10/12/09 Gov Team Agenda (650-919-4127):

1) 10-1pm - Fleet Week Ship Visit + Prep

2) 1-2pm - Lunch
3) 3-6pm - UC Hastings (4pm start)
4) 6pm - SF City Hall Team Picture
5) 8pm - Back at Sunnyvale Caltrains
Rules: Never leave group without notice, walk
safely, and always present teams best image.
A) Listen baby
Ain't no mountain high
Ain't no valley low
Ain't no river wide enough, baby
If you need me, call me
No matter where you are
No matter how far
Dont worry baby
Just call out my name
I'll be there in a hurry
You don't have to worry

There ain't no mountain high enough

Ain't no valley low enough
Ain't no river wide enough
To keep me from getting to you, baby
Remember the day
I set you free
I told you
You could always count on me darlin
And from that day on
I made a vow
I'll be there when you want me
Some way, some how
Cause baby
There ain't no mountain high enough
Ain't no valley low enough
Ain't no river wide enough
To keep me from getting to you, baby
-Gov Team Song
Originally Sung by Marvin Gaye and Tammi Terrel

B) Lois Weithorn, UC Hastings Professor of Law (in Moot Court, you refer to her as your honor)
Professor Weithorn joined the full-time Hastings faculty in 2001. A native of New York City, she attended
Kirkland and Hamilton Colleges in upstate New York. She received her Ph.D. in psychology from the
University of Pittsburgh and her J.D. from Stanford where she was President of the Stanford Law Review
and was elected to the Order of the Coif. After graduating, she clerked for the Hon. Joseph T. Sneed III of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Professor Weithorn's academic and professional activities as a psychologist reflected her strong interest
in legal issues. On the staff of the National Mental Health Association in Washington, D.C., she worked
primarily on federal mental health policy matters. As Director of Research of the Institute of Law,
Psychiatry, and Public Policy at the University of Virginia, she did interdisciplinary research, teaching, and
clinical work and served on the faculty at the University of Virginia School of Law. She continued these
endeavors on the full-time faculty of Department of Psychology at the University of Virginia. She served on
the Ethics Committees of the American Psychological Association, chaired APA division committees on
child custody, informed consent, and professional responsibility, and served as a consultant to various
governmental agencies.
Eventually, when she could no longer resist her attraction to the study of law, she attended Stanford Law
School, subsequently becoming a Fellow at Stanford's Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral
Sciences. She began teaching at Hastings as an Adjunct Professor in 1997 and consulted on child and
family policy issues to the Judicial Council of California. She has taught and published in the areas of
children and the law, family law, biomedical ethics, mental health law, and behavioral science and the law.
In her spare time, she enjoys the seemingly boundless energy of her children, Zachary and Cara, from
whom she learns something new every day.
C) Moot Court Final Checklist for Today (unit captain facilitate the completion of all these by 3pm):
__ 1: Written brief ready to turn-In
__ 2: Outlined or written your oral section

__ 3: Rebuttal has had chance to read/talk to

other side to prepare

__ 4: Discussed likely/possible questions

__ 6: Rehearsed both with Chiang and with unit,
__ 5: Refreshed memory of cited case facts
and meet with other 2 co-teams to talk big picture
D) The Future of American Military Strategy a Conference Report
By Michael P. Noonan, Foreign Policy Research Institute.

