Expand Your Horizons

The articles and features in JHP bring you the best of current scholarship cover
ing a wide range of topics, such as: Authenticity Community-building Confluent e
ducation Consciousness Creativity Existential psychotherapy Holistic healing and
learning Humanistic politics Humanistic psychotherapy Human science research Id
entity I-Thou encounters Love Peace and mediation Personal Growth Self-actualiza
tion Self-transcendence Spiritual development Synergy Values.
Authenticity
Authenticity is a technical term in existentialist philosophy, and is also used
in the philosophy of art and psychology. In philosophy, the conscious self is se
en as coming to terms with being in a material world and with encountering exter
nal forces, pressures and influences which are very different from, and other th
an, itself. Authenticity is the degree to which one is true to one's own persona
lity, spirit, or character, despite these pressures. Different types of existent
ialist philosophers see this process in different ways.
A lack of authenticity is considered to be bad faith.
Secular and religious notions of authenticity have coexisted for centuries under
different guises; perhaps the earliest account of authenticity that remains pop
ular is Socrates' admonition that "the unexamined life is not worth living". In
philosophy of art, "authenticity" describes the perception of art as faithful to
the artist's self, rather than conforming to external values such as historical
tradition, or commercial worth.[citation needed] A common definition of "authen
ticity" in psychology refers to the attempt to live one's life according to the
needs of one's inner being, rather than the demands of society or one's early co
nditioning.[1][2][3] In the twentieth century, Anglo-American discussions of aut
henticity often center around the writings of a few key figures associated with
existentialist philosophy, where the term originated; because most of these writ
ers wrote in languages other than English, the process of translating and anthol
ogizing has had a strong impact on the debate. Walter Kaufmann might be credited
with creating a "canon" of existentialist writers which include Sren Kierkegaard
, Martin Heidegger, and Jean-Paul Sartre. For these writers, the conscious self
is seen as coming to terms with being in a material world and with encountering
external forces and influences which are very different from itself; authenticit
y is one way in which the self acts and changes in response to these pressures.
Erich Fromm
However, a very different definition of authenticity was proposed by Erich Fromm
in the mid-1900s. He considered behavior of any kind, even that wholly in accor
d with societal mores, to be authentic if it results from personal understanding
and approval of its drives and origins, rather than merely from conformity with
the received wisdom of the society. Thus a Frommean authentic may behave consis
tently in a manner that accords with cultural norms, but for the reason that tho
se norms appear on consideration to be appropriate, rather than blindly, simply
because they happen to be the current norms. Fromm thus considers authenticity t
o be a positive outcome of enlightened and informed motivation rather than a neg
ative outcome of rejection of the expectations of others. He described the latte
r condition - the drive primarily to escape external restraints typified by the
"absolute freedom" of Sartre - as "the illusion of individuality", as opposed to
the genuine individuality that results from authentic living.
Other perspectives
Those who advocate social reform value the study of authenticity since it can pr
ovide a radical manifesto and an overview of the shortcomings of social structur
es. Michael Kernis and Brian Goldman defined authenticity as "the unimpeded oper
ation of one's true or core self in one's daily enterprise." [1]

Writers tend to agree that authenticity is something to be pursued as a goal int

rinsic to "the good life." And yet it is often described as an intrinsically dif
ficult state to achieve, due in part to social pressures to live inauthentically
, and in part due to a person's own character. It is also described as a revelat
ory state, where one perceives oneself, other people, and sometimes even things,
in a radically new way. Some writers argue that authenticity also requires self
-knowledge, and that it alters a person's relationships with other people. Authe
nticity also carries with it its own set of moral obligations, which often exist
regardless of race, gender and class. The notion of authenticity also fits into
utopian ideology, which requires authenticity among its citizens to exist, or w
hich claims that such a condition would remove physical and economic barriers to
pursuing authenticity.
Criticisms
Authenticity has its paradoxical components. Sartre illustrated these in his ext
ensive writings, pointing to the conflict between seeing the self as unique and
different from the world, but the self is embedded in a world which clearly cont
ains other such beings. Stated as a doctrine authenticity can be thought to be s
elf-defeating. This is because it is thereby classified and becomes part of the
non-self, an object of perhaps methodical study among others. This is opposed to
the notion of the individual self which seeks its own solution independently of
competing external ideologies.[8] Another criticism is that the solution to Sar
tre's difficulties involves some compromise to allow unique individuals to co-ex
ist in a way which is acceptable to all of them. Therefore public ethics or mora
lity may be a limit on authenticity.[9] Because authenticity is such a slippery
concept, and because it can never be rigorously defined, it can be seen as a thr
eat to rationality or to Enlightenment ideas about the transparency of laws.
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Community-building
The term community has two distinct meanings: 1) A group of interacting people,
living in some proximity (i.e., in space, time, or relationship). Community usua
lly refers to a social unit larger than a household that shares common values an
d has social cohesion. The term can also refer to the national community or inte
rnational community, and, 2) in biology, a community is a group of interacting l
iving organisms sharing a populated environment.
In human communities, intent, belief, resources, preferences, needs, risks, and
a number of other conditions may be present and common, affecting the identity o
f the participants and their degree of cohesiveness.
Since the advent of the Internet, the concept of community has less geographical
limitation, as people can now gather virtually in an online community and share
common interests regardless of physical location. Prior to the internet, virtua
l communities (like social or academic organizations) were far more limited by t
he constraints of available communication and transportation technologies.
The word "community" is derived from the Old French communit which is derived fro
m the Latin communitas (cum, "with/together" + munus, "gift"), a broad term for
fellowship or organized society.[1]
Psychology
To what extent do participants in joint activities experience a sense of communi
ty?
In a seminal 1986 study, McMillan and Chavis identify four elements of "sense of
community": 1) membership, 2) influence, 3) integration and fulfillment of need
s, and 4) shared emotional connection. They give the following example of the in
terplay between these factors:
Someone puts an announcement on the dormitory bulletin board about the formation

of an intramural dormitory basketball team. People attend the organizational me

eting as strangers out of their individual needs (integration and fulfillment of
needs). The team is bound by place of residence (membership boundaries are set)
and spends time together in practice (the contact hypothesis). They play a game
and win (successful shared valent event). While playing, members exert energy o
n behalf of the team (personal investment in the group). As the team continues t
o win, team members become recognized and congratulated (gaining honor and statu
s for being members), Influencing new members to join and continue to do the sam
e. Someone suggests that they all buy matching shirts and shoes (common symbols)
and they do so (influence).[9]
A Sense of Community Index (SCI) has been developed by Chavis and colleagues and
revised and adapted by others. Although originally designed to assess sense of
community in neighborhoods, the index has been adapted for use in schools, the w
orkplace, and a variety of types of communities.[10]
Studies conducted by the APPA show substantial evidence that young adults who fe
el a sense of belonging in a community, particularly small communities, develop
fewer psychiatric and depressive disorders than those who do not have the feelin
g of love and belonging.[citation needed]
Socialization
Lewes Bonfire Night procession commemorating 17 Protestant martyrs burnt at the
stake from 1555 to 1557.
The process of learning to adopt the behavior patterns of the community is calle
d socialization. The most fertile time of socialization is usually the early sta
ges of life, during which individuals develop the skills and knowledge and learn
the roles necessary to function within their culture and social environment.[12
] For some psychologists, especially those in the psychodynamic tradition, the m
ost important period of socialization is between the ages of one and ten. But so
cialization also includes adults moving into a significantly different environme
nt, where they must learn a new set of behaviors.[13]
Socialization is influenced primarily by the family, through which children firs
t learn community norms. Other important influences include school, peer groups,
people, schools, mass media, the workplace, and government. The degree to which
the norms of a particular society or community are adopted determines one's wil
lingness to engage with others. The norms of tolerance, reciprocity, and trust a
re important "habits of the heart," as de Tocqueville put it, in an individual's
involvement in community.[14]
Community development
Main article: Community development
Community development, often linked with Community Work or Community Planning, i
s often formally conducted by non-government organisations (NGOs), universities
or government agencies to progress the social well-being of local, regional and,
sometimes, national communities. Less formal efforts, called community building
or community organizing, seek to empower individuals and groups of people by pr
oviding them with the skills they need to effect change in their own communities
.[15] These skills often assist in building political power through the formatio
n of large social groups working for a common agenda. Community development prac
titioners must understand both how to work with individuals and how to affect co
mmunities' positions within the context of larger social institutions.
Formal programs conducted by universities are often used to build a knowledge ba
se to drive curricula in sociology and community studies. The General Social Sur
vey from the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago and t
he Saguaro Seminar at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard Univer
sity are examples of national community development in the United States. In The
United Kingdom, Oxford University has led in providing extensive research in th
e field through its Community Development Journal,[16] used worldwide by sociolo
gists and community development practitioners.

At the intersection between community development and community building are a n

umber of programs and organizations with community development tools. One exampl
e of this is the program of the Asset Based Community Development Institute of N
orthwestern University. The institute makes available downloadable tools[17] to
assess community assets and make connections between non-profit groups and other
organizations that can help in community building. The Institute focuses on hel
ping communities develop by "mobilizing neighborhood assets" building from the i
nside out rather than the outside in.[18]
[edit]Community building and organizing
In The Different Drum: Community-Making and Peace, Scott Peck argues that the al
most accidental sense of community that exists at times of crisis can be conscio
usly built. Peck believes that conscious community building is a process of deli
berate design based on the knowledge and application of certain rules.[19] He st
ates that this process goes through four stages:[20]
Chaos: When people move beyond the inauthenticity of pseudo-community and feel s
afe enough to present their "shadow" selves. This stage places great demands upo
n the facilitator for greater leadership and organization, but Peck believes tha
t "organizations are not communities", and this pressure should be resisted.
Emptiness: This stage moves beyond the attempts to fix, heal and convert of the
chaos stage, when all people become capable of acknowledging their own woundedne
ss and brokenness, common to us all as human beings. Out of this emptiness comes
True community: the process of deep respect and true listening for the needs of
the other people in this community. This stage Peck believes can only be describ
ed as "glory" and reflects a deep yearning in every human soul for compassionate
understanding from one's fellows.
More recently Peck remarked that building a sense of community is easy but maint
aining this sense of community is difficult in the modern world.[21] Community b
uilding can use a wide variety of practices, ranging from simple events such as
potlucks and small book clubs to largerscale efforts such as mass festivals and c
onstruction projects that involve local participants rather than outside contrac
tors.
Community building that is geared toward citizen action is usually termed "commu
nity organizing."[22] In these cases, organized community groups seek accountabi
lity from elected officials and increased direct representation within decisionmaking bodies. Where good-faith negotiations fail, these constituency-led organi
zations seek to pressure the decision-makers through a variety of means, includi
ng picketing, boycotting, sit-ins, petitioning, and electoral politics. The ARIS
E Detroit! coalition and the Toronto Public Space Committee are examples of acti
vist networks committed to shielding local communities from government and corpo
rate domination and inordinate influence.
Community organizing is sometimes focused on more than just resolving specific i
ssues. Organizing often means building a widely accessible power structure, ofte
n with the end goal of distributing power equally throughout the community. Comm
unity organizers generally seek to build groups that are open and democratic in
governance. Such groups facilitate and encourage consensus decision-making with
a focus on the general health of the community rather than a specific interest g
roup. The three basic types of community organizing are grassroots organizing, c
oalition building, and "institution-based community organizing," (also called "b
road-based community organizing," an example of which is faith-based community o
rganizing, or "congregation-based community organizing").[23]
If communities are developed based on something they share in common, whether th
at be location or values, then one challenge for developing communities is how t
o incorporate individuality and differences. Indeed, as Rebekah Nathan suggests
in her book, My Freshman Year, we are actually drawn to developing communities t
otally based on sameness, despite stated commitments to diversity, such as those
found on university websites. Nathan states that certain commonalities allow co
llege students to cohere: What holds students together, really, is age, pop cultu
re, a handful of (recent) historical events, and getting a degree (qtd. In Barrio
s 229). Universities may try to create community through all freshman reads, fre
shman seminars, and school pride; however, Nathan argues students will only form

