FOUNDATIONS OF A NATIONAL PEACE DEAL

This document presents general guidelines to help us make progress in quickly

and face-to-face reviewing those remarks made for every topic and
conscientiously suggesting and discussing correction proposals without delay.

Contents
TOC

1. The October 2, 2016 plebiscite and peoples mandate.

A plebiscite, called by the President of the Republic of Colombia, was held on
October 2, 2016, in order for the electorate to vote for the approval or rejection
of the General Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict and the
Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace.
The plebiscite campaign was set up under certain conditions such as:
o A change in the polling threshold that made the plebiscite legitimate:
Even though the Law provided that a minimum of 50% of the registered
population had to go to the polls for greater legitimacy, the Law was
amended so that the threshold was 13% of that population voting YES.
o YES and NO vote campaigns were not equally financed from public money:
Even though the Senate of the Republic of Colombia approved that both
campaigns were equally financed from public money when a bill was
being discussed to set up a plebiscite, this was rejected in the House of
Representatives. This led to serious imbalances.
o The States advertising was not limited: Even though the Senate of the
Republic of Colombia introduced limits to the States advertising during
the plebiscite campaign, this was rejected in the House of
Representatives. This led to more imbalances because many of the
Colombian government agencies continued to publish more messages
related to peace.
o Public servants were allowed to campaign for the Yes vote in the
plebiscite: Public servants from national and decentralized bodies within
the executive branch were allowed to actively engage in campaign. This
led to serious imbalances that clearly favored those who followed the
Colombian government guidelines.
o A Manichaeist approach was the strategy used by peace deal
campaigners: During the plebiscite campaign and even days beforehand,
a number of media messages were conveyed, such as peace is better

than war. The purpose of this was to create a false dilemma in regard to
the process.
In reference to the plebiscite, the Constitutional Court of Colombia decided that
that the threshold could be amended and clarified that the plebiscite call could
not be construed as an opinion on the right to peace. The Constitutional Court
expressed that peace, as a right, is not subject to discussion and ruled that the
actual sense in voting was the contents of the deals.
In a voter turnout of 13,066,047close to the turnout in the 2010 presidential
election second round and the 2014 presidential election first roundand in
spite of the abovementioned imbalances, the NO vote won victory by polling
50.21% ahead of YES vote that polled 49.78%, that is 6,377,482 votes.
As NO voters rejected the deals and asked for material corrections to be
introduced, a National Deal must be made possible in Colombia so that peoples
mandate is both recognized and materialized. After Colombian peoples
sovereign decision, the Centro Democrtico party has issued a call for such a
deal to be reached.

2. Havana deals state of affairs and the need for an urgent National Deal.
As Colombian peoples sovereign will was expressed on October 2, 2016, it is
evident that the deals and the compromises reached by and between the
Colombian government and FARC are neither legally binding nor enforceable
now.
This evidence notwithstanding and so as to respect the views of millions of
Colombians who voted YES, it is necessary to consider the possibility of
materializing a political understanding that uses such deals as a starting point
to introduce corrections and to reach a compromise that makes Colombias
unity possible.
It is important to highlight that it is wrong to take the approach that Havana
deals are a Special Deal in the light of the IHL and, therefore, are already
included in our Constitutionality Block and, thus, in our legal system. As they
have been rejected by Colombian peoples sovereign will, those deals are not
legally binding as the government and FARC intended.
It is also important to highlight that all corrections to be introduced to the
deals must be based on certain general guidelines related to the topics
included in the Havana deals and a discussion must be started in order to get
a consensus of opinion thereon.
Below are the general guidelines to help us make progress in quickly and
face-to-face reviewing those remarks made for every topic and
conscientiously suggesting and discussing correction proposals without
delay.

3. General guidelines:
3.1.

Preamble

The general framework for both the preamble and the introduction must be the
foundational principles enshrined in the Colombias Constitution.
The final deal shall not be included in the Colombias Constitution on an
unamendable basis. It shall be implemented by the institutional means required to
juridically secure it.
In order to implement it, a parallel strategy, a growing bureaucracy, and tax burden
shall be avoided.
1. The results from the plebiscite means that voters unanimously supported
peace and that most of voters rejected and are worried about the contents
of the deal reached by and between the government and FARC.
2. Peoples mandate is that the President does not implement the deal he
signed, but uses his still intact powers to renegotiate what has been agreed.
3. The new preamble of the deal must consider the plebiscite results and the
mandate from people to the President, along with the clear message from
people to FARC.
4. The deal to be reached must be juridically and politically secured.
5. That juridical and political security must be based on the national deal,
permitting that a compromise to be reached by and between the
government and FARC is widely supported by most Colombians.
6. Prospective justice must not be enshrined.
7. The entire deal cannot be signed as a special deal.
8. It must be clear what a special deal is and what is not for purposes of signing
what is to be agreed.

