ntroduction: the netherlands and the beginning of World War II

During WW-I The Netherlands had the Neutral status. Our pacifist Politic lead to a
deplorable state of our army in the 30's. In fact, we were divided in two camps at
that time, just a slight upper hand for the pacifists. Because we were only a small
country that would never be able to defend itself against a large invasion army, we
tried to maintain our neutral status.
When it became clear that Hitler had no peace in mind and the first skirmishes
started in Europe, Dutch politics changed rapidly and new laws were activated to
improve our army and general defense. Too late of course, our old fashion army could
never be modernized in time, not enough arms could be produced or bought in time
either.
At the time that Germany invaded The Netherlands on may 10 in 1940, only 40% of
the needed arms were present. Apart from an old Renault tank from WW-I, used for
training, we had no tanks at all! The only armoured material we could put into action
were 28 light armoured cars like the one on the photo. They did a great job defending
the airfields, inflicting a high number of casualties on the light armed German
Paratroopers.
Due to the circumstances as described above 50% of our artillery was dated 1880.
We had 120 planes, 60 of them old dual-winged reconnaissance planes. We had an
impressive number of bombers too, 9 to be exact. We had only 90.000 men (9
divisions of 10.000 men each), most badly trained soldiers, with no sufficient supplies
at all. With the mobilization we had a totall of 280.000 soldiers and officers.
This fighting force had to stand up against 460.000 (24 divisions of 17.700 men each)
German soldiers, well trained and equiped with modern gear. In addition 12000 well
trained German Paratroopers, with enormous supplies. Just for the record, our
neighbour Belgium had 650.000 soldiers at that same time.
Dutch defense strategy: 'Fortress Holland'

Because it would be impossible to defend the whole country against a German

invasion, it was decided to defend only the western part. This defense strategy was
called 'Vesting Holland' (Fortress Holland). It contained the major part of our big cities
en de largest port in the world; Rotterdam.
This strategy existed since hundreds of years and was mostly based on defense
works among the numerous rivers and canals. When an attack was eminent we would
slowly pull back behind these lines. The deserted terrain would be flooded by various
means of inundation. This way, it was thought, we could delay the advance long
enough and meanwhile wait for our allies to come to the rescue.
Political tensions also lead to serious differences among the military leaders.
Numerous requests for more financial and material support were denied. Also the
differences in opinion, between war minister Dijxhoorn and our supreme commander
of armed forces General Reynders, what strategy should be used, lead to the
resigning of the latter. He was replaced on February 6th by General H.G. Winkelman.
May 10th 1940: the attack

Fall Gelb, the masterplan from the German General 'Erich Von Mannstein' was the
basis for the attack of western Europe. A major attack through the Belgian Ardennes
(which was thought to be impossible), outstepping the strong French 'Maginot Line'
on the borders of Germany and France. It was by this maneuver that the German
forces could conquer large parts of the open area in northern France easily and strike
forward to the French coast with great speed.
It was because of this plan that Holland suddenly became strategic important. There
was great danger for an attack from Holland into the back of the advancing German
forces. Besides, Germany desperate needed the Dutch airfields to supply it's
advancing forces. During the raid on Holland history was written. Never before so
many paratroopers landed in such short time on enemy territory. All of Germany's
Airlanding forces (2 divisions from who no one knew the existence) including the
major part of Germany's air force, was put into action in The Netherlands. They were
put in action to capture the Dutch Airfields and the Royal Family.
Holland was attacked by Armygroup B under the command of the legendary Field
Marshall Fedor von Bock.
May 15th 1940: the surrender

Because the lines around Rotterdam were holding, and the German advance didn't
went as smooth as planned, Germany's high command feared that an invasion of
British troops in Holland could not be prevented if the battle in Holland would not be
ended very soon. A request for a pin point attack by bombers on Rotterdam was done
by the local commanders of the German forces (Student,Schmidt). However
Germany's supreme command (Goring in this case) changed this request in a total
bombardment of the city. Because Holland didn't want to give up that easy and due

to circumstances it was on may 15th 1940 that German bombers attacked Rotterdam
and killed 800 civilians. one third of the city was destroyed and all this while the
ultimatum was still in it's timeframe. It was because of this brutal way of warfare, and
the German threat for even more bombings on large Dutch cities, that The
Netherlands had no choice but to surrender on May 15 at Rijsoord.
Despite it's lack of decent weaponry, the small army and the overwhelming odds of
troops and war machinery against them, the Dutch put up a fears resistance.
Surrender only came after the barbaric bombardment of Rotterdam and the treat to
do the same to all other major cities. Where the invasion of Norway and Denmark
were accomplished with only minor losses, in Holland these losses were extremely
high. 2076 Dutch soldiers lost their lives, compared with the other Allied forces
involved in the invasion of Western Europe, we paid the highest price of all. More
then 4000 out of 12000 German paratroopers were put out of action. These extreme
high losses of troops and airplanes had direct consequences for the planned invasion
of Britain. Never would Germany carry out a large scale airlanding operation again
because of it's decimated airborne troops, loss of airplanes and the losses that were
to be expected like in Holland. 328 of 1024 German deployed aircraft were destroyed
in this battle.
relations to Operation Market Garden

A number of similarities to the German invasion of 1940 and Operation Market

Garden can be named. Some of them are pure coincidence, others are important. I
will name some of them:
1) Holland writes history: largest airborne operation of 12.000 German paratroopers
(1940). Targets: bridges and airfields.
Four years later Holland breaks it's own record when over 30.000 Allied paratroopers
land (1944). Targets: bridges.
2) Generalleutnant Kurt Student: Commander German Airborne Forces attacking
Holland in 1940.
This commander takes a severe hit in the head by his own troops, when he tries to
stop SS men firing during a seize fire, at the negotiating table. A few months before
Market Garden, Student returns as commander of the German Airborne Forces that
are all stationed in Holland. An Airborne expert, his knowledge is very important for
the Germans during OMG. He knows the territory. It is Student that delay's the
advance of XXX Corps which is the main reason for the failure of Operation Market
Garden. (1944)
3) SS Leibstandarte 'Adolf Hitler' div. battles around Arnhem and Rhenen. (1940)
Four year later men of these units return to the battle scene they knew from 1940 to
play a decisive roll in Market Garden. From interviews we know that many of them
still knew the area very well.

