BIRAOGO

Facts:
The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic
May 2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his
staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang
corrupt, walang mahirap." The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his
ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the
presidency.
The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted by
petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo
assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress
under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional
authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds
therefor.
The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A.
Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent
members of the House of Representatives.
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed
Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth
Commission).
Issue
2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of
powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for
public offices, agencies and commissions;
Ruling
The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot
be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive
Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to
ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With
AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is
not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same
composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in
conducting the inquiry.

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO versus FIDEL RAMOS (253 SCRA 559)

Facts:
The protestant, Miriam Defensor-Santiago ran for presidency and lost in the May
1992 election. In her Motion on the 16 th day of August in the year 1995, reiterated in
her comment of the 29th of August of the same year, protestant Defensor-Santiago
prayed that the revision in the remaining precincts of the pilot areas be dispensed
with and the revision process in the pilot areas be deemed computed.
The Court deferred action on the motion and required, instead, the protestant and
protestee to submit their respective memoranda. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the election protest filed by Defensor-Santiago is moot and
academic by her election as a Senator in the May 1995 election and her assumption
of office as such on the 30th of June in the year 1995.
Held:
YES. The Court held that the election protest filed by Santiago has been abandoned
or considered withdrawn as a consequence of her election and assumption of office
as Senator and her discharge of the duties and functions thereof.
The protestant abandoned her determination to protest and pursue the public
interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate.
Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it would
dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential elections,
thereby enhancing the all too crucial political stability of the nation during this
period of national recovery.
Also, the PET issued a resolution ordering the protestant to inform the PET within 10
days if after the completion of the revision of the ballots from her pilot areas, she
still wishes to present evidence. Since DS has not informed the Tribunal of any such
intention, such is a manifest indication that she no longer intends to do so.

CIVIL LIBERTIES
FACTS:
Petitioners: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David
for petitioners in 83896 and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83815. Both petitions
were consolidated and are being resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of the

unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C.

Aquino on July 25, 1987.
Executive Order No. 284, according to the petitioners allows members of the
Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other than
government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions.
The petitioners are challenging EO 284s constitutionality because it adds
exceptions to Section 13 of Article VII other than those provided in the constitution.
According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against holding any other office or
employment in government are those provided in the Constitution namely: 1. The
Vice President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3 par.2
of Article VII. 2. The secretary of justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and
Bar Council by virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII.
Issue:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is constitutional.
Decision:
No. It is unconstitutional. Petition granted. Executive Order No. 284 was declared
null and void.
In the light of the construction given to Section 13 of Article VII, Executive Order No.
284 is unconstitutional. By restricting the number of positions that Cabinet
members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition their
primary position to not more that two positions in the government and government
corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in
direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec. 13 of Article VII of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.
The phrase unless otherwise provided in this constitution must be given a literal
interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the constitution
itself: Sec. 3 Art VII and Sec. 8 Art. VIII.

Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006

FACTS:
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued
invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as
resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon
Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group
(hereinafter North Rail Project).
On September 28, 2005, the President then issued Executive Order 464, Ensuring
Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on
Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in

Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other
Purposes, which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately.
ISSUE:
1

Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress;

RULING:
1. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article
VI of the Constitution. This power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials
of the executive branch; it is co-extensive with the power to legislate. The
matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those which may be
a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the operation of
government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for
investigation.
Banda v. Ermita
G.R. No. 166620 April 20, 2010
FACTS:
President GMA issued Executive Order No. 378 on 2004 amending Section 6 of
Executive Order No. 285by, inter alia, removing the exclusive jurisdiction
of the NPO (National Printing Offi ce) over the printing services requirements
of government agencies and instrumentalities.Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378,
government agencies and instrumentalities are allowed to source their printing
services from the private sector through competitive bidding, subject to
the condition that theservices off ered by the private supplier be of
superior quality and lower in cost compared to what was o ff e r e d b y t h e
N P O. E xe c u t i v e O r d e r N o . 3 7 8
a l s o l i m i t e d N P O s a p p r o p r i a t i o n i n t h e G e n e r a l Appropriations Act to its
income. Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their security of
tenure as employees of the NPO,petitioners now challenge its
constitutionality, contending that: (1) it is beyond the executive powers
of President Arroyo to amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285 issued by former
President Aquino when thelatter still exercised legislative powers; and (2)
Executive Order No. 378 violates petitioners security of tenure, because it
paves the way for the gradual abolition of the NPO.
ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in
Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either
house of Congress, valid and constitutional?
RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the
executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that
certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of
the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the

obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of

such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a
particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch
whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such
information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the
reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade
congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to
do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said
provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
frustrated.