The Foreign Policy Research Institute held a conference on the future of American military strategy
on 5 December 2005 at the Union League of Philadelphia. A distinguished group drawn from the
current and retired ranks of the military (active and reserve component), academia, and policy
analysis convened to explore alternative strategies for American defense policy.
Problems Facing the Military
The military and non-military arms of the government should be adapted to deal with a very
unconventional world. The global force posture should be flexible using a light international footprint
to allow for tailored responses to crises. The Army, while generally moving in the right direction in
terms of being more agile and expeditionary, is still too focused on conventional threats. To address
this, Hoffman stated that more investment needed to be made in infantry forces, civil affairs and
psychological operations units and less emphasis should be placed in heavy mechanized force
structure and investment. The Air Force brings significant capabilities to the table in terms of strategic
mobility and warfighting, but its investment priorities should focus upon developing a future bomber,
space capabilities, information warfare, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) rather than procuring
large numbers of expensive fighter aircraft such as the F-22. The Marine Corps should become more
modular, and the current three division/three air wing force should transition to six brigades that would
be more cohesive and provide a rotation base for long-term conflicts. Because small wars require
small unit leaders who are more mature, more seasoned, and more experienced, the Marines need to
adjust manpower policies and training to develop and retain such leaders. Lastly, the Navy needs to
adjust from its surplus of strike and blue water (open ocean) assets and develop more green
(littoral) and brown (inland/riverine) water capabilities. Three aircraft carriers should be mothballed
leaving nine in the fleet and smaller boats should be purchased to deal with unconventional
threats. Special Operations Forces (SOF) would be split off to form a distinct, yet small, service.
Hoffman compared the United States to a one-armed cyclops. The military tool of national power
has been developed, resourced, and honed at the expense of other elements of national power. In
order to rectify that situation, Hoffman made several recommendations. On the domestic side, more
homeland resilience needs to be developed. Most of the National Guard should be transitioned to the
Department of Homeland Security with force structure adjustments made to make it more useful for
domestic operations. The Coast Guard, too, should have its end-strength increased by 10-20 percent
and needs modernized equipment (e.g., ships, helicopters, and UAVs). Internationally, the State
Department and other inter-agency actors need to be bolstered and need to work with the
international community. Hoffman called for increased funding for State Department stabilization
initiatives and more investment in humanitarian threat reduction programs.
Irregular warfare is not a passing fad. Hoffman declared complex irregular warfare is the form of
conflict that gives us the most problems and will challenge us the most in the future. The United
States does not dominate all technologies and all forms of warfare and is particularly weak culturally
and capability-wise in the unconventional realm. Our enemies have learned from places such as
Afghanistan, Somalia, and Iraq to be more efficient, cunning, and savage. The Pentagon is thinking
about a much more irregular world, but it must face the imponderables, put aside parochial illusions
about the future, and not allow our enemies to outstrip the march of our imagination, our intelligence
or our resolve."
A Smaller Military to Fight the War on Terrorism

