4.2 Traditional and Religious and Other Local Community Leaders

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4.

2 Traditional and religious and other local community leaders


Though traditional rulers do not have any constitutional role in governance in
Nigeria,
historically they have been involved in peace-related activities as custodians of
the
peoples cultures and traditions. All communities in the Middle Belt region
recognize
the centrality of the traditional institutions in the maintenance of peace and
stability.
They have also been engaged by government in this light as a way of garnering
public support and trust in government-related peace endeavours.
Religious institutions have become one of the central pillars of community peace,
security and stability in view of the role that religious leaders play in society, as
well
as the influence they have on their adherents. A respondent in Kafanchan opined
that the pastors and imams meet monthly to discuss issues that affect the
peace and
security of the area (B5.5). Other testimonies affirm that people with family
problems often consult religious leaders and that pastors and imams enjoy a
good
degree of confidence as spiritual or religious leaders.
In Rigasa community of Kaduna state, the sulhu approach to reconciliation is an
effective method used by the traditional rulers (mai anguwa local chiefs - or
hakimi
village heads), whereby together with some respected personalities in the
community, they resolve conflicts in a way that ensures relationships are rebuilt
for
the common good, rather than rely on the formal court processes, which are
often
used as a last resort.
However, notwithstanding the positive role that religious institutions and their
leaders
can play in engendering peace in communities, it is evident that religion has
been
exploited for political and other interests, to the extent that the use of abusive
and
provocative language as well as the hate message of we versus them has been
64
responsible for deep-seated tensions, ill-feelings and intolerance between
Christians
and Muslims.
In each of the LGAs in the region, the role of government in the management and
provision of security is quite evident through the peace and security committees,
which are modeled after those of the state and federal governments.
Membership of
the security committee is drawn from all the security agencies, leadership of the
local
government and some traditional leaders respectively. The security committee
provides a platform and opportunity for exchange of ideas and intelligence on
security matters and how they can be resolved. Though sometimes weak in
terms of
capacity to respond to early warning signs, they prove useful with respect to
having
first hand information on threat analysis.

4.3 Community-level peace initiatives


Many respondents talked with nostalgia about times in the past when different
ethnoreligious
groups lived together in peace and when ties of neighbourhood, friendship
and intermarriage kept them bound together. Although most consider that the
increasing balkanization of communities has changed this, not everyone would
agree:
Our parents before us lived in peace with the TarokI make
sure I tell my Tarok friends of any naming ceremony, marriage,
or any celebration for that matter. We are very close and I
personally consider them my brothers. Many Tarok people have
mingled with my people and even converted to Islam. We give
them our daughter to marry and they live among us without a
single difference. In fact one of us refused to give his daughter
to a fellow Fulani man. Instead he gave her to a Tarok boy who
had stayed with him and reared his cattle and had become like a
son to him. He sponsored the boy to school and now the boy
and the girl are living as husband and wife, so you see what we
are saying. There is nothing better than peace. Before the crisis
there were thousands of Tarok boys living with the Fulani. I can
tell you none of these boys was harmed during the crisis. (B3.9).
One respondent drew attention to the fact that every community has their
ways of
managing conflicts. But most communities today are planning vengeance
instead of
peaceful co-existence (B1.1). This view is echoed by a respondent who
commented: It looks as if, in spite of the cordial relationship that had existed for
years between us, people had not built a mechanism that will promote oneness
(B1.8). These comments underline the fact that although communities within the
Middle Belt region have in place structures and mechanisms for managing
conflicts
for example by facilitating dialogue, reconciliation and trust between or among
people - they appear now to be largely cosmetic, and critically weak as a result
of
deep-seated hatred and the protracted nature of some of the conflicts, leading to
what can be regarded as balance of force or fire for fire.
Interviewees also suggest that the reduction and resolution of community-level
conflicts in the region largely depends on communities appreciating the value of
cooperation to address threats, as well as understanding the consequences of
not
cooperating. Through cooperation they will be well placed to check the
movement of
persons in and out, track early warning signs to conflicts, and contain the
likelihood
of conflicts from elsewhere spilling over into their communities. As a respondent
from Rikkos observed:
65
Some sources of conflict in the community are the rumours of
the crisis in some community. If one person comes into this
community with blood wounds and he said they were done to
him by youth of a certain community, it will bring tension. Now
what happens is that a committee is set up to investigate the
problem. The committee will work to calm the people and enjoin
them to be patient. If the incident is correct, the people are told

to stay at the border for protection of the community. This is


different from before, when people just go to fight (B2.2).
Several community-based peacebuilding initiatives have been designed and
implemented by state and non-state actors in Plateau and Kaduna state. One of
such
has been microcredit schemes for women and youths as a vital tool for conflict
mitigation and empowerment. The best-known examples of community-driven
peace
initiatives are those in Congo-Russia of Jos North LGA, Rantya and Dadin Kowa of
Jos South. These have proven to be models for peace and stability that are well
known and respected locally and that can be replicated. The Dadin Kowa
initiative in
particular was frequently mentioned by respondents, especially those in Rikkos
and
Furaka. In Rigasa community of Kaduna State, the role of women leaders has
proven to be a model that should be appreciated in terms of their ability to
mediate
and settle disputes among Hausa women.
Respondents also referred to inter-faith initiatives. A respondent from Kafanchan
gave this catalogue, for example, of community peacebuilding activities initiated
jointly by Muslim and Christian leaders:
CAN, the bishop of Kafanchan, Jamaatu Nasil Islam, have
organized peace seminars. A cardinal from Rome who was
invited by the bishop to talk on peaceThe emir has formed a
committee for both Muslims and Christians and district heads
from other chiefdoms, where the chairman is a Christian. There
is a subcommittee for public enlightenment of youths on the
effects of drugs. This committee has gone round all the district
inside and outside of Kafanchan. The committee have as part of
its programmes organized peace football match won by Baju
Bombers. The Peace and Reconciliation Committee formed by
the Emir of Jamaa bought the trophies for the 1 st, 2nd and 3rd
positions, while the bishop contributed N300,000.00 to buy
prizes for all participatory teams. The emir and bishop singlehandedly
sponsored the final competition. These are things the
government should be interested to sponsor, not individuals
(B5.5).
Respondents were also aware of humanitarian initiatives to support victims of
violence by providing relief supplies and assistance with rebuilding their homes.
In
some cases these were deliberately intended as gestures of support to the other
side, as when the Governor of Bauchi sent relief supplies and personally came to
ensure that both Muslim and Christian families had received them (described by
respondent B1.11).
In addition, a number of narratives testify to the initiative of individuals, often
described as council chairmen, religious leaders, and other local functionaries,
who
played key roles in supporting victims of violence, reducing tension and keeping
people together, often at extreme risk to themselves. One respondent quoted
the
66
example of his father, then village head, who had helped Hausas in fear of attack
to
relocate out of the area, but was eventually attacked and killed for his pains:

To ensure their safety and protection, my dad arranged for a


security escort for the transiting population of the Hausas who
were grateful for the assistance. When the attack was taking
place, we recognized the voice of some of the attackers who
were contemplating to burn the house of my dad or not. While
some had objected to that, others were of the opinion that his
house should be burnt because he is sarkin arne meaning the
head of unbelievers (B1.7).

5. PATHWAYS FOR THE NSRP

ON THE

MIDDLE BELT REGION

The situation on the ground in the Middle Belt reveals that discontent with past
approaches and efforts at conflict management has grown. It has also become
obvious that sustainable peace in the communities cannot be effected without
productive and constructive partnership between communities, government, civil
society and development partners respectively. It is evident that in the absence
of
such partnership, and without community support and buy-in, peace will be a
mirage.
Dialogue, reconciliation and accommodation are viable strategies that should be
adopted by both state and non-state actors for the management of inter-group
relations in the region.
NSRPs role in strengthening the link between communities and other formal
state
institutions will be a significant step towards stabilization and reconstruction in
the
Middle Belt. This can be done by providing support for traditional institutions at
the
community level to build confidence and strong partnerships between
communities,
governments and development partners.
The patriarchal nature of politics and governance is reflected in conflict
management
to the extent that neither traditional nor modern political institutions allow for
the
involvement of women and youth. The potential for synergy between these
institutions and actors should be effectively utilized for the common good. An
analysis of the political economy of the Middle Belt should take into account the
critical role that women and other vulnerable groups play as far as the dynamics
of
violence in the region is concerned.
The involvement of government institutions at the local, state and federal levels
is
central to effective policy response and intervention, with emphasis on conflict
management and poverty reduction. Many respondents urged government to be
more pro-active in solving problems, specifically in communicating with
communities,
creating youth employment, promoting economic growth and supporting
vulnerable
people through credit facilities, and so on. The perception was that conflicts
would
be much reduced if these initiatives were taken.
It is particularly important to design programmes that focus on strengthening the
capacity of youth groups, neighbourhoods and communities on peace-related
matters. This will help address challenges associated with the breakdown in

community relations or harmony. Youth councils exist in most places; in the


Middle
Belt there are several youth specific groups that have been established and to an
extent supported by government at all levels. Some of such groups have
benefited
from donor support. A development approach was recommended by one
respondent thus:
67
the development approach to conflict management. When the
state and other stakeholders provide basic amenities and create
job for the idle army of youths, it is already managing or even
preventing conflict. This is because people who have nothing
have nothing to protect, nothing for which to fear, and so would
easily resort to burning and mass killing as a way of expressing
their anger against the system which is unjust and unfair to them
(B2.9).
Strengthening the link between state and non-state security providers as it
relates to
security provisioning at the community level, should be a central focus of donor
intervention. This approach will go a long way in addressing the absence of
synergy
and coordination between formal state institutions and the array of non-state
providers. One major challenge that resonates in the discourse on violence and
criminality in Plateau and Kaduna states is also tied to the question of killings
and
attacks, in the face of a security system that is also deficient in terms of
proactiveness
in tackling such problems.
The lingering issues of indigeneship, is a major source of conflict in Jos North and
Kafanchan in Plateau and Kaduna states respectively. The inability of the federal
government to address this issue through a constitutional amendment or review
process constitutes a major problematic in the management of diversity and
efforts
towards accommodation and inclusivity. The NSRP can support advocacy on
clearer
definitions of residency, to address the indigene/settler dichotomy in the polity.
This research into community-level conflict management in Plateau and Kaduna
States, which are part of the Middle Belt region, identified and listened to
peoples
testimonies and experiences relating to the drivers of conflicts in these areas.
Some
of the key issues arising include rising youth unemployment, criminality and
violence,
and the way ethnicity and religion are used as bases for mobilization by the
conflicting parties. Religion and ethnicity have played grave roles as far as
criminality, violent conflict, instability and underdevelopment in the Middle Belt
are
concerned.
Both formal and non-formal mechanisms exist for the regulation of relations
between
groups that are potentially in conflict. However, though these were seen to have
worked well in the past, successive waves of violence have driven communities
apart, and the structures that once linked them are now largely non-existent.
This

suggests that rebuilding these structures of linkage could be a sound


peacebuilding
strategy. The commonalities associated with the experiences of people and
communities as far as conflicts in the Middle Belt region are concerned provide a
sound basis for a coordinated and strategic approach for NSRPs design and
implementation.

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69
SECTION C: NORTH EAST

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