Right after the liberation of The Netherlands in may 1945,

my father made this beautiful drawing.
In remembrance to my dear mother and father, who we
miss so much.
prelude: ALLIES
Since the Allied Forces landing in Normandy the advance
of the front was much faster than expected and in August
1944 a frontline was established at the France-German
and Belgium-Dutch borders.
The intent of the landing (Operation Overlord) from the
Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Forces Europe,
'General Eisenhower', was to trusts forward a front as wide as possible to force
the Germans back to their own homeland.
Because of the high rate of speed of the advancing Allied Army, the situation in
August 1944 was different then was planned. Enormous logistical problems started to
develop to supply a fast fighting and advancing army, Eisenhower observed the same
problems that Hitler had during his Blitz-march into Russia (Moscow). The Allied
Forces were progressing faster then the supplies could be delivered. Because of the
fanatical commanders and quick advance, some of the Army Groups found
themselves in positions other then original planned and this was also creating
opportunities.
Once the advance slowly came to halt, Eisenhower had a difficult choice. Isolated
German units were dug in around important harbours in France and Belgium and
gave heavy opposition with good success. However the Allied Forces took one
harbour, if not the most important one, without any problems. The harbour of
Antwerp!
Because of the quick retreat the Germans didn't have time to destroy the harbour
installations. Most all docks and infrastructure were in working order. Only one thing
prevented the use of the harbour, and that was the 15th German Army under
command of Von Zangen occupied the North and South side of the waterway to
Antwerp (Westerschelde) and shipping was impossible.
Eisenhower had to take a number of difficult decisions.
the Allied armies and commanders
Even during WW II politics played a big role. Because Field-marshal Montgomery had
the most experience in battles, he received from Eisenhower the command for
Operation Overlord and its following battles. Public opinion in the United States in
August 1944 started to make waves, because General Bradley was still under
command of Montgomery, Eisenhower was ordered by the Chief of Staff General
Marshall to take direct command of all ground-troops. This changed the order of
command and all United State troops were under direct command of Eisenhower and
of the Commander in Chief (President of the United States) and not under
Montgomery.

The important Armies and their Commanders on the front line of the German and
Dutch borders were:
frontline: Belgium-Dutch border: 21ste British Army Group (Montgommery)
containing:
1st Canadian Army: (General Crerar) and 2nd British Army: (General Dempsey)
frontline: France-German border: 12th US Army Group (General Bradley)
containing:
US 1st Army (General Hodge) en US 3rd Army (General Patton)
Now that situation was changed due to the rapid advance, Eisenhower stood
isolated in his opinion about a wide frontal attack. Patton and Monty were of the
opinion that a swift spearhead in a small area would have better results. Other
commanders supported them in this. Now followed a discussion between
Eisenhower and his Generals about the strategy to follow. Patton wanted one
thing, spearhead to the town of Metz and its industrial area of the Saar. Monty
wanted via The Netherlands to spearhead into the industrial area of the Ruhr.
Both plans had its credits and if it weren't for the supplies he (Ike) wouldn't have
to choose. Eisenhower knew there was only one priority at the moment, he
needed a harbour close to the front, and Antwerp was the only harbour in allied
hands. And so Eisenhower gave the order to the already stagnant march to take
a break, temporarily stop and make Antwerp harbour operational and from there
re-evaluate the situation.
This was against the wishes of Montgomery; Monty was convinced that with the
supplies of Patton's 3rd Army he could advance quickly. Monty continues his request,
which ended up with confrontations between his boss, Eisenhower, and him. (An
important factor for the British to continue the attack into Holland is the numerous V2
launch-sites in Holland doing great damage to Britain). The key for the discision taken
in these discicive days are the only resources the Allied Forces had in their arsenal,
the First Allied Airborne Army under the command of the U.S. Lt-General Brereton.
Eisenhower was for sometime now pondering on how to find a way to involve the
airborne into this war. It was because of the harbour of Antwerp that Monty's troop
had the priority in the supplies. Monty's last pitch to Ike is to persuade him, and
activate the First Airborne Division in his plan MARKET GARDEN and because the
German Army resistance was growing, Eisenhower had a change of mind and gives
Monty the green light for his plan on one condition; that it had to be real fast and
quick.
And so completed the decision to go ahead with the Operation Market Garden and
the results of this action are of the utmost importance. Patton was raving mad and
blew a gasket, however he couldn't change anything to the situation. The First
Airborne Division is eager to jump into action, because during operation Overlord
time after time the drop zones (DZ) were over run by their own ground units before
they could even set foot on the ground.
the mistake

During these stirring times one thing is overlooked, isolation of the German 15th
Army lead by General Von Zangen.
The British forces neglected to advance another 30km (20 miles) and prevent the
escape of 80.000 German soldiers.