Charles V. Pea, a senior fellow with the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy and an adviser on the
Straus Military Reform Project, led off by claiming that the end of the Cold War ensured that the
United States was relatively safe in a traditional nation-state strategic context. Our overwhelming
strategic nuclear force is a deterrent and no other nation has the power projection capabilities to
attack us directly. This reality allows us to think radically about how to change the military and reduce
defense spending by at least 25 percent. In his opinion, the U.S. has an overcapacity in military
capability. Overcapacity in defense capabilities is problematic because it leads their overuse, or
misuse, by policymakers.
The U.S. should not underwrite the security of so many countries and regions around the world. The
Europeans and East Asian nations should shoulder more of the burden for their security. Our global
force posture should transition from a sprawling one to that of a balancer of last resort. We would
understand that crises and conflicts that develop around the world, for the most part, actually dont
threaten U.S. national security, according to Pena. The United States would only step into crises or
conflicts that truly threatened national security. National security should be more narrowly defined in
general and should be seen first and foremost as protection from threats to the United States, its
population, and its way of life. Al Qaeda is a real threat, but it is not a nation-state and our global
presence helps to feed its popularity.
The military should be about half the size that it is today. In order to transform the military it needs to
learn to do more with less. Reducing the defense budget will drive transformation because it will force
tough choices that will drive new thinking and innovation. Funding from unnecessary weapons
programs such as the F-22 should be reprogrammed for capabilities such as UAVs, language
training, human intelligence, and SOF. Such a military should secure the U.S. from traditional threats
and would acknowledge that the military is not the primary tool for dealing with the terrorism threat
either domestically nor internationally. Captain Joe Bouchard, USN (ret.), the Executive Director of
the Center for Homeland Security and Defense (CHSD) at Zel Technologies, LLC, focused his
remarks on the War on Terrorism. He began with the observation that the War on Terrorism is the
wrong phrase because it implies that there is a military solution to the problem when there is not one.
What we are in these days is a clash of ideas, a clash of ideologies.
Defense Strategy in the Post-Saddam Era
(1) Defending the Baltic states from a Russian invasion. OHanlon argued that economic coercion
against Russia would be the primary response against any such eventuality.
(2) Defending Russia (primarily Siberia) from a Chinese invasion. Again, an economic response such
as a blockade or global economic sanctions would be most appropriate.
(3) Defending a reunified Korea against a Chinese land invasion because of historical border
disputes. He argued that this was extraordinarily unlikely because China is going to have a lot of
other more plausible and appealing places to apply military leverage, if it ever decides it wants to.
Disputes over the resources on the seabed were more likely in his opinion.
Sufficiently Plausible/Sufficiently Important Scenarios
(4) China using an economic blockade and coercion against Taiwan in the event that Taiwan pushes
more ambitiously for independence. Any blockade of Taiwan scenario would be challenging to our
Navy and Air Force because it would necessitate maintaining an air supremacy, naval blockade
breaking capability in the western Pacific for many, many months while China would be able to control
escalation at times and places of its choosing.
(5) Intervening in Indonesia or the Philippines to prevent al Qaeda from taking large swaths of
territory. This would require a lot of stability operations capability and ideally would be carried out at
the invitation of the host country and as part of a multinational coalition. That said, under certain
circumstances we might have to go in without permission.
(6) An island in, or near, the Indonesian or Malacca Straits falling under the control of a Jihadi group
threatening international shipping. In this scenario, OHanlon asserted that we would have the option

of sailing around the lanes, even though it would be less economically efficient. (6) Intervening to
ensure that neither Indonesia nor the Philippines become failed states. Both nations are too important
to our global interests to allow them to fail, particularly if such state failure spread jihadi influence.
(7) The complete collapse of nuclear armed Pakistan. Nuclear weapons in the hands of Pakistani
Jihadis would be directly threatening to the United States in a way that would send chills up my spine
I think it would be actually a greater threat to our core security than almost any attack on any
overseas ally that I can think of in a more classic sense, said OHanlon.
(8) Nuclear war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. If a limited nuclear exchange occurred
perhaps an international trusteeship for Kashmir could be set in place to alleviate the necessity of
either country to concede defeat. A robustly sized force would be needed to rigorously control the
borders.
(9) U.S. preemptive action against Iranian nuclear installations in response to increased Iranian
support for terrorism and their making blatant progress towards a nuclear weapon. Irans reaction
would likely be twofold: (a) they will continue their nuclear program in a slower manner with public
support and (b) doing something else such as fomenting more trouble inside of Iraq, to supporting
more anti-Israeli terror, to attacking our interests in the Persian Gulf.
(10) Iran shutting down the Strait of Hormuz. This would require a more robust Navy presence in the
Gulf for an extended period of time with a lot of quick response capacity to intercept ballistic missiles,
to try to intercept anti-ship cruise missiles, and to be responsive against any submarines that would
try to do a quick ambush and then retreat.
(11) An international trusteeship for Palestine. If the peace process broke down or stalled, this
scenario, in the future, might be feasible.
(12) A jihadi coup in Saudi Arabia. This might put the eastern oil fields at risk and in todays world the
loss of that oil supply would jeopardize the global economy. The U.S. would consider unilateral
intervention if no other options were available. Hopefully future energy conservation and alternative
energy production would allow for a time lag that might allow the situation to work itself out internally
and, if not, would allow for the development of multilateral (for legitimacy purposes) intervention force.
Conclusion
Next, we need to pull together a set of alliances or a global alliance to try to help preserve Pax
Americana and the peace. He sees Great Britain, Japan, and India, along with the United States, as
members of an emerging global alliance held together by strategic interests (vis--vis China and the
Middle East), a dedication to liberal democracy, and a continuing commitment to the legitimacy of
military force as a tool of statecraft. Last, the United States needs to have a domestic dialogue about
strategy making.
Paying too much attention or placing too much emphasis on non- traditional threats now might lead
us to develop the wrong suite of capabilities for ten or fifteen years down the road, when we may be
dealing with major powers that have conflicting interests with ours. First, while it is currently
indeterminate whether China will or will not become a threat, pursuing policies such as building an
encircling alliance around China might greatly increase the probability of conflict or long-term friction
in Sino-American relations. Second, primacy will weaken the incentives of our potential allies to stand
with us or help us confront mutual threats that do arise. Third, a militarily active approach in the
Persian Gulf is not well connected to our interests and actually causes us more problems than it
solves. Too much of an American presence fuels support for al Qaeda and weakens the legitimacy of
governments in the region who have their own reasons to go after jihadis. Last, while we have a
strong interest in the current war of ideas, primacy takes an overly aggressive and counter-productive
approach to promoting our values. Our ideology, said Press, doesnt need to be spread at the barrel
of a gun. There are more useful political, economic, and humanitarian tools to spread our values.
The U.S. military must avoid preparing for the wars that it wants to fight rather than the wars it is
going to have to fight. Even after 9/11 the military has focused too much expenditure on high-end

