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Loadstar Vs Pioneer
Loadstar Vs Pioneer
Loadstar Vs Pioneer
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 157481
time of the year and as such, was an ordinary peril of the voyage for which the M/V Weasel should have been
normally able to cope with; and (3) petitioner was negligent in the selection and supervision of its agents and
employees then manning the M/V Weasel.
In its Answer, petitioner alleged that no fault nor negligence could be attributed to it because it exercised due
diligence to make the ship seaworthy, as well as properly manned and equipped. Petitioner insisted that the failure to
deliver the subject cargo to the consignee was due to force majeure. Petitioner claimed it could not be held liable for
an act or omission not directly attributable to it.
On February 15, 1993, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondent, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant
Loadstar Shipping Co., Inc. ordering the latter to pay as follows:
1. To pay plaintiff the sum of P1,900,000.00 with legal rate of interest per annum from date of
complaint until fully paid;
2. To pay the sum equal to 25% of the claim as and for attorneys fees and litigation expenses; and,
3. To pay the costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.6
The RTC reasoned that petitioner, as a common carrier, bears the burden of proving that it exercised extraordinary
diligence in its vigilance over the goods it transported. The trial court explained that in case of loss or destruction of
the goods, a statutory presumption arises that the common carrier was negligent unless it could prove that it had
observed extraordinary diligence.
Petitioners defense of force majeure was found bereft of factual basis. The RTC called attention to the PAG-ASA
report that at the time of the incident, tropical storm "Asiang" had moved away from the Philippines. Further,
records showed that the sea and weather conditions in the area of Hinubaan, Negros Occidental from 8:00 p.m. of
June 24, 1984 to 8:00 a.m. the next day were slight and smooth. Thus, the trial court concluded that the cause of the
loss was not tropical storm "Asiang" or any other force majeure, but gross negligence of petitioner.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
In its Decision dated October 15, 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision with modification that
Loadstar shall only pay the sum of 10% of the total claim for attorneys fees and litigation expenses. It ruled,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated February 15, 1993, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 8, in Civil Case No. 86-37957 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the appellant shall only pay the sum of 10% of the total claim as and for attorneys fees and
litigation expenses. Costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied.8
The instant petition is anchored now on the following assignments of error:
I
We think not. The voyage-charter agreement between petitioner and Northern Mindanao Transport Company, Inc.
did not in any way convert the common carrier into a private carrier. We have already resolved this issue with
finality in Planters Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals11 where we ruled that:
It is therefore imperative that a public carrier shall remain as such, notwithstanding the charter of the whole or
portion of a vessel by one or more persons, provided the charter is limited to the ship only, as in the case of a timecharter or voyage-charter. It is only when the charter includes both the vessel and its crew, as in a bareboat or demise
that a common carrier becomes private, at least insofar as the particular voyage covering the charter-party is
concerned. Indubitably, a shipowner in a time or voyage charter retains possession and control of the ship, although
her holds may, for the moment, be the property of the charterer.12
Conformably, petitioner remains a common carrier notwithstanding the existence of the charter agreement with the
Northern Mindanao Transport Company, Inc. since the said charter is limited to the ship only and does not involve
both the vessel and its crew. As elucidated in Planters Products, its charter is only a voyage-charter, not a bareboat
charter.
As a common carrier, petitioner is required to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods it
transports.13 When the goods placed in its care are lost, petitioner is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently. Petitioner therefore has the burden of proving that it observed extraordinary diligence in order to avoid
responsibility for the lost cargo.14
In Compania Maritima v. Court of Appeals,15 we said:
it is incumbent upon the common carrier to prove that the loss, deterioration or destruction was due to accident or
some other circumstances inconsistent with its liability.
...
The extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods tendered for shipment requires the common carrier to
know and to follow the required precaution for avoiding damage to, or destruction of the goods entrusted to it for
safe carriage and delivery. It requires common carriers to render service with the greatest skill and foresight and "to
use all reasonable means to ascertain the nature and characteristics of goods tendered for shipment, and to exercise
due care in the handling and stowage, including such methods as their nature requires."16
Article 1734 enumerates the instances when a carrier might be exempt from liability for the loss of the goods. These
are:
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;
(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; and
(5) Order or act of competent public authority.17
Petitioner claims that the loss of the goods was due to a fortuitous event under paragraph 1. Yet, its claim is not
substantiated. On the contrary, we find supported by evidence on record the conclusion of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals that the loss of the entire shipment of cement was due to the gross negligence of petitioner.
Records show that in the evening of June 24, 1984, the sea and weather conditions in the vicinity of Negros
Occidental were calm. The records reveal that petitioner took a shortcut route, instead of the usual route, which
exposed the voyage to unexpected hazard. Petitioner has only itself to blame for its misjudgment.
Petitioner heavily relies on Home Insurance Co. v. American Steamship Agencies, Inc. 18 and Valenzuela Hardwood
and Industrial Supply, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.19 The said cases involved a private carrier, not a common carrier.
Moreover, the issue in both cases is not the effect of a voyage-charter on a common carrier, but the validity of a
stipulation absolving the private carrier from liability in case of loss of the cargo attributable to the negligence of the
private carrier.
Lastly, on the third issue, we find consistent with law and prevailing jurisprudence the Court of Appeals award of
attorneys fees and expenses of litigation equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total claim. The contract between the
parties in this case contained a stipulation that in case of suit, attorneys fees and expenses of litigation shall be
limited to only ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award. Given the circumstances of this case, we deem the
said amount just and equitable.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated October 15, 2002 and the Resolution dated
February 27, 2003, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40999, are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Asscociate Justice
AT T E S TAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman, Third Division
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairmans Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice