Galido vs.

COMELEC
Facts: Petitioner and private respondent were candidates during the January 18, 1988 local elections for the position of Mayor in
the municipality of Garcia-Hernandez, Province of Bohol. Petitioner was proclaimed the duly-elected Mayor by the Municipal
Board of Canvassers. Private respondent Saturnino Galeon filed an election protest before the RTC of Bohol, Tagbilaran City,
wherein the court upheld the proclamation of petitioner. Private respondent appealed the RTC decision to the COMELEC which
reversed the trial courts decision through its First Division and declared private-respondent the duly-elected mayor. Petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the COMELEC en banc, affirming the decision of the First Division. COMELEC held
that the 15 ballots in the same precinct containing the initial C after the name Galido were marked ballots, and, therefore,
invalid. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and injunction before the Supreme Court, who resolved to dismiss the said petition.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied with finality by the SC. Still, the petitioner filed another petition for
certiorari and injunction which contained the same allegations and legal issues. A TRO was issued by the SC and the private
respondent Galeon now seeks for the dismissal of the present petition for 3 main reasons: 1) Final decisions, orders or rulings of
the COMELEC in election contests involving elective municipal offices are final and executory, and not appealable. 2) The
petition involves pure questions of fact as they relate to appreciation of evidence which is beyond the power of review of the SC.
3) It is exactly the same petition which was already dismissed with finality by the SC. These allegations were answered by the
petitioner: 1) According to the Constitution, the present petition can still be brought to the SC by certiorari, not by an ordinary
appeal. 2) The petition involves pure questions of law. 3) The dismissal with finality of the first petition did not refer to the merits of
the
petition.
Issues:
(1) Whether COMELEC has jurisdiction over the case
(2) May a COMELEC decision be brought to the Supreme Court by a petition for certiorari by the aggrieved party?
(3)

Did

the

COMELEC

gravely

abused

its

discretion

in

rendering

the

decision?

Held:
(1) Yes. COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective
regional, provincial, and city officials and has appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving municipal officials decided by trial
courts of general jurisdiction or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
(2) Yes. The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the COMELEC in contests involving municipal and barangay officials are
final, executory, and not appealable, does not preclude a recourse to the SC by way of a special civil action of certiorari.
(3) No. COMELEC has the inherent power to decide an election contest and the extent to which such precedents apply rests on
its discretion, the exercise of which should not be controlled unless such discretion has been abused to the prejudice of either
party. But this petition has become moot and academic because private respondent has already assumed the position of Mayor
of Garcia-Hernandez as the duly-elected Mayor of the municipality by virtue of the COMELEC decision. Petition dismissed.
People v. Delgado Case Digest [G.R. Nos. 93419-32 September 18, 1990]
FACTS:
COMELEC received reports agains private respondents for alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code. After conducting a
preliminary investigation on said report, The Provincial Election Supervisor found a prima facie case and recommended filing of
an information against each respondents for violation of Sec. 261 (y) (2) and (5) of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC
en banc, in a minute resolution, resolved to file information against the private respondents.
Informations were filed against the respondents in the RTC. The Regional Election Director was designated by COMELEC to
handle the prosecution with the authority to assign another COMELEC prosecutor.
Private respondents filed motions for reconsiderations and the suspension of the warrant of arrest with the respondent court on
the ground that no preliminary investigation was conducted. RTC ordered the reinvestigation of the case and the suspension of
the service of the warrants pending submission of the reinvestigation report of the COMELEC.
COMELEC prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that only the Supreme Court can review the decisions, orders,
rulings and resolutions of the COMELEC but was denied.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not only the Supreme Court can review orders of the COMELEC.
2. Whether or not the respondent court has the authority to order the reinvestigation of the case and to order the COMELEC Law
Department to furnish said respondent the records of the preliminary investigation of the case for the purpose of determining
probable cause.
RULING:
First Issue
The Court held that "what is contemplated by the term final orders, rulings and decisions' of the COMELEC reviewable on
certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and
taken cognizance of by said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers." Thus, the decisions of the
COMELEC on election contests or administrative questions brought before it are subject to judicial review only by this Court.

