LessonsfromtheWinterWar:FrozenGritandFinlands

FabianDefense

Whetheronthesoccerpitchorthefieldofbattle,humanshaveanaturaltendencytorootfortheunderdog.
Oursacredtexts,medievalballads,andregimentalhistoriesarefilledwithgutwrenchingtalesofdesperate
menfacingoverwhelmingodds.FromthebattleofThermopylaetothesiegeoftheAlamo,fromthegunfight
atCamarontotheclashatRorkesDrift,thereissomethingaboutsuchlopsidedconteststhatcontinuesto
exertapowerfulswayoverourcollectiveimagination.
Alltoooften,however,itiscertainclimacticbattlesorflashesinthepanofmartialhistorythatcaptureour
interest,ratherthanthemoreprotractedandlesscinematicstrugglesbetweentwounevenlymatched
armies.AnexceptionmightbethecampaignsofQuintusFabiusMaximusduringtheSecondPunicWar.The
redoubtableRomanseffortshavebequeathedtoussomethingofanawkwardnomenclaturethe
adjectiveFabiannowusedtodesignatenationallydrivenscorchedearthtacticsorstrategiesofdelayand
progressiveattrition.
TherearecountlessotherfascinatingexamplesofFabianwarfarethatcouldandshouldbedrawnuponby
contemporarystrategists.AlfredtheGreatshitandruncampaignagainstthemaraudingDanes,launched
fromhisswampysanctuarydeepintheSomersetMarshes,providesonesuchexample,asdotheless
fortunateattemptsofHerewardtheWake(theNorthernEnglishLordwhoinspiredthelegendofRobin
Hood)tocoordinatearegionwideresistanceagainstthebrutaloccupationofWilliamtheConqueror.The
DukeofWellingtonsfosteringofaSpanishulcerduringtheNapoleonicWarsandJosipTitoswaragainst
AxisforcesduringWorldWarIIarebothequallyrifewithlessons.

YetoneofhistorysmostdramatictalesofFabiandefenseisfoundmuchfurthernorth,inthedarkpine
forestsstretchingbeyondtheArcticCircleandinthemassgraveyardsthatstilldotthebanksoftheKarelian
Isthmus.Karelia,renownedforitsnaturalbeauty,isoneofthosemanybucolicbutbenightedstretchesof
territorythatbythetyrannyofgeographyhavefoundthemselvesrepeatedlyravagedbygreatpower
conflicts.
FinlandsWinterWarwiththeSovietUnion,wagedoverthecourseof105daysfromNovember1939to
March1940,shouldbeanobjectofstudyforallstudentsofmilitarystrategy.Finland,aweak,sparsely
populated,anddiplomaticallyisolatednation,succeededinimposingstaggeringcostsonafarmorepotent
aggressor.Indeed,therespectivekillratiosandcasualtyratesareperhapssomeofthestarkestinthe
annalsof20thcenturywarfare.WhileHelsinkiisestimatedtohavelostapproximately25,000soldiersduring
theSovietoffensive,theinvadersfatalitieshavebeenpeggedatcloseto200,000,withhundredsof
thousandsmorecrippledbyfrostbite.Thiswasawarofextremes,whosebattleswerefoughtduringoneof
thecoldestwintersonrecord,insnowboundwoodswheredaylightonlylastedafewhoursand
temperaturesregularlyplummetedfarbelowfreezing.Insuchconditions,anyexposedfleshrantheriskof
beingimmediatelyafflictedbyfrostbite,whilestacksofbodiesfrozeinminutes,acquiringthesolidityofbrick
walls.Ragingblizzardsandhowlingwindsregularlydisruptedradiotransmissions,preventedaerial
reconnaissance,anddeviatedthetrajectoryofartilleryfire.Finlandeventuallybuckledundertheweightof
Stalinsonslaughtandfounditselfobligedtopartwithlargetractsofterritory.Itscitizenarmyhadsoseverely
goredtheSovietbear,however,thattheNordicnationpreserveditsindependenceandwassparedthegrim
fateoftheBalticstates.TheconflictalsoputaseveredentintheprestigeofaRedArmystillreelingfromthe
savageleadershippurgesofthe1930s.Moscowspainedpostmortemoftheconflicttriggeredendless
boutsofinternalrecriminationbeforeeventuallyleadingtosomemuchneededmilitaryreforms.
