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Constitutional Law 2 San Beda Collated Digests
Constitutional Law 2 San Beda Collated Digests
Constitutional Law 2 San Beda Collated Digests
Facts:
Impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide. The justiciable
controversy poised in front of the Court was the constitutionality of the subsequent filing of a second
complaint to controvert the rules of impeachment provided for by law.
Issue:
Whether or Not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution and
whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis.
Held:
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all the issues
which this controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the
feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally permissible.
Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure from, the
Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential
truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial
branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that
part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by
the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without
destroying their indispensable co-equality. There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the
exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and
balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to
defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and
interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the
Constitution.
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In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of
public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Before he can invoke the
power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing
the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of
the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general
interest common to all members of the public.
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be
entertained. This Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any
impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief
Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claims
infringes his prerogatives as a legislator. Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has standing
to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office. 83
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal
reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the
ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a
complaint does.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment proceedings
because Section 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all
cases of impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo
singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment proceeding."
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the
impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the
members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of
Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another
impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.
The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main
issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the
constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction
where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because
it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of
the government.
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No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system which recognizes
equality of all men before the law as essential to the law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure
respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or
instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality other than the Supreme
Court which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its application to numerous cases
especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law
and neither is any other member of this Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that
he gets to have less in law than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective
of his station in life.
Thus, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of
Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of
the Constitution.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS
[267 SCRA 408; G.R. No. 122156; 3 Feb 1997]
Facts:
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986,
decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent
Manila Hotel Corporation. In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated:
petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or
15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its
hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid
of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of
the necessary contracts, matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the
matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and
consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the
Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical
monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier
generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and
capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a
part of the national patrimony. 6 Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries
with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a governmentowned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism
industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy.
Issue:
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Held:
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the highest
bidder solely for the sake of privatization. The Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant
role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. This is the plain and
simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding
the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will
continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution. It was thus ordered that GSIS accepts the
matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary
clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for purpose.
PEOPLE VS. POMAR
[46 Phil 126; G.R. No. L-22008; 3 Nov 1924]
Facts:
Macaria Fajardo was an employee of La Flor de la Isabela, a Tobacco factory. She was granted a
vacation leave, by reason of her pregnancy, which commenced on the 16 th of July 1923. According to
Fajardo, during that time, she was not given the salary due her in violation of the provisions of Act No.
3071. Fajardo filed a criminal complaint based on Section 13 and 15 of said Act against the manager of
the tobacco Factory, Julio Pomar, herein defendant. The latter, on the other hand, claims that the facts in
the complaint did not constitute an offense and further alleges that the aforementioned provisions of Act
No. 3071 was unconstitutional. Section 13, Act No. 3071 provides that, Every person, firm or corporation
owning or managing a factory, shop or place of labor of any description shall be obliged to grant to any
woman employed by it as laborer who may be pregnant, thirty days vacation with pay before and another
thirty days after confinement: Provided, That the employer shall not discharge such laborer without just
cause, under the penalty of being required to pay to her wages equivalent to the total of two months
counting from the day of her discharge. Section 15 of the same Act provides for the penalty of any
violation of section 13. The latter was enacted by the legislature in the exercise of its supposed Police
Power with the purpose of safeguarding the health of pregnant women laborers in "factory, shop or place
of labor of any description," and of insuring to them, to a certain extent, reasonable support for one month
before and one month after their delivery. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff,
sentencing the defendant to pay the fine of fifty pesos and in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment. Hence, the case was raised to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the former decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 13 of Act No. 3071 is unconstitutional.
Whether or not the promulgation of the questioned provision was a valid exercise of Police Power.
Held:
The Supreme Court declared Section 13 of Act No. 3071 to be unconstitutional for being violative or
restrictive of the right of the people to freely enter into contracts for their affairs. It has been decided
several times, that the right to contract about one's affairs is a part of the liberty of the individual,
protected by the "due process of law" clause of the constitution. The contracting parties may establish any
agreements, terms, and conditions they may deem advisable, provided they are not contrary to law,
morals or public policy
The police power of the state is a very broad and expanding power. The police power may encompass
every law for the restraint and punishment of crimes, for the preservation of the public peace, health, and
morals. But that power cannot grow faster than the fundamental law of the state, nor transcend or violate
the express inhibition of the constitution. The Police Power is subject to and is controlled by the
paramount authority of the constitution of the state, and will not be permitted to violate rights secured or
guaranteed by the latter.
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The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives
passed the following resolutions:
1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution of
the Philippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a
maximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among
the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants,
although each province shall have, at least, one (1) member;
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Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17, 1967, became
Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the
aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general
elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967.
Issue:
Whether or Not a Resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violates the Constitution.
Held:
Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring Republic Act 4913 and R. B. H. Nos.
1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in these two (2) cases must be, as they are hereby,
dismiss and the writs therein prayed for denied, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so
ordered.
As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally. It may not be contested
except directly, by quo warranto proceedings. Neither may the validity of his acts be questioned upon the
ground that he is merely a de facto officer. And the reasons are obvious: (1) it would be an indirect inquiry
into the title to the office; and (2) the acts of a de facto officer, if within the competence of his office, are
valid, insofar as the public is concerned.
"The judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper
allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units
thereof."
Article XV of the Constitution provides:
. . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the
Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may
propose amendments to this Constitution or call a contention for that purpose. Such
amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the
votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification.
From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied so long as the electorate
knows that R. B. H. No. 3 permits Congressmen to retain their seats as legislators, even if they should run
for and assume the functions of delegates to the Convention.
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Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari assailing the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167
on the ground that it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press.
On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT
FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into law. Pursuant to said law, the City
of Baguio and the Cordilleras which consist of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra
and Kalinga-Apayao, all comprising the Cordillera Autonomous Region, shall take part in a plebiscite for
the ratification of said Organic Act originally scheduled last December 27, 1989 which was, however, reset
to January 30, 1990 by virtue of Comelec Resolution No. 2226 dated December 27, 1989. The
Commission on Elections, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election
Code (BP 881), said R.A. 6766 and other pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution No. 2167, to
govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. In a
petition dated November 20, 1989, herein petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims to be a newspaper
columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated in
the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution
No. 2167, which provides:
It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void and unconstitutional because it violates the
constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press enshrined in the
Constitution. Unlike a regular news reporter or news correspondent who merely reports the news,
petitioner maintains that as a columnist, his column obviously and necessarily contains and
reflects his opinions, views and beliefs on any issue or subject about which he writes. Petitioner
likewise maintains that if media practitioners were to express their views, beliefs and opinions on
the issue submitted to a plebiscite, it would in fact help in the government drive and desire to
disseminate information, and hear, as well as ventilate, all sides of the issue.
Issue:
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is unconstitutional. It is clear
from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was the power to supervise
and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of
transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or information to the end that equal
opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public
information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. The evil sought to be prevented by
this provision is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give any undue advantage to a
candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or television time. This is also the reason why a
"columnist, commentator, announcer or personality, who is a candidate for any elective office is required
to take a leave of absence from his work during the campaign period (2nd par. Section 11(b) R.A. 6646).
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However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can be
construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the
exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. Media
practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise
holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19
of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis.
Plebiscite Issue are matters of public concern and importance. The people's right to be informed and to
be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to an unabridged
discussion of the Issue, including the forum. The people affected by the Issue presented in a plebiscite
should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be
exercised. Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for expression but they do not
guarantee full dissemination of information to the public concerned because they are limited to either
specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or television times.
The instant petition is GRANTED. Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is declared null and void
and unconstitutional.
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MIRASOL VS CA
[351 SCRA 44; G.R. No. 128448; 1 Feb 2001]
Facts:
The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. Philippine National Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasols'
sugar production venture FROM 1973-1975 under a crop loan financing scheme. The Mirasols signed
Credit Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB.
The Chattel Mortgage empowered PNB to negotiate and sell the latter's sugar and to apply the proceeds
to the payment of their obligations to it.
President Marcos issued PD 579 in November, 1974 authorizing Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX)
to purchase sugar allocated for export and authorized PNB to finance PHILEX's purchases. The decree
directed that whatever profit PHILEX might realize was to be remitted to the government. Believing that
the proceeds were more than enough to pay their obligations, petitioners asked PNB for an accounting of
the proceeds which it ignored. Petitioners continued to avail of other loans from PNB and to make
unfunded withdrawals from their accounts with said bank. PNB asked petitioners to settle their due and
demandable accounts. As a result, petitioners, conveyed to PNB real properties by way of dacion en
pago still leaving an unpaid amount. PNB proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged properties.
PNB still had a deficiency claim.
Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds, insisting that said proceeds, if properly
liquidated, could offset their outstanding obligations. PNB remained adamant in its stance that under P.D.
No. 579, there was nothing to account since under said law, all earnings from the export sales of sugar
pertained to the National Government.
On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific performance, and damages against
PNB.
Issue:
Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional without notice to the
Solicitor General where the parties have agreed to submit such issue for the resolution of the Trial Court.
Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof are unconstitutional.
Whether or not said PD is subject to judicial review.
Held:
It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of
a statute, presidential decree, or executive order. The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or
the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all Regional Trial Courts.
The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable the Solicitor General to decide
whether or not his intervention in the action assailing the validity of a law or treaty is necessary. To deny
the Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount to depriving him of his day in court. We must
stress that, contrary to petitioners' stand, the mandatory notice requirement is not limited to actions
involving declaratory relief and similar remedies. The rule itself provides that such notice is required in
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Facts:
During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP,
acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood
Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of
support for the government, demanding the resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and the
PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of
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In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG
MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the
Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that there is no
factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al,
petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the same
Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the
proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as
an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President. (3)
Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners
contending that there was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion
"opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion.
Issue:
Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional?
Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit?
Held:
The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional.
Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The President in addition to
its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive powers. It is not disputed that
the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for
the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within
constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here
have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted without factual basis. The issue
of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as there was no indication that military tribunals have
replaced civil courts or that military authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of
usurpation of the legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since the President, in declaring a
state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief
Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President
by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section
23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this
whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long
as a valid warrantless arrest is present.
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
Issue upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Based on the
foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only
petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing to challenge
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On 9 August 1990, Mateo A.T. Caparas, then Chairman of PCGG, wrote then President Corazon C.
Aquino, requesting her for authority to sign the proposed Consignment Agreement between the Republic
of the Philippines through PCGG and Christie, Manson and Woods International, Inc concerning the
scheduled sale on 11 January 1991 of eighty-two) Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware seized
from Malacaang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the
late President Marcos, his relatives and cronies. On 14 August 1990, then President Aquino, through
former Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr., authorized Chairman Caparas to sign the
Consignment Agreement allowing Christie's of New York to auction off the subject art pieces for and in
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. On 15 August 1990, PCGG, through Chairman Caparas,
representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed the Consignment Agreement with
Christie's of New York. According to the agreement, PCGG shall consign to CHRISTIE'S for sale at public
auction the eighty-two Old Masters Paintings then found at the Metropolitan Museum of Manila as well as
the silverware contained in seventy-one cartons in the custody of the Central Bank of the Philippines, and
such other property as may subsequently be identified by PCGG and accepted by CHRISTIE'S to be
subject to the provisions of the agreement.
On 26 October 1990, the Commission on Audit through then Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo submitted to
President Aquino the audit findings and observations of COA on the Consignment Agreement of 15
August 1990 to the effect that: the authority of former PCGG Chairman Caparas to enter into the
Consignment Agreement was of doubtful legality; the contract was highly disadvantageous to the
government; PCGG had a poor track record in asset disposal by auction in the U.S.; and, the assets
subject of auction were historical relics and had cultural significance, hence, their disposal was prohibited
by law.
After the oral arguments of the parties on 9 January 1991, we issued immediately our resolution denying
the application for preliminary injunction to restrain the scheduled sale of the artworks on the ground that
petitioners had not presented a clear legal right to a restraining order and that proper parties had not been
impleaded.
On 11 January 1991, the sale at public auction proceeded as scheduled and the proceeds of
$13,302,604.86 were turned over to the Bureau of Treasury.
Issue:
Whether or not the Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware are embraced in the phrase "cultural
treasure of the nation".
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Whether or not the paintings and silverware are properties of public dominion on which can be disposed
of
through
the
joint
concurrence
of
the
President
and
Congress.
Whether or not PCGG has complied with the due process clause and other statutory requirements for the
exportation and sale of the subject items.
Whether or not the petition has become moot and academic, and if so, whether the above Issue warrant
resolution from this Court.
Held:
This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provides that every action must be
prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, and that all persons having interest in
the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. The Court will
exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal
standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing" means a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and
to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere
incidental interest. Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a
desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and related party.
There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed exceptions to the rule on legal
standing, as when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty for
the fulfillment of a public right recognized by the Constitution, and when a taxpayer questions the validity
of a governmental act authorizing the disbursement of public funds.
Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and in law. The ownership of these
paintings legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the members thereof, although the public has
been given the opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings when they were placed on exhibit.
The confiscation of these properties by the Aquino administration however should not be understood to
mean that the ownership of these paintings has automatically passed on the government without
complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and just compensation. If these
properties were already acquired by the government, any constitutional or statutory defect in their
acquisition and their subsequent disposition must be raised only by the proper parties the true owners
thereof whose authority to recover emanates from their proprietary rights which are protected by statutes
and the Constitution. Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the
valued pieces have become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever
to question their alleged unauthorized disposition.
Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Obviously, petitioners are not challenging any
expenditure involving public funds but the disposition of what they allege to be public properties. It is
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For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case of controversy one
which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations
not cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become
stale, such as the case before us. Since the purpose of this petition for prohibition is to enjoin respondent
public officials from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a particular date 11 January 1991
which is long past, the Issue raised in the petition have become moot and academic.
The cultural properties of the nation which shall be under the protection of the state are classified as the
"important cultural properties" and the "national cultural treasures." On the other hand, a "national cultural
treasures" is a unique object found locally, possessing outstanding historical, cultural, artistic and/or
scientific value which is highly significant and important to this country and nation. This Court takes note
of the certification issued by the Director of the Museum that the Italian paintings and silverware subject of
this petition do not constitute protected cultural properties and are not among those listed in the Cultural
Properties Register of the National Museum.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition for prohibition and mandamus is DISMISSED.
