Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Remedial Velasco Cases PDF
Remedial Velasco Cases PDF
2016
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
Digested by: DC 2016 Members
Editors:
Tricia Lacuesta
Lorenzo Gayya
Cristopher Reyes
Macky Siazon
Janine Arenas
Ninna Bonsol
Lloyd Javier
REMEDIAL
LAW
Supreme Court decisions penned by Associate Justice
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.
Table of Contents
General Principles............................................................................................................................................................. 4
Nature of the Philippine Courts .................................................................................................................................. 4
Principle of Judicial Hierarchy ..................................................................................................................................... 4
Doctrine of Non-interference or Doctrine of Judicial Stability ......................................................................... 5
Jurisdiction ........................................................................................................................................................................... 6
Over the Subject Matter ................................................................................................................................................. 6
Meaning of Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter ............................................................................................. 6
Doctrine of Adherence of Jurisdiction....................................................................................................................... 7
Jurisdiction of Courts ...................................................................................................................................................... 8
Supreme Court ............................................................................................................................................................. 8
Court of Appeals ....................................................................................................................................................... 10
Sandiganbayan ......................................................................................................................................................... 11
Regional Trial Courts.............................................................................................................................................. 12
Sharia Courts ............................................................................................................................................................ 13
Civil Procedure ................................................................................................................................................................. 14
Cause of Action............................................................................................................................................................... 14
Meaning of Cause of Action .................................................................................................................................. 14
Failure to State Cause of Action ............................................................................................................................... 15
Parties to Civil Actions ................................................................................................................................................ 17
Pleadings.......................................................................................................................................................................... 19
Complaint ................................................................................................................................................................... 19
Answer ........................................................................................................................................................................ 20
Counterclaims ........................................................................................................................................................... 21
Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping ............................................................................. 22
Allegations in a Pleading ....................................................................................................................................... 28
Amendment ............................................................................................................................................................... 29
Summons ......................................................................................................................................................................... 30
Motions ............................................................................................................................................................................. 32
Motion to Dismiss .................................................................................................................................................... 32
Pre-Trial ........................................................................................................................................................................... 37
Notice of Pre-Trial ................................................................................................................................................... 37
1|P a ge
2|P a ge
3|P a ge
4|P a ge
5|P a ge
Jurisdiction
Over the subject matter
Meaning of jurisdiction over the subject matter
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 180705, November 27, 2012, VELASCO, JR., J.
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law, not by the consent or acquiescence of any or all
of the parties.
Facts:
R.A. 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment Company(CIC) to administer the
Coconut Investment Fund(CIF), which, under Section 8 thereof, was to be sourced from a P0.55 levy
on the sale of every 100 kg. of copra. Charged with the duty of collecting and administering the Fund
was Philippine Coconut Administration(PCA). Like COCOFED with which it had a legal linkage, the
PCA, by statutory provisions scattered in different coco levy decrees, had its share of the coco levy.
And per Cojuangcos own admission, PCA paid, out of the CCSF, the entire acquisition price for the
72.2% option shares. The list of FUB stockholders included Cojuangco with 14,440 shares and PCA
with 129,955 shares. It would appear later that, pursuant to the stipulation on maintaining
Cojuangcos equity position in the bank, PCA would cede to him 10% of its subscriptions to (a) the
authorized but unissued shares of FUB and (b) the increase in FUBs capital stock. In all, from the
"mother" PCA shares, Cojuangco would receive a total of 95,304 FUB (UCPB) shares broken down as
follows: 14,440 shares + 10% (158,840 shares) + 10% (649,800 shares) = 95,304.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the subdivided
amended compalints including the shares allegedly acquired by Cojuangco by virtue of the PCA
agreements.
Ruling:
Yes. Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law, not by the consent or acquiescence of
any or all of the parties. In turn, the issue on whether a suit comes within the penumbra of a statutory
conferment is determined by the allegations in the complaint, regardless of whether or not the suitor
will be entitled to recover upon all or part of the claims asserted. From the allegations, it is fairly
obvious that they partake, the nature of ill-gotten wealth suits. Both deal with the recovery of
sequestered shares, property or business enterprises claimed, as alleged in the corresponding basic
complaints, to be ill-gotten assets of President Marcos, his cronies and nominees and acquired by
taking undue advantage of relationships or influence and/or through or as a result of improper use,
6|P a ge
7|P a ge
Jurisdiction of courts
Supreme Court
STAR ELECTRIC CORPORATION vs. R & G CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT AND TRADING, INC.
G.R. No. 212058, December 07, 2015
The Supreme Court only resolves questions of law and not questions of facts, subject to certain
exceptions.
FACTS:
8|P a ge
9|P a ge
Court of Appeals
DIESEL CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. v. UPSI PROPERTY HOLDINGS, INC.
G.R. No. 154885, 24 March 2008, Second Division, (Velasco, Jr., J.)
10 | P a g e
Sandiganbayan
Rodolfo Cuenca and Cuenca Investment Corp vs. Presidential Commission on Good
Government
G.R. Nos. 159104-05, October 5, 2007, Velasco, Jr. J
Under Sec. 2 of EO 14, The Presidential Commission on Good Government shall file all such
cases, whether civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan, which shall have exclusive and original
jurisdiction thereof.
Facts:
UHC is a wholly owned subsidiary of Independent Realty Corporation. Cuenca and his family
holdings (CIC) negotiated and reached an agreement with respondents IRC and UHC that the Cuenca
would purchase all the shares of stock and subscription rights of IRC in UHC which he would transfer
all of his shares to PNCC, Sta. Ines and Resorts Hotel Corporation which Cuenca is a controlling
stockholder to UHC. The instant controversy between Cuenca and respondent IRC was overtaken by
dramatic political events. President Marcos was ousted in a bloodless revolution and left behind an
unbelievably large amount of funds and assets that were sequestered by the new government of
President Aquino through PCGG. Respondent PCGG directed the President of IRC, to dissolve all the
11 | P a g e
12 | P a g e
Sharia Courts
SULTAN YAHYA JERRY M.TOMAWIS, Petitioner, versus HON. RASAD G. BALINDONG, AMNA A.