While a small contingent stays behind and defends the harbour of Breskens, the
whole army escapes via the islands of Zeeland to take position in the
surroundings of the Willems Kanaal in the line of Breda-Tilburg -Best.
The movement of the 15th Army was one of the first orders issued by Field
Marshall Von Rundstedt when he was back in command. He had allready seen
the risk that Von Zangen's Army would be surrounded and cut off by the
advancing Allied forces.
This causes grave delays for the troops of the Operation Market Garden. A delay that
will have great consequences for the operation.

prelude: AXIS
The most successful and decorated Germany Army Officer is without a doubt FieldMarshall ' Karl Rudolf Gerd Von Rundstedt'. He is the 'Oberbefehlshaber West'
(OBW) when the Allied Forces are landing in Normandy.
When the Germans in France on all fronts are retreating or being destroyed, the OBW
on the 2 July 1944 receives a phone-call from Hitler's Chief-of-Staff 'Wilhelm Keitel'
who asked Von Rundstedt what they should do? Von Rundstedt snaps back with the
answer 'End this war, idiots!' When Hitler hears about the answer, he fires Von
Rundstedt as OBW and announces that "the old man" probably can't handle his
duties anymore. Von Rundstedt is infuriated. Because of this and his handling the
invasion of Normandy, when he was severely restricted by the interference of Hitler
himself (he would have followed a totally different strategy).
Von Rundstedt is replaced by Field-marshal Gunther Von Kluge. A short time later an
assassination attempt on Hitler's life is attempted, and because Von Kluge is involved
with this he is called to appear in Hitler's headquarters. Von Kluge understands the
reasons and commits suicide on the way to the Fuhrer. Von Kluge is then replaced by
Field-marshal Walter Model who is not only OBW now but also Army-leader of
Army-Group B. An almost impossible task.
When in September the situation is further deteriorated Von Rundstedt is summonsed
by Hitler. Hitler wanted personally to testify the opinion of Karl (VR). Hitler sees that
the pure frontline commander Model is not fitting as OBW and puts Von Rundstedt
back in this function. In two months time, Von Rundstedt is the 4th OBW and is back
at his old post. Von Rundstedt is a model officer. Even though there are the futile
plans of Hitler, Von Rundstedt goes directly in action and takes a number of crucial
decisions, and Model can now give undivided attention to his 'Army-Group B'.
The military genius Von Rundstedt is; he estimates the situation immediately and
accurately. He notices the unusual stagnation of Monty's troops and concludes from
this, that there is an offensive developing. In conclusion he anticipates and executes
a number of important orders, including the following; The 15th Army under Von
Zangen has to attempt to escape the threatening cut off by Allied Forces. Later this
decision is of crucial importance in the execution of Operation Market Garden.

the Axis armies and commanders

The most important armies and its commanders on the German-Dutch borders
were now;
Frontline: Belgium- Dutch border; Army-Group B (Model) consisting of: 15th
Army: (General Von Zangen) and 7th Army: (Model ), Fallschirmjager Armee
(General K. Student)
Frontline: German - French border: Army-Group G (General Blaskowitz) (very
limited strength)
Now that Model is released from his position as OBW can he concentrate on the
things he is most suited for: the leadership of an Army on the front-line. Model isn't
the type for paperwork and meetings; he loves the action of the field. Still he is
standing for an almost impossible task, to set up a defense with a left over and ragtag army. On top of this he hasn't got any dependable armored protection in his
arsenal to call on.

His first orders are important in the running interference with Operation Market
Garden. He orders Bittrich to take his 2nd armored corps and gradually retreat from
the battles in France and settle in still tranquil country side of The Netherlands, to
recuperate and be re-supplied with personnel and equipment. The 1st Airborne Army
of Student is added to the Army-Group B and settles in the line of Breda - Tilburg Best.
Through this new (yet weak) defense-line the escaping and retreating troops from all
units of the defeating Germany Army are added. Student, the commander of the 1st
Airborne Army takes direct action and let most of his experience troops travel from
Germany to the line. On top of this the escaping 15th Army arrives along this line and
slowly a strong defense is built along the canals in the south of the Netherlands.
When in September the first armored vehicles of the 2nd SS Pantzerkorps arrive in
the Netherlands, we can talk of considerable troop concentration. It has to be said
that all sections were undermanned and was less then a fraction of the original
strength. There was however a large amount of anti-aircraft guns and field artillery.
The opposition against the Allied Forces was growing day by day...
the mistake
When the Germans are driven from Antwerp they are neglecting to destroy, for the
Allied Forces so important harbor installations. Also the other infrastructure is
completely intact. Bridges are mined but not ruined.
Is the optimist Model in the understanding that a counter-offensive is a possibility?
Even when on the first day the complete orders of Operation Market Garden are in his
hands, he distrust these and neglects to inform his superiors.

the attack plan: Operation Market Garden

By the beginning of September 1944, British, American and other allied forces
advancing rapidly from the Seine, had liberated most of France and Belgium.
After a short pause for re-organization, they were ready for further advances by
the middle of that month. Field-Marshal Montgomery felt that a pencil-like
thrust northward through Holland and then eastward into Germany, outflanking
the Siegfried Line and striking along the main route to Berlin across the plains of
Northern Germany, offered excellent prospects of bringing the war to an early end.
The first step was to secure the crossings of the rivers Rhine, Waal and Maas in the
general area Grave, Nijmegen and Arnhem. To achieve this he decided to lay a carpet
of airborne troops, who would seize and hold the crossings over these rivers and
facilitate the advance of the Second British Army northwards.
To the British First Airborne Division was allotted the task of capturing intact the
bridges at Arnhem and establishing a bridgehead round them so that formations of
the British Second Army could pass through without delay on their advance
northwards. The crossings at Nijmegen and Grave were to be taken by the 82nd
American Airborne Division and those between Grave and Eindhoven by the 101st
Airborne Division.
visualisation

