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Evidence Batch 1 PDF
Evidence Batch 1 PDF
L-5275
trunk which contained their valuables. P10 in cash and jewels worth P180
were taken away.
The Chief of Police of Antatet, who lived around twenty meters away from the
house of Ramil, heard three pistol shots, so he repaired to the municipal
building to fetch one of his policemen, then they passed by the house of the
Mayor, and together with him they proceeded to the house of Ramil. When
they reached it the robbers were already gone. They found Ramil already
dead with gun-shots wounds on the left eye, in the right breast, at the back,
and at the left index finger. They questioned the wife, who recounted, to them
what had happened. The chief of police found a fired bullet, caliber .32, inside
the truck, four empty .22 caliber cartridges near the dead body, three
empty .32 caliber shells, one near the broken box inside the bedroom and the
other two five meters from the house of the deceased, and three .45 caliber
empty shells under the house just below the body the dead body. The
following day, a physician of Antatet performed an autopsy on the dead body
of Ramil and he found four gunshot wounds in the places already indicated
above. When he opened the chest cavity, he discovered a .22 caliber slug
right at the heart.
The above facts are not contradicted. The evidence, upon which the judgment
of conviction is based, consists of the testimony on one, Jose Mallillin, that of
Andres Bumanglag, which in part corroborates Mallillin's testimony, and the
findings of a ballistic expert of the Philippine Constabulary to the effect that
the empty .32 caliber cartridges found under the house of Ramil had been
fired from the Llama auto-pistol possessed by, and licensed in the name of,
Mallillin, and that the .32 caliber slug, Exhibit C, which was found inside the
trunk, had also been fired therefrom. These findings were based on the fact
that the striations found in the said bullet are identical with and congruent to
those which he fired from the same Llama auto-pistol, and the pin marks at
the empty .32 caliber cartridges are identical with and congruent to that found
at an empty cartridge fired from the same pistol.
Mallillin was formerly a school teacher of Antatet and had resided there, but
on the date of the robbery he was living in a contiguous town, Cauayan. He
testified as follows: On the evening in question, while he was on his way
home, he saw four persons near a checkpoint, and as he passed by, two of
them got hold of him and a third snatched his pistol away and compelled him
to follow them. The four were later recognized by him to be the defendants
Balbino Gabuni, Juanito Dasig and Marcelino Dayao, and Sergio Eduardo.
They boarded a jeep, which was parked near the road and in which there
were two others whom Mallillin did not recognize, and then they drove to the
junction of the Cabatuan-Antatet roads. Here they all went down and walked
towards Antatet.
When the party was around 100 meters from the municipal building, he saw
his companions talking to Andres Bumanglag. Taking Bumanglag aside, he
informed the latter that he had been held up. Upon Mallillin' suggestion, his
companions asked Bumanglag how the house of Ramil could be entered, and
the latter answered that it could be done through a window near the well.
They also asked further information from him, and thereafter he was allowed
to go away, but with the warning that if he would squeal, he would be put to
death.
After Bumanglag had left, they went to a place around fifty meters from the
House of Ramil, the intended victim. Here they waited till about midnight
when they approached the house. Gabuni then ordered Mallillin to stay in a
place beside the road. Dasig and Eduardo then gave him their shoes for him
to keep, while the five, including the two unknown persons, approached the
house. Dasig and Eduardo entered the house through the window, while
Gabuni stayed at the door in front. Gabuni gave his carbine to Dayao and
Mallillin's Llama pistol to Dasig, while Eduardo held a .22 caliber pistol.
Five minutes after the three had gone up the house, Mallillin heard three
shots. Then he heard a voice calling for help. He got frightened, so he
hurriedly went away bound for Cauayan. While still in Antatet, he heard the
policemen of Antatet exchange shots with his companions. He arrived in
Cauayan at about one o'clock. At around 4:30 that morning, Sergio Eduardo
called at his house and asked for their shoes, and as he went away, he
warned Mallillin not to squeal, otherwise he would be killed. Mallillin asked for
his pistol and was informed that it was with Marcelino Dayao. That same
morning he went to Dayao and got it from the latter. Juanito Dasig also called
at his house that same morning, warning him that if he would squeal, he
would be in a bad fix, informing him further that their two companions, whom
Mallillin had not recognized, had gone to Manila to fetch some more of their
companions until they reach as many as twenty.
has shown such gross insensibility to the difference between right and
wrong, between truth and falsehood.
In the case of Godair vs. Ham National Bank, 80 N.E., 407, the Supreme
Court of Illinois made the following very illuminating expression of the scope
of the rule:
As to the second criticism, it has uniformly been held by this Court that
the maxim, "falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus," should only be applied in
cases where a witness has knowingly and willfully given false
testimony.Chittenden vs. Evans, 41 Ill. 251; City of Chicago vs. Smith,
48 Ill. 107; United States Express Co. vs. Hutchings, 58 Ill. 44; Pope
vs. Dodson, Id. 360; Guliher vs. People, 82 Ill. 145; Swan vs. People,
98 Ill. 610;Hoge vs. People, 117 Ill. 35, 6 N.E. 796; Freeman vs. Easly,
117 Ill. 317, 7 N.E. 856; Overtoom vs. Chicago & Eastern Illinois
Railroad Co., 181 Ill. 323, 54 N.E. 898; Matthews vs. Granger, 196 Ill.
164, 63 N.E. 658.
In City of Chicago vs. Smith, supra, on page 108 of 48 Ill., it was said:
"As to the eight instructions asked by the defendant and refused, we
are of opinion, under the authority of the case of Brenman vs. People,
15 Ill. 511, it should not have been given. There the court say it does
not follow, merely because a witness makes an untrue statement, that
his entire testimony is to be disregarded. This must depend on the
motive of the witness. If he intentionally swears falsely as to one
matter, the jury may properly reject his whole testimony as unworthy of
credit. But, if he makes a false statement through mistake or
misapprehension, they ought not to disregard his testimony altogether.
The maxim, 'falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus,' should only be applied in
cases where a witness wilfully and knowingly gives false testimony.
And in Pope vs. Dodson, supra, on page 365 of 58 Ill.: "The tenth
instruction in the series given for appellee is palpably erroneous. It told
the jury that, if the witness Lovely, "has sworn falsely in any material
statement," the jury might disregard her entire statement except so far
as it was corroborated. A witness cannot be discredited simply on the
ground of an erroneous statement. It is only where the statements of a
witness are willfully and corruptly false in contradicted on a material
point," then the jury had the right to disregard his whole testimony
positively state that the date when she went to attend Dasig's wife was
December 23, 1949. This date was included in the leading questions
propounded by counsel for appellants, where the date is insiduously joined
with another fact and witness' affirmative answer may refer to the more
important fact contained in the answer, not to the date. Thus, the first
question asked was as follows:
"Q: Do you remember having attended to the wife of Juanito Dasig
sometime or around December 23, 1949? A. yes, sir." (t.s.n., p.174)
The affirmative answer may well mean that she did actually attend, and may
not imply that she did so on December 23, 1949. Another question was:
Q. How many days previous to that trip of yours on December 24,
1949? Was it the day previous? A. Previous. (t.s.n. p. 176)
This question is a leading question. The witness also connects the night of
the robbery with a trip supposedly made by her with one Dr. Modales. But as
to this occasion of the trip, her answer as to the date is also ambiguous, thus:
Q. Do you remember the date of that trip of yours with Dr. Modales
when you left him in Antatet? A. It seems to me it was on December
24, 1949. (t.s.n., p. 175; Emphasis supplied)
On cross-examination, however, this witness testified that she never keeps a
record of the cases that she attends to every day, and on being asked what
cases she attended in December, 1949, she answered that she can not tell
unless she saw her record. Its date, therefore, December 23, 1949, was not
remembered by her but put into her mind by the leading questions of the
counsel. To convince the court that the attendance took place on December
23rd, it was necessary for her to have shown that that date appeared in the
record she kept.
The alibi presented by Gabuni is to the effect that on December 23, he and
Sergeant Tamani were together the whole day and evening, and during the
evening Gabuni stayed at home. That Gabuni and Sergeant Tamani should
stay in a barrio two kilometers away, on patrol, from nine in the morning to six
in the evening, of fully nine hours, is hard to understand. For them to spend
four more hours drinking and eating together in a restaurant, evidently without
their returning to their offices to report the results of their supposed mission, is
still harder to believe. But for them to eat again at the home of Gabuni, after
they had already eaten in a restaurant, is the height of improbability. Gabuni
must have been on vacation that day, not on duty. If Gabuni was really and
actually on patrol on hat day, why was not the police blotter submitted? But
even if the above story, improbable as it is, were assumed to be true, and his
claim that he was at his house at ten in the evening and woke up at six in the
morning, also true, it is still not impossible for him to have gone down the
house after ten o'clock in the evening to join the commission of the robbery,
and come back at home in time to be there and wake up at six o'clock in the
following morning.
Neither can the defense of alibi presented by appellant Marcelino Dayao
stand the test of careful scrutiny. That Dayao was with his witnesses on
certain days and on the occasions mentioned, in the case of witnesses
Silverio Anies and Jauna Molina on the presentation of the latter's claim, and
in the case of witness Daniel Yuson on the occasion of a night of gambling,
may be assumed to be true. But their assertion that it was on the precise
date, December 23, 1949, that they saw or were with Dayao is difficult to
believe. Human memory on dates or days is frail, and unless the day is an
extraordinary or unusual one for the witness, there is no reasonable
assurance of its correctness. Dayao's witnesses did not prove that some
extraordinary or unusual thing had happened on that day, that would have
made them remember it. As to Anies, the presentation of the claim is admitted
by him to be a common occurrence, such that he had to admit he can not
remember the dates when other similar applicants saw him. As to witness
Yuson, the playing of mahjong was also a common pastime. Neither Anies
nor Yuson presented any writing or book entry where the event or occasion
they mentioned took place. The trial court did not believe their testimony, and
we are unable to find that its conclusion is not borne out by human
experience.
Having found that sufficient admissible evidence, worthy of credit, has been
adduced to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendants-appellants
were the ones who perpetrated the robbery in question, and the evidence with
which they sought to prove their defenses of alibi having been found to be
unsatisfactory, we must affirm, as we hereby affirm, the judgment appealed
from, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.
Dulay, was sleeping in the second storey of the house with their two
children.[4]
Appellant arrived inside the house and said something to Rosalina. Appellant
who was carrying a long and straight bolo, suddenly hacked the sleeping
Lazaro. After hacking Lazaro, appellant went upstairs, awakened Urbano and
hacked him. Rosalina brought her two children to the corn field to
hide. Urbano later ran towards the corn field where he died due to his
wounds. Lazaro died inside the house.[5]
Dr. Armando Avena, Municipal Health Officer of Aringay, La Union, conducted
the autopsy on the remains of Urbano and prepared a Post-Mortem
Examination Report[6] stating that the cause of death of Urbano was the
massive loss of blood secondary to multiple hacked and stab wounds. The
weapon used in the killing of Urbano could have been a bolo which
penetrated six (6) centimeters (cm) and hit the heart. Another wound, a hack
wound, measuring seven (7) cms. in length was found at the right scapular
region with the depth of about three (3) cms. at the posterior aspect.
