File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R.

Ford Presidential Library

MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:

The President's Meeting with the Cabinet on Indochina

DATE:

Tuesday, April 29, 1975

9:45 a. m..

PLACE:

The Cabinet Room.

Pre s ident: We had a difficult tim.e in Indoc hina recently, be ginning

with the situation in Phnom. Penh. We have m.anaged in Vietnam. to
prevent a panic and to stabilize the m.ilitary and diplom.atic situation
tem.porarily. This has enabled us to get virtually all the Am.ericans
out and m.any Vietnam.ese out. The fact that we have not panicked and
have kept together has enabled us to com.e out of a tragic situation as
well as possible.
Kissinger: When the President m.ade his April 10th speech to the
Congress, he set the goal of stabilization of the situation. That
optim.ized our chances for whatever the outcom.e would be. It prevented
a panic and the jeopardizing of 6, 000 Am.ericans; it kept stability in
governm.ent, and it gave som.e chance to the high-risk Vietnam.ese.
The supplem.ental kept troops in the field and let us start the evacuation.
Defacto there was a ceasefire for a few days.
H there is a change in governm.ent in Saigon, it is foreseeable

it would m.ove from. pro-Am.erican to neutral to pro-Com.m.unist and

from. helping us to opposing us.
Between the speech and yesterday, the num.ber of Am.ericans
was reduced from. 6, 000 to 950. Yesterday, Tan Son Nhut cam.e under
attack. The President called an NSC m.eeting and decided on one m.ore
day of fixed-wing operations if possible to get out 8, 000 Vietnam.ese and
thin out the Am.ericans. We located them. in two areas: the Tan Son Nhut
com.pound with about 400 Am.ericans. and the Em.bassy with 400 Am.ericans
<l'-'

.G~/XGD:
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SSIFIED BY
HENR Y A. KISSINGER
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EDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652

El\,IPTlON CATEGORY
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~/XGDS

2.

and ZOO hangers-on. The airport was closed by incoming fire so the
President ordered a helicopter evacuation. ' The airlift was ordered
at 1050 and began in the early hours. Our orders were to evacuate the
Americans, and we thought that could be done in a couple of hours, but
the Americans became mixed with Vietnamese and the decision was
they couldn't be evacuated without danger, so we have evacuated many
Vietnamese. The operation is continuing and probably will continue for
two or three more hours. If we are lucky and get them out, we will
have accomplished our objective to get the high-risk Vietllamese out,
and we have eased the transition to the new government. It is sti11
..
tragic but at least it is contro11ed.
President: The two Marines who 'Were ki11ed yesterd$.y were ki11ed by
happenstance rocket fire. We plaIlJled a fixed-wing evacu:atio~, Put
'they were warned off when the runway 'Yas blocked. We then went to ' .
a helicopter evacuation. On the ground they decided toevacuate
Vietnamese with Ameri,cansand we have to let them be the jugge on
the ground.

"

Schlesinger: There are abOut ZOO men in a sec';rity (orce ~t 'Tall Son
Nhut because the priority nowjs at the Embassy. There are an unknown
number of Americans and Vietnamese sti11 left. The only attacks were
on aircraft on which fire was returned and on the boat from
. .Can Tho.
Now we have the problem of sniper fire. We hope to complete the
operation by noon.
,

President: Are we actua11y in the process of getting the security force

out of Tan Son Nhut?
Schlesinger: Yes.
Kissinger: They can protect themselves better than others.
Morton: How about other nationals?
Kissinger: A11 have left but the French.
President: One of the problems has been that the number of Americans
has been growing as we evacuate -- they are coming out of the woodwork.
The rifle fire is worrisome. The fire is South Vietnamese, which
illustrates the problem we would have faced had we panicked the situation.

~~L/XGDS

~/XGDS

3.

Kissinger: And pushing for aid helped keep the situation stable.
Schlesinger: [Describes tlie loss of control at Tan Son Nhut] which
led to your decision to evacuate at about 11 :00 p. m.
President: We have ordered Martin to get the Americans out but he
is the judge of how to get them out be st.
Kissinger: You never ordered any but Americans out in the helicopter
lift. Including Vietnamese was a local decision, probably to insuf',e,the
evacuation of American citizens.
Morton: Where will the refugees go?
President: We have set up three U. S. refugee centers-- Camp Pendleton,
Camp Chaffee and Eglin Air Force Base.. There were some objections to
this, but we must spread them out to the extent possible.
Kissinger: We have approached a number of countries to take some.
President: After the leadership meeting, Henry and Ron Nessen will
brief the press. Tell them. Let's, say nothing so we can speak with
one voice.
Morton: Maybe the TTPI can take 4-5,000 skilled people.
real shortage and we can ex:ploreit.

There is a

Coleman: Are you giving any thought now to outlining what our foreign
policy will be in this part of the world from here out? Your April 10th
speech was great for the time but. obviously, the situation has changed
now.

C~/XGDS

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