Axis defense in September 1944

September 4 1944, Hitler made Field-marshal Walther Model commander of

B Army. When Model had arrived he was facing huge difficulties. His army was
split in two by the Allies. One half, the 15 th Army was located south of The
Westerschelde making an effort escaping to Brabant. The other half, the 17th
Army, was set-back to Maastricht and Aken by the American Army. Between the
two Army's lies a gap of 120 km.
Through this gap German soldiers and collaborators were escaping Northward in
panic. Model was a master in defensive actions. He had to save the Western front. By
acting fast the German flee was stopped. The 15th army succeeded in escaping to
Brabant, closing the gap. Now a strong defensive line was established again. The 9th
SS Hohenstaufen and the 10th SS Frundsberg armored-divisions were called back by
Model from Luik, to take a rest in the quiet surroundings of Arnhem and catch up from
their heavy exertion in the Normandy. The tanks were hidden in the wooded terrain,
repairs were made and the divisions supplied.
Commanding-officers were stationed in several places around Arnhem. Model himself
in Oosterbeek the village where the heaviest fighting would be taking place later. In
Wolfheze (the landing-zone) an SS training battalion was formed. Now, a large
concentration of various units were stationed in the Arnhem area, including Luftwaffe
troops from the nearby Deelen Airfield.
the frontline on September 17, 1944

The Dutch & Belgian - German border from Belgium to Nijmegen, is protected by the
strong German defense-line; 'Westwall' or as the Allies call it; 'The Siegfriedline'. It is
clear to see Montgomery wants to bypass this line in order to go around it and move
on to the industrial hart of Germany, The Ruhr-area. By taking this objective Germany
would soon be cut of from it's main war industry and soon be defeated.

It also shows a weak point. The large distance which the ground forces had to move,
in order to reach the main objective, Arnhem bridge. They had to move forward on a
long small single road. (Hells Highway).
Pre WWII studies from the Dutch Army learned that this would almost be impossible
to accomplish, as vehicles moving on this long small road would be easy targets for
air and ground attacks.
The soil on both sides of this road were to soft for heavy equipment.
Just the reason why the German invasion in Holland in 1940 was planned differently,
and also the reason why French help was not able to reach their targets in Holland on
time to assist the Dutch Forces, as secretly agreed by both countries in case of an
attack from Germany on France.

dropping zones as planned and the local situation

The map shows a number of foibles on the plan, wich were the cause of failure on the
Arnhem part.

1: The large distance between dropping-zone and main target.

2: Dropping in different lifts. (Not enough planes available for one large dropping.)
Only the first lift arrived on schedule. The rest were late (bad weather), on the wrong
spot and worse, not at all. Later on, supplies were dropt on the right spot but
unfortunatly those spots were already taken by the enemy at that time.
One of the weaknesses of Airborne troops is, they can't take enough wapens and
supplies at once. Therefore quick supplying is essential. In this case many supplies
were dropped on overrun zones. Because of strict orders to the pilots not to respond
to signals from the ground, adjustment of dropping-zones were not possible.
main target: Arnhem road bridge
Well, here it is. The main target for the
1st Airlandingbrigade, the road-bridge
of Arnhem. One mile downstream this
bridge there was a shipbridge, the
middle sections were removed a few
days before the landings, so it couldn't
be used for crossing.
Two Miles downstream of the river
Rhine, another crossing, the Railway

bridge. This bridge was blown up in the face of the first troops arriving to take it.
Five Miles downstream, the fourth rivercrossing, The Drielse Ferry. Some claim it was
was sunk on wednesday 20st by the Dutch ferryman Pieter Hensen. But records of
the engineers operating the ferry show that it was still beeing used on September
21st, so this story isn't thrue.
What makes it more unlikely is that we know that both parties needed the ferry badly.
The Brittish to get Polish reinforcements from Driel across to Oosterbeek and the
Germans to get troops across to Nijmegen.
The houses direct to the left and to the right of the bridge, offering a splendid
strategic position to overlook the bridge directly. This air-reconaissance photo is taken
in 1939 when Arnhem Bridge was completed.
enemy positions on 17 september

Brittish Intelligence did not take notice of the warnings of the Dutch resistance.
Though MI6 didn't trust Dutch resistance very much, it was one of the best organised
resistance networks in the world and it had send detailed reports about the growing
strenght of German troops.
Alarming was the presence of headquarters of the 9.SS and 10.SS divisions as you
can see on this map. Dutch resistance spotted staf-cars of high SS officers. They also
notified Brittish intelligence about the presence of armoured cars and tanks in the
woods around Arnhem. Also present are the Dutch SS (!) trainees, and the SS
trainings school of Major Josef Krafft.

And there is the strong presence of Luftwaffe forces around the airfield of Deelen.
Near the airfield, the location of a large Bunker-complex called DIOGENES,
headquarters of '3rd Jagddivision', which still exists today beeing used by the
government as storage-facillity for important documents
the 3 discisive factors for Arnhem landings

1: It was thought that the enemy flak from Deelen airfield and the town of Arnhem
was likely to be too intense to permit aircraft carrying parachute troops or towing
gliders to pass over or close to those areas. Therefore the landings could not be
carried out on the open ground south of Arnhem and close to the bridges. The only
alternative landing areas were the large open spaces north and south of the railway
west of Wolfheze station.
2: With the numbers of aircraft and gliders available it would take three separate lifts
to transport the whole Division and the Polish Brigade to the area.
3: The enemy situation. Information on this was rather scanty. In brief, the Division
was informed that immediate opposition was unlikely to exceed a force of about three
thousand men with some tanks. In fact, the major part of the 2nd S.S. Panzer Corps
was reorganizing in the Arnhem area at that time.
outlines

From consideration of these and other factors the Divisional Commander decided
upon a plan the outline of which was as follows. The Division would land by daylight
in three lifts on three consecutive days. On the first day the lst Parachute Brigade
would land by parachute in the area west of Wolfheze with the task of advancing
rapidly into Arnhem and seizing the road and the railway bridges over the river. At
the same time part of the 1st Airlanding Brigade, Divisional Headquarters and as
many supporting troops as could be fitted in would land by glider in the area
immediately North West of Wolfheze Station.
The task of the Airlanding Brigade was to secure the dropping and landing zones for
the second lift on the next day. Thes upporting troops consisted of parts of the
Divisional Artillery both field and anti-tank guns, Engineers, and the Divisional