PUMBAYA, JALILAH A. MANGOMPIA, and RAMLA A. MUSOR, Respondents.
G.R. No. 182434, March 5, 2010, Velasco
BP 129 was enacted to reorganize only existing civil courts and is a law of general application
to the judiciary. In contrast, PD 1083 is a special law that only applies to Sharia courts.
Facts:
Private respondents filed with the Sharia District Court (SDC) an action for quieting of title of
a parcel of land against Tomawis who argued that the regular courts have jurisdiction over the case.
The respondent judge asserted that SDC has original jurisdiction over the case, concurrently with the
RTC by force of Article 143, paragraph 2(b) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1083 or the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.
Issue:
13 | P a g e
Civil Procedure
Cause of action
Meaning of cause of action
ST. MICHAEL SCHOOL OF CAVITE, INC. AND SPOUSES CRISANTO S. CLAVERIA AND GLORIA M.
CLAVERIA v. MASAITO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND REXLON REALTY GROUP, INC.
G.R. No. 166301, 29 February 2008, Second Division, (Velasco, Jr., J.)
For a complaint to state a cause of action in an easement case, more specifically, Art. 649 of the
Civil Code has laid down the following requirements: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) there is payment of proper indemnity;
and (3) the isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate.
Facts:
St. Michael together with four other homeowners filed a complaint against Masaito for
easement of right-of-way because Masaito threatened to fence off and close the only gate of the
school which serves as both the entry and exit points for the entire school population. According to
Masaito, the initiatory pleading does not aver the first to basic requirements for the establishment of
a legal easement of right-of-way. The RTC dismissed the case for lack of cause of action.
Issue:
14 | P a g e
15 | P a g e
16 | P a g e
17 | P a g e
18 | P a g e
Pleadings
Complaint
VIVIAN Y. LOCSIN, YAO SHIONG SHIO, OSCAR MANUEL, RAMON LINAN, PAZ Y. FLORES, for and
on their own behalf, and SIXTO O. RACELIS, for and on behalf of ORIENTAL PETROLEUM AND
MINERAL CORPORATION v. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION
ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST, REV. EMETERIO BARCELON, S.J.,
EDUARDO F. HERNANDEZ, GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., AMPARO BARCELON, ANTONIO CAGUIAT,
RAMON A. PEDROSA, JAIME L. LEDESMA, SIMPLICIO J. ROXAS, VALERIANO FUGOSO, WILFREDO
SAARES, ULTRANA MINERALS CORP., INDEPENDENT REALTY CORP., PERFORMANCE
INVESTMENT CORP., MID-PASIG LAND DEVELOPMENT CORP., FABIAN VER, PIEDRAS
PETROLEUM CORP., and RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 134458 August 9, 2007 VELASCO, JR., J.
Ultimate facts mean the important and substantial facts which either directly form the basis of
the plaintiffs primary right and duty or directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the
defendant.
FACTS:
Petitioners Yao Shiong Shio, Oscar Manuel, and Ramon Linan filed a Complaint
for Declaration of Nullity of PCGG Deed of Sale, Sequestration Orders, Prayer for Issuance of TRO
and/or Preliminary Injunction and Appointment of Receiver, with Damages against respondents. The
petition was denied, thus, petitioners filed an amended complaint but later filed Notice of Dismissal
of both the original and amended complaints which were approved by the Sandiganbayan.
Thereafter, petitioners filed a new complaint which was identical to the prior amended complaint.
The Sandiganbayan denied the prayer for a preliminary injunction. Petitioners then filed their Motion
for Leave to Admit Amended Complaint seeking to state more fully their averments in express terms
which were only implied from the ultimate facts in their original Complaint. The Sandiganbayan
denied admittance of petitioners amended complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the
admission of petitioners proposed amended complaint.
RULING:
No. Sec. 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court provides: Every pleading shall contain in a
methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the
party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement of mere
evidentiary facts. Ultimate facts mean the important and substantial facts which either directly form
the basis of the plaintiffs primary right and duty or directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions
of the defendant.
In this case, the Sandiganbayan found that the real objective of petitioners in amending the
complaint is to supply the missing or omitted date which omission had resulted in the denial of the
petition for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. In short, what the court a quo found is
that the whole exercise of amending the complaint is not to correct or enhance the alleged ultimate
19 | P a g e
Answer
ILEANA DR. MACALINAO v. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
G.R. No. 175490, September 17, 2009, Velasco, Jr., J.
A plaintiff should not be made to suffer for the respondents failure to file an answer and
concomitantly, to allow the latter to submit additional evidence by dismissing or remanding the case for
further reception of evidence.
Facts:
Macalinao is a card holder of a BPI credit facility. Upon failure of Macalinao to pay for its
balance when it became due, BPI demanded payment of 3% per month interest and an additional 3%
per month penalty charge. After the summons and a copy of the complaint were served upon
petitioner Macalinao and her husband, they failed to file their Answer. Thus, respondent BPI moved
that judgment be rendered in accordance with Section 6 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which
was granted. The MTC ruled in favor of BPI. Macalinao claims that the basis of the re-computation of
the CA was not the amount of the principal obligation. Thus, this allegedly necessitates a reexamination of the evidence presented by the parties. For this reason, Macalinao further contends
that the dismissal of the case or its remand to the lower court would be a more appropriate
disposition of the case.
