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Case Recwenr 6july Se
Case Recwenr 6july Se
BSP lawmaker Umakant Yadav seeking the stay of his conviction in a land dispute matter so that he could contest
election to Uttar Pradesh assembly scheduled for next year
A vacation bench of Justice Pinaki Chandra Ghose and Justice Amitava Roy declined the early hearing of the plea as
his counsel Dushyant Parashar told the bench that he has already undergone more than six years of the seven year
sentence awarded to him.
Yadav, who was convicted by a court in Uttar Pradesh's Jaunpur town on February 7, 2012, told the court that he has
already undergone six years, two months imprisonment and his appeal against his conviction and sentencing was
pending before the session court there.
Convicted for offences under Indian Penal Code's section 419 (Punishment for cheating by personation), 420 (Cheating
and dishonestly inducing delivery of property), 467 (Forgery of valuable security, will, etc), 468 (Forgery for purpose of
cheating), 469 (Forgery for purpose of harming reputation),471 (Using as genuine a forged document), and 506
(Punishment for criminal intimidation), he is on bail at present.
Before being convicted and sentenced to jail, Yadav was member of Uttar Pradesh assembly for three terms and an MP
for one term.
The bench took exception to the lawyer telling it that the petitioner was a former MP.
"Don't tell us all this. For us all are equal," it observed.
Referring to earlier verdicts of the top court including in the case of actor Sanjay Duttin 1993 Mumbai serial bomb blast
case, Yadav said that the absence of the stay of conviction and sentence including fine came in the way of his
contesting the upcoming assembly elections.
His plea for the suspension of conviction and fine was earlier rejected by the Jaunpur sessions judge on December 16,
2013 and the Allahabad High court too declined it.
court, and in a shocking judgement, were acquitted of all charges. Finally, the case went to the Supreme Court, which overturned the High courts
judgement (uncommon to say the least) and restored the original sentence, thereby convicting the paedophiles. The judges, while passing the
judgement, rightly said, A deterrent punishment is being imposed in order to help wipe out the name of India from the map of sex
tourism. Let paedophiles all over the world know that India should not be their destination in the future. Children are the
greatest gift to humanity. The sexual abuse of children is one of the most heinous crimes.
Homegrown Verdict: The case achieved widespread media coverage, which stressed on the fact that child abuse is rampant behind closed
doors in India. More often than not, the abusers are in complete control of the victims. They are vulnerable, scared and lack support. In such a
time, this judgement (albeit, even with the High Court blemish) gave hope to NGOs and other similar organisations that justice still prevails in this
country.
maintaining the culture of India, they conveniently forget that the rule in itself was enforced by the British, who themselves got rid of the law in
1967.
The recent developments make this judgement seem even more bizarre in hindsight. The Supreme Court has recognised the transgender sex
and given them a third sex status, but according to 377, if they indulge in sexual activity of any kind they can be arrested. So its all right to give
them recognition, but lets deprive them of their basic right to engage in sexual activity by choice? The law is ambiguous and archaic, and heavy
criticism from within the country as well as outside it is testament to that. Like it is said, it is not a matter of sex, it is a matter of curbing human
rights which is not what a democracy does.
production and marketing of the patented products but to search for someone who may be sued for infringement of the
patent, the bench said.
Homegrown Verdict: The judgement is remarkable in the sense that it provides massive relief to over 28 lakh cancer patients in India.
Consider this: a one-month dose of Glivec costs around Rs 1.2 lakh, while generic drugs, manufactured by Indian companies, costs Rs 8,000. A
patent would have given Novratis a 20-year monopoly on the drug, meaning that it would have been impossible for the average Indian to find an
affordable cancer drug in that period.
he tapped her on the shoulder. When Rathi turned around he threw acid on her face, also injuring her father, aunt and
two other passengers Sudeshakumari Singh and Sameer Shaikh.
Rathi was taken Guru Nanak Hospital before being shifted to Masina Hospital. When her condition worsened, she was
taken to Bombay Hospital on May 18. However, she succumbed to her injuries on June 1.
Rathis post-mortem report states that she died of multiple organ failure. Apeksha Vora, Panwars lawyer, alleged that
Rathi had died not because of the acid attack but owing to medical negligence by doctors at Bhabha Hospital. The
prosecution, however, rejected the allegation and said Rathi had never been taken to Bhabha Hospital.
After a shoddy investigation, the government railway police (GRP) first arrested Pawankumar Gahalon, another
neighbour of Rathi in Delhi, but let him off as they found no evidence linking him to the murder. Then, on January 17,
2014, the Mumbai crime branch arrested Panwar and charged him with murder.