Dr. Avena also conducted the autopsy on Lazaro or Pertolino Dulay. He
prepared a Post-Mortem Examination Report[7] on the death of Lazaro stating
the following findings:
There is a wound hacked 14 cm. linear hitting the anterior neck down to the
left lower breast about 6 cm. in depth hitting the ribs and anterior lower
pillars.[8]
Accused-appellant had a different story. He testified that in the morning of
July 18, 1995, he was at his house in Sta. Cecilia, Aringay, La Union, repairing
its roof since 7:00 oclock.[9] At noon, he went to the house of Rosalina Dulay,
which was about 100 meters away, to have lunch.[10] He usually ate lunch at
Rosalinas house.[11] He reached the house at around 1:30 oclock in the
afternoon.[12] Rosalina was outside the house.[13] When accused-appellant
entered the house, he found the brothers, Urbano and Lazaro Dulay, hacking
each other with bolos.[14] Since Urbano, who was older, was being attacked by
the younger Lazaro, accused-appellant intervened to restrain the
latter.[15] While accused-appellant was pacifying Lazaro, Urbano was able to
run away.[16] Lazaro, however, turned to accused-appellant and hacked him
with the bolo five (5) times, hitting him in the head and on his left foot above the
notice,[32] and does not impair the witnesss credibility.[33] The pertinent excerpts
of Rosalinas testimony reveal that while her husbands relatives did threaten
her to take the witness stand, it was not for the purpose of falsely testifying
against the accused-appellant, viz:
Q. While you were in Tarlac, Tarlac you were visited by the relatives of
your husband, Urbano Dulay?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And they were asking you to testify against the accused Virgilio Lucena,
is that correct?
A. They did not tell that, sir.
Q. And when they visited you in Tarlac, Tarlac, what was then the reason
for their visit?
A. They delivered to me the subpoena, sir.
Q. And they asked you also to testify?
ATTY. CALOZA:
Already answered, Your Honor.
COURT:
Sustained.
ATTY. GAYMAN:
Is it not a fact that you were also threatened by them to come and testify
against Virgilio Lucena?
ATTY. CALOZA:
Objection. No basis, Your Honor.
COURT:
Witness may answer.
Yes, sir. They were threatening to kill me if I am going to testify on the
other party.
ATTY. CALOZA:
May we move to strike out the answer of the witness, on the other party,
Your Honor.
COURT:
Remain on record the answer of the witness, on the other party.
Q. Were the relatives of your husband threatening you to testify?
A. They were not telling me that, sir.[34]
Accused-appellant further contends that Rosalinas testimony as to his
having attacked Urbano many times was contrary to the medical findings. This
is likewise bereft of merit. On the contrary, her assertion is consistent with the
findings of Dr. Armando Avena that the cause of death was the massive loss
of blood secondary to multiple hacked wounds and stab wounds.[35] It must be
remembered in this regard that the detailed testimony of a witness in a murder
or homicide case acquires greater weight and credibility if it corresponds with
the autopsy report.[36]
So, too, must fall accused-appellants argument as to the alleged
inconsistency in Rosalinas testimony on direct examination that Lazaro Dulay
was near the table downstairs, which concededly conflicts with her claim on
cross-examination that he was sleeping on top of the table at the time he was
attacked by accused-appellant. While indeed these statements are
contradictory, the alleged conflict is more apparent than real and refers to minor
or trivial matters which, in fact, serve to strengthen rather than destroy the
credibility of a witness to a crime, especially so when the crime is, as in this
case, shocking to the conscience and numbing to the senses. [37]
These supposed inconsistencies hardly dent the credibility of Rosalina who
remained steadfast and unwavering in relating the principal occurrence and
positively identifying the accused-appellant as the assailant of the victims.[38] In
other words, as long as the mass of the testimony jibes on material points, the
slight clashing of statements dilute neither the witnesss credibility nor the
veracity of the testimony variations in the testimony of witnesses on the same
side in respect to minor, collateral or incidental matters do not impair the weight
of their united testimony to the prominent facts.[39]
For the foregoing considerations, accused-appellants argument with
regard to his supposed lack of motive to kill the victims becomes a moot
point. Suffice it to state in this regard that proof of ill motive to commit the crime
fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro's testimony, on August 10, 1995 the public
prosecutors filed an information for rape with homicide against Webb, et al. 1
The Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 274, presided over by
Judge Amelita G. Tolentino, tried only seven of the accused since Artemio
Ventura and Joey Filart remained at large.2 The prosecution presented Alfaro
as its main witness with the others corroborating her testimony. These
included the medico-legal officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims, the
security guards of Pitong Daan Subdivision, the former laundrywoman of the
Webbs household, police officer Biongs former girlfriend, and Lauro G.
Vizconde, Estrellitas husband.
For their part, some of the accused testified, denying any part in the crime
and saying they were elsewhere when it took place. Webbs alibi appeared
the strongest since he claimed that he was then across the ocean in the
United States of America. He presented the testimonies of witnesses as well
as documentary and object evidence to prove this. In addition, the defense
presented witnesses to show Alfaro's bad reputation for truth and the
incredible nature of her testimony.
But impressed by Alfaros detailed narration of the crime and the events
surrounding it, the trial court found a credible witness in her. It noted her
categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank testimony, undamaged
by grueling cross-examinations. The trial court remained unfazed by
significant discrepancies between Alfaros April 28 and May 22, 1995
affidavits, accepting her explanation that she at first wanted to protect her
former boyfriend, accused Estrada, and a relative, accused Gatchalian; that
no lawyer assisted her; that she did not trust the investigators who helped her
prepare her first affidavit; and that she felt unsure if she would get the support
and security she needed once she disclosed all about the Vizconde killings.
In contrast, the trial court thought little of the denials and alibis that Webb,
Lejano, Rodriguez, and Gatchalian set up for their defense. They paled,
according to the court, compared to Alfaros testimony that other witnesses
and the physical evidence corroborated. Thus, on January 4, 2000, after four
years of arduous hearings, the trial court rendered judgment, finding all the
accused guilty as charged and imposing on Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian,
Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez the penalty of reclusion perpetua and on
Biong, an indeterminate prison term of eleven years, four months, and one
day to twelve years. The trial court also awarded damages to Lauro
Vizconde.3
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision, modifying
the penalty imposed on Biong to six years minimum and twelve years
maximum and increasing the award of damages to Lauro Vizconde.4 The
appellate court did not agree that the accused were tried by publicity or that
the trial judge was biased. It found sufficient evidence of conspiracy that
rendered Rodriguez, Gatchalian, Fernandez, and Estrada equally guilty with
those who had a part in raping and killing Carmela and in executing her
mother and sister.
On motion for reconsideration by the accused, the Court of Appeals' Special
Division of five members voted three against two to deny the motion,5 hence,
the present appeal.
On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this case, the Court
issued a Resolution granting the request of Webb to submit for DNA analysis
the semen specimen taken from Carmelas cadaver, which specimen was
then believed still under the safekeeping of the NBI. The Court granted the
request pursuant to section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence6 to give the
accused and the prosecution access to scientific evidence that they might
want to avail themselves of, leading to a correct decision in the case.
Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the Court that it no longer
has custody of the specimen, the same having been turned over to the trial
court. The trial record shows, however, that the specimen was not among the
object evidence that the prosecution offered in evidence in the case.
This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit on
the ground that the governments failure to preserve such vital evidence has
resulted in the denial of his right to due process.
Issues Presented
Accused Webbs motion to acquit presents a threshold issue: whether or not
the Court should acquit him outright, given the governments failure to
produce the semen specimen that the NBI found on Carmelas cadaver, thus
depriving him of evidence that would prove his innocence.
In the main, all the accused raise the central issue of whether or not Webb,
acting in conspiracy with Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez,
Ventura, and Filart, raped and killed Carmela and put to death her mother and
sister. But, ultimately, the controlling issues are:
1. Whether or not Alfaros testimony as eyewitness, describing the
crime and identifying Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada,
Rodriguez, and two others as the persons who committed it, is entitled
to belief; and
2. Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi
and rebut Alfaros testimony that he led the others in committing the
crime.
The issue respecting accused Biong is whether or not he acted to cover up
the crime after its commission.
The Right to Acquittal
Due to Loss of DNA Evidence
Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland,7 that he is entitled to outright acquittal
on the ground of violation of his right to due process given the States failure
to produce on order of the Court either by negligence or willful suppression
the semen specimen taken from Carmela.
The medical evidence clearly established that Carmela was raped and,
consistent with this, semen specimen was found in her. It is true that Alfaro
identified Webb in her testimony as Carmelas rapist and killer but serious
questions had been raised about her credibility. At the very least, there exists
a possibility that Alfaro had lied. On the other hand, the semen specimen
taken from Carmela cannot possibly lie. It cannot be coached or allured by a
promise of reward or financial support. No two persons have the same DNA
fingerprint, with the exception of identical twins.8 If, on examination, the DNA
of the subject specimen does not belong to Webb, then he did not rape
Carmela. It is that simple. Thus, the Court would have been able to determine
that Alfaro committed perjury in saying that he did.
Still, Webb is not entitled to acquittal for the failure of the State to produce the
semen specimen at this late stage. For one thing, the ruling in Brady v.
Alfaros Story
The group had another shabu session at the parking lot. After sometime, they
drove back but only Alfaro proceeded to Vinzons Street where Carmela lived.
The Nissan Patrol and the Mazda pick-up, with their passengers, parked
somewhere along Aguirre Avenue. Carmela was at their garden. She
approached Alfaro on seeing her and told the latter that she (Carmela) had to
leave the house for a while. Carmela requested Alfaro to return before
midnight and she would leave the pedestrian gate, the iron grills that led to
the kitchen, and the kitchen door unlocked. Carmela also told Alfaro to blink
her cars headlights twice when she approached the pedestrian gate so
Carmela would know that she had arrived.
Based on the prosecutions version, culled from the decisions of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals, on June 29, 1991 at around 8:30 in the evening,
Jessica Alfaro drove her Mitsubishi Lancer, with boyfriend Peter Estrada as
passenger, to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center parking lot to buy shabu
from Artemio "Dong" Ventura. There, Ventura introduced her to his friends:
Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Miguel "Ging"
Alfaro returned to her car but waited for Carmela to drive out of the house in
her own car. Alfaro trailed Carmela up to Aguirre Avenue where she dropped
off a man whom Alfaro believed was Carmelas boyfriend. Alfaro looked for
her group, found them, and relayed Carmelas instructions to Webb. They
then all went back to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center. At the parking
lot, Alfaro told the group about her talk with Carmela. When she told Webb of
Carmelas male companion, Webbs mood changed for the rest of the
evening ("bad trip").
