Thirteen Days in

October
A simulation of the Cuban Missile Crisis for 6 to 41 people
By Bill Kerney (bkerney@hotmail.com)

Thirteen Days in October

Introduction for the Person Running the Simulation

The Cuban Missile Crisis is one of those events that at first seems easy to understand, but when you
begin digging into the subject, enormous complexities emerge. Vastly different ideas, ideologies, and
personalities of the major players made the matter enormously complicated, and almost pushed the
world into a nuclear war. On the surface, the crisis seems almost trivial neither John F. Kennedy nor
Nikita Khrushchev wanted an exchange of nuclear weapons that would have left millions dead but the
logical consequences of each very rational step they took seemed to always push both sides closer to
war. So how could this have happened?
This simulation was written as a different sort of way to understand the crisis. Not by taking the
textbook approach wherein two great powers played chicken with nuclear weapons but by letting
the participants experience it from the inside, by taking on the persona of one of the major players of
the Cuban Missile Crisis. Being able to sit down at a table of the Executive Committee and listen to your
peers argue passionately for a wide variety of solutions gives the interested student of history a realistic
feel for all the influences pushing the President in different directions. For players of the Soviet side, it is
even more eye-opening: the motivations of, and influences upon, Khrushchev go often unstudied in the
West, other than being almost caricatured as someone who backed down at the last second.
The Soviets were paranoid (and perhaps rightly so) after the Bay of Pigs that the US would invade Cuba,
so the nuclear missiles were placed there as a deterrent against further US incursions. This was done in
the same fashion as the US had used to protect West Berlin (a likewise small sliver of land deep within
hostile territory). But the Soviets vastly underestimated the response of the American public to having
nuclear weapons in Cuba, at which point it became politically infeasible to simply remove them.
Further complicating the matter was the notion that both sides believed in tit-for-tat retaliation, and
that a step backwards for one country was a step forward for the other. As Khrushchev put it in a letter
to Kennedy, it was as if both sides were pulling on the ends of the knot of war and making it tighter
and tighter. As the person running this simulation for your friends or classroom, you will want to try to
simulate that feeling of ever-increasing tension. If things ever calm down, there are historical events
you can use (like shooting down the U-2 over Cuba) that will ratchet tensions back up again.
The engine of the simulation will be each person trying to fulfill their personas goals. If you are running
this for fun, the winners will be those that successfully accomplished the highest percentage of their
personal goals. If you are running this for a classroom, you should base grades on the students efforts
to attempt to achieve all his personas goals for it is deliberately impossible for all personas to achieve
all of their goals. This is what drives the conflict in the simulation, and what actually drove the conflict in
history. You are the ultimate arbiter of if a goal is successful but it is always interesting to have people
go around in a circle, when the simulation is over, to discuss their motivations and goals. Some personas
have an automatic failure condition if a specific event happens. They lose even if they meet their other
goals and objectives. (In a classroom scenario, I would not recommend punishing them for automatic
failure if they at least really tried to achieve their goals, as events are often out of one persons control.)
Thirteen Days in October

This simulation was made as historically accurate as possible. The quotes for each persona were actually
said by them though in several cases they had to be censored for language. The goals for each person
were set by extensive readings of the notes of the Executive Committee (which contradict RFKs
autobiographical hagiography Thirteen Days, incidentally) and Sterns The Cuban Missile Crisis in
American Memory, which does a really excellent job exploring the myths around the crisis, and
explaining in detail the positions of each of the major players. Please refer to the Appendix for primary
documents, videos, maps, and recommended books if you want to brush up on your own knowledge.
Note that while the setup of the simulation is as historically accurate as possible, the way that it actually
plays out does not need to be historical, and it should not be forced to follow history by you. For
example, if the Americans decide to drop practice depth charges on the Soviet submarines running the
blockade, and the Soviets have not implemented a three man rule to launch nuclear weapons (i.e. the
top three officers must all concur), then one of the Soviet subs will, on its own initiative, launch a
nuclear torpedo at the US Navy and sink the fleet. This is historically what would have happened, but is
not what historically did happen due to the calm thinking of one of the USSRs submarine officers.
If you want to decorate the area in which you run the simulation, little plastic American, UN, and Soviet
flags work wonders for creating environment. I personally just print out the pages on heavy card stock
and fold them in half, so that everyone can see the flags and portraits of the people they are portraying.
If the people in the simulation do decide to launch nuclear weapons, the president (or premier) must
write down the names of the targets he is striking. Walk the list over to the other side and tell them that
nuclear weapons will strike those targets within 15 to 30 minutes, and ask them for their response. If
they do not respond to a nuclear attack, the president/premier is deposed and loses the game (but, hey,
an unlimited nuclear exchange is averted). If they do respond, take the list of targets back to the other
side, and so forth. The Americans at this time have 182 ICBMs (long range missiles), 500 MRBMs
(medium range), and 1,600 strategic bomber loads capable of striking Russia. The Soviets had 42 ICBMs
capable of hitting America, 100 MRBMs (being built up in Cuba, about 5 were ready by the Crisis start),
160 strategic bomber loads, and 90 tactical (short range) nuclear missiles capable of hitting targets in
Cuba, such as Guantanamo Bay or an invading force. Note that while an unlimited nuclear exchange
might be considered a failure for the simulation, several of the characters will win the simulation if it
happens, as they consider such an exchange inevitable, and better to get it done with sooner rather
than later. The participants will still learn about the crisis, even if it ends in apocalypse.
When running the simulation, you should be constantly moving back and forth between the two major
groups, listening in on their conversations, answering questions that the players would know (Has the
US blockaded Cuba yet?), egging on the controversy (Do you think the American people would stand
for doing absolutely nothing, Mr. President?) and encouraging quieter players to participate more
vociferously, even if they personally disagree with their given stance.
Enjoy!
-Bill Kerney (bkerney@hotmail.com)
Thirteen Days in October