communities based on the attributes, such as age and pop culture, that they bri
ng with them to college. Nathans point, then, is that people come to college and
don t expand their social horizons and cultural tolerance, which can prevent the
development of your social community. (Barrios, Barclay. Emerging: Conetmporary
Readings for Writers. New York: Bedford St. Martins, 2010.)
[edit]Community currencies
Some communities have developed their own "Local Exchange Trading Systems" (LETS
)[24] and local currencies, such as the Ithaca Hours system,[25] to encourage ec
onomic growth and an enhanced sense of community. Community Currencies have rece
ntly proven valuable in meeting the needs of people living in various South Amer
ican nations, particularly Argentina, that recently suffered as a result of the
collapse of the Argentinian national currency.[26]
The anti-war affinity group "Collateral Damage" protesting the Iraq war
[edit]Community service
Main article: Community service
Community service is usually performed in connection with a nonprofit organizati
on, but it may also be undertaken under the auspices of government, one or more
businesses, or by individuals. It is typically unpaid and voluntary. However, it
can be part of alternative sentencing approaches in a justice system and it can
be required by educational institutions.
[edit]Types of community
Special nature of human community
Definitions of community as "organisms inhabiting a common environment and inter
acting with one another,"[28] while scientifically accurate, do not convey the r
ichness, diversity and complexity of human communities. Their classification, li
kewise is almost never precise. Untidy as it may be, community is vital for huma
ns.[citation needed] M. Scott Peck expresses this in the following way: "There c
an be no vulnerability without risk; there can be no community without vulnerabi
lity; there can be no peace, and ultimately no life, without community."[29]
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Confluent education
Genie Z. Laborde, Ph.D. (born 1928) is an American author, educator, video produ
cer, Chief Executive Officer, artist, and founder of International Dialogue Educ
ation Associates, Inc., a business seminar company based in Palo Alto, Californi
a. She has authored several business communication and negotiation books, and de
signed the three day business seminar Influencing with Integrity, which has been t
aught to Fortune 500 Companies and educational institutions in fifteen countries
.
Influences
Fascinated by the new esoteric classes offered at the Esalen Institute in Big Su
r, California which formed a key part of the Human Potential Movement of the 196
0s, during the 1970s she studied with many of the leaders of this movement: Geor
ge Leonard, Alan Watts, George I. Brown, Ed. D., Gay Luce, Ph. D. (founder of Ni
ne Gates), Frank Barron, Ph. D. (Creativity at UC Santa Cruz), Buckminster Fulle
r, Joseph Campbell, Joseph Downing (author of "Dreams and Nightmares"), Barbara
Brennan, and received Arica Training. All of these leaders created additional kn
owledge which she would use to design her trainings for corporations.
Publications

Influencing with Integrity: Management Skills for Communication and Negotiation

(1984)
Fine Tune Your Brain: When Everything s Going Right and What to Do When It Isn t
(1989)
Using Your Right Brain For a Change
Influencing with Integrity on the Internet (2000)
103 Ways to Tap Your Right Brain
Spellbinding: Skills for Relationships (2008)
Recreating A Relationship with a New Paradigm: A New Set of Beliefs and Experien
ces that Work Better than the Old
Quick Skills For Relationships; Expert Communication = Success in Your Relations
hip
Adult Coloring Book; The Ten Universal Laws of Charismatic Relationships
Influencing with Integrity By The Numbers
Instant Charisma By Using Your Right Brain
Selling with Integrity; The Skills of Influencing with Integrity Applied to Sale
s
Rapport on the Telephone
Child Development Techniques
Tooting Your Own Horn: How To Measure Soft-Skills Training
You CAN Measure the Results of Soft-Skills Training. It s Been Done. Here s How!
The ABCs of Negotiation; The Skills of Influencing with Integrity Applied to Neg
otiation
Infinite Energy Not Luck; Finding FLOW for Empowerment
90 Days to Communication Excellence (1985)
The ABCs of NLP
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Consciousness
Consciousness is a term that refers to the relationship between the mind and the
world with which it interacts.[1] It has been defined as: subjectivity, awarene
ss, the ability to experience or to feel, wakefulness, having a sense of selfhoo
d, and the executive control system of the mind.[2] Despite the difficulty in de
finition, many philosophers believe that there is a broadly shared underlying in
tuition about what consciousness is.[3] As Max Velmans and Susan Schneider wrote
in The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness: "Anything that we are aware of at
a given moment forms part of our consciousness, making conscious experience at o
nce the most familiar and most mysterious aspect of our lives."[4]
Philosophers since the time of Descartes and Locke have struggled to comprehend
the nature of consciousness and pin down its essential properties. Issues of con
cern in the philosophy of consciousness include whether the concept is fundament
ally valid; whether consciousness can ever be explained mechanistically; whether
non-human consciousness exists and if so how it can be recognized; how consciou
sness relates to language; and whether it may ever be possible for computers or
robots to be conscious. Perhaps the thorniest issue is whether consciousness can
be understood in a way that does not require a dualistic distinction between me
ntal and physical states or properties.
At one time consciousness was viewed with skepticism by many scientists, but in
recent years it has become a significant topic of research in psychology and neu
roscience. The primary focus is on understanding what it means biologically and
psychologically for information to be present in consciousnessthat is, on determi
ning the neural and psychological correlates of consciousness. The majority of e
xperimental studies assess consciousness by asking human subjects for a verbal r
eport of their experiences (e.g., "tell me if you notice anything when I do this
"). Issues of interest include phenomena such as subliminal perception, blindsig
ht, denial of impairment, and altered states of consciousness produced by psycho
active drugs or spiritual or meditative techniques.
In medicine, consciousness is assessed by observing a patient s arousal and resp

onsiveness, and can be seen as a continuum of states ranging from full alertness
and comprehension, through disorientation, delirium, loss of meaningful communi
cation, and finally loss of movement in response to painful stimuli.[5] Issues o
f practical concern include how the presence of consciousness can be assessed in
severely ill, comatose, or anesthetized people, and how to treat conditions in
which consciousness is impaired or disrupted.[6]
In philosophy
The philosophy of mind has given rise to many stances regarding consciousness. A
ny attempt to impose an organization on them is bound to be somewhat arbitrary.
Stuart Sutherland exemplified the difficulty in the entry he wrote for the 1989
version of the Macmillan Dictionary of Psychology:
ConsciousnessThe having of perceptions, thoughts, and feelings; awareness. The te
rm is impossible to define except in terms that are unintelligible without a gra
sp of what consciousness means. Many fall into the trap of equating consciousnes
s with self-consciousnessto be conscious it is only necessary to be aware of the
external world. Consciousness is a fascinating but elusive phenomenon: it is imp
ossible to specify what it is, what it does, or why it has evolved. Nothing wort
h reading has been written on it.[17]
Most writers on the philosophy of consciousness have been concerned to defend a
particular point of view, and have organized their material accordingly. For sur
veys, the most common approach is to follow a historical path by associating sta
nces with the philosophers who are most strongly associated with them, for examp
le Descartes, Locke, Kant, etc. The main alternative, followed in the present ar
ticle, is to organize philosophical stances according to the answers they give t
o a set of basic questions about the nature and status of consciousness.
Is consciousness a valid concept?
The most compelling argument for the existence of consciousness is that the vast
majority of mankind have an overwhelming intuition that there truly is such a t
hing.[18] Skeptics argue that this intuition, in spite of its compelling quality
, is false, either because the concept of consciousness is intrinsically incoher
ent, or because our intuitions about it are based in illusions. Gilbert Ryle, fo
r example, argued that traditional understanding of consciousness depends on a C
artesian dualist outlook that improperly distinguishes between mind and body, or
between mind and world. He proposed that we speak not of minds, bodies, and the
world, but of individuals, or persons, acting in the world. Thus, by speaking o
f consciousness we end up misleading ourselves by thinking that there is any s
ort of thing as consciousness separated from behavioral and linguistic understan
dings.[19] More generally, many philosophers and scientists have been unhappy ab
out the difficulty of producing a definition that does not involve circularity o
r fuzziness.[17]
Neuroscientists are not ready to define consciousness according to Richard Frack
owiak and 7 other neuroscientists who published a 1144 page book Human Brain Fun
ction in 2004. Chapter 16 is "The Neural Correlates of Consciousness" (32 pages)
in which on page 269 is the author s apology: "We have no idea how consciousnes
s emerges from the physical activity of the brain and we do not know whether con
sciousness can emerge from non-biological systems, such as computers... At this
point the reader will expect to find a careful and precise definition of conscio
usness. You will be disappointed. Consciousness has not yet become a scientific
term that can be defined in this way. Currently we all use the term consciousnes
s in many different and often ambiguous ways. Precise definitions of different a
spects of consciousness will emerge ... but to make precise definitions at this
stage is premature."
[edit]Is it a single thing?
Many philosophers have argued that consciousness is a unitary concept that is un
derstood intuitively by the majority of people in spite of the difficulty in def
ining it.[20] Others, though, have argued that the level of disagreement about t
he meaning of the word indicates that it either means different things to differ

ent people, or else is an umbrella term encompassing a variety of distinct meani

ngs with no simple element in common.[21]
Ned Block proposed a distinction between two types of consciousness that he call
ed phenomenal (P-consciousness) and access (A-consciousness).[22] P-consciousnes
s, according to Block, is simply raw experience: it is moving, colored forms, so
unds, sensations, emotions and feelings with our bodies and responses at the cen
ter. These experiences, considered independently of any impact on behavior, are
called qualia. A-consciousness, on the other hand, is the phenomenon whereby inf
ormation in our minds is accessible for verbal report, reasoning, and the contro
l of behavior. So, when we perceive, information about what we perceive is acces
s conscious; when we introspect, information about our thoughts is access consci
ous; when we remember, information about the past is access conscious, and so on
. Although some philosophers, such as Daniel Dennett, have disputed the validity
of this distinction,[23] others have broadly accepted it. David Chalmers has ar
gued that A-consciousness can in principle be understood in mechanistic terms, b
ut that understanding P-consciousness is much more challenging: he calls this th
e hard problem of consciousness.[24]
Some philosophers believe that Block s two types of consciousness are not the en
d of the story. William Lycan, for example, argued in his book Consciousness and
Experience that at least eight clearly distinct types of consciousness can be i
dentified (organism consciousness; control consciousness; consciousness of; stat
e/event consciousness; reportability; introspective consciousness; subjective co
nsciousness; self-consciousness)and that even this list omits several more obscur
e forms.[25]
[edit]How does it relate to the physical world?
Main article: Mindbody problem
Illustration of dualism by Ren Descartes. Inputs are passed by the sensory organs
to the pineal gland and from there to the immaterial spirit.
The first influential philosopher to discuss this question specifically was Desc
artes, and the answer he gave is known as Cartesian dualism. Descartes proposed
that consciousness resides within an immaterial domain he called res cogitans (t
he realm of thought), in contrast to the domain of material things which he call
ed res extensa (the realm of extension).[26] He suggested that the interaction b
etween these two domains occurs inside the brain, perhaps in a small midline str
ucture called the pineal gland.[27]
Although it is widely accepted that Descartes explained the problem cogently, fe
w later philosophers have been happy with his solution, and his ideas about the
pineal gland have especially been ridiculed.[28] Alternative solutions, however,
have been very diverse. They can be divided broadly into two categories: dualis
t solutions that maintain Descartes s rigid distinction between the realm of con
sciousness and the realm of matter but give different answers for how the two re
alms relate to each other; and monist solutions that maintain that there is real
ly only one realm of being, of which consciousness and matter are both aspects.
Each of these categories itself contains numerous variants. The two main types o
f dualism are substance dualism (which holds that the mind is formed of a distin
ct type of substance not governed by the laws of physics) and property dualism (
which holds that the laws of physics are universally valid but cannot be used to
explain the mind). The three main types of monism are physicalism (which holds
that the mind consists of matter organized in a particular way), idealism (which
holds that only thought truly exists and matter is merely an illusion), and neu
tral monism (which holds that both mind and matter are aspects of a distinct ess
ence that is itself identical to neither of them). There are also, however, a la
rge number of idiosyncratic theories that cannot cleanly be assigned to any of t
hese camps.[29]
Since the dawn of Newtonian science with its vision of simple mechanical princip
les governing the entire universe, some philosophers have been tempted by the id
ea that consciousness could be explained in purely physical terms. The first inf
luential writer to propose such an idea explicitly was Julien Offray de La Mettr