Webb gave out free cocaine. They all used it and some shabu, too. After
about 40 to 45 minutes, Webb decided that it was time for them to leave. He
said, "Pipilahan natin siya [Carmela] at ako ang mauuna." Lejano said, "Ako
ang susunod" and the others responded "Okay, okay." They all left the
parking lot in a convoy of three vehicles and drove into Pitong Daan
Subdivision for the third time. They arrived at Carmelas house shortly before
midnight.
Alfaro parked her car between Vizcondes house and the next. While waiting
for the others to alight from their cars, Fernandez approached Alfaro with a
suggestion that they blow up the transformer near the Vizcondes residence
to cause a brownout ("Pasabugin kaya natin ang transformer na ito"). But
Alfaro shrugged off the idea, telling Fernandez, "Malakas lang ang tama mo."
When Webb, Lejano, and Ventura were already before the house, Webb told
the others again that they would line up for Carmela but he would be the first.
The others replied, "O sige, dito lang kami, magbabantay lang kami."
Alfaro was the first to pass through the pedestrian gate that had been left
open. Webb, Lejano, and Ventura followed her. On entering the garage,
Ventura using a chair mounted the hood of the Vizcondes Nissan Sentra and
loosened the electric bulb over it ("para daw walang ilaw"). The small group
went through the open iron grill gate and passed the dirty kitchen. Carmela
opened the aluminum screen door of the kitchen for them. She and Webb
looked each other in the eyes for a moment and, together, headed for the
dining area.
As she lost sight of Carmela and Webb, Alfaro decided to go out. Lejano
asked her where she was going and she replied that she was going out to
smoke. As she eased her way out through the kitchen door, she saw Ventura
pulling out a kitchen drawer. Alfaro smoked a cigarette at the garden. After
about twenty minutes, she was surprised to hear a womans voice ask, "Sino
yan?" Alfaro immediately walked out of the garden to her car. She found her
other companions milling around it. Estrada who sat in the car asked her,
"Okay ba?"
After sitting in the car for about ten minutes, Alfaro returned to the Vizconde
house, using the same route. The interior of the house was dark but some
light filtered in from outside. In the kitchen, Alfaro saw Ventura searching a
ladys bag that lay on the dining table. When she asked him what he was
looking for, he said: "Ikaw na nga dito, maghanap ka ng susi." She asked him
what key he wanted and he replied: "Basta maghanap ka ng susi ng main
door pati na rin ng susi ng kotse." When she found a bunch of keys in the
bag, she tried them on the main door but none fitted the lock. She also did not
find the car key.
Unable to open the main door, Alfaro returned to the kitchen. While she was
at a spot leading to the dining area, she heard a static noise (like a television
that remained on after the station had signed off). Out of curiosity, she
approached the masters bedroom from where the noise came, opened the
door a little, and peeked inside. The unusual sound grew even louder. As she
walked in, she saw Webb on top of Carmela while she lay with her back on
the floor. Two bloodied bodies lay on the bed. Lejano was at the foot of the
bed about to wear his jacket. Carmela was gagged, moaning, and in tears
while Webb raped her, his bare buttocks exposed.
Webb gave Alfaro a meaningful look and she immediately left the room. She
met Ventura at the dining area. He told her, "Prepare an escape. Aalis na
tayo." Shocked with what she saw, Alfaro rushed out of the house to the
others who were either sitting in her car or milling on the sidewalk. She
entered her car and turned on the engine but she did not know where to go.
Webb, Lejano, and Ventura came out of the house just then. Webb suddenly
picked up a stone and threw it at the main door, breaking its glass frame.
As the three men approached the pedestrian gate, Webb told Ventura that he
forgot his jacket in the house. But Ventura told him that they could not get in
anymore as the iron grills had already locked. They all rode in their cars and
drove away until they reached Aguirre Avenue. As they got near an old hotel
at the Tropical Palace area, Alfaro noticed the Nissan Patrol slow down.
Someone threw something out of the car into the cogonal area.
The convoy of cars went to a large house with high walls, concrete fence,
steel gate, and a long driveway at BF Executive Village. They entered the
compound and gathered at the lawn where the "blaming session" took place.
It was here that Alfaro and those who remained outside the Vizconde house
learned of what happened. The first to be killed was Carmelas mother, then
Jennifer, and finally, Carmella. Ventura blamed Webb, telling him, "Bakit
naman pati yung bata?" Webb replied that the girl woke up and on seeing him
molesting Carmela, she jumped on him, bit his shoulders, and pulled his hair.
Webb got mad, grabbed the girl, pushed her to the wall, and repeatedly
stabbed her. Lejano excused himself at this point to use the telephone in the
house. Meanwhile, Webb called up someone on his cellular phone.
At around 2:00 in the morning, accused Gerardo Biong arrived. Webb ordered
him to go and clean up the Vizconde house and said to him, "Pera lang ang
katapat nyan." Biong answered, "Okay lang." Webb spoke to his companions
and told them, "We dont know each other. We havent seen each
otherbaka maulit yan." Alfaro and Estrada left and they drove to her fathers
house.12
Sacaguing showed interest. Alfaro promised to bring that someone to the NBI
to tell his story. When this did not happen and Sacaguing continued to press
her, she told him that she might as well assume the role of her informant.
Sacaguing testified thus:
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. Atty. Sacaguing, how did Jessica Alfaro become a witness in the
Vizconde murder case? Will you tell the Honorable Court?
xxxx
A. She told me. Your Honor, that she knew somebody who related to
her the circumstances, I mean, the details of the massacre of the
Vizconde family. Thats what she told me, Your Honor.
When Alfaro seemed unproductive for sometime, however, they teased her
about it and she was piqued. One day, she unexpectedly told Sacaguing that
she knew someone who had the real story behind the Vizconde massacre.
Q. Why not?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. Because Jessica Alfaro was never able to comply with her promise
to bring the man to me. She told me later that she could not and the
man does not like to testify.
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
WITNESS SACAGUING:
But was it possible for Alfaro to lie with such abundant details some of which
even tallied with the physical evidence at the scene of the crime? No doubt,
yes.
A. She told me, "easy lang kayo, Sir," if I may quote, "easy lang Sir,
huwag kayong"
Firstly, the Vizconde massacre had been reported in the media with dizzying
details. Everybody was talking about what the police found at the crime scene
and there were lots of speculations about them.
COURT:
How was that?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. "Easy lang, Sir. Sir, relax lang, Sir, papapelan ko, papapelan ko na
lang yan."
xxxx
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. All right, and what was your reaction when Ms. Alfaro stated that
"papapelan ko na lang yan?"
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. I said, "hindi puwede yan, kasi hindi ka naman eye witness."
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. And what was the reply of Ms. Alfaro?
Consequently, to explain the smashed door, Alfaro had to settle for claiming
that, on the way out of the house, Webb picked up some stone and, out of the
blue, hurled it at the glass-paneled front door of the Vizconde residence. His
action really made no sense. From Alfaros narration, Webb appeared rational
in his decisions. It was past midnight, the house was dark, and they wanted to
get away quickly to avoid detection. Hurling a stone at that glass door and
causing a tremendous noise was bizarre, like inviting the neighbors to come.
b. The crime scene showed that the house had been ransacked. The rejected
confessions of the Barroso "akyat-bahay" gang members said that they tried
to rob the house. To explain this physical evidence, Alfaro claimed that at one
point Ventura was pulling a kitchen drawer, and at another point, going
through a handbag on the dining table. He said he was looking for the frontdoor key and the car key.
Again, this portion of Alfaros story appears tortured to accommodate the
physical evidence of the ransacked house. She never mentioned Ventura
having taken some valuables with him when they left Carmelas house. And
why would Ventura rummage a bag on the table for the front-door key, spilling
the contents, when they had already gotten into the house. It is a story made
to fit in with the crime scene although robbery was supposedly not the reason
Webb and his companions entered that house.
c. It is the same thing with the garage light. The police investigators found that
the bulb had been loosened to turn off the light. The confessions of the
Barroso gang claimed that one of them climbed the parked cars hood to
reach up and darken that light. This made sense since they were going to rob
the place and they needed time to work in the dark trying to open the front
door. Some passersby might look in and see what they were doing.
Alfaro had to adjust her testimony to take into account that darkened garage
light. So she claimed that Ventura climbed the cars hood, using a chair, to
turn the light off. But, unlike the Barroso "akyat-bahay" gang, Webb and his
friends did not have anything to do in a darkened garage. They supposedly
knew in advance that Carmela left the doors to the kitchen open for them. It
did not make sense for Ventura to risk standing on the cars hood and be
seen in such an awkward position instead of going straight into the house.
And, thirdly, Alfaro was the NBIs star witness, their badge of excellent
investigative work.lavvphil After claiming that they had solved the crime of the
decade, the NBI people had a stake in making her sound credible and,
obviously, they gave her all the preparations she needed for the job of
becoming a fairly good substitute witness. She was their "darling" of an asset.
And this is not pure speculation. As pointed out above, Sacaguing of the NBI,
a lawyer and a ranking official, confirmed this to be a cold fact. Why the trial
court and the Court of Appeals failed to see this is mystifying.
At any rate, did Alfaro at least have a fine memory for faces that had a strong
effect on her, given the circumstances? Not likely. She named Miguel "Ging"
Rodriguez as one of the culprits in the Vizconde killings. But when the NBI
found a certain Michael Rodriguez, a drug dependent from the Bicutan
Rehabilitation Center, initially suspected to be Alfaros Miguel Rodriguez and
showed him to Alfaro at the NBI office, she ran berserk, slapping and kicking
Michael, exclaiming: "How can I forget your face. We just saw each other in a
disco one month ago and you told me then that you will kill me." As it turned
out, he was not Miguel Rodriguez, the accused in this case.13
Two possibilities exist: Michael was really the one Alfaro wanted to implicate
to settle some score with him but it was too late to change the name she
already gave or she had myopic vision, tagging the wrong people for what
they did not do.
3. The quality of the testimony
There is another thing about a lying witness: her story lacks sense or suffers
from inherent inconsistencies. An understanding of the nature of things and
the common behavior of people will help expose a lie. And it has an abundant
presence in this case.
One. In her desire to implicate Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez,
and Filart, who were supposed to be Webbs co-principals in the crime, Alfaro
made it a point to testify that Webb proposed twice to his friends the gangrape of Carmela who had hurt him. And twice, they (including, if one believes
Alfaro, her own boyfriend Estrada) agreed in a chorus to his proposal. But
when they got to Carmelas house, only Webb, Lejano, Ventura, and Alfaro
entered the house.
her house? It made no sense. It would only make sense if Alfaro wanted to
feign being a witness to something she did not see.
Five. Alfaro went out of the house to smoke at the garden. After about twenty
minutes, a woman exclaimed, "Sino yan?" On hearing this, Alfaro immediately
walked out of the garden and went to her car. Apparently, she did this
because she knew they came on a sly. Someone other than Carmela became
conscious of the presence of Webb and others in the house. Alfaro walked
away because, obviously, she did not want to get involved in a potential
confrontation. This was supposedly her frame of mind: fear of getting involved
in what was not her business.