However, under Section 2(6), of Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC may "investigate and, where appropriate,
prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses and
malpractices." Under Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC, through its duly authorized legal officers, "have
the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the
same."
Section 268 of the same Code provides that: "The regional trial courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide
any criminal action or proceedings for violation of this Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to
vote which shall be under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the decision of the courts, appeal will
lie as in other criminal cases."
From the foregoing provisions of the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that aside from the adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC to decide election contests and administrative questions, it is also vested the power of a
public prosecutor with the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and the prosecution of election offenses
punishable under the Code before the competent court. Thus, when the COMELEC, through its duly authorized law officer,
conducts the preliminary investigation of an election offense and upon a prima facie finding of a probable cause, files the
information in the proper court, said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, all the subsequent
disposition of said case must be subject to the approval of the court. The COMELEC cannot conduct a reinvestigation of the case
without the authority of the court or unless so ordered by the court.
Second Issue
The records of the preliminary investigation required to be produced by the court must be submitted by the COMELEC. The trial
court may rely on the resolution of the COMELEC to file the information, by the same token that it may rely on the certification
made by the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation, in the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Nevertheless the
court may require that the record of the preliminary investigation be submitted to it to satisfy itself that there is probable cause
which will warrant the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
The refusal of the COMELEC or its agents to comply with the order of the trial court requiring them to conduct a reinvestigation in
this case and to submit to the court the record of the preliminary investigation on the ground that only this Court may review its
actions is certainly untenable.
The petition is brought in the name of the People of the Philippines. Thus, Only the Solicitor General can represent the People of
the Philippines in this proceeding. The consent of the Office of the Solicitor General should have been secured by the COMELEC
before the filing of this petition. On this account alone, the petition should be dismissed.
The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
People vs. Inting
FACTS:
On February 6, 1988, A Permanent Nursing Attendant filed a complaint against OIC-Mayor with the COMELEC for allegedly
transferring her to a very remote barangay and without prior permission or clearance from the COMELEC.
After a preliminary investigation by the Provincial Election Supervisor, a prima facie case was found.
On September 26, 1988, a criminal case against the OIC-Mayor was filed with the respondent court for violation of Sec. 261 Par.
(h) of the Omnibus Election Code.
Respondent court issued a warrant of arrest and fixed a bail at five thousand pesos (P 5, 000) as recomended by the Provincial
Election Supervisor.
However, before the accused could be arrested, the trial court set aside its decision on the ground that the Provincial Election
Supervisor is not authorized to determine probable cause pursuant to Sec. 2 Art. III of the 1987 Constitution.
In another order dated November 22, 1988, the court gave Provincial Election Supervisor fifteen (15) days from receipt to file
another information charging the same offense with the written approval of the Provincial Fiscal. Upon failure to comply with the
order, the information was quashed.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Does a preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial Election Supervisor involving election offenses have to be coursed
through the Provincial Fiscal now Provincial Prosecutor, before the Regional Trial Court may take cognizance of the investigation
and determine whether or not probable cause exists?
RULING:
The determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the Election
Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes this determination.
The preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists him to make the determination of