Instructions for Running the Simulation

1) Hand out the personas. Besides you as coordinator, there are 8 Soviet positions, 2 neutral, and 12 US
personas. The most important roles are JFK, Khrushchev, U Thant, the two US/USSR ambassadors, and
the two UN ambassadors. After those have been assigned, give at least one advisor on each side arguing
for war and peace. After these have been given out, assign the rest of the roles. If theres more people
than roles, create duplicates for the various roles (except for president and premier), and call the second
person Undersecretary to Dean Rusk, etc., with the same goals. Thus, up to 41 people may play.
2) Have the people read over the goals for their role. These goals might very well not align with the
persons own beliefs! Tell them they will win or be graded - by following a high percentage of their
goals, so it is important for them to understand what they are supposed to be doing.
3) Move the participants to different parts of the room, where they cant easily overhear each other.
The Soviets (and Castro) on one side, the US on the other. The UN and OAS at a table in the middle.
4) Set up a table for diplomats from each side to meet with each other where they cannot be overheard.
5) Hand out the EXCOMM and Presidium objectives to the US and USSR respectively.
6) Once theyve read it over, begin the simulation. When it runs, JFK and Khrushchev are in charge of
their respective factions while they should listen to everyones opinions, they make the final call.
7) When one side has a proposal to make to the other side, they must send a diplomat to talk. That
diplomat can only talk with the other sides diplomat, who will then take it back to the leaders of the
other faction. Having this extended line of communication is a significant part of the tension, especially
when certain players (RFK) might be undermining the negotiations. This is also why the UN exists.
8) Ending the simulation. It ends when the time limit is reached (normally 60 minutes), or both sides
come to an agreement, or an unlimited nuclear exchange takes place. (A limited nuclear exchange will
probably lead to both sides escalating into an unlimited nuclear exchange, but it doesnt end the game.)
9) As the person running the simulation, if it looks like it is going to end in a peace too early, escalate the
simulation. You have four phases (which take place chronologically in history) you can move the
simulation into. At each phase, notify the CIA of some troubling new information that has just taken
place. If the Americans do anything obvious (bombing the island, for example), you must notify the
Soviet Presidium of those actions as well. Play on their paranoia:
Phase I Give the CIA a photograph of Cuban missile sites being built. They are without doubt nuclear
weapons because the length of them is exactly the same as missiles photographed in Red Square.
Phase II If a blockade is enacted, Russian ships will receive encrypted telegrams from the Kremlin, but
do not turn back from the quarantine line. The Americans can: 1) intercept and inspect for nukes (which
the USSR can decide if they have), 2) back away to give Khrushchev more time, 3) Destroy them.
Phase III Soviet nuclear submarines are detected escorting their ships. The American Navy
recommends using training depth charges to rattle the hull of it to drive them to the surface. (If this
happens, and the Soviets havent implemented a three-man rule to launch nukes, a Soviet captain will
launch his nuclear torpedoes at the American navy, which will probably trigger a nuclear exchange.)
Phase IV A CIA U-2 has been shot down by Cuban forces, and the pilot is killed. The US military calls for
bombing Cuban SA-2 surface-to-air missile sites in retaliation. Missile site construction has accelerated.
UN Summit: Additionally, you should stop the simulation briefly at some point and summit where both
sides ambassadors (and Cuba) can present their arguments to the world. U Thant calls for disarmament.
Thirteen Days in October

CIA Phase IV Handouts:

CIA Handout #3: Missile Construction has accelerated on Cuba. They are almost launch-ready.

