I.

Classification of Property, Articles 414-426

1. Star Two SPV-AMC Inc. v. Paper Corporation of the Philippines, 692 SCRA 439
2. Laurel v. Abrogar, 576 SCRA 41
3. BPI Family Bank v. Franco, 538 SCRA 184
4. Leung Yee v. Strong Machinery, 37 Phil 644
5. Prudential Bank v. Panis, 153 SCRA 390
6. Sergs Products v. PCI Leasing, 338 SCRA 499
7. Evangelista v. Alto Surety & Insurance Co., 103 Phil 401
8. Davao Sawmill v. Castillo, 61 Phil 709
9. Tsai v. Court of Appeals, 366 SCRA 324
10. Mindanao Bus Co. v. City Assessor, 6 SCRA 197
11. MERALCO v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals 114 SCRA 260
12. Lo v. KJS Eco-Formwork System Phil Inc., 413 SCRA 182
13. Woodrige School, Inc. v. ARB Construction Co., Inc., 516 SCRA 176
14. Zarate v. Director of Lands, 434 SCRA 322
15. Secretary of DENR v. Yap, 568 SCRA 164
16. Republic of the Philippines (Phil. Reclamation Authority) v. City of Paranaque,
677 SCRA 246
17. Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, 704 SCRA 561
Star
Two
SPV-AMC
Inc. v. Paper
Corporation
of
the
Philippines,
692
SCRA
439

By contracts, all uncontested in this case, machineries and equipments

(sic) are included in the mortgage in favor of RCBC, in the foreclosure
of the mortgage and in the consequent sale on foreclosure also in favor
of petitioner.
Law and jurisprudence provide and guide that even if not expressly
so stated, the mortgage extends to the improvements. (Art 2127)
The real estate mortgage over the machineries and equipments (sic) is
even in full accord with the classification of
such properties by the Civil Code of the Philippines as immovable
property. Thus:
Article 415. The following are immovable property:
(1) Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds

adhered to the soil;

xxxx
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the
owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried
on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet
the needs of the said industry or works;
Laurel
v. Interest in business was not specifically enumerated as personal
Abrogar, 576 property in
SCRA 41
the Civil Code in force at the time the above decision was rendered.
Yet, interest in business was declared to be personal property since
it is capable of appropriation and not included in the
enumeration of real properties. Article 414 of the Civil Code
provides that all things which are or may be the object of
appropriation are considered either real property or personal
property. Business is likewise not enumerated as personal
property under the Civil Code. Just like interest in business,
however, it may be appropriated. Following the ruling in
Strochecker v. Ramirez, 44 Phil. 933 (1922), business should also be
classified as personal property. Since it is not included in the
exclusive enumeration of real properties under Article 415, it is
therefore, personal property.
It was conceded that in making the international phone calls,
the human voice is converted into electrical impulses or electric
current which are transmitted to the party called. A telephone call,
therefore, is electrical energy. It was also held in the assailed
Decision that intangible property such as electrical energy is
capable of appropriation because it may be taken and carried away.
Electricity is personal property under Article 416 (3) of the Civil
Code, which enumerates forces of nature which are brought under
control by science.
BPI Family
Bank
v.
Franco, 538
SCRA 184

BPIFBs argument is unsound. To begin with, the movable property

mentioned in Article 559 of the Civil Code pertains to a specific or
determinate thing. A determinate or specific thing is one that is
individualized and can be identified or distinguished from others of

the same kind.

In this case, the deposit in Francos accounts consists of money
which, albeit characterized as a movable, is generic and fungible. The
quality of being fungible depends upon the possibility of the property,
because of its nature or the will of the parties, being substituted by
others of the same kind, not having a distinct individuality.
There is no doubt that BPIFB owns the deposited monies in the
accounts of Franco, but not as a legal consequence of its unauthorized
transfer of FMICs deposits to Tevestecos account. BPIFB conveniently
forgets that the deposit of money in banks is governed by the Civil
Code provisions on simple loan or mutuum. As there is a debtorcreditor relationship between a bank and its depositor, BPIFB
ultimately acquired ownership of Francos deposits, but such
ownership is coupled with a corresponding obligation to pay him an
equal amount
on demand.
Although BPIFB owns the deposits in Francos accounts, it cannot
prevent him from demanding payment of BPIFBs obligation by
drawing checks against his current account, or asking for the release
of the funds in his savings account. Thus, when Franco issued checks
drawn against his current account, he had every right as creditor to
expect that those checks would be honored by BPIFB as debtor.
Leung Yee v. A factory building is real property, and the mere fact that it is
Strong
mortgaged and sold, separate and apart from the land on which it
Machinery
stands, in no wise changes its character as real property.
Prudential
Bank
v.
Panis,
153
SCRA 390

In the enumeration of properties under Article 415 of the Civil Code

of the Philippines, this Court ruled that, "it is obvious that the
inclusion of 'building' separate and distinct from the land, in said
provision of law can only mean that a building is by itself an
immovable property."
Thus, while it is true that a mortgage of land necessarily includes, in
the absence of stipulation of the improvements thereon, buildings, still

a building by itself may be mortgaged apart from the land on which it

has been built. Such a mortgage would be still a real estate mortgage
for the building would still be considered immovable property even if
dealt with separately and apart from the land (Leung Yee vs. Strong
Machinery Co., 37 Phil. 644). In the same manner, this Court has also
established that possessory rights over said properties before title is
vested on the grantee, may be validly transferred or conveyed as in a
deed of mortgage (Vda. de Bautista vs. Marcos, 3 SCRA 438 [1961]).
Sergs
Products v.
PCI Leasing,
338
SCRA
499

In the present case, the machines that were the subjects of the Writ of
Seizure were placed by petitioners in the factory built on their own
land. Indisputably, they were essential and principal elements of their
chocolatemaking industry. Hence, although each of them was
movable or personal property on its own, all of them have become
immobilized by destination because they are essential and principal
elements in the industry. In that sense, petitioners are correct in
arguing that the said machines are real, not personal, property
pursuant to Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code.