Reconnaissance Regiment with a proportion of Administrative troops. To lift the lst

Parachute Brigade and this force 161 parachute aircraft of the U.S. 9th Troop Carrier
Command and 297 gliders and tug aircraft of 38 and 46 Groups RAF were required.
With the second lift on the second day would come the 4th Parachute Brigade landing
on a dropping zone between Planken Wambuis and the railway, and the remainder of
the Airlanding Brigade. They would be carried in 126 parachute aircraft and 305
gliders. A further 35 aircraft would drop supplies at the same time. And on the third
day the lst Polish Parachute Brigade Group were to land South of the main bridge, it
being estimated that by that time enemy flak in Arnhem would no longer be
operative.
They would be carried in 114 parachute aircraft and 45 gliders. At the same time 163
aircraft would drop supplies for the 1st Airborne Division. The task of the Airlanding
Brigade, when the landing and dropping zones no longer needed to be secured, the
4th Parachute Brigade and the 1st Polish Parachute Brigade Group was to form a
perimeter round Arnhem leaving the 1st Parachute Brigade holding the bridges and in
reserve. The sectors to be held by them were respectively West, North and East of
the town, the Polish Parachute Brigade crossing the river on arrival to reach their
sector.
D-Day: 17 september

The day selected for the operation was Sunday, 17th September, 1944. The weather
was fine and the flight from England uneventful. Landings commenced at one o'clock
in the afternoon, were most successful and accomplished practically without
opposition, the troops being enthusiastically received by the local population. Within
two and a half hours of the start of the landings, battalions of the 1st Parachute
Brigade had started their advance to capture the bridges. And by half past eight that
evening after overcoming and bypassing a certain amount of opposition the 2nd
Parachute Battalion under command of Lieutenant-Colonel J. D. Frost had captured
the north end of the main road bridge.
One company of this Battalion had been detached to capture the railway bridge, but
this was blown up as they arrived at it. Thereafter the company were surrounded,
forced to break out and were never able to reform and join their Battalion at the main
bridge. The major part of the Headquarters of the 1st Parachute Brigade however
reached the bridge later that night.
Unfortunately they were without their commander, Brigadier Lathbury, who with
General Urquhart had been visiting the 3rd Parachute Battalion and had been forced
by enemy activity to remain with it. This Battalion and the 1st Parachute Battalion
had also both advanced eastwards, the former to support the advance of the 2nd
Parachute Battalion and the latter to seize certain high ground north of Arnhem so as

to deny the enemy observation on the town of Arnhem. Both these attacks met with
serious and increasing resistance, which held up this advance. During the night and
morning of the 18th September, determined efforts were made by both battalions to
advance, and some progress was made despite heavy casualties, a position near the
St. Elizabeth Hospital being reached. On the 17th September the remainder of the
troops in the first lift had comparatively quiet night.
Early on the morning of the 18th enemy activity in the area of the dropping and
landing zones increased and at the same time, though information was very scanty, it
was clear that all was not well with the 1st Parachute Brigade. Brigadier Hicks, who
had by now taken over command in the absence of General Urquhart, decided to
reinforce the 1st Parachute Brigade immediately, and on the arrival of the second lift
to divert part of the 4th Parachute Brigade to this task also. The latter were due to
start landing at ten o'clock on the morning of the 18th, but due to the weather in
England their take-off was delayed, and they did not start dropping until about three
o'clock in the afternoon. Although there was more opposition than on the previous
day, the landings were carried out south of Planken Wambuis very satisfactorily.
St. Elizabeth Hospital - De Brink - Museum

Unfortunately on the 19th neither the 4th Parachute Brigade nor the force trying to
break through to the bridge was successful. As a result General Urquhart, who had by
now rejoined his Headquarters in the Hartenstein Hotel, decided after visiting
Brigadier Hackett, the Commander of the 4th Parachute Brigade, that this Brigade
should disengage from its present position and move south of the railway to an area
about the road and railway crossings south of De Koepel, west of De Brink, and at
Oosterbeek Laag. It was hoped that it would be possible from this position to develop
further operations for the reinforcement of the force holding the bridge.

click on the map for a full scale overview

By the evening of the 18th September the situation was as follows: 2nd Parachute
Battalion with certain other elements holding firm on the north end of the Arnhem
Bridge, the other two Battalions of the 1st Parachute Brigade trying to break through
in the general area of the St. Elizabeth Hospital and De Brink. On their way to join
them were the 2nd Battalion, The South Staffordshire Regiment of the 1st Airlanding
Brigade and the 11th Parachute Battalion of the 4th Parachute Brigade, with a view to
a further attack being made on the 19th. The rest of the 4th Parachute Brigade was
concentrated in the area of Wolfheze and to the west of it with a view to attacking
eastwards along the railway.
However the 4th Parachute Brigade were very heavily engaged on the evening of the
19th September in moving south of the railway about Wolfheze and again on the
morning of the 20th, when they started their move eastwards. By the end of that day
some 200 men, all that were left of that Brigade, which then included the 156th and
10th Parachute Battalions, had assembled in the Hartenstein area and were placed in
position covering the approaches to Hartenstein along the main road from Arnhem. In
the meanwhile all efforts on the 19th September to reach the bridge had failed and
the remnants of the 1st, 3rd and 11th Parachute Battalions and of the 2nd Battalion
The South Staffordshire Regiment had reassembled in the area of Oosterbeek Church,
where they were reorganized into a composite force by Major Lonsdale of the 11th
Parachute Battalion, this force thereafter being known as Lonsdale Force.
Two battalions of the 1st Parachute Brigade advancing to the bridge, are confronted
by tanks and self-propelled guns, they have already suffered heavy losses in fierce
street-fighting. In the night of Monday-Tuesday they are in the system of streets west
of the St. Elizabeth Hospital, to this mazy area have also been directed the 11 th
Parachute Battalion which forms part of the 4th Parachute Brigade landed on the
Ginkelse Heide near Ede on Monday afternoon, and elements of the 2nd Battalion
South Staffordshires, who have been withdrawn from the defence of the landing
zones near Wolfheze. The orders these troops have received from Divisional
Headquarters are to push through to the road bridge at Arnhem and to relieve Frost's
battalion from its encirclement. The 600 men at the bridge were fighting heavy,
many already dead or wounded and short on ammunition.