Issue:
Whether or not the case shall be dismissed.
Ruling:
No. Based on the records, the summons and a copy of the complaint were served upon
petitioner Macalinao and her husband on May 4, 2004. Nevertheless, they failed to file their Answer
despite such service. Thus, respondent BPI moved that judgment be rendered accordingly.
Consequently, a decision was rendered by the MeTC on the basis of the evidence submitted by
respondent BPI.
Thus, respondent BPI should not be made to suffer for petitioner Macalinao's failure to file
an answer and concomitantly, to allow the latter to submit additional evidence by dismissing or
remanding the case for further reception of evidence. Significantly, petitioner Macalinao herself
admitted the existence of her obligation to respondent BPI, albeit with reservation as to the principal
amount. Thus, a dismissal of the case would cause great injustice to respondent BPI. Similarly, a
remand of the case for further reception of evidence would unduly prolong the proceedings of the
instant case and render inutile the proceedings conducted before the lower courts.
20 | P a g e
21 | P a g e
22 | P a g e
23 | P a g e
24 | P a g e
25 | P a g e
26 | P a g e
27 | P a g e
Allegations in a pleading
Casent Realty Development Corporation vs. PhilBanking Corporation
G.R. No. 150731, September 14, 2007, Velasco, Jr. J
Where the defense in the Answer is based on an actionable document, a Reply specifically
denying it under oath must be made; otherwise, the genuineness and due execution of the document will
be deemed admitted.
Facts:
Casent Realty Development Corporation executed two promissory notes in favor of Rare
Realty Corporation which was payable on June 27, 1985. These promissory notes were assigned to
PhilBanking Corporation through a Deed of Assignment. Upon due date Philbanking demanded
payment but despite repeated demands Casent has failed to pay its obligations. Thereby it filed a
collection case against Casent. Casent answered that the complaint stated no cause of action and that
the parties executed a Dacion en Pago which ceded and conveyed its Iloilo properties to PhilBanking
with the intention of totally extinguishing its obligations. It presented a confirmation statement
issued by PhilBanking stating that Casent had no more outstanding loan. PhilBanking has failed to
answer which prompted Casent on filing a Motion for Judgment on Demurrer to the Evidence,
pointing out that PhilBankings failure to file a Reply to the Answer which raised the Dacion and
Confirmation Statement constituted an admission of the genuineness and execution of said
documents; and that since the Dacion obliterated Casents obligation covered by the promissory
notes, the bank had no right to collect anymore. PhilBanking subsequently filed an Opposition which
alleged that: (1) the grounds relied upon by Casents in its demurrer involved its defense and not
insufficiency of evidence; (2) the Dacion and Confirmation Statement had yet to be offered in
evidence and evaluated; and (3) since Philbanking failed to file a Reply, then all the new matters
alleged in the Answer were deemed controverted. Casents claimed that even though it failed to file a
Reply, all the new matters alleged in the Answer are deemed controverted anyway, pursuant to Rule
6, Section 10.
Issue:
28 | P a g e
Amendment
Irene Marcos-Araneta, Daniel Rubio, Orlando G. Reslin, and Jose G. Reslin v. Court of Appeals,
Julita C. Benedicto, and Francisca Benedicto-Paulino
G.R. No. 154096 August 22, 2008, Velasco, Jr., J.
Responsive pleadings are those which seek affirmative relief and/or set up defenses. A motion
to dismiss is not a responsive pleading.
Facts:
Ambassador Roberto S. Benedicto and his associates (Benedicto group) organized Far East
Managers and Investors, Inc. (FEMII) and Universal Equity Corporation (UEC). Both corporations
were organized pursuant to a contract or arrangement whereby Benedicto, as trustor, placed in his
name and in the name of his associates, as trustees, the shares of stocks of FEMII and UEC with the
obligation to hold those shares and their fruits in trust and for the benefit of Irene Marcos-Araneta
(Irene) to the extent of 65% of such shares. Several years after, Irene demanded reconveyance of the
65% stockholdings, but the Benedicto group refused to oblige. So, Irene instituted a complaint for the
conveyance of shares of stock, accounting and receivership against the Benedicto group. The
respondents herein filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the venue is improperly laid. The RTC
granted the motion to dismiss ruling that the action is partly a personal action and therefore the
complaint must filed in the place wherein the plaintiff resides. The complaint was filed in Batac,
Ilocos Norte and it was proven that Irene did not reside therein. Before finality of the decision, Irene
filed an amended complaint adding Daniel Rubio, Orlando Reslin and Jose Reslin as plaintiffs.
According to Irene, the inclusion of additional plaintiffs who reside in Batac, Ilocos Norte cures the
defect of venue. The RTC entertained the amended complaint since Irene, according to the RTC, may
opt to file an amended complaint as a matter of right, and such filing cures the defect in venue. The
CA reversed the RTC decision.
Issues:
Whether or not Irene may file an amended complaint
Ruling:
Yes. According to Sec. 2 Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, A party may amend his pleading once
as a matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served. Responsive pleadings are
those which seek affirmative relief and/or set up defenses. A motion to dismiss is not a responsive
pleading. The RTC did not err in admitting petitioners amended complaint, respondents not having
yet answered the original complaint when the amended complaint was filed. Irene, by force of said
Sec. 2 of Rule 10, had, as a matter of right, the option of amending her underlying reconveyance
complaint. Also, the RTC decision granting respondents motion to dismiss has not yet attained
finality at the time Irene filed her amended complaint.
