous Cultural Commu ies The Congress may create a consultative body to advise the President on policies affecting indigenous cultural communities. The majority of the members of such body shall come from such communities. (Article XVI, Section 12) On October 29, 1997, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8371 entitled "An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote the Rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples, Creating a National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Establishing Implementing Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” It is simply known as "The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997" or the IPRA." As defined therein, Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of people or homogeneous societies who have continuously lived as an organized community on communally bounded and defined territory. These groups of people have actually occupied, possessed and utilized their territories under claim of ownership since time immemorial. They share common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or, they, by their resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became historically differentiated from the Filipino majority. They also include their descendants who inhabited the country at the time of conquest or colonization, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions but who may have been displaced from their traditional territories or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains. The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants these people the ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these lands and domains. The ownership given is the indigenous concept of ownership under customary law which traces its origin to native title, Other rights are also granted the ICCsIIPs, and these are: ~ the right to develop lands and natural resources; | Cruz v. DENR, G.R. No, (35385. December 6, 2000, Precis of Justice Puno "Ibid 561- the right to stay in the territories; - the right in case of displacement; - the right to safe and clean air and water; - the right to claim parts of reservations; - the right to resolve conflict; ~ the right to ancestral lands which include a) the right to transfer land/property tofamong members of the same ICCs/IFs, subject to customary laws and traditions of the community concerned; ») the right to redemption for a period not exceeding 15 years from date of transfer, if the transfer is to a non-member of the ICC/IP and is tainted by vitiated consent of the ICC/IP, or if the transfer is for an unconscionable consideration.® Within their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, the \CCs/IPs are given the right to self-governance and empowerment, social justice and human rights, the right to preserve and protect their culture, traditions, institutions and community intellectual rights, and the right to develop their own sciences and technologies.* To carry out the policies of the Act, the law created the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). The NCIP is an independent agency under the Office of the President and is composed of seven (7) Commissioners belonging to ICCs/IPs from each of the ethnographic areas — Region | and the Cordilleras; Region Il; the rest of Luzon; Island groups including Mindoro, Palawan, Romblon, Panay and the rest of the Visayas; Northern and Western Mindanao; Souther and Eastern Mindanao; and Central Mindanao.® The NCIP tock over the functions of the Office for Northern Cultural Communities and the Office for Southern Cultural Communities created by former President (Corazon Aquino which were merged under a revitalized structure. Disputes involving ICCs/IPs are to be resolved under customary laws and practices. When still unresolved, the matter may be brought to the NCIP, which is granted quasi-judicial powers. The NCIPs decisions may be appealed to the Court of Appeals by a petition for review: > tbia “Ibid 5 Ibi “Ibid 562APPENDIX“A” 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES PREAMBLE, We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society, and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, feedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution ARTICLE | NATIONAL TERRITORY ‘The national teritory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines ARTICLE IL DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES PRINCIPLES Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State, Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and acheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations. Section 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State, Its goal is 1o secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personel, military or civil se-viee. Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and promotion of the general welfare are essential forthe enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy. 563Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable. STATE POLICIES Section 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. tn its relations with other state, the paramount consideration shall be netional sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-determination. Section 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons init territory. Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and fiee the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, arising standard of living, and an improved quality of life forall. Section 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development. Section 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. Section 13. The State recognizes the vital rate of the youth in nation-building and shall promote end protect their physical, moral, spiritual, imellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs. Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men, Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them. Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. Section 17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, aris, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and development. - Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare. Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investments 564Section 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform, Section 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development. ‘Section 23. The State shall encourage non-governmental, community-based, or sectoral organizations that promote the welfare of the nation, Section 24, The State recognizes the vital role of communication and information in nation-building Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments Section 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law. Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption, Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. ARTICLE IIL BILL OF RIGHTS Section 1. No person shall be deprived of lif, liberty, or property without due process of lav, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws, Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may Produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. @) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding, Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights Section 6, The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order ofthe court. Neither shal the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. 565Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acs, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Section 8. The right of the zeople, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Section 9, Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation, Section 10, No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed Section 11, Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial badies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to_be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, Ifthe person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. ‘These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. 2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicada, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited, G) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him, (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to the rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families. Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released (on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required, Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer fora criminal offense without due process of law. @) Inall criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, o meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused: Provided, that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable Section 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it. Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy dispos ‘quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. ion of their cases before all judicial, Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Section 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations (2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous 566