Stalinsinitialmultiprongedassaultcomprisedover600,000troopsalongwiththousandsoftanks,planes,
andheavyartillerypieces.FacingthismassiveonslaughtwasaFinnishArmythatstoodatlessthanhalfthe
sizeoftheinvadingarmy,evenfollowingthefullmobilizationofninedivisionsworthofreservesand
conscripts.Inadditiontothisseverenumericalinferiority,theFinnshadonlyafewtanks,barelyanyplanes,
andaperilouslylowlevelofmunitionsfortheirminuteartilleryforce.Thewaralmostimmediatelytookon
twoverydifferentforms,bothofwhichunfoldedconcurrently.Whileamoreconventionalpositionalconflict
warragedalongtheMannerheimLineastretchofFinnishfortificationserectedacrosstheKarelian
IsthmusawarofdetachmentwaswagedbyFinnishskitroopsagainstSovietcolumnsdeepinthe
forestedregionsofFinlandsinterior.
AlongtheMannerheimLine,theoutnumberedandoutgunnedFinnsweresubjectedtosomeoftheheaviest
artillerybarragessincetheBattleofVerduninWorldWarI.Duringoneartillerybombardment,over300,000
shellsfellonFinnishpositionswithin24hours.Accordingtosomecontemporaryaccounts,theRussian
artillerysalvoescouldbeheardinHelsinkioverahundredmilesaway.Followingsuchapocalypticbarrages,
Soviettroopswouldrushtostormenemybunkers,onlytofindthemeerilysilent,withtheFinnishdefenders
lyingseeminglyunscathed,butdeadfromsheerconcussion.
Theextremenatureofthiswarisalsoreflectedinthecolorfulcastofcharactersthattookpartinitsmany
battles.ThecommanderinchiefoftheFinnishforces,CarlMannerheim,wasabrilliantstrategist,but
somethingofananachronisticfigure,anausterearistocratandformeradventureroftheGreatGame,who
seemedtheembodimentofanotherera.ServingunderhimwasthehumblerSimoHayha,historysmost
deadlysniper,nicknamedtheWhiteDeathbytheRedArmyandcreditedwithmorethan500kills.

Perhapsmostimportantly,theWinterWarcontinuestocontainanumberofimportantlessons,manyof
whichappearparticularlyrelevantinaneracharacterizedbyarevivalofgreatpowercompetition,inwhich
smallnationsseektodevisenewmeansofoffsettingthethreatsposedbylargerandmorepowerful
predatorypowers.
LeveragingWeatherandGeography
TheFinnsprovedsingularlyadeptatleveragingtheirhomelandsharshenvironmentalconditionsand
geographyinthecourseoftheirstrugglefornationalsurvival.Finnishtroopswerenearlyallhighly
experiencedskiersandpossessedadegreeofmobilitySovietsoldierscouldnotmatch.Silentlyglidingout
ofpineforests,bedeckedinsnowcapesoftenhaphazardlyassembledfrombedlinens,Finnishskitroopers
continuouslysurprised,circumvented,andharassedtheirbeleagueredopponents.Despitetheearlier
warningsofafewisolatedvoiceswithintheSovietCommissariatofDefense,theRussianandUkrainian
soldierscatapultedbytheirthousandsintothefrozentaigahadreceivedlittletonoarctictraining.Fewcould
effectivelyusesnowshoes,letaloneski.Easilydetectableintheirkhakiuniforms,countlessSoviettroops
vanishedintothefrozenwilderness,nevertobeseenagain.Whenreadingaboutthetrulyastonishinglevels
ofattritionatthehandsofskitroopers,oneisremindedofthemaneuverabilityovermatchMongolhorse
archersenjoyedovertheirfoesformuchofthe13thcentury.
Perhapssomeofthemostusefulinsightsintothisuniquewayofwarcanbegleanedbyperusingthe
writingsofFinnishveteranslaterrecruitedaswinterwarfareadvisorsfortheU.S.Army.Intheirview,itwas
notsufficienttoadapttoaharshgeography.Rather,thegoalshouldtodevelopnewformsofoperationalart
thatenableonetoleveragethatsamegeographyagainstanilladaptedfoe.Writinginthe1950s,these
grizzledveteransthusadvisedtheU.S.10thMountainDivisionthefollowing:
Snowandice,underwinterconditions,areactuallytobeconsideredasanaidtooperationsandanaidto
therapidmovementoftroops,notasahindrancewhichisthecommonconception.
Inwinterwarfare,theynoted,mobilityrapidlybecamethemainconcernandsourceofcomparative
advantage.Withmuchofthelandscapeblanketedunderheavylayersofsnow,skitrooperscouldaffordto
exploremultipleaxesofapproach,whereasSovietinfantryandarmoredunitswereconfinedtonarrow
forestroadsandloggedtracks.Theirlong,windingcolumnscouldthenbeambushedandcutapart
piecemealinwhattheFinnsgrimlydubbedmottitacticsamottireferringtoatraditionalmeasureof
choppedfirewood.Thiswasfacilitatedbythefactthat:
Infantryonskiscouldgoanywhereandretainfreedomofmaneuver.Asthelakes,rivers,andmarshlands
freezeduringthewinter,theyceasetobenaturalobstaclesandthusthebattlefieldbecomeslargerthan
duringotherseasons.Camouflagedskitroopsarehighlymobileandcanmountsurpriseattacksonthe
flanksandrearoftheenemytocutoffcommunicationsandsupplylines,inturnaidingitsdestruction.
