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A Case Study of The Terrorist Cult of Mojahedin
A Case Study of The Terrorist Cult of Mojahedin
Mojahedin.ws
Introduction
From its very inception, MKO advocated an armed struggle policy and
eclectic Islamic-Marxist ideology to further its political struggle. Later on,
it proved to be not the least bound to its own adopted eclecticism but
greatly hailing a philosophy of ends justify the means". Violence was the
opt means to achieve the end of assuming the power. Expelled form Iran
after the revolution for its public, bloody rebellions, the group vowed as an
archenemy of Iranian people and has so far been orchestrating and
conducting terror and violence against the nation and targeting Iranians,
personalities as well as civilians. Its ideological drift and political
misconduct led it afield of a conventional political group and the world
came to develop an idea of recognizing it not only a terrorist group but
also a highly destructive cult evolving its own mind control techniques and
sharing common properties with other dangerous cults.
The US and the European Union have also developed their own definition
of terrorism, but the most outstanding parameters in all these definitions
are the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or properties to
intimidate or coerce a government to achieve political or social objectives.
Terrorism thus denoting a lack of legitimacy and morality, it is crucial for
many terrorist groups, especially if struggling in exile for political ends,
not to be labeled a terrorist group under the anti-terrorist laws of the
countries that ban the activities of terrorists and impose limitations.
The post revolution Iran was the scene of many terrorist operations and
assassinations perpetrated by dissident groups. The first wave of these
assassinations was committed by the group of Forqan*. Forqan group
shook the newly established government by assassinating General Qarani,
Mahdi Iraqi and his son, Dr. Mofateh, and Morteza Mottahari. At the time
MKO, seemingly siding with the revolution, took no clear position against
the assassinations and their issued announcements were cunningly
ambiguous; the group was careful not to provoke the either side. It well
depicted its inborn outlook on the issue of terrorism that advocated its
use.
In the post-revolution power struggle and Rajavis bid for power, MKO
were actually repudiated to have any share in the governing structure of
the Islamic Republic. MKOs function on 20 June 1981, mass
demonstrations in Tehran and many other Iranian provincial towns, that
led it to make a fundamental shift in its strategy and tactic to initiate an
armed move against the Islamic Republic, steered the country to the
verge of a chaotic atmosphere. From the 20 June (the start of the armed
march) to Feb. 1982 (killing of 20 members of Mojahedin including Musa
Khyabani, MKO commander inside Iran after Rajavis escape to France,
and Ashraf Rabiee, Rajavis first wife), MKO expanded a wave of terror by
launching armed operations, carrying out daily attacks against civilians,
assassinating officials, and blasting the state-owned edifices and public
communities.
In June 1986, Rajavi acted in collusion with Saddam and moved MKOs
bases to Iraq with the impression of availing an opportunity, granted by
Iraq-Iran tension, near the Iranian borders to fulfill the plan of
overthrowing the Islamic Republic. Forming a liberation army equipped
and financed by Saddam, the hot MKO fanned the flames of war and
exceeded in hostile attitudes towards Iranians by launching military
aggressions against Iranian border-lined cities. One should never forget
that war of cities, Iraqis new tactic to shell Iranians far and near cities by
long-range missiles, started soon after MKOs move to Iraq. Rajavi took it
for granted that war of cities could disturb Iranians internal security that
might consequently raise tension between the nation and the
government.
The original meaning of the term cult, derived from the French word
"culte", comes from Latin noun "cultus" which is related to the Latin verb
"colere" meaning "to worship or give reverence to a deity". The term has
originally a positive, religious connotation but in recent years, it has
turned to be a widely used popular term, usually connoting some group
that is at least unfamiliar and perhaps even disliked or feared. This latter
use of the term has gained such credence and momentum that it has
virtually swallowed up the more neutral historical meaning. The term can
be defined either sociologically, concerned with behavior, or
theologically, concerned with doctrine. Sociological definition Include
consideration of such factors as authoritarian leadership patterns, loyalty
and commitment mechanisms, lifestyle characteristics, [and] conformity
patterns (including the use of various sanctions in connection with those
members who deviate). [3]
- single authority
- questionable credentials
- requirement for unconditional trust
- they always claim to be in unique direct contact with God
- sexual misconduct
- grandiose promises
- they demand major ongoing financial contributions from members
- they claim that evil sinister forces attempt to subvert them [4]
4. Isolation from society -- not necessarily physical isolation, but this can
be psychological isolation.
MKO portraits two completely different images; its relation with the world
outside and its internal structure. Duped by its heavy propaganda blitz,
most people in Western countries, unaware of its terrorist nature, take it
for a revolutionary, freedom-seeker, and pro-democratic organization. The
groups internal structure, totally concealed from the eyes of the
outsiders, nearly shares all of the characteristics of a destructive cult with
added emphasis on the authoritarian pyramid structure and mind control
techniques. Massoud Rajavi, the long self-appointed leader, is known to be
the mastermind of MKO. Released from Shahs prison after revolution,
Rajavi took up the responsibility of acting as the organizations
spokesman that awarded him an opportunity to develop authority both
within the organisation and in the public's perception.
How did the Mujahideen become a cult? The principal lever for the
transformation of the organization from a mass movement to a cult was
Rajavis ideological revolution in January 1985. The first phase of this
revolution basically involved Masoud Rajavi marrying Maryam Qajar
Azdanlou, the wife of Mehdi Abrishamchi, Rajavis most trusted lieutenant.
