Professional Documents
Culture Documents
S-75 Dvina - SAM
S-75 Dvina - SAM
S-75 Dvina - SAM
WEAPON
Difficulty
DAM
SA-2A
SA-N-2A
SA-2B
SA-2C
SA-2D
Dif
Dif+1
Dif+2
Average
Average
+1
Average
+2
Easy -2
Easy -1
C:31
C:31
C:32
C:32
C:33
SA-2E
PEN
B:80
B:80
B:80
B:80
B:84
C:34 B:85
/nuke
C:34 B:86
C:34 B:86
Speed
Guidanc
e
Warhead
RNG
45c
45c
46c
46c
47c
250kg
250kg
260kg
260kg
280kg
8km-30km
8km-30km
7km-34km
7km-43km
6km-43km
49c/nuke
295kg or
15kt
300kg
300kg
6km-43km
SA-2F
50c
6km-43km
S-75 Volga
50c
5km-50km
WEIGHT
PRICE
OTHER
The Lavochkin OKB S-75 (Russian -75, NATO reporting name SA-2 Guideline) is a high-altitude surface-to-air
guided missile (SAM) system of the Soviet Union and is the most widely deployed and used air defense missile in
history.
They gained notoriety when they shot down a USAF U-2 spy plane in 1960, and during the Vietnam War when they
were briefly the cause of much consternation among US air-war planners. It has also been locally-produced in the
People's Republic of China as the HQ-1 and HQ-2.
History
in the action by mistake. That action led to the U-2 Crisis of 1960. It is also believed that Chinese SA-2s downed some
ROCAF-piloted U-2s based on Taiwan.
North Vietnamese S-75 site. Note the typical hexagonal pattern that made the sites easy to spot from the air; the
Vietnamese later abandoned the layout for this reason.
In 1965 North Vietnam asked for some assistance against the U.S.'s airpower, to which they were essentially
defenseless at the time. After some discussion it was agreed to supply the NVA with the S-75, although the decision
was not taken lightly as it greatly increased the chances that one would fall into US hands for study. Site preparation
started early in the year, and the US detected the program almost immediately on April 5, 1965. While military
planners pressed for the sites to be attacked before they could become operational, their political leaders refused,
fearing that Soviet technical staff might be killed.
Then on July 23, 1965, a US Navy F-4C aircraft was shot down. The US responded with Operation Iron Hand three
days later to attack the other sites before they could become operational. Most of the SA-2s were deployed around
the Hanoi-Haiphong area and were off limits to attack (as were local airfields) for political reasons. Then, President
Lyndon Johnson announced on public TV that one of the other sites would be attacked the next week. The Vietnamese
removed the missiles and replaced them with decoys, while moving every available anti-aircraft gun into the
approach routes. The tactic worked, causing some American casualties indirectly.
Over the next year the US delivered a number of solutions to the SA-2 problem. The Navy had the Shrike missile in
service by mid-August, and mounted their first offensive strike on a site in October. The Air Force responded by fitting
B-66 bombers with powerful jammers that blinded the early warning radars, and developed smaller jamming pods for
fighters which denied range information to the radars. Later developments included the Wild Weasel aircraft fitted
with jammer pods and ECM systems, dedicated to jamming and then shooting the sites with Shrikes of their own.
The Soviets and Vietnamese, however, were able to adapt to some of these tactics. The USSR upgraded the radar
several times to improve ECM resistance. They also introduced a passive guidance mode, whereby the missile could
lock on the jammer itself. This had an added advantage, since the radar could be kept off thus preventing Shrikes
from being fired. Moreover, some new tactics were developed to combat the Shrike. One of them was to point the
radar to the side and then turn it off briefly. Since the Shrike was a relatively primitive anti-radiation missile, it would
follow the beam away from the radar and then simply crash when it lost the signal (after the radar was turned off).
Another was a "false launch", when the tracking radar was turned on but the missiles were not actually fired. This
allowed the missile crew to see if the target was equipped with a Shrike. If the aircraft fired one, it could be
neutralized with the above techique without sacrificing any missiles.
Despite these advances, the US was able to come up with effective ECM packages for the B-52E models. These
planes were able to fly raids against Hanoi with relatively few losses (though still significant enough to cause some
concern, see linebacker 2).
PVO Strany started to replace the SA-2 with the much more effective SA-10 and SA-12 systems in the 1980s. Today
only a few hundred, if any, of the 4,600 missiles are still in Russian service, even though they underwent a
modernization program as late as 1993.
The SA-2 remains in widespread service throughout the world, with some level of operational ability in 35 countries.