ie, in his book Man a Machine (L homme machine). His arguments, however, were ve
ry abstract.[30] The most influential modern physical theories of consciousness
are based on psychology and neuroscience. Theories proposed by neuroscientists s
uch as Gerald Edelman[31] and Antonio Damasio,[32] and by philosophers such as D
aniel Dennett,[33] seek to explain consciousness in terms of neural events occur
ring within the brain. Many other neuroscientists, such as Christof Koch,[34] ha
ve explored the neural basis of consciousness without attempting to frame all-en
compassing global theories. At the same time, computer scientists working in the
field of Artificial Intelligence have pursued the goal of creating digital comp
uter programs that can simulate or embody consciousness.[35]
A few theoretical physicists have argued that classical physics is intrinsically
incapable of explaining the holistic aspects of consciousness, but that quantum
theory provides the missing ingredients. Several theorists have therefore propo
sed quantum mind (QM) theories of consciousness.[36] Notable theories falling in
to this category include the Holonomic brain theory of Karl Pribram and David Bo
hm, and the Orch-OR theory formulated by Stuart Hameroff and Roger Penrose. Some
of these QM theories offer descriptions of phenomenal consciousness, as well as
QM interpretations of access consciousness. None of the quantum mechanical theo
ries has been confirmed by experiment. Recent papers by Guerreshi, G., Cia, J.,
Popescu, S. and Briegel, H. [37] could falsify proposals such those of Hameroff
which rely on quantum entanglement in protein. At the present time many scientis
ts and philosophers consider the arguments for an important role of quantum phen
omena to be unconvincing.[38]
[edit]Why do people believe that other people are conscious?
Many philosophers consider experience to be the essence of consciousness, and be
lieve that experience can only fully be known from the inside, subjectively. But
if consciousness is subjective and not visible from the outside, why do the vas
t majority of people believe that other people are conscious, but rocks and tree
s are not?[39] This is called the problem of other minds.[40] It is particularly
acute for people who believe in the possibility of philosophical zombies, that
is, people who think it is possible in principle to have an entity that is physi
cally indistinguishable from a human being and behaves like a human being in eve
ry way but nevertheless lacks consciousness.[41]
The most commonly given answer is that we attribute consciousness to other peopl
e because we see that they resemble us in appearance and behavior: we reason tha
t if they look like us and act like us, they must be like us in other ways, incl
uding having experiences of the sort that we do.[42] There are, however, a varie
ty of problems with that explanation. For one thing, it seems to violate the pri
nciple of parsimony, by postulating an invisible entity that is not necessary to
explain what we observe.[42] Some philosophers, such as Daniel Dennett in an es
say titled The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies, argue that people who giv
e this explanation do not really understand what they are saying.[43] More broad
ly, philosophers who do not accept the possibility of zombies generally believe
that consciousness is reflected in behavior (including verbal behavior), and tha
t we attribute consciousness on the basis of behavior. A more straightforward wa
y of saying this is that we attribute experiences to people because of what they
can do, including the fact that they can tell us about their experiences.[44]
[edit]How can we know whether non-human animals are conscious?
The topic of animal consciousness is beset by a number of difficulties. It poses
the problem of other minds in an especially severe form, because animals, lacki
ng language, cannot tell us about their experiences.[45] Also, it is difficult t
o reason objectively about the question, because a denial that an animal is cons
cious is often taken to imply that it does not feel, its life has no value, and
that harming it is not morally wrong. Descartes, for example, has sometimes been
blamed for mistreatment of animals due to the fact that he believed only humans
have a non-physical mind.[46] Most people have a strong intuition that some ani
mals, such as dogs, are conscious, while others, such as insects, are not; but t
he sources of this intuition are not obvious.[45]
Philosophers who consider subjective experience the essence of consciousness als
o generally believe, as a correlate, that the existence and nature of animal con

sciousness can never rigorously be known. Thomas Nagel spelled out this point of
view in an influential essay titled What Is it Like to Be a Bat?. He said that
an organism is conscious "if and only if there is something that it is like to b
e that organism something it is like for the organism"; and he argued that no ma
tter how much we know about an animal s brain and behavior, we can never really
put ourselves into the mind of the animal and experience its world in the way it
does itself.[47] Other thinkers, such as Douglas Hofstadter, dismiss this argum
ent as incoherent.[48] Several psychologists and ethologists have argued for the
existence of animal consciousness by describing a range of behaviors that appea
r to show animals holding beliefs about things they cannot directly perceive Don
ald Griffin s 2001 book Animal Minds reviews a substantial portion of the eviden
ce.[49]
[edit]Could a machine ever be conscious?
The idea of an artifact made conscious is an ancient theme of mythology, appeari
ng for example in the Greek myth of Pygmalion, who carved a statue that was magi
cally brought to life, and in medieval Jewish stories of the Golem, a magically
animated homunculus built of clay.[50] However, the possibility of actually cons
tructing a conscious machine was probably first discussed by Ada Lovelace, in a
set of notes written in 1842 about the Analytical Engine invented by Charles Bab
bage, a precursor (never built) to modern electronic computers. Lovelace was ess
entially dismissive of the idea that a machine such as the Analytical Engine cou
ld think in a humanlike way. She wrote:
It is desirable to guard against the possibility of exaggerated ideas that might
arise as to the powers of the Analytical Engine. ... The Analytical Engine has
no pretensions whatever to originate anything. It can do whatever we know how to
order it to perform. It can follow analysis; but it has no power of anticipatin
g any analytical relations or truths. Its province is to assist us in making ava
ilable what we are already acquainted with.[51]
One of the most influential contributions to this question was an essay written
in 1950 by pioneering computer scientist Alan Turing, titled Computing Machinery
and Intelligence. Turing disavowed any interest in terminology, saying that eve
n "Can machines think?" is too loaded with spurious connotations to be meaningfu
l; but he proposed to replace all such questions with a specific operational tes
t, which has become known as the Turing test.[52] To pass the test a computer mu
st be able to imitate a human well enough to fool interrogators. In his essay Tu
ring discussed a variety of possible objections, and presented a counterargument
to each of them. The Turing test is commonly cited in discussions of artificial
intelligence as a proposed criterion for machine consciousness; it has provoked
a great deal of philosophical debate. For example, Daniel Dennett and Douglas H
ofstadter argue that anything capable of passing the Turing test is necessarily
conscious,[53] while David Chalmers argues that a philosophical zombie could pas
s the test, yet fail to be conscious.[54]
In a lively exchange over what has come to be referred to as The Chinese Room Arg
ument, John Searle sought to refute the claim of proponents of what he calls Stron
g Artificial Intelligence (AI) that a computer program can be conscious, though h
e does agree with advocates of Weak AI that computer programs can be formatted to s
imulate conscious states. His own view is that consciousness has subjective, firs
t-person causal powers by being essentially Intentional due simply to the way hu
man brains function biologically; conscious persons can perform computations, bu
t consciousness is not inherently computational the way computer programs are. T
o make a Turning machine that speaks Chinese, Searle gets in a room stocked with
algorithms programmed to respond to Chinese questions, i.e., Turning machines,
programed to correctly answer in Chinese questions asked in Chinese, and he find
s hes able to process the inputs to outputs perfectly without having any understa
nding of Chinese, nor having any idea what the questions and answers could possi
bly mean. And, this is all a current computer program would do. If the experimen
t were done in English, since Searle knows English, he would be able to take que
stions and give answers without any algorithms for English questions, and he wou
ld be affectively aware of what was being said and the purposes it might serve:
Searle passes the Turning test of answering the questions in both languages, but

hes only conscious of what hes doing when he speaks English. Another way of putti
ng the argument is to say computational computer programs can pass the Turning t
est for processing the syntax of a language, but that semantics cannot be reduce
d to syntax in the way Strong AI advocates hoped: processing semantics is consci
ous and intentional because we use semantics to consciously produce meaning by w
hat we say.[55]
In the literature concerning artificial intelligence (AI), Searle s essay has be
en second only to Turing s in the volume of debate it has generated.[55] Searle
himself was vague about what extra ingredients it would take to make a machine c
onscious: all he proposed was that what was needed was "causal powers" of the so
rt that the brain has and that computers lack. But other thinkers sympathetic to
his basic argument have suggested that the necessary (though perhaps still not
sufficient) extra conditions may include the ability to pass not just the verbal
version of the Turing test, but the robotic version,[56] which requires groundi
ng the robot s words in the robot s sensorimotor capacity to categorize and inte
ract with the things in the world that its words are about, Turing-indistinguish
ably from a real person. Turing-scale robotics is an empirical branch of researc
h on embodied cognition and situated cognition[57]
[edit]Spiritual approaches
To most philosophers, the word "consciousness" connotes the relationship between
the mind and the world. To writers on spiritual or religious topics, it frequen
tly connotes the relationship between the mind and God, or the relationship betw
een the mind and deeper truths that are thought to be more fundamental than the
physical world. Krishna consciousness, for example, is a term used to mean an in
timate linkage between the mind of a worshipper and the god Krishna.[58] The mys
tical psychiatrist Richard Maurice Bucke distinguished between three types of co
nsciousness: Simple Consciousness, awareness of the body, possessed by many anim
als; Self Consciousness, awareness of being aware, possessed only by humans; and
Cosmic Consciousness, awareness of the life and order of the universe, possesse
d only by humans who are enlightened.[59] Many more examples could be given. The
most thorough account of the spiritual approach may be Ken Wilber s book The Sp
ectrum of Consciousness, a comparison of western and eastern ways of thinking ab
out the mind. Wilber described consciousness as a spectrum with ordinary awarene
ss at one end, and more profound types of awareness at higher levels.[60]
Defining consciousness
In the 1144 page book "Human Brain Function"[82] by 8 neuroscientists, on page 2
69 is the authors apology:
"We have no idea how consciousness emerges from the physical activity of the bra
in and we do not know whether consciousness
can emerge from non-biological systems, such as computers... At this point the r
eader will expect to find a careful and
precise definition of consciousness. You will be disappointed. Consciousness has
not yet become a scientific term that
can be defined in this way. Currently we all use the term consciousness in many
different and often ambiguous ways.
Precise definitions of different aspects of consciousness will emerge ... but to
make precise definitions at this stage is premature."
Stream of consciousness
Stream of consciousness refers to the flow of thoughts in the conscious mind. Th
e full range of thoughts that one can be aware of can form the content of this s
tream, not just verbal thoughts. Commonly used experimental techniques, includin
g self-reporting, gives easier access to verbal thoughts than to thoughts more c
losely connected to senses other than hearing and activities other than speaking
and writing.
Buddhism

The phrase "stream of consciousness" (Pali; vina-sota) occurs in early Buddhist scr
iptures.[1] The Yogachara school of Mahayana Buddhism developed the idea into a
thorough theory of mind.[2]
Hammalawa Saddhatissa Mahathera writes: "There is no self that stands at the m
entality to which characteristics and events accrue and from which they fall awa
y, leaving it intact at death. The stream of consciousness, flowing through many
lives, is as changing as a stream of water. This is the anatta doctrine of Budd
hism as concerns the individual being."[3]
[edit]Proponents
William James is given credit for the concept. He was enormously skeptical about
using introspection as a technique to understand the stream of consciousness. "
The attempt at introspective analysis in these cases is in fact like seizing a s
pinning top to catch its motion, or trying to turn up the gas quickly enough to
see how the darkness looks." [4]
Bernard Baars has developed Global Workspace Theory[5] which bears some resembla
nce to stream of consciousness.
[edit]Criticism
Susan Blackmore challenged the concept of stream of consciousness in several pap
ers. "When I say that consciousness is an illusion I do not mean that consciousn
ess does not exist. I mean that consciousness is not what it appears to be. If i
t seems to be a continuous stream of rich and detailed experiences, happening on
e after the other to a conscious person, this is the illusion".[6]
[edit]Literary technique
Main article: Stream of consciousness (narrative mode)
In literature, stream of consciousness writing is a literary device which seeks
to portray an individual s point of view by giving the written equivalent of the
character s thought processes, either in a loose interior monologue, or in conn
ection to his or her sensory reactions to external occurrences. Stream-of-consci
ousness writing is strongly associated with the modernist movement. Its introduc
tion in the literary context, transferred from psychology, is attributed to May
Sinclair.[7]
________________________________________________________________________________
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Creativity
Creativity refers to the phenomenon whereby a person creates something new (a pr
oduct, a solution, a work of art, a novel, a joke, etc.) that has some kind of v
alue. What counts as "new" may be in reference to the individual creator, or to
the society or domain within which the novelty occurs. What counts as "valuable"
is similarly defined in a variety of ways.
Scholarly interest in creativity ranges widely: Topics to which it is relevant i
nclude the relationship between creativity and general intelligence; the mental
and neurological processes associated with creative activity; the relationship b
etween personality type and creative ability; the relationship between creativit
y and mental health; the potential for fostering creativity through education an
d training, especially as augmented by technology; and the application of an ind
ividual s existing creative resources to improve the effectiveness of learning p
rocesses and of the teaching processes tailored to them.
Creativity and creative acts are therefore studied across several disciplines psychology, cognitive science, education, philosophy (particularly philosophy of
science), technology, theology, sociology, linguistics, business studies, and e
conomics. As a result, there are a multitude of definitions and approaches.
Etymology