But if that were the case, how could she testify based on personal knowledge
of what went on in the house? Alfaro had to change that frame of mind to one
of boldness and reckless curiosity. So that is what she next claimed. She
went back into the house to watch as Webb raped Carmela on the floor of the
masters bedroom. He had apparently stabbed to death Carmelas mom and
her young sister whose bloodied bodies were sprawled on the bed. Now,
Alfaro testified that she got scared (another shift to fear) for she hurriedly got
out of the house after Webb supposedly gave her a meaningful look.
Alfaro quickly went to her car, not minding Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada,
Rodriguez, and Filart who sat on the car or milled on the sidewalk. She did
not speak to them, even to Estrada, her boyfriend. She entered her car and
turned on the engine but she testified that she did not know where to go. This
woman who a few minutes back led Webb, Lejano, and Ventura into the
house, knowing that they were decided to rape and harm Carmela, was
suddenly too shocked to know where to go! This emotional pendulum swing
indicates a witness who was confused with her own lies.
4. The supposed corroborations
Intending to provide corroboration to Alfaros testimony, the prosecution
presented six additional witnesses:
Dr. Prospero A. Cabanayan, the NBI Medico-Legal Officer who autopsied
the bodies of the victims, testified on the stab wounds they sustained14 and
the presence of semen in Carmelas genitalia,15 indicating that she had been
raped.
Normal E. White, Jr., was the security guard on duty at Pitong Daan
Subdivision from 7 p.m. of June 29 to 7 a.m. of June 30, 1991. He got a
report on the morning of June 30 that something untoward happened at the
Vizconde residence. He went there and saw the dead bodies in the masters
bedroom, the bag on the dining table, as well as the loud noise emanating
from a television set.16
White claimed that he noticed Gatchalian and his companions, none of whom
he could identify, go in and out of Pitong Daan Subdivision. He also saw them
along Vinzons Street. Later, they entered Pitong Daan Subdivision in a threecar convoy. White could not, however, describe the kind of vehicles they used
or recall the time when he saw the group in those two instances. And he did
not notice anything suspicious about their coming and going.
Cabanacan testified that, at this point, Webb introduced himself as the son of
Congressman Webb. Still, the supervisor insisted on seeing his ID. Webb
grudgingly gave it and after seeing the picture and the name on it, Cabanacan
returned the same and allowed Webb to pass without being logged in as their
Standard Operating Procedure required.18
But Whites testimony cannot be relied on. His initial claim turned out to be
inaccurate. He actually saw Gatchalian and his group enter the Pitong Daan
Subdivision only once. They were not going in and out. Furthermore, Alfaro
testified that when the convoy of cars went back the second time in the
direction of Carmelas house, she alone entered the subdivision and passed
the guardhouse without stopping. Yet, White who supposedly manned that
guardhouse did not notice her.
Surprisingly, White failed to note Biong, a police officer, entering or exiting the
subdivision on the early morning of June 30 when he supposedly "cleaned
up" Vizconde residence on Webbs orders. What is more, White did not notice
Carmela arrive with her mom before Alfaros first visit that night. Carmela
supposedly left with a male companion in her car at around 10:30 p.m. but
White did not notice it. He also did not notice Carmela reenter the subdivision.
White actually discredited Alfaros testimony about the movements of the
persons involved.
Further, while Alfaro testified that it was the Mazda pick-up driven by Filart
that led the three-vehicle convoy,17White claimed it was the Nissan Patrol with
Gatchalian on it that led the convoy since he would not have let the convoy in
without ascertaining that Gatchalian, a resident, was in it. Security guard
White did not, therefore, provide corroboration to Alfaros testimony.1avvphi1
Justo Cabanacan, the security supervisor at Pitong Daan Subdivision
testified that he saw Webb around the last week of May or the first week of
But Cabanacan's testimony could not be relied on. Although it was not
common for a security guard to challenge a Congressmans son with such
vehemence, Cabanacan did not log the incident on the guardhouse book. Nor
did he, contrary to prescribed procedure, record the visitors entry into the
subdivision. It did not make sense that Cabanacan was strict in the matter of
seeing Webbs ID but not in recording the visit.
Mila Gaviola used to work as laundry woman for the Webbs at their house at
BF Homes Executive Village. She testified that she saw Webb at his parents
house on the morning of June 30, 1991 when she got the dirty clothes from
the room that he and two brothers occupied at about 4.a.m. She saw him
again pacing the floor at 9 a.m. At about 1 p.m., Webb left the house in t-shirt
and shorts, passing through a secret door near the maids quarters on the
way out. Finally, she saw Webb at 4 p.m. of the same day.19
On cross-examination, however, Gaviola could not say what distinguished
June 30, 1991 from the other days she was on service at the Webb
household as to enable her to distinctly remember, four years later, what one
of the Webb boys did and at what time. She could not remember any of the
details that happened in the household on the other days. She proved to have
a selective photographic memory and this only damaged her testimony.
Gaviola tried to corroborate Alfaro's testimony by claiming that on June 30,
1991 she noticed bloodstains on Webb's t-shirt.20 She did not call the
attention of anybody in the household about it when it would have been a
point of concern that Webb may have been hurt, hence the blood.
Besides, Victoria Ventoso, the Webbs' housemaid from March 1989 to May
1992, and Sgt. Miguel Muoz, the Webbs' security aide in 1991, testified that
Gaviola worked for the Webbs only from January 1991 to April 1991. Ventoso
further testified that it was not Gaviola's duty to collect the clothes from the
2nd floor bedrooms, this being the work of the housemaid charged with
cleaning the rooms.
What is more, it was most unlikely for a laundrywoman who had been there
for only four months to collect, as she claimed, the laundry from the rooms of
her employers and their grown up children at four in the morning while they
were asleep.
And it did not make sense, if Alfaros testimony were to be believed that
Webb, who was so careful and clever that he called Biong to go to the
Vizconde residence at 2 a.m. to clean up the evidence against him and his
group, would bring his bloodied shirt home and put it in the hamper for
laundrywoman Gaviola to collect and wash at 4 a.m. as was her supposed
habit.
Lolita De Birrer was accused Biongs girlfriend around the time the Vizconde
massacre took place. Birrer testified that she was with Biong playing mahjong
from the evening of June 29, 1991 to the early morning of June 30, when
Biong got a call at around 2 a.m. This prompted him, according to De Birrer,
to leave and go to BF. Someone sitting at the backseat of a taxi picked him
up. When Biong returned at 7 a.m. he washed off what looked like dried blood
from his fingernails. And he threw away a foul-smelling handkerchief. She
also saw Biong take out a knife with aluminum cover from his drawer and hid
it in his steel cabinet.21
The security guard at Pitong Daan did not notice any police investigator
flashing a badge to get into the village although Biong supposedly came in at
the unholy hour of two in the morning. His departure before 7 a.m. also
remained unnoticed by the subdivision guards. Besides, if he had cleaned up
the crime scene shortly after midnight, what was the point of his returning
there on the following morning to dispose of some of the evidence in the
presence of other police investigators and on-lookers? In fact, why would he
steal valuable items from the Vizconde residence on his return there hours
later if he had the opportunity to do it earlier?
At most, Birrers testimony only established Biongs theft of certain items from
the Vizconde residence and gross neglect for failing to maintain the sanctity
of the crime scene by moving around and altering the effects of the crime.
Birrers testimony failed to connect Biong's acts to Webb and the other
accused.
Lauro Vizconde testified about how deeply he was affected by the loss of her
wife and two daughters. Carmella spoke to him of a rejected suitor she called
"Bagyo," because he was a Paraaque politicians son. Unfortunately, Lauro
did not appear curious enough to insist on finding out who the rejected fellow
was. Besides, his testimony contradicts that of Alfaro who testified that
Carmela and Webb had an on-going relation. Indeed, if Alfaro were to be
believed, Carmela wanted Webb to come to her house around midnight. She
even left the kitchen door open so he could enter the house.
5. The missing corroboration
There is something truly remarkable about this case: the prosecutions core
theory that Carmela and Webb had been sweethearts, that she had been
unfaithful to him, and that it was for this reason that Webb brought his friends
to her house to gang-rape her is totally uncorroborated!
For instance, normally, if Webb, a Congressmans son, courted the young
Carmela, that would be news among her circle of friends if not around town.
But, here, none of her friends or even those who knew either of them came
forward to affirm this. And if Webb hanged around with her, trying to win her
favors, he would surely be seen with her. And this would all the more be so if
they had become sweethearts, a relation that Alfaro tried to project with her
testimony.
But, except for Alfaro, the NBI asset, no one among Carmelas friends or her
friends friends would testify ever hearing of such relationship or ever seeing
them together in some popular hangouts in Paraaque or Makati. Alfaros
claim of a five-hour drama is like an alien page, rudely and unconnectedly
inserted into Webb and Carmelas life stories or like a piece of jigsaw puzzle
trimmed to fit into the shape on the board but does not belong because it
clashes with the surrounding pieces. It has neither antecedent nor
concomitant support in the verifiable facts of their personal histories. It is quite
unreal.
What is more, Alfaro testified that she saw Carmela drive out of her house
with a male passenger, Mr. X, whom Alfaro thought the way it looked was
also Carmelas lover. This was the all-important reason Webb supposedly
had for wanting to harm her. Again, none of Carmelas relatives, friends, or
people who knew her ever testified about the existence of Mr.X in her life.
Nobody has come forward to testify having ever seen him with Carmela. And
despite the gruesome news about her death and how Mr. X had played a role
in it, he never presented himself like anyone who had lost a special friend
normally would. Obviously, Mr. X did not exist, a mere ghost of the
imagination of Alfaro, the woman who made a living informing on criminals.
On arrival at San Francisco, Webb went through the U.S. Immigration where
his entry into that country was recorded. Thus, the U.S. Immigration
Naturalization Service, checking with its Non-immigrant Information System,
confirmed Webb's entry into the U.S. on March 9, 1991. Webb presented at
the trial the INS Certification issued by the U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service,28 the computer-generated print-out of the US-INS
indicating Webb's entry on March 9, 1991,29 and the US-INS Certification
dated August 31, 1995, authenticated by the Philippine Department of
Foreign Affairs, correcting an earlier August 10, 1995 Certification.30
Webb claims that in 1991 his parents, Senator Freddie Webb and his wife,
Elizabeth, sent their son to the United States (U.S.) to learn the value of
independence, hard work, and money.22 Gloria Webb, his aunt, accompanied
him. Rajah Tours booked their flight to San Francisco via United Airlines.
Josefina Nolasco of Rajah Tours confirmed that Webb and his aunt used their
plane tickets.