probable cause. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents
behind the Prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the Judge to make his determination.
Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or
released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion
about the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary
investigation proper-whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and,
therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial is the function of the
Prosecutor. The former, which is more properly called preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge.
The latter is executive in nature. It is part of the prosecution's job. It is in this context that we address the issue raised in the
instant petition so as to give meaning to the constitutional power vested in the COMELEC regarding election offenses.
Article IX C Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC not only to investigate but also to prosecute cases of
violation of election laws. This means that the COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving
election offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing an information in court. This power
is exclusive with COMELEC.
The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct
of elections, failure of which would result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the
sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute
offenses committed by public officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear
constitutional mandate.
An examination of the provisions of the Constitution and the Election Code of 1978 reveals the clear intention to place in the
COMELEC exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election offenses committed by any person, whether private
individual or public officer or employee, and in the latter instance, irrespective of whether the offense is committed in relation to
his official duties or not. In other words, it is the nature of the offense and not the personality of the offender that matters. As long
as the offense is an election offense jurisdiction over the same rests exclusively with the COMELEC, in view of its all-embracing
power over the conduct of elections. (Corpus v. Tanodbayan, 149 SCRA 281 [1987]).
Hence, the Provincial Fiscal, as such, assumes no role in the prosecution of election offenses. If the Fiscal or Prosecutor files an
information charging an election offense or prosecutes a violation of election law, it is because he has been deputized by the
COMELEC. He does not do so under the sole authority of his office. (People v. Basilla, et al., G.R. Nos. 83938-40, November 6,
1989). In the instant case, there is no averment or allegation that the respondent Judge is bringing in the Provincial Fiscal as a
deputy of COMELEC. He wants the Fiscal to "approve" the COMELEC's preliminary investigation.
It is to be noted that on February 27, 1987 (when the 1987 Constitution was already in effect) the President issued Executive
Order No. 134 which was the ENABLING ACT FOR ELECTIONS FOR MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ON MAY 11, 1987 AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES." Section 11 thereof provides:
Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have exclusive power to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable as provided for in the preceding section, and to prosecute the same: Provided,
That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within two (2) months from filing, the complainant may file the
complaint with the Office of the Fiscal or with the Department of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted.
The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government.
It is only after a preliminary examination conducted by the COMELEC through its officials or its deputies that section 2, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution comes in. This is so, because, when the application for a warrant of arrest is made and the information is
filed with the court, the judge will then determine whether or not a probable cause exists for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
It is apparant that the respondent trial court misconstrued the constitutional provision when it quashed the information filed by the
Provincial Election Supervisor. The order to get the approval of the Provincial Fiscal is not only superfluous but unwarranted.
The instant petition is GRANTED.
TAN vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986
Governing law: Art XI Sec. 3 of Constitution in relation to Sec. 197 of Local Government Code
Facts:
This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros
to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, effective Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and the
municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto proposed to
belong to the new province).
Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for January 3, 1986. Petitioners opposed,
filing a case for Prohibition and contending that the B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the Local

Government Code because:

The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the territory of the new province of Negros
del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite.
The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only be about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser
than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute, Sec. 197 of LGC.
Issue:
WON the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites of the Consititution, which states that Sec. 3. No
province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in
accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in
a plebiscite in the unit or units affected? NO.
Held:
Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries, the approval of a
majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected must first be obtained. The creation of the proposed new province
of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the division and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental (parent
province).
Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first would be the parent province of Negros
Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the
area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.
Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628) should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent. Rather, the dissenting view
of Justice Abad Santos is applicable, to wit:
when the Constitution speaks of the unit or units affected it means all of the people of the municipality if the municipality is to
be divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger.
The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of the
parent province, not to mention the adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the
petitioners.
SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal effect for being a patent nullity.

Manzala vs. COMELEC

FACTS: Petitioner Ibarra R. Manzala and private respondent Julie R. Monton were mayoralty candidates in the Municipality of
Magdiwang, Romblon, during the May 10, 2004 National and Local Elections. On May 13, 2004, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers proclaimed private respondent as the duly elected Municipal Mayor with 2,579 votes, or a margin of 13 votes, over
petitioners 2,566 votes.
On May 19, 2004, petitioner filed an election protest with the RTC of Romblon seeking recount in the 10 precincts of Magdiwang
on the grounds of fraud, serious irregularities, and willful violation of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang 881)
and other pertinent COMELEC rules allegedly committed by the voters and the Chairman and members of the Board of Election
Inspectors during the election.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner. Petitioner moved for the execution of the decision pending appeal which
the trial court granted on December 16, 2005.
On August 24, 2006, the Former Second Division of the COMELEC issued a Resolution which reversed and set aside the
decision of the trial court. It found that private respondent obtained 2,560 votes, or a margin of 17 votes, over petitioners 2,543
votes.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the COMELEC En Banc in its Resolution of January 24, 2007. It later
affirmed the earlier Resolution dated August 24, 2006.
On February 1, 2007, petitioner filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUE:
1.
2.
HELD:
1.