ESTRADA V DESIERTO
Facts
After Estradas impeachment proceedings were aborted and his resignation from the
Presidential post, a cluster of legal problems started appearing. Several cases
previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion
including among others, bribery and graft and corruption, plunder, perjury, serious
miscounduct, malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds. A special
panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to
investigate the charges against the petitioner.Petitioner filed with this Court a
petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to
enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in any
other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of
petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted Petitioner also contends
that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the
investigation of the cases filed against him due to the barrage of prejudicial
publicity on his guilt. He submits that the respondent Ombudsman has developed
bias and is all set to file the criminal cases in violation of his right to due process.

Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined
due to prejudicial publicity
Held
No. Then and now, we now rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not
incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an
accuseds right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always
been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in
the criminal field x x x. The press does not simply publish information about trials

but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors,
and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair
trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-togavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of
the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. Our judges are learned in the law and
trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a
litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per
se fatally infect their impartiality.

Drilon v. Lim
G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994
Cruz, J.
Facts:
The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the
Local Government Code1. The Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him of four oil
companies and a taxpayer) declared Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila Revenue Code)
null and void for non-compliance with the procedure in the enactment of tax
ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.
The RTC revoked the Secretarys resolution and sustained the ordinance. It
declared Sec 187 of the LGC as unconstitutional because it vests on the Secretary
the power of control over LGUs in violation of the policy of local autonomy
mandated in the Constitution. The Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is
constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax
ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not been
observed. (Petition originally dismissed by the Court due to failure to submit
certified true copy of the decision, but reinstated it anyway.)
Issue:
WON the lower court has jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Sec
187 of the LGC
1

Held:
Yes. BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in
which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Moreover,
Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.
In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the
utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of
unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of
separation of powers. It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is
charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a law
unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was first carefully studied by the
executive and the legislative departments and determined by them to be in
accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally approved. To doubt is to
sustain. The presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest
showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution.

In Re Appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta

AM No. 98-5-01-SC | November 9, 1998

FACTS:

On March 30, 1998, The President signed appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela
and Hon. Placido Vallarta as Judges of RTC-Bago City and Cabanatuan City,
respectively. These appointments were deliberated, as it seemed to be expressly
prohibited by Art 7 Sec 15 of the Constitution
A meeting was held on March 9, 1998 by the Judicial and Bar Council to discuss the
constitutionality of appointments to the Court of Appeals (CA) in light of the
forthcoming 1998 Presidential elections. Senior Associate Justice Florenz Regalado,
Consultant of the Council and Member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was
in the position that election ban had no application to the CA based on the
Commissions records. This hypothesis was then submitted to the President for
consideration together with the Councils nominations for 8 vacancies in the CA
The Chief Justice (CJ) received on April 6, 1998, an official communication from the
Executive Secretary transmitting the appointments of 8 Associate Justices of CA
duly signed on March 11, 1998 (day immediately before the commencement of
the ban on appointments), which implies that the Presidents Office did not agree
with the hypothesis.

The President, addressed to the JBC, requested on May 4, 1998 the transmission of
the list of final nominees for the vacancy in view of the 90 days imposed by the
Constitution (from Feb 13, date present vacancy occurred).
ISSUE:

WON the President can fill vacancies in the judiciary pursuant to Article 8 Sec 4 and
9, during the appointment ban period stated in Article 7 Sec 15.

HELD:

Article 8 Sec 4 and 9 simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in
the courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Article7
Sec15. Thus, the President is neither required to make appointments to the
courts nor allowed to do so. Likewise, the prohibition on appointments comes
into effect only once every six years. The Court also pointed out that Article8 Sec4
and 9 should prevail over Article7 Sec15 as they may be considered later
expressions of the people when they adopted the Constitution.

The Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, declared the appointments signed by

the President on March 30, 1998 of Hon. Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta VOID. They
are ordered to cease and desist from discharging the office of Judge of the Courts to
which they were respectively appointed on the said date. They come within the
operation of the prohibition on appointments. While the filling of judiciary vacancies
is in the public interest, there is no compelling reason to justify such appointment
within the 2 months appointment ban.