The marriage was an overt violation of Islamic marriage rituals and a
majority of ranking members saw the whole affair as an ugly and bizarre
form of cuckoldry. The event, more regarded as an internal coup data,
promoted the husband to the rank of a guru and the wife to the rank of
the joint leader of the organization. Massoud Rajavi indoctrinated the
ideological revolution as a purging process saying Those Mojahedin
members who pass through this furnace, are more steadfastness, more
steel like person, and have more future in the resisting [6]
In the front of revolution and progressiveness, you would not find two
people with the same political and organizational potentialities of
Massoud Rajavi among all the opposition. [7]
Many of his messages imply that he has a close relationship with Imam
Zaman (the last and still awaited Imam in Shiite Islam) and therefore he
has direct contact with God. Under Rajavis instructions as an ideological
leader, members began to give up Islamic practices and rituals because,
as stated by their chosen ideological leader, they were no longer
individually responsible; they were only responsible to Rajavi and he was
responsible to God. Later on, especial prayer texts were devised to praise
him and his wife, Maryam.
That is clear that such process could pursue in no rational route. The
dominant element in the process is love and emotion that bypass
logic and reason. The means are not those of polemics and
persuasions but self-devotion. That is the point where Massoud
claims Mojahedins heart. [9]
The second phase of the full transition to the status of a cult started after
the Iran-Iraq cease-fire in 1988. Rajavi launched thousands of his warriors
on ''Operation Eternal Light'' across the border to capture Iranian territory.
It was a total military failure. The operation before anything was a
resolution of Rajavis own volition, a proven suicide operation excluding
the leader himself. The failure proved to be a victory for Rajavi; the made
amendments to the ideological revolution after the operation guaranteed
his position as a hallowed figure with the sole authority to question
anybody while the members were not in the least permitted to violate the
leaders sacramental sphere. To create a compelling control atop, all the
individual attachments and values had to be detached. The detachment
did not include physical spectrum, but above that, psychological scopes.
During the first Gulf War and the US attack to Iraq, MKO leaders enforced
separation of the members children residing in Iraq-based camps. The
children, about 800 including little babies, were sent to different Western
countries for some purposes. First they could be abused as potential
fundraising instruments to collect large amounts of charity money on
pretext of Iranian homeless children. On the other hand, the children
could be trained as the next generation of MKO soldiers. Nadereh Afshari,
an ex-member of MKO and who was posted in Germany and was
responsible for receiving children during the gulf war, has revealed that
when the German government tried to absorb Mojahedin children into
their education system, the organization refused. Many of these children
were sent to Mojahedin-run schools, particularly in France. She has
elaborated that Rajavi ''saw these kids as the next generation's soldiers.
They wanted to brainwash them and control them. Every morning and
night, the kids, beginning as young as 1 and 2, had to stand before a
poster of Massoud and Maryam, salute them and shout praises to them.
[11]
In June 2003, people in some Western cities were shocked to witness one
of the most appalling cult potentialities of MKO. On 17 June 2003 more
than 1.200 France police and gendarmerie forces raided 13 MKO-run
offices in Paris districts and arrested 164 suspected Mojahedin cadres as
well as Maryam Rajavi on charges of terrorist activities. In the next few
days, to carry out premeditated missions, a number of the groups
members immolated themselves in public to protest Maryam Rajavis
arrest. According to reports issued by the group itself, 16 people
attempted to set themselves alight in three days in Paris, Berne, Rome,
London, Ottawa, Athens and Nicosia. The human tragedy ended with two
deaths; two women, Sediqeh Mojaveri, 44-year-old, and Neda Hassani, 19-
year-old, died because of the self-immolation injuries. [12]
Besides old members joining the organization for political causes, a large
number of the members are the young Iranian people who have been
deceived to join the group. These young, unaware recruits fall into the
trap of the middlemen who by false promises of good job, high salary and
residence in Western countries paralyze their rational minds and send
them to MKOs camps in Iraq. Undergoing brainwashing methods in the
camps, they rarely dream to return to Iran because they are unnerved and
intimidated by the threats of being tried and even executed for having
connection and cooperating with a counter-revolutionary group.
The members who try to leave the MKO or criticize it in any form have to
pay a very heavy price. In a 28-page report released by Human Rights
Watch in May 2005 entitled No Exit: Human Rights Abuses Inside the
MKO Camps, shocking details about inhuman behaviors and control of
the insiders of MKO was published for the world. The facts revealed how
dissident members were tortured, beaten and held in solitary confinement
for years at military camps in Iraq after they criticized the groups policies
and undemocratic practices, or indicated that they planned to leave the
organization. The report is based on the direct testimonies of a dozen
former MKO members, including five who were turned over to Iraqi
security forces and held in notorious Abu Ghoraib prison under Saddams
rule.
MKO has long been using a lexicon of its own. The terms they use inside
the organization have their own connotations different with those used
outside. The followings are examples of a more than 1200 terms lexicon
volume:
To determine how dangerous MKO cult might be, the Advanced Bonewits'
Cult Danger Evaluation Frame can be a good help. As Bonewits
explains, The purpose of this evaluation tool is to help both amateur
and professional observers, including current or would-be members,
of various organizations (including religious, occult, psychological or
political groups) to determine just how dangerous a given group is
liable to be, in comparison with other groups, to the physical and
mental health of its members and of other people subject to its
influence. [14]
Factors: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Low High
1. INTERNAL CONTROL: Amount of
internal political power exercised
by leader(s) over members. 1. _________________________
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Low High
Sources:
[3]. A Guide to Cults and New Religions; ed. Ronald Enroth, Downers
Grove, Ill, InterVarsity 1983, p14.
[4].www.phact.org
[5]. www.refocus.org
[9]. Ibid.
[12]. www.mojahedin.ws
[14]. www.qed.net/bonewits/ABCDEF.HTML