2.

WON COMELEC has appellate jurisdiction to review, revise, modify, or even reverse and set aside the decision of
the RTC?
WON the RTCs ruling on the validity of the ballots should not be disturbed
Yes. Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and
barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable. In the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
powers, the Constitution also mandates the COMELEC to hear and decide cases first by division and upon motion
for reconsideration, by the COMELEC en banc. Election cases cannot be treated in a similar manner as criminal
cases where, upon appeal from a conviction by the trial court, the whole case is thrown open for review and the
appellate court can resolve issues which are not even set forth in the pleadings. In the present case, the COMELEC
en banc had thoroughly reviewed the decision of its Former Second Division and affirmed the findings thereof with
modification as to the number of votes obtained by both parties after re-appreciation, that is, private respondent
obtained 2,535 votes, or a margin of 60 votes, over petitioners 2,475 votes.
No. The appreciation of the contested ballots and election documents involves a question of fact best left to the
determination of the COMELEC, a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over the country.
To reiterate, the COMELEC is the constitutional commission vested with the exclusive original jurisdiction over
election contests involving regional, provincial and city officials, as well as appellate jurisdiction over election protests
involving elective municipal and barangay officials.

SANIDAD vs. COMELEC

181 SCRA 529
Facts: On 23 October 1989, RA 6766 (Act providing for an organic act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region) was enacted into law. The
plebiscite was scheduled 30 January 1990. The Comelec, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code
(BP 881), RA 6766 and other pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic
Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. Pablito V. Sanidad, a newspaper columnist of Overview for the Baguio Midland Courier assailed
the constitutionality of Section 19 (Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers) of the said resolution, which provides During the
plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall
use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.
Issue: Whether columnists are prohibited from expressing their opinions, or should be under Comelec regulation, during plebiscite periods.
Held: Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was the power to supervise and regulate the use and
enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or
information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public
information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. Neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11-b, 2nd paragraph of
RA 6646 (a columnist, commentator, announcer or personality, who is a candidate for any elective office is required to take a leave of absence
from his work during the campaign period) can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and
regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising
their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates
involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167 has no statutory basis.

ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp v. COMELEC

January 28, 2000
FACTS:
COMELEC issued a Resolution approving the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS CBN or any other groups, its
agents or representatives from conducting exit surveys. The Resolution was issued by
the Comelec allegedly upon "information from a reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR
groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections and to make an exit survey of the vote during the elections for national
officials particularly for President and Vice President, results of which shall be broadcasted immediately. The electoral body
believed that such project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National
Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not authorized or deputized ABS-CBN to undertake the exit
survey.
Two days before the elections on May 11, 1998, the Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner
ABS-CBN. The Comelec was directed to cease and desist, until further orders, from implementing the assailed Resolution or the
restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the exit polls were actually conducted and reported by media without any
difficulty or problem.
ISSUE:

W/N the Comelec, in the exercise of its powers, can absolutely ban exit polls

ABS-CBN:
The holding of exit polls and the nationwide reporting of their results are valid exercises of the freedoms of
speech and of the press
COMELEC:
1)The issuance thereof was "pursuant to its constitutional and statutory powers to promote a clean, honest, orderly and credible
May 11, 1998 elections"; and "to protect, preserve and maintain the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot."
2)It contends that "the conduct of exit surveys might unduly confuse and influence the voters," and that the surveys were
designed "to condition the minds of people and cause confusion as to who are the winners and the losers in the election," which
in turn may result in "violence and anarchy."
3)"exit surveys indirectly violate the constitutional principle to preserve the sanctity of the ballots," as the "voters are lured to
reveal the contents of ballots," in violation of Section 2, Article V of the Constitution and relevant provisions of the Omnibus
Election Code. It submits that the constitutionally protected freedoms invoked by petitioner "are not immune to regulation by the
State in the legitimate exercise of its police power," such as in the present case.
4) "[p]ress freedom may be curtailed if the exercise thereof creates a clear and present danger to the community or it has a
dangerous tendency." It then contends that "an exit poll has the tendency to sow confusion considering the randomness of
selecting interviewees, which further make[s] the exit poll highly unreliable. The probability that the results of such exit poll may
not be in harmony with the official count made by the Comelec x x x is ever present. In other words, the exit poll has a clear and
prsent danger of destroying the credibility and integrity of the electoral process."