While convicting Panwar, the court relied heavily on the testimony of Shaikh, who was also injured in the attack, and of
another passenger, Rohit Singh, who identified Panwar in court. Of the five eyewitnesses examined by the court, three
were injured in the attack. In all, 37 witnesses, including doctors from all the three hospitals, were examined.
The prosecution also called as a witness a shopkeeper who identified Panwar as the person who had bought acid from
his shop, and also relied on call records to show that Panwar had travelled from Delhi to Mumbai on the day of the
murder.
Devsar however his election was set aside by the High Court for not
complying with the provision of the Representation of People Act as
he failed to file a certified copy of the voters list.
the
157
Year
Old
Law
judgment in this case, a little bit of background may help the reader. The
case was an appeal against the conviction of the accused by the
Rajasthan high court on the ground that the right of private defence under
Section 97 of the IPC could not be invoked by the accused. Section 97 of
the IPC reads as follows: Right of private defence of the body and of
property.Every person has a right, subject to the restrictions contained
in section 99, to defend (First) His own body, and the body of any
other person, against any offence affecting the human body; (Secondly)
The property, whether movable or immovable, of himself or of any other
person, against any act which is an offence falling under the definition of
theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass, or which is an attempt to
commit theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass. Section 97 was part
of the Indian Penal Code as enacted in 1860. Explaining Section 97,
Supreme Court speaking through Justice Vivian Bose in Amjad Khan Vs
The State (1952) held as follows: Under section 97 of the Indian Penal
Code the right extends not only to the defence of ones own body against
any offence affecting the human body but also to defending the body of
any other person. The right also embraces the protection of property,
whether ones own or another persons, against certain specified offences,
Court had held that since both the parties had withheld the origin and
genesis of the occurrence and since it cannot be determined as to which
party was the aggressor, the case had to be decided against the accused
persons treating it as a case of free fight between the parties. Terming the
High Court finding as misconceived, the Court observed Once the Court
came to a finding that the prosecution has suppressed the genesis and
origin of the occurrence and also failed to explain the injuries on the
person of the accused including death of father of the appellants, the only
possible and probable course left open was to grant benefit of doubt to
the appellants. Referring to Lakshmi Singh and others v. State of Bihar,
the Court further said The appellants can legitimately claim right to use
force once they saw their parents being assaulted and when actually it
has been shown that due to such assault and injury their father
subsequently died. In the given facts, adverse inference must be drawn
against the prosecution for not offering any explanation much less a
plausible one. Drawing of such adverse inference is given a go-bye in the
case of free fight mainly because the occurrence in that case may take
place at different spots and in such a manner that a witness may not
reasonably be expected to see and therefore explain the injuries sustained
by the defence party. This is not the factual situation in the present case.
SC Permits Delhi Govt. to Buy 110 Diesel Ambulances
Supreme Court, while giving partial relaxation of its blanket ban on
fresh registration of diesel vehicles over 2000 CC in the National
Capital, has allowed the Delhi Government to purchase 110 diesel-run
ambulances. (MC Mehta case)
Supreme Court has indicated of lifting seven-month-long ban on sale
of diesel cars and SUVs with engine capacity of 2000cc or more in
the National Capital Region by accepting in principle auto majors'
offer to voluntarily deposit an interim Green Cess of 1% of the
vehicle's ex-showroom cost.
------- (society of Indian automobiles v state of kerala)
NEW DELHI: The Supreme Court on Monday gave a clear indication of lifting the seven-month-long
ban on sale of diesel cars and SUVs with engine capacity of 2000cc or more in the National Capital
Region by accepting in principle auto majors' offer to voluntarily deposit an interim green cess of 1%
of the vehicle's ex-showroom cost.
Mercedes Benz, whose diesel cars all have engine capacity of 2000cc or more, and Toyota, whose
best-selling Innova has taken a beating after the ban, told the SC that as an interim measure, they
could deposit 1% of the ex-showroom cost of each big diesel car or SUV in an escrow account.
Before reserving its order on applications seeking vacation of the ban, a bench of Chief Justice T S
Thakur and Justices A K Sikri and R Banumathi said, "If you (automobile manufacturers) deposit on
sale of each big diesel car a green cess of 1% of ex-showroom cost of the vehicle, you can sell as
many as you want."
Even though the controversy on levying green cess on big diesel cars under the 'polluter pays'
principle appeared settled, the Centre raised two fundamental objectionsone, that the court had no
jurisdiction to levy tax as it fell within the exclusive domain of the government, and two, the court was
not right in its perception that "diesel is the devil".
Attorney general Mukul Rohatgi said, "The likely imposition of green cess for diesel cars of more than
2000cc engine capacity will not be in consonance with the constitutional scheme of things in terms of
Article 265 of the Constitution of India that 'no tax can be levied without the authority of law' and such
cess must be imposed through legislation by authority of Parliament.