Evangelista
v.
Alto
Surety
&
Insurance
Co., 103 Phil
401

A house is not personal property, much less a debt, credit or other

personal property capable of manual delivery, but immovable
property. "A true building (not merely superimposed on the soil), is
immovable or real property, whether it is erected by the owner of the
land or by a usufructuary or lessee" (Laddera vs. Hodges, 48 Off. Gaz.,
5374.) and the attachment of such building is subject to the provisions
of subsection (a) of section 7, Rule 59 of the Rules of Court.

Davao
Sawmill
Castillo,
Phil 709

A lessee placed machinery in a building erected on land belonging

v. to another, with the understanding that the machinery was not
61 included in the improvements which would pass to the lessor on the
expiration or abandonment of the land leased. The lessee also treated
the machinery as personal property by executing chattel mortgages in
f favor of third persons. The machinery was levied upon by the sheriff
as personalty pursuant to a writ of execution obtained without any
protest being registered. Held: That the machinery must be classified
as personal property.
Machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes

immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner of the property or

plant, but not when so placed by a tenant, a usufructuary, or any
person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the
agent of the owner.
Tsai v. Court Petitioners contend that the nature of the disputed machineries, i.e.,
of Appeals, that they were heavy, bolted or cemented on the real property
366
SCRA mortgaged by EVERTEX to PBCom, make them ipso facto immovable
324
under Article 415 (3) and (5) of the New Civil Code. This assertion,
however, does not settle the issue. Mere nuts and bolts do not
foreclose the controversy. We have to look at the parties intent. While
it is true
that the controverted properties appear to be immobile, a perusal of
the contract of Real and Chattel Mortgage executed by the parties
herein gives us a contrary indication. In the case at bar, both the trial
and the appellate courts reached the same finding that the true
intention of PBCom and the owner, EVERTEX, is to treat machinery
and equipment as chattels.

Mindanao
Bus Co. v.
City
Assessor, 6
SCRA 197

MERALCO
v.
Central
Board
of

Too, assuming arguendo that the properties in question are

immovable by nature, nothing detracts the parties from treating it as
chattels to secure an obligation under the principle of estoppel. As far
back as Navarro v. Pineda, 9 SCRA 631 (1963), an immovable may be
considered a personal property if there is a stipulation as when it is
used as security in the payment of an obligation where a chattel
mortgage is executed over it, as in the case at bar.
Movable equipments, to be immobilized in contemplation of Article
415 of the Civil Code, must be the essential and principal elements of
an industry or works which are carried on in a building or on a piece
of land. Thus, where the business is one of transportation, which is
carried on without a repair or service shop, and its rolling equipment
is repaired or serviced in a shop belonging to another, the tools and
equipments in its repair shop which appear movable are merely
incidentals and may not be considered immovables, and, hence, not
subject to assessment as real estate for purposes of the real estate tax.
It is incontestable that the pipeline of Meralco Securities does not fall
within any of the classes of exempt real property enumerated in
section 3 of the Assessment Law and section 40 of the Real Property

Assessment
Tax Code.
Appeals 114
SCRA 260
Pipeline means a line of pipe connected to pumps, valves and control
devices for conveying liquids, gases or finely divided solids. It is a line
of pipe running upon or in the earth, carrying with it the right to the
use of the soil in which it is placed (Note 21[10], 54 C.J.S. 561).
Article 415[1] and [3] provides that real property may consist of
constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil and everything attached
to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be
separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of
the object.
The pipeline system in question is indubitably a construction adhering
to the soil (Exh. B, p. 39, Rollo). It is attached to the land in such a way
that it cannot be separated therefrom without dismantling the steel
pipes which were welded to form the pipeline.
Insofar as the pipeline uses valves, pumps and control devices to
maintain the flow of oil, it is in a sense machinery within the meaning
of the Real Property Tax Code. It should be borne in mind that what
are being characterized as real property are not the steel pipes but the
pipeline system as a whole. Meralco Securities has apparently two
pipeline systems.
A pipeline for conveying petroleum has been regarded as real
property for tax purposes (Miller County Highway, etc. Dist vs.
Standard Pipe Line Co., 19. Fed. 2nd 3; Board of Directors of Red River
Levee Dist. No. 1 of Lafayette County, Ark vs. R. F. C., 170 Fed. 2nd
430; 50 C. J. 750, note 86).
Lo v. KJS
EcoFormwork
System Phil
Inc.,
413
SCRA 182

It may well be that the assignment of credit, which is in the nature

of a sale of personal property, produced the effects of a dation in
payment which may extinguish the obligation. However, as in any
other contract of sale, the vendor or assignor is bound by certain
warranties. More specifically, the first paragraph of Article 1628 of the
Civil Code provides: The vendor in good faith shall be responsible for
the existence and legality of the credit at the time of the sale, unless it

should have been sold as doubtful; but not for the solvency of the
debtor, unless it has been so expressly stipulated or unless the
insolvency was prior to the sale and of common knowledge.
Woodrige
School, Inc.
v.
ARB
Construction
Co., Inc., 516
SCRA 176

In the case of Abellana, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 316

(1992), the Court held that the road lots in a private subdivision are
private property, hence, the local government should first acquire
them by donation, purchase, or expropriation, if they are to be utilized
as a public road. Otherwise, they remain to be private properties of
the ownerdeveloper.
The law is clear. The transfer of ownership from the subdivision
ownerdeveloper to the local government is not automatic but requires
a positive act from the ownerdeveloper before the city or municipality
can acquire dominion over the subdivision roads. Therefore, until and
unless the roads are donated, ownership remains with the ownerdeveloper.
To be entitled to a legal easement of right of way, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2)
payment of proper indemnity; (3) the isolation was not due to acts of
the proprietor of the dominant estate and (4) the right of way claimed
is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate.