CIA Handout #4: New

Soviet army encampments
have been built around the
island. It is possible we
might have
underestimated the size of
the ground forces the USSR
has on Cuba.

Thirteen Days in October

The Executive Committee of the National Security Council (EXCOMM) has proposed the following
possible solutions to the Cuban Missile Crisis:
1) Limited Air Strikes attack the missile sites in Cuba, to prevent them from being able to launch
against the US.
2) Comprehensive Air Strikes attack the missile sites, SAM sites, bombers, and other military targets in
Cuba to reduce their military threat.
3) Full-Scale Invasion Start with air strikes, then follow with a landing of between 10,000 and 150,000
men. Complete conquest of Cuba is predicted within five days, with another five years occupation
necessary to establish a stable Cuban government.
4) Quarantine Start a naval blockade of Cuba, preventing new Soviet military hardware from entering
the island. If the Organization of American States (OAS) agree, then this is legal under international law.
5) Trade Turkey for Cuba Offer to remove nuclear missiles in Turkey for the removal of nuclear
missiles in Cuba. Turkey will not be happy about this, however.
Other options:
5) Maintain aerial surveillance over Cuba, possibly including night-time surveillance using flares.
6) Promise to not invade Cuba.
7) Trade sanctions
8) Issue warnings to Castro and Khrushchev
9) Apply diplomatic pressure from the UN and OAS.
Diplomacy Note: Only Dean Rusk may talk with the OAS, and only Adlai Stevenson may talk to the UN.
Only RFK (or anyone else appointed by JFK) may talk with the Soviet diplomats, and only the diplomats.

Thirteen Days in October

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and Allies

Your main goals are:
1) Avoid a nuclear war if possible. But if war will come, it will come. We have more people to lose.
2) Prevent the invasion of Cuba. The American imperialists invaded Cuba last year in the Bay of Pigs, and
have been engaging in assassination and sabotage attempts against Castro since then. We must ensure
the US never tries to take over Cuba again.
3) Achieve the removal of nuclear missiles from Turkey. They are mere miles from our glorious leaders
dacha on the Crimean Sea, and are a threat to everyone.
Your minor goals are:
1) Project an attitude of strength. The US has far more nuclear weapons than us, so it is important to
bark loudly. If they attack us, we must retaliate in some kind.
2) Continue to build up the nuclear capability in Cuba as rapidly as possible in case war comes sooner
rather than later.
3) Prevent any permanent blockade of Cuba.
Diplomacy Note: Only your diplomats may talk with the Americans directly.

Thirteen Days in October

John F. Kennedy (JFK), President of the United States

The odds of a nuclear exchange are now even.
Your goals are:
1) Prevent nuclear war. You are very reluctant to engage in any military action, as the Russians could
retaliate, which would cost us to retaliate, and this could escalate into a nuclear war. The first step is
the most important.
2) Remove the Soviet missiles from Cuba. They are an offensive threat to the heartland of America, and
cannot be tolerated at any cost.
3) You greatly prefer diplomatic solutions to military ones, and will do what you can to give the Russians
a chance to come up with a diplomatic solution to the problem.
4) You cannot do nothing, or you will be impeached by Congress. If no diplomatic solution can be had,
you support limited military strikes on Cuba.
Note: You should hold votes with EXCOMM to see how they stand, but remember final decisions for
everything rests in your hands. You do not believe the military actually knows what it is doing.

Thirteen Days in October

Robert Francis Bobby Kennedy (RFK) Attorney General of the United States
Id sure like to get Cuba back.
1) You wish to see Castro removed from power by any means necessary. You have been in charge of
Operation Mongoose, which has conducted espionage, assassination attempts, sabotage, propaganda
attempts, and so forth, against Castros regime. None of it has worked, but you are confident that one of
Mongooses attempts will succeed at some point.
You are strongly opposed to a promise to not invade Cuba.
You are weakly opposed to a blockade, as it will not do enough.
You support all forms of military action against Cuba.
2) You anticipate running for president after JFKs second term, so you will do everything to cast yourself
in as good a light as possible. You can and should stand up and make public announcements of your
successes at any chance you get. You have authorization to meet with the Russian diplomats.
3) You feel personally betrayed by the Russians, who lied to you about the missiles in Cuba. If a missile
trade between Cuba and Turkey is proposed, you will be absolutely against it unless the US removal of
missiles from Turkey is kept quiet. (This will make it look like an absolute US victory on the world stage.)
4) You do not support a surprise attack on Cuba, as it will make us look like the Japanese in Pearl Harbor.