In San Francisco, Webb and his aunt Gloria were met by the latters daughter,
Maria Teresa Keame, who brought them to Glorias house in Daly City,
California. During his stay with his aunt, Webb met Christopher Paul Legaspi
Esguerra, Glorias grandson. In April 1991, Webb, Christopher, and a certain
Daphne Domingo watched the concert of Deelite Band in San Francisco.31 In
the same month, Dorothy Wheelock and her family invited Webb to Lake
Tahoe to return the Webbs hospitality when she was in the Philippines. 32
Webb told his friends, including his neighbor, Jennifer Claire Cabrera, and his
basketball buddy, Joselito Orendain Escobar, of his travel plans. He even
invited them to his despedida party on March 8, 1991 at Faces Disco along
Makati Ave.23 On March 8,1991, the eve of his departure, he took girlfriend
Milagros Castillo to a dinner at Bunchums at the Makati Cinema Square. His
basketball buddy Rafael Jose with Tina Calma, a blind date arranged by
Webb, joined them. They afterwards went to Faces Disco for Webb's
despedida party. Among those present were his friends Paulo Santos and Jay
Ortega.24
On June 28, 1991, Webbs parents visited him at Anaheim and stayed with
the Brottmans. On the same day, his father introduced Honesto Aragon to his
son when he came to visit.40 On the following day, June 29, Webb, in the
company of his father and Aragon went to Riverside, California, to look for a
car. They bought an MR2 Toyota car.41 Later that day, a visitor at the
Brottmans, Louis Whittacker, saw Webb looking at the plates of his new
Here, as already fully discussed above, Alfaro and her testimony fail to meet
the above criteria.
nonetheless returned to become the lone witness to a grim scene is also quite
inexplicable.
She did not show up at the NBI as a spontaneous witness bothered by her
conscience. She had been hanging around that agency for sometime as a
stool pigeon, one paid for mixing up with criminals and squealing on them.
Police assets are often criminals themselves. She was the prosecutions
worst possible choice for a witness. Indeed, her superior testified that she
volunteered to play the role of a witness in the Vizconde killings when she
could not produce a man she promised to the NBI.
And, although her testimony included details, Alfaro had prior access to the
details that the investigators knew of the case. She took advantage of her
familiarity with these details to include in her testimony the clearly
incompatible act of Webb hurling a stone at the front door glass frames even
when they were trying to slip away quietlyjust so she can accommodate this
crime scene feature. She also had Ventura rummaging a bag on the dining
table for a front door key that nobody needed just to explain the physical
evidence of that bag and its scattered contents. And she had Ventura
climbing the cars hood, risking being seen in such an awkward position,
when they did not need to darken the garage to force open the front door
just so to explain the darkened light and foot prints on the car hood.
Further, her testimony was inherently incredible. Her story that Gatchalian,
Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart agreed to take their turns raping
Carmela is incongruent with their indifference, exemplified by remaining
outside the house, milling under a street light, visible to neighbors and
passersby, and showing no interest in the developments inside the house,
like if it was their turn to rape Carmela. Alfaros story that she agreed to serve
as Webbs messenger to Carmela, using up her gas, and staying with him till
the bizarre end when they were practically strangers, also taxes incredulity.
To provide basis for Webbs outrage, Alfaro said that she followed Carmela to
the main road to watch her let off a lover on Aguirre Avenue. And,
inexplicably, although Alfaro had only played the role of messenger, she
claimed leading Webb, Lejano, and Ventura into the house to gang-rape
Carmella, as if Alfaro was establishing a reason for later on testifying on
personal knowledge. Her swing from an emotion of fear when a woman woke
up to their presence in the house and of absolute courage when she
f. A documented alibi
To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory
evidence57 that (a) he was present at another place at the time of the
perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to
be at the scene of the crime.58
The courts below held that, despite his evidence, Webb was actually in
Paraaque when the Vizconde killings took place; he was not in the U.S. from
March 9, 1991 to October 27, 1992; and if he did leave on March 9, 1991, he
actually returned before June 29, 1991, committed the crime, erased the fact
of his return to the Philippines from the records of the U.S. and Philippine
Immigrations, smuggled himself out of the Philippines and into the U.S., and
returned the normal way on October 27, 1992. But this ruling practically
makes the death of Webb and his passage into the next life the only
acceptable alibi in the Philippines. Courts must abandon this unjust and
inhuman paradigm.
If one is cynical about the Philippine system, he could probably claim that
Webb, with his fathers connections, can arrange for the local immigration to
put a March 9, 1991 departure stamp on his passport and an October 27,
1992 arrival stamp on the same. But this is pure speculation since there had
been no indication that such arrangement was made. Besides, how could
Webb fix a foreign airlines passenger manifest, officially filed in the
Philippines and at the airport in the U.S. that had his name on them? How
could Webb fix with the U.S. Immigrations record system those two dates in
its record of his travels as well as the dates when he supposedly departed in
secret from the U.S. to commit the crime in the Philippines and then return
there? No one has come up with a logical and plausible answer to these
questions.
The Court of Appeals rejected the evidence of Webbs passport since he did
not leave the original to be attached to the record. But, while the best
evidence of a document is the original, this means that the same is exhibited
in court for the adverse party to examine and for the judge to see. As Court of
Appeals Justice Tagle said in his dissent,59 the practice when a party does
not want to leave an important document with the trial court is to have a
photocopy of it marked as exhibit and stipulated among the parties as a
faithful reproduction of the original. Stipulations in the course of trial are
binding on the parties and on the court.
The U.S. Immigration certification and the computer print-out of Webbs
arrival in and departure from that country were authenticated by no less than
the Office of the U.S. Attorney General and the State Department. Still the
Court of Appeals refused to accept these documents for the reason that
Webb failed to present in court the immigration official who prepared the
same. But this was unnecessary. Webbs passport is a document issued by
the Philippine government, which under international practice, is the official
record of travels of the citizen to whom it is issued. The entries in that
passport are presumed true.60
The U.S. Immigration certification and computer print-out, the official
certifications of which have been authenticated by the Philippine Department
of Foreign Affairs, merely validated the arrival and departure stamps of the
U.S. Immigration office on Webbs passport. They have the same evidentiary
value. The officers who issued these certifications need not be presented in
court to testify on them. Their trustworthiness arises from the sense of official
duty and the penalty attached to a breached duty, in the routine and
disinterested origin of such statement and in the publicity of the record. 61
The Court of Appeals of course makes capital of the fact that an earlier
certification from the U.S. Immigration office said that it had no record of
Webb entering the U.S. But that erroneous first certification was amply
explained by the U.S. Government and Court of Appeals Justice Tagle stated
it in his dissenting opinion, thus:
While it is true that an earlier Certification was issued by the U.S. INS on
August 16, 1995 finding "no evidence of lawful admission of Webb," this was
already clarified and deemed erroneous by no less than the US INS Officials.
As explained by witness Leo Herrera-Lim, Consul and Second Secretary of
the Philippine Embassy in Washington D.C., said Certification did not pass
through proper diplomatic channels and was obtained in violation of the rules
on protocol and standard procedure governing such request.
The initial request was merely initiated by BID Commissioner Verceles who
directly communicated with the Philippine Consulate in San Francisco, USA,
bypassing the Secretary of Foreign Affairs which is the proper protocol
procedure. Mr. Steven Bucher, the acting Chief of the Records Services
Board of US-INS Washington D.C. in his letter addressed to Philip Antweiler,
Philippine Desk Officer, State Department, declared the earlier Certification
as incorrect and erroneous as it was "not exhaustive and did not reflect all
available information." Also, Richard L. Huff, Co-Director of the Office of
Information and privacy, US Department of Justice, in response to the appeal
raised by Consul General Teresita V. Marzan, explained that "the INS
normally does not maintain records on individuals who are entering the
country as visitors rather than as immigrants: and that a notation concerning
the entry of a visitor may be made at the Nonimmigrant Information system.
Since appellant Webb entered the U.S. on a mere tourist visa, obviously, the
initial search could not have produced the desired result inasmuch as the
data base that was looked into contained entries of the names of
IMMIGRANTS and not that of NON-IMMIGRANT visitors of the U.S..62
The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed marked cynicism over the
accuracy of travel documents like the passport as well as the domestic and
foreign records of departures and arrivals from airports. They claim that it
would not have been impossible for Webb to secretly return to the Philippines
after he supposedly left it on March 9, 1991, commit the crime, go back to the
U.S., and openly return to the Philippines again on October 26, 1992. Travel
between the U.S. and the Philippines, said the lower courts took only about
twelve to fourteen hours.
If the Court were to subscribe to this extremely skeptical view, it might as well
tear the rules of evidence out of the law books and regard suspicions,
surmises, or speculations as reasons for impeaching evidence. It is not that
official records, which carry the presumption of truth of what they state, are
immune to attack. They are not. That presumption can be overcome by
evidence. Here, however, the prosecution did not bother to present evidence
to impeach the entries in Webbs passport and the certifications of the
Philippine and U.S. immigration services regarding his travel to the U.S. and
back. The prosecutions rebuttal evidence is the fear of the unknown that it
planted in the lower courts minds.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE vs. WEBB
Abad, J.:
CASE:
On June 30, 1991, Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela and
Jennifer were brutally murdered in their home in Paraaque. In an intense
investigation, a group of suspects were initially arrested by the police, but
were eventually discharged due to suspicions of frame up. Later in 1995, The
National Bureau of Investigation announced the resolution of the crime as
they presented a star witness Jessica M. Alfaro who pointed at the accused
(herein appellants) Webb et.al. as the main culprits. She also included police
officer Gerardo Biong as an accessory to the crime. Relying on Alfaros
testimony, information for rape with homicide was filed by the public
prosecutors against appellants.
On April 20, 2010, the Court granted the request of Webb to submit
the semen specimen taken from Carmelas cadaver on DNA analysis,
believing it is under the safekeeping of the NBI. The NBI, however, denied
that the specimen is under their custody and that it was turned over to the trial
court. The trial court on the other hand, denied the claim that the specimen
was under their care. This prompted Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit
denying Webb of his right to due process.
3.) WON Webbs evidences are proven sufficient enough to rebut Alfaros
testimony? NO.
4.) WON Biong acted to cover up the crime after its commission, thus making
himself an accessory to the crime? NO.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SET ASIDE the Decision dated
December 15, 2005 and Resolution dated January 26, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 0336 and Acquits accused-appellants Hubert
Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez,
Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada and Gerardo Biong of the crimes of which
they were charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their guild beyond
reasonable doubt. They are ordered immediately RELEASEDfrom detention
unless they are confined for another lawful cause.
1.)
2.)
ISSUE/HELD:
1.) Whether or not Webb was indeed denied of due process on the premise
that the semen specimen was lost under the care of the government and
must immediately be acquitted? NO.
officers one day teased her about being dormant, she became piqued
and suddenly claimed that she know someone who knows about the
massacre. But when the said someone was not presented, she told
Sacaguing that she might as well assume the role of her informant.
Alfraro never refuted such testimony. It is possible for Alfaro to lie even
with such intricate details, given that she practically lived in the NBI
office. Moreover, the media is all over the case that everything is
thoroughly reported. Generally, her story lacks sense or suffers from
inherent inconsistencies.
3.)
Among the accused, it was Webb who presented the strongest alibi.