TheFinnsabilitytoremainabsolutelysilentbysometimesusingreindeertotransportheaviermaterial
crosscountryratherthanmotorizedvehiclesallowedthemtospringambushafterambushonincreasingly
jumpySovietpatrols.Manyoftheseattacksoccurredduringthelongarcticnights,duringwhichSovietcamp
firesprovidedconvenienttargetingbeaconsforFinnishsnipers.Asanaddedbenefit,RedArmysoldiers
soonbegantosufferfromseveresleepdeprivation,withalltheattendanteffectsontheirmoraleand
battlefieldeffectiveness.

Interestingly,theinstrumentalizationofgeographyremainsattheheartofFinlandsdefensestrategytothis
day.StrategistsinHelsinkistillplanforanindepthdefenseoftheirhomeland,withtheaimofdrawingany
potentialinvaderintothehinterlandswheretheywouldbegrounddownbysmallunitsequippedwithanti
tankguidedmissiles(ATGMs),lightweightartillery,andmultiplelaunchrocketsystems(MLRS).While
Americanstrategistshaveonlyjustbeguntorediscoverconceptsofarchipelagicdefense,Finnishplanners
havelongdevelopedsophisticatedoperationalconceptsaroundthedefenseoftheirmanynarrowinletsand
smallislandsthatincorporateamixtureofminewarfareassets,underwaterlisteningposts,fastattackcraft,
andcoastaljaegerunitsarmedwithantishipmissilesandmortars.
WithalmosttheentiretyofitsterritoryfallingunderthecoverageofadvancedRussianairdefensesystems,
Helsinkihasadoptedanequallypragmaticattitudetowardthedefenseofitsairspace.Ratherthanchoosing
toengageinafruitlesscompetitionforairdominance,theFinnishAirForcefocusesonredundancyand
survivability:dispersingairstrips,practicingemergencyhighwaylandings,anderectingahighlymobileair
defensegrid.Thisapproachtonationaldefense,withitscoldbloodedattentiontoselfrelianceandnational
resiliency,isadirectproductofthenationsgeographyanditsfraughthistory.Itisalsocloselyintertwined
withitsrefusaltojoinNATO,forthetimebeing,atleast.Indeed,theFinnsremainacutelyawareofthefact
thattheymustcontinuetoplanfortheirowndefense,justasduringthelong,hardmonthsoftheWinter
War.Inmanyways,thisrealizationhasonlysharpenedtheirthinkingonmatterspertainingtoasymmetric
warfareandterritorialdefense.AstheUnitedStatesandcertainofitskeyAsianalliesdevoteevermore
attentiontoforwardbasehardening,resiliency,anddeterrencethroughprotraction,therearenodoubt
manyadditionalinterestinglessonstoderivefromFinlandsFabiandefensemodel.
TheImportanceofDevisingCreativeApproachestoEnemyAttrition:TiberiusGracchus,wheninSpain,
uponlearningthattheenemyweresufferingfromalackofprovisions,providedhiscampwithanelaborate
supplyofeatablesofallkindsandthenabandonedit.Whentheenemyhadgotpossessionofthecampand
hadgorgedthemselvestorepletionwiththefoodtheyfound,GracchusbroughtbackhisArmyandsuddenly
crushedthem.OnAmbushes,TheStratagemaofFrontinus.
Onelessonistheimportanceoflookingbeyondfrontalunitonunitcombattodevisemorecreativeand
costeffectiveapproachestoenemyattrition.DuringtheWinterWar,theFinnsprovedparticularlyadeptat
channeling,diverting,anddemoralizingSoviettroops.
Owingtotheharshnessofthatparticularwinter,hundredsofFinlandslakeswerecoveredwiththicklayers
oficethatprovidedtheinvadingforcewideexpansestomasstroopsatasaferemovefromthesniper
infestedforests.Finnishbombmakerssoondesignedrudimentarymineswithjaggededges,whichcouldbe
discreetlyembeddedintoorundertheicesheets.Thesewouldbedetonatedwhenenemyformations
crossedthelake,consigninghundredsofunfortunateSovietsoldiers,manyofwhomcouldnotswim,toa
waterygrave.Asaresult,RedArmycommandersbegantorefusetomovelargenumbersoftroopsacross
frozenbodiesofwater,insteadchannelingtheirtroopsintonearbyforestswhereFinnishsnipersand
machinegunnerswouldpatientlylieinwait.