The lexeme in the English word creativity comes from the Latin term cre "to creat
e, make" and its derivational suffixes also come from Latin. The word "create" a
ppears in English as early as the 14th century, notably in Chaucer[1] (in The Pa
rson s Tale[2]). However, its modern meaning as an act of human creation did not
emerge until after the Enlightenment.[1]
Definition
In a summary of scientific research into creativity Michael Mumford suggested: "O
ver the course of the last decade, however, we seem to have reached a general ag
reement that creativity involves the production of novel, useful products (Mumfor
d, 2003, p. 110).[3] Beyond this general commonality, authors have diverged dram
atically in their precise definitions, with Peter Meusburger claiming that over
a hundred different versions can be found in the literature.[4]
Aspects of creativity
Theories of creativity (in particular investigating why some people are more cre
ative than others) have focused on a variety of aspects. The most dominant are u
sually identified as the four "Ps" - process, product, person and place.[5] A fo
cus on process is shown in cognitive approaches that try to describe thought mec
hanisms and techniques for creative thinking. Theories invoking divergent rather
than convergent thinking (such as Guilford), or those describing the staging of
the creative process (such as Wallas) are primarily theories of creative proces
s. A focus on creative product usually appears in attempts to measure creativity
in people (psychometrics, see below), or in creative ideas framed as successful
memes.[6] A focus on the nature of the creative person considers more general i
ntellectual habits, such as openness, levels of ideation, autonomy, expertise, e
xploratory behaviour and so on. A focus on place considers the best circumstance
s in which creativity flourishes, including degrees of autonomy, access to resou
rces and the nature of gatekeepers.
[edit]Historical and personal creativity
The product of "creativity" has typically been defined in one of two ways: eithe
r as something historically new (and relatively rare), such as scientific discov
eries or great works of art; or as producing something new in a personal sense an apparent innovation for the creator, regardless of whether others have made
similar innovations, or whether others value the particular act of creation. In
the former sense there are writers such as Mihly Cskszentmihlyi[7] have defined cre
ativity in terms of rare individuals who have been judged by others to have made
significant creative, often domain-changing contributions (and as such, the lev
el of creativity of an individual can vary over historical time as perceptions c
hange), and Simonton, who has analysed the career trajectories of the creatively
eminent in order to map patterns and predictors of creative productivity.[8] In
the latter sense, writers such as Ken Robinson,[9] and Anna Craft[10] have focu
ssed on creativity in a general population, particularly with respect to educati
on.
There are a variety of labels for the two sides of this dichotomy. Margaret Bode
n distinguishes between h-creativity (historical) and p-creativity (personal).[1
1] Craft makes a similar distinction between "high" and "little c" creativity.[1
0] while Craft cites Robinson referring to "high" and "democratic" creativity. C
ommon also is the pairing of terms "Big C" and "Little C".
Kozbelt, Beghetto and Runco, use a little-c/Big-C model to review major theories
of creativity [5] This approach was first introduced by James C. Kaufman and Be
ghetto into a four C model: mini-c (transformative learning), which are "persona
lly meaningful interpretations of experiences, actions and insights"; little-c (
everyday problem solving and creative expression); Pro-C, exhibited by people wh
o are professionally or vocationally creative but not eminent, and Big-C, reserv
ed for those who are considered truly great in their field. This was to help dis
tinguish more clearly between the amateur unapprenticed in the particular creati
ve domain (e.g. the visual arts, astrophysics etc.), the professional who was do
main-competent, and creative genius. The four-c model was also intended to help

accommodate models and theories of creativity that stressed domain-competence as

an essential component, and domain transformation as the highest mark of creati
vity; it also, they argued, made a useful framework for analysing creative proce
sses in individuals.[12]
________________________________________________________________________________
______
Gestalt therapy
Gestalt therapy is an existential/experiential form of psychotherapy that emphas
izes personal responsibility, and that focuses upon the individual s experience
in the present moment, the therapist-client relationship, the environmental and
social contexts of a person s life, and the self-regulating adjustments people m
ake as a result of their overall situation.
Gestalt therapy was developed by Fritz Perls, Laura Perls and Paul Goodman in th
e 1940s and 1950s.
Noteworthy issues
[edit]Self
In field theory, self is a phenomenological concept, existing in comparison with
other. Without the other there is no self, and how one experiences the other is
inseparable from how one experience herself. The continuity of selfhood (functi
oning personality) is something that is achieved in relationship, rather than so
mething inherently "inside" the person. This can have its advantages and disadva
ntages. At one end of the spectrum, one may not have enough self-continuity to b
e able to make meaningful relationships, or to have a workable sense of who she
is. In the middle, her personality is a loose set of ways of being that work for
her, including commitments to relationships, work, culture and outlook, always
open to change where she needs to adapt to new circumstances or just want to try
something new. At the other end, her personality is a rigid defensive denial of
the new and spontaneous. She acts in stereotyped ways, and either induces other
people to act in particular and fixed ways towards her, or she redefines their
actions to fit with fixed stereotypes.
In Gestalt therapy, the process is not about the self of the client being helped
or healed by the fixed self of the therapist, rather it is an exploration of th
e co-creation of self and other in the here-and-now of the therapy. There is no
assumption that the client will act in all other circumstances as he or she does
in the therapy situation. However, the areas that cause problems will be either
the lack of self definition leading to chaotic or psychotic behaviour, or the r
igid self definition in some area of functioning that denies spontaneity and mak
es dealing with particular situations impossible. Both of these conditions show
up very clearly in the therapy, and can be worked with in the relationship with
the therapist.
The experience of the therapist is also very much part of the therapy. Since we
co-create our self-other experiences, the way a therapist experiences being with
a client is significant information about how the client experiences themselves
. The proviso here is that a therapist is not operating from their own fixed res
ponses. This is why Gestalt therapists are required to undertake significant the
rapy of their own during training.
From the perspective of this theory of self, neurosis can be seen as fixed predi
ctability - a fixed Gestalt - and the process of therapy can be seen as facilita
ting the client to become unpredictable - more responsive to what is in the clie
nt s present environment, rather than responding in a stuck way to past introjec
ts or other learning. If the therapist has expectations of how the client should
end up, this defeats the aim of therapy.
[edit]Change
In what has now become a "classic" of Gestalt therapy literature, Arnold Beisser
described Gestalt s paradoxical theory of change.[19] The paradox is that the m
ore one attempts to be who one is not, the more one remains the same. Conversely
, when people identify with their current experience, the conditions of wholenes

s and growth support change. Put another way, change comes about as a result of
"full acceptance of what is, rather than a striving to be different".[20]
[edit]The empty chair technique
Empty-chair technique or chairwork is typically used in Gestalt therapy to explo
re patients relationships with themselves or other people in their lives. The t
echnique involves the client addressing the empty chair as if another person was
in it.[21] They may also move between chairs and act out two or more sides of a
discussion, typically involving the patient and persons significant to them. A
form of role-playing, the technique focuses on exploration of self and is utiliz
ed by therapists to help patients self-adjust.
Existential psychotherapy
Existential psychotherapy is a philosophical method of therapy that operates on
the belief that inner conflict within a person is due to that individual s confr
ontation with the givens of existence.[1] These givens, as noted by Irvin D. Yal
om, are: the inevitability of death, freedom and its attendant responsibility, e
xistential isolation (referring to Phenomenology), and finally meaninglessness.
These four givens, also referred to as ultimate concerns, form the body of exist
ential psychotherapy and compose the framework in which a therapist conceptualiz
es a client s problem in order to develop a method of treatment. In the British
School of Existential therapy (Cooper, 2003), these givens are seen as predictab
le tensions and paradoxes of the four dimensions of human existence, the physica
l, social, personal and spiritual realms (Umwelt, Mitwelt, Eigenwelt and Uberwel
t).
Existential Therapy s View of the Human Mind
Existential therapy starts with the belief that although humans are essentially
alone in the world, they long to be connected to others. People want to have mea
ning in one another s lives, but ultimately they must come to realize that they
cannot depend on others for validation, and with that realization they finally a
cknowledge and understand that they are fundamentally alone (Yalom, 1980). The r
esult of this revelation is anxiety in the knowledge that our validation must co
me from within and not from others.
Psychological Dysfunction
Because there is no single existential view, opinions about psychological dysfun
ction vary.
For theorists aligned with Yalom, psychological dysfunction results from the ind
ividual s refusal or inability to deal with the normal existential anxiety that
comes from confronting life s "givens": mortality, isolation, meaninglessness, a
nd freedom.[3]
For other theorists, there is no such thing as psychological dysfunction or bein
g mentally ill.[citation needed] Every way of being is merely an expression of h
ow one chooses to live one s life. However, one may feel unable to come to terms
with the anxiety of being alone in the world. If so, an existential psychothera
pist can assist one in accepting these feelings rather than trying to change the
m as if there is something wrong. Everyone has the freedom to choose how they ar
e going to be in life, however this may go unexercised because making changes is
difficult; it may appear easier and safer not to make decisions that one will b
e responsible for. Many people will remain unaware of alternative choices in lif
e for various societal reasons.
[edit]The Good Life
Existentialism suggests that it is possible for people to face the anxieties of
life head-on and embrace the human condition of aloneness, to revel in the freed
om to choose and take full responsibility for their choices. They courageously t
ake the helm of their lives and steer in whatever direction they choose; they ha

ve the courage to be. One does not need to arrest feelings of meaninglessness, b
ut can choose new meanings for their lives. By building, by loving, and by creat
ing one is able to live life as one s own adventure. One can accept one s own mo
rtality and overcome fear of death. Though the French author Albert Camus denied
the specific label of existentialist, in his novel, L Etranger, his main charac
ter Meursault, ends the novel by doing just this. He accepts his mortality and r
ejects the constrictions of society he previously placed on himself, leaving him
unencumbered and free to live his life with an unclouded mind.[citation needed]
[edit]Existential Therapy
The existential psychotherapist is generally not concerned with the client s pas
t; instead, the emphasis is on the choices to be made in the present and future.
The counselor and the client may reflect upon how the client has answered life
s questions in the past, but attention ultimately shifts to searching for a new
and increased awareness in the present and enabling a new freedom and responsibi
lity to act. The patient can then accept they are not special, and that their ex
istence is simply coincidental, without destiny or fate. By accepting this, they
can overcome their anxieties, and instead view life as moments in which they ar
e fundamentally free.(The outline above is based on a strictly Sartrean perspect
ive)
[edit]Four worlds
Existential thinkers seek to avoid restrictive models that categorize or label p
eople. Instead they look for the universals that can be observed cross-culturall
y.[citation needed] There is no existential personality theory which divides hum
anity into types or reduces people to part components. Instead there is a descri
ption of the different levels of experience and existence with which people are
inevitably confronted. The way in which a person is in the world at a particular
stage can be charted on this general map of human existence (Binswanger, 1963;
Yalom, 1980; van Deurzen, 1984). One can distinguish four basic dimensions of hu
man existence: the physical, the social, the psychological and the spiritual. On
each of these dimensions people encounter the world and shape their attitude ou
t of their particular take on their experience. Their orientation towards the wo
rld defines their reality. The four dimensions are obviously interwoven and prov
ide a complex four-dimensional force field for their existence. Individuals are
stretched between a positive pole of what they aspire to on each dimension and a
negative pole of what they fear.
Physical dimension On the physical dimension (Umwelt) individuals relate to thei
r environment and to the givens of the natural world around them. This includes
their attitude to the body they have, to the concrete surroundings they find the
mselves in, to the climate and the weather, to objects and material possessions,
to the bodies of other people, their own bodily needs, to health and illness an
d to their own mortality. The struggle on this dimension is, in general terms, b
etween the search for domination over the elements and natural law (as in techno
logy, or in sports) and the need to accept the limitations of natural boundaries
(as in ecology or old age). While people generally aim for security on this dim
ension (through health and wealth), much of life brings a gradual disillusionmen
t and realization that such security can only be temporary. Recognizing limitati
ons can bring great release of tension.
Social dimension On the social dimension (Mitwelt) individuals relate to others
as they interact with the public world around them. This dimension includes thei
r response to the culture they live in, as well as to the class and race they be
long to (and also those they do not belong to). Attitudes here range from love t
o hate and from cooperation to competition. The dynamic contradictions can be un
derstood in terms of acceptance versus rejection or belonging versus isolation.
Some people prefer to withdraw from the world of others as much as possible. Oth
ers blindly chase public acceptance by going along with the rules and fashions o
f the moment. Otherwise they try to rise above these by becoming trendsetters th
emselves. By acquiring fame or other forms of power, individuals can attain domi
nance over others temporarily. Sooner or later, however, everyone is confronted

with both failure and aloneness.