Facts:
Principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as
an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and nonprofit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the
protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio
S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His
substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently
ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and
alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the
full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests."
The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said
resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court."
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On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint
based on two grounds, namely: the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and, the issue raised
by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of
Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that, the complaint
shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, the motion is dilatory and the action presents a
justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. In
the said order, not only was the defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action against him
and that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the
relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of
the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge
gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only
represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains
sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the
Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3
of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of
generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and
self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative
obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in
granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available
involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners
maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit
that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be
revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
Issue:
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Held:
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the
State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time
usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled
unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the
agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs
indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due
process.
The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all
citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if
not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. The plaintiffs therein are numerous and
representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for
the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in
the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Nature means the created world in its entirety. Every generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. The minors'
assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and
State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the
civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights
altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly
stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and
constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they
are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the
fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself,
thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to
preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would
be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come generations which stand to inherit
nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well
as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and
utilization of the country's natural resources, then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June
1987 E.O. No. 192, Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources,
specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed
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The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting
and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically
speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's
being subject to law and higher authority.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes
already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6
June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 and P.D. No. 1152 were issued. Thus, the right of the petitioners to a balanced
and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and
functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or
protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which
they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful
ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to
state a cause of action; the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the
facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity
of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. Policy
formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in
issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and
expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no
longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that
protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not
involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber
licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that
a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be
stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose,
such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose
of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and
enhancing the general welfare.
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with
respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing
or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed
in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of
right.
Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing
Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to
implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
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Held:
The tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act is constitutional. The tax under said Act is levied with a
regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar
industry. Since sugar production is one of the great industries of our nation, its promotion, protection, and
advancement, therefore redounds greatly to the general welfare. Hence, said objectives of the Act is a
public concern and is therefore constitutional. It follows that the Legislature may determine within
reasonable bounds what is necessary for its protection and expedient for its promotion. If objectives and
methods are alike constitutionally valid, no reason is seen why the state may not levy taxes to raise funds
for their prosecution and attainment. Taxation may be made with the implement of the states police
power. In addition, it is only rational that the taxes be obtained from those that will directly benefit from it.
Therefore, the tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act is held to be constitutional.
TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD
[151 SCRA 208; G.R. No. L-75697; 18 Jun 1987]
Facts:
The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators adversely affected by
Presidential Decree No. 1987, An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to
regulate and supervise the videogram industry.
A month after the promulgation of the said
Revenue Code provided that:
"SEC. 134.
Video Tapes. There shall be collected on each processed video-tape
cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided,
That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax."
"Section 10.
Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. Notwithstanding
any provision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%)
of the purchase price or rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or
disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual
program.
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Held:
Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a condition
for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition.
The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of
the sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and needs in a word, the public order
of the general community. An important component of that public order is the health and physical
safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of
governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether
there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for
admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general
community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the
regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable
method of protecting the health and safety of the public.
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Held:
The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to compel print media
companies to donate Comelec space amounts to taking of private personal property without payment
of the just compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of necessity for the
taking has not been established by respondent Comelec, considering that the newspapers were not
unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking of private property for public use is authorized by the
constitution, but not without payment of just compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute
a valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the case at bench, there is no showing of existence of
a national emergency to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers.
Facts:
Respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) filed complaints for the expropriation of sugarcane lands
belonging to the petitioners. The stated public purpose of the expropriation was the expansion of the
Dasmarias Resettlement Project to accommodate the squatters who were relocated from the
Metropolitan Manila area. The trial court rendered judgment ordering the expropriation of these lots and
the payment of just compensation. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court.
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Section 1-C, SY 06-07
Issue:
Whether or not the judgment of expropriation was forfeited in the light of the failure of respondent NHA to
use the expropriated property for the intended purpose but for a totally different purpose.
Held:
The Supreme Court held in favor of the respondent NHA. Accordingly, petitioners cannot insist on a
restrictive view of the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by contending that the contract for low
cost housing is a deviation from the stated public use. It is now settled doctrine that the concept of public
use is no longer limited to traditional purposes. The term "public use" has now been held to be
synonymous with "public interest," "public benefit," "public welfare," and "public convenience." Thus,
whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use."
In addition, the expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban development is for a public
purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercials firms, entertainment
and service companies, and other private concerns. Moreover, the Constitution itself allows the State to
undertake, for the common good and in cooperation with the private sector, a continuing program of urban
land reform and housing which will make at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to
underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. The expropriation of
private property for the purpose of socialized housing for the marginalized sector is in furtherance of
social justice.
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Facts:
On October 10, 1984, Pres. Marcos issued P.D. 1956 creating a Special Account in the General Fund,
designated as the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF). The OPSF was designed to reimburse oil
companies for cost increases in crude oil and imported petroleum products resulting from exchange rate
adjustments and from increases in the world market prices of crude oil.
Subsequently, the OPSF was reclassified into a "trust liability account," in virtue of E.O. 1024, and ordered
released from the National Treasury to the Ministry of Energy.
Pres. Aquino, amended P.D. 1956. She promulgated Executive Order No. 137 on February 27, 1987,
expanding the grounds for reimbursement to oil companies for possible cost underrecovery incurred as a
result of the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products, the amount of the underrecovery being
left for determination by the Ministry of Finance.
The
petition
avers
that
the
creation
29(3), Article VI of the Constitution, reading as follows:
of
the
trust
fund
violates
(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a
special fund and paid out for such purposes only. If the purpose for which a special fund
was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to
the general funds of the Government.
The petitioner argues that "the monies collected pursuant to . . P.D. 1956, as amended, must be treated
as a 'SPECIAL FUND,' not as a 'trust account' or a 'trust fund,' and that "if a special tax is collected for a
specific purpose, the revenue generated therefrom shall 'be treated as a special fund' to be used only for
the purpose indicated, and not channeled to another government objective." Petitioner further points out
that since "a 'special fund' consists of monies collected through the taxing power of a State, such amounts
belong to the State, although the use thereof is limited to the special purpose/objective for which it was
created."
He also contends that the "delegation of legislative authority" to the ERB violates 28 (2). Article VI of the
Constitution, viz.:
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Section 1-C, SY 06-07
and, inasmuch as the delegation relates to the exercise of the power of taxation, " the limits, limitations
and restrictions must be quantitative, that is, the law must not only specify how to tax, who (shall) be
taxed (and) what the tax is for, but also impose a specific limit on how much to tax." 12
Issue:
Whether or Not the invalidity of the "TRUST ACCOUNT" in the books of account of the Ministry of Energy
(now, the Office of Energy Affairs), created pursuant to 8, paragraph 1, of P.D. No. 1956, as amended,
"said creation of a trust fund being contrary to Section 29 (3), Article VI of the Constitution.
Whether or Not the unconstitutionality of 8, paragraph 1 (c) of P.D. No. 1956, as amended by Executive
Order No. 137, for "being an undue and invalid delegation of legislative power to the Energy Regulatory
Board.
Held:
The OPSF is a "Trust Account" which was established "for the purpose of minimizing the frequent price
changes brought about by exchange rate adjustment and/or changes in world market prices of crude oil
and imported petroleum products." Under P.D. No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137 dated
27 February 1987, this Trust Account may be funded from any of the following sources:
a) Any increase in the tax collection from ad valorem tax or customs duty imposed on petroleum
products subject to tax under this Decree arising from exchange rate adjustment, as may be
determined by the Minister of Finance in consultation with the Board of Energy;
b) Any increase in the tax collection as a result of the lifting of tax exemptions of government
corporations, as may be determined by the Minister of Finance in consultation with the Board of
Energy;
c) Any additional amount to be imposed on petroleum products to augment the resources of the
Fund through an appropriate Order that may be issued by the Board of Energy requiring payment
of persons or companies engaged in the business of importing, manufacturing and/or marketing
petroleum products;
d) Any resulting peso cost differentials in case the actual peso costs paid by oil companies in the
importation of crude oil and petroleum products is less than the peso costs computed using the
reference foreign exchange rate as fixed by the Board of Energy.
Page 45
Section 1-C, SY 06-07
Hence, it seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are exacted in the
exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF is a special fund is plain from the
special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the general fund; and while it is placed in
what the law refers to as a "trust liability account," the fund nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny
and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that these measures comply with the constitutional
description of a "special fund." Indeed, the practice is not without precedent.
With regard to the alleged undue delegation of legislative power, the Court finds that the provision
conferring the authority upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on petroleum products provides a
sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised. In addition to the general policy of the law to
protect the local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump rates, 8(c) of P.D. 1956
expressly authorizes the ERB to impose additional amounts to augment the resources of the Fund.
What petitioner would wish is the fixing of some definite, quantitative restriction, or "a specific limit on how
much to tax." The Court is cited to this requirement by the petitioner on the premise that what is involved
here is the power of taxation; but as already discussed, this is not the case. What is here involved is not
so much the power of taxation as police power. Although the provision authorizing the ERB to impose
additional amounts could be construed to refer to the power of taxation, it cannot be overlooked that the
overriding consideration is to enable the delegate to act with expediency in carrying out the objectives of
the law which are embraced by the police power of the State.
The interplay and constant fluctuation of the various factors involved in the determination of the price of oil
and petroleum products, and the frequently shifting need to either augment or exhaust the Fund, do not
conveniently permit the setting of fixed or rigid parameters in the law as proposed by the petitioner. To do
so would render the ERB unable to respond effectively so as to mitigate or avoid the undesirable
consequences of such fluidity. As such, the standard as it is expressed suffices to guide the delegate in
the exercise of the delegated power, taking account of the circumstances under which it is to be
exercised.
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THE BILL
OF RIGHTS
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No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSO. VS. MAYOR OF MANILA
[20 SCRA 849; G.R. NO.L-24693; 31 JULY 1967]
Facts:
Petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association with one of its members, Hotel del Mar
Inc., and Go Chiu, the president and general manager of the second petitioner, filed a petition for
prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was
sued in his capacity as such charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of
Manila and to give the necessary orders for the execution and enforcement of such ordinances. It was
alleged that the petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the
interest of its eighteen members operating hotels and motels, characterized as legitimate businesses duly
licensed by both national and city authorities and regularly paying taxes. It was alleged that on June 13,
1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963
by the then acting City Mayor, Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga. After which the alleged grievances against
the ordinance were set forth in detail. There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it regulate motels, on the ground that in the
revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels. it also being
provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for
inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives. The
lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain
from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.
Issue:
Whether or Not Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is unconstitutional, therefore, null and void.
Held:
A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental character ought to have admonished the
lower court against such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be
allowed to stand, consistently with what has been the accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in
both procedural and substantive aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the
presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically
by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The action of the elected
representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things,
be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances
which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance,
has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the people x x x . The
Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or
property rights under the guise of police regulation.
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to
rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not the case here. The
principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford
Fire Insurance Co. where the American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly
summed up the matter thus: The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of
the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation
prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying
questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the
statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on
the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment
against the ordinance set aside.
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Facts:
Philphos Movement for Progress, Inc. (PMPI for brevity), filed with the Department of Labor and
Employment a petition for certification election among the supervisory employees of petitioner, alleging
that as a supervisory union duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment it was seeking
to represent the supervisory employees of Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation. Mediator-Arbiter
Rodolfo S. Milado issued an order directing the holding of a certification election among the supervisory
employees of petitioner, excluding therefrom the superintendents and the professional and technical
employees. However, the PMPI filed an amended petition with the Mediator-Arbiter wherein it sought to
represent not only the supervisory employees of petitioner but also its professional/technical and
confidential employees. The parties therein agreed to submit their respective position papers and to
consider the amended petition submitted for decision on the basis thereof and related documents.
Mediator-Arbiter Milado issued an order granting the petition and directing the holding of a certification
election among the "supervisory, professional (engineers, analysts, mechanics, accountants, nurses,
midwives, etc.), technical, and confidential employees. PHILPHOS appealed the order to the Secretary of
Labor and Employment who rendered a decision through Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma
dismissing the appeal. PHILPHOS moved for reconsideration but the same was denied; hence, the
instant petition alleging denial of due process on the part of the DOLE to which the mediator-arbiter was
under.
Issue:
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Section 1-C, SY 06-07
Held:
There was no denial of due process. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or,
as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of petitioner PHILPHOS agreed to file its position paper
with the Mediator-Arbiter and to consider the case submitted for decision on the basis of the position
papers filed by the parties, there was sufficient compliance with the requirement of due process, as
petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunity to present its side. Moreover, petitioner could have, if it so
desired, insisted on a hearing to confront and examine the witnesses of the other party. But it did not;
instead it opted to submit its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter. Besides, petitioner had all the
opportunity to ventilate its arguments in its appeal to the Secretary of Labor.
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Held:
A valid search must be authorized by a search warrant issued by an appropriate authority. However, a
warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its
occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual
search. In the case at bar, the guns were not tucked in Arellanos waist nor placed within his reach, as
they were neatly packed in gun cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the car. Given these
circumstances, the PNP could not have thoroughly searched the car lawfully as well as the package
without violating the constitutional injunction. Absent any justifying circumstance specifically pointing to
the culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the search could not have been valid. Consequently, the firearms
obtained from the warrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding. It was also
shown in the facts that the PNP had not informed the public of the purpose of setting up the checkpoint.
Petitioner was also not among those charged by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election Code. He
was not informed by the City Prosecutor that he was a respondent in the preliminary investigation. Such
constituted a violation of his right to due process. Hence, it cannot be contended that petitioner was fully
given the opportunity to meet the accusation against him as he was not informed that he was himself a
respondent in the case. Thus, the warrantless search conducted by the PNP is declared illegal and the
firearms seized during the search cannot be used as evidence in any proceeding against the petitioner.
Resolution No. 92-0829 is unconstitutional, and therefore, set aside.