*Zarate
v.
Director of
Lands,
434
SCRA 322

The petitioner was burdened to prove, by positive and

incontrovertible evidence, two legal requirements: (1) the land applied
for was alienable and disposable; and, (2) the applicant and his
predecessorsininterest had occupied and possessed the land openly,
continuously, exclusively, and adversely for thirty (30) years
immediately preceding the filing of his application on December 26,
1976. One claiming private rights must prove that he has complied
with the legal requirements of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended, which prescribes the substantive as well as procedural
requirements for acquisition of public lands. When the conditions set
forth by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by
operation of the law, acquires a right to grant, a government grant,
without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued.

It is a rule of law that possession of forest lands, however long,

cannot ripen into private ownership. Such lands are not capable of
private appropriation, and possession thereof, no matter how long,
cannot
ripen
into
ownership.
Secretary of
DENR
v.
Yap,
568
SCRA 164

In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, there must be a

positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation,
declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes; The burden of proof in overcoming the
presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is
on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who
must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable.A positive act declaring land as alienable and
disposable is required.
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land
under PD No. 705 may seem to be out of touch with the present
realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of
its forest cover to pave the way for commercial developments. As a
premier tourist destination for local and foreign tourists, Boracay
appears more of a commercial island resort, rather than a forest land.
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multimillion
peso beach resorts on the island; that the island has already been
stripped of its forest cover; or that the implementation of Proclamation
No. 1064 will destroy the islands tourism industry, do not negate its
character as public forest.

Republic of
the
Philippines
(Phil.
Reclamation
Authority) v.
City
of
Paranaque,
677
SCRA
246

The subject lands are reclaimed lands, specifically portions of the

foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. As such, these lands
remain public lands and form part of the public domain. In the case of
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority and AMARI Coastal Development
Corporation, 403 SCRA 1 (2002), the Court held that foreshore and
submerged areas irrefutably belonged to the public domain and were
inalienable unless reclaimed, classified as alienable lands open to
disposition and further declared no longer needed for public service.
The fact that alienable lands of the public domain were transferred to
the PEA (now PRA) and issued land patents or certificates of title in
PEAs name did not automatically make such lands private. This

Court also held therein that reclaimed lands retained their inherent
potential as areas for public use or public service.
*Heirs
of
Malabanan v.
Republic, 704
SCRA 561
Republic v.
Vda.
De
Joson
Republic v.
Zurbaran
Realty
and
Development
Corp.
II. Ownership, Articles 427-439

Related laws: Rules 60 (Replevin) and 70 (Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer)
of the Rules of Court

1. Estate of Edward Miller Grimm v. Estate of Charles Parsons, 504 SCRA 67

2. Waite v. Perterson, 8 Phil 449
3. Department of Education v. Onate, 524 SCRA 200
4. MWSS v. Act Theater, Inc., 432 SCRA 419
5. PNB v. Court of Appeals, 374 SCRA 22
6. Calub v. Court of Appeals, 331 SCRA 55
7. Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. v. PNCC, 519 SCRA 432
8. Suarez v. Spouses Emboy Jr., 718 SCRA 677
9. Asis v. Asis, 546 SCRA 580
10. Republic of the Phils. v. Sunvar Realty & Devt. Corp, 674 SCRA 320
11. Bongato v. Malvar, 387 SCRA 327
12. Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA108
13. Jose v. Alfuerto, 686 SCRA 323
14. Caro v. Sucaldito, 458 SCRA 595
15. Caezo v. Apolinario, 629 SCRA 580
16. Emilia v. Bado, 23 SCRA 183
17. Valdez v. CA, 489 SCRA 369

Estate
of
Edward Miller
Grimm
v.
Estate
of
Charles
Parsons, 504
SCRA 67

Trust is the legal relationship between one having an equitable

ownership in property and another person owning the legal title to
such property, the equitable ownership of the former entitling him to
the performance of certain duties and the exercise of certain powers
by the latter. Trust relations between parties may be express, as when
the trust is created by the intention of the trustor. An express trust is
created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing
or deed or by words evidencing an intention to create a trust; the use
of the word trust is not required or essential to its constitution, it
being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended. Implied trust comes
into existence by operation of law, either through implication of an
intention to create a trust as a matter of law or through the
imposition of the trust irrespective of, and even contrary to any such
intention.
the Court finds the evidence adduced and admitted by the trial
court more than adequately supporting a conclusion that MC No.
1088 was issued to and held by Parsons as the trustee thereof of
Grimm or his estate. The fact that respondent GP & Co. may have
paid, starting 1992, as evidence discloses, the membership fees due
on MC No. 1088 does not make Grimm less of a beneficial owner.
Such payment, needless to stress, is not a mode of acquiring
ownership.