On Tuesday at early dawn they launch their attack: the two parachute battalions via
Onderlangs (the low road), the other two battalions along the Utrechtseweg
'Bovenover' (the high road). The action in this narrow corridor between the deep
railway cutting on one side and the river on the other side is a signal failure. Along
Onderlangs the paratroops initially manage to penetrate to the Oude Haven, but then
they are beaten back by a frontal German counter-attack supported by murderous
fire from the brick-yard on the opposite bank of the river (Heavy machine guns and
80mm AA guns).

With great difficulty, less than a hundred men succeed to regain their starting point,
the Rhine Pavilion. Here they return at 8 a.m. At that time, the attack along the
Utrechtseweg has been checked at the narrowest point of the corridor near the
Municipal Museum and the offices of the P.G.E.M. (County Electricity Board). For a few
hours the South Staffordshires, who form the vanguard, succeed in warding off the
thrusts of the selfpropelled guns of the Hohenstaufen Division, but a about noon the
Germans break through and repel them to the St. Elisabeth Hospital. There a chaotic
situation develops which might well be said to be typical of the Battle of Arnhem.
General Urquhart, whom his troops have been unable to trace or contact since
Sunday evening, because he had been cut off en route to Arnhem and had been
compelled to seek safety by hiding in a house in this same area in order to avoid
being killed or taken prisoner by the Germans, has in the meantime returned to
Divisional Headquarters in Hartenstein. Since he realizes that the situation of his
division is becoming critical - west of Oosterbeek German pressure is likewise
increasing steadily, whilst attempts of the 4th Parachute Brigade to break through
the German Sperrlinie near the Johannahoeve, north of the railway line UtrechtArnhem, are entirely ineffectual - he has ordered the 11th Battalion to break off
fighting on the Utrechtseweg and to retreat to a new, defensive line further west.
The battalion starts preparing for this withdrawal, as soon as the commanding officer
has dispatched a runner to inform the South Staffordshires; however, they do not
receive the message and are still under the impression that they can fall back on the
positions of the llth. Battalion, but when they have to give way to the German
counter- attack they land up in the middle of a German column ready to march off. In
the resulting confusion the british suffer heavy losses. Thus, of the four battalions
wich have taken part in the attempted break-through to the bridge,only remnants
succeed in falling back to Oosterbeek in the course of the day. To the battalion
surrounded near the bridge this means that their only hope of rescue is the advent of
the second army.
all wounded recieve equal treatment
During the battle, The St. Elisabeth Hospital, was used by British as well as German
army doctors assisted by Dutch medical personel, to take care of the wounded on
both sites. The civilian patients were evacuated by the Germans. During the battle
there also has been a truce, in order to evacuate the dead and wounded on both
sites.

Arnhem Bridge

During 18-19 September, most of the Hohenstaufen's available armour, joined by the
Kampfgruppe Knaust launched heavy attacks from the north-east. Eventually pinned

down by superior numbers of infantry, Frost's battalion was reduced by artillery, and
the concentrated fire of the SP's and tanks who were able to roam virtually at will.
On the bridge at Arnhem on the 19th and 20th the defenders were continually
attacked, shelled and mortared. The houses which they were holding were set
on fire, food and ammunition ran low, and the numbers of wounded continually
mounted. Nevertheless the position was still held. However by the evening of
the 20th nearly all the houses held had been set on fire and there was nowhere
to put the wounded. During the night enemy infiltration made the position
worse.
At about the time that John Frost was wounded, the bridge force lost one of its
most important positions. In the substantial Van Limburg Stirum School building,
halfway along the eastern side of the ramp embankment running down to the
town, the combined force of Royal Engineers and 3rd Battalion men who had
held this exposed position throughout the battle, with no heavier weapon than a
Bren gun, were about to be overwhelmed. About thirty men remained
unwounded, but ammunition was low and there was no food or water.
Either a German tank standing on the ramp only seventy yards away or a German
gun further away started systematically blowing away the roof and top store of the
building, where most of the defenders were positioned. One shell set the roof ablaze;
another burst where two of the 3rd Battalion officers, Major Lewis and Lieutenant
Wright, were taking their turns to rest, injuring both officers. What did happen next
became an emotive subject among the defenders. There were no means of putting
out the fire, and it was obvious that the building had to be evacuated. Captain
Mackay appointed a party of sappers to remain at their positions to prevent any
German attack over the surrounding ground while the evacuation took place. The
wounded were brought up from the basement, the eight seriously hurt being carried
on doors or mattresses. Meanwhile, the shelling of the upper part of the building had
continued, and one of the rearguard positions was hit with two men being killed and
one badly crushed.
Captain Mackay returned to the building to fetch out the remainder of the rearguard.
The intention now was for the whole party to move to a nearby building, the one
evacuated by the Royal Engineers on the Sunday night. Men were being hit outside
the school, and Major Lewis called out from his mattress: 'Time to put up the white
flag'. Some men being unwounded, felt guilty about allowing themselfes to be
captured, so they called out to ask if the fit men could attempt to get out. He shouted
back that they could. This news was passed to the RE' s. About ten men, including
Captains Robinson and Mackay, then dashed across the road into the gardens of
some houses to the east, only to be discovered later and taken prisoner. (Mackay
eventually escaped and reached England).
A sapper was sent to the top of the embankment with a white towel tied to his rifle
but was immediately struck on both legs by a burst of machine-gun fire. He died of
those wounds five months later. The Germans closed in, and the firing ceased. So
ended the gallant defense of the Van Limburg Stirum School.
At five o'clock on the morning of the 21st an attempt to retake some houses failed
and it was clear that the end had come. Those remaining split into small parties and
tried to break out. All opposition at the bridge now ceased. The task of the 1st
Parachute Brigade had been to seize and hold this bridge. Those who reached it did