JAVIER VS. COMELEC
[144 SCRA 194; G.R. NOS. L-68379-81; 22 SEPT 1986]
Facts:
The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the
May 1984 elections. The former appeared to enjoy more popular support but the latter had the advantage
of being the nominee of the KBL with all its perquisites of power. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the
elections, the bitter contest between the two came to a head when several followers of the petitioner were
ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter's men. Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are
now facing trial for these murders. Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad the private
respondent's proclamation, the petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to question the canvass of
the election returns. His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by
the Second Division of the said body. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the
proclamation was void because made only by a division and not by the Commission on Elections en banc
as required by the Constitution. Meanwhile, on the strength of his proclamation, the private respondent
took his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa.
Issue:
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Whether or Not the Second Division of the Commission on Elections authorized to promulgate its decision
of July 23, 1984, proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election.
Held:
This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as the
indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must
not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his
decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their
rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge,
otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not
seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice
they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter
calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play cans for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a
suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and
waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing.
Judicial (and also extra-judicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed
to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to
foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the
arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.
YNOT VS. IAC
[148 SCRA 659; G.R. NO. 74457; 20 MAR 1987]
Facts:
Executive Order No. 626-A prohibited the transportation of carabaos and carabeef from one province to
another. The carabaos of petitioner were confiscated for violation of Executive Order No 626-A while he
was transporting them from Masbate to Iloilo. Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of Executive
Order No. 626-A. The government argued that Executive Order No. 626-A was issued in the exercise of
police power to conserve the carabaos that were still fit for farm work or breeding.
Issue:
Whether or Not EO No. 626-A is a violation of Substantive Due Process.
Held:
The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of police power, because it is not reasonably necessary for
the purpose of the law and is unduly oppressive. It is difficult to see how prohibiting the transfer of
carabaos from one province to another can prevent their indiscriminate killing. Retaining the carabaos in
one province will not prevent their slaughter there. Prohibiting the transfer of carabeef, after the slaughter
of the carabaos, will not prevent the slaughter either.
PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ
[180 SCRA 218; G.R. NO.84818; 18 DEC 1989]
Facts:
Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications. Charging rates for
certain specified lines that were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose Alcuaz Commissioner of the
National Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent
(15%) due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the power to fix rates. Said order was
issued without prior notice and hearing.
Issue:
Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.
Held:
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The right to hearing, includes the right to present ones case and submit evidence
presented.
The tribunal must consider the evidence presented
The decision must have something to support itself.
Evidence must be substantial (reasonable evidence that is adequate to support
conclusion)
Decision must be based on the evidence presented at hearing
The tribunal body must act on its own independent consideration of law and facts
and not simply accept subordinates views
Court must render decision in such a manner that the proceeding can know the
various issued involved and reasons for decisions rendered.
The court stresses that while there is no controlling and precise definition of Due Process, it gives an
unavoidable standard that government actions must conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty and
property is valid.
The closure of the radio station is like wise a violation of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and
expression. The court stresses that all forms of media, whether print or broadcast are entitled to this
constitutional right. Although the government still has the right to be protected against broadcasts which
incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. The test for the limitation of freedom of expression is the
clear and present danger rule. If in the circumstances that the media is used in such nature as to create
this danger that will bring in such evils, then the law has the right to prevent it. However, Radio and
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The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements
does not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative
character. There cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and submit
evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views
of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and
the reason for the decision rendered.
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EQUAL PROTECTION
Art 3, Sec. 1.
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
PEOPLE VS. CAYAT
[68 PHIL 12; G.R. NO. 45987; 5 MAY 1939]
Facts:
Law prohibits any member of a non-Christian tribe to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink, any
intoxicating liquors of any kind. The law, Act No. 1639, exempts only the so-called native wines or liquors
which the members of such tribes have been accustomed to take.
Issue:
Whether or Not the law denies equal protection to one prosecuted and sentenced for violation of said law.
Held:
No. It satisfies the requirements of a valid classification, one of which is that the classification under the
law must rest on real or substantial distinctions.
The distinction is reasonable. The classification between the members of the non- Christian and the
members of the Christian tribes is not based upon accident of birth or parentage but upon the degree of
civilization and culture. The term non-Christian tribes refers to a geographical area and more directly to
natives of the Philippines of a low grade civilization usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled
communities. The distinction is reasonable for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions
existing in the non- Christian tribes
The prohibition is germane to the purposes of the law. It is designed to insure peace and order in and
among the non- Christian tribes has often resulted in lawlessness and crime thereby hampering the
efforts of the government to raise their standards of life and civilization. This law is not limited in its
application to conditions existing at the time of the enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long
as those conditions exists. The Act applies equally to all members of the class. That it may be unfair in its
operation against a certain number of non- Christians by reason of their degree of culture is not an
argument against the equality of its operation nor affect the reasonableness of the classification thus
established.
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Held:
SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid classification, the Filipino female domestics
working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the special risk to which their class was
exposed. There is no question that Order No.1 applies only to female contract workers but it does not
thereby make an undue discrimination between sexes. It is well settled hat equality before the law under
the constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of
classification, provided that:
1.
2.
3.
4.
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No. The case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was
primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the
intervention and participation of State authorities. Under the circumstances, can accused/appellant validly
claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been violated. Stated
otherwise, may an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be
invoked against the State. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. It was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding
agency, who made search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard
operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to
the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts. Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not
convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the
Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed
that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search.
No. The law enforcers testified that accused/appellant was informed of his constitutional rights. It is
presumed that they have regularly performed their duties (See. 5(m), Rule 131) and their testimonies
should be given full faith and credence, there being no evidence to the contrary.
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Facts:
Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner Waterous Drug Corporation on 15 August 1988. On 31
July 1989, Catolico received a memorandum from WATEROUS Vice President-General Manager Emma
R. Co warning her not to dispense medicine to employees chargeable to the latter's accounts because
the same was a prohibited practice. On the same date, Co issued another memorandum to Catolico
warning her not to negotiate with suppliers of medicine without consulting the Purchasing Department, as
this would impair the company's control of purchases and, besides she was not authorized to deal directly
with the suppliers.
As regards the first memorandum, Catolico did not deny her responsibility but explained that her act was
"due to negligence," since fellow employee Irene Soliven "obtained the medicines in bad faith and through
misrepresentation when she claimed that she was given a charge slip by the Admitting Dept." Catolico
then asked the company to look into the fraudulent activities of Soliven.
In a letter dated 2 February 1990, Catolico requested access to the file containing Sales Invoice No. 266
for her to be able to make a satisfactory explanation. In said letter she protested Saldaa's invasion of her
privacy when Saldaa opened an envelope addressed to Catolico.
In a letter to Co dated 10 February 1990, Catolico, through her counsel, explained that the check she
received from YSP was a Christmas gift and not a "refund of overprice." She also averred that the
preventive suspension was ill-motivated, as it sprang from an earlier incident between her and Co's
secretary, Irene Soliven.
On 5 March 1990, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda Bautro, issued a memorandum notifying Catolico
of her termination. On 5 May 1990, Catolico filed before the Office of the Labor Arbiter a complaint for
unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, and illegal suspension. In his decision of 10 May 1993, Labor
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Petitioners seasonably appealed from the decision and urged the NLRC to set it aside because the Labor
Arbiter erred in finding that Catolico was denied due process and that there was no just cause to
terminate her services.
In its decision of 30 September 1993, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter on the ground
that petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for Catolico's dismissal from her employment. It found
that petitioner's evidence consisted only of the check of P640.00 drawn by YSP in favor of complainant,
which her co-employee saw when the latter opened the envelope. But, it declared that the check was
inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(1 and 2) of Article III of the Constitution. It
concluded:
With the smoking gun evidence of respondents being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of
the constitutional right invoked by complainants, respondents' case falls apart as it is
bereft of evidence which cannot be used as a legal basis for complainant's dismissal.
The NLRC then dismissed the appeal for lack of merit, but modified the dispositive portion of the
appealed decision by deleting the award for illegal suspension as the same was already included in the
computation of the aggregate of the awards in the amount of P35,401.86.
Issue:
Whether or Not the dismissal of the private respondent is in violation of the Constitution, under the Bill of
Rights.
Held:
As to the first and second grounds, petitioners insist that Catolico had been receiving "commissions" from
YSP, or probably from other suppliers, and that the check issued to her on 9 November 1989 was not the
first or the last. They also maintained that Catolico occupied a confidential position and that Catolico's
receipt of YSP's check, aggravated by her "propensity to violate company rules," constituted breach of
confidence. And contrary to the findings of NLRC, Catolico was given ample opportunity to explain her
side of the controversy.
In her Comment, Catolico asserts that petitioners' evidence is too "flimsy" to justify her dismissal. The
check in issue was given to her, and she had no duty to turn it over to her employer. Company rules do
not prohibit an employee from accepting gifts from clients, and there is no indication in the contentious
check that it was meant as a refund for overpriced medicines. Besides, the check was discovered in
violation of the constitutional provision on the right to privacy and communication; hence, as correctly held
by the NLRC, it was inadmissible in evidence.
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Catolico was denied due process. Procedural due process requires that an employee be apprised of the
charge against him, given reasonable time to answer the charge, allowed ample opportunity to be heard
and defend himself, and assisted by a representative if the employee so desires. Ample opportunity
connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the employee to enable him to prepare
adequately for his defense, including legal representation. In the case at bar, although Catolico was given
an opportunity to explain her side, she was dismissed from the service in the memorandum of 5 March
1990 issued by her Supervisor after receipt of her letter and that of her counsel. No hearing was ever
conducted after the issues were joined through said letters.
Catolico was also unjustly dismissed. It is settled that the burden is on the employer to prove just and
valid cause for dismissing an employee, and its failure to discharge that burden would result in a finding
that the dismissal is unjustified. It clearly appears then that Catolico's dismissal was based on hearsay
information. Catolico's dismissal then was obviously grounded on mere suspicion, which in no case can
justify an employee's dismissal. Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for
the termination of employment; and even the dismissal of an employee for loss of trust and confidence
must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employer's arbitrariness, whims, caprices, or suspicion.
Besides, Catolico was not shown to be a managerial employee, to which class of employees the term
"trust and confidence" is restricted.
As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC anchored its decision, that the Bill of Rights
does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is
not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the
contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities.
Finally, since it has been determined by the Labor Arbiter that Catolico's reinstatement would not be to the
best interest of the parties, he correctly awarded separation pay to Catolico. Separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement is computed at one month's salary for every year of service. In this case, however, Labor
Arbiter Lopez computed the separation pay at one-half month's salary for every year of service. Catolico
did not oppose or raise an objection. As such, we will uphold the award of separation pay as fixed by the
Labor Arbiter.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the challenged decision and resolution of
the National Labor Relations Commission dated 30 September 1993 and 2 December 1993, respectively,
in NLRC-NCR CA No. 005160-93 are AFFIRMED, except as to its reason for upholding the Labor
Arbiter's decision, viz., that the evidence against private respondent was inadmissible for having been
obtained in violation of her constitutional rights of privacy of communication and against unreasonable
searches and seizures which is hereby set aside.
Facts:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin 1 hereinafter referred to as
Respondents-Prosecutors several judges2 hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges
issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein 4 and/or the
corporations of which they were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons abovenamed and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take
possession of the following personal property to wit:
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as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or
intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications
adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code)
and the Revised Penal Code."
Respondents-prosecutors contentions
(1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law;
(2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and
(3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless
of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.
The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be
split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned
corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
Issue:
Whether or not those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations are obtained
legally.
Whether or not those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein are obtained legally.
Held:
The petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures
made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective
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With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the
aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by
this Court, thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence
against petitioners herein.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were
issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a
"violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof
with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges
who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the
introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the
applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would
be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff
and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," as alleged in the
aforementioned applications without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or
__________________________
Hon. Jose W. Diokno, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, Jose Lukban, in his capacity as Acting
Director, National Bureau of Investigation, Special Prosecutors Pedro D. Cenzon, Efren I. Plana and
Manuel Villareal, Jr. and Assistant Fiscal Maneses G. Reyes, City of Manila.
2
Hon. Amado Roan, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon. Roman Cansino, Judge of
the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon. Hermogenes Caluag, Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, Hon. Eulogio Mencias, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig
Branch, and Hon. Damian Jimenez, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Quezon City.
3
U.S. Tobacco Corporation, Atlas Cement Corporation, Atlas Development Corporation, Far East
Publishing Corporation (Evening News), Investment Inc., Industrial Business Management Corporation,
General Agricultural Corporation, American Asiatic Oil Corporation, Investment Management Corporation,
Holiday Hills, Inc., Republic Glass Corporation, Industrial and Business Management Corporation, United
Housing Corporation, The Philippine Tobacco-Flue-Curing and Redrying Corporation, Republic Real
Estate Corporation and Merconsel Corporation.
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Facts:
In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners were denied
due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a
prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President;
and (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge
issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to
determine probable cause. Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On
March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the
resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case
against petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the
Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed
the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by
the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners' contention that they
have been denied the administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support.
Issue:
Whether or Not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them
although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of
Justice and, subsequently, by the President.
Whether or Not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a
warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to
determine probable cause
Held:
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With respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary
investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to
Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits.
Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counteraffidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the
respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.
The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on
the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination nder
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority
by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized by law,"
has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of
warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant
and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the
report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause
and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable
cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary
examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding
cases filed before their courts. It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the
prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained. The petitions fail to establish
that public respondents, through their separate acts, gravely abused their discretion as to amount to lack
of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for cannot issue.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part
of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585, 82827 and
83979. The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc dated April
7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is LIFTED.
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Facts:
Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement filed with the POEA, charged petitioner with illegal
recruitment. Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent petitioner a telegram directing him to appear
to the POEA regarding the complaint against him. On the same day, after knowing that petitioner had no
license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas Achacoso issued a
Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 to petitioner. It stated that there will a seizure of the documents and
paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having
verified that petitioner has (1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and
Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment; (2) Committed/are committing acts
prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code. A team was
then tasked to implement the said Order. The group, accompanied by mediamen and Mandaluyong
policemen, went to petitioners residence. They served the order to a certain Mrs. For a Salazar, who let
them in. The team confiscated assorted costumes. Petitioner filed with POEA a letter requesting for the
return of the seized properties, because she was not given prior notice and hearing. The said Order
violated due process. She also alleged that it violated sec 2 of the Bill of Rights, and the properties were
confiscated against her will and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation.
