Issue:

Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11
(b) of RA 7941 constitutional
Held:
Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those
parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving
of representation are actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from
the deliberations on the proposed bill. The two percent threshold is consistent not only
with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence
of "representation." Under a republican or representative state, all government authority
emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. But to
have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a
sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list
system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of
contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of
Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to
ensure meaningful local representation.
Issue:
How should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?
Held:
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private
respondents, as well as the members of this Court that the initial step is to rank all the
participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on
the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by
dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system. All
parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only
these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party
receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the first party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to,
in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on
proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot
possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most
number of votes.
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other
qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation.

Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC

[G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]
Facts:
COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13 parties which obtained at
least 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system as members of the
House of Representatives. Upon petition for respondents, who were party-list
organizations, it proclaimed 38 additional party-list representatives although they
obtained less than 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system on the
ground that under the Constitution, it is mandatory that at least 20% of the members of
the House of Representatives come from the party-list representatives.
Issue:
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words,
should the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and all
the time?
Held:
It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of
Representatives. The Constitution vested Congress with the broad power to define and
prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representatives. In the exercise of its
constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it necessary to require parties participating
in the system to obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party list system to be
entitled to a party-list seat. Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties having a
sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in
Congress.
FORMULA FOR
determination of total number of party-list representatives = #district
representatives/.80 x .20
additional representatives of first party = # of votes of first party/ # of votes of party
list system
additional seats for concerned party = # of votes of concerned party/ # votes of first
party x additional seats for concerned party

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.80 representatives
This formulation means that any increase in the number of district
representatives, as may be provided by law, will necessarily result in a
corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats. To illustrate,
considering that there were 208 district representatives to be elected during the
1998 national elections, the number of party-list seats would be 52, computed as
follows:
208
x .20 = 52
.80
The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The
problematic question, however, is this: Does the Constitution require all such
allocated seats to be filled up all the time and under all circumstances? Our
short answer is No.
G.R. No. 147589
June 26, 2001
ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec
Facts
Petitioners challenged the Comelecs Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which approved the
participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the
2001 party-list elections. Petitioners sought the disqualification of private respondents,
arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and
underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted on their petition,
petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioners recourse to the Court was proper.
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections.
3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.
RULING:

342 SCRA 247, October 6, 2000 (Constitutional Law Party List

Representatives, 20% Allocation)
FACTS: Petitioner assailed public respondent COMELEC resolutions ordering
the proclamation of 38 additional party-list representatives to complete the 52
seats in the House of Representatives as provided by Sec 5, Art VI of the 1987
Constitution and RA 7941.
On the other hand, Public Respondent, together with the respondent parties, avers
that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives
in the House of Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was
mandatory, wherein the twenty (20%) percent congressional seats for party-list
representatives is filled up at all times.
ISSUE: Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is
mandatory.
HELD: No, it is merely a ceiling for the party-list seats in Congress. The same
declared therein a policy to promote proportional representation in the election
of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would
benefit them.
It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions
participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for
the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering
more than this percentage could have additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes.
Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than
three seats in the House of Representatives (sec 11(b) RA 7941).
Note:
Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the
determinant in arriving at the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers,
who shall comprise twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list. We thus translate this legal provision into a
mathematical formula, as follows:
No. of district representatives
- x .20 = No. of party-list

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1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the
remaining 20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987
Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which
garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to
one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%,
then it is entitled to 3 seats this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban
Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6%
of the votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a
party-list candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used.
BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its
provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of
the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the
2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed
by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is
mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be
impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also
proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed in the HELD portion of this
digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity
of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not
major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said
elections limited to sectoral parties.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere
ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list
elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.

1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of other
remedies "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved,
and in case of urgency." Tha facts attendant to the case rendered it justiciable.
2. Political Parties -- even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections
subject to the requirements laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the
statutory law pertinent to the Party List System.
Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the
party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article
VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representative may be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. It is however, incumbent upon the Comelec to determine proportional
representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, the criteria for participation in
relation to the cause of the party lsit applicants so as to avoid desecration of the noble
purpose of the party-list system.
3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of
respondents in the Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations was
necessary which was beyond the pale of the Court. The Court not being a trier of facts.
However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law
and the Consitution, the Court decided to set some guidelines culled from the law and
the Consitution, to assist the Comelec in its work. The Court ordered that the petition be
remanded in the Comelec to determine compliance by the party lists.
BANAT vs COMELEC
GR no. 179271
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers,
made a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in
May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the
following rules:

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IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast,
then it is guaranteed a seat, and not qualified. This allows those party-lists garnering
less than 2% to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1,
shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all
the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included
because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus,
the remaining available seats for allocation as additional seats are the maximum seats
reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are
disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of
fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first
round, all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the twopercenters) are given their one seat each. The total number of seats given to these twopercenters are then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17
party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists
hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the
tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round,
particularly, in determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second,
in determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast,
and in the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the
remaining number of seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the
additional number of seats allotted for the party list but the 3 seat limit rule shall still
be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is
7.33% of the total votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).

HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for
legislative districts, there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative.
Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not more than 250 members
of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts,
and 50 would be from party-list representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed
Congress to fix the number of the membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create
additional legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May
2007 elections, there were 220 district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or
the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of
Seats Available to Party-List Representatives
Hence,
(220 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling meaning, the
number of party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the
members of the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to
allow that only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat
and those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates
a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme
Court explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes
cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of
the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that
the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the
availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this
situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats
and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number
of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the
number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent
threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the
full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in
the House of Representatives.

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they are considered nuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the Revised
Penal Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by
using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of
religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its
constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of
laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines international obligations against
discrimination based on sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and
genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly
dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not
among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner
made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary
to actual verification reports by COMELECs field personnel.
Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds.

Held:
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the
proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said
sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be
registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong BayaniOFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, the enumeration of marginalized and
under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is
specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At
bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is government neutrality in
religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. We thus find that it was grave violation of the

Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number
of additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a
two-percenter which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a
total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still
get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and
there are still unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining partylists and those higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are
occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties
(the likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either
from the Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political parties from participating
in the party-list elections as the word party was not qualified and that even the framers
of the Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to
participate in the party-list elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which
represents the marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion,
concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the will of the
framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the people who ultimately ratified the
Constitution and the will of the people is that only the marginalized sections of the
country shall participate in the party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot
participate in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall
dominate the party-list system.
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs COMELEC
GR no 190582
Facts:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and
trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public
respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To
buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in their
decision. It also stated that since their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy,

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prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or
abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal
Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is
not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution
of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental
interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system.
The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a
statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any
substantial public interest.

non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify
the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have a secular
purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why
special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to
justify its position that petitioners admission into the party-list system would be so
harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and civil
laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a
nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else
which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality, the remedies for which are a

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