However, the filing of the amended complaint does not cure the defect in venue. The action is
a personal action. According the Sec. 2 Rule 4 indicates quite clearly that when there is more than one
plaintiff in a personal action case, the residences of the principal parties should be the basis for
determining proper venue. Irene is the real party in interest since she is the beneficiary so entitled to
the avails of the present suit. Not one of her co-plaintiffs can be considered principal parties because
29 | P a g e
30 | P a g e
31 | P a g e
Ruling:
No. Dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court cannot defeat the
right of a co-owner to ask for partition at any time, provided that there is no actual adjudication of
ownership of shares yet. Pertinent hereto is Article 494 of the Civil Code. Between dismissal with
prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 and the right granted to co-owners under Art. 494 of the Civil Code,
the latter must prevail. To construe otherwise would diminish the substantive right of a co-owner
through the promulgation of procedural rules. Substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural
rule. This further finds support in Art. 496 of the New Civil Code.
Thus, for the Rules to be consistent with statutory provisions, the Court held that Art. 494 is
an exception to Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court to the effect that even if the order of dismissal for
failure to prosecute is silent on whether or not it is with prejudice, it shall be deemed to be without
prejudice. In the case at bar, since the co-ownership is still subsisting 30-70 in favor of respondent
spouses Candelario, there is no legal bar preventing herein respondents from praying for the
partition of the property through counterclaim.
32 | P a g e
33 | P a g e
34 | P a g e
35 | P a g e
36 | P a g e
37 | P a g e
38 | P a g e
39 | P a g e
40 | P a g e
Trial
Consolidation or severance of hearing or trial
Steel Corporation of the Philippines v. Equitable PCI Bank Inc.
G.R. No. 190462 & G.R. No. 190538, November 17, 2010, Velasco, JR, J.
The purpose of consolidation of cases is to avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression
and abuse, prevent delays, clear congested dockets, and simplify the work of the trial court.
Facts:
SCP is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacturing and distribution of cold-rolled
and galvanized steel sheets and coils. During its operations, SCP encountered and suffered from
financial difficulties and temporary illiquidity, aggravated by the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. And
shortage in working capital and reduced operating capacity compounded its problem. As a result,
SCP was unable to service its principal payments for its liabilities. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc., which
accounted for 27.45% of the total liabilities of SCP, filed a creditor-initiated petition to place the SCP
under corporate rehabilitation pursuant to the provisions of Section 1, Rule 4 of the Interim Rules of
Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation entitled In the Matter of the Petition to have Steel
Corporation of the Philippines Placed under Corporate Rehabilitation with Prayer for the Approval of
the Proposed Rehabilitation Plan. BDO-EPCIB included its proposed rehabilitation plan in the said
petition. Rehabilitation Court approved the rehabilitation and likewise appointed Atty. Santiago T.
Gabionza, Jr. as the Rehabilitation Receiver for SCP. SCP did not oppose the petition but instead filed
its own counter rehabilitation plan and submitted it for the consideration of the Rehabilitation Court.
Other creditors filed their respective comments on the petition. Atty. Gabionza submitted his
recommended rehabilitation plan. The said plan contained the salient features of the rehabilitation
41 | P a g e
42 | P a g e
43 | P a g e
44 | P a g e
45 | P a g e
46 | P a g e
47 | P a g e
48 | P a g e
The motion should satisfactorily explain why granting the same would be in the higher
interest of justice;
The motion must be made before the ruling sought to be reconsidered attains finality;
If the ruling sought to be reconsidered was rendered by the Court through one of its
Divisions, at least three (3) members of the said Division should vote to elevate the case
to the Court En Banc; and
The favorable vote of at least two-thirds of the Court En Bancsactual membership must
be mustered for the second motion for reconsideration to be granted.
Unfortunately for respondent-movants, the foregoing requirements do not obtain in the case
at bench. To begin with, there are no extraordinarily persuasive reasons in the higher interest of
justice on which the instant second motion for reconsideration is anchored on. Based on the records,
the second motion for reconsideration is a mere rehash, if not a reiteration, of respondent-movants
previous arguments and submissions, which have amply been addressed by the Court in its August
13, 2014 Decision, and effectively affirmed at length in its March 18, 2015 Resolution.
2) No. In the case at bar, the DND and AFP moved for intervention on the ground that they
are the beneficiaries of the proceeds from the project to be undertaken by the BCDA. Obviously, this
right to the proceeds is far from actual as it veritably rests on the success of the bidding process,
such that there will be no proceeds that will accrue to their benefit to speak of if the project does not
49 | P a g e
Appeals in general
RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR. v. COURT OF APPEALS (Fifth Division)
and NELIA S. SILVERIO-DEE,
G.R. No. 178933, September 16, 2009, VELASCO, JR., J. (civpro, appeal from interoluctory
orders)
Interlocutory orders cannot be appealed.
Facts:
On May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order ordering Nelia Silverio-Dee to vacate
the premises of the property located at No. 3, Intsia Road, Forbes Park, MakatiCity. Instead of filing a
Notice of Appeal and Record on Appeal, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Order. This motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC in an Order dated December 12,
2005. Private respondent then filed her Notice of Appeal and subsequently filed her Record on
Appeal on January 23, 2006. In denying due course the Notice/Record on Appeal, the RTC, in its
Order dated, ruled that the appeal taken by Nelia Silverio-Dee from the Order of this Court denying
the Motion for Reconsideration is misplaced as no appeal may be taken from the order denying the
motion for reconsideration. Furthermore, assuming that what said movant had appealed is the final
Order dated May 31, 2005, still, the appeal cannot be given due course as the Record on Appeal had
been filed beyond the thirty-day period to appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 is an Interlocutory Order which is
not subject to appeal under Sec. 1 of Rule 41.
Ruling:
Yes. The May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC is an Interlocutory Order, not subject to an appeal.