3.2.

Introduction

The focus must be the willingness to construct a stable and lasting peace only.
The land question must observe decentralization, local democracy, obligation to
honor a political platform, and the ability of future candidates running for governor
or mayor to make proposals.
The concept of involvement of citizens and its methods must be those enshrined in
the Constitution of 1991.
The new national political deal must be in accordance with the new political reality.

3.3.

Comprehensive Rural Reform

The rural development system is comprehended in Colombias economic and social

development system, which is one of the governments undiscussable red lines.
Consequently, the fact of having discussed it with FARC results in an irremediable
illegitimacy.
Notwithstanding this completed fact, the Comprehensive Rural Reform (RRI) must
be subject to minimum conditions that, first of all, are not detrimental to
democratic institutions and principles and, secondly, make that reform realistic and
effective. Thus, that reform must:
o Be truly comprehensive and inclusive. Without detriment to the approach to
be chosen for the peasant, family, and community economy in search of
equality, a comprehensive reform must recognize large-scale corporate
production, its importance for Colombias rural development and economy,
and the States obligation to promote it according to conditions established.
o Be truly comprehensive from the standpoint of productivity. Historically,
those reforms exclusively focused on redistributing land did not manage to
reduce rural poverty.
o Respect the right to legitimate private property.
o Promote that current and new small owners can join together.
o Allow and promote the involvement of citizens under democratic
institutionalism.
The land
Beneficiaries from the Free Land Fund and allowances (e.g., subsidies, seed money,
and other socioeconomic programs) must be objectively selected, as laid down in
Law. In no case may FARC directly or indirectly be involved in selecting
beneficiaries, by using organizations in their areas of influence.
The Colombian government shall precisely define the concept of Nations Empty
Land and the process of converting it into private property based on the principle
of bona-fide occupation. The ownership of empty lands occupied bona fide within
the terms laid down in Law shall be respected and legalized and those tenements

shall not be included in the Land Fund. The deals must not be detrimental to honest
owners and tenants whose good faith must make an unquestionable presumption
of innocence.
Nevertheless, in order to ensure that land property is legitimately owned, the State
shall define the competences, scope, and legal instances in order to apply the
governmental in rem forfeiture both due to breach of the ecological purposes and
for public and social purposes. Furthermore, environmental legislation and
institutions need to be comprehensively reviewed.
The deal must explicitly provide for acknowledging and recognizing that funds
obtained from that organizations war economy, along with the land stolen, must
be utilized to pay reparations to victims.
The State shall ensure that the use of rural land for profit purposes is determining
by free market, under those restrictions laid down in an updated environmental
legislation. However, the State may award incentives and benefits to encourage
land owners to use their land for specific purposes based on any priorities set forth
in departmental, regional, or national plans and Colombias macroeconomic
strategies.
The Colombian government must reconsider the distortions of Act 1448 dated
2011, in reference to restitution of lands, such as the so-called concept of nonguiltiness-free bona fide purchasers, which is not only intrinsically contradictory,
but detrimental to the right to legal landownership. A context analysis cannot
operate as an evidence to find bona-fide owners guilty.
Peasant Reserve Zones (ZRCs)
The Colombian State must draw up and implement policies for all peasants, without
any discrimination whatsoever on grounds of location. For the sake of the principles
of equality and inclusion trumpeted under the Rural Reform, may no type of
preference whatsoever exist as it is discriminatory against peasants who are not
located in ZRCs.
The Cadastre