Psychological dimension On the psychological dimension (Eigenwelt) individuals r
elate to themselves and in this way create a personal world. This dimension incl
udes views about their own character, their past experience and their future pos
sibilities. Contradictions here are often experienced in terms of personal stren
gths and weaknesses. People search for a sense of identity, a feeling of being s
ubstantial and having a self. But inevitably many events will confront them with
evidence to the contrary and plunge them into a state of confusion or disintegr
ation. Activity and passivity are an important polarity here. Self-affirmation a
nd resolution go with the former and surrender and yielding with the latter. Fac
ing the final dissolution of self that comes with personal loss and the facing o
f death might bring anxiety and confusion to many who have not yet given up thei
r sense of self-importance.
Spiritual dimension On the spiritual dimension (berwelt) (van Deurzen, 1984) indi
viduals relate to the unknown and thus create a sense of an ideal world, an ideo
logy and a philosophical outlook. It is here that they find meaning by putting a
ll the pieces of the puzzle together for themselves. For some people this is don
e by adhering to a religion or other prescriptive world view, for others it is a
bout discovering or attributing meaning in a more secular or personal way. The c
ontradictions that have to be faced on this dimension are often related to the t
ension between purpose and absurdity, hope and despair. People create their valu
es in search of something that matters enough to live or die for, something that
may even have ultimate and universal validity. Usually the aim is the conquest
of a soul, or something that will substantially surpass mortality (as for instan
ce in having contributed something valuable to humankind). Facing the void and t
he possibility of nothingness are the indispensable counterparts of this quest f
or the eternal.
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Holistic health
Holistic health is a concept in medical practice upholding that all aspects of p
eople s needs, psychological, physical and social should be taken into account a
nd seen as a whole. As defined above, the holistic view on treatment is widely a
ccepted in medicine.[1] A different definition, claiming that disease is a resul
t of physical, emotional, spiritual, social and environmental imbalance, is used
in alternative medicine.[2]
Alternative medicine
In alternative medicine, it is believed that the spiritual aspect should also be
taken into account when assessing a person s overall well-being.[3] This spirit
ual aspect is claimed not to be associated with any religious ideology.[4]
________________________________________________________________________________
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Human science
Human science is the study and interpretation of the experiences, activities, co
nstructs, and artifacts associated with human beings. The study of the human sci
ences attempts to expand and enlighten the human being s knowledge of his or her
existence, its interrelationship with other species and systems, and the develo
pment of artifacts to perpetuate the human expression and thought. It is the stu
dy of human phenomena. The study of the human experience is historical and curre
nt in nature. It requires the evaluation and interpretation of the historic huma
n experience and the analysis of current human activity to gain an understanding
of human phenomena and to project the outlines of human volution. Human science
is the objective, informed critique of human existence and how it relates to re
ality. The ultimate question of science is - What is reality? The ultimate quest
ion in the study of human beings - What is the reality of being human? To study
appropriate human phenomena it is necessary to use multiple systems of inquiry.

Empirical, psychological/philosophical, and spiritual methods of inquiry are the

research methodologies associated with the human sciences. [1]
Meaning of

science

Ambiguity and confusion regarding usage of the terms science , empirical scien
ce , and scientific method have complicated the usage of the term human scien
ce with respect to human activities. The term science is derived from the Lat
in scientia meaning knowledge . Science may be appropriately used to refer to
any branch of knowledge or study dealing with a body of facts or truths systema
tically arranged to show the operation of general laws.
However, according to Positivists, the only authentic knowledge is scientific kn
owledge which comes from positive affirmation of theories through strict scienti
fic method. As a result of the positivist influence, the term science is frequen
tly employed as a synonym for empirical science. Empirical science is knowledge
based on the scientific method, a systematic approach to verification of knowled
ge first developed for dealing with natural physical phenomena and emphasizing t
he importance of experience based on sensory observation. However, even with reg
ard to the natural sciences, significant difference exist among scientists and p
hilosophers of science with regard to what constitutes valid scientific method.[
2] More recently, usage of the term has been extended to the study of human soci
al phenomena as well. Thus, the natural sciences and social sciences are commonl
y classified as science, whereas the study of classics, languages, literature, m
usic, philosophy, history, religion, and the visual and performing arts are refe
rred to as the humanities. Ambiguity with respect to the meaning of the term sci
ence is aggravated by the widespread use of the term formal science with referen
ce to any one of several sciences that is predominantly concerned with abstract
form that cannot be validated by physical experience through the senses, such as
logic, mathematics, and the theoretical branches of computer science, informati
on theory, and statistics.
[edit]History
Human science (also, humanistic social science, moral science and human sciences
) refers to the investigation of human life and activities via a phenomenologica
l methodology that acknowledges the validity of both sensory and psychological e
xperience. It includes but is not necessarily limited to humanistic modes of inq
uiry within fields of the social sciences and humanities, including history, soc
iology, anthropology, and economics. Its use of an empirical methodology that en
compasses psychological experience contrasts to the purely positivistic approach
typical of the natural sciences which exclude all methods not based solely on s
ensory observations. Thus the term is often used to distinguish not only the con
tent of a field of study from those of the natural sciences, but also its method
ology.[3]
[edit]Early development
The term moral science was first used by Hume in his Enquiry concerning the Prin
ciples of Morals to refer to the systematic study of human nature and relationsh
ips. Hume wished to establish a "science of human nature" based upon empirical p
henomena, and excluding all that does not arise from observation. Rejecting tele
ological, theological and metaphysical explanations , Hume sought to develop an
essentially descriptive methodology; phenomena were to be precisely characterize
d. He emphasized the necessity of carefully explicating the cognitive content of
ideas and vocabulary, relating these to their empirical roots and real-world si
gnificance.[4]
A variety of early thinkers in the humanistic sciences took up Hume s direction.
Adam Smith, for example, conceived of economics as a moral science in the Humea
n sense.[5]
[edit]Later development
Partly in reaction to the establishment of positivistic philosophy and the latte
r s Comtean intrusions into traditionally humanistic areas such as sociology, no
n-postivistic researchers in the humanistic sciences began to carefully but emph

atically distinguish the methodological approach appropriate to these areas of s

tudy, for which the unique and distinguishing characteristics of phenomena are i
n the forefront (e.g. for the biographer), from that appropriate to the natural
sciences, for which the ability to link phenomena into generalized groups is for
emost. In this sense, Droysen contrasted the humanistic science s need to compre
hend the phenomena under consideration with natural science s need to explain ph
enomena, while Windelband coined the terms idiographic for a descriptive study o
f the individual nature of phenomena, and nomothetic for sciences that aim to de
fine the generalizing laws.[3]
Dilthey brought nineteenth-century attempts to formulate a methodology appropria
te to the humanistic sciences together with Hume s term "moral science", which h
e translated as de:Geisteswissenschaft - a term with no exact English equivalent
. Dilthey attempted to articulate the entire range of the moral sciences in a co
mprehensive and systematic way.[6] Meanwhile, his conception of Geisteswissenscha
ften encompasses also the abovementioned study of classics, languages, literature
, music, philosophy, history, religion, and the visual and performing arts. He c
haracterized the scientific nature of a study as depending upon:[6]
The conviction that perception gives access to reality
The self-evident nature of logical reasoning
The principle of sufficient reason
But the specific nature of the Geisteswissenschaften is based on the inner exper
ience (Erleben), the comprehension (Verstehen) of the meaning of expressions and und
erstanding in terms of the relations of the part and the whole in contrast to th
e explanation of phenomena by hypothetical laws in the natural sciences.[7]
Edmund Husserl, a student of Franz Brentano, articulated his phenomenological ph
ilosophy in a way, that could be thought as a basis of Dilthey s attempt. Dilthe
y appreciated Husserls Logische Untersuchungen[8] (1900/1901, the first draft of Hu
sserl s Phenomenology) as an epoch making epistemological foundation of his concep
tion of Geisteswissenschaften.[9]
In recent years, human science has been used to refer to "a philosophy and app
roach to science that seeks to understand human experience in deeply subjective,
personal, historical, contextual, cross-cultural, political, and spiritual term
s. Human science is the science of qualities rather than of quantities and close
s the subject-object split in science. In particular, it addresses the ways in w
hich self-reflection, art, music, poetry, drama, language and imagery reveal the
human condition. By being interpretive, reflective, and appreciative, human sci
ence re-opens the conversation among science, art, and philosophy."[10]
[edit]Objective vs. subjective experiences
Since Auguste Comte, the positivistic social sciences have sought to imitate the
approach of the natural sciences by emphasizing the importance of objective ext
ernal observations and searching for universal laws whose operation is predicate
d on external initial conditions that do not take into account differences in su
bjective human perception and attitude. Critics argue that subjective human expe
rience and intention plays such a central role in determining human social behav
ior that the objectivist approach to the social sciences is too confining. Rejec
ting the positivist influence, they argue that the scientific method can rightly
be applied to subjective as well objective experience. The term subjective is u
sed in this context to refer to inner psychological experience rather than outer
sensory experience. It is not used in the sense of being prejudiced by personal
motives or beliefs.
________________________________________________________________________________
_______
Identity
Identity (philosophy)
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
In philosophy, identity, from Latin: identitas (sameness), is the relation each th
ing bears just to itself.[1][2] The notion of identity gives rise to many philos

ophical problems, including the identity of indiscernibles (if x and y share all
their properties, are they one and the same thing?), and questions about change
and personal identity over time (what has to be the case for a person x at one
time and a person y at a later time to be one and the same person?).
It is important to distinguish the philosophical concept of identity from the mo
re well-known notion of identity in use in psychology and the social sciences. T
he philosophical concept concerns a relation, specifically, a relation that x an
d y stand in just in case they are one and the same thing, or identical to each
other (i.e. just in case x = y). The sociological notion of identity, by contras
t, has to do with a person s self-conception, social presentation, and more gene
rally, the aspects of a person that make them unique, or qualitatively different
from others (e.g. cultural identity, gender identity, national Identity, online
identity and processes of identity formation.)
Logic of identity
In logic, the identity relation (also called "equality") is normally defined as
the binary relation that holds only between a thing and itself. That is, identit
y is the two-place predicate, "=", such that for all x and y, "x = y" is true if
x is the same thing as y. Identity is transitive, symmetric, and reflexive. It
is an axiom of most normal modal logics that for all x and y, if x = y then nece
ssarily y = x. That is, identity does not hold contingently, but of necessity.
Put in these terms (above), it can seem rather trivial, but the point, of course
, is that the same number, object, or person, can have different "guises", and i
t is far from trivial if two or more guises refer to the same same number, objec
t, or person. For example, 1+1=2 because 1+1 and 2 are different "guises" fo
r the same number. Similarly, for personal identity over time, "me today" and "m
e yesterday" are different guises for the same person.
Law of identity
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
This article uses forms of logical notation. For a concise description of the sy
mbols used in this notation, see List of logic symbols.
In logic, the law of identity is the first of the so-called three classic laws o
f thought. It states that an object is the same as itself: A A (if you have A, t
hen you have A); While this can also be listed as A A (A if-and-only-if A,) this
is redundant.[1] Any reflexive relation upholds the law of identity. When discu
ssing equality, the fact that "A is A" is a tautology.
History
The earliest use of the law appears to occur in Plato's dialogue Theaetetus (185
a), where Socrates attempts to establish that what we call "sounds" and "colours
" are two different classes of thing.
Socrates: How about sounds and colours: in the first place you would admit that
they both exist?
Theaetetus: Yes.
Socrates: And that either of them is different from the other, and the same with
itself?
Theaetetus: Certainly.
Socrates: And that both are two and each of them one?
Theaetetus: Yes.
Parmenides the Eleatic (circa BCE. 490) formulated the principle Being is (eon e
mmenai) as the foundation of his philosophy.
Aristotle identifies the law in Book VII of the Metaphysics:
Now "why a thing is itself" is a meaningless inquiry (forto give meaning to the q
uestion 'why'the fact or the existence of the thing must already be evidente.g., t
hat the moon is eclipsedbut the fact that a thing is itself is the single reason
and the single cause to be given in answer to all such questions as why the man
is man, or the musician musical, unless one were to answer, 'because each thing