SUPREME COURT:

The COMELEC Resolution on exit polls ban is nullified and set aside.

1) Clear and present danger of destroying the integrity of electoral processes

Speculative and Untenable. First, by the very nature of a survey, the interviewees or participants are selected at random, so that
the results will as much as possible be representative or reflective of the general sentiment or view of the community or group
polled. Second, the survey result is not meant to replace or be at par with the official Comelec count. It consists merely of

the opinion of the polling group as to who the electorate in general has probably voted for, based on the limited data gathered
from polled individuals. Finally, not at stake here are the credibility and the integrity of the elections, which are exercises that are
separate and independent from the exit polls. The holding and the reporting of the results of exit polls cannot undermine those of
the elections, since the former is only part of the latter. If at all, the outcome of one can only be indicative of the other.
2) Overbroad
The Comelec's concern with the possible noncommunicative effect of exit polls -- disorder and confusion in the voting centers -does not justify a total ban on them. Undoubtedly, the assailed Comelec Resolution is too broad, since its application is without
qualification as to whether the polling is disruptive or not.[44] Concededly, the Omnibus Election Code prohibits disruptive
behavior around the voting centers.[45] There is no showing, however, that exit polls or the means to interview voters cause
chaos in voting centers. Neither has any evidence been presented proving that the presence of exit poll reporters near an
election precinct tends to create disorder or confuse the voters. Moreover, the prohibition incidentally prevents the collection of
exit poll data and their use for any purpose. The valuable information and ideas that could be derived from them, based on the
voters' answers to the survey questions will forever remain unknown and unexplored. Unless the ban is restrained, candidates,
researchers, social scientists and the electorate in general would be deprived of studies on the impact of current events and of
election-day and other factors on voters' choices.
3) Violation of Ban Secrecy
The contention of public respondent that exit polls indirectly transgress the sanctity and the secrecy of the ballot is off-tangent to
the real issue. Petitioner does not seek access to the ballots cast by the voters. The ballot system of voting is not at issue here.
The reason behind the principle of ballot secrecy is to avoid vote buying through voter identification. Thus, voters are prohibited
from exhibiting the contents of their official ballots to other persons, from making copies thereof, or from putting distinguishing
marks thereon so as to be identified. Also proscribed is finding out the contents of the ballots cast by particular voters or
disclosing those of disabled or illiterate voters who have been assisted. Clearly, what is forbidden is the association of voters with
their respective votes, for the purpose of assuring that the votes have been cast in accordance with the instructions of a third
party. This result cannot, however, be achieved merely through the voters' verbal and confidential disclosure to a pollster of whom
they have voted for.
In exit polls, the contents of the official ballot are not actually exposed. Furthermore, the revelation of whom an elector has voted
for is not compulsory, but voluntary. Voters may also choose not to reveal their identities. Indeed, narrowly tailored
countermeasures may be prescribed by the Comelec, so as to minimize or suppress incidental problems in the conduct of exit
polls, without transgressing the fundamental rights of our people.##
An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified individuals or groups of individuals for the purpose of
determining the probable result of an election by confidentially asking randomly selected voters whom they have voted for,
immediately after they have officially cast their ballots. The results of the survey are announced to the public, usually through the
mass media, to give an advance overview of how, in the opinion of the polling individuals or organizations, the electorate voted.
In our electoral history, exit polls had not been resorted to until the recent May 11, 1998 elections.

SWS vs Comelec
Facts:
Petitioner SWS and KPC states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections and release to
the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of
election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to
justify such restraint.
Issue:
Are the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre-polls and exit polls and the dissemination of their results through
mass media, valid and constitutional?
Ruling:
No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a
direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the
governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression.
It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support
regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the
maintenance of democratic institutions.