Issue:
Whether or Not the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) can
validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code
Held:
Under the new Constitution, . . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized. Mayors and prosecuting officers cannot issue warrants of seizure or
arrest. The Closure and Seizure Order was based on Article 38 of the Labor Code. The Supreme Court
held, We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest
warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article
38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect The power of the
President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order
arrests) cannot be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole
domain of the courts. Furthermore, the search and seizure order was in the nature of a general warrant.
The court held that the warrant is null and void, because it must identify specifically the things to be
seized.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to return all materials seized
as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.
MORANO VS. VIVO
[20 SCRA 562; G.R. L-22196; 30 JUN 1967]
Facts:
Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen born in Fukien, China arrived in the Philippines on November 1961 to
visit her cousin, Samuel Lee Malaps. She left China and her children by a first marriage: Fu Tse Haw and
Fu Yan Kai both minors, in the care of neighbors in Fukien, China. Chan Sau wah arrived in the
Philippines with Fu Yan Fun, her minor son also by the first marriage. Chan Sau Wah and her minor son
Fu Yan Fun were permitted only into the Philippines under a temporary visitor's visa for two months and
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Warrants of Arrest were issued 7March1988 against petitioners for violation of Sec37, 45 and 46 of
Immigration Act and sec69 of Revised Administrative Code. Trial by the Board of Special Inquiry III
commenced the same date. Petition for bail was filed 11March 1988 but was not granted by the
Commissioner of Immigration. 4 April1988 Petitioners filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The
court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988.
Issue:
Whether or Not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and detain petitioners pending determination of
existence of probable cause.
Whether or Not there was unreasonable searches and seizures by CID agents.
Whether or Not the writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted to petitioners.
Held:
While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it violates the declared policy of the state
to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social well being of the youth. The arrest of
petitioners was based on the probable cause determined after close surveillance of 3 months. The
existence of probable cause justified the arrest and seizure of articles linked to the offense. The articles
were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest; therefore the articles are admissible evidences (Rule 126,
Section12 of Rules on Criminal Procedure).
The rule that search and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule.
There are at least three exceptions to this rule. 1.) Search is incidental to the arrest. 2.) Search in a
moving vehicle. 3.) Seizure of evidence in plain view. In view of the foregoing, the search done was
incidental to the arrest.
The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and
estops them from questioning its validity. Furthermore, the deportation charges and the hearing presently
conducted by the Board of Special Inquiry made their detention legal. It is a fundamental rule that habeas
corpus will not be granted when confinement is or has become legal, although such confinement was
illegal at the beginning.
The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner of Immigration are in accordance with Sec37 (a)
of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 in relation to sec69 of the Revised Administrative code. Section
37 (a) provides that aliens shall be arrested and deported upon warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of a
ground for deportation against them. Deportation proceedings are administrative in character and never
construed as a punishment but a preventive measure. Therefore, it need not be conducted strictly in
accordance with ordinary Court proceedings. What is essential is that there should be a specific charge
against the alien intended to be arrested and deported. A fair hearing must also be conducted with
assistance of a counsel if desired.
Lastly, the power to deport aliens is an act of the State and done under the authority of the sovereign
power. It a police measure against the undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is
found to be injurious to the public good and tranquility of the people.
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The issue of constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1866 has been laid to rest in the case of Misolas
v. Panga, G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990 (181 SCRA 648), where this Court held that the declaration
of unconstitutionality of the third paragraph of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 is wanting in
legal basis since it is neither a bill of attainder nor does it provide a possibility of a double jeopardy.
Petitioners' contention that Republic Act 6968 has repealed Presidential Decree No. 1866 is bereft of
merit. It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that where the words and phrases of a statute are not
obscure or ambiguous. its meaning and the intention of the legislature must be determined from the
language employed, and where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction.
Petitioners contend that Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 is couched in general or vague terms.
The terms "deal in", "acquire", "dispose" or "possess" are capable of various interpretations such that
there is no definiteness as to whether or not the definition includes "constructive possession" or how the
concept of constructive possession should be applied. Petitioners were not found in actual possession of
the firearm and ammunitions. They were in Quezon City while the prohibited articles were found in Davao
City. Yet they were being charged under Presidential Decree No. 1866 upon the sole circumstance that
the house wherein the items were found belongs to them.
Petitioners question the admissibility in evidence of the articles seized in violation of their constitutional
right against unreasonable search and seizure. Petitioners aver that while they concede that Capt. Obrero
had permission from Ma. Luisa Veroy to break open the door of their residence, it was merely for the
purpose of ascertaining thereat the presence of the alleged "rebel" soldiers. The permission did not
include any authority to conduct a room to room search once inside the house. The items taken were,
therefore, products of an illegal search, violative of their constitutional rights As such, they are
inadmissible in evidence against them.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures (Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution).
However, the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute
one. Among the recognized exceptions thereto are: (1) a search incidental to an arrest; (2) a search of a
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None of these exceptions pertains to the case at bar. The reason for searching the house of herein
petitioners is that it was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center for rebel soldiers.
While Capt. Obrero was able to enter the compound, he did not enter the house because he did not have
a search warrant and the owners were not present. This shows that he himself recognized the need for a
search warrant, hence, he did not persist in entering the house but rather contacted the Veroys to seek
permission to enter the same. Permission was indeed granted by Ma. Luisa Veroy to enter the house but
only to ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers. Under the circumstances it is undeniable that the police
officers had ample time to procure a search warrant but did not.
Undeniably, the offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum prohibitum but it does not follow that
the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita but the subjects of
this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is
still necessary. Hence, the rule having been violated and no exception being applicable, the articles
seized were confiscated illegally and are therefore protected by the exclusionary principle. They cannot
be used as evidence against the petitioners in the criminal action against them for illegal possession of
firearms. (Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 689-690 [1986]). Besides, assuming that there was indeed a
search warrant, still in mala prohibita, while there is no need of criminal intent, there must be knowledge
that the same existed. Without the knowledge or voluntariness there is no crime.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition as granted and the criminal case against the petitioners for illegal
possession of firearms is DISMISSED.
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The document (PAGPAPATUNAY) was inadmissible to the court as the accused was not informed of her
right not to sign the document neither was she informed that she has the right to the assistance of a
counsel and the fact that it may be used as evidence against her. It was not proved that the marijuana
belonged to her. Not only does the law require the presence of witnesses when the search is conducted,
but it also imposes upon the person making the search the duty to issue a detailed receipt for the property
seized. He is likewise required to deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the warrant,
together with a true and accurate inventory thereof duly verified under oath. Again, these duties are
mandatory and are required to preclude substitution of the items seized by interested parties.
The guilt of the accused was has not been established. Judgment is reversed.
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Section 1-C, SY 06-07
Facts:
On 1 February 1988, military agents were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue,
Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their office, about a "sparrow man"
(NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound. That the wounded man
in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols
the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump along
Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. The wounded man's name was listed by the hospital
management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes,
Bian, Laguna however it was disclosed later that the true name of the wounded man was Rolando Dural.
In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Servicesof the
CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, he was positively identified by the eyewitnesses
as the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols.
Issue:
Held:
Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive organization.
Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was
committing as offense when arrested. The crimes rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit
such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance therefore in connection therewith constitute
direct assaults against the state and are in the nature of continuing crimes.
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Issue:
Whether or Not arrest without warrant is lawful.
Whether or Not evidence from such arrest is admissible.
Held:
Search and seizures supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. Rule 126, Sec 12 of
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything, which may be used as proff of the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant.(People v. Castiller) The failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that
their knowledge required from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill requirements for its issuance.
However, warantless search and seizures are legal as long as PROBABLE CAUSE existed. The police
officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime from the surveillance of the
activities of the accused. As police officers were the ones conducting the surveillance, it is presumed that
they are regularly in performance of their duties.
PEOPLE V. RODRIGUEZA
[205 SCRA 791; G.R. No. 95902; 4 Feb 1992]
Facts:
NARCOM agents staged a buy-bust operation, after gaining information that there was an ongoing illegal
traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Albay. The participating agents were given money treated with
ultraviolet powder. One of the agents went to said location, asked for a certain Don. Thereafter, the Don,
herein accused, met with him and a certain object wrapped in a plastic later identified as marijuana was
given in exchange for P200. The agent went back to headquarters and made a report, based on which, a
team was subsequently organized and a raid was conducted in the house of the father of the accused.
During the raid, the NARCOM agents were able to confiscate dried marijuana leaves and a plastic syringe
among others. There was no authorization by any search warrant. The accused was found positive of
ultraviolet powder. The lower court, considering the evidences obtained and testimonies from the
prosecution, found him guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and sentenced him to
reclusion perpetua.
Issue:
Whether or Not the lower court was correct in its judgment.
Held:
The NARCOM agents procedure in the entrapment of the accused failed to meet the qualification that the
suspected drug dealer must be caught red-handed in the act of selling marijuana to a person posing as a
buyer, since the operation was conducted after the actual exchange. Said raid also violated accused
right against unreasonable search and seizure, as the situation did not fall in the circumstances wherein a
search may be validly made even without a search warrant, i.e. when the search is incidental to a lawful
arrest; when it involves prohibited articles in plain view. The NARCOM agents could not have justified
their act by invoking the urgency and necessity of the situation because the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses reveal that the place had already been put under surveillance for quite some time. Had it been
their intention to conduct the raid, then they should, because they easily could, have first secured a
search warrant during that time. The Court further notes the confusion and ambiguity in the identification
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CIC Taduran, who acted as the poseur buyer, testified that appellant sold him 100 grams of dried
marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic bag. Surprisingly, and no plausible explanation has been advanced
therefor, what were submitted to and examined by the PCCL and thereafter utilized as evidence against
the appellant were the following items:
One (1) red and white colored plastic bag containing the following:
Exh. "A"Thirty (30) grams of suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops contained inside a
transparent plastic bag.
Exh. "B" Fifty (50) grams of suspected dried marijuana leaves and seeds contained
inside a white colored plastic labelled "Robertson".
Exh. "C" Four (4) aluminum foils each containing suspected dried marijuana fruiting
tops having a total weight of seven grams then further wrapped
with a piece of aluminum foil.
Exh. "D" Five (5) small transparent plastic bags each containing suspected dried
marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of seventeen grams.
Exh. "E" One plastic syringe.
Evidently, these prohibited articles were among those confiscated during the so-called follow-up raid in
the house of Rodriguezas father. The unanswered question then arises as to the identity of the marijuana
leaves that became the basis of appellant's conviction. In People vs. Rubio, this Court had the occasion
to rule that the plastic bag and the dried marijuana leaves contained therein constitute the corpus delicti of
the crime. As such, the existence thereof must be proved with certainty and conclusiveness. Failure to do
so would be fatal to the cause of the prosecution. Conviction is reversed and set aside and accused is
acquitted.
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Page 90
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Facts:
Two complaints for grave oral defamation were filed against Faustina Callanta. The City Judge of
Dagupan City, Felipe Villanueva, denied the motions to quash the complaints. Thus, petitioner Callanta
brought the suits for certiorari in the Supreme Court. Petitioner questions the validity of the issuance of
warrant of arrest by respondent, arguing that the City Fiscal should have conducted the preliminary
investigation. According to petitioners counsel, there was jurisdictional infirmity. After the issuance of the
warrants of arrest and the bail fixed at P600, petitioner posted the bail bond, thus obtaining her
provisional liberty. The City Fiscal in this case did not disagree with the judges investigation, and agreed
with the complaints filed.
Issue:
Whether or Not petitioners contentions are to be given merit.
Held:
Based on many precedent cases of the Supreme Court, where the accused has filed bail and waived the
preliminary investigation proper, he has waived whatever defect, if any, in the preliminary examination
conducted prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest. In the case at bar, it is futile for the petitioner to
question the validity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest, because she posted the bail bond. Petitioner
also erred in arguing that only the City Fiscal can conduct a preliminary investigation. According to the
Charter of the City of Dagupan, the City Court of Dagupan City may also conduct preliminary
investigation for any offense, without regard to the limits of punishment, and may release, or commit and
bind over any person charged with such offense to secure his appearance before the proper court.
Petition for certiorari is denied. Restraining order issued by the Court is lifted and set aside.
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It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner
only after they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be
useless, futile and much too late.
Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptions heretofore discussed, and
hence, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures has not been violated.
PEOPLE V. MENGOTE
[210 SCRA 174; G.R. NO. 87059; 22 JUN 1992]
Facts:
The Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious
looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance
team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. The patrolmen saw two men looking from
side to side, one of whom holding his abdomen. They approached the persons and identified themselves
as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run but unable to escape because the other lawmen
surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of them the accused-appellant was found with
a .38 caliber with live ammunitions in it, while his companion had a fan knife. The weapons were taken
from them and they were turned over to the police headquarters for investigation. An information was
filed before the RTC convicting the accused of illegal possession of firearm arm. A witness testified that
the weapon was among the articles stolen at his shop, which he reported to the police including the
revolver. For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the fire arm or that he was licensed
to possess it but instead, he claimed that the weapon was planted on him at the time of his arrest. He was
convicted for violation of P.D.1866 and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. In his appeal he pleads that
the weapon was not admissible as evidence against him because it had been illegally seized and
therefore the fruit of a poisonous tree.
Issue:
Whether or not the warrantless search and arrest was illegal.
Held:
An evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure inadmissible in any proceeding for any
purpose as provided by Art. III sec 32 of the Constitution. Rule 113 sec.5 of the Rules of Court, provides
arrest without warrant lawful when: (a) the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense, (b) when the offense in fact has just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of the facts indicating the person arrested has committed it and (c) the person to be
arrested has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the
accused appellant was merely looking from side to side and holding his abdomen, according to the
arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that has just been committed or was being
actually committed or at least being attempt by Mengote in their presence. Moreover a person may not be
stopped and frisked in a broad daylight or on a busy street on unexplained suspicion.