is inseparable from itself, and its being one just meant this.' This, however, i
s common to all things and is a short and easy way with the question.)
Metaphysics, Book VII, Part 17
Aristotle highlights "the fact that a thing is itself" because the objective of
his inquiry at that point in the Metaphysics concerns "substance" and to provide
answers to the question "what kind of thing substance should be said to be", gi
ven that "substance is a principle and a cause" of being. He further argues that
while it is true that the question, "why a thing is itself" is meaningless, "th
e fact that a thing is itself" has meaning because we can then restate the why q
uestion to inquire "why something is predictable of something" given that each s
omething is itself unique. For Aristotle, "substance is actuality" and it is the
actual "thing that is itself" something that proceeds another such something in
time.
Aristotle makes the claim that, "the fact that a thing is itself" allows for "a
fixed constant nature of sensible things", and thus when confronted with the pro
nouncement that "this is bread" one can proceed to eat with confidence and not d
emand that for each and every such pronouncement evidence be provided to demonst
rate that "this is not bread". Thus "the fact that a thing is itself" perhaps fi
nds its greatest utility to man by providing "a fixed constant nature of sensibl
e things" in an ever changing universe of being---Metaphysics, Book VII, Part 17
Thus in Aristotle we see the first logical presentation of the law of identity,
"the fact that a thing is itself", to help answer the question "what kind of thi
ng should be said to be". However, Aristotle never claimed that [A = A, 1 = 1, o
r A A], none of which correspond symbolically to "the fact that a thing is itsel
f," for the simple reason that Aristotle never explicitly made the claim "thing
is thing."
Both Thomas Aquinas (Met. IV., lect. 6) and Duns Scotus (Quaest. sup. Met. IV.,
Q. 3) follow Aristotle. Antonius Andreas, the Spanish disciple of Scotus (d. 132
0) argues that the first place should belong to the law "Every Being is a Being"
(Omne Ens est Ens, Qq. in Met. IV., Q. 4), but the late scholastic writer Franc
isco Suarez (Disp. Met. III., 3) disagreed, also preferring to follow Aristotle.
Leibniz claimed that the law of Identity, which he expresses as 'Everything is w
hat it is,' is the first primitive truth of reason which is affirmative, and the
law of noncontradiction, is the first negative truth (Nouv. Ess. IV., 2, i), ar
guing that "the statement that a thing is what it is, is prior to the statement
that it is not another thing" (Nouv. Ess. IV.. 7, 9). Wilhelm Wundt credits Gott
fried Leibniz with the symbolic formulation, "A is A."[2]
Locke (Essay Concerning Human Understanding IV. vii. iv. ("Of Maxims") says:
... whenever the mind with attention considers any proposition, so as to perceiv
e the two ideas signified by the terms, and affirmed or denied one of the other
to be the same or different; it is presently and infallibly certain of the truth
of such a proposition; and this equally whether these propositions be in terms
standing for more general ideas, or such as are less so: e.g. whether the genera
l idea of Being be affirmed of itself, as in this proposition, "whatsoever is, i
s"; or a more particular idea be affirmed of itself, as "a man is a man"; or, "w
hatsoever is white is white" ...
J.S. Mill formulates the law as: "Whatever is true in one form of words, is true
in every other form of words, which conveys the same meaning" (Exam. of Hamilto
n, p. 409). Shakespeare has Juliet Capulet state the same idea as "A rose by any
other name would smell as sweet", in the 1597 play Romeo and Juliet.
African Spir proclaims the law of identity as the fundamental law of knowledge,
which is opposed to the changing appearance of the empirical reality.[3]
[edit]A Linguistic Principle
This section does not cite any references or sources. Please help improve this s
ection by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challe
nged and removed. (December 2010)
That everything is necessarily "the same with itself and different from another"
is the self-evident[citation needed] first principle of language, for it govern

s the designation or "identification" of individual concepts within any symbolic

language, so as to avoid any ambiguity in the communicating of concepts between
the users of that language. Such a principle is necessary because a "symbolic d
esignator" (name, word, sign, etc.) has no inherent meaning of its own, but deri
ves its meaning from the language user who correlates the given designator with
a conventionally prescribed concept that has been previously learned. To put it
another way, the principle (law) states that although it is permissible to call
the same concept by many different names, words, signs, etc., a fact that makes
it possible for there to be different languages, it is not permissible, within a
ny single linguistic group, to call different concepts by the same designator, e
lse the users of the language will not know which of the possible concepts they
are intended to call to mind when they encounter that designator.
Exceptions are only permissible where the users are able to readily discern whic
h of the different concepts they are intended to call to mind by the context in
which the designator is used. Since our ability to generate valid conclusions fr
om premises is dependent upon our having a clear understanding of the concepts e
xpressed in those premises, it follows that any ambiguity in the symbolic denota
tion of those concepts will hamper our ability to reason soundly. It is for this
reason that the law of identity is considered the self-evident first principle
of thought (reason).
In the introduction to his treatise An Investigation of the Laws of Thought, Geo
rge Boole wrote: There exist, indeed, certain general principles founded in the v
ery nature of language, by which the use of symbols, which are but the elements
of scientific language, is determined. To a certain extent these elements are ar
bitrary. Their interpretation is purely conventional: we are permitted to employ
them in whatever sense we please. But this permission is limited by two indispe
nsable conditions, first, that from the sense once conventionally established we
never, in the same process of reasoning, depart; secondly, that the laws by whi
ch the process is conducted be founded exclusively upon the above fixed sense or
meaning of the symbols employed. While his remarks pertain here to the developme
nt of a scientific language of formal reasoning or Logic, they apply equally wel
l to natural languages, for all languages are essentially systems of symbolic co
mmunication. Linguistic terms, like all symbols, are devoid of any inherent mean
ing, and so must derive their meaning from the users of the language, who attrib
ute meaning to them in a manner that is conventionally prescribed within their p
articular linguistic group. Consequently, the same indispensable conditions apply
to the employment of terms in a natural language as to the symbols employed in B
oole s formal logic.
In his Metaphysics( Book II ), Aristotle gives the following explication of that
linguistic principle which later came to be known as the Law of Identity: First
then this at least is obviously true, that the word be or not be has a defin
ite meaning, so that not everything will be so and not so. Again, if man has one mea
ning, let this be two-footed animal; by having one meaning I understand this: if ma
n means X, then if A is a man, X will be what being a man means for him. (It makes n
ifference even if one were to say a word has several meanings, if only they are
limited in number; for to each definition there might be assigned a different wo
rd. For instance, we might say that man has not one meaning but several, one of wh
ich would have one definition, viz. two-footed animal, while there might be also s
everal other definitions if only they were limited in number; for a peculiar nam
e might be assigned to each of the definitions. If, however, they were not limit
ed but one were to say that the word has an infinite number of meanings, obvious
ly reasoning would be impossible; for not to have one meaning is to have no mean
ing, and if words have no meaning our reasoning with one another, and indeed wit
h ourselves, has been annihilated; for it is impossible to think of anything if
we do not think of one thing; but if this is possible, one name might be assigne
d to this thing.) Let it be assumed then, as was said at the beginning, that the
name has a meaning and has one meaning; it is impossible, then, that being a man
should mean precisely not being a man, if man not only signifies something about one
subject but also has one significance (for we do not identify having one signifi
cance with signifying something about one subject since on that assumption even musi

cal and white and man would have had one significance, so that all things would have
been one; for they would all have had the same significance).
[edit]Trivia
In 2002 Jonathon Keats held a petition drive to pass "A = A" as statutory law in
Berkeley, California. Specifically, the proposed law stated that, "every entity
shall be identical to itself". Any entity caught being unidentical to itself wa
s to be subject to a fine of up to one tenth of a cent. The law did not pass.[4]
Personal identity
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
(Redirected from Personal identity (philosophy))
This article includes a list of references, related reading or external links, b
ut its sources remain unclear because it lacks inline citations. Please improve
this article by introducing more precise citations. (December 2011)
For other uses, see Personal identity (disambiguation).
What does it take for individuals to persist from moment to moment or in other w
ords, for the same individual to exist at different moments?
Personal identity is the unique numerical identity of persons through time. That
is to say, the necessary and sufficient conditions under which a person at one
time and a person at another time can be said to be the same person, persisting
through time. In the modern philosophy of mind, this concept of personal identit
y is sometimes referred to as the diachronic problem of personal identity. The s
ynchronic problem is grounded in the question of what features or traits charact
erize a given person at one time.
Identity is an issue for both continental philosophy and analytic philosophy. A
key question in continental philosophy is in what sense we can maintain the mode
rn conception of identity, while realizing many of our prior assumptions about t
he world are incorrect.
Theories
[edit]Continuity of substance
[edit]Bodily substance
One basic concept of personal persistence over time is simply to have continuous
bodily existence. However, as the Ship of Theseus problem illustrates, even for
inanimate objects there are difficulties in determining whether one physical bo
dy at one time is the same thing as a physical body at another time. With humans
, over time our bodies age and grow, losing and gaining matter, and over suffici
ent years will not consist of any of the matter they once consisted of. It is th
us problematic to ground persistence of personal identity over time in the conti
nuous existence of our bodies.
Nevertheless, this approach has its supporters. Eric Olson gives a definition of
a human as a biological organism and asserts that a psychological relation is n
ot necessary for personal continuity. Olson s personal identity lies in life-sus
taining processes instead of bodily continuity. This biological approach squares
with many other psychological accounts of personal identity but does not fall i
nto common metaphysical traps.
Derek Parfit presents a thought experiment designed to bring out our intuitions
about the corporeal continuity. This thought experiment discusses cases in which
a person is teletransported from Earth to Mars. In the one case, the person ent
ers the teletransporter and has each molecule of his body disassembled, teletran
sported to Mars, and then reassembled. In another case the person enters the tel
etransporter where that persons body is destroyed while all the exact states of t
hat persons cells are recorded. This information is then teletransported to Mars,
where another machine uses organic material to produce a perfect copy of that p
ersons body. The question is whether in either of these cases the person on Mars

is identical to the person on Earth. Suppose that these two cases are just the f
urthest opposite points on a spectrum. In-between these two cases there are more
cases in which an increase amount of the person on Mars is constituted of the n
umerically identical matter as the person on Earth. The question for that the cr
iterion for personal identity becomes where on this spectrum does the person on
Mars stop being identical to the person on Earth. Is it at 1, 51, or 99.9 percen
t? It appears that we are not able to draw a line. This inability appears to sho
w that having a numerically identical physical body is not the criterion for per
sonal identity.
[edit]Mental substance
In a dualist concept of mind, a person s mind is considered to consist of an imm
aterial substance, separate from and independent from the body. If a person is t
hen identified with their mind, rather than their body if a person is considered
to be their mind and their mind is such a non-physical substance, then personal
identity over time may be grounded in the persistence of this non-physical subs
tance, despite the continuous change in the substance of the body it is associat
ed with. However, dualism is far from uncontroversial or unproblematic, and adop
ting it as a solution raises a host of other questions. The mind-body problem co
ncerns the explanation of the relationship, if any, that exists between minds, o
r mental processes, and bodily states or processes. One of the aims of philosoph
ers who work in this area is to explain how a supposedly immaterial mind can inf
luence a material body and vice-versa.
Our perceptual experiences depend on stimuli which arrive at our various sensory
organs from the external world and these stimuli cause changes in our mental st
ates; ultimately causing us to feel a sensation, which may be pleasant, unpleasa
nt, or neutral. Someone s desire for a slice of pizza, for example, will tend to
cause that person to move their body in a specific manner and in a specific dir
ection to obtain said pizza. The question, then, is how it can be possible for c
onscious experiences to arise out of a lump of grey matter endowed with nothing
but electrochemical properties. A related problem is to explain how someone s pr
opositional attitudes (e.g. beliefs and desires) can cause that individual s neu
rons to fire and his muscles to contract in exactly the correct manner. These co
mprise some of the puzzles that have confronted epistemologists and philosophers
of mind from at least the time of Ren Descartes.
[edit]Continuity of consciousness
John Locke considered personal identity (or the self) to be founded on conscious
ness, and not on the substance of either the soul or the body. Book II Chapter X
XVII entitled "On Identity and Diversity" in An Essay Concerning Human Understan
ding (1689) has been said to be one of the first modern conceptualizations of co
nsciousness as the repeated self-identification of oneself. Through this identif
ication, moral responsibility could be attributed to the subject and punishment
and guilt could be justified, as critics such as Nietzsche would point out.
According to Locke, personal identity (the self) "depends on consciousness, not
on substance" nor on the soul. We are the same person to the extent that we are
conscious of our past and future thoughts and actions in the same way as we are
conscious of our present thoughts and actions. If consciousness is this "thought
" which "that goes along with the substance ... which makes the same person", th
en personal identity is only founded on the repeated act of consciousness: "This
may show us wherein personal identity consists: not in the identity of substanc
e, but... in the identity of consciousness". For example, one may claim to be a
reincarnation of Plato, therefore having the same soul substance. However, one w
ould be the same person as Plato only if one had the same consciousness of Plato
s thoughts and actions that he himself did. Therefore, self-identity is not bas
ed on the soul. One soul may have various personalities.
Neither is self-identity founded on the body substance, argues Locke, as the bod
y may change while the person remains the same. Even the identity of animals is
not founded on their body: "animal identity is preserved in identity of life, an
d not of substance", as the body of the animal grows and changes during its life
. On the other hand, identity of humans is based on their consciousness. Take fo
r example a prince s mind which enters the body of a cobbler: to all exterior ey