The denial of due course by the RTC was based on two (2) grounds: (1) that Nelia Silverio-Dees
appeal was against an order denying a motion for reconsideration which is disallowed under Sec.
1(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court; and (2) that Nelia Silverio-Dees Record on Appeal was filed
beyond the reglementary period to file an appeal provided under Sec. 3 of Rule 41.
The rationale behind the rule proscribing the remedy of appeal from an interlocutory order
is to prevent undue delay, useless appeals and undue inconvenience to the appealing party by having
to assail orders as they are promulgated by the court, when they can be contested in a single appeal.
The appropriate remedy is thus for the party to wait for the final judgment or order and assign such
interlocutory order as an error of the court on appeal.
50 | P a g e
51 | P a g e
52 | P a g e
53 | P a g e
Perfection of Appeal
SPOUSES CURATA v. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY
G.R. Nos. 154211-12, 158252, 166200, 168272, 170683, 173392, June 22, 2009, VELASCO, JR.,
J.
The rule on payment of docket fees as mandatory in the perfection of an appeal, is relaxed by
the higher interest of justice and fair play.
54 | P a g e
The parties in Rule 41 appeal proceedings may raise questions of fact or mixed questions of fact
Facts:
Pasimio filed a case for collection of a sum of money pursuant to the bank deposits she had
with PNB. PNB however, after presenting several notarized documents and promissory notes
presenting the loans secured by the deposited amount refused to deliver back the deposited amount
in light of the compensation when Pasimio failed to pay those loans.
The RTC rendered a decision by relying on the statements of Pasimio that she was defrauded
in signing pro forma forms which serves as evidence of her loans to the bank. The CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC and denied PNBs claim with respect to questions of facts, because the CA said
that it is not a trier of facts.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in refusing rules on factual issues.
55 | P a g e
56 | P a g e
57 | P a g e
58 | P a g e
59 | P a g e
60 | P a g e
Provisional Remedies
Preliminary attachment
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ESTATE OF ALFONSO LIM, SR., ALFONSO LIM, JR., TEODORA
Q. PENA, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, TAGGAT INDUSTRIES, INC., PAMPLONA
REDWOOD VENEER, IMC., SOUTHERN PLYWOOD, WESTERN CAGAYAN LUMBER, ACME
PLYWOOD, VETERAN WOODWORK, INC., SIERRA MADRE WOOD INDUSTRIES, INC., AND
TROPICAL PHILIPPINES WOOD INDUSTRIES, INC.
G.R. No. 164800, July 22, 2009, Velasco, Jr., J.
For a writ of attachment to issue under Sec.1 (d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, the applicant
must sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud in incurring the obligation upon
which the action is brought.
Facts:
The Republic filed before the Sandiganbayan a complaint averring that Alfonso Lim, Sr. and
Alfonso Lim, Jr., acted in unlawful collusion with the Marcoses, and took undue advantage of their
relationship with the latter. The Republic then prayed for the reconveyance of all funds and property
acquired by them in abuse of right and power through unjust enrichment. When Lim, Sr. passed
away, his estate filed a motion to lift the sequestration over certain real properties. Such motion was
opposed by the Republic alleging that the sequestered lots stand as security for the satisfaction of
any judgment the Republic may obtain against the estate of Lim, Sr. The Sandiganbayan then lifted
the sequestration order. The estate of Lim, Sr. then filed a demurrer to evidence alleging that the
Republics evidence did not prove or disprove that the defendants on their own or in concert with the
Marcoses, amassed ill-gotten wealth. The Republic also filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Wirt of
Preliminary Attachment against respondents in the amount of its claims, to counter the effects to the
lifting of the sequestration order. However, the Sandiganbayan, stating that bare allegations of the
commission of fraud by respondents in incurring the obligations are not sufficient for the granting of
the writ of preliminary attachment, denied the motion. The Sandiganbayan also denied respondents
demurrer to evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan correctly denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment.
Ruling:
No. For a writ of attachment to issue under Sec.1 (d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, the
applicant must sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud in contracting the
debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought.
61 | P a g e
Preliminary injunction
ST. JAMES COLLEGE OF PARAAQUE; JAIME T. TORRES, represented by his legal
representative, JAMES KENLEY M. TORRES; and MYRNA M. TORRES v. EQUITABLE PCI BANK
G.R. No. 179441 August 9, 2010 VELASCO, JR., J
The injunctive writ is conditioned on the existence of a clear and positive right of the applicant
which should be protected.
FACTS:
Spouses Jaime (now deceased) and Myrna Torres, owned and operated St. James College,
defaulted in their loan of PhP25, 000,000 secured by REM in favor of EPCIB. The bank made a
counter proposal on the xrestructuring of the loan. Jaime Torres chose and agreed to pay the equal
annual amortizations of PhP 6,100,000 payable every May. However, they failed to pay. Thereafter,
partial payment was accepted by the bank. Spouses again issued a check as partial payment. By
letter, EPCIB again reminded Spouses that its receipt of the check payment is without prejudice to
the banks rights considering the overdue nature of Spouses loan. The Spouses ordered stop payment
of the check. The bank demanded full settlement of spouses loan which was unheeded. And so the
bank filed a Petition for Sale to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgaged property. However, RTC
issued an Order granting a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of Spouses. On appeal, CA nullified
and set aside the RTC orders.
ISSUE:
Whether the grant of the writ of preliminary injunction was proper.
RULING:
No. The injunctive writ is conditioned on the existence of a clear and positive right of the
applicant which should be protected, the writ being the strong arm of equity, an extraordinary
peremptory remedy which can be availed of only upon the existence of well-defined circumstances.