His travel preparations were confirmed by Rajah Tours and the
Philippine immigration, confirming that he indeed left for San
Francisco, California with his Aunt Gloria on March 9, 1991 on board
United Airlines Flight 808. His passport was stamped and his name
was listed on the United Airlines Flights Passenger Manifest. Upon
reaching US, the US Immigration recorded his entry to the country.
Moreover, details of his stay there, including his logs and paychecks
when he worked, documents when he purchased a car and his license
are presented as additional evidence, and he left for Philippines on
October 26, 1992. Supreme Court accused the trial and court of
appeals as having a mind that is made cynical by the rule drilled into
his head that a defense of alibi is a hangmans noose in the faces of a
witness sweaking I saw him do it. A judge, according to the SC, must
keep an open mind, and must guard against slipping into hasty
conclusion arising from a desire to quickly finish the job of deciding a
case. For positive identification to be credible, two criteria must be met;
1.) the positive identification of the offender must come from a credible
witness 2.) the witness story of what she personally saw must be
believable, not inherently contrived. For alibi to be credible and
established on the other hand, it must be positive, clear, and
documented. It must show that it was physically impossible for him to
be at the scene of the crime. Webb was able to establish his alibis
credibility with his documents. It is impossible for Webb, despite his so
called power and connections to fix a foreign airlines passenger
manifest. Webbs departure and arrival were authenticated by the
Office of the USAttorney General and the State Department.
PER CURIAM:
Most jurisdictions recognize age as a barrier to having full responsibility over
ones action.1 Our legal system, for instance, does not punish a youth as it
would an adult, and it sees youthful misconduct as evidence of unreasoned or
impaired judgment. Thus, in a myriad of cases, we have applied the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority embodied in Article 68 of the Revised
Penal Code -- the rationale of which is to show mercy and some extent of
leniency in favor of an accused who, by reason of his age, is presumed to
have acted with less discernment. The case at bar is another instance when
the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority must apply.
For our resolution is the motion for reconsideration2 filed by brothers James
Anthony and James Andrew, both surnamed Uy, praying for the reduction of
the penalties we imposed upon the latter on the ground that he was a minor
at the time the crimes were committed.
A brief review of the pertinent facts is imperative.
On February 3, 2004, we rendered a Decision3 convicting the Uy brothers,
together with Francisco Juan Larraaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan,
Alberto Cao and Ariel Balansag of the crimes of (a) special complex crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape;
and (b) simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu City
in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU 45303 and 45304 is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN
LARRAAGA alias PACO; JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN
ADLAWAN alias WESLEY; ALBERTO CAO alias ALLAN
PAHAK; ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias MM,
are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime
of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape and
are sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH by lethal injection;
(2) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN
LARRAAGA alias PACO; JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN
ADLAWAN alias WESLEY; ALBERTO CAO alias ALLAN
PAHAK; ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias MM,
are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple kidnapping and
serious illegal detention and are sentenced to suffer the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA;
submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and the death
penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
In accordance with Article 83 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 25 of RA No. 7659, upon the finality of this Decision let the records of
this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for the possible
exercise of Her Excellencys pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
On March 23, 2004, the Uy brothers filed a motion for reconsideration
anchored on the following grounds:
I
ACCUSED JAMES ANDREW S. UY WAS, LIKE HIS YOUNGER BROTHER
JAMES ANTHONY S. UY, A MINOR AT THE TIME THE OFFENSES AT
BAR ALLEGEDLY HAPPENED LAST JULY 16, 1997;
II
THE IDENTITY OF THE DEAD BODY OF THE WOMAN FOUND IN TANAWAN, CARCAR, CEBU LAST JULY 18, 1997 WAS NEVER
CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHED THUS THE NEED FOR ITS
EXHUMATION FOR DNA TESTING.4
The issues raised in the above motion being intertwined with those raised by
Larraaga, Aznar, Adlawan, Cao and Balansag in their separate motions for
reconsideration, we deemed it appropriate to consolidate the motions. After a
painstaking evaluation of every piece and specie of evidence presented
before the trial court in response to the movants plea for the reversal of their
conviction, still we are convinced that the movants guilt has been proved
beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, in our Resolution dated July 21, 2005, we
denied all the motions. However, left unresolved is the issue of James
Andrews minority.
Hence, this disquisition.
Three (3) Justices of the Court maintain their position that RA 7659 is
unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they
In their motion, the Uy brothers claim that James Andrew was only seventeen
(17) years and two hundred sixty two (262) days old at the time the crimes
were committed. To substantiate such claim, he begs leave and pleads that
we admit at this stage of the proceedings his (1) Certificate of Live Birth
issued by the National Statistics Office, and (2) Baptismal Certificate. In the
ultimate, he prays that his penalty be reduced, as in the case of his brother
James Anthony.
Considering that the entry of James Andrews birth in the proffered Certificate
of Live Birth is not legible, we required the Solicitor General (a) to secure from
the City Civil Registrar of Cotobato, as well as the National Statistics Office, a
clear and legible copy of James Certificate of Live Birth, and thereafter, (b) to
file an extensive comment on the Uy brothers motion, solely on the issue of
James Andrews minority.
On November 17, 2005, the Solicitor General submitted his
comment.1wphi1 Attached therewith are clear and legible copies of James
Certificate of Live Birth duly certified by the Office of the City Civil Registrar of
Cotobato and the National Statistics Office. Both documents bear the entry
October 27, 1979 as the date of his birth, thus, showing that he was indeed
only 17 years and 262 days old when the crimes were committed on July 16,
1997.
Consequently, the Solicitor General recommended that the penalty imposed
on James Andrew be modified as follows:
In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303 for the special complex crime of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape, the death penalty should
be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
In Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, for the crime of simple kidnapping and
serious illegal detention, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be reduced
to twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
maximum, similar to the penalty imposed on his brother James Anthony in
Criminal Case No. CBU-45303.
The motion is meritorious.
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty
next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the
proper period.
Thus, the imposable penalty on James Andrew, by reason of his minority, is
one degree lower than the statutory penalty. The penalty for the special
complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and
rape, being death, one degree lower therefrom is reclusion perpetua.5 On the
other hand, the penalty for simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention
is reclusion perpetua to death. One degree lower therefrom is reclusion
temporal.6 There being no aggravating and mitigating circumstance, the
penalty to be imposed on James Andrew is reclusion temporal in its medium
period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should be sentenced to
suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period,
as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium
period, as maximum.7
Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua should be imposed upon James Andrew; while in Criminal Case No.
CBU-45304, the imposable penalty upon him is twelve (12) years of prision
mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of
reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. Our
Decision dated February 3, 2004 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
in Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, James Andrew Uy is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua; while in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, the
penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as
MINIMUM, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium
period, as maximum. SO ORDERED.
RELOVA, J.:
Charged and convicted of the crime of murder by the then Court of First
Instance of Palawan the two (2) accused, Adriano Caete and Jose Bilog,
were both sentenced to the maximum penalty of death and to pay jointly and
severally the heirs of the deceased, Douglas Bilog, in the sum of P12,000.00
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay proportional
costs.
The People's version of the facts is as follows:
Accused Jose Bilog and Douglas Bilog were brothers. They
were owners of adjoining ricelands adjacent to the InagawanSub Colony at Puerto Princess, Palawan (p. 10, tsn, Jan. 4,
1973, Anonas). They were not in good terms and always
quarrelled because Jose resented the fact that Douglas has
received a bigger share of the lands inherited from their parents.
(pp. 12, 20, tsn., Anonas).
The ire of Jose against his brother became unbearable that on
or about April 28, 1971, he got his father's shotgun and waylaid
Douglas at the bridge leading their house. A tragic incident was
averted only when Concepcion the wife of Douglas, informed
her uncle, Cervancia, of Jose's evil scheme. Cervancia
immediately went after Jose and succeeded in retrieving the
gun from the latter and tried to settle their differences (p. 10, tsn,
Anonas).
On the other hand, appellant Jose Bilog claims that the lower court erred (1)
in giving credit to the testimony of prosecution witness Antonio Cabig,
notwithstanding that said witness is "known to be a confirmed degenerate and
an admitted perjurer"; (2) in disregarding his defense of alibi; and (3) in not
acquitting him on reasonable doubt.
WITNESS:
The contention is utterly without merit. The findings of the trial court is entitled
to great weight that Caete's retraction was merely a last minute effort at
exculpation, considering that his extra-judicial confession, Exhibit "C", given in
April 1972, was freely and voluntarily given. The fact is, there was no
evidence presented that said confession was obtained as a result of violence,
torture, intimidation or promise of reward or leniency, nor that the
FISCAL DILIG:
A Caete.
Q By whom?
A Yes, sir.
Q You said that Douglas Bilog was hit by Adriano
Caete. What instrument did Caete stab
Douglas?
A Yes, sir.
A At the left side and on the breast.
FISCAL DILIG:
Q In what part of the body of Douglas Bilog was
hit?
A At the back of the body and here at the front.
Q After Boy Bilog hit his brother Douglas, do you
know what happened to the knife marked as Exh.
"B"?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened to that weapon marked as Exh.
"B"?
A Yes, sir.
commission of the crime and this affects not only the person who received the
money or the reward but also the person who gave it. (People vs. Talledo, 58
Phil. 539).
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED but, for lack of
necessary votes, the sentence is modified in that both appellants shall each
suffer Reclusion Perpetua only, and shall indemnify, jointly and severally, the
heirs of Douglas Bilog in the sum of P30,000.00. Costs against both
appellants.
SO ORDERED.
The Case
Decision[1]
was sleeping, and covered her mouth, poked a knife at her neck, undressed
her and removed her panty, and thereafter have carnal knowledge of her
against her will and without her consent.[3]
During his arraignment on August 3, 1998,[4] appellant, with the assistance
of his counsel de oficio,[5] pleaded not guilty to all three charges. After trial in
due course, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
In its Brief,[6] the Office of the Solicitor General presents the prosecutions
version of the facts as follows:
Roda Ongotan was an adopted daughter of Rodrigo and Leticia
Ongotan. Rodrigo and Leticia have eight (8) other children, namely: Ricardo,
21 years old; Ronald, 20 years old; Rogelio, 19 years old; Roberto, 18 years
old; Rose, 16 years old; Rochelle, 13 years old; Rodel, 10 years old and
Racquel, 8 years old. They lived in a two-storey house at 104 Zusuaregui, Old
Balara, Quezon City. Rodas family occupied the second floor of the house,
which had three (3) bedrooms. The first bedroom was occupied by Roda s
parents and three (3) sisters. The second bedroom was occupied by the
brother of Rodas mother, Vivencio Padora, while the third bedroom was
occupied by Roda. Rodas five (5) brothers sleep in the sala. Rodas bedroom
was adjacent to the kitchen. Her room was about two armslength wide and
one-and-a-half armslength long. It had no door and only a curtain covered
and separated it from the rest of the house. Appellant, who was the uncle of
Rodas mother, slept just outside Rodas bedroom. When the rape incidents
occurred in 1995 and 1996, the ground floor of the Ongotan house was
rented by Teresita Ongotans (the sister of Rodas father) family.