1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 206020,

April 14, 2015

PONENTE: Reyes
TOPIC: Election law, prior restraint of free speech, posting of campaign materials on PUV and public terminals, captiveaudience doctrine

DOCTRINE:
The right to participate in electoral processes is a basic and fundamental right in any democracy. It includes not only the
right to vote, but also the right to urge others to vote for a particular candidate. The right to express ones preference for
a candidate is likewise part of the fundamental right to free speech. Thus, any governmental restriction on the right to
convince others to vote for a candidate carries with it a heavy presumption of invalidity.

FACTS:
On January 15, 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615, which provided for the rules implementing R.A.
No. 9006 in connection with the May 13, 2013 national and local elections and subsequent elections. Section 7 thereof,
which enumerates the prohibited forms of election propaganda, pertinently provides:
SEC. 7. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. During the campaign period, it is unlawful:
xxxx
(f) To post, display or exhibit any election campaign or propaganda material outside of authorized common poster areas,
in public places, or in private properties without the consent of the owner thereof.
(g) Public places referred to in the previous subsection (f) include any of the following:
xxxx
5. Public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys, trains, taxi cabs, ferries, pedicabs and tricycles, whether motorized or not;
6. Within the premises of public transport terminals, such as bus terminals, airports, seaports, docks, piers, train stations,
and the like.
The violation of items [5 and 6] under subsection (g) shall be a cause for the revocation of the public utility franchise and
will make the owner and/or operator of the transportation service and/or terminal liable for an election offense under
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9006 as implemented by Section 18 (n) of these Rules.
Petitioner sought for clarification from COMELEC as regards the application of REsolution No. 9615 particularly Section
7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), vis--vis privately owned public utility vehicles (PUVs) and transport
terminals. The petitioner then requested the COMELEC to reconsider the implementation of the assailed provisions and
allow private owners of PUVs and transport terminals to post election campaign materials on their vehicles and transport
terminals.
The COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 13-0214, which denied the petitioners request to reconsider the
implementation of Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 are constitutional.

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the said provisions of Resolution No. 9615 are null and void for being repugnant to Sections 1
and 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 are prior restraints on
speech

Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 unduly infringe on the
fundamental right of the people to freedom of speech. Central to the prohibition is the freedom of individuals, i.e., the
owners of PUVs and private transport terminals, to express their preference, through the posting of election campaign
material in their property, and convince others to agree with them.
Pursuant to the assailed provisions of Resolution No. 9615, posting an election campaign material during an election period
in PUVs and transport terminals carries with it the penalty of revocation of the public utility franchise and shall make the
owner thereof liable for an election offense.
The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right to free expression of the owners of PUVs
and transport terminals. As a result of the prohibition, owners of PUVs and transport terminals are
forcefully and effectively inhibited from expressing their preferences under the pain of indictment for an
election offense and the revocation of their franchise or permit to operate.

The assailed prohibition on posting election campaign materials is an invalid content-neutral regulation
repugnant to the free speech clause.
A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that
merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well-defined standards, is constitutionally permissible, even if it
restricts the right to free speech, provided that the following requisites concur:
1.

The government regulation is within the constitutional power of the Government;

2.

It furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;

3.

The governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and

4.

The incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are content-neutral regulations since they merely control the
place where election campaign materials may be posted. However, the prohibition is still repugnant to the free speech
clause as it fails to satisfy all of the requisites for a valid content-neutral regulation.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615, are not within
the constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC under Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution.
Also, there is absolutely no necessity to restrict the right to free speech of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals.
The COMELEC may only regulate the franchise or permit to operate and not the ownership per se of PUVs
and transport terminals.
In the instant case, the Court further delineates the constitutional grant of supervisory and regulatory powers to the
COMELEC during an election period. As worded, Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution only grants COMELEC
supervisory and regulatory powers over the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation, inter
alia, of transportation and other public utilities. The COMELECs constitutionallydelegated powers of supervision and
regulation do not extend to the ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals, but only to the franchise or permit to
operate the same.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not within the constitutionally delegated power
of the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the franchise or permit to operate of transportation utilities .
The posting of election campaign material on vehicles used for public transport or on transport terminals is not only
a form of political expression, but also an act of ownership it has nothing to do with the franchise or permit to operate the
PUV or transport terminal.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not justified under the captive-audience doctrine.
The captive-audience doctrine states that when a listener cannot, as a practical matter, escape from intrusive
speech, the speech can be restricted. The captive-audience doctrine recognizes that a listener has a right
not to be exposed to an unwanted message in circumstances in which the communication cannot be
avoided.
A regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine is in the guise of censorship, which undertakes selectively to shield the
public from some kinds of speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others. Such selective restrictions have
been upheld only when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home or the degree of captivity makes it either impossible
or impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure.
Thus, a government regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine may not be justified if the supposed captive
audience may avoid exposure to the otherwise intrusive speech. The prohibition under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6)
of Resolution No. 9615 is not justified under the captive-audience doctrine; the commuters are not forced or compelled to
read the election campaign materials posted on PUVs and transport terminals. Nor are they incapable of declining to

receive the messages contained in the posted election campaign materials since they may simply avert their eyes if they find
the same unbearably intrusive.
Lehmans case not applicable
The COMELEC, in insisting that it has the right to restrict the posting of election campaign materials on PUVs and
transport terminals, cites Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, a case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. In Lehman, a policy
of the city government, which prohibits political advertisements on government-run buses, was upheld by the U.S.
Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the advertising space on the buses was not a public forum, pointing out
that advertisement space on government-run buses, although incidental to the provision of public transportation, is a part
of commercial venture. In the same way that other commercial ventures need not accept every proffer of advertising from
the general public, the citys transit system has the discretion on the type of advertising that may be displayed on its
vehicles.
In Lehman, the political advertisement was intended for PUVs owned by the city government; the city government, as
owner of the buses, had the right to decide which type of advertisements would be placed on its buses.
Lehman actually upholds the freedom of the owner of the utility vehicles, i.e., the city government, in choosing the types of
advertisements that would be placed on its properties. In stark contrast, Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No.
9615 curtail the choice of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals on the advertisements that may be posted on their
properties.
Also, the city government in Lehman had the right, nay the duty, to refuse political advertisements on their buses.
Considering that what were involved were facilities owned by the city government, impartiality, or the appearance thereof,
was a necessity. In the instant case, the ownership of PUVs and transport terminals remains private; there exists no valid
reason to suppress their political views by proscribing the posting of election campaign materials on their properties.
Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport terminals from posting election campaign materials violates
the equal protection clause.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 do not only run afoul of the free speech clause, but also of the equal
protection clause. One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right, which
is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
It is conceded that the classification under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not limited to existing
conditions and applies equally to the members of the purported class. However, the classification remains constitutionally
impermissible since it is not based on substantial distinction and is not germane to the purpose of the law . A distinction
exists between PUVs and transport terminals and private vehicles and other properties in that the former,
to be considered as such, needs to secure from the government either a franchise or a permit to operate.
Nevertheless, as pointed out earlier, the prohibition imposed under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of
Resolution No. 9615 regulates the ownership per se of the PUV and transport terminals; the prohibition
does not in any manner affect the franchise or permit to operate of the PUV and transport terminals.
As regards ownership, there is no substantial distinction between owners of PUVs and transport terminals and owners of
private vehicles and other properties. As already explained, the ownership of PUVs and transport terminals, though made
available for use by the public, remains private. If owners of private vehicles and other properties are allowed to
express their political ideas and opinion by posting election campaign materials on their properties, there
is no cogent reason to deny the same preferred right to owners of PUVs and transport terminals. In terms
of ownership, the distinction between owners of PUVs and transport terminals and owners of private
vehicles and properties is merely superficial. Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification.
The fact that PUVs and transport terminals are made available for use by the public is likewise not
substantial justification to set them apart from private vehicles and other properties . Admittedly, any
election campaign material that would be posted on PUVs and transport terminals would be seen by many people.
However, election campaign materials posted on private vehicles and other places frequented by the public,
e.g.,commercial establishments, would also be seen by many people. Thus, there is no reason to single out owners of PUVs
and transport terminals in the prohibition against posting of election campaign materials.
Summary
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 violate the free speech clause; they are
content-neutral regulations, which are not within the constitutional power of the COMELEC issue and are not necessary to
further the objective of ensuring equal time, space and opportunity to the candidates. They are not only repugnant to the
free speech clause, but are also violative of the equal protection clause, as there is no substantial distinction between
owners of PUV s and transport terminals and owners of private vehicles and other properties.
On a final note, it bears stressing that the freedom to advertise ones political candidacy is clearly a significant part of our
freedom of expression. A restriction on this freedom without rhyme or reason is a violation of the most valuable feature of
the democratic way of life.