Waite
Perterson,
Phil 449

v. When the property of one person is unlawfully taken by another,

8 the former has a right of action against the latter for the recovery of
the property or for damages for the taking or retention, and he is
entitled to his choice of these two remedies. This is also a right which
may be transferred by the sale or assignment of the property, and the
transferee can maintain either action against the wrongdoer.
If a sheriff levies upon property at the instance of a creditor and is
indemnified by the latter, the creditor is thenceforward liable for the
acts of the sheriff with respect to the property.

Department of Respondent testified that he came to know of Lot 6849 only in 1973
Education v. when he was 23 years old. He asserted that he took possession of

Onate,
524 said lot in the same year when his two (2) uncles, the brothers of his
SCRA 200
late father, passed on to him the disputed lot as his fathers share of
the inheritance from the late Claro Oate and Gregoria Los Baos
(his grandparents). However, it is interesting to note that he testified
that he only came to know in 1991 that the elementary school was
built on a portion of Lot 6849, now Lot 6849A. These assertions are
irreconcilable. Common experience tells us that one who owns a
property and takes possession of it cannot fail to discover and know
that an existing elementary school was built and standing on the lot
from the time that the owner starts possessing a property.
MWSS v. Act Article 429 of the Civil Code, relied upon by the petitioner in
Theater, Inc., justifying its act of disconnecting the water supply of the respondent
432 SCRA 419 without prior notice, reads:
Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to
exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For
this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonable to repel or
prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or
usurpation of his property.
When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms
resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for
which actor can be held accountable. In this case, the petitioner
failed to act with justice and give the respondent what is due to it
when the petitioner unceremoniously cut off the respondents water
service connection. (Art. 19, Civil Code)
PNB v. Court Notably, the Civil Code protects the actual possessor of a property,
of
Appeals, to wit: Art. 433. Actual possession under claim of ownership raises a
374 SCRA 22
disputable presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort to
judicial process for the recovery of the property. Under the
aforequoted provision, one who claims to be the owner of a property
possessed by another must bring the appropriate judicial action for
its physical recovery. The term judicial process could mean no less
than an ejectment suit or reinvindicatory action, in which the
ownership claims of the contending parties may be properly heard
and adjudicated.

Besides, as earlier stressed, Article 433 of the Civil Code, cited

above, requires nothing less than an action for ejectment to be
brought even by the true owner. After all, the actual possessor of a
property enjoys a legal presumption of just title in his favor, which
must be overcome by the party claiming otherwise.
Calub v. Court Note that property that is validly deposited in custodia legis
of
Appeals, cannot be the subject of a replevin suit. In Mamanteo v. Deputy
331 SCRA 55
Sheriff Magumun, we elucidated further: . . . the writ of replevin
has been repeatedly used by unscrupulous plaintiffs to retrieve their
chattel earlier taken for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code, tax
assessment, attachment or execution. Officers of the court, from the
presiding judge to the sheriff, are implored to be vigilant in their
execution of the law otherwise, as in this case, valid seizure and
forfeiture proceedings could easily be undermined by the simple
devise of a writ of replevin . . .
Superlines
Transportation
Company, Inc.
v. PNCC, 519
SCRA 432

On to the substantive issues. Tillson v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA

587 (1991), discusses the term replevin as follows: The term replevin
is popularly understood as the return to or recovery by a person of
goods or chattels claimed to be wrongfully taken or detained upon
the persons giving security to try the matter in court and return the
goods if defeated in the action; the writ by or the commonlaw
action in which goods and chattels are replevied, i.e., taken or
gotten back by a writ for replevin; and to replevy, means to recover
possession by an action of replevin; to take possession of goods or
chattels under a replevin order. Bouviers Law Dictionary defines
replevin as a form of action which lies to regain the possession of
personal chattels which have been taken from the plaintiff
unlawfully x x x, (or as) the writ by virtue of which the sheriff
proceeds at once to take possession of the property therein described
and transfer it to the plaintiff upon his giving pledges which are
satisfactory to the sheriff to prove his title, or return the chattels
taken if he fail so to do; the same authority states that the term, to
replevy means to redeliver goods which have been distrained to
the original possessor of them, on his giving pledges in an action of
replevin. The term therefore may refer either to the action itself, for
the recovery of personalty, or the provisional remedy traditionally

associated with it, by which possession of the property may be

obtain[ed] by the plaintiff and retained during the pendency of the
action. (Emphasis and italics supplied; citations omitted) In a
complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that he
is either the owner or clearly entitled to the possession of the object
sought to be recovered, and that the defendant, who is in actual or
legal possession thereof, wrongfully detains the same.
In upholding the dismissal of petitioners complaint, the Court of
Appeals held that while there is no law authorizing the
impounding of a vehicle involved in an accident by the police
authorities, x x x neither is there a law making the impounding of
vehicles involved in accidents illegal. It added that the Supreme
Court is of the view that there is yet no clearcut policy or rule on the
matter. The appellate court is mistaken. The Constitution grants the
right against unreasonable seizures. Thus, Section 2, Article III
provides: The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Italics supplied)
The seizure and impounding of petitioners bus, on Loperas request,
were unquestionably violative of the right to be let alone by the
authorities as guaranteed by the Constitution.
Suarez
v. Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled
Spouses
to its possession. However, the owner cannot simply wrest
Emboy Jr., 718 possession thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the
SCRA 677
property. To recover possession, he must resort to the proper judicial
remedy and, once he chooses what action to file, he is required to
satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to prosper.
This Court stresses that to give the court jurisdiction to effect the
ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land, it is necessary
that the complaint must sufficiently show such a statement of facts as

to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which the
statutes provide a remedy, without resort to parol testimony, as these
proceedings are summary in nature. In short, the jurisdictional facts
must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails
to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as
where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when
dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
Asis v. Asis, The issue of ownership raised as a defense will not oust the MeTC of
546 SCRA 580 its jurisdiction over an ejectment case, as the court can rule on the
issue of ownership provisionally to determine who has right to
possess the disputed property. When the defendant raises the
defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession
cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the
issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession.
Republic
of
the Phils. v.
Sunvar Realty
& Devt. Corp,
674 SCRA 320