In this case, contrary to what the RTC ruled, there was no urgent necessity to issue the writ
to protect the rights and interest of petitioners as owners. First, they could participate in the
foreclosure sale and get their property back unencumbered by the payment of the obligations that
they acknowledged in the first place. Second, a foreclosure sale does not ipso facto pass title to the
winning bidder over the mortgaged property. Petitioners continue to own the mortgaged property
sold in an auction sale until the expiration of the redemption period. Third, petitioners have one year
from the auction sale to redeem the mortgaged property. The one-year redemption period is another
grace period accorded petitioners to pay the outstanding debt, which would be converted to the
proceeds of the forced sale pursuant to the requisites under Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 3135, as
62 | P a g e
63 | P a g e
64 | P a g e
65 | P a g e
66 | P a g e
67 | P a g e
68 | P a g e
69 | P a g e
70 | P a g e
71 | P a g e
72 | P a g e
73 | P a g e
74 | P a g e
75 | P a g e
76 | P a g e
77 | P a g e
Criminal Procedure
Prosecution of Offenses
People of the Philippines v. Demetrio Salazar
G.R. No. 181900, October 20, 2010, Velasco, JR, J.
By itself, an affidavit of desistance or pardon is not a ground for the dismissal of an action, once
it has been instituted in court.
Facts:
AAA who was only 12 years old at the time the crime was committed was raped by the
Salazar twice. AAA was the daughter of BBB whom Salazar was cohabiting with. Salazar was
thereafter charged with two counts of statutory rape. Thereafter, AAA purportedly executed an
Affidavit of Desistance wherein she stated that she was not raped by accused-appellant Salazar and
that she no longer intends to pursue the cases filed against accused-appellant Salazar. During the
hearing, she explained that her own mother forced her to execute the affidavit upon threat of harm.
RTC convicted the accused with two counts of statutory rape but CA modified it by 2 simple rapes
78 | P a g e
79 | P a g e
Preliminary Investigation
GERRY A. SALAPUDDIN v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, GOV. JUM AKBAR, and NOR-RHAMA J.
INDANAN
G.R. No. 184681, February 25, 2013, VELASCO, JR., J.
The presumption of innocence, and all rights associated with it, remains even at the stage of
preliminary investigation. It is, thus, necessary that in finding probable cause to indict a person for the
commission of a felony, only those matters which are constitutionally acceptable, competent, consistent
and material are considered.
Facts:
One day, shortly after the adjournment of the day's session in Congress, a bomb exploded
near the entrance of the South Wing lobby of the House of Representatives in Batasan Complex which
was caused by an improvised bomb planted on a motorcycle parked near the entrance stairs of the
South Wing lobby. Thereafter, the police officers raided an alleged ASG safehouse at Parkwood Hills,
Payatas, Quezon City leading to the arrest of several persons, one of which was Ikram Indama, who
was the driver of petitioner Gerry Salapuddin. In one of the affidavits executed by Ikram, he said that
he heard Salapuddin ordering a person to kill Rep. Akbar of Basilan.
The prosecution later on included Salapudding in the complaint for murder and multiple
frustrated murder based on the affidavits of Ikram. Later on, the Secretary of Justice issued a
resolution on April 23, 2008 excluding Salapuddin from the charges for the complex crime of murder
and frustrated murder modifying the supplemental resolution of the investigating panel.
Respondents Jum Akbar and Nor-Rhama Indanan filed on May 13, 2008 a petition for
certiorari before the CA questioning the Secretary of Justice's April 23, 2008 resolution. In its ruling
dated August. 6, 2008, the CA set aside the resolution of the Secretary of Justice stating that the
totality of the evidence "sufficiently indicates the probability that Salapuddin lent moral and material
support or assistance to the perpetrators in the commission of the crime.
Issue:
Whether or not the inclusion of Salapuddin in the case was proper.
80 | P a g e
Arrest
Arrest Without Warrant, When Lawful
People of the Philippines v. Sulpicio Sonny Boy Tan y Phua
G.R. No. 191069, November 15, 2010, Velasco, JR, J.
Sec. 5(a) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court states the instances when the person to be arrested is
actually committing an offense, the peace officer may arrest him even without a warrant. However, a
warrantless arrest must still be preceded by the existence of probable cause.
Facts:
SPO2 Geronimo, SPO1 Quilala, PO3 Avendano, and PO1 Cruz of the Makati City Philippine
National Police (PNP) conducted a manhunt operation against a suspect in a robbery case involving
Korean nationals along P. Burgos, Barangay Poblacion, Makati City. While on board their civilian
vehicle, they chanced upon a male individual selling certain items to two foreigners. They heard him
say, Hey Joe, want to buy Valium 10, Cialis, Viagra? Curious, they inquired and the male individual
told them that he was selling Viagra and Cialis, while, at the same time, showing them the contents of
his bag which yielded 120 tablets of Valium 10. The male individual, who later turned out to be Sonny
Boy, was immediately searched and placed under arrest, after which they informed him of the nature
of his apprehension and of his constitutional rights. Sonny Boy was then brought to the office of the
Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Force (SAID-SOTF), where the items recovered
from him were marked and inventoried by PO1 Cruz. The items were turned over to the duty
investigator.
In contrast, Sonny Boy interposed the defense of denial. He maintained that he was merely
watching cars as a parking boy along P. Burgos when two men suddenly held and invited him for
questioning. They asked him if he knew any drug pushers and, if he did, to identify them. When he
was unable to do so, they charged him for violation of Sec. 11, Art. II of RA 9165, illegal possession of
dangerous drugs.