The Comprehensive Rural Reform must observe Article 9 of Act 101 dated 1993,
which provides that When town regulations on land use do not permit any use
other than agricultural and livestock, cadastral valuations may not consider
anything other than productivity, profitability, and tenement improvements, thus
excluding the influence of the development of industry and tourism, building
development, and other similar developments.
Otherwise, rural cadastral survey, for property tax, becomes an exaction for
producers.
Cadastral update processes shall respect legitimate landownership and current
land use for production. Governmental institutions shall be the sole bodies allowed
to conduct these processes.
The Colombian government shall give priority to the challenging and necessary
cadastral update in reference to the land registration process, two essential
processes to legalized ownership. In regard to valuating the existing rural cadastral
survey instead, those tenements thereunder have experienced a material increase
from 32 trillion Colombian pesos in 2002 to 157 trillion Colombian pesos in 2015,
resulting in an exorbitant increase in the property tax.
Involvement of Citizens or Communitarianism
The involvement of communities operates as the exercise of a right that cannot
become FARCs social and land control method after a deal is reached.
Article 103 of Colombias Constitution is the foundation and guideline for the
involvement of citizens.
Thus, National Plans included in the RRI, financed and promoted by the State must
observe decentralization and regional and local autonomy, under the Colombias
Constitution and laws.
The involvement of communities must respect the ability of future candidates
running for governor or mayor to make proposals and preserve the obligation to
honor a political platform, which is the declared policy of whoever aspires to be
elected and a means for voters to demand that declared policy to be honored.

New institutions
By creating 14 National Plans to address all demands related to a comprehensive
rural reform, apart from other bodies to address the land use and other purposes
within the RRI, new institutions are created, which are not only dissociated from
existing institutions, but also burdened with a fiscal cost that must be taken into
account to include them in the Reform.
Consequently, those National Plans and other bodies must be, as a general rule,
included in existing centralized and decentralized institutions.

3.4.

Political participation

This deal demands a deal is signed with FARC as a condition to implement an

Opposition Statute. This concession is a wrong message from Colombian
democracy and graduates FARC as a legitimate Opposition to the government.
The wording needs to be corrected in order for the Opposition Statute to prevail
as a national priority based on which all political groups participate pari passu.
This deal provides for guarantees for demonstrations, but these must clarify
that social and political demonstrations must be pacific in order for people to
express their views. This needs to be included in the wording because, by means
of the Pardon Draft Bill, there is a purpose to make an association between
social and political demonstrations and crimes committed in the name thereof.
The uncontrolled proliferation of political parties and movements has been
pernicious for Colombian democracy. The rule of minimum thresholds for
electoral processes in order for parties to keep the legal entity status has been
useful to tackle this phenomenon, demanding them to poll a minimum amount
of votes to be entitled to public funds and permissions. According to section
2.3.1.1 (of the deals), their purpose is to ignore that minimum threshold rule in
the Congress elections as a condition of obtaining and keeping the legal entity
status, paving the way for the consolidation of those small election companies
so harmful for Colombia.
Participation of all Political Parties in those 16 Special Temporary Peace Electoral
Districts must be the general criterion, even by giving priority to victims from
violence to become candidates. It is discriminatory to create electoral districts
by vetoing participation of political groups represented in the Congress.
The electoral system reform must be conducted by the Congress of the Republic
of Colombia and technically supported by the Colombias National Electoral
Council, the academia, and specialized international bodies. Any ad hoc expert
commission must be incorporated by the Congress of the Republic of Colombia.
The comprehensive security scheme for political proselytism must be created in
accordance with current institutions, by making it suitable for its purposes in a

transparent and effective manner in order to avoid bureaucracy resulting from

parallel institutions. This must also be applied to assessment and monitoring
activities.

3.5.

End of the conflict

FARC political party must not be given exorbitant privileges, but be provided
with the same funds and means as those of the other political parties and
movements in Colombia. Moreover, it must be governed by the same standards
related to operation and funding as the other political parties are. In no case
whatsoever may FARC have a seat in the Colombias National Electoral Council,
a privilege that many existing parties are not given.
The 3 temporary representatives from FARC in the Senate and the House of
Representatives or other bodies, to discuss regulations relating to the
implementation of the deals, cannot be individuals convicted of crimes against
humanity or serious crimes, save for political crimes or negligent crimes.
The special seats that FARC will be given in the Senate and the House of
Representatives for 8 years cannot be taken by individuals who have been
convicted for crimes against humanity or serious crimes.
ECOMUNs role needs to be thoroughly checked. The scope and corporate
purpose of this social and solidarity economy organization, which is present
nationwide for FARC members to become members thereof, remains unclear. It
is of the essence that this organization does not play the same role played by
certain Colombian States institutions, especially in regards to demobilization
and reintegration. Neither can it claim competences and duties allocated to
decentralized bodies.
Preferably, funds from demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration should
be managed by governmental agencies. The idea of creating the ECOMUN must
only be considered as a publicprivate body subject to all regulations related to
the management of public funds.
Section 3.4.3 (of the deals) may result in a new punishable conduct related to
the threat against the implementation of Havana deals. This is a dangerous
ambiguity related to a National Commission for Security Guarantees of which
FARC would be a member holding a permanent seat next to the State security
corps.