es, the cobbler would remain a cobbler. But to the prince himself, the cobbler w
ould be himself, as he would be conscious of the prince s thoughts and acts, and
not those of the cobbler. A prince s consciousness in a cobbler s body: thus th
e cobbler is, in fact, a prince.
But this interesting border-case leads to this problematic thought that since pe
rsonal identity is based on consciousness, and that only oneself can be aware of
his consciousness, exterior human judges may never know if they really are judg
ing - and punishing - the same person, or simply the same body. In other words,
Locke argues that you may be judged only for the acts of your body, as this is w
hat is apparent to all but God; however, you are in truth only responsible for t
he acts for which you are conscious. This forms the basis of the insanity defens
e: one cannot be held accountable for acts from which one was unconscious - and
therefore leads to interesting philosophical questions:
personal identity consists [not in the identity of substance] but in the identit
y of consciousness, wherein if Socrates and the present mayor of Queenborough ag
ree, they are the same person: if the same Socrates waking and sleeping do not p
artake of the same consciousness, Socrates waking and sleeping is not the same p
erson. And to punish Socrates waking for what sleeping Socrates thought, and wak
ing Socrates was never conscious of, would be no more right, than to punish one
twin for what his brother-twin did, whereof he knew nothing, because their outsi
des were so like, that they could not be distinguished; for such twins have been
seen.
Or again:
PERSON, as I take it, is the name for this self. Wherever a man finds what he ca
lls himself, there, I think, another may say is the same person. It is a forensi
c term, appropriating actions and their merit; and so belong only to intelligent
agents, capable of a law, and happiness, and misery. This personality extends i
tself beyond present existence to what is past, only by consciousness, --whereby
it becomes concerned and accountable; owns and imputes to itself past actions,
just upon the same ground and for the same reason as it does the present. All wh
ich is founded in a concern for happiness, the unavoidable concomitant of consci
ousness; that which is conscious of pleasure and pain, desiring that that self t
hat is conscious should be happy. And therefore whatever past actions it cannot
reconcile or APPROPRIATE to that present self by consciousness, it can be no mor
e concerned in it than if they had never been done: and to receive pleasure or p
ain, i.e. reward or punishment, on the account of any such action, is all one as
to be made happy or miserable in its first being, without any demerit at all. F
or, supposing a MAN punished now for what he had done in another life, whereof h
e could be made to have no consciousness at all, what difference is there betwee
n that punishment and being CREATED miserable? And therefore, conformable to thi
s, the apostle tells us, that, at the great day, when every one shall receive a
ccording to his doings, the secrets of all hearts shall be laid open. The sente
nce shall be justified by the consciousness all person shall have, that THEY THE
MSELVES, in what bodies soever they appear, or what substances soever that consc
iousness adheres to, are the SAME that committed those actions, and deserve that
punishment for them.
Henceforth, Locke s conception of personal identity founds it not on the substan
ce or the body, but in the "same continued consciousness", which is also distinc
t from the soul since the soul may have no consciousness of itself (as in reinca
rnation). He creates a third term between the soul and the body - and Locke s th
ought may certainly be meditated by those who, following a scientist ideology, w
ould identify too quickly the brain to consciousness. For the brain, as the body
and as any substance, may change, while consciousness remains the same.[citatio
n needed] Therefore personal identity is not in the brain, but in consciousness.
However, Locke s theory also reveals his debt to theology and to Apocalyptic "g
reat day", which by advance excuse any failings of human justice and therefore h
umanity s miserable state. The problem of personal identity is at the center of
discussions about life after death, and immortality. In order to exist after dea
th, there has to be a person after death who is the same person as the person wh
o died.

Bernard Williams presents a thought experiment appealing to our intuitions about

what it is to be the same person in the future.[1] The thought experiment consi
sts of two approaches to the same experiment. For the first approach Williams su
ggests that we suppose that there is some process by which subjecting two person
s to it can result in the two persons have exchanged bodies. The process has put i
nto the body of person B the memories, behavioral dispositions, and psychologica
l characteristics of the person who prior to undergoing the process belonged to
person A; and conversely with person B. To show this we are to suppose that befo
re undergoing the process person A and B are asked to which resulting person, ABody-Person or B-Body-Person, they wish to receive a punishment and which a rewa
rd. Upon undergoing the process and receiving either the punishment or reward, i
t appears to us that A-Body-Person expresses the memories of choosing who gets w
hich treatment as if that person was person B; conversely with B-Body-Person. Th
is sort of approach to the thought experiment appears to show us that since we t
ake the person who expresses the psychological characteristics of person A to be
person A, then our intuition is that psychological continuity is the criterion
for personal identity.
The second approach is to suppose that you are told that you will have your memo
ries erased and then you will be tortured. Are you to be afraid of being torture
d? The intuition is that you probably are afraid of being tortured, since it wil
l still be you despite not having your memories. Next, we are asked to consider
several similar scenarios. You have your memories erased, you are given new fake m
emories, and then you are to be tortured; You have your memories erased, you are
given copies of another person s memories, and then you are to be tortured; You
have your memories erased, you are given another person s genuine memories, and
then you are to be tortured; You have your memories erased, you are given anoth
er persons genuine memories, that person is given your memories, and then you are
to be tortured. Our intuition is that in all these cases we are to be afraid of
being tortured, that is it is still us despite having our memories erased and r
eceiving new memories. However, the last scenario is an identical scenario to th
e one in the first approach. In the first case, our intuition shows us that our
psychological continuity is the criterion for personal identity, but in second c
ase, our intuition is that it is our bodily continuity that is the criterion for
personal identity. To resolve this conflict Williams feels our intuition in the
second approach is stronger and if he was given the choice of distributing a pu
nishment and a reward he would want his body-person to receive the reward and th
e other body-person to receive the punishment, even if that other body-person ha
s his memories.
In psychology, personal continuity, also called personal persistence, is the uni
nterrupted connection concerning a particular person of his or her private life
and personality. Personal continuity is the union affecting the facets arising f
rom personality in order to avoid discontinuities from one moment of time to ano
ther time.[clarification needed] Personal continuity is an important part of ide
ntity; this is the process of ensuring that the qualities of the mind, such as s
elf-awareness, sentience, sapience, and the ability to perceive the relationship
between oneself and one s environment, are consistent from one moment to the ne
xt. Personal continuity is the property of a continuous and connected period of
time and is intimately concerned with a person s body or physical being.[clarifi
cation needed][citation needed] Associationism, a theory of how ideas combine in
the mind, allows events or views to be associated with each other in the mind,
thus leading to a form of learning. Associations can result from contiguity, sim
ilarity, or contrast. Through contiguity, one associates ideas or events that us
ually happen to occur at the same time. Some of these events form an autobiograp
hical memory in which each is a personal representation of the general or specif
ic events and personal facts.
Similarly, ego integrity is the psychological concept of the ego s accumulated a
ssurance of its capacity for order and meaning. Ego identity is the accrued conf
idence that the inner sameness and continuity prepared in the past are matched b
y the sameness and continuity of one s meaning for others, as evidenced in the p
romise of a career. Body and ego must be masters of organ modes{[clarify}} and o

f the other nuclear conflicts[clarification needed] in order to face the fear of

ego loss in situations which call for self-abandon.
[edit]The bundle theory of the self
David Hume undertook looking at the mind-body problem. Hume also investigated a
person s character, the relationship between human and animal nature, and the na
ture of agency. Hume pointed out that we tend to think that we are the same pers
on we were five years ago. Though we ve changed in many respects, the same perso
n appears present as was present then. We might start thinking about which featu
res can be changed without changing the underlying self. Hume, however, denies t
hat there is a distinction between the various features of a person and the myst
erious self that supposedly bears those features. When we start introspecting, "
we are never intimately conscious of anything but a particular perception; man i
s a bundle or collection of different perceptions which succeed one another with
an inconceivable rapidity and are in perpetual flux and movement".[2]
It is plain that in the course of our thinking, and in the constant revolution o
f our ideas, our imagination runs easily from one idea to any other that resembl
es it, and that this quality alone is to the fancy a sufficient bond and associa
tion. It is likewise evident that as the senses, in changing their objects, are
necessitated to change them regularly, and take them as they lie contiguous to e
ach other, the imagination must by long custom acquire the same method of thinki
ng, and run along the parts of space and time in conceiving its objects.[3]
Note in particular that, in Hume s view, these perceptions do not belong to anyt
hing. Hume, similar to the Buddha[citation needed], compares the soul to a commo
nwealth, which retains its identity not by virtue of some enduring core substanc
e, but by being composed of many different, related, and yet constantly changing
elements. The question of personal identity then becomes a matter of characteri
zing the loose cohesion of one s personal experience. (Note that in the Appendix
to the Treatise, Hume said mysteriously that he was dissatisfied with his accou
nt of the self, yet he never returned to the issue.)
In short, what matters for Hume is not that identity exists but that the relat
ions of causation, contiguity, and resemblances obtain among the perceptions. Cr
itics of Hume might point out that in order for the various states and processes
of the mind to seem unified, there must be something which perceives their unit
y, the existence of which would be no less mysterious than a personal identity.
[edit]The no-self theory
Another view of personal identity is known as the no-self theory. According to t
his view the self cannot be reduced to a bundle because the concept of a self is
incompatible with the idea of a bundle. This is because the idea of a bundle im
plies the notion of bodily or psychological relations that do not in fact exist.
A principal exponent of this view is James Giles. Giles argues that the no-self
or eliminativist theory and the bundle or reductionist theory are in agreement
about the non-existence of a substantival self. The reductionist theory, however
, makes the mistake of attempting to resurrect the idea of the self in terms of
various accounts about psychological relations. The no-self theory, on the other
hand, lets the self lie where it has fallen .[4]This is because the no-self th
eory is a rejection of all theories of the self, even the bundle theory. On Gile
s reading, Hume is actually a no-self theorist and it is a mistake to attribute
to him a reductionist view like the bundle theory. This reading is supported by
Hume s famous assertion that personal identity is a fiction. On this account th
e Buddhist view of personal identity is also a no-self theory rather than a redu
ctionist theory. This is because the Buddha clearly rejects all attempts to reco
nstruct the self in terms of consciousness, feelings, or the body.[5]
Other positions[specify] state that the intuitive concept of self is an evolutio
nary artifact. In the free will model[clarification needed] of consciousness the
brain models its own unconscious processes just as it models other people. This
modeling makes the assumption that the model will continue to apply through tim
e, and so assumes they are the same person they were yesterday. This leads to th
e intuitive sense of self. The sense of self has also become part of our language,
part of our concept of responsibility, and the basis of self based morality.
The Buddha attacked all attempts to conceive of a fixed self, while stating that

holding the view "I have no self" is also mistaken. This is an example of the m
iddle way charted by the Buddha.
Identity (social science)
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Identity is a term used to describe a person s conception and expression of thei
r individuality or group affiliations (such as national identity and cultural id
entity). The term is used more specifically in psychology and sociology, and is
given a great deal of attention in social psychology. The term is also used with
respect to place identity.
Description
"Identity" may be defined as the distinctive character belonging to any given in
dividual, or shared by all members of a particular social category or group. The
term comes from the French word identit which finds its linguistic roots in the
Latin noun identitas, -tatis, itself a derivation of the Latin adjective idem me
aning "the same."The term is thus essentially comparative in nature, as it empha
sizes the sharing of a degree of sameness or oneness with others in a particular
area or on a given point. Identity may be distinguished from identification; the fo
rmer is a label whereas the latter refers to the classifying act itself. Identit
y is thus best construed as being both relational and contextual, while the act
of identification is best viewed as inherently processual.[1]
A psychological identity relates to self-image (a person s mental model of him o
r herself), self-esteem, and individuality. An important part of identity in psy
chology is gender identity, as this dictates to a significant degree how an indi
vidual views him or herself both as a person and in relation to other people, id
eas and nature. In cognitive psychology, the term "identity" refers to the capac
ity for self-reflection and the awareness of self (Leary & Tangney 2003, p. 3).
Sociology places some explanatory weight on the concept of role-behavior. The no
tion of identity negotiation may arise from the learning of social roles through
personal experience. Identity negotiation is a process in which a person negoti
ates with society at large regarding the meaning of his or her identity.
Psychologists most commonly use the term "identity" to describe personal identit
y, or the idiosyncratic things that make a person unique. Meanwhile, sociologist
s often use the term to describe social identity, or the collection of group mem
berships that define the individual. However, these uses are not proprietary, an
d each discipline may use either concept and each discipline may combine both co
ncepts when considering a person s identity.
Use in psychology
Erik Erikson was one of the earliest psychologists to be explicitly interested i
n identity. The Eriksonian framework rests upon a distinction among the psycholo
gical sense of continuity, known as the ego identity (sometimes identified simpl
y as "the self"); the personal idiosyncrasies that separate one person from the
next, known as the personal identity; and the collection of social roles that a
person might play, known as either the social identity or the cultural identity.
Erikson s work, in the psychodynamic tradition, aimed to investigate the proces
s of identity formation across a lifespan. Progressive strength in the ego ident
ity, for example, can be charted in terms of a series of stages in which identit
y is formed in response to increasingly sophisticated challenges. On some readin
gs of Erikson, the development of a strong ego identity, along with the proper i
ntegration into a stable society and culture, lead to a stronger sense of identi
ty in general. Accordingly, a deficiency in either of these factors may increase
the chance of an identity crisis or confusion (Cote & Levin 2002, p. 22).
Although the self is distinct from identity, the literature of self-psychology c
an offer some insight into how identity is maintained (Cote & Levin 2002, p. 24)
. From the vantage point of self-psychology, there are two areas of interest: th
e processes by which a self is formed (the "I"), and the actual content of the s