"Therefore, imposition of green cess without legislative mandate would be in contravention of the
constitutional mandate, especially when duties and taxation on diesel cars are already in place."
As the court wondered whether the attorney general was arguing for the government or the
automobile manufacturers, amicus curiae Aparajita Singh said the court in public interest and in
protection of right to life guaranteed under Article 21, which encompasses right to clean environment,
had in the past imposed green cess as 'net present value' (NPV) on industries to which forest land
had been allotted.
"Imposing green cess on diesel cars, which in common perception is more polluting than petrol cars,
is a possible solution to deter sale of more diesel cars under the precautionary principle to protect
intergenerational equity and to save children from the ill-effects of vehicular emission," Singh said.
The AG requested the court to vacate the December 16 order banning sale of big diesel cars and
SUVs in the NCR saying it was the constitutional duty of the government to impose tax and not that of
the judiciary. He requested the court to give the government six weeks to conduct a detailed study on
various issues related to diesel cars, their emissions, utilization of subsidized fuel by these costly cars
and SUVs and arrive at an amount that should be imposed on car manufacturers.
He said manufacturers of big diesel cars more than met the emission norms and hence it would send
a wrong signal to the automobile industry, which has attracted huge foreign direct investment under
Make In India programme and created millions of jobs.
Though the bench agreed with the AG's request to conduct a study, it said, "The Supreme Court had
come to the rescue of people in the 1990s by ordering conversion of the entire city transport into CNG
mode. If it had not done so, people would have found it difficult to breathe and live in Delhi. The
government must not be seen to be opposing the court's green move against vehicles which are
perceived to be polluting."
The SC, however, was not satisfied with its contention and said: "If the law
requires that the orders of attachment should be withdrawn upon
acquittal, it stands to reason that such orders must be withdrawn when
the prosecution abates or cannot result in a conviction due to the death of
the accused, whose property is attached.
imprisonment till the end of the normal life of the convict as observed in O.M. Cherian and Duryodhan Routs cases
(supra).
The court relying on a catena of judgments answered this issue in the affirmative before proceeding to decide on the
main issue at hand regarding whether the life sentences should run concurrently or consecutively.
It dealt with Section 31 of Code of Criminal Procedure in detail. Section 31 provides that when two sentences are
awarded in one trial, they will run consecutively and not concurrently unless the court directs that the sentences run
concurrently. The court, however ruled that in case of life imprisonment the same cannot be applicable.
the provisions of Section 31 under Cr.P.C. must be so interpreted as to be consistent with the basic tenet that a life
sentence requires the prisoner to spend the rest of his life in prison. Any direction that requires the offender to undergo
imprisonment for life twice over would be anomalous and irrational for it will disregard the fact that humans like all
other living beings have but one life to live. So understood Section 31 (1) would permit consecutive running of sentences
only if such sentences do not happen to be life sentences. That is, in our opinion, the only way one can avoid an obvious
impossibility of a prisoner serving two consecutive life sentences.
In arriving at this conclusion, the court also placed reliance on another provision Section 427(2) of CrPC.
That, in our opinion, happens to be the logic behind Section 427 (2) of the Cr.P.C. mandating that if a prisoner already
undergoing life sentence is sentenced to another imprisonment for life for a subsequent offence committed by him, the
two sentences so awarded shall run concurrently and not consecutively. Section 427 (2) in that way carves out an
exception to the general rule recognised in Section 427 (1) that sentences awarded upon conviction for a subsequent
offence shall run consecutively.
The court, thus, ruled that if more than one life sentences are awarded, then the same would get super imposed over
each other.
We are also inclined to hold that if more than one life sentences are awarded to the prisoner, the same would get super
imposed over each other. This will imply that in case the prisoner is granted the benefit of any remission or
commutation qua one such sentence, the benefit of such remission would not ipso facto extend to the other.
Cases pertaining to matrimonial disputes can now be transferred out of Jammu and Kashmir by the apex court for ensuring
access to justice to litigants, the Supreme Court on Tuesday ruled.
A five-judge Constitution bench headed by Chief Justice TS Thakur considered the fact that the local laws of Jammu and
Kashmir do not provide remedy for seeking transfer of the cases outside the state at the request of a litigant.
The provisions of the Civil Procedure Code and the Criminal Procedure Code which deal with transfer of cases, are not
applicable in Jammu and Kashmir. The bench also comprising justices FMI Kalifulla, A K Sikri, S A Bobde and R Banumati said
the apex court can exercise its Constitutional powers while transferring the cases out of the state to ensure access to justice, a
key right available to all litigants.
The judgement came on a batch of petitions including the one filed by one Anita Kushwaha, who had sought transfer of her
cases out of Jammu and Kashmir.
Jallikattu??