On January 5, 1995, around 5:00 a.m., Roda had just awakened and was still
lying down when appellant entered her room. Appellant immediately covered
her mouth with a handkerchief and threatened to kill her if she shouted. Using
his left hand, appellant poked a knife (balisong) at her. Appellant was then
wearing a white shirt and black short pants while Roda was wearing an
orange-colored short pants and a pink dress. Appellant took off his short
pants and removed Rodas short pants and underwear. He forcibly spread her
legs and inserted his penis into her vagina. Roda could not remember how
long was appellants penis remained inserted in her vagina. After raping her,
appellant dressed up and left her room.
On March 5, 1995, Roda went to bed around 8:00 p.m. Around 5:00 a.m. the
following day, Roda was awakened by the presence of appellant inside her
bedroom. Upon seeing appellant, Roda asked him what he wanted from
her. Appellant told her to be quiet and immediately covered her mouth with a
handkerchief. Appellant wound the handkerchief around Rodas
head. Appellant then told her that should she shout or report what was
happening to anyone, he would kill her. Thereupon, appellant raised her
duster. Roda resisted, but her strength was no match for
appellants. Appellant told her not to resist and to make her immobile,
appellant poked a knife (balisong) at the left side of her neck. Roda started to
cry when she realized the futility of her resistance to appellants lustful
intention. Thereupon, appellant removed her underwear. When this was
removed, appellant lowered his maong pants and underwear. Then, using his
knees which were placed between Rodas legs, appellant forced her legs
apart. Appellant inserted his penis into Rodas vagina. Roda could not do
anything but cry as she felt weak. When appellant inserted his penis into her
vagina, Roda felt pain. She could not remember how long appellants penis
stayed inside her vagina. When appellant was finished with her, he dressed
up and removed the handkerchief around her head. When morning came,
Roda did not tell her mother of the incident out of fear of appellant.
On April 16, 1996, around midnight, Roda was at the kitchen preparing the
food to be brought by her parents and five (5) siblings on their trip to the
province. After she had prepared their baon, her parents, four (4) brothers
and one (1) sister left the house. Only Roda, Rochelle, Rodel and appellant
were left in the house. Thereafter, she put to sleep Rochelle and Rodel who
slept at their parents bedroom. Roda did not sleep because she was afraid of
appellant who was with them in the house. Before her parents left, Roda had
pleaded with them not to leave. She could not tell them the reason out of fear
of appellant.She could not ask them either to bring them all because no one
would be left at the house. Neither could she go with them because no one
would look after her young brother and sister.
Thereupon, Roda saw appellant already inside her room and appellant, upon
seeing her immediately covered her mouth to prevent her from making any
noise. Appellant used a handkerchief to cover her mouth and poked a knife at
her neck. Roda resisted but appellant was stronger. As they were still
standing, appellant ordered her to lie down. Appellant told her not to report
the incident to anyone. Thereupon, appellant took off his short pants, and
followed that by removing Rodas short pants and underwear. When this was
done, appellant forced her legs open and inserted his penis into her
vagina. Roda could not do anything but cry. She could not remember how
long appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. After appellant raped her, he
ordered her to dress up and threatened her that should she report what had
happened to anyone, he would kill her.
On December 17, 1997, Roda summoned enough courage to file a complaint
against appellant. She first confided in her aunt, Antonia Espos, about her
unfortunate ordeal in the hands of appellant. Her aunt assured her that she
would help her file charges against appellant.
Dr. Cristina Freyra, a Medico-Legal Officer at the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory, EDSA, Q.C., stated that she performed a genital
examination on Roda Ongotan on December 16, 1997. At the time of Rodas
examination, Roda was fifteen (15) years old. Dr. Freyras examination
revealed that Rodas hymen had deep-healed lacerations at 3:00 and 9:00
oclock positions and a healed laceration at 5:00 oclock position. Dr. Freyra
opined that these lacerations could have been caused by a hard blunt object
like an erect male organ. Dr. Freyra concluded that Roda was in a non-virgin
state physically.[7](Citations omitted)
(3) children to find work upon the request and invitation of his niece, Leticia
Ongotan.
In Manila, accused-appellant Ernie Baro and his wife, with their three (3)
children, the eldest being 3 years old and the youngest at 1 year old, stayed
at the place located at Orocoy St., Montessorie, Manila.Later on, they
transferred to the house of his niece, Leticia Ongotan at 104 Scout
Zuzuarigue St., Old Balara, Quezon City, where they stayed for about 1
year. Th[e]reat, accused, Ernie Baro met herein complainant Roda Ongot[a]n,
who later on charged him of three (3) counts of rape on December 17, 1997,
allegedly committed by him on January 5; March 5, 1995 and April 16,
1996. The herein accused vehemently denied the charges despite his denial,
the trial court nonetheless found him guilty of the charge.[9] (Citations omitted)
Assignment of Errors
In his Brief, appellant faults the court a quo with the following alleged errors:
I
The lower court erred in giving full faith and credence to the testimony of
complainant, Roda Ongotan y Padora, despite its inherent incredibility,
contradictions and implausibility.
II
The lower court likewise erred in disregarding accused-appellants defense of
alibi despite having clearly satisfied the legal criteria for its being, and
supported by the attendant milieu and circumstances of the case. [13]
First Issue:
Credibility of Complainants Testimony
Appellant submits that the RTC erred in according full faith and credence
to complainants testimony despite its inherent incredibility, contradictions and
implausibility.
We agree. While it is true that it may be the sole basis for convicting the
accused in a rape case,[14] the complaining witness testimony must be
credible.[15] In reviewing rape cases, this Court has always been guided by the
following principles: (a) an accusation of rape can be made with facility -- while
it may be difficult for the prosecution to prove, it is usually more difficult for the
person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) in view of the intrinsic nature
of the crime in which only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of
the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) the evidence
for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits -- it cannot be allowed
to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[16]
After a painstaking review of the records of the case, this Court finds
several circumstances creating reasonable doubt as to appellants guilt. These
are: (1) delay in filing the Complaint, (2) failure of the prosecution to prove
appellants moral ascendancy over complainant, (3) lack of support from the
records for the RTCs finding of violent sexual intercourse between appellant
and complainant, and (4) discrepancies in the complainants testimony.
after a period of two long years from the time first rape supposedly took place
and to disregard the threats allegedly made by appellant.
The RTC erred in stating that appellant had exercised moral ascendancy
over complainant. This was not proven during the trial. Neither do the records
show that he exercised moral ascendancy over her.He is in fact not much older
than her brothers. It was not shown whether he was her benefactor -- a source
of financial support -- or whether he exercised discipline over her. In other
words, there is no proof beyond reasonable doubt that it was his moral
ascendancy that prevented her from putting up a resistance. [21] Presumptions
of moral ascendancy cannot and should not prevail over the constitutional
presumption of innocence.
There is moderate growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and
coadapted with pinkish brown labia minora presenting in between. On
separating the same disclosed an elastic, fleshy-type hymen with shallow,
sealed laceration at 5 and deep-healed lacerations at 3 and 9 oclock
positions. External vaginal orifice offers moderate resistance to the
introduction of the examining index finger. Vaginal canal is narrow with
prominent rugosities. Cervix is normal in size, color and consistency.
CONCLUSION:
Subject is in a non-virgin state physically.
There are no external signs of recent application of any form of trauma at the
time of the examination.[22]
Furthermore, during her testimony, Dr. Freyra admitted that such
lacerations[23] could have been caused by any hard blunt object or even by a
finger or a vibrator.[24] She never mentioned violent sexual intercourse. This
fact is clear from the Transcript of Stenographic Notes, which we quote:
Q: What was [sic] your findings if any in connection with your examination?
A: On examination, there were deep-healed lacerations at 3:00 and 9:00
oclock positions and there was healed laceration at 5:00 oclock position.
Q: Could you tell us what could have caused the lacerations?
A: Any hard blunt object could produce the lacerations.
Q: Could you mention any?
A: An erect male organ.
Q: Could you tell us the size of that male organ that caused the laceration?
Atty Venturanza:
The question of the prosecutor is quite misleading. What was stated by
the witness is any hard blunt object and she just mentioned as one of
the objects is an erect male organ and now he [is] asking the size.
Court:
Lay the basis.
Fiscal Jamolin:
If you said that one of the causes of the laceration is an erect male
organ. On the basis of this possibility, could you tell us the size of that
male organ that caused the lacerations?
A: It could be any size but it should be bigger. [B]y 1 cm. [i]norder to produce
laceration, the diameter of the hard thing that entered the hymen should
be bigger by 1 cm.[25]
It must be noted that the healed lacerations found in complainants hymen
were not proven to have been caused by rapes that supposedly happened two
years earlier. Such lacerations may simply mean that, depending on the
changes observed in the affected tissues, a period ranging from four days to
one month passed from the time they had been inflicted up to the time they
were examined.[26]
times, with her parents and four fully grown brothers within shouting
distance. Considering the cramped space and the quietness of the night, the
faintest cry from her would have been heard by one or more of her family
members who were in that same house.
Third, complainant described each rape in a very uniform and even
seemingly systematic manner. Each rape always started with appellant
entering the room and complainant asking what he wanted from her. It always
began with appellant covering her mouth with a handkerchief and pulling down
her underwear. There was no difference at all in the way the rapes were
committed. The manner in which she described them engenders the suspicion
that her testimony had been coached, rehearsed, or contrived.
Second Issue:
Alibi as a Defense
Complainant alleges that appellant raped her three times -- one on each of
the following dates: January 5, 1995, March 5, 1995, and April 16, 1996. During
his testimony, appellant stated that he was in Catubig, Northern Samar until
November 15, 1996, when he came to Manila upon the invitation of
complainants mother.[35] He likewise testified that it would take twenty-four
hours for a bus to travel from Catubig, Northern Samar, to Manila.[36] It would
have been highly unlikely for him to take the 24-hour bus ride to Manila, commit
the dastardly act upon complainant, and then return to Catubig, Samar, by
taking another 24-hour bus ride. He would have had to do so three times in
order to commit the three alleged rapes on the dates given.
No evidence was adduced by the prosecution to prove that appellant was
indeed in Manila when the alleged rapes were committed. It would have been
a simple matter for it to present the testimony of complainants mother, Leticia
Ongotan, to contradict his testimony. It would also have been a simple matter
for it to present the testimony of any of the brothers or the sisters of complainant
to establish exactly on what date he had arrived in Manila.
Truly, the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
merits. It cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of that for the
defense. In the present case, the testimony of appellant that he was in Catubig,
Northern Samar, on the dates when the alleged rapes were committed remain
uncontradicted by the prosecution. Moreover, he testified that it was upon the
invitation of complainants mother, his niece, that he moved his family to Manila
in November 1996 or seven months after the last rape allegedly occurred.
Present:
- versus -
November 25, 2005 finding herein petitioner Julius Cacao y Prieto (Cacao) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No.