Vietnam and Egypt are tied for the largest deployments at 260 missiles each, while North Korea has 270, and Poland
has 240. The Chinese also deploy the HY-2, an upgrade of the SA-2, in relatively large numbers.
Description
being easily recognizable in reconnaissance photos. Typically another six missiles are stored on tractor-trailers near
the center of the site.
The V-750 is a two-stage missile, consisting of a solid-fuel booster and a storable liquid-fuel upper stage burning red
fuming nitric acid as the oxidizer, and kerosene as the fuel. The booster fires for about 4-5 seconds, and the main
engine for about 22 seconds, by which time the missile is traveling at about Mach 3. The booster mounts four large
cropped-delta wing fins with small control surfaces in their trailing edges, used to control roll. The upper stage has
smaller cropped-deltas near the middle of the airframe, with a smaller set of control surfaces are at the extreme rear
and (in most models) much smaller fins on the nose.
The missiles are guided using radio control signals from the guidance computers at the site, sent on one of three
channels. The earlier SA-2 models received their commands via two sets of four small antennas in front of the front
most fins, while the D models and on used four much larger strip antennas running between the forward and middle
fins. The guidance system at an SA-2 site can handle only one target at a time, but can direct three missiles against
it. Additional missiles could be fired against the same target after one or more missiles of the first salvo had
completed their run and the radio channel was freed.
The missile typically mounts a 195 kg (430 lb) fragmentation warhead, with proximity, contact and command fusing.
The warhead has a lethal radius of about 65 m (215 ft) at lower altitudes, while at higher altitudes the thinner
atmosphere allows for a wider radius of up to 250 m (820 ft). The missile itself is accurate to about 75m (250 ft),
which explains why two were typically fired in a salvo. One version, the SA-2E, mounted a 295 kg (650 lb) nuclear
warhead of an estimated 15 kT yield, or a conventional warhead of similar weight.
Typical range for the missile is about 45 km (30 miles), with a maximum altitude around 20,000 m (60,000 ft). The
radar and guidance system imposed a fairly long short-range cutoff of about 500-1,000 m (3,000 ft), making them
fairly safe to attack at low level.
'Fan Song' radar (left) and what looks like a 'Low Blow' to the right. Photo by Nellis AFB.
The main search radar, known as the Spoon Rest in the west, has a range of about 275 km (170 miles), while the
tracking/guidance radars, the Fan Song, have a range of about 65 km (40 miles). Earlier versions used a targeting
radar known as Knife Rest, which was replaced in Soviet use, but can still be found in older installations. The Fan Song
system consisted of two antennas operating on different frequencies, one for elevation and the other for azimuth. The
regimental HQ also includes a Spoon Rest, as well as a Flat Face long-range C-band radar and the Side Net heightfinder. Information from these radars is forwarded to the battalion Spoon Rest operators to allow them to coordinate
their searches.
Models
SA-2C; S-75M Volkhov, Fan Song-C radar with V-750 m missiles. Improved -2B deployed in 1961. The V-750 m was
externally identical to the V-750VK/V-750VN, but with improved performance for range up to 43 km (27 miles) and
reduced lower altitude limits of 400 m (1,312 ft).
SA-2D; Fan Song-E radar and V-750SM missiles. Differed significantly from the A/B/C in having the new antennas and
a longer barometric nose probe and several other differences associated with the sustainer motor casing. The missile
is 10.8 m (35.4 ft) long, has the same body diameters and warhead as the SA-2C, but the weight is increased to 2450
kg (5,400 lb). The effective maximum range is 43 km (27 miles), the minimum range is 6 km (4 miles) and the
intercept altitude envelope is between 250 and 25000 m (820-82,000 ft). The Fan Song-E was introduced to make it
more difficult to jam.
SA-2E: Fan Song-E radar and V-750AK missiles. Similar rocket to the D, but uses a bulbous warhead section lacking
the forward fins. The SA-2E is 11.2 m (36.7 ft) long, has a body diameter of 0.5 m (19.7 in) and weighs 2450 kg
(5,400 lb) at launch. The missile can be fitted with either a command detonated 15 kT nuclear or 295 kg (650 lb)
conventional HE warhead.
SA-2F: Fan Song-F radar and V-750SM missiles. After watching jamming in Vietnam and the Six-Day War render the
SA-2 completely ineffective, the existing systems were quickly upgraded with a new radar system designed to help
ignore wide-band scintillation jamming. The command system also included a home-on-jam mode to attack aircraft
carrying strobe jammers, as well as a completely optical system (of limited use) when these failed. F's were
developed starting in 1968 and deployed in the USSR later that year, while shipments to Vietnam started in late
1970.
S-75M Volga (Russian -75 - Volga River). Version from 1995.