- Under the Rules of Court, lessors against whom possession of any

land is unlawfully withheld after the expiration of the right to hold
possession mayby virtue of any express or implied contract, and
within one year after the unlawful deprivationbring an action in
the municipal trial court against the person unlawfully withholding
possession, for restitution of possession with damages and costs.
Unless otherwise stipulated, the action of the lessor shall commence
only after a demand to pay or to comply with the conditions of the
leas and to vacate is made upon the lessee; or after a written notice
of that demand is served upon the person found on the premises,
and the lessee fails to comply therewith within 15 days in the case of
land or 5 days in the case of buildings.
-Hence, a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful
detainer if it states the following elements:
1. Initially, the possession of the property by the defendant was by
contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff.
2. Eventually, the possession became illegal upon the plaintiffs
notice to the defendant of the termination of the latters right of
possession.

3. Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property

and deprived the plaintiff of the latters enjoyment.
4. Within one year from the making of the last demand on the
defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the
Complaint for ejectment.
Bongato
v. In forcible entry, one employs force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
Malvar,
387 stealth to deprive another of physical possession of land or building.
SCRA 327
Thus, the plaintiff must allege and prove prior physical possession of
the property in litigation until deprived thereof by the defendant.
This requirement implies that the possession of the disputed land by
the latter was unlawful from the beginning.
The sole question for resolution hinges on the physical or material
possession (possession de facto) of the property. Neither a claim of
juridical possession (possession de jure) nor an averment of
ownership by the defendant can outrightly prevent the court from
taking cognizance of the case. Ejectment cases proceed
independently of any claim of ownership, and the plaintiff needs
merely to prove prior possession de facto and undue deprivation
thereof.
It is wise to be reminded that forcible entry is a quieting process,
and that the restrictive time bar is prescribed to complement the
summary nature of such process. Indeed, the oneyear period within
which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from
the date of actual entry to the land. However, when entry is made
through stealth, then the oneyear period is counted from the time
the plaintiff learned about it. After the lapse of the oneyear period,
the party dispossessed of a parcel of land may file either an accion
publiciana, which is a plenary action to recover the right of
possession; or an accion reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover
ownership as well as possession.
Sarmiento v. A careful reading of the facts averred in said complaint filed by
Court
of herein private respondent reveals that the action is neither one of
Appeals, 250 forcible entry nor of unlawful detainer but essentially involves a
SCRA108
boundary dispute which must be resolved in an accion

reivindicatoria on the issue of ownership over the disputed 71

square meters involved.
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are two distinct actions
defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible entry,
one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means
of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful
detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the
expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any
contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal
from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the
prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, the possession was
originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or
termination of the right to possess, hence the issue of rightful
possession is decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual
possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the termination of the
defendants right to continue in possession.
What determines the cause of action is the nature of defendants
entry into the land. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may
be filed against the intruder within one year therefrom is forcible
entry. If, on the other hand, the entry is legal but the possession
thereafter became illegal, the case is one of unlawful detainer which
must be filed within one year from the date of the last demand.
To give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant
or deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the complaint should
embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within
the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these
proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show
enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to
parol testimony. The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of
the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of
forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how
entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, as in the
case at bar, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an
accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court.

If private respondent is indeed the owner of the premises subject

of this suit and she was unlawfully deprived of the real right of
possession or the ownership thereof, she should present her claim
before the regional trial court in an accion publiciana or an accion
reivindicatoria, and not before the municipal trial court in a
summary proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible entry. For even
if one is the owner of the property, the possession thereof cannot be
wrested from another who had been in the physical or material
possession of the same for more than one year by resorting to a
summary action for ejectment. This is especially true where his
possession thereof was not obtained through the means or held
under the circumstances contemplated by the rules on summary
ejectment.
We have held that in giving recognition to the action for forcible
entry and unlawful detainer, the purpose of the law is to protect the
person who in fact has actual possession, and in case of a
controverted proprietary right, the law requires the parties to
preserve the status quo until one or the other sees fit to invoke the
decision of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the question of
ownership.
Jose
v. In this case, paragraph 7 makes it clear that the respondents
Alfuerto, 686 occupancy was unlawful from the start and was bereft of contractual
SCRA 323
or legal basis. In an unlawful detainer case, the defendants
possession becomes illegal only upon the plaintiffs demand for the
defendant to vacate the property and the defendants subsequent
refusal. In the present case, paragraph 8 characterizes the
defendants occupancy as unlawful even before the formal demand
letters were written by the petitioners counsel. Under these
allegations, the unlawful withholding of possession should not be
based on the date the demand letters were sent, as the alleged
unlawful act had taken place at an earlier unspecified date.
a case for unlawful detainer
alleging tolerance must definitely establish its existence from the
start of possession; otherwise, a case for forcible entry can mask itself
as an action for unlawful detainer and permit it to be filed beyond