chemata which compose the self-concept (the "Me"). In the latter field, theorist
s have shown interest in relating the self-concept to self-esteem, the differenc
es between complex and simple ways of organizing self-knowledge, and the links b
etween those organizing principles and the processing of information (Cote & Lev
in 2002).
The "Neo-Eriksonian" identity status paradigm emerged in later years, driven lar
gely by the work of James Marcia. This paradigm focuses upon the twin concepts o
f exploration and commitment. The central idea is that any individual s sense of
identity is determined in large part by the explorations and commitments that h
e or she makes regarding certain personal and social traits. It follows that the
core of the research in this paradigm investigates the degrees to which a perso
n has made certain explorations, and the degree to which he or she displays a co
mmitment to those explorations.
A person may display either relative weakness or relative strength in terms of b
oth exploration and commitments. When assigned categories, four possible permuta
tions result: identity diffusion, identity foreclosure, identity moratorium, and
identity achievement. Diffusion is when a person lacks both exploration in life
and interest in committing even to those unchosen roles that he or she occupies
. Foreclosure is when a person has not chosen extensively in the past, but seems
willing to commit to some relevant values, goals, or roles in the future. Morat
orium is when a person displays a kind of flightiness, ready to make choices but
unable to commit to them. Finally, achievement is when a person makes identity
choices and commits to them.
Use in social psychology
At a general level, self-psychology is compelled to investigate the question of
how the personal self relates to the social environment. To the extent that thes
e theories place themselves in the tradition of "psychological" social psycholog
y, they focus on explaining an individual s actions within a group in terms of m
ental events and states. However, some "sociological" social psychology theories
go further by attempting to deal with the issue of identity at both the levels
of individual cognition and of collective behavior.
The question of what psychological reasons drive the individual s adoption of gr
oup identities remains open. Many people gain a sense of positive self-esteem fr
om their identity groups, which furthers a sense of community and belonging. Ano
ther issue that researchers have attempted to address is the question of why peo
ple engage in discrimination, i.e., why they tend to favor those they consider a
part of their "in-group" over those considered to be outsiders. Both questions
have been given extensive treatment by Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner s social
identity theory. Their theory focuses mainly on the role of self-categorization
and attempts to show how a simple sense of distinctiveness can lead people to ac
t in a discriminating way. Moreover, social identity theory shows that merely cr
afting cognitive distinction between in- and out-groups can lead to subtle effec
ts on people s evaluations of others (Cote & Levine 2002).[2]
Different social situations also compel people to attach themselves to different
self-identities which may cause some to feel marginalized, thus traveling betwe
en different groups and self-identifications. These different selves lead to con
structed images dichotomized between what people want to be (the ideal self) and
how others see them (the limited self). Educational background and Occupational
status and roles significantly influence identity formation in this regard.[3]
Another issue of interest in social psychology is related to the notion that the
re are certain identity formation strategies which a person may use to adapt to
the social world. (Cote & Levin 2002, pp. 35) developed a typology which investig
ated the different manners of behavior that individuals may have. (3) Their typo
logy includes:
Psychological symptoms Personality symptoms
Social symptoms
Refuser Develops cognitive blocks that prevent adoption of adult role-schemas
Engages in child-like behavior Shows extensive dependency upon others and no me
aningful engagement with the community of adults

Drifter
Possesses greater psychological resources than the Refuser (i.e., intelligence,
charisma)
Is apathetic toward application of psychological resources
Has no meaningfu
l engagement with or commitment to adult communities
Searcher
Has a sense of dissatisfaction due to high personal and social expectations
Shows disdain for imperfections within the community
Interacts to some degree
with role-models, but ultimately these relationships are abandoned
Guardian
Possesses clear personal values and attitudes, but also a deep fear of change
Sense of personal identity is almost exhausted by sense of social identity
Has an extremely rigid sense of social identity and strong identification with a
dult communities
Resolver
Consciously desires self-growth Accepts personal skills and competencies and use
s them actively
Is responsive to communities that provide opportunity for self-growth
Kenneth Gergen formulated additional classifications, which include the strategi
c manipulator, the pastiche personality, and the relational self. The strategic
manipulator is a person who begins to regard all senses of identity merely as ro
le-playing exercises, and who gradually becomes alienated from his or her social
"self". The pastiche personality abandons all aspirations toward a true or "ess
ential" identity, instead viewing social interactions as opportunities to play o
ut, and hence become, the roles they play. Finally, the relational self is a per
spective by which persons abandon all sense of exclusive self, and view all sens
e of identity in terms of social engagement with others. For Gergen, these strat
egies follow one another in phases, and they are linked to the increase in popul
arity of postmodern culture and the rise of telecommunications technology.
Use in philosophy
See also: Personal identity (philosophy) and Identity (philosophy)
Philosophers have also reflected on the identity concept. In many ways Philosoph
ical reflection on identity predated psychological. Philosophical discourse on i
dentity begins with Descartes. His famous mantra "I doubt, therefor I think, the
refor I am." have left many to inquire what exactly "I" is, and if indeed we can
derive an "I-ness" from doubt.
Hegel rejects Cartesian philosophy, supposing that we do not always doubt and th
at we do not always have consciousness. In his famous Master-Slave Dialectic Heg
el attempts to show that the mind (Geist) only become conscious when it encounte
rs another mind. One Geist attempts to control the other, since up until that po
int it has only encountered tools for its use. A struggle for domination ensues,
leading to Lordship and Bondage.
Nietzsche who was influenced by Hegel in some ways but rejected him in others, c
alled for a rejection of "Soul Atomism" in The Gay Science. Nietzsche supposed t
hat the Soul was a interaction of forces, an ever-changing thing far from the im
mortal soul posited by both Descartes and the Christian tradition. His "Construc
tion of the Soul" in many ways resembles modern Social Constructivism.
Martin Heidegger, following Nietzsche, did work on identity. For Heidegger, peop
le only really form an identity after facing death. It s death that allows peopl
e to choose from the social constructed meanings in their world, and assemble a
finite identity out of seemingly infinite meanings. For Heidegger, most people n
ever escape the "they", a socially constructed identity of "how one ought to be"
created mostly to try to escape death through ambiguity.

Many philosophical schools derive from rejecting Hegel, and do this diverse trad
itions of acceptance and rejection have developed.
Paul Ricoeur has introduced the distinction between the ipse identity (selfhood,
who am I?) and the idem identity (sameness, or a third-person perspective which o
bjectifies identity) (Ricoeur & Blamey 1995).
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I and Thou
Ich und Du, usually translated as I and Thou, is a book by Martin Buber, publish
ed in 1923, and first translated to English in 1937.
Premise
Buber s main proposition is that we may address existence in two ways:
that of the "I" towards an "It", towards an object that is separate in itself, w
hich we either use or experience;
and that of the "I" towards "Thou", in which we move into existence in a relatio
nship without bounds.
One of the major themes of the book is that human life finds its meaningfulness
in relationships. All of our relationships, Buber contends, bring us ultimately
into relationship with God, who is the Eternal Thou.
Buber explains that humans are defined by two word pairs: "I-It" and "I-Thou".
For "I-It," the "It" refers to the world of experience and sensation. I-It descr
ibes entities as discrete objects drawn from a defined set (e.g., he, she or any
other objective entity defined by what makes it measurably different from other
living entities). It can be said that "I" have as many distinct and different r
elationships with each "It" as there are "It"s in my life. Fundamentally, "It" r
efers to the world as we experience it.
By contrast, the word pair "I-Thou" describes the world of relations. This is th
e "I" that does not objectify any "It" but rather acknowledges a living relation
ship. "I-Thou" relationships are sustained in the spirit and mind of an "I" for
however long the feeling or idea of relationship is the dominant mode of percept
ion. A person sitting next to a complete stranger on a park bench may enter into
an "I-Thou" relationship with the stranger merely by beginning to think positiv
ely about people in general. The stranger is a person as well, and gets instanta
neously drawn into a mental or spiritual relationship with the person whose posi
tive thoughts necessarily include the stranger as a member of the set of persons
about whom positive thoughts are directed. It is not necessary for the stranger
to have any idea that he is being drawn into an "I-Thou" relationship for such
a relationship to arise. But what is crucial to understand is the word pair "I-T
hou" can refer to a relationship with a tree, the sky, or the park bench itself
as much as it can refer to the relationship between two individuals. The essenti
al character of "I-Thou" is the abandonment of the world of sensation, the melti
ng of the between, so that an individual stands in direct relationship with anot
her "I".
Despite the separation of "I" from the "It" and "Thou" in this very sentence des
cribing the relationship, Buber s two notions of "I" require attachment to a wor
d partner. Despite our splitting of these individual terms for the purposes of a
nalysis, there is to Buber s mind either an "I-Thou" or an "I-It" relationship.
Every sentence man uses with I, refers to the two pairs: I-Thou and I-It. This i
nstance is also interchangeable with Thou and It which would refer to I. It is b
ounded by others and It can only exist through this attachment because for every
object there is another object. Thou on the other hand, has no limitations. Whe
n Thou is spoken, the speaker has no thing or has nothing which means that Thou
is abstract. The speaker yet takes his stand in relation.
What does it mean when a person experiences the world? Man goes around the world
hauling out knowledge from the world. These experiences present man with only w
ords of It, He, She and It with contrast to I-Thou. What this means is that the

experiences are all physical and do involve a great deal of spirituality. The tw
ofold nature of the world means that our being in the world has two aspects: the
aspect of experience, which is perceived by I-Its, and the aspect of relation,
which is perceived by I-Thou.
[edit]Examples
Buber uses an example of a tree and presents five separate relations:
the first relation is looking at the tree as a picture with the color and detail
s through the aesthetic perception;
the second relation is identifying the tree as movement. The movement includes t
he flow of the juices through the veins of the tree, the breathing of the leaves
, the roots sucking the water, the never-ending activities between the tree and
earth and air, and the growth of the tree;
the third relation is categorizing the tree by its type, in other words, studyin
g it;
the fourth relation is the ability to look at something from a different perspec
tive. I can subdue its actual presence and form so sternly that I recognize it on
ly as an expression of law;
the fifth relation is interpreting the experience of the tree in mathematical te
rms.
Through all of these relations, the tree is still an object that occupies time a
nd space and still has the characteristics that make it what it is.[1]
If "Thou" is used in the context of an encounter with a human being, the human b
eing is not He, She, or bound by anything. You do not experience the human being
; rather you can only relate to him or her in the sacredness of the I-Thou relat
ion. The I-Thou relationship cannot be explained; it simply is. Nothing can inte
rvene in the I-Thou relationship. I-Thou is not a means to some object or goal,
but a definitive relationship involving the whole being of each subject. The ine
vitable fate of Thou is to become an It.
Love is a subject-to-subject relationship. Like the I-Thou relation, love is not
a relation of subject to object, but rather a relation in which both members in
the relationship are subjects and share the unity of being. The ultimate Thou i
s God. In the I-Thou relation there are no barriers, and this means that man can
relate directly to God. God is ever-present in human consciousness, and manifes
ts himself in music, literature, and other forms of culture. As previously menti
oned, Thou is inevitably addressed as It. Because of this, the I-Thou relation b
ecomes the being of the I-Thou relation. God is now spoken to directly not spoke
n about.
God is the worldwide relation to all relations. There is no world that disconnec
ts man from God. What this is a world of It alone. The individuals action is guid
ed by I-Thou. "One who truly meets the world goes out also to God."
Philosophy of dialogue is a type of philosophy based on the work of the Austrian
-born Jewish philosopher Martin Buber best known through its classic presentatio
n in his 1920s little book I and Thou.[1] For Buber, the fundamental fact of hum
an existence, too readily overlooked by scientific rationalism and abstract phil
osophical thought, is "man with man", a dialogue which takes place in the so-cal
led "sphere of between" ("das Zwischenmenschliche").[2]
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