 The Special Investigation Unit, already created, must not limit its actions only
against those organizations that are said to be heirs of the paramilitaries. Any
violent group should be considered, including, but not limited to, FARC
dissidents and ELN.
FARC must not be allowed to check the background of public servants from all
the Colombian States institutions, by means of the National Commission for
Security Guarantees.
FARC must not be allowed to have influence on the Colombian States
intelligence regulations, by means of the National Commission for Security
Guarantees.
FARC must not be allowed to supervise and control Private Security services, by
means of the National Commission for Security Guarantees.
Section 3.4.7.3.3 (of the deals) provides for the possibility that people who are
trustworthy for FARC become members of a Security and Protection Corps
having direct coordination with the Colombian national police. Any individual
must be selected and hired under authorization of the Colombian national
police after a psychological and professional screening. The Colombian national
police must retain the right to veto.

3.6.

Drug trafficking

The comprehensive and balanced approach to fight against the world drug
problem must clearly continue, instead of adopting a new approach based on a
differentiated treatment.
The new policy must be based on the comprehensive and balanced approach,
which is neither against considering alternative approaches based on evidence,
nor against the general human rights and public health approach, nor against
good practices, nor against recommendations from experts.
FARC group has not expressly admitted its organized drug trafficking business at
all and, instead, is implying to be linked up with it accidentally, as a result of
their Rebellion. The purpose of this groups self-image is to look for pardon
based on the idea that drug trafficking is related to political crimes.
Since FARC is not firmly committed to admit its umbilical link to drug trafficking,
it is required that the deal provides that FARC explicitly undertakes to:

provide all the information about their cultivated areas

provide all the information about their routes
provide all the information about their logistics
provide all the information about their chemical precursor
suppliers
provide all the information about their money laundering networks
Even though voluntary manual eradication is preferred, it is important that the
States right to do aerial spraying for national security reasons is made explicit.
Therefore, Attorney General of Colombias proposal of immediately resume
aerial spraying using glyphosate must be considered.
Considering that the number of illegal crops has overwhelmingly increased in
the last two years, section 4.1.3.4 (of the deals) is worrisome because it makes
it possible to disregard penalties against growers. Even though alternative
development or crop substitution schemes may be considered, effective
penalties must not be disregarded for national security reasons.

 Thus, drug trafficking as an independent crime that cannot be pardoned must

be made explicit. Cooperating with authorities by providing effective
information would be useful to consider extenuating circumstances or effective
alternative penalties.

3.7.

Victims

FARC must express regret and apologize for their acts.

This deal does not include any explicit commitment from FARC to effectively
contribute to pay financial reparations to victims. Even though the document
provides for material reparation, this term is fuzzy and needs to be clarified by
the commitment to give up all properties to compensate victims.
FARC must provide a clear and thorough list of properties owned by them before
the deal becomes effective, as requested by the Attorney General of Colombia.
Those properties shall be used to pay financial reparations to victims.
FARC must release all people kidnapped and hold themselves accountable to
victims for missing persons. The work of the Special Unit for the Search of
Individuals reported Missing, created in March, must be sped up and FARC
members must directly cooperate with it.
The Centro Democrtico party shall support requests from organizations
representing FARC victims.
The Truth Commission must be composed of representatives from all political
groups in the Congress, in order to widen the scope of it, and not only of those
representatives agreed by and between FARC and the Colombian government.
The involvement of victims in making community media more democratic must
be ensured as well as their representation in those 16 special temporary
electoral districts.

3.8.

Justice and impunity

The Centro Democrtico party is voicing the concerns expressed by some

Justices from High Courts in reference to the justice topic and invites Justices to
join the table to discuss proposals in order to address those concerns.
A Special Jurisdiction for Peace has been created and there is:
o
o
o
o
o

no clarification on Colombian laws

no clarification on how to apply the Colombian Criminal Code
the possibility of defining punishable conducts
no clarification on guarantees for legal proceedings
no clarification on adversarial proceedings