the required oneyear prescription period from the time of forcible

entry.
Caro
v. -The essence of an action for reconvenyance is that the decree of
Sucaldito, 458 registration is respected as incontrovertible but what is sought
SCRA 595
instead is the transfer of property which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another persons name, to its rightful
owner or to one with a better right.
Reversion is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert
the land back to the government under the Regalian doctrine.
Caezo
v. In order that an action for the recovery of title may prosper, it is
Apolinario,
indispensable, in accordance with the precedents established by the
629 SCRA 580 courts, that the party who prosecutes it must fully prove, not only
his ownership of the thing claimed, but also the identity of the same.
However, although the identity of the thing that a party desires to
recover must be established, if the plaintiff has already proved his
right of ownership over a tract of land, and the defendant is
occupying without right any part of such tract, it is not necessary for
plaintiff to establish the precise location and extent of the portions
occupied by the defendant within the plaintiffs property.
Emilia
Bado,
SCRA 183

v. There are three kinds of actions available to recover possession of

23 real property: (a) the summary action for forcible entry (where
preliminary mandatory injunction may be sought within ten days
from the filing of the complaint under article 539 of the Civil Code)
or illegal detainer, which seeks the recovery of physical possession
only and is brought within one year in the municipal court; (b) the
accion publiciana, which is f or the recovery of the right to possess
and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding in a Court of
First Instance; and (c) accion de reivindicacion, which seeks the
recovery of ownership, which includes the jus utendi and the jus
fruendi, also brought in the Court of First Instance.
Valdez v. CA, Under existing law and jurisprudence, there are three kinds of
489 SCRA 369 actions available to recover possession of real property: (a) accion
interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; and (c) accion reivindicatoria.
Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely,
forcible entry (detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico). In

forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of real property

by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas
in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the
expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any
contract, express or implied. The two are distinguished from each
other in that in forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is
illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which party has
prior de facto possession while in unlawful detainer, possession of
the defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the
expiration or termination of the right to possess. The jurisdiction of
these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper
municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court. Both actions must
be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land,
in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of
unlawful detainer.The issue in said cases is the right to physical
possession.
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the
plaintiffs supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right
from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered.
Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action
for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy.
-In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint do not contain
any averment of fact that would substantiate petitioners claim that
they permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by
respondents. The complaint contains only bare allegations that
respondents without any color of title whatsoever occupies the land
in question by building their house in the said land thereby
depriving petitioners the possession thereof. Nothing has been said
on how respondents entry was effected or how and when
dispossession started. Admittedly, no express contract existed
between the parties. This failure of petitioners to allege the key
jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal. Since the
complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid
cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had no
jurisdiction over the case. It is in this light that this Court finds that
the Court of Appeals correctly found that the municipal trial court

had no jurisdiction over the complaint.

III. Ownership Accession; Quieting of Title; Ruinous Building and Trees in Danger of
Falling, Articles 440-483, 546, 548
1. Galang v Reyes, 678 SCRA 523
2. Gulla v. Heirs of Labrador, 496 SCRA 735
3. Equatorial Realty and Devt., Inc. v. Mayfair Theater Inc., November, 370 SCRA
56
4. Sulo ng Nayon, Inc. v. Nayong Pilipino, 576 SCRA 655
5. PNB v. De Jesus, 411 SCRA 557
6. Macasaet v. Macasaet, 439 SCRA 625
7. Pleasantville Devt. Corp. v. CA, 253 SCRA 10
8. Reynante v. Court of Appeals, 207 SCRA 794
9. Agustin v. IAC, 187 SCRA 218
10. Celestial v. Cachopero, 413 SCRA 469
11. Morandarte v. CA, 436 SCRA 213
12. Jagualing v. CA, 194 SCRA 607
13. Office of the City Mayor v. Mario D. Ebio, 621 SCRA 555
14. Lucasan v. PDIC, 557 SCRA 306
15. Lasquite v. Victory Hills, Inc., 590 SCRA 616
16. Tandog v. Macapagal, 532 SCRA 551
17. Rumarate v. Hernandez, 487 SCRA 317
18. Metrobank v. Alejo, 364 SCRA 813
19. Saligumba v. Palanog, 573 SCRA 8
20. Clado-Reyes v. Limpe, 557 SCRA 400
21. Tanenglian v. Lorenzo, 550 SCRA 348
22. Santos v. Heirs of Lustre, 561 SCRA 120
23. Heirs of Valeriano S. Concha Sr. v. Lumocso, 540 SCRA 1
24. Iglesia ni Cristo v. Ponferrada, 505 SCRA 828
Galang
v
Reyes, 678
SCRA 523
Gulla
v.
Heirs
of
Labrador,

496 SCRA
735
Equatorial
Realty and
Devt., Inc.
v. Mayfair
Theater Inc.,
November,
370 SCRA
56
Sulo
ng
Nayon, Inc.
v. Nayong
Pilipino, 576
SCRA 655
PNB v. De
Jesus,
411
SCRA 557
Macasaet v.
Macasaet,
439 SCRA
625
Pleasantvill
e
Devt.
Corp. v. CA,
253 SCRA
10
Reynante v.
Court
of
Appeals,
207 SCRA
794
Agustin v.
IAC,
187
SCRA 218
Celestial v.
Cachopero,
413 SCRA