Thirteen Days in October

General Curtis LeMay, Chief of Staff of the US Air Force

Weve got the bear stuck in a trap. Lets take off its leg to the [waist]
Note: You control most of the nuclear weapons in America. Only the president can overrule you.
1) You strongly support military intervention in Cuba. Limited airstrikes, comprehensive air strikes, and a
full invasion are all good options. It is utterly unacceptable for the Cubans to possess a nuclear strike
capability in the American heartland. The Russians only understand strength. Just look at this picture:

2) You strongly oppose a naval blockade, as it will allow the Russians the chance to continue to build up
their nuclear strike capability in Cuba, and is too weak a response. Its just appeasement.
3) As head of the Strategic Air Command, you support a justified nuclear exchange with the Russians. To
prepare for that, you want to keep nuclear bombers in the air at all time, around the world.
Thirteen Days in October

Robert Strange McNamara Secretary of Defense and former President of Ford Motors
Before we attack Cuba, we have to be d---ed sure the Soviets understand this is coming.
Your goals:
1) You see the problem as a diplomatic one, not a military one. Military strikes should only be done to
put pressure on diplomatic efforts.
2) You strongly support a naval blockade, as it is a relatively peaceful way to put pressure on the
Russians and Cuba.
3) You are very worried about killing any Russians (in Cuba or on the seas), and will recommend only
intercepting ships going into Cuba that are not Russian, so as to prevent an incident.
4) You recommend trading the nukes in Turkey away for the removal of nukes in Cuba.
5) You support offering Cuba the Guantanamo Bay Naval Station back in exchange for other favors.
6) You are strongly opposed to a surprise military strike, as it is Opposed to the tradition of America.
Note: You are a bit erratic, and can change your mind on all of the above for a good reason.
Thirteen Days in October

Dean Rusk, Secretary of State

The US has 40 allies around the world. There is no such thing as unilateral action, as what we do will
affect them all.
As the countrys top diplomat, you are allowed to talk to the Russian diplomats, and the OAS.
Your goals:
1) You believe the situation can be solved diplomatically, not militarily. At all points, you must lobby for
more time for diplomatic solutions to work, and oppose military intervention. You are especially
opposed to an invasion after the Bay of Pigs fiasco, and the risks of escalation to a nuclear war.
2) Bobby Kennedy does not like you very much. Take every opportunity to dismiss his views as nave.
3) You strongly support a naval blockade. You may approach the Organization of American States (the
person running the simulation) to request their support in the blockade. You dislike unilateral action.
4) You support increased surveillance over Cuba, reinforcement of Guantanamo Bay, and support antiCastro rebels. But you dont support launching recon flares at night, to avoid the appearance of war.
5) You weakly oppose trading nukes in Cuba for nukes in Turkey, as it will weaken our position.

Thirteen Days in October

Adlai Ewing Stevenson II, Ambassador to the United Nations

Mr. Zorin, I am prepared to wait for my answer until hell freezes over.
You are the only American who can speak before the UN.
Your goals:
1) Strongly support a UN-mediated removal of nuclear weapons in Turkey for removal from Cuba.
2) Weakly support a UN proposal to end the blockade, in exchange for Soviet promises to deliver no
more missiles.
3) Embarrass the USSR UN representative. Valerian Zorin, your Soviet counterpart. He keeps insisting
there are no nuclear weapons in Cuba. Press him for a yes or no answer, and when he refuses, show him
this picture of nuclear weapons there:

Thirteen Days in October

CIA Handout #2: A photograph of the Soviets building a medium-range missile site, in clear
contradiction of the words their diplomats have been saying.

Thirteen Days in October

Lyndon Baines Johnson (LBJ), Vice-President of the United States

If you let a bully come in your front yard, he'll be on your porch the next day, and the day after that
hell [be in your bed].
1) You believe the Joint Chiefs of Staff should make the final decision on Cuba, as it is a military matter.
You trust the military to make sound military judgments and far more than politicians to do so.
2) You feel there is no point going to the UN or NATO or the OAS for support.
3) You weakly support trading a removal of nuclear weapons in Turkey for a removal in Cuba.
4) You think we should refuse to negotiate with the Russians, however, until work stops on the missile
sites in Cuba.
5) You are opposed to dropping flares over Cuba at night for reconnaissance, as it might make them
believe there is an invasion taking place.
Thirteen Days in October

McGeorge Mac Bundy, United States National Security Advisor

If our allies can live with Soviet missiles next door, why cant we?
Your goals:
1) You at first advocate comprehensive air strikes against Cuba, in order to show the Soviets we are
strong, and will not tolerate them invading West Berlin.
2) If a good argument for a blockade is made, you will switch your position and argue in favor of it, and
against military intervention, as air strikes might cause the Soviets to attack West Berlin.
3) You are firmly opposed to a trade of missiles between Turkey and Cuba. Turkey is a NATO ally, and we
should not sell them out just because the Soviets put missiles in Cuba.
4) We could feasibly do nothing, and live with the new balance of power.
5) You see yourself as the Devils Advocate, and try to disagree with the President on principle.

Thirteen Days in October

John Alexander McCone Director of the CIA

At different phases in the simulation, you will be provided with new information. You will start with a
photo of the nuclear sites under construction that begins the crisis (see the attached CIA Handout #1).
Adlai Stevenson has another one of your photos, if you want to look at it as well.
Your goals:
1) You support military intervention of all kinds in Cuba.
2) You support using CIA assets to undermine Castros regime in Cuba, including Operation Mongoose
run by Bobby Kennedy. 500 of your best men are working on the project. All attempts at sabotage and
assassination have failed so far, however.
3) If one of your U-2s gets shot down, though, you switch positions and support trading Turkish nuclear
weapons for the Cuban ones.

Thirteen Days in October

CIA Handout 1: U-2 reconnaissance

photos showing nuclear missile sites
under construction

Thirteen Days in October

General Maxwell Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

I am all against invasion, but nonetheless trying to eliminate as effectively as possible every weapon
present in Cuba that can strike the United States.
Your goals:
1) You strongly support selective and comprehensive air strikes into Cuba to eliminate the threat.
However, you are opposed to a full-scale invasion.
2) However, there are serious risks in military action. Only a surprise attack could be guaranteed to work,
but you do not want the US to be the Japanese at a new Pearl Harbor. If you give warning, it would be
very costly to invade in American lives. And even air strikes could quickly escalate into a general nuclear
war.
2) If the president shows resistance to military action, you may propose a blockade of Cuba, to restrict
Soviet military supplies from reaching the island. This will put pressure on the Kremlin without
immediately moving both countries into war.
3) You are opposed to a trade of Turkish nuclear weapons for Cuban ones.

Thirteen Days in October

Llewellyn E. Tommy Thompson, former ambassador to the Soviet Union

Your goals:
1) You strongly support a blockade of Cuba.
2) You are a personal friend of Nikita Khrushchev, and have lived with him for a while when you were
ambassador. You feel that Khrushchev is hemmed in by pro-war elements in the Kremlin, and
recommend that the president give Khrushchev every opportunity to make peace, including backing
down from confrontations at the blockade. You worry this whole thing is a ploy to get West Berlin.
3) You strongly oppose a trade of missiles between Turkey and Cuba. However, you do know that
Khrushchev is annoyed by having missiles so near his resort villa on the Crimean Sea.
4) If the Soviets continue work on missile sites in Cuba, and diplomacy seems to be going nowhere, you
can switch your position and support a full invasion of Cuba, or a CIA-supported ouster of Castro.

Thirteen Days in October

C. Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury

Your goals:
1) You initially support limited air strikes just on missile sites in Cuba.
2) If a good argument for a blockade is made, you switch positions and support the blockade instead.
3) You strongly oppose removing missiles from Turkey in exchange for the missiles in Cuba.
4) You see all of this as just a first step to the isolation and ouster of Castro by the US.

Thirteen Days in October

The United Nations

Thirteen Days in October

U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations

You may only talk with Adlai Stevenson and Valerian Zorin, the two UN representatives from the US and
the USSR respectively, as well as Fidel Castro directly and the OAS. Put the UN flag in full view on your
table. While you have the weight of world opinion on your side the two superpowers are free to ignore
you. So be smart when applying pressure or proposing compromises. Make sure both sides win.
Your goals:
1) You must avoid a general war at all costs. If there is a limited military exchange, you must do
everything you can to keep it from escalating into a general nuclear exchange.
2) If a US blockade of Cuba is enacted, you will propose eliminating the blockade in exchange for Soviet
promises to not ship any more nuclear weapons to Cuba.
3) You strongly support a UN proposal to eliminate nuclear weapons from all non-nuclear power
countries. In particular, this means removing weapons from Turkey, Italy, and Cuba.
4) If you cannot achieve #3, you will support an exchange of removal of nuclear weapons from Turkey in
exchange for removal from Cuba.
Thirteen Days in October

The Organization of American States (OAS)

Today, the OAS has unanimously voted to support a blockade of Cuba.
You are the worlds oldest regional organization, dating back to 1889, which brings together all of the
independent states of North and South America. For the purposes of this simulation, you will represent
a consensus of the smaller countries of the Americas.
You may only talk with American and Soviet diplomats who are authorized to talk to you, and the UN.
1) Promote representative democracy. Communism is a threat to democracies. Removing the Soviet
missiles from Cuba is essential. The best option for dealing with Cuba is a blockade. While a blockade is
normally an act of war, due to the Rio Treaty you have signed, if you vote for a blockade of Cuba it is
legal under the UN Charter which allows regional security arrangements that exclude foreign influences.
2) Promote peace and security. If there is a nuclear exchange or invasion of Cuba, you lose.
3) If either the US or USSR goes against your wishes, you have a lot of influence with the UN, and can call
for sanctions against the side that is not following your resolutions.