In the interests of Colombian institutions, creating a Transitional Court within

the Judicial Branch is preferable. This will avoid that High Courts are not
substituted and builds confidence in institutions.
This Transitional Court shall have competence on private individuals and army
soldiers and police officers only if they willfully appear to court.
Army soldiers and police officers convicted or investigated must be given
benefits such as reduction of sentence, the earliest probation allowed, and
reconsideration of sentences to reclaim honorwhich did not mean impunity
, regardless of what has been agreed with FARC. They must retain the right to
be imprisoned in military or police garrisons.
Accusations or reports used as evidence to bring proceedings at the Transitional
Court shall come from existing legal bodies.
Article 65 of the Justice Deal appoints foreign judges to decide legal proceedings
in Colombia, violating Colombias Constitution and laws.
Article 36 of the Justice Deal provides for eligibility for politics for those
responsible for serious crimes and crimes against humanity, which is against

Colombias Constitution. It must be clearly explicit that eligibility for politics

shall not be given to those convict of for such crimes.
Article 38 of the Justice Deal paves the way for pardoning the murder of
soldiers and police officers by invoking the idea of dead in combat in the
light of the IHL. Historically, FARC group has not met these criteria. According
to the wording of the article, FARC could say that many of its treacherous
attacks against soldiers and police officers are the basis for a crime to be
pardoned.
Article 39 of the Justice Deal paves the way for pardoning the kidnapping of
soldiers and police officers by invoking the idea of apprehension of
combatants in military operations.
Article 39 widens the scope of pardon to any acts related to supporting,
funding, and hiding rebellion. This approach, which is included in Article 7 of
the Pardon Act, paves the way for considering a number of crimes included in
the Colombian Criminal Code as related to political crimes.
Article 59 of the Justice Deal is intended to apply the same fundamentals on
command hierarchy and line of responsibility laid down in Article 44 for
Colombian Armed Forces to FARC. The purpose of such a wording is to lessen
FARC ringleaders degree of liability, which is contradictory to the ruling
pronounced in March 2016 by the International Criminal Court on Jean Pierre
BEMBA case. Such a ruling refers to the liability of those in command.
Article 60 of the Justice Deal paves the way for the scenario that masterminds
of crimes against humanity who tell the whole truth are exempted from jail
sentences or any equivalent penalty. According to the wording of the article,
Article 77 of the Rome Statute is being breached. For the sake of a deal,
reduced jail sentences, under alternative imprisonment conditions such as
agricultural farms, may be of course considered.
Article 58 of the Justice Deal paves the way to review the res judicata, fragrantly
violating Article 8 of the Pact of San Jos, namely in reference to the need of a
pre-existing court.

 Events such as monies from drug trafficking in politics and the scandal of
politicians colluding with outlaw paramilitary groups (parapolitics) were
severely punished in Colombia (fairly in some cases); however, impunity is about
to be given in reference to the scandal of politicians colluding with outlaw
guerrillas (FARCpolitics).
Article 72 prohibits extradition in connection with crimes committed before the
final deal was signed and makes it difficult to extradite FARC members whose
crimes are committed after the final deal is signed. It should be considered that
extradition is prevented on condition that commitments to truth, reparation,
and non-repetition are honored.
Therefore and for the sake of a new proposal that makes transitional justice
possible under existing institutions, we suggest the following:
1. ELIMINATE the so-called Special Jurisdiction for Peace and replace it by a
transitional justice system governed by the regular Colombian judiciary.
2. CREATE, under the regular judiciary, specialized courtrooms that would be
called COURTS FOR PEACE, which would be reporting to the Supreme Court of
Justice of Bogot.
3. GIVE COMPETENCE to the Main Courtroom of the Supreme Court of Justice of
Colombia in order for it to be the highest in rank (second and last instance)
which the so-called Courts for Peace will be reporting to.
4. Courts for Peace will be composed, in turn, of several types of courtrooms
(pardon and amnesty court, truth acceptance court, procedural safeguards
control court, and trial court).
5. CREATE the so-called Offices of the Attorney for Peace, which will be part of
an elite unit from the Office of the Attorney General and will be the highest
in rank.
6. The Offices of the Attorney for Peace duties will be:
(i) to fight against organizations resulting from the conflict and