KULAYAN VS ABDUSAKAR TAN

FACTS:
Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, declaring a state of
emergency in the province of Sulu. The Proclamation cited the kidnapping incident
as a ground for the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to the
Human Security Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which bestows on the Provincial Governor

the power to carry out emergency measures during man-made and natural
disasters and calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement
agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence. In the Proclamation, Tan called
upon the PNP and the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF) to set up checkpoints and
chokepoints, conduct general search and seizures including arrests, and other
actions necessary to ensure public safety. Petitioners, Jamar Kulayan, et al. claimed
that Proclamation No. 1-09 was issued ultra vires, and thus null and void, for
violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the
President sole authority to exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers as
the chief executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed forces
Petitioners, Jamar Kulayan, et al. claimed that Proclamation No. 1-09 was issued
ultra vires, and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency
powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic and
commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a governor can exercise the calling-out powers of a President
HELD:
It has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers,
and that is the President of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII
of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the President and no
one else. Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to
exercise emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the
Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-out powers under Section
7, Article VII thereof. While the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 3 of the
Constitution mandates that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the
military, making the civilian president the nations supreme military leader. The net
effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that a civilian
President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the armed forces. The
Constitution does not require that the President must be possessed of military
training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct military
operations and to determine military strategy. Normally, he would be expected to
delegate the actual command of the armed forces to military experts; but the
ultimate power is his.
Given the foregoing, Governor Tan is not endowed with the power to call upon the
armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan
exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and called upon the
Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out
powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An
exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and
may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code.

GONZALES vs ABAYA
G.R. No. 164007, Aug. 10, 2006
FACTS:
On July 27, 2003 at around 1:00 a.m., more than 300 heavily armed junior officers
and enlisted men of the AFP entered the premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury
Apartments on Ayala Avenue, Makati City, where they disarmed the security guards
and planted explosive devices around the building. They then declared their
withdrawal of support from their Commander-in-Chief and demanded that she
resign as President of the Republic.
After much negotiation, the group finally laid down their arms. Subsequently, an
Information for coup detat was filed against them with the RTC, at the same time
that they were tried at court martial for conduct unbecoming an officer. They
question the jurisdiction of the court martial, contending that the RTC ordered that
their act was not service-connected and that their violation of Art. 96 of the Articles
of War (RA 7055) was absorbed by the crime of coup detat.
ISSUE:
o

Whether the act complained of was service-connected and therefore

cognizable by court martial or absorbed by the crime of coup d'etat
cognizable by regular courts

RULING:
The military justice system is disciplinary in nature, aimed at achieving the highest
form of discipline in order to ensure the highest degree of military efficiency. Military
law is established not merely to enforce discipline in times of war, but also to
preserve the tranquility and security of the State in times of war, but also to
preserve the tranquility and security of the State in time of peace; for there is
nothing more dangerous to the public peace and safety than a licentious and
undisciplined military body. The administration of military justice has been
universally practiced. Since time immemorial, all the armies in almost all countries
of the world look upon the power of military law and its administration as the most
effective means of enforcing discipline. For this reason, the court martial has
become invariably an indispensable part of any organized armed forces, it being the
most potent agency in enforcing discipline both in peace and in war.
The Court held that the offense is service-connected. It bears stressing that the
charge against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as
officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities. Such
violation allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. In

short, the charge has a bearing on their professional conduct or behavior as military
officers.

SANLAKAS Vs. Executive Secretary

421 SCRA 656 G.R. No. 159085
February 3, 2004
Facts: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and
enlisted men of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known
and unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they
complained of the corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for
the government, demanding the resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense
and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised
Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the
Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and
the officers went back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August
1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation
No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued.
In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND
PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that
Sec. 18 Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of
rebellion to call out the AFP, and that there is no factual basis for such proclamation.
(2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al, petitioners contending
that the proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the same
Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress
within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the
presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as
Congress has not delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al.
v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners
contending that there was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section
23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears
that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional
implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion.
Issue:
Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional?
Held:
The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4
are constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state
or rebellion. The President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred
by the Constitution executive powers. It is not disputed that the President has full
discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for
the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether the power was
exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of

discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their
assertion that the President acted without factual basis. The issue of the
circumvention of the report is of no merit as there was no indication that military
tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military authorities have taken over the
functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of the legislative power of the
Congress is of no moment since the President, in declaring a state of rebellion and
in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief
Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers,
vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the
delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on
warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this whether
there is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code,
and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present.
David vs Arroyo
G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006

Facts:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20 th Anniversary of
the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of
national emergency, On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5
implementing PP 1017.
Seven (7) petitions challenging the constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 were
filed against the respondents. Three (3) of these petitions impleaded President
Arroyo as respondent.
Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face because of its overbreadth.
They claim that its enforcement encroached on both unprotected and protected
rights under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution and sent a chilling effect to
the citizens.
Issue:
Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional.
RULING:

The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws
not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, are

declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring

national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution
is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the President to take
over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest without
prior legislation.
G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and
the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is necessary and appropriate
actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless
violence. Considering that acts of terrorism have not yet been defined and
made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.