Judgment is reversed and set aside. Accused-appellant is acquitted.
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In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of the
following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days. Then in the 7 in the
morning of May 11, 1989, the accused went to Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada.
At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the
Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his
men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose
of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said
area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana
and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM,
that same morning that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. The
group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in coordination with Tublay Police Station, set up a
checkpoint at the designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and inspected all vehicles coming
from the Cordillera Region.
The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front going towards the rear of the bus.
Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on
accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification papers.
When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on
his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag, as
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Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus,
accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier. Upon stepping out of the bus, the
officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the
officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was only
after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally presented his passport.
Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet
for further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they were
found to also contain hashish. Representative samples were taken from the hashish found among the
personal effects of accused and the same were brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical
analysis.
In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish. a prohibited drug
which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
ACCUSEDS DEFENSE
During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he raised the issue of
illegal search of his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM
officers in his pouch bag and that the two (2) travelling bags were not owned by him, but were merely
entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further claimed that the Australian
couple intended to take the same bus with him but because there were no more seats available in said
bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked accused to take charge of the bags, and that they
would meet each other at the Dangwa Station.
The trial court found the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt established beyond reasonable doubt.
Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the crime charged, accused
argues that the search of his personal effects was illegal because it was made without a search warrant
and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were discovered during the illegal search are not admissible as
evidence against him.
Issue:
Whether or Not the contention of the accused is valid, and therefore the RTC ruling be reversed.
Held:
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, where the search is made pursuant to a
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Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually
being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his
personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed
with a search warrant when the search was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under
the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that
accused was then and there committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable,
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. Warrantless search of the personal
effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid, because of existence of probable cause,
where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, 10 or where the
accused was acting suspiciously, 11 and attempted to flee.
The appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby affirmed. Costs against the accusedappellant.
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Section 1-C, SY 06-07
Facts:
On or about 8 July 1992, at about 6:00 in the morning, the Coastguard personnel received information
from NARCOM agent Ruben Laddaran that a suspected "shabu" courier by the name of Alvaro Saycon
was on board the MV Doa Virginia, which was arriving at that moment in Dumaguete City. Upon receipt
of the information, the Coastguard chief officer CPO Tolin, instructed them to intercept the suspect. A
combined team of NARCOM agents and Philippine Coastguard personnel consisting of CPO Tolin, a
certain Miagme, and Senior Police Officers Ruben Laddaran and Winifredo Noble of NARCOM posted
themselves at the gate of Pier 1. The MV Doa Virginia docked at 6:00 a.m. that same morning at Pier 1
in Dumaguete City. Alvaro Saycon alighted from the boat carrying a black bag and went through the
checkpoint manned by the Philippine Coastguard where he was identified by police officer Winifredo
Noble of NARCOM. Saycon was then invited to the Coastguard Headquarters at the Pier area. He
willingly went with them. At the headquarters, the coastguard asked Saycon to open his bag, and the
latter willingly obliged. In it were personal belongings and a maong wallet. Inside that maong wallet, there
was a Marlboro pack containing the suspected "shabu". When police officer Winifredo Noble asked
Saycon whether the Marlboro pack containing the suspected "shabu" was his, Saycon merely bowed his
head. Then Saycon, his bag and the suspected "shabu" were brought to the NARCOM office for booking.
When Alvaro Saycon was arrested, the NARCOM agents did not have a warrant of arrest. The PNP's
Forensic Analyst declared in court that she had conducted an examination of the specimens and found
out that the specimens weighed 4.2 grams in total, consisted of methamphetamine hydrochloride, more
widely known as "shabu."
Issue:
Whether or Not the warrantless search was valid.
Held:
The warrantless search was valid, as the accused was a passenger of a motor vehicle. There was
probable cause to believe that the accused was carrying prohibited drugs. Three weeks earlier, agents of
the Narcotics Command bought methamine hydrochloride from him. An agent of the Narcotics Command
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Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against
Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of Western Police District of the City of
Manila, seeking to enjoin said defendants and their agents from confiscating plaintiffs magazines or from
preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and educational
magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the publication is protected by the Constitutional
guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. Plaintiff also filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a
temporary restraining order against indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and burning of plaintiff's "Pinoy
Playboy" Magazines, pending hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction. The Court granted the
temporary restraining order. The case was set for trial upon the lapse of the TRO. RTC ruled that the
seizure was valid. This was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Held:
The Court ruled that the government authorities have not shown the required proof to justify a ban and to
warrant confiscation of the literature. First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1)
finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure,
by way of a search warrant. The court provides the following guidelines to be observed:
1. The authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge, if in their opinion an
obscenity seizure is in order;
2. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are obscene and
pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference and
action;
3. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed obscene. The question is to be
resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the judges sound discretion;
4. If in the opinion of the court, probable cause exists, it shall issue the search warrant prayed for;
5. The proper suit is then brought in the court under Article 201 of the RPC (Obscene publications).
6. Any conviction is subject to appeal. The appellate court may assess whether or not the properties
seized are indeed obscene.
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Section 1-C, SY 06-07
Held:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court 8 and by prevailing jurisprudence
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based
on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right
to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and (d) "plain view"
justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk;
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.
The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure
can be lawfully conducted.
The accused cannot be said to be committing a crime, she was merely crossing the street and was not
acting suspiciously for the Narcom agents to conclude that she was committing a crime. There was no
legal basis to effect a warrantless arrest of the accuseds bag, there was no probable cause and the
accused was not lawfully arrested.
The police had more than 24 hours to procure a search warrant and they did not do so. The seized
marijuana was illegal and inadmissible evidence.
RULE 113, RULES OF COURT
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
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In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with
section 7 of Rule 112.
Section 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. An application for search warrant
shall be filed with the following:
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court
where the criminal action is pending.
Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. The officer, if refused admittance to the
place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or
inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or
liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein.
Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and proceedings thereon.
(a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the warrant,
together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath.
(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall ascertain if the return
has been made, and if none, shall summon the person to whom the warrant was issued and
require him to explain why no return was made. If the return has been made, the judge shall
ascertain whether section 11 of this Rule has been complained with and shall require that the
property seized be delivered to him. The judge shall see to it that subsection (a) hereof has been
complied with.
(c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian of the log book on
search warrants who shall enter therein the date of the return, the result, and other actions of the
judge.
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Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted bail. Petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion
entitled, "motion for permission to leave the country," stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the
United States, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities." The prosecution opposed said
motion and after due hearing, both trial judges denied the same. Petitioner thus filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and
26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove, respectively, as well as the communication-request of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, denying his leave to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the
issuance of the appropriate writ commanding the Immigration Commissioner and the Chief of the Aviation
Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear him for departure. The Court of Appeals denied the petition.
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Issue:
Held:
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a
necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner
to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid
restriction on his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without
sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts. Petitioner has not shown the
necessity for his travel abroad. There is no indication that the business transactions cannot be undertaken
by any other person in his behalf.
MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS
[177 SCRA 668; G.R. NO. 88211; 15 SEPT 1989]
Facts:
This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate
members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to
the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to
impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by
law. Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed
particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino) may
prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Held:
"It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to
other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote.
Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right under
international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of
movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter
one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of
movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees
the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any
country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security,
public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country
cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to
return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to
travel.
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The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well considered view that
the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International Law and under
our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that
the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and
welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses
would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime.
The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines,
the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
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Wherefore, the petitioner is Dismissed without prejudice to the filling of another motion for leave to travel
abroad, should petitioner still desire, based on her heart condition. In such an event the determination of
her medical condition should be made by joint panel of medical specialists recommended by both the
accused and the prosecution.
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The 30 yr old previous GERONA decision of expelling and dismissing students and teachers who refuse
to obey RA1265 is violates exercise of freedom of speech and religious profession and worship.
Jehovahs Witnesses may be exempted from observing the flag ceremony but this right does not give
them the right to disrupt such ceremonies. In the case at bar, the Students expelled were only standing
quietly during ceremonies. By observing the ceremonies quietly, it doesnt present any danger so evil and
imminent to justify their expulsion. What the petitioners request is exemption from flag ceremonies and
not exclusion from public schools. The expulsion of the students by reason of their religious beliefs is also
a violation of a citizens right to free education. The non-observance of the flag ceremony does not totally
constitute ignorance of patriotism and civic consciousness. Love for country and admiration for national
heroes, civic consciousness and form of government are part of the school curricula. Therefore,
expulsion due to religious beliefs is unjustified.
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED. Expulsion is ANNULLED.
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Held:
No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion. The
free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As
Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The States interest in enforcing its
prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free
exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the
concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the States interest only
amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition.
Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in
mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
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Issue:
Held:
Yes. Freedom of speech and of the press are rights of the same fundamental character, safeguarded by
the due process of law clause. The word 'liberty' contained in that amendment embraces not only the right
of a person to be free from physical restraint, but the right to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties as
well.
The Act operates as a restraint in a double sense. First, its effect is to curtail the amount of revenue
realized from advertising; and, second, its direct tendency is to restrict circulation. This is plain enough
when we consider that, if it were increased to a high degree, as it could be if valid it well might result in
destroying both advertising and circulation.
Judge Cooley has laid down the test to be applied: The evils to be prevented were not the censorship of
the press merely, but any action of the government by means of which it might prevent such free and
general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential to prepare the people for an intelligent
exercise of their rights as citizens.
The tax here involved is bad not because it takes money from the pockets of the appellees. It is bad
because, it is seen to be a deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of
information to which the public is entitled in virtue of the constitutional guaranties. A free press stands as
one of the great interpreters between the government and the people.
The form in which the tax is imposed is in itself suspicious. It is not measured or limited by the volume of
advertisements. It is measured alone by the extent of the circulation of the publication in which the
advertisements are carried, with the plain purpose of penalizing the publishers and curtailing the
circulation of a selected group of newspapers.
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or
or
or
or
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US VS. BUSTOS
[37 PHIL. 731; G.R. L-12592; 8 MAR 1918]
Facts:
In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled, and prepared and
signed a petition to the Executive Secretary(privileged communication) through the law office of Crossfield
and O'Brien, and five individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of
Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. The specific
charges against the justice of the peace include the solicitation of money from persons who have pending
cases before the judge. Now, Punsalan alleged that accused published a writing which was false,
scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous against him.
Issue:
Whether or Not accused is entitled to constitutional protection by virtue of his right to free speech and free
press.
Held:
Yes. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The
administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is,
therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge
the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively suppressed. It is a duty which every
one owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the
duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public
officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them.
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the
complement of the part of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably
for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply,
without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances.
The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the charges made. All
persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs.
Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded
protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and
adoption of the doctrine of privilege. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of
justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in
its nature and this person in good faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is
mistaken. Although the charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to
be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that
malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens to
secure the removal from office of a person thought to be venal were justifiable. In no way did they
abuse the privilege.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that presumption. A
privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of
malice or falsity.
PITA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
[178 SCRA 362; G.R. NO.80806; 5 OCT 1989]
Facts:
On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of
Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxilliary Services Bureau,
Western Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and confiscated from
dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications
and other reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent and later burned the
seized materials in public at the University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the presence of
Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members of various student organizations.
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Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against
Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of Western Police District of the City of
Manila, seeking to enjoin said defendants and their agents from confiscating plaintiffs magazines or from
preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and educational
magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the publication is protected by the Constitutional
guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. Plaintiff also filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a
temporary restraining order against indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and burning of plaintiff's "Pinoy
Playboy" Magazines, pending hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction. The Court granted the
temporary restraining order. The case was set for trial upon the lapse of the TRO. RTC ruled that the
seizure was valid. This was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or Not the seizure violative of the freedom of expression of the petitioner.
Held:
Freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state has the right to protect society from
pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals, as indeed we have laws punishing the author,
publishers and sellers of obscene publications. However, It is easier said than done to say, that if the
pictures here in question were used not exactly for art's sake but rather for commercial purposes, the
pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection. Using the Kottinger rule: the test of obscenity is
"whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are
open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being
obscene may fall." Another is whether it shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency.
Ultimately "whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case
and that the question is to be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached
by it." The government authorities in the instant case have not shown the required proof to justify a ban
and to warrant confiscation of the literature First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1)
finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure,
by way of a search warrant. The court provides that the authorities must apply for the issuance of a
search warrant from a judge, if in their opinion an obscenity seizure is in order and that;
1. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are obscene and
pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference and
action;
2. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed obscene. The question is to be
resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the judges sound discretion;
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Held:
Yes. Freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures and
exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television. Furthermore the
circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a commercial activity expected to yield
monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of expression.
The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience. Neither
private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely look like.
There was, in other words, no "clear and present danger" of any violation of any right to privacy. Subject
matter is one of public interest and concern. The subject thus relates to a highly critical stage in the
history of the country.
At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of public concern, that petitioners
propose to film were taking place, Enrile was a "public figure:" Such public figures were held to have lost,
to some extent at least, their right to privacy.
The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the constitutional freedom of
speech and of expression and the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the
proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of events.
LOPEZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
[34 SCRA 116; L-26549; 31 JUL 1970]
Facts:
In the early part of January, 1956, there appeared on the front page of The Manila Chronicle, of which
petitioner Lopez was the publisher, as well as on other dailies, a news story of a sanitary inspector
assigned to the Babuyan Islands, Fidel Cruz, sending a distress signal to a passing United States Airforce
plane which in turn relayed the message to Manila. An American Army plane dropping on the beach of an
island an emergency-sustenance kit containing, among other things, a two-way radio set. He utilized it to
inform authorities in Manila that the people in the place were living in terror, due to a series of killings
committed since Christmas of 1955. Losing no time, the Philippines defense establishment rushed to the
island a platoon of scout rangers. Upon arriving Major Encarnacion and his men found, instead of the
alleged killers, a man named Fidel Cruz who merely wanted transportation home to Manila. In view of this
finding, Major Encarnacion branded as a "hoax," the report of respondent.