469
Morandarte
v. CA, 436
SCRA 213
Jagualing v.
CA,
194
SCRA 607
Office of the
City Mayor
v. Mario D.
Ebio,
621
SCRA 555
Lucasan v.
PDIC, 557
SCRA 306
Lasquite v.
Victory
Hills, Inc.,
590 SCRA
616
Tandog
v.
Macapagal,
532 SCRA
551
Rumarate v.
Hernandez,
487 SCRA
317
Metrobank
v. Alejo, 364
SCRA 813
Saligumba
v. Palanog,
573 SCRA 8
Clado-Reyes
v.
Limpe,
557 SCRA
400

Tanenglian
v. Lorenzo,
550 SCRA
348
Santos
v.
Heirs
of
Lustre, 561
SCRA 120
Heirs
of
Valeriano S.
Concha Sr.
v. Lumocso,
540 SCRA 1
Iglesia
ni
Cristo
v.
Ponferrada,
505 SCRA
828
IV. Co-Ownership, Articles 484-501

Additional Law: Condominium Act

1. Acre v. Yuttikki, 534 SCRA 224

2. PNB v. Heirs of Militar, 467 SCRA 377
3. Santos v. Heirs of Lustre, 561 SCRA 120
4. Iglesia Ni Cristo v. Ponferrada, 505 SCRA 828
5. Sps .Cruz v. Leis, 327 SCRA 571
6. Oesmer v. Paraiso Devt. Corp, 514 SCRA 228
7. Gapacan v. Omipet, 387 SCRA 383
8. Basa v. Aguilar, 117 SCRA 128
9. Del Blanco v. IAC, 156 SCRA 55
10. Delima v. CA, 201 SCRA 641
11. Paz Galvez v. CA, 485 SCRA 347
12. Deiparine v. CA, 299 SCRA 668
13. Heirs of Cesar Marasigan v. Marasigan, 548 SCRA 409
14. Quimpo v. Vda de Beltran, 545 SCRA 174
15. Maglucot-Aw v. Maglucot, 329 SCRA 78

16. Austria v. Lichauco, 520 SCRA 401

17. Vda de Daffon v. CA, 387 SCRA 427
18. Balo v. CA, 471 SCRA 227
19. Sepulveda v. Pelaez, 450 SCRA 302
20. Alejandrino v. CA, 295 SCRA 536
21. Valmonte v. CA, 252 SCRA 92
22. Arriola v. Arriola, 542 SCRA 666
23. Panganiban v. Oamil, 542 SCRA 166
24. Reyes v. Hon. Concepcion, 190 SCRA 171
25. Heirs of Abalos v. Bucal, 546 SCRA 252
26. G.O.A.L., Inc. v. CA, 276 SCRA 359
27. Yamane v. BA Lepanto Condominium Corp., 474 SCRA 258
28. Sunset View Condominium Corp. v. Campos, Jr., 104 SCRA 295
29. Skyworld Condominium Owners Assoc., Inc. v. SEC, 211 SCRA 565
30. Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc., 566 SCRA 333
Acre
v.
Yuttikki, 534
SCRA 224
PNB v. Heirs
of Militar, 467
SCRA 377
Santos
v.
Heirs
of
Lustre,
561
SCRA 120
Iglesia
Ni
Cristo
v.
Ponferrada,
505 SCRA 828
Sps .Cruz v.
Leis,
327
SCRA 571
Oesmer
v.
Paraiso Devt.
Corp,
514
SCRA 228
Gapacan
v.

Omipet, 387
SCRA 383
Basa
v.
Aguilar, 117
SCRA 128
Del Blanco v.
IAC,
156
SCRA 55
Delima v. CA,
201 SCRA 641
Paz Galvez v.
CA, 485 SCRA
347
Deiparine v.
CA, 299 SCRA
668
Heirs of Cesar
Marasigan v.
Marasigan,
548 SCRA 409
Quimpo
v.
Vda
de
Beltran,
545
SCRA 174
Maglucot-Aw
v. Maglucot,
329 SCRA 78
Austria
v.
Lichauco, 520
SCRA 401
Vda de Daffon
v. CA, 387
SCRA 427
Balo v. CA,
471 SCRA 227
Sepulveda v.
Pelaez,
450
SCRA 302

Alejandrino v.
CA, 295 SCRA
536
Valmonte
v.
CA, 252 SCRA
92
Arriola
v.
Arriola,
542
SCRA 666
Panganiban v.
Oamil,
542
SCRA 166
Reyes v. Hon.
Concepcion,
190 SCRA 171
Heirs
of
Abalos
v.
Bucal,
546
SCRA 252
G.O.A.L., Inc.
v. CA, 276
SCRA 359
Yamane v. BA
Lepanto
Condominiu
m Corp., 474
SCRA 258
Sunset View
Condominiu
m Corp. v.
Campos, Jr.,
104 SCRA 295
Skyworld
Condominiu
m
Owners
Assoc., Inc. v.
SEC,
211
SCRA 565

Hulst v. PR
Builders, Inc.,
566 SCRA 333
V. Possession, Articles 523-561, 1120, 1123

Take note of Prescription Articles 1106-1155

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Republic v. Imperial Credit Corp., 555 SCRA 314