Issue:
81 | P a g e
82 | P a g e
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of Manlangit beyond reasonable
Ruling:
Yes. Contrary to accused-appellants challenge to the validity of the buy-bust operation, the
Court categorically stated in Quinicot v. People that a prior surveillance or test buy is not required for
a valid buy-bust operation, as long as the operatives are accompanied by their informant, thus:
Settled is the rule that the absence of a prior surveillance or test buy does not affect the legality of
the buy-bust operation. There is no textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. The Court
has left to the discretion of police authorities the selection of effective means to apprehend drug
dealers. A prior surveillance, much less a lengthy one, is not necessary, especially where the police
operatives are accompanied by their informant during the entrapment. Flexibility is a trait of good
police work. We have held that when time is of the essence, the police may dispense with the need for
prior surveillance. In the instant case, having been accompanied by the informant to the person who
was peddling the dangerous drugs, the policemen need not have conducted any prior surveillance
before they undertook the buy-bust operation.
The warrantless search was also valid. Under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113, a person may be
arrested without a warrant if he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense." Appellant Doria was caught in the act of committing an offense. When an accused is
apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are not only
authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SPO3 SANGKI ARA Y MIRASOL et al.
G.R. No. 185011 December 23, 2009, Velasco, Jr. J.
One of the situations covered by a lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court is when a person has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense in the presence of a peace officer or private person.
Facts:
After receiving an information that three suspected drug pushers contacted the informant
for a deal involving shabu, a buy-bust team was immediately formed. The team went to the school
and waited for the car of the alleged pushers. The sale of shabu was consummated inside the vehicle.
Upon the signal of the poseur-buyer, SPO3 Sangki Ara, Mike Talib and Jordan Musa were arrested.
The RTC and the CA convicted SPO3 Ara, Talib and Musa of violation of Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002 (RA 9165).
Issue:
valid.
Whether or not the buy-bust conducted leading to the warrantless arrest and seizure was
Ruling:
Yes. Owing to the special circumstances surrounding the drug trade, a buy-bust operation
has long been held as a legitimate method of catching offenders. It is a form of entrapment employed
as an effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of commission of an offense. A buy-bust
operation can be carried out after a long period of planning. The period of planning for such
operation cannot be dictated to the police authorities who are to undertake such operation. It is
unavailing then to argue that the operatives had to first secure a warrant of arrest given that the
objective of the operation was to apprehend the accused-appellants in flagrante delicto. In fact, one of
83 | P a g e
Bail
Nature
GAUDENCIO B. PANTILO III v. JUDGE VICTOR A. CANOY
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2262, February 9, 2011, Velasco, Jr., J.
A judge cannot verbally grant bail (Constructive bail) to the accused who is not yet charged
and did not file an application or petition for its grant.
Facts:
Gaudencio Pantillo is the brother of the homicide victim in a pending criminal case under the
sala of Judge Victor Canoy. When Pantillo attended the criminal cases inquest proceedings, he was
informed that the accused, Ronald Perocho was released from detention. Pantillo proceeded to the
84 | P a g e
85 | P a g e
86 | P a g e
87 | P a g e
88 | P a g e
Evidence
General Principles
Admissibility of Evidence
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CARLITO PABOL
G.R. No. 187084 October 12, 2009 J. Velasco
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must
be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that accused is guilty and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except
that of guilt.
89 | P a g e
90 | P a g e
91 | P a g e
92 | P a g e
93 | P a g e
94 | P a g e
95 | P a g e
96 | P a g e
Presumptions
Disputable presumptions
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RODANTE DE LEON y DELA ROSA
G.R. No. 186471 January 25, 2010, Velasco, Jr., J.
Absent any proof of motive to falsely accuse appellant of such a grave offense, the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official duty and the findings of the trial court with respect to the
credibility of witnesses shall prevail over appellants bare allegation.
Facts:
A buy-bust team was formed after the police received an information regarding the illegal
activities of Rodante De Leon. The team proceeded to the meeting place where the exchange of
money and one plastic sachet containing shabu between the poseur-buyer and De Leon took place.
De Leon was arrested and was charged with violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (RA 9165). Both the RTC and the CA convicted De
Leon. De Leon questioned the validity of the buy-bust operation and argued that the prosecution
failed to prove the chain of custody of the evidence. He contended that the court merely relied on the
disputable presumption of regularity in the performance of the police function.
Issue:
Whether or not the buy-bust operation, allegedly tainted with irregularities, is valid.
Ruling:
Yes. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to
for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In
this jurisdiction, the operation is legal and has been proved to be an effective method of
apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is
undertaken.
In the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that the buy-bust operation conducted by the
police officers, who made use of entrapment to capture appellant in the act of selling a dangerous
drug, was valid and legal. Moreover, the defense has failed to show any evidence of ill motive on the
part of the police officers. Absent any proof of motive to falsely accuse appellant of such a grave
offense, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the findings of the trial
court with respect to the credibility of witnesses shall prevail over appellants bare allegation.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SERGIO LAGARDE
G.R. No. 182549, January 20, 2009, Velasco, Jr., J.
For alibi to prosper, the accused persons must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, (1)
their presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (2) the physical
impossibility of their presence at the scene of the crime.
97 | P a g e
98 | P a g e
99 | P a g e
100 | P a g e
101 | P a g e
102 | P a g e
103 | P a g e
104 | P a g e
Documentary evidence
Best Evidence Rule
MCMP CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION v. MONARK EQUIPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 201001, November 10, 2014, Velasco, Jr., J.
The requirements before a party may present secondary evidence to prove the contents of the
original document whenever the original copy has been lost are: 1) the existence or due execution of the
original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its non-production in court; and
(3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be
attributed.