This Week Magazine of the Manila Chronicle, then edited by Gatbonton, devoted a pictorial article to it in
its issue of January 15, 1956. Mention was made that while Fidel Cruz story turned out to be false it
brought attention to the government that people in that most people in the area are sick sick, only two
individuals able to read and write, food and clothing being scarce.
The magazine carried photographs of the person purporting to be Fidel Cruz. Unfortunately, the pictures
that were published were that of private respondent Fidel G. Cruz, a businessman contractor from Santa
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The Mayors first defense is untenable. Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free
speech and assembly. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To
justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if
free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is
imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one . The
fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its
suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the state.
ZALDIVAR VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
[170 SCRA 1; G.R. NO. 79690-707; 1 FEB 1989]
Facts:
The case stemmed from the resolution of the Supreme Court stopping the respondent from investigating
graft cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar. The Court ruled that since the adoption of the 1987
Constitution, respondents powers as Tanodbayan have been superseded by the creation of the Office of
the Ombudsman, he however becomes the Special Prosecutor of the State, and can only conduct an
investigation and file cases only when so authorized by the Ombudsman. A motion for reconsideration
was filed by the respondent wherein he included statements which were unrelated in the Issue raised in
the Court. This include: (a)That he had been approached twice by a leading member of the court and he
was asked to 'go slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him; (b) That he "was approached and asked
to refrain from investigating the COA report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will
embarass the Court;" and (c) that in several instances, the undersigned respondent was called over the
phone by a leading member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the cases against two Members of the
Court." Statements of the respondent saying that the SCs order '"heightens the people's apprehension
over the justice system in this country, especially because the people have been thinking that only the
small fly can get it while big fishes go scot-free was publicized in leading newspapers.
Now, the Court Resolved to require respondent to explain in writing why he should not be punished for
contempt of court for making such public statements reported in the media. Respondent then sought to
get some members of the Court to inhibit themselves in the resolution of the Zaldivar case for alleged bias
and prejudice against him. A little later, he in effect asked the whole Court to inhibit itself from passing
upon the Issue involved in proceeding and to pass on responsibility for this matter to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, upon the ground that respondent cannot expect due process from this Court, that the
Court has become incapable of judging him impartially and fairly. The Court found respondent guilty of
contempt of court and indefinitely suspended from the practice of law. Now, he assails said conviction,
invoking his freedom of speech. Counsel for respondent urges that it is error "for this Court to apply the
"visible tendency" rule rather than the "clear and present danger" rule in disciplinary and contempt
charges."
Issue:
Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom of speech/expression.
Held:
There was no violation. The Court did not purport to announce a new doctrine of "visible tendency," it was
simply paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court which penalizes a variety of
contumacious conduct including: "any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct
or degrade the administration of justice."
Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-interest test," the Court held that the
statements made by respondent Gonzalez are of such a nature and were made in such a manner and
under such circumstances, as to transcend the permissible limits of free speech. What is here at stake is
the authority of the Supreme Court to confront and prevent a "substantive evil" consisting not only of the
obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also the avoidance of the broader evil of the
degradation of the judicial system of a country and the destruction of the standards of professional
conduct required from members of the bar and officers of the courts, which has some implications to the
society.
REYES VS. BAGATSING
[125 SCRA 553; L-65366; 9 NOV 1983]
Facts:
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Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that BP 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the
Philippines is a signatory.
They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the
presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus
repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the
message for which the expression is sought.
Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a curtailment
of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it puts a condition for
the valid exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies without a permit as illegal and
penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not mere regulations but are actually
prohibitions. Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the standard of
maximum tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside from being void for being vague and for lack of
publication.
KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly and therefore B.P. No. 880
cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And even assuming that the legislature can set
limits to this right, the limits provided are unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on
clear and convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too comprehensive. Second, the five-day
requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain events require instant public assembly, otherwise
interest on the issue would possibly wane.As to the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the
government takes action even before the rallyists can perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or
executive order supports the policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of B.P.
No. 880 and violates the Constitution as it causes a chilling effect on the exercise by the people of the
right to peaceably assemble.
Respondents argued that petitioners have no standing. BP 880 entails traffic re-routing to prevent grave
public inconvenience and serious or undue interference in the free flow of commerce and trade. It is
content-neutral regulation of the time, place and manner of holding public assemblies. According to
Atienza RA. 7160 gives the Mayor power to deny a permit independently of B.P. No. 880. and that the
permit is for the use of a public place and not for the exercise of rights; and that B.P. No. 880 is not a
content-based regulation because it covers all rallies.
Issue:
Whether or Not BP 880 and the CPR Policy unconstitutional.
Held:
No question as to standing. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the right
of petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880. B.P. 880 is not an
absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the
assemblies. It refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to
lawful cause does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes,
otherwise they would not be peaceable and entitled to protection. Maximum tolerance 1 is for the
protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.
There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation.
The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be
struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some
police agents to justify abuses. Insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum
tolerance, this was declared null and void.
The Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the
immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or
designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country.
After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior
permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or
plazas of a city or municipality that has not yet complied with Section 15 of the law.
FERNANDO VS. ESTORNINOS
[G.R. NO 159751; 6 DEC 2006]
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The police searched the premises and confiscated twenty-five VHS tapes(among of which is Kahit sa
Pangarap Lang with Myra Manibog as actress who is naked) and ten different magazines(Dalaga,
Penthouse, Swank, Erotic, Rave, Playhouse, Gallery, QUI), which they deemed pornographic. Petitioners
were charged and convicted. CA affirmed the decision hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or Not the CA erred in affirming RTCs decision.
Held:
No. As obscenity is an unprotected speech which the State has the right to regulate, the State in pursuing
its mandate to protect the public from obscene, immoral and indecent materials must justify the regulation
or limitation. (Kottinger Rule Applied).
MALABANAN VS. RAMENTO
[129 SCRA 359; G.R. NO.62270; 21 MAY 1984]
Facts:
Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent University. They sought and were
granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M, on August 27,
1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they held a general assembly at the Veterinary
Medicine and Animal Science basketball court (VMAS), the place indicated in such permit, not in the
basketball court as therein stated but at the second floor lobby. At such gathering they manifested in
vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal
Science with the Institute of Agriculture. The same day, they marched toward the Life Science Building
and continued their rally. It was outside the area covered by their permit. Even they rallied beyond the
period allowed. They were asked to explain on the same day why they should not be held liable for
holding an illegal assembly. Then on September 9, 1982, they were informed that they were under
preventive suspension for their failure to explain the holding of an illegal assembly. The validity thereof
was challenged by petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal against private respondents
and before the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports. Respondent Ramento found petitioners guilty
of the charge of illegal assembly which was characterized by the violation of the permit granted resulting
in the disturbance of classes and oral defamation. The penalty was suspension for one academic year.
Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether on the facts as disclosed resulting in the disciplinary action and the penalty imposed, there was
an infringement of the right to peaceable assembly and its cognate right of free speech.
Held:
Yes. Student leaders are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective if during a rally
they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe. But with the activity taking place in the
school premises and during the daytime, no clear and present danger of public disorder is discernible.
This is without prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for conduct, "materially disrupts classwork or
involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."
The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational institutions.
Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to be
subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear and
present danger to a substantive evil that the state, has a right to present. As a corollary, the utmost
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Facts:
A motion to quash the charge against the petitioners for violation of the BP 22 was made, contending that
no offense was committed, as the statute is unconstitutional. Such motion was denied by the RTC. The
petitioners thus elevate the case to the Supreme Court for relief. The Solicitor General, commented that it
was premature for the accused to elevate to the Supreme Court the orders denying their motions to
quash. However, the Supreme Court finds it justifiable to intervene for the review of lower court's denial of
a motion to quash.
Issue:
Whether or Not BP 22 impairs freedom of contract. Whether or not BP 22 transgresses the constitutional
inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
Held:
The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into "lawful" contracts.
Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Checks can not be categorized as mere
contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has become a convenient
substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free from the
regulatory power of the state.
The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is
dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law
punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is
to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation.
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On the right to due process, petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of this substantive and constitutional
right, as he was duly represented by a counsel. He was accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to
present evidence to substantiate his defense; only that he chose not to, and instead opted to file a Motion
to Acquit after the prosecution had rested its case. What due process abhors is the absolute lack of
opportunity to be heard.
PEOPLE VS. JUDGE AYSON
[175 SCRA 216; G.R. NO. 85215; 7 JUL 1989]
Facts:
Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned at its Baguio City station. It was
alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL management notified
him of an investigation to be conducted. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code
of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine
Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter was sent by Ramos stating
his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The findings of the Audit team were given to him, and he
refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating that he was prevented from settling said amounts.
He proffered a compromise however this did not ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa was charged
against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos written
admission and statement, to which defendants argued that the confession was taken without the accused
being represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit those stating that accused was not
reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for reconsideration
filed by the prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence the admission and
statement of accused.
Held:
No. Section 20 of the 1987 constitution provides that the right against self-incrimination (only to witnesses
other than accused, unless what is asked is relating to a different crime charged- not present in case at
bar).
This is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of
subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is not to "be compelled to be a
witness against himself. It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a
prohibition of inquiry." the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character,
is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to
disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify
altogether. It is a right that a witness knows or should know. He must claim it and could be waived.
Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the accused include:
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be
used against him.
3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.
The individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a
statement. But unless and until such rights and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial,
no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.
PEOPLE VS. MAQUEDA
[242 SCRA 565; G.R. NO.112983; 22 MAR 1994]
Facts:
British Horace William Barker (consultant of WB) was slain inside his house in Tuba, Benguet while his
Filipino wife, Teresita Mendoza was badly battered with lead pipes on the occasion of a robbery. Two
household helpers of the victims identified Salvamante (a former houseboy of the victims) and Maqueda
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No. Appellant is not in custodial investigation. A person under a normal audit examination is not under
custodial investigation. An audit examiner himself can hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement officer
contemplated in the above rule. In any case, the allegation of his having been "pressured" to sign the
Examination Report prepared by Dulguime (examined cash, as ordered by Espino, the provincial auditor)
appears to be belied by his own testimony.
PEOPLE VS. ALICANDO
[251 SCRA 293; G.R. NO. 117487; 2 DEC 1995]
Facts:
Appellant was charged with the crime of rape with homicide of Khazie Mae Penecilla, a minor, four years
of age, choking her with his right hand. The incident happened after appellant drank liquor. A neighbor,
Leopoldo Santiago found the victims body and the parents and police were informed. Appellant was living
in his uncle's house some five arm's length from Penecilla's house. Appellant was arrested and
interrogated by PO3 Danilo Tan. He verbally confessed his guilt without the assistance of counsel. On the
basis of his uncounselled verbal confession and follow up interrogations, the police came to know and
recovered from appellant's house, Khazie Mae's green slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a
stained pillow and a stained T-shirt all of which were presented as evidence for the prosecution. He was
arraigned with the assistance of Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera of the PAO. Appellant pleaded guilty. The RTC
convicted him. Hence an automatic review for the imposition of death penalty.
Issue:
Whether or Not the death penalty proper.
Held:
No. The records do not reveal that the Information against the appellant was read in the language or
dialect known to him. The Information against the appellant is written in the English language. It is
unknown whether the appellant knows the English language. Neither is it known what dialect is
understood by the appellant. Nor is there any showing that the Information couched in English was
translated to the appellant in his own dialect before his plea of guilt. The RTC violated section 1(a) of Rule
116, the rule implementing the constitutional right of the appellant to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him. It also denied appellant his constitutional right to due process of law. It is
urged that we must presume that the arraignment of the appellant was regularly conducted. When life is
at stake, we cannot lean on this rebuttable presumption. There could be no presumption. The court must
be sure.
The trial court violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of the appellant. Said
section requires that the court shall conduct a searching inquiry the voluntariness and full comprehension
of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of
culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf. The trial court simply inquired if
appellant had physical marks of maltreatment. It did not ask the appellant when he was arrested, who
arrested him, how and where he was interrogated, whether he was medically examined before and after
his interrogation, etc. It limited its efforts trying to discover late body marks of maltreatment as if
involuntariness is caused by physical abuse alone.
Further, there are physical evidence to prove Khazie was raped. These consists of a pillow with
bloodstains in its center 14 and the T-shirt 15 of the accused colored white with bloodstains on its bottom.
These physical evidence are evidence of the highest order. They strongly corroborate the testimony of
Luisa Rebada that the victim was raped.These are inadmissible evidence for they were gathered by PO3
Danilo Tan of the Iloilo City PNP as a result of custodial interrogation where appellant verbally confessed
to the crime without the benefit of counsel.
PEOPLE VS. DE GUZMAN
[224 SCRA 93; G.R. NOS. 98321-24; 30 JUN 1993]
Facts:
All the accused were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu with three counts of murder and
one count of frustrated murder in four Informations. The victim Jose Bantug was found with gunshots in
the head, body, and skull. The other three informations charged them with the murder of Francisco
Carteciano y Sorilla and Antonio S. Carteciano, and the frustrated murder of Lorna V. Carteciano. The
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We, therefore, find that the conviction of accused-appellant for the crimes charged has been established
beyond reasonable doubt and the penalty imposed is in accordance with law. However, the civil indemnity
imposed by the trial court should be increased to P50,000 in conformity with our recent rulings on the
matter.
WHEREFORE, except for the modification that the civil indemnity to be paid by accused-appellant Victor
Nuez, Jr. to the heirs of each victim who died is hereby increased to P50,000, the appealed decision is
hereby affirmed in all other respects, with costs against accused-appellant
PEOPLE VS. JUDGE DONATO
[198 SCRA 130; G.R. NO.79269; 5 JUN 1991]
Facts:
Private respondent and his co-accused were charged of rebellion on October 2, 1986 for acts committed
before and after February 1986. Private respondent filed with a Motion to Quash alleging that: (a) the
facts alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c)
the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants; and (d) the criminal action or liability has
been extinguished. This was denied. May 9, 1987 Respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed
that the respondent is not entitled to bail anymore since rebellion became a capital offense under PD
1996, 942 and 1834 amending ART. 135 of RPC. On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order
No. 187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect
Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code as it existed before the amendatory decrees. Judge Donato now
granted the bail, which was fixed at P30,000.00 and imposed a condition that he shall report to the court
once every two months within the first ten days of every period thereof. Petitioner filed a supplemental
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Issue:
Whether or Not the accuseds right to bail violated.