Thirteen Days in October

Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

We will bury you!

Important Note: As Premier, First Secretary, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Chairman of the
Bureau of the Central Committee, and head of the Soviet Presidium, you have the final say on what the
USSR will do in these negotiations. You should always ask your subordinates for advice on what they
think should be done, but this is not a democracy What you say, goes.
1) Your are angered by the presence of nuclear missiles in Turkey, not far from your vacation home on
the Crimean Sea. You strongly wish the US will remove them.
2) You are very worried about the US undermining, attacking, or invading Cuba. Again. You felt the best
way to protect Cuba was to sneak nuclear weapons in, and then after construction was complete,
announce to the world the fact as a fait accompli. You do not understand why the US would be upset
about nuclear weapons in Cuba, when they have nuclear weapons in Italy and Turkey.
3) You are surrounded by people who are advocating for war with the US. You think that tantamount to
suicide, as the United States has many more nuclear missiles than the USSR (you wont let them know
that, though!). Avoid a nuclear war at all costs.
4) That said, you cannot do nothing. If the US attacks you, you must respond or be deposed.
Attached are letters you may send to the US if they blockade Cuba. Sign any letter you wish to send:

Thirteen Days in October

Mr. President,
The United States has openly taken the path of grossly violating the United Nations
Charter, the path of violating international norms of freedom of navigation on the
high seas, the path of aggressive actions both against Cuba and against the Soviet
Union.
The statement by the Government of the United States of America can only be regarded
as undisguised interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cuba, the
Soviet Union and other states. The United Nations Charter and international norms give
no right to any state to institute in international waters the inspection of vessels
bound for the shores of the Republic of Cuba.
And naturally, neither can we recognize the right of the United States to establish
control over armaments which are necessary for the Republic of Cuba to strengthen its
defense capability.
We reaffirm that the armaments which are in Cuba, regardless of the classification to
which they may belong, are intended solely for defensive purposes in order to secure
the Republic of Cuba against the attack of an aggressor.
I hope that the United States Government will display wisdom and renounce the actions
pursued by you, which may lead to catastrophic consequences for world peace.

N. Khrushchev

Thirteen Days in October

Dear Mr. President:

I think you will understand me correctly if you are really concerned about the welfare
of the world. Everyone needs peace: both capitalists, if they have not lost their
reason, and, still more, Communists, people who know how to value not only their own
lives but, more than anything, the lives of the peoples. We, Communists, are against
all wars between states in general and have been defending the cause of peace since we
came into the world. We have always regarded war as a calamity, and not as a game nor
as a means for the attainment of definite goals, nor, all the more, as a goal in
itself. Our goals are clear, and the means to attain them is labor. War is our enemy
and a calamity for all the peoples.

I see, Mr. President, that you too are not devoid of a sense of anxiety for the fate
of the world understanding, and of what war entails. What would a war give you? You
are threatening us with war. But you well know that the very least which you would
receive in reply would be that you would experience the same consequences as those
which you sent us. And that must be clear to us, people invested with authority, trust,
and responsibility. We must not succumb to intoxication and petty passions, regardless
of whether elections are impending in this or that country, or not impending. These
are all transient things, but if indeed war should break out, then it would not be in
our power to stop it, for such is the logic of war. I have participated in two wars
and know that war ends when it has rolled through cities and villages, everywhere
sowing death and destruction.

You are a military man and, I hope, will understand me. Let us take for example a
simple cannon. What sort of means is this: offensive or defensive? A cannon is a
defensive means if it is set up to defend boundaries or a fortified area. But if one
concentrates artillery, and adds to it the necessary number of troops, then the same
cannons do become an offensive means, because they prepare and clear the way for
infantry to attack. The same happens with missile-nuclear weapons as well, with any
type of this weapon.

Mr. President, I appeal to you to weigh well what the aggressive, piratical actions,
which you have declared the USA intends to carry out in international waters, would
lead to. You yourself know that any sensible man simply cannot agree with this, cannot
recognize your right to such actions.
If you did this as the first step towards the unleashing of war, well then, it is
evident that nothing else is left to us but to accept this challenge of yours. If,
however, you have not lost your self-control and sensibly conceive what this might
lead to, then, Mr. President, we and you ought not now to pull on the ends of the rope
in which you have tied the knot of war, because the more the two of us pull, the
tighter that knot will be tied. And a moment may come when that knot will be tied so
tight that even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it, and then it
will be necessary to cut that knot Consequently, if there is no intention to tighten
that knot and thereby to doom the world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war, then
let us not only relax the forces pulling on the ends of the rope, let us take measures
to untie that knot. We are ready for this.