this for nearly four days under continual attack and fire and against increasing and
ultimately overwhelming odds.
Oosterbeek perimeter
At nine o'clock on the morning of the 21st September, General Urquhart held a
conference at his Headquarters to organize a defensive perimeter of those troops
that remained. These were divided into two forces, one under Brigadier Hicks, the
other under Brigadier Hackett. They were to hold a position with its base on the river
Rhine, and running from the area of Oosterbeek Church northwards across the main
road to Arnhem to the neighbourhood of Graftombe, thence its western flank passed
a few hundred yards west of the Hartenstein Hotel to Heveadorp. This position during
the battle did contract and individual enemy troops were to infiltrate into, but despite
intense German efforts it never gave way.
1st Polish Parachute Brigade Group

It is now necessary to recount the activities of the 1st Polish Parachute Brigade
Group. Its anti-tank battery had landed in gliders in the midst of the battle on the
18th and 19th September and been absorbed into the 1st Airborne Division on the
north side of the river. Because of the altered course of the events, the Brigade itself
could not be dropped on the 19th September as planned. It was clear also that it
could not carry out its original task of landing south of the main Arnhem bridge,
crossing it and occupying a position east of Arnhem. A dropping zone was therefore
selected for the Poles east and north-east of Driel on which they landed on the
evening of 21st September with the task of holding a firm bridgehead on the south
bank of the river in that area.

During the flight a radio

message came in that the
group had to return because
of bad weather. 2/3 of the
Armada turned home but
Sosabowski ordered his
group to keep flying.
Therefore the Polish Brigade
landed at Driel without the
heavy weapons and only at
1/3 of it's strenght and with
no up-to-date information or
intelligence on the situation.
Beside that they landed in
occupied territory and during
the landing they were shot
at from all sites. It was a
miracle that only few
casualties occured during
the landing.
That night their patrols found that the Heveadorp ferry had been sunk and that the
north bank of the river at that point was in enemy hands, meantime during the 20th
and 21st enemy attacks on the Divisional perimeter had been continuous and the
whole area was being submitted to an intense bombardment by every kind of shell,
mortar and bomb the enemy possessed. Hand to hand fighting with enemy infantry
and close range engagements with enemy gun and flamethrowing tanks were
frequent occurrences. It was imperative that if the British Second Army were to take
advantage of this small remaining bridgehead on the north bank of the river they
should do so immediately.
Reinforcement of the perimeter was also essential if it was to remain of sufficient size
to cover a crossing of the river in force. However it was only by the night of 20th
September that a gallant operation by the British Guards Armoured Division and
the American 82nd Airborne Division had succeeded in capturing the bridge at
Nijmegen, and despite all efforts made it was not until the evening of the 23rd
September that the 43rd British Infantry Division succeeded in reaching the
south bank of the river west of Driel in force. They were too late for any major
crossing to be attempted that night.
Nevertheless efforts had been made on the night of the 22nd September to get
as many of the Polish Parachute Brigade as possible across the river from south
to north. As a result of enemy action and a shortage of boats or rafts only some
50 men got over. The following night the Polish Parachute Brigade again tried to
cross the river in force and, after many casualties, they ferried over a further
200 officers and men.
Sosabowski was a very expirienced officer. He had fought against the Germans
in 1939 when Poland was invaded and was one of the few commanders who was still
booking succes against the Germans when the battle in Poland was allready lost.
Sosabowksi analysed the situation. He still saw a change to turn the tide in favour of
the allies. A major crossing downstream close to Wageningen would offer the
opportunity to attack the Germans in the back and rescue the remainder of 1st
Airborne Divison and also establish a bridgehead further upstream.

But his superiors saw it all different. He was ignored and at the Valburg conference
became clear that the British Commanders were allready looking for a scapegoat. It
was decided that a Battalion of the Dorset Regiment and 1st Battalion of the Polish
Brigade would try to cross the river under command of XXX Corps. Sosabowski made
clear that there was absolutely no chance of success to cross the river on that spot
where the Germans were in control of the higher grounds on the opposite bank of the
river. He was ignored and send away in a very unpolite way. So on the nigth of the
24th September the 4th Battalion The Dorset Regiment of the 43rd British Infantry
Division made a attempt to cross the river led by their Commanding Officer,
Lieutenant-Colonel G. Tilly. There were not enough boates for the 1st Polish Battalion.
The landings were very scattered owing to enemy fire and the swift river current, and
the battalion was never able to concentrate on landing. It was a total failure and a
waste of troops and the outcome made no difference at all.
the withdrawal