Facts:
MCMP leased equipment from Monark, covered by a contract. Monark delivered the
equipment to MCMP, which shall be paid within 30 days. Despite the lapse of such period, MCMP
failed to pay the rental fees. Upon demands made upon MCMP, partial payments were made, but
further demands went unheeded. Monark then filed a complaint against MCMP. MCMP alleged in
defense that it had an agreement with Monark that it would not be charged for the whole time that
the leased equipment was in its possession but rather only for the actual time that the equipment
was used although still on the project site. MCMP, however, admitted that this agreement was not
contained in the contract. Monark then presented Peregrino as one of its witnesses, who testified that
there were 2 original copies of the contract, one retained by Monark, and the other copy for MCMP.
He testified that Monarks copy had been lost and that diligent efforts to recover the copy proved
futile. Instead, Peregrino presented a photocopy of the contract. MCMP objected to the presentation
of secondary evidence to prove the contents of the contract arguing that there were no diligent
efforts to search for the original copy. MCMP did not present its copy of the contract despite the
directive of the RTC to produce the same. RTC ruled in favor of Monark, and affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not Monark is allowed to present secondary evidence to prove the existence of
the contract.
Ruling:
Yes. In Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lagman, the Court held that before a party
is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original, the offeror must prove
the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the
original or the reason for its non-production in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence
of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed. The correct order of proof is
as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents.
105 | P a g e
106 | P a g e
107 | P a g e
108 | P a g e
109 | P a g e
Whether or not petitioners have a better claim over than the land than respondents.
Ruling:
Yes. The undisputed pieces of documentary proof like the tax declarations, tax receipts, and
miscellaneous sales applications, which antedate those of respondents, unquestionably demonstrate
the truth and factual basis of petitioners claim of possession. Mr. Valencia's testimony for the
respondents, on his alleged occupation of the said lot must give way to the clearly established facts
that petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the lot much earlier
than respondents and Mr. Valencia. Under the admitted facts rule, evidence of whatever description
must yield to the extent that it conflicts with admitted or clearly established facts. The Court gives
superior credit to petitioners' witnesses whose testimonies on material points are in accord with
facts already established, rather than to respondents and witness Romeo Valencia whose testimonies
were shown to be false or bereft of weight and credence.
Examination of a Witness
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NESTOR BAJADA y BAUTISTA, VICTOR CALISAY y
LOYAGA, and JOHN DOE
G.R. No. 180507, November 20, 2008, VELASCO, JR., J.
Before the credibility of a witness and the truthfulness of his testimony can be impeached by
evidence consisting of his prior statements which are inconsistent with his present testimony, the crossexaminer must lay the predicate or the foundation for impeachment and thereby prevent an injustice to
the witness being cross-examined.
Facts:
Nestor Bajada, Victor Calisay and John Doe were charged with robbery with. The RTC
convicted them and sentenced them to Death Penalty, taking into consideration the two aggravating
circumstances of dwelling and additional serious physical injury. The CA reversed the decision since
the information failed to specifically allege the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, hence, it cannot
be appreciated even if proved during trial. The main contention of Bajada was the court erred in
110 | P a g e
111 | P a g e
112 | P a g e
Special proceedings
Writ of Kalikasan
WEST TOWER CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, ET. AL. V. FIRST PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 194239, June 16, 2015, VELASCO, JR., J.
Sec. 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases does not require that a
petitioner be directly affected by an environmental disaster.
Facts:
FPIC operates two pipelines in which its systems transport nearly 60% of the petroleum
requirements of Metro Manila and parts of the provinces of Bulacan, Laguna, and Rizal. In May 2010,
however, a leakage from one of the pipelines was suspected after the residents of West Tower
Condominium started to smell gas within the condominium. A search made within the condominium
premises led to the discovery of a fuel leak from the wall of its Basement 2. What started as a twodrum leak at the initial stages became a 15-20 drum a day affair. Eventually, the sump pit of the
condominium was ordered shut down by the City of Makati to prevent the discharge of contaminated
water into the drainage system of Barangay Bangkal. Eventually, the fumes compelled the residents
of West Tower to abandon their respective units and the condo's power was shut down.
West Tower Corp. interposed the present Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan on
behalf of the residents of West Tower and in representation of the surrounding communities in
Barangay Bangkal, Makati City. The Court granted the petition. FPIC directors submitted a Joint
Return praying for the dismissal of the petition and the denial of the privilege of the Writ of
Kalikasan. In the meantime, petitioners also filed civil and criminal complaints against respondents
arising from the same incident or leakage from the White Oil Pipeline (WOPL).
Issue:
1) Whether petitioner West Tower Corp. has the legal capacity to represent the other
petitioners and whether the other petitioners, apart from the residents of West Tower and
Barangay Bangkal, are real parties-in-interest;
2) Whether or not the TEPO shall be immediately lifted in light of the DOE's issuance of a
certification attesting to the safety of the WOPL for continued commercial operations
3) Whether a special trust fund should be opened by respondents to answer for future similar
contingencies
113 | P a g e
Misc. Topics
FEDERICO "TOTO" NATIVIDAD v. MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION
BOARD (MTRCB), represented by its
Chairperson MA. CONSOLIZA T. LAGUARDIA; Spouses THELMA J. CHIONG and DIONISIO F.
CHIONG; and MARICHU S. JIMENEA
G.R. No. 161422, December 13, 2007, Velasco, Jr., J.
Although the MTRCB has the power to preventively seize the master copy of a motion picture
pending hearing and final disposition of a case, said preventive seizure of the master copy cannot
however exceed more than 20 days.
Facts:
The subject of the present case is the movie Butakal (Sugapa Sa Laman). The movie was
allegedly based on the true story of two sisters, Jacqueline and Marijoy Chiong of Cebu. The sisters
were kidnapped, raped and killed. The persons responsible for the death of the two sisters were
114 | P a g e
115 | P a g e
116 | P a g e