9165 (The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from 12 years and one day to 15 years
and ordering him to pay a fine of P400,000.00. Also assailed is the Resolution[5] of the
CA dated December 11, 2007 denying the motion for reconsideration.
On October 15, 2004, two separate informations were filed against Joseph Canlas y
Naguit[6] and Cacao[7] indicting them for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165
before the RTC of Laoag City. Insofar as pertinent to this petition, we shall quote the
information only against Cacao in Criminal Case No. 11489-13 which reads:
That on or about the 14th day of October, 2004, at Laoag City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously [sic] have in his possession, control and custody 1 plastic
sachet of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu containing a total
of 1.6 grams including plastic sachets [sic] without any license or
authority, in violation of the aforesaid law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
When arraigned on November 30, 2004, Cacao pleaded not guilty.[9] Thereafter trial
on the merits followed.
The inculpatory facts, as unveiled by the prosecution in its evidence given during the
trial, were briefly synthesized by the Office of the Solicitor General, viz:
On October 14, 2004, at around 7:45 in the evening, Police Officer 3
(PO3) Celso Pang-ag of the Intelligence and Operation Section of the
Laoag City Police Station received a telephone call from an informant
about a drug session being held inside Room 5 of the Starlight Hotel
located at Barangay 5, Ablan Avenue, Laoag City.
Acting on the information, PO3 Pang-ag, together with PO2 Jonel
Mangapit, went immediately to the Starlight Hotel to determine the
veracity of the report. Upon arrival at the target area, PO3 Pang-ag and
PO2 Mangapit approached the lady clerk manning the information
counter of Starlight Hotel and inquired about the alleged drug session
at Room 5 of the hotel.
The lady clerk informed PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit that the
roomboy of the hotel was about to deliver a softdrink to Room 5 and
they could follow him if they [so wish]. Thus, PO3 Pang-ag and PO2
Mangapit followed the roomboy to Room 5. Upon arrival, the roomboy
knocked at the door and a woman, later identified as Mylene, opened
the door wide enough to enable the police officers to look inside.
PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit saw petitioner seated on top of the
bed sniffing shabu while Joseph Canlas was on the floor assisting
petitioner sniffing shabu. At this juncture, PO3 Pang-ag and PO2
Mangapit arrested petitioner and Joseph and confiscated from them
the drug paraphernalia, glass tooter, scissors, lighters and plastic
sachets.
PO2 Mangapit frisked petitioner and recovered from him one plastic
sachet containing shabu.
After informing petitioner and Joseph of their constitutional rights, PO3
Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit brought them to the Laoag City Police
Station and turned them over to the police officer on duty while the
confiscated items were turned over to SPO3 Loreto Ancheta.
The Philippine National Police (PNP) laboratory conducted an
examination on the specimen recovered from appellant and his
companion which tested positive for shabu.[10]
Cacao professed his innocence and presented his defense in this wise:
In the afternoon of 14 October 2004, petitioner was waiting for a ride
going home along the National Road at the rotunda of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte. Joseph Canlas [who was on his way
to] Laoag City aboard his motorcycle x x x pulled over and asked the
petitioner if the latter could spare a moment to estimate a work he
Barely a moment after entering Room 5, the two then heard a knock
on the door from the outside. Mylene Daquiaog immediately stood up
and told the petitioner and Canlas that they are (her) companions.
x x x at the Starlight Hotel, petitioner asked for a room and [was given]
Room 5 x x x. Thereafter, Canlas stayed inside Room 5 while
petitioner went out to the hotels counter to wait for the woman they
[had] contacted. Present at the counter at the time was the lady cashier
[named] Cherry Corpuz.
In about thirty (30) minutes, a tricycle-for-hire arrived with a man and a
woman on board as passengers. The tricycle went inside the hotel and
stopped right in front of the counter where the petitioner and the lady
cashier were. After alighting from the tricycle, the woman companion
inquired where Room 5 is [and was directed] by the lady cashier. The
woman [who] alighted from the tricycle in the company of another male
person was later on identified to be Mylene Daquioag. Thereafter,
Mylene Daquioag proceeded to Room 5 while the male companion
stayed behind with the petitioner at the hotels counter. When petitioner
could not wait [any] longer because there was only one woman who
arrived, he x x x asked the male companion of Mylene Daquioag if
another woman is coming. The male companion answered in the
negative. A couple of minutes [later], petitioner followed to Room 5 so
he could [sic] go home instead because it was then getting late.
Upon entering the room, petitioner saw Mylene Daquioag and Canlas
seated at the table inside the room. He also saw Mylene Daquioag
offer something contained in plastic x x x to Canlas. The latter refused
as he said it is a woman that he was asking [for].
As petitioner was made to sit at [sic] the bed, one of the police officers
pointed to a plastic sachet on the floor. It was about two (2) meters
away from him and about a meter from the police pointing [to] it. The
same police then explained that the plastic sachet belongs to the
petitioner. Immediately, petitioner cried foul on the assertion.
Due to the suddenness of events, the petitioner was not as much as
able to notice what the other police did to Canlas.
Without much ado, the petitioner and Canlas were apprehended,
handcuffed and brought to the Laoag City Police Station. Charges
were later on filed against them.[11]
On November 25, 2005, the trial court rendered its judgment finding Cacao guilty of
the offense charged and sentenced him accordingly, viz:
WHEREFORE x x x
The accused Julius Cacao is likewise found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as charged of illegal possession of
methamphetamine hydrochloride weighing 1.3987 grams in Criminal
Case No. 11489 and is therefore sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Aggrieved by the Decision of the trial court, Cacao interposed an appeal to the
CA. On July 27, 2007, the appellate court rendered judgment affirming Cacaos
conviction. It held that the circumstances obtaining in this case validly cloaked the
arresting officers with the authority to search and seize any contraband or prohibited
material which may be used as proof of the offense of which Cacao is charged. It also
ruled that there is no proof that the police officers compelled Cacao to admit a
crime. As to the alleged contradictory statements, the appellate court ruled that they
refer only to minor details which are not sufficient to overthrow the probative value
accorded them by the trial court.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration[13] but the motion was denied by the appellate
court in its Resolution[14] dated on December 11, 2007.
Issues
In this petition, Cacao ascribes to the trial court the following errors:
I.
Our Ruling
We find merit in the petition.
As a general rule, factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and the CA are
entitled to great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. However, if
there is any indication that the trial court overlooked certain facts or circumstances
which would substantially affect the disposition of the case,[21] we will not hesitate to
review the same. In this case, we find it imperative to review the factual findings of the
trial court because of certain inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses on material points.
Jurisprudence holds that in prosecution of cases involving illegal possession of
prohibited drugs, the prosecution must establish with moral certainty the elemental
act of possession of a prohibited substance coupled with the fact that such
Q: How about the one big plastic sachet you were able to seize from
the right front pocket of accused Cacao, what did you do?
A: I turned it over to the evidence custodian, Sir.
We have scrutinized in detail the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and found
not only glaring inconsistencies on material points but more importantly a failure to
identify indubitably the prohibited drug allegedly confiscated from Cacao.
The
testimonies
of
the
prosecutions principal witnesses
are inconsistent as to who
delivered the prohibited drug to
the evidence custodian.
PO3 Celso Pang-ag (Pang-ag) and PO2 Jonel Mangapit (Mangapit) both testified
that it was the latter who brought the item confiscated from petitioner to the evidence
custodian, SPO3 Loreto Ancheta (Ancheta). Thus:
Q: Who was that evidence custodian to whom you turned over that
plastic sachet?
A: SP02 Loreto Ancheta, Sir.[25]
The foregoing assertions are totally at odds with the testimony of Ancheta, the
evidence custodian. The latter denied that it was Mangapit who delivered the item
allegedly recovered from Cacao. Instead, he repeatedly and categorically declared
that it was SP03 Balolong (Balolong) from whom he received the plastic sachet
of shabu.
Q: Who delivered to you the specimen allegedly confiscated from the
possession of Cacao?
A: SP03 Balolong, Sir.[26]
During his cross-examination, Ancheta confirmed his declaration that it was
Q: What about the two plastic sachets you confiscated from the
possession of the accused Joseph and the one plastic sachet
which Jonel Mangapit confiscated from the possession of
Julius Cacao as well as the drug paraphernalia you mentioned,
what did you do with them?
A: We turned over the confiscated drug paraphernalia and the one I
confiscated to the evidence custodian, SP03 Loreto Ancheta
and the one confiscated by P02 Mangapit was also turned over
by him to the evidence custodian, sir.
Q: Who was the evidence custodian whom you and Jonel Mangapit
turned over the items you said?
A: SPO3 Loreto Ancheta, Sir.[24]
Balolong and definitely not Mangapit who handed to him the plastic sachet
of shabu. Ancheta testified thus:
Q: You said that it was officer Balolong who handed to you the plastic
sachet of shabu which was allegedly taken from the
possession of accused Julius Cacao, did I hear you right?
A: Julius Cacao, yes sir.
Q: It was not officer Mangapit who handed to you the plastic sachet of
shabu?
A: Balolong, sir.
The patent inconsistency between the testimonies of Mangapit and Pang-ag, on one
hand, and the testimony of Ancheta on the other hand, necessarily leads us to doubt
that the plastic sachet of shabu identified in court is the same item that was allegedly
seized and confiscated from petitioner. If the version of Mangapit is to be believed,
then the most lamentable aspect pertains to his failure to identify the seized item with
certainty. For sure Mangapit, who is the most competent person to make the proper
identification being the officer who confiscated the item from Cacao, never actually
identified the same:
Q: If shown to you again that one big plastic sachet where you put
markings would you be able to recognize and identify the same?
A: Yes, sir.
Mangapit. It is now clearly evident from the records that the sachet of shabu which
At this juncture, it must be stressed that the corpus delicti in dangerous drugs cases
the evidence custodian received, marked and submitted for examination and later
presented in court is not the same sachet of shabu which Mangapit claimed to have
constitutes the drug itself. This means that proof beyond reasonable doubt of the
identity of the prohibited drug is essential.[35]
instructive. Thus:
As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule
requires the presentation of the seized prohibited drugs as an exhibit
be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter
in question is what the proponent claims it to be. This would ideally
cover the testimony about every link in the chain, from seizure of the
prohibited drug up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way
that everyone who touched the exhibit would describe how and from
whom it was received, to include, as much as possible, a description
of the condition in which it was delivered to the next in the chain.
Finally, petitioners defenses of denial and frame-up are concededly inherently weak
and commonly used in drug-related cases. However, it must be stressed that
conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the
strength of the evidence of the prosecution.
Based on the foregoing, we are of the considered view that the quantum of evidence
needed to convict, that is proof beyond reasonable doubt, has not been adequately
established by the prosecution. While as a rule we desist from disturbing the findings
and conclusions of the trial court especially with respect to the credibility of witnesses,
we must bow to the superior and immutable rule that the guilt of the accused must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt because the law presumes that the accused is
innocent unless and until proven otherwise. Presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty cannot by itself override the constitutional right of the
accused to be presumed innocent unless overcome by strong, clear and compelling
evidence.