Carlos v. Republic, 468 SCRA 709
Heirs of M. Cabal v. Spouses Cabal, 497 SCRA 301
Dizon v. Hon. Rodriguez, 13 SCRA 705
De Vera v. CA, 305 SCRA 625
DBP v. Court of Appeals, 316 SCRA 651
Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc. v. CA, 407 SCRA 519
Villarico v. Sarmiento, 442 SCRA 110
Asset Privatization v. TJ Enterprises, 587 SCRA 481
Ong v. Republic, 548 SCRA 160
Cequea vs. Bolante, 330 SCRA 216
Ericcson Telecommunications Inc v. City of Pasig, 538 SCRA 99
Escritor v. IAC, 155 SCRA 577
Isagani Cruz v. Secretary of DENR, 347 SCRA 129
Baes v. Lutheran Church of the Phils, 475 SCRA 13
Seria v. Caballero, 436 SCRA 593
Aguirre v. Court of Appeals, 421 SCRA 310
Beltran v. Doriano, 32 Phil. 66
Arzadon-Crisologo v. Raon, 532 SCRA 391
Daclag v. Macahilig, 560 SCRA 137 (Decision)
Daclag v. Macahilig, 579 SCRA 556 (Resolution)
Florentino v. Supervalue, Inc., 533 SCRA 156
Ramel v. Aquino, 497 SCRA 170
Cosio v. Palileo, 17 SCRA 196
Castellano v. Francisco, 554 SCRA 63
EDCA Publishing v. Sps. Santos, 184 SCRA 614
Edu v. Gomez, 129 SCRA 603
Dizon-Pamintuan v. People, 234 SCRA 63
Rivera v. Vargas, 588 SCRA 529

Republic vs Imperial Credit Corp.

a person who seeks confirmation of an

imperfect or incomplete title to a piece of
land on the basis of possession by himself

and his predecessors-in-interest

shoulders the burden of proving by
clear
and
convincing
evidence
compliance with the requirements of
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended. Accordingly, applicants
for confirmation and registration of
imperfect title must prove:

Carlos vs Republic

(a) that the land forms part of the

alienable lands of the public domain;
and
(b) that they have been in open,
continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation
(not clandestine) of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain,
under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, since
12 June 1945.
Even if it were true that it was
petitioner who had actual possession of
the land at that time, such possession was
no longer in the concept of an owner.
Possession may be had in one of two
ways: possession in the concept of an
owner and possession of a holder. A
possessor in the concept of an owner may
be the owner himself or one who claims
to be so. On the other hand, one who
possesses as a mere holder acknowledges
in another a superior right which he
believes to be ownership, whether his
belief be right or wrong. Petitioner herein
acknowledges the sale of the property to
Ususan Development Corporation in
1996 and in fact promised to deliver the
certificate of title to the corporation upon

Heirs of M. Cabal vs Sps. Cabal

its obtention. Hence, it cannot be said that

her possession since 1996 was under a
bona fide claim of ownership. Under the
law, only he who possesses the property
under a bona fide claim of ownership is
entitled to confirmation of title.
It has been said that good faith is
always presumed, and upon him who
alleges bad faith on the part of the
possessor rests the burden of proof. Good
faith is an intangible and abstract quality
with no technical meaning or statutory
definition, and it encompasses, among
other things, an honest belief, the absence
of malice and the absence of design to
defraud or to seek an unconscionable
advantage. An individuals personal
good faith is a concept of his own mind
and, therefore, may not conclusively be
determined by his protestations alone. It
implies honesty of intention, and freedom
from knowledge of circumstances which
ought to put the holder upon inquiry. The
essence of good faith lies in an honest
belief in the validity of ones right,
ignorance of a superior claim, and
absence of intention to overreach another.
Applied to possession, one is considered
in good faith if he is not aware that there
exists in his title or mode of acquisition
any flaw which invalidates it.
Rights of a Builder in Good Faith. The
owner of the land on which anything has
been built, sown or planted in good faith
shall have the right to appropriate as his
own the building, planting or sowing,
after payment to the builder, planter or

Dizon vs Hon. Rodriguez

DPB vs CA

sower of the necessary and useful

expenses, and in the proper case,
expenses for pure luxury or mere
pleasure. The owner of the land may also
oblige the builder, planter or sower to
purchase and pay the price of the land. If
the owner chooses to sell his land, the
builder, planter or sower must purchase
the land, otherwise the owner may
remove the improvements thereon. The
builder, planter or sower, however, is not
obliged to purchase the land if its value is
considerably more than the building,
planting or sowing. In such case, the
builder, planter or sower must pay rent
to the owner of the land. If the parties
cannot come to terms over the conditions
of the lease, the court must fix the terms
thereof. The right to choose between
appropriating the improvement or selling
the land on which the improvement
stands to the builder, planter or sower, is
given to the owner of the land.
The possessor with a Torrens Title who
is not aware of any flaw in his title which
invalidates it is considered a possessor in
good faith and his possession does not
lose this character except in the case and
from the moment his Torrens Title is
declared null and void by final judgment
of the Courts.
A possessor in good faith is one who is
not aware that there exists in his title or
mode of acquisition any flaw, which
invalidates it. Good faith is always
presumed, and upon him who alleges
bad faith on the part of a possessor rests
the burden of proof. It was therefore

incumbent on the PIEDAS to prove that

DBP was aware of the flaw in its title i.e.
the nullity of the foreclosure. This, they
failed to do
It may be argued that P.D. 27 was
already in effect when DBP foreclosed the
property. However, the legal propriety of
the foreclosure of the land was put into
question only after Opinion No. 92 series
of 1978 of the Ministry of Justice declared
that said land was covered by P.D. 27 and
could not be subject to foreclosure
proceedings. The Opinion of the Ministry
of Justice was issued on July 5, 1978 or
almost
two
months
after
DBP
consolidated its title to the property on
March
10,
1978.
By
law
and
jurisprudence, a mistake upon a doubtful
or difficult question of law may properly
be the basis of good faith.