OneofFinnishcommandersmosteffectivestrategies,however,wastheweaponizationoftheirenemys
hunger.Asanyavidwintersportpractitionerknows,strenuousphysicalactivityinextremecoldrequiresa
highproteindiet.TheaverageSovietgruntduringtheWinterWarwasoftengrantedlittlemorethanahunk
ofbreadandsometea.Meanwhile,theFinnshadanelaboratesystemofsleddrivencookingunitsserving
nutrientrichgruelandpreservedmeats.Duringoneincidentlatercalledthesausagewar,the44th
UkrainianDivisionbrokethroughFinnishlinesonlytodiscoveranabandonedfieldkitchenthathadbeen

servingsausages.Madwithhunger,theUkrainiansrushedtogorgethemselvesonthemeat.Theirculinary
detourallowedtheFinnstoregroupandcounterattack,whichledtothedecimationoftheunit.Soonafter,
ordersweregiventoprioritizethetargetingofSovietfieldkitchenstoexacerbatetheirhungerand
psychologicalfrailtyevenfurther.
LiketheRomanscoutsofFabiusMaximus,Finnishrearguardunitsexcelledatstrategiesofdelayand
sabotage,riggingrecentlyevacuatedterritorywithdozensofboobytraps,forcingRedArmyunitstocomb
througheachhamlethousebyhouse,barnbybarn,inthenervewrackingdelousingoperationssofamiliar
tocounterinsurgencyspecialists.Insomecases,villagesweresimplysetaflameinabidtopreventthe
assailantsfromfindingshelterfromtheelementsforthenight.
SmallNations,PredatoryPowers,andtheValueofConscription:Switzerlanddoesnothaveanarmy,it
isanarmy.PrinceKlemensMetternich
Lastbutnotleast,FinlandsremarkableperformanceduringtheWinterWardemonstratesthecontinued
valueofconscriptionforsmall,lightlypopulatedcountriesnotshieldedbymilitaryalliancestructures.The
Finnishpeoplessavageresistanceorsisu(aFinnishtermthatcanlooselybetranslatedasgrit)bringsto
mindtheactionsofVietnamesedanqan(citizensoldiers)duringthe1979SinoVietnameseWar.
Vietnamscitizensoldiers,whohadreceivedsmallarmstrainingfromtheregularunitsofthePeoplesArmy
ofVietnam(PAVN),playedanimportantroleindelayingChinasadvance,disruptingitslinesof
communications,anddisplayinganunparalleledmasteryofjunglewarfare.
MuchlikeBritainsfamedstiffupperlipduringtheBlitz,thesisuexhibitedbythepeopleofFinlandduring
theWinterWarisnownestedatthecoreoftheNordicnationsnationalmythos.ForFinnishdefense
plannersliketheircounterpartsinnationssuchasSingaporeandIsraelconscriptionisviewedas
essentialtopreservingboththeircountrysmilitarystrengthanditsnationalunity(sisu)inthefaceoflarger
prospectiveadversaries.UnlikemostWesternEuropeannations,whichmovedawayfromterritorialdefense
attheendoftheColdWar,Finlandstillrequiresmilitaryserviceofitscitizens.Conscriptsarenotonly
draftedintotheregularArmy,butalsointotheBorderGuard,whichfallsunderthetutelageoftheInterior
Ministry.Inbothcases,rawrecruitsarerapidlyprovidedwithextensiveamountsofsurvivalandwinter
warfaretraining,withthegoalofenablingthemtooperatedeepinthewilderness,ifnecessary.Selectunits,
suchastheSpecialBorderJaegers,aredesignedtofightbehindenemylinesintheeventofalargescale
landinvasion.
WhenexaminingFinlandsforcestructureandconceptsofoperationforterritorialdefense,onecanthelp
butwonderwhyacountrysuchasTaiwan,whicharguablyfacesafarmoresevereconventionalthreat,
chosetogosuchadifferentwayandabandonconscription.Beyondthepoliticalexpediencyofsucha
gesture(conscriptionhasalwaysbeendeeplyunpopular),thereappearstobenoclearstrategicrationale
forthisseismicshiftintheislandnationsdefenseposture.Furthermore,itappearstohavealreadyproven
ruinouslyexpensive.
Inthesetimesofcreepingrevisionismandgrowinguncertainty,maybeitstimemoreofusbothinthe
UnitedStatesandoverseaslookedtowardshardylittleFinlandforinspirationinmattersofasymmetric
balancing.
IskanderRehmanisaPostdoctoralFellowintheProjectforInternationalOrderandStrategy(IOS),atthe
BrookingsInstitution.HecanbefollowedonTwitter@IskanderRehman.