We welcome all forces which stand on positions of peace These thoughts are dictated
by a sincere desire to relieve the situation, to remove the threat of war.
Respectfully yours,
N. Khrushchev

Thirteen Days in October

Fidel Alejandro Castro Ruz, Prime Minister of Cuba and Commander in Chief of the armed forces.
"Patria o Muerte!"
"What the imperialists cannot forgive us, is that we have made a Socialist revolution under their noses."
1) America has been opposed to you since before the Revolution, and since you have taken over Cuba
from Batista in 1959, has been trying to sabotage your mines, enact economic sanctions, conduct
assassination missions against you, poison you even set off flares at night to convince Cubans you are
the anti-Christ. Then the US invaded during the failed Bay of Pigs, so you formed an economic alliance
with the Soviets. Your primary goal is to further deepen these ties to a full military alliance, like what the
United States has with NATO and countries such as Turkey.
2) You wish the US does not invade Cuba.
3) If the US does invade Cuba, you wish that the USSR strike first, with either a strategic nuclear launch
or by shooting your (very secret) tactical nuclear weapons at the invading forces or at Guantanamo.
4) While you were originally opposed to the strategic nuclear weapons on Cuba, due to the risk of your
island becoming a battleground, you now support them as a way of deterring an American invasion.
5) In exchange for UN inspections, you demand: the U.S. end its embargo, put a stop to its support for
dissidents, cease its support for militant attacks on Cuba, stop violating Cuban air space and territorial
waters and withdraw from the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base

Thirteen Days in October

Anatoly Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the United States

Note: As a diplomat, you are allowed to talk to any person on the US side that wishes to speak with you.
Your goals:
1) You do not believe there to be nuclear weapons in Cuba. If the United States says that there are, they
are clearly lying. You can give them your personal assurances that there will be never be offensive
weapons placed in Cuba by the USSR.
2) If the United States takes any actions against Cuba, you will find out from them what they want in
return for ending those actions, and take those proposals to Khrushchev.
3) When Khrushchev has a proposal for the United States, you must meet with their representatives and
present it to them in the best possible light. Give away as little as you can to get as much as you can.
4) If asked, you support peaceful negotiations between the US and the USSR, but youre not really
important enough to have your opinions matter much.

Thirteen Days in October

Valerian Zorin, USSR representative to the United Nations Security Council

Note: As the UN representative, only you are allowed to talk with U Thant and Adlai Stevenson in the
United Nations to arrange a deal with them.
Your goals:
1) Deny that the USSR has any missiles in Cuba. It does not matter what people are saying, or what
proof they have. The USSR has no need for missiles in Cuba. You have no need to let facts get in the
way of this theme.
2) If Adlai Stevenson presents photographic evidence at the United Nations, you must embarrass him by
reminding him the last time he presented photographic evidence to the UN to advocate for war, they
turned out to be doctored.
3) You will bring whatever proposal Khrushchev advocates to the United Nations, and push for their
passing. You especially like proposals that make the USSR seem reasonable, such as removing nuclear
weapons in Cuba in exchange for removing missiles in Turkey.

Thirteen Days in October

Andrei Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Note: You are the equivalent of Dean Rusk, the United States Secretary of State. As a diplomat, you may
meet with any US person who wishes to talk with you.
Your goals:
1) Deny that nuclear weapons are in Cuba, and that they will never be placed there. Tell the US that the
USSR supports peaceful coexistence, and opposes countries meddling in the foreign affairs of others.
2) You support proposals of mutual disarmament between the two nations.
3) If the United States makes threats against Cuba, point out that their wishes for world peace are
incompatible with the threats they are making. Cuban weapons are defensive only, and are not to be
used against the United States.
4) You must pass any proposals for peace between Khrushchev and your counterpart, Dean Rusk, and
argue for them as passionately as you can.

Thirteen Days in October

Rodion Malinovsky, Minister of Defense and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces
Your goals:
1) You are firmly convinced a nuclear exchange with the United States is inevitable. The only question is
when. It is better to launch nuclear weapons before the United States can prepare for it (by scattering
its armed forces across a wide geographical area to minimize damage). If you see any evidence the
United States is moving to attack Cuba, you will lobby heavily for a pre-emptive nuclear strike.
2) However, the main value of nuclear weapons is as a deterrent. It is better to threaten to use nuclear
weapons than to actually use them. Having a strong conventional force is more important.
3) You demand the military have more say over international incidents like the current one. If
Khrushchev does not listen to you, then you have the power in the Community Party to stage a coup and
get him overthrown. While you are friends with Khrushchev, this will not get in the way of your goal of
having an autonomous military. Make this very clear to him.