By the morning of the 25th September it was clear to General Urquhart, the landings
during the previous night having failed, that heavy casualties, fatigue, and lack of
ammunition, food and water were exercising an increasing effect on the defenders of
the perimeter and that further strong enemy offensive action might cause its
defences to disintegrate. It was at this time that a message was received from 2nd
Army stating the possibility of the withdrawal of the lst Airborne Division southwards
across the river. General Urquhart immediately replied that if this withdrawal was to
be carried out, it must be done on the night of the 25th September and no later. A
signal confirming that the withdrawal would be that night was soon after received.
Enemy action during the 25th September was fortunately less intense than on
previous days, and by ten o'clock that night the withdrawal began in a storm of wind
and rain and strong artillery and machinegun support from the south bank of the
river, which all helped to deaden sounds of movement. By dawn on the morning of
the 26th approximately 1700 men of the 1st Airborne Division together with about
420 pilots had been ferried across the river, 300 men remaining on the north bank,
all who could swim having already done so. These were all that remained from a force
of 10.000 men.
The courageous British and Canadian sappers did everything in their power to rescue
the trapped para's, a very dangerous job. When the first 3 Canadian storm boats
went in the water, one of them recieved a direct hit by a stray mortar. The dramatic
incident was observed from both sides of the river. The result was that all three
engineers in the first boat and another 2 in the second were killed.
One of the casualties from the first stormboat was the Canadian Sapper Harold C.
Magnusson. His body was recoverd from the river on 14-11-1944 far downstream

near Gorkum together with a Polish soldier. Harold was 22 years of age. It was only in
oktober 2003 the family got to know what had happend exactly to Harold.
the end of the battle of Arnhem

Thus ended the Battle for Arnhem, but no account of it would be complete without
mention of the heroic efforts made during the battle by the Royal Air Force and the
United States Air Force to supply the 1st Airborne Division with ammunition, food,
and other supplies by air, by the medical services in their treatment of the wounded,
and by the local population by the information they gave, their efforts to succour the
wounded and aid the escape of those left behind.
The Royal Air Force had to contend with bad weather, intense opposition from
fighters and flak and lack of exact knowledge of where to drop supplies, the planned
dropping zones not being in the Division's hands. No wonder that much of the
supplies dropped fell into enemy hands, but if ever men of the 1st Airborne Division
needed inspiration it was provided by the sight of the supply dropping aircraft flying
straight and level through the flak, and continuing to do so even when on fire until
they had dropped their supplies.
After the battle, the medical personnel of the Division were evacuated with the
casualties to Apeldoorn. The majority became prisoners, but some, including
Brigadier Hackett, who had been seriously wounded during the battle, and Colonel
Warrack, the Chief Medical Officer of the Division, succesfully escaped. Many others
including Brigadier Lathbury were concealed and fed by the local population, while
arrangements for their escape were made.
No praise can be too high for all those Dutch men and women who risked their lives
in this way. Within a month of the withdrawal of the Division a party of 120 officers
and men had crossed the river in a body. Thereafter escaping became much more
difficult but for a considerable period odd groups of men continued to infiltrate across
the river into the British lines.
the results
In conclusion, it is necessary to sum up the results of this battle. In the opinion of
Field-Marshall Montgomery the action of the British 1st Airborne Division against
overwhelming odds held off reinforcements from Nijmegen and vitally contributed to
the capture of the bridge there. On this account alone the considered that the battle
had been ninety percent succesful. Finally in a letter to General Urquhart written on
the 28th September 1944 he said as follows:
' In the annals of the British Army there are many glorious deeds. In our Army we
have always drawn great strength and inspiration from past traditions, and

endeavoured to live up to the high standards of those who have gone before. But
there can be few episodes more glorious than the epic of Arnhem, and those that
follow after will find it hard to live up to the high standards that you have set. So long
as we have in the armies of the British Empire, officers and men who will do as you
have done, then we can indeed look forward with complete confidence to the future.'
In years to come it will be a great thing for a man to be able to say: 'I fought at
Arnhem'
fter the battle

Soon Arnhem became frontline and The Bridge was destroyed by the RAF and USAAF
in October to prevent the Germans reinforcing their positions on 'the Island' (space
between the rivers Waal and Rijn). Once again in the second World War our bridge
was destroyed. (1940 &1944). Arnhem and Oosterbeek where to suffer from
numerous artillery shelling and air raids to come.
arnhem destroyed

The people of Arnhem and Oosterbeek were evacuated. Arnhem became a ghost
town. When the people returned many saw their houses destroyed and possessions
taken away. They had to start all over again.
the casualties

Not only many soldiers lost their lives here. Many civilians became victims of

brutalities and where shot without reason. Dutch resistance lost many members that
had proven so valuable during the battle and where so badly needed for the coming
winter.
The winter of 1944-1945 went into history as 'starvation-winter'. Over 100.000
civilians died of hunger in this winter. Many Dutch where put on transport for forced
labor in German factories the last few months of the war, many never returned.
the beaten...

Lieutenant J. Reynolds expresses his anger and disappointment to the

German photographers by giving them 'the finger' when he is taken away at the
Museum on Utrechtseweg Arnhem.
(photoframe center)

and the 'loot' is going to the fatherland

The houses depraved from everything that could be used for defense works. Over
10.000 doors were removed to cover the system of trenches along the river Rijn.
Properties systematically stolen and put on transport to Germany by the
'Feldwirtschafts-commando' and 'Bergungscommando'. With the city evacuated,
signs like these could be placed without danger. Photographer De booys risked his life
shooting many photo's of these events. (photos: De Booys)
The Bridge

The building of Arnhem Road Bridge started in 1932 and was completed in 1935. In
May 1940 during the invasion of Holland the Bridge was destroyed by the Dutch
Army. After Holland was captured the Germans reinstated the original ship bridge that
connected both parts of the town before the bridge was build in 1935. It was only in
September 1944, 3 weeks before the start of OMG that the Bridge was finally
repaired again by the Germans. There were now 2 bridges operational. The main
Bridge and the Ship bridge. It was only a few days before the operation, that the
middle sections of the ship bridge were removed and stored a few hundred meters
downstream. One of the original ships is recovered some year ago. It is beeing
restored for display as we speak. It was in Oktober 1944 when allied bombers
destroyed Arnhem bridge. In April 1945 when Holland was liberated, the Canadians
first build a double pontoon bridge (Campbell Bridge)on the spot were the ship bridge
had been. At the same time the construction of a bailey Bridge was started just east
of the destroyed road bridge. It was opend on June 8th, 1945. Finally in 1950 the
rebuild road bridge was opend again.