Held:
No. It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules of Court, as amended, that before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a
matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. To
that extent the right is absolute. If the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a
matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is limited to
determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. But once it is determined that the evidence of guilt
is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right. If an accused who is charged with a crime punishable
by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither
a matter of right on the part of the accused nor of discretion on the part of the court.
COMMENDADOR VS. DE VILLA
[200 SCRA 80; G.R. NO. 93177; 2 AUG 1991]
Facts:
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 who are officers of the AFP were directed to appear in
person before the Pre-Trial Investigating Officers for the alleged participation the failed coup on
December 1 to 9, 1989. Petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as
mandated by Article of War 71. A motion for dismissal was denied. Now, their motion for reconsideration.
Alleging denial of due process.
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was denied by
GCM No.14. He filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional
liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM then granted the provisional liberty. However he
was not released immediately. The RTC now declared that even military men facing court martial
proceedings can avail the right to bail.
The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition for habeas corpus on the ground that
they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. The petition was referred to RTC. Finding
after hearing that no formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after
their arrest, the trial court ordered their release.
Issue:
Whether or Not there was a denial of due process.
Whether or not there was a violation of the accused right to bail.
Held:
NO denial of due process. Petitioners were given several opportunities to present their side at the pre-trial
investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after the denial of their
motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit their counter-affidavits.
On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for reconsideration which they were again asked to submit
in writing. They had been expressly warned in the subpoena that "failure to submit counter-affidavits on
the date specified shall be deemed a waiver of their right to submit controverting evidence." Petitioners
have a right to pre-emptory challenge. (Right to challenge validity of members of G/SCM)
It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of violations of
the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no authority to order their release and otherwise interfere
with the court-martial proceedings. This is without merit. * The Regional Trial Court has concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and on petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto.
The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not been recognized and is not
available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The right to a
speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.
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Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted bail. Petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion
entitled, "motion for permission to leave the country," stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the
United States, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities." The prosecution opposed said
motion and after due hearing, both trial judges denied the same. Petitioner thus filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and
26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove, respectively, as well as the communication-request of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, denying his leave to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the
issuance of the appropriate writ commanding the Immigration Commissioner and the Chief of the Aviation
Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear him for departure. The Court of Appeals denied the petition.
Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which granted
him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his liberty could
prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.
Issue:
Held:
The right to bail is a matter of right if the charge is not a capital offense or punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death.
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a
necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond.
The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires
his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel.
Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed
beyond the reach of the courts.
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Petitioner has not shown the necessity for his travel abroad. There is no indication that the business
transactions cannot be undertaken by any other person in his behalf.
CALLANTA VS. VILLANUEVA
[77 SCRA 377; G.R. NOS. 24646 & L-24674; 20 JUN 1977]
Facts:
Two complaints for grave oral defamation were filed against Faustina Callanta. The City Judge of
Dagupan City, Felipe Villanueva, denied the motions to quash the complaints. Thus, petitioner Callanta
brought the suits for certiorari in the Supreme Court. Petitioner questions the validity of the issuance of
warrant of arrest by respondent, arguing that the City Fiscal should have conducted the preliminary
investigation. According to petitioners counsel, there was jurisdictional infirmity. After the issuance of the
warrants of arrest and the bail fixed at P600, petitioner posted the bail bond, thus obtaining her
provisional liberty. The City Fiscal in this case did not disagree with the judges investigation, and agreed
with the complaints filed.
Issue:
Whether or Not petitioners contentions are to be given merit.
Held:
Based on many precedent cases of the Supreme Court, where the accused has filed bail and waived the
preliminary investigation proper, he has waived whatever defect, if any, in the preliminary examination
conducted prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest. In the case at bar, it is futile for the petitioner to
question the validity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest, because she posted the bail bond. Petitioner
also erred in arguing that only the City Fiscal can conduct a preliminary investigation. According to the
Charter of the City of Dagupan, the City Court of Dagupan City may also conduct preliminary
investigation for any offense, without regard to the limits of punishment, and may release, or commit and
bind over any person charged with such offense to secure his appearance before the proper court.
Petition for certiorari is denied. Restraining order issued by the Court is lifted and set aside.
TATAD VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
[159 SCRA 70; G.R. NOS. L-72335-39; 21 MAR 1988]
Facts:
The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report" with the Legal Panel of
the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing charges of alleged violations of
Rep. Act No. 3019 against then Secretary of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was
made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely known that
Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had resigned from the
Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal complaint
filed with the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980 which was around
two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos by referring the complaint
to the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report
was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices
against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counteraffidavits were in the case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on June
5, 1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan. Five criminal informations were filed with the
Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone. (1) Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA.
3019 for giving D' Group, a private corporation controlled by his brother-in-law, unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official functions; (2) Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b)
for receiving a check of P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity Trading
Corporation as consideration for the release of a check of P588,000.00 to said corporation for printing
services rendered for the Constitutional Convention Referendum in 1973; (3) Violation of Section 7 on
three (3) counts for his failure to file his Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the calendar years 1973,
1976 and 1978. A motion to quash the information was made alleging that the prosecution deprived
accused of due process of law and of the right to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against him. It
was denied hence the appeal.
Issue:
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Held:
YES. Due process (Procedural) and right to speedy disposition of trial were violated. Firstly, the complaint
came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. Secondly,
departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require the
submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their
witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for finding
investigation and report. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve
a case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While we agree with the respondent
court that this period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it can not be disregarded or
ignored completely, with absolute impunity. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed
reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar.
GALMAN VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
[144 SCRA 43; G.R. NO.72670; 12 SEP 1986]
Facts:
Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was killed from his plane that had just
landed at the Manila International Airport. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-blank into the
back of his head by an assassin. The military investigators reported within a span of three hours that the
man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days
later as Rolando Galman) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down
in turn.
President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due to large masses of people
who joined in the ten-day period of national mourning yearning for the truth, justice and freedom.
The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version stating that
"the evidence shows to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations. Only the soldiers
in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him; that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a
military conspiracy, not a communist plot. Only difference between the two reports is that the majority
report found all the twenty-six private respondents above-named in the title of the case involved in the
military conspiracy; " while the chairman's minority report would exclude nineteen of them.
Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the killer.
Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in the two
criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed
for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to respondents' separate comments
and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the
prosecution.
But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition
and to lift the TRO issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. The
same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from receipt of respondent
Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently was not served on them).
Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legal
ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits that the people are
entitled to due process.
However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged,
declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. Respondents submitted that with
the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case had become moot and academic. Thereafter,
same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration alleging that
respondents committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice
and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the
Philippines to due process of law.
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Testimony
- only Alcantara was identified
- only 3 assailants had a
- conference
- failed to identify Alcantara
- at the hospital and in open
- court (pointed to another person)
Issue:
Whether or not the rights of the accused was violated.
Held:
YES. The peoples evidence failed to meet the quantum required to overcome the presumption. The
second identification which correctly pointed to accused by Venancio should not be credited. There is no
reason for him to err as they know each other for 3 years. It was also incorrect to give too much weight to
Police Sgt. Awanans testimony as to the previous identification at the hospital. The testimony of Sgt.
Awanan was not corroborated by Venancio.
The identification procedure was irregular. Due process demands that the identification procedure of
criminal suspects must be free from impermissible suggestions as the influence of improper suggestion
probably accounts for more miscarriages of justice than any other single factor. Conviction must be based
on the strength of the prosecution and not the weakness of the defense. There was blatant violation of the
constitutional rights of appellant as an accused. Appellant belongs to the economically deprived in our
society. He is nearly illiterate(third grade education). Our Constitution and our laws strictly ordain their
protection following the Magsaysay desideratum that those who have less in life should have more in law.
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Facts:
Generoso Corpuz is the Supervising Accounting Clerk in the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Nueva
Viscaya. He was designated Acting Supervising Cashier in the said office. In this capacity, he received
collections, disbursed funds and made bank deposits and withdrawals pertaining to government accounts.
On April 13, 1981 his designation as Acting Supervising Cashier was terminated and a transfer of
accountabilities was effected between him and his successor. The Certificate of turnover revealed a
shortage of P72,823.00. He was able to pay only P10,159.50. After a final demand letter for the total of
P50,596.07 which was not met, a case of malversation was filed against him. Corpuz did not deny such
facts but he insists that the shortage was malversed by other persons. He alleged that Paymaster
Diosdado Pineda through 1 of 4 separate checks (PNB) issued and encashed such checks while he was
of leave. Also, Acting Deputy Provincial Treasurer Bernardo Aluning made to post the amount on his
cashbook although he had not received the said amount. He was convicted in Sandiganbayan.
Issue:
Whether or Not Corpuz is guilty of malversation.
Held:
It is a subtle way of camouflaging the embezzlement of the money equivalent when 1 of the 4 checks
issued and encashed in the same day was entered in the accuseds cash book 3 months after such
encashments. Also, Corpuz claim that he was absent when Paymaster Diosdado Pineda through 1 of 4
separate checks (PNB) issued and encashed such checks, was not proven.
Post-Audit is not a preliminary requirement to filing a malversation case. The failure of the public officer to
have duly forthcoming any public funds with which he is chargeable, upon demand by an authorized
officer shall be a prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds to personal use.
The equipoise rule(balancing test) which is the presumption of innocence is applicable only where the
evidence of the parties is evenly balance, in which case the scale of justice should be tilt in favor of the
accused. There is no such balance in the case at bar. The evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming
and has not been overcome by the petitioner with his claims. The presumed innocence must yield to the
positive finding that he is guilty of malversation.
Wherefore his petition is denied. He is guilty as principal of Malversation of Public Funds.
PEOPLE VS. HOLGADO
[85 PHIL 752; G.R.L-2809; 22 MAR 1950]
Facts:
Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal
detention because according to the information, being a private person, he did "feloniously and without
justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight
hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty. He pleaded guilty (without a
counsel) and said that he was just instructed by Mr. Ocampo, which no evidence was presented to indict
the latter.
Issue:
Whether or Not there was any irregularity in the proceedings in the trial court.
Held:
Yes. Rule 112, section 3 of ROC that : If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by
the court that it is his right to have attorney being arraigned., and must be asked if he desires the aid of
attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for
procuring attorney. This was violated. Moreso the guarantees of our Constitution that "no person shall be
held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the
accused be given the opportunity to be heard by counsel.
The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of the qualified plea of accused. The record does not
show whether the supposed instructions of Mr. Ocampo was real and whether it had reference to the
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Held:
YES. The desire to speed up the disposition of cases should not be effected at the sacrifice of the basic
rights of the accused. Citing People vs. Domingo (55 SCRA 243-244): the trial courts should exercise
solicitous care before sentencing the accused on a plea of guilty especially in capital offenses by first
insuring that the accused fully understands the gravity of the offense, the severity of the consequences
attached thereto as well as the meaning and significance of his plea of guilty; and that the prudent and
proper thing to do in capital cases is to take testimony, to assure the court that the accused has not
misunderstood the nature and effect of his plea of guilty. Mere pro-forma appointment of de officio
counsel, who fails to genuinely protect the interests of the accused, resetting of hearing by the court for
alleged reception of evidence when in fact none was conducted, perfunctory queries addressed to the
accused whether he understands the charges and the gravity of the penalty, are not sufficient compliance.
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Held:
Yes. Procedural due process requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be informed as to
why he was indicted and what penal offense he has to face, to be convicted only on a showing that his
guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the evidence against him. It is
also not just due process that requires an arraignment. It is required in the Rules that an accused, for the
first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is imperative that he
is thus made fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime
imputed to him. At the very least then, he must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is
mobilized against him. Being arraigned is thus a vital aspect of the constitutional rights guaranteed him.
Also, respondent Judge Senining convicted petitioner notwithstanding the absence of an arraignment.
With the violation of the constitutional right to be heard by himself and counsel being thus manifest, it is
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Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of respondent Judge Romulo R. Senining
dated December 28, 1973, finding the accused guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries, is nullified and
set aside. Likewise, the decision of respondent Judge Rafael T. Mendoza dated November 16, 1976,
affirming the aforesaid decision of Judge Senining, is nullified and set aside. The case is remanded to the
City Court of Cebu for the prosecution of the offense of slight physical injuries, with due respect and
observance of the provisions of the Rules of Court, starting with the arraignment of petitioner.
Facts:
Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been forced to respond to no less
the five information for various crimes and misdemeanors, has appeared with her witnesses and counsel
at hearings no less than on eight different occasions only to see the cause postponed, has twice been
required to come to the Supreme Court for protection, and now, after the passage of more than one year
from the time when the first information was filed, seems as far away from a definite resolution of her
troubles as she was when originally charged.
Issue:
Whether or Not petitioner has been denied her right to a speedy and impartial trial.
Held:
Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all other accused persons, has a right to a
speedy trial in order that if innocent she may go free, and she has been deprived of that right in defiance
of law. We lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures
postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in
this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to
compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his
freedom.
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Facts:
Luis Tampal, Domingo Padumon, Arsenio Padumon, Samuel Padumon, Pablito Suco, Dario Suco and
Galvino Cadling were charged of robbery with homicide and multiple serious physical injuries in the
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga with Hon. Wilfredo Ochotorena as presiding judge. However, only
private respondents, Luis Tampal, Domingo Padumon, Arsenio Padumon, and Samuel Padumon were
arrested, while the others remained at large.
The case was set for hearing on July 26, 1991, but Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Wilfredo Guantero
moved for postponement due to his failure to contact the material witnesses. The case was reset without
any objection from the defense counsel. The case was called on September 20, 1991 but the prosecutor
was not present. The respondent judge considered the absence of the prosecutor as unjustified, and
dismissed the criminal case for failure to prosecute. The prosecution filed a motion for reconsidereation,
claiming that his absence was because such date was a Muslim holiday and the office of the Provincial
prosecutor was closed on that day. The motion was denied by respondent judge.