(ii) to investigate, to describe the facts, and to accuse in Courts for Peace
courtrooms.
7. Justices and prosecutors in these Courts of Peace MUST AND SHALL BE
COLOMBIANS and their minimum age shall be 40. Moreover, these justices and
prosecutors shall ensure the highest international standards of integrity,
independence, autonomy, and impartiality.
8. FOREIGN LAWYERS will be allowed to intervene only to act in the capacity of the
defense counsel for people tried in COURTS FOR PEACE.
9. Courts for Peace shall have competence to try private individuals and army
soldiers and police officers, provided that these people WILLFULLY appear in
these courts; otherwise, they will be tried in a regular court.
10.A DIFFERENT TREATMENT is provided for State officials in reference to justice.
11.FARC commanders liability for their subordinates acts, pursuant to the
chain of command, shall be based on controlling their will in accordance with
the concept of MEDIATE PERPETRATION IN POWER STRUCTURE ORGANIZATIONS.
12.PARDON AND AMNESTY IS GIVEN ALSO TO THIRD PARTIES WHO ARE NOT COMBATANTS
(accessories), provided that all weapons and arsenals are decommissioned.
Pardon and amnesty shall not operate as a waiver of commitment to truth.
13.PENALTIES ARE AMENDED, providing for a minimum jail sentence of 5 years and a
maximum jail sentence of 20 years to be imposed by Courts for Peace to
those who have seriously violated Human Rights or the International
Humanitarian Law.
14.IF RESPONSIBILITY IS ACCEPTED either by the principal or the accessory, jail
sentences would be from 5 to 8 years, if any alternative imprisonment places
such as agricultural farms.
15.IF RESPONSIBILITY IS NOT ACCEPTED but determined by regular legal authorities, jail
sentences would range from 15 to 10 years. For accessories or aiders and

abettors who do not accept responsibility, jail sentence show range from 10
to 15 years.
16.JAIL SENTENCE JUDGMENTS ruled by the Trial Courtroom may be appealed.
Likewise, the Main Courtroom from the Supreme Court of Justice of
Colombia may be requested at any time to review any judgment ruled by the
trial court whenever new evidence is provided to prove that an evident legal
mistake was made against the convict.
17.Courts for Peace may neither ignore nor disregard the res judicata principle
related to previous judgments ruled by regular courts.
18.Jail sentences can be made equivalent, based on favorableness, for the
benefit of those who have been convicted and sentenced by regular courts
to jail terms higher than those set forth in the transitional justice scheme.

3.9.

Implementation, verification, and endorsement

Peace deals implementation must not be based on a bill and legislation passage
and sanction process that replaces that laid down in Colombias Constitution
and laws. A National Deal must be the foundation for a trustworthy process in
harmony with the fundamentals of Colombias institutions.
The deals must be disclosed and explained before they are implemented so that
they are made widely known to the public for the sake of a national deal going
beyond political views and accepted by all Colombians, unlike the process to
grant 31 FM radio stations to FARC under no public tender and for no
consideration whatsoever.
It is worrisome that the use of funds from royalties is being discussed without
clearly considering what institutions will be involved therein and in times of
uncertainty for the future of such royalties due to the decline of the mining and
energy sector.
It is worrisome that, by the Implementation, Monitoring, and Verification
Commission with a permanent seat for FARC, this group is allowed to:
o settle the peace deal construction elements where FARCs interests are
repeatedly mentioned.
o previously control all new regulations to be implemented or to be
construed as detrimental to FARCs interests.
o have privileges in reference to new legislations.
There is an evident interest in including the Havana deals in the Constitutionality
Block of the Colombias Constitution. A National Deal will help to reach a general
consensus on how to duly implement and enforce the deals, but not to make
them become a parallel Constitution.

4. Considerations on institutions, economy, and taxes

In order for the proposals set forth in the deals to be realisticthat is to say, that
can be afforded and honored, all bureaucracy and programs suggested in the
deal must be reconsidered to get a clear and realistic analysis of costs and times.
The wording of the deals must make it explicit that they shall be implemented
in accordance with the fiscal rule and not pave the way for more taxes that may
have an adverse effect on Colombias economic development.
The deals shall be implemented in accordance with Colombias National Budget
and not according to strategies that are not laid down in the Fiscal Accounting
and may result in sources of economic vulnerability.
The wording of the deals must make it explicit that they shall be implemented
in accordance with current institutions and that, if any new institution is
considered, two institutions for the same purpose must not exist so that the
public administration is efficient.
In no case whatsoever shall powers of decentralized bodies be put in risk.
Therefore, those provisions that are detrimental to decentralization must be
thoroughly reconsidered.

5. Preservation of public order in Colombia

We propose that a National Deal is slowly but surely reached so that we
eventually get an agreement backed by most Colombians.
We kindly ask the Colombian government to continue with those actions agreed
with FARC and intended to protect and have its members concentrated in areas.
We kindly ask the UN to support this process as a guarantor for successfully
achieving Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration.
We propose to quickly discuss a pardon and amnesty process that effectively
ensures reintegration of regular guerrillas not to linked up with crimes against
humanity into civil society.
Our wish is to bring this document for consideration to reach a National Deal.