Thirteen Days in October

Issa Pliyev, Commander of Soviet Forces in Cuba

This dirt I stand on was brought over from the Motherland. We must defend the Motherland or die!
Note: You have standing orders that if communications with Cuba are cut, you have permission to
launch your nuclear weapons against the United States.
1) You have three R-12 nuclear missile regiments and two R-14 nuclear missile regiments under your
control, as well as 60,000 conventional troops and non-nuclear surface to air missiles. You only have a
few medium range missiles ready for launch yet, so your primary goal is to get the missile sites built as
quickly as possible, barring any counter-orders from the Kremlin.
2) You possess, in secret, 94 tactical (small-yield) nuclear weapons that are ready to be used. If invaded,
you will launch tactical nukes against Guantanamo Bay to destroy it utterly, and nuclear-tipped Surface
to Air missiles to destroy incoming waves of American planes.
3) As part of the Soviet Denial and Deception campaign, you must constantly tell Castro that you have
intelligence suggesting an imminent attack by the United States. This will justify your presence on the
island.

Thirteen Days in October

Vice Admiral Georgi S. Abashvili

If it happens, let it happen here.
You are second in command in Cuba to Pliyev, and commander of Naval forces in the vicinity, which
includes five nuclear-equipped submarines.
1) In the event of a sudden nuclear strike by the Americans, you must order your nuclear submarine
commanders to exercise discretion in when they choose to launch nuclear weapons. You may choose to
have either the captain make the decision, or require the top three officers on each submarine concur in
order to launch nuclear weapons. Tell the person running this simulation your choice.
2) You support a conventional or nuclear exchange between the US and the USSR to take place in Cuba,
instead of in the Russian Motherland. Much better for Cuba to be destroyed, than Moscow. You will
lobby Khrushchev to initiate a surprise attack on the Americans for maximum effectiveness, as the signs
are on the wall that war will begin soon. Whoever strikes first, wins!
3) You oppose any disarmament of Cuba, as your men travelled for months, packed like sardines, in
transport vessels to get to Cuba, and have expended much blood and sweat building up the defenses of
the island. The Americans cannot be trusted to not invade Cuba if we leave.

Thirteen Days in October

Appendix
Photos and videos for the simulation:
It can help to have an LCD projector hooked up to a screen to show maps, photos, videos, etc., while the
simulation is running. For example, when having a UN summit, switch the screen to show the UN flag.
When critical events occur, it can help to play a video from history showing that event taking place.
Many photos and maps of the Cuban Missile Crisis can be found here:
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/photos.htm
Many original letters and documents can be found here, if you want additional handouts:
http://microsites.jfklibrary.org/cmc/
Useful videos to show during the simulation are:
JFK announcing the blockade: http://youtu.be/P7YkJxQT_0Y
Adlai Stevenson interrogating Zorin in the UN: http://youtu.be/MSV9_J8Csts
Other videos:
Thirteen Days (Kevin Costner film): http://youtu.be/tho5ZYLiuoc, though it is full of errors and
misportrayals. See for example: http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5428
The Man Who Saved the World (PBS documentary on how close a Soviet submarine was to launching a
nuclear torpedo at the US Navy): http://www.pbs.org/wnet/secrets/episodes/the-man-who-saved-theworld-watch-the-full-episode/905/
Khrushchevs Perspective during the Cuban Missile Crisis: http://youtu.be/N8hLWDdvBm8
Sergei Khrushchevs (Nikita Khrushchevs son) perspective on it: http://youtu.be/phpe0DsisbY
Good books on the subject:
Thirteen Days by RFK. Excellent book, but in real life he was much more of a hawk than the RFK he
presents here. This was probably done in order to increase his stature as a presidential candidate.
The Cuban Missile Crisis in American Memory by Stern. He examines the myths surrounding the Cuban
Missile Crisis and finds the reality behind it (such as with Thirteen Days, above). He does an excellent job
summarizing the views and motivations of each of the major players.
One Minute to Midnight, an excellent narrative of the Crisis by Dobbs, which was based in part on
interviews with Castro at a Cuban Missile Crisis conference held in Havana many years after the event.
15 Minutes by Keeney which gives a timeline view of the Cold War, including nuclear weapons
development, testing, accidents, war readiness, and so forth, focusing on the views held by General
Curtis LeMay, which were very useful for crafting his persona for this simulation.

Thirteen Days in October