Issue:
Whether or Not the postponement is a violation of the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of their
cases.
Whether or Not the dismissal serves as a bar to reinstatement of the case.
Held:
In determining the right of an accused to speedy disposition of their case, courts should do more than a
mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. What
are violative of the right of the accused to speedy trial are unjustified postponements which prolong trial
for an unreasonable length of time. In the facts above, there was no showing that there was an unjust
delay caused by the prosecution, hence, the respondent judge should have given the prosecution a fair
opportunity to prosecute its case.
The private respondents cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy. In several cases it was held
that dismissal on the grounds of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar another
prosecution for the same offense, but in this case, this does not apply, considering that the rights of the
accused to a speedy trial was not violated by the State. Therefore, the order of dismissal is annulled and
the case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings.
The arraignment of an accused shall be held within 30 days from filing of the information, or from the date
the accused has appeared before the justice, judge or court in which the charge is pending, whichever
date last occurs. Thereafter, where a plea of not guilty is entered, the accused shall have at least 15 days
to prepare for trial. Trial shall commence within 30 days from arraignment as fixed by the court. In no case
shall the entire trial period exceed 180 days from the 1 st day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
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Facts:
At about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of March 6, 1992, a 60 year old woman, identified as Virginia Talens
was found lying dead in a canal at Bo. San Nicolas, Mexico, Pampanga; she was last seen alive at about
3:00 o'clock early morning of March 6, 1992 by Orlando Pangan and Richard Pangan who were with her
going home coming from the wake of one Leonardo Flores; both Orlando and Richard Pangan testified
that accused was with them in going home at about 3:00 o'clock in the morning of March 6, 1992; Orlando
and Richard Pangan reached first their house and left the two on the way and that was the last time
Virginia was seen alive; just a few minutes after reaching his house and while inside his house, Orlando
Pangan heard a shout; another woman, one Serafia Gutierrez, testified that she likewise was awakened
by a shout at about 3:00 in the morning; Dr. Aguda who autopsied the victim found hematoma on the
head and chest, an abrasion on the left chin and stabwound on the neck which stabwound, the doctor
claims, was the cause of death of the victim; Police Investigator Gonzales who immediately responded
upon report, recovered at the scene a pin, the victim's wristwatch, earring, a ring and P135.00 money; he
likewise found on March 9, 1992 when he continued his investigation bloodstain on the front door of the
house of the accused which bloodstain when submitted for examination was found to be of human blood;
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Issue:
Whether or Not there is evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction of the appellant of the crime of Robbery
with Homicide.
Held:
There was no eyewitness or direct evidence; either to the robbery or to the homicide and none of the
things allegedly stolen were ever recovered. However, direct evidence is not the only matrix from which
the trial court may draw its findings and conclusion of culpability. Resort to circumstantial evidence is
essential when to insist on direct testimony would result in setting felons free.
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the theory that the accused is guilty of the offense charged,
and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other possible,
rational hypothesis excepting that of guilt. All the circumstances established must constitute an unbroken
chain which leads to one and fair and reasonable conclusion pointing solely to the accused, to the
exclusion of all other persons, as the author of the crime. The facts and circumstances consistent with the
guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his innocence can constitute evidence which, in weight and
probative value, may be deemed to surpass even direct evidence in its effect on the court.
The fatal stabbing of Virginia Talens occurred at around 3:00 a.m. of March 6, 1992. Appellant hastily
abandoned his house in Barrio San Nicolas, Mexico, Pampanga, his residence since childhood, on that
very date. Appellant was nowhere when his co-worker and barrio mate, Eduardo Bagtas, came to
appellant's house to fetch him for work at around 6:30 to 7:00 a.m. of March 6, 1992. Appellant also
abandoned his job as a painter in Sta. Ana, Pampanga, on March 6, 1992, the date of the crime, leaving
behind an unfinished painting project. He was not seen again from said date. Police investigators found
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Both appellant and victim gambled at the wake they attended. The victim was, in fact, enjoying a winning
streak when her son, Ramil Talens, came to fetch her but which he failed to do because his mother was
winning, and she refused to leave. The purse of Talens containing cash was gone when her corpse was
found in the canal with a stab wound and bruises. What was left was a safety pin which victim used to
fasten the missing purse to her clothes.
Denial is an inherently weak defense which must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to
merit credibility. Denial is negative and self-serving and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over
the testimonies of credible witnesses who positively testified that appellant was at the locus criminis and
was the last person seen with the victim alive.
The absence of evidence showing any improper motive on the part of the principal witness for the
prosecution to falsely testify against the appellant strongly tends to buttress the conclusion that no such
improper motive exists and that the testimony of said witnesses deserve full faith and credit.
The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and
submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wants to
save the State the trouble of having to effect his arrest. Spontaneity and intent to give one's self up are
absent where the accused went into hiding for six months after the incident and had to resort to an alias
when he was involved in an accident being investigated by the police authorities.
Robbery with Homicide is a special complex crime against property. Homicide is incidental to the robbery
which is the main purpose of the criminal. In charging Robbery with Homicide, the onus probandi is to
establish: "(a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; (b)
the property belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized with animus lucrandi; and (d) on the
occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is used in the generic sense,
was committed." Although there was no witness as to the actual robbing of the victim, there is testimony
that the victim had more or less P2,000.00; and wore gold earrings valued at P750.00. These were never
recovered.
While there is indeed no direct proof that Virginia Talens was robbed at the time she was killed, we may
conclude from four circumstances that the robbery occasioned her killing: (1) Both appellant and victim
gambled at the wake. (2) The appellant knew that victim was winning. (3) The victim was last seen alive
with appellant. (4) The victim's purse containing her money and earrings were missing from her body
when found.
The decision of the regional trial court is affirmed. Costs against appellant. So ordered.
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Facts:
Eleven (11) people rode in a Ford Fiera going to Baguio. Namely they are: Felizardo Galvez, Jimmy
Jetwani, Simeon Calama, Rene Salonga, Eduardo Lopez, Adolfo Quiambao, Aliman Bara-akal, Anwar
Hadji Edris, Gumanak Ompa and defendant-appelants in this case, Omar Magpalao and Rex
Magumnang.
After an hour of driving, the car stopped so that one of the passengers could urinate. While the car was
stopped the Bara-akal, Edris, Ompa, Magpalao and Magumnang pointed guns and knives at the other
passengers and divested them of their properties.
On of the robbers then ordered Galvez to drive the car towards the precipice (bangin). When the car was
near the precipice, Galvez then stepped to the brakes. The other passengers jumped out of the car and
went to different directions to escape. Galvez however, was left in side the car and was stabbed by one of
the robbers. The robbers then escaped. Quiambao, who owned the car helped Galvez to get to a hospital.
Galvez died in the hospital. The robbers were then apprehended with the exception of Edris who remain
at large. Mangumnang however escaped while being in detention and Bara-akal died inside the jail. Since
Mangumnang was not arrested, the trial in absentia continued as to him. Ompa, Magpalao, and
Magumnang were all held guilty as principal by direct participation of the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
Issue:
Whether or Not the lower court erred in failing to apply the Constitutional mandate on the presumption of
innocence and proof beyond reasonable doubt when it allowed the trial in absentia to push through on the
part of defendant-appellant Magumnang.
Held:
The Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. The reason is that the lower court has jurisdiction over
Magumnang the moment the latter was in custody. Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the
instance of parties but until the case is terminated. Since all the requisites of trial in absentia are
complete, the court has jurisdiction over Magumnang.
In addition, Magumnang was presumed innocent during his trial in absentia. The prosecution had strong
evidence against him as proof beyond reasonable doubt that he is a principal by direct participation in the
crime of Robbery with Homicide. Thus, the Constitutional mandate was not violated.
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Facts:
Petitioner Villaflor was charged with the crime of adultery. The trial judge ordered the petitioner to subject
herself into physical examination to test whether or not she was pregnant to prove the determine the
crime of adultery being charged to her. Herein petitioner refused to such physical examination interposing
the defense that such examination was a violation of her constitutional rights against self-incrimination.
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Issue:
Whether or Not the physical examination was a violation of the petitioners constitutional rights against
self-incrimination.
Held:
No. It is not a violation of her constitutional rights. The rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against
compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of
the body of the accused is permissible.
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Held:
Yes, revival of the case will put the accused in double jeopardy for the very reason that the case has been
dismissed already without the consent of the accused which would have an effect of an acquittal on the
case filed. The dismissal was due to complainants incapability to present its evidence due to non
appearance of the witnesses and complainant himself which would bar further prosecution of the
defendant for the same offense. For double jeopardy to exist these three requisites should be present,
that one, there is a valid complaint or information filed second, that it is done before a court of competent
jurisdiction and third, that the accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or
information. In the case at bar, all three conditions were present, as the case filed was grave coercion,
filed in a court of competent jurisdiction as to where the coercion took place and last the accused were
arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or the information. When these three conditions are present
then the acquittal, conviction of the accused, and the dismissal or termination of the case without his
express consent constitutes res judicata and is a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged. In
the case, it was evidently shown that the accused invoked their right to a speedy trial and asked for the
trial of the case and not its termination which would mean that respondents had no expressed consent to
the dismissal of the case which would make the case filed res judicata and has been dismissed by the
competent court in order to protect the respondents as well for their right to speedy trial which will be
equivalent to acquittal of the respondents which would be a bar to further prosecution.
PEOPLE VS. DE LA TORRE
[380 SCRA 586; G.R. NOS. 137953-58; 11 MAR 2002]
Facts:
Wilfredo dela Torre, appellee, has three children from a common-law relationship, the eldest of which is
Mary Rose. When Mary Rose was 7 yearsold, her mother left them together with her youngest brother so
she and her other brother were left to the care of her father.
Mary Rose was the brightest in her class despite their poverty. However, in January 1997, a sudden
change in Mary Roses behavior behavior was noticed. She was twelve years old at that time. She
appeared sleepy, snobbish and she also urinated on her panty. When confronted by her head teacher,
Mary Rose admitted that she was abused repeatedly by her father. Her father, however, denied
vehemently the charges being imputed to him by her daughter.
The RTC convicted appellee of two counts of acts of lasciviousness and four counts of murder. However,
the RTC refused to impose the supreme penalty of death on appellee. It maintained that there were
circumstances that mitigated the gravity of the offenses such as the absence of any actual physical
violence or intimidation on the commission of the acts, that after the mother of Mary Rose left the conjugal
home, for more than five years, Wilfredo, Mary Rose and her brother were living together as a family and
Mary Rose was never molested by her father.
The prosecution seeks to modify the RTC Decision by imposing the supreme penalty of death of the
accused. It argues that it has proven that the victim is the daughter of the accused, and that she was
below eighteen years old when the rapes took place. As a consequence, the trial court should have been
imposed the penalty of death pursuant to Section 11 of R.A. 7659. .
Issue:
Whether or Not the Court erred in penalizing the appellee with reclusion perpetua in each of the four
indictments of rape, instead of imposing the supreme penalty of death as mandated by R.A. 7659.
Held:
Under Section 1, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, any party may appeal from a
judgment or final order unless the accused will be put in double jeopardy. In People vs. Leones, it
declared that:
while it is true that this Court is the Court of last resort, there are allegations of error
committed by a lower court which we ought not to look into to uphold the right of the
accused. Such is the case in an appeal by the prosecution seeking to increase the
penalty imposed upon the accused for this runs afoul of the right of the accused against
double jeopardyWhen the accused after conviction by the trial court did not appeal his
decision, an appeal by the government seeking to increase the penalty imposed by the
trial court places the accused in double jeopardy and should therefore be dismissed.
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The ban on double jeopardy primarily prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an
instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also
serves as a deterrent from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And
finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing
a greater penalty.
Being violative of the right against double jeopardy, the appeal of the prosecution cannot prosper.
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CITIZENSHIP
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Facts:
Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22,
1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon
Chapter, represented by its President, Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the
COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo; election and proclamation on the ground that he was
not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on January 20, 1983. In his answer
dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but
pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect
himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon himself as a
means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad." He
added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of
democracy. In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo was a
naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on
January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor. They also argued
that their petition in the Commission on Elections was not really for quo warranto under Section 253 of the
Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing as governor, his
candidacy and election being null and void ab initio because of his alienage. Speaking for the public
respondent, the Solicitor General supported the contention that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the
Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he
was disqualified from public office in the Philippines. His election did not cure this defect because the
electorate of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code, and the Omnibus
Election Code. He also joined in the private respondent's argument that Section 253 of the Omnibus
Election Code was not applicable because what the League and Estuye were seeking was not only the
annulment of the proclamation and election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also asking for the
termination of Frivaldo's incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a Filipino.
Issue:
Whether or Not petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on
January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon.
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The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public
officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific
requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be
inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section
117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a
citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1,
of the Constitution.
In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "naturalborn" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence
shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following
certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by
Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos
dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing
American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and
voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright.
This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while
owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon
does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the
citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate
alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially
if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires
strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of
the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and
fidelity to any other state.
It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the
Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of great
price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored. This
country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother. Once
rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant children. The returning
renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love.
Petition Dismissed. Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is hereby declared not a citizen of the Philippines and
therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to
vacate his office and surrender the same to the duly elected Vice-Governor of the said province once this
decision becomes final and executory.
MERCADO VS. MANZANO
[307 SCRA 630; G.R. NO. 135083; 26 MAY 1999]
Facts:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Private respondent Eduardo Manzano are candidates for the position of
Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May, 1998 elections. Private respondent was the winner of the said
election but the proclamation was suspended due to the petition of Ernesto Mamaril regarding the
citizenship of private respondent. Mamaril alleged that the private respondent is not a citizen of the
Philippines but of the United States. COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified the private
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Facts:
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny due
course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in
truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American,
and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his
Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the
allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior
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Issue:
Whether or Not FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen.
Held:
It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in
turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a
Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him
from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of
Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo
would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that
San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other
evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have
benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship
(of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ.
The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all
persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or
illegitimate.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that
he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in
violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.
Issue:
Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines in view of the constitutional
requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a naturalborn citizen.
Held:
Respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished from the lengthy process of
naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned
resides or last resided. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to
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