threats. In order to minimize irregular threats and counter a rising China and develop a liberal world
order, we must invest in providing security that is necessary for prosperity and economic
advancement.
Service
Army
Marine Corps
Navy
Air Force
Coast Guard
Total

Total Active Duty Personnel (Percent of Total)

517,998 (36%)
186,209 (13%)
373,830 (26%)
328,270 (23%)
39,121 (3%)
1,445,428 (100%)

Percentage Female
14%
6.2%
14.9%
20.1%
10.7%
14.9%

Enlisted
433,300
166,674
322,565
262,860
31,286
1,216,685

Officers
84,698
19,535
51,265
65,410
7,835
228,743

Personnel Deployed Overseas

As of December 2007, U.S. Forces were stationed at more than 820 installations in at least 39 countries.
Iraq
Germany
Japan (United States Forces Japan)
South Korea (United States Forces Korea)
Afghanistan
Italy
United Kingdom

196,600
57,155
33,164
26,076
25,700
9,701
9,655

Budget for 2007

Total funding
Operations and maintenance
Military Personnel
Procurement
Research, Development, Testing & Evaluation
Military Construction
Family Housing
Working Capital Funds

$439.3 Billion
$152.2 Bil.
$110.8 Bil.
$84.2 Bil.
$73.2 Bil.
$12.6 Bil.
$4.1 Bil.
$2.4 Bil.

+6.9%
+6.6%
+3.7%
+10.5%
+3.1%
+57.5%
+2.5%
+9.1%

Programs spending more than $1 billion

Program
Missile Defense
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
F-22 Raptor
Future Combat System
DDG 1000 Destroyer
Carrier Replacement Program
F/A-18E/F Hornet
Virginia class submarine
V-22 Osprey
MH-60R/S
C-130 Tanker
Chemical Demilitarization
San Antonio class amphibious transport dock
Littoral combat ship
Stryker
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
Space-Based Infrared System
EA-18G Growler

2008 Budget request[6]

$8.8 Bil.
$6.1 Bil.
$4.6 Bil.
$3.7 Bil.
$3.5 Bil.
$3.1 Bil.
$2.6 Bil.
$2.7 Bil.
$2.6 Bil.
$1.6 Bil.
$1.6 Bil.
$1.5 Bil.
$1.4 Bil.
$1.2 Bil.
$1.2 Bil.
$1.2 Bil.
$1.1 Bil.
$1.6 Bil.

Change, 2007 to 2008

-6.2%
+23.0%
+15.0%
+8.1%
+2.7%
+117.7%
-13.5%
-1.1%
+23.9%
+3.9%
+7.3%
+16.6%
+263.5%
+30.4%
+29.6%
+33.8%
+59.9%
+56.4%