Funa vs Villar
GR 192791 April 24 2012
Facts:
On February 15, 2001, Pres Arroyo appointed Carague as Chairman of the COA for a term of 7 years. Caragues term of office
started on February 2, 2001 to end on February 2, 2008. On February 7, 2004, Villar was appointed as the third member of the
COA for a term of 7 years starting February 2, 2004 until February 2, 2011.
Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year of Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar was
designated as Acting Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008. Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was
nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly thereafter, the Commission on Appointments confirmed his
appointment. He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in the appointment papers, until the expiration of the
original term of his office as COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011.
Issue 1: W/N a promotional appointment from the position of Commissioner to Chairman is constitutionally permissible and does
NOT constitute reappointment as barred by the Article IX (D), Sec 1 (2) of the Constitution
Yes. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is eligible for an appointment to the
position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban
on reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of service as commissioner and the unexpired period of the
term of the predecessor will not exceed 7 years and provided further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted
from death, resignation, disability or removal by impeachment.
Reappointment found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and the same office (Commissioner to Commissioner or
Chairman to Chairman). On the other hand, an appointment involving a movement to a different position or office (Commissioner
to Chairman) would constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under the
Constitution.
Issue 2: W/N the appointment of Villar to the position of COA Chairman which is made vacant by the expiration of term of the
predecessor is valid
No. The Constitution clearly provides that if the vacancy results from the expiration of the term of the predecessor, the
appointment of a COA member shall be for a fixed 7-year term.
Here, the vacancy in the position of COA chairman left by Carague in February 2, 2008 resulted from the expiration of his 7-year
term. Under that circumstance, there can be no unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor to speak of. Hence, in light of
the 7-year aggregate rule, Villars appointment to a full term is not valid as he will be allowed to serve more than seven 7 years
under the constitutional ban.
Villar had already served 4 years of his 7-year term as COA Commissioner. A shorter term, however, to comply with the 7-year
aggregate rule would also be invalid as the corresponding appointment would effectively breach the clear purpose of the
Constitution of giving to every appointee so appointed subsequent to the first set of commissioners, a fixed term of office of 7
years.

Osmena vs. COA

FACTS: The controversy had its origin in the stabbing by an unknown assailant of Reynaldo de la Cerna, the son of the de la
Cerna Spouses. He was rushed to the Cebu City Medical Center, but unfortunately died that night. His parents claimed that
Reynaldo would not have died were it not for the ineptitude, gross negligence, irresponsibility, stupidity and incompetence of the
medical staff of the Medical Center.
The de la Cerna Spouses accordingly instituted in the RTC of Cebu City a civil action, for recovery of damages, based Article
2180 of the Civil Code. Named defendants were the city of Cebu, the Sangguniang Panlungsod, and five physicians of the Cebu
City Medical Center. The City of Cebu which, according to the complaint, operates, maintains, and manages the Cebu City
Medical Center, was impleaded as defendant on the theory that as employer of the alleged negligent doctors, it was vicariously
responsible for the latters negligence since it failed to exercise due care and vigilance over the doctors while acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, to prevent them from causing the death of Reynaldo. The Civil Code provision relied upon by
plaintiffs, pertinently reads as follows:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those
persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
After the action had been pending for some time, negotiations for an amicable settlement were commenced, which culminated in
an agreement designed to put an end to the controversy in a manner acceptable to the parties.
Since the compromise agreement included a provision for the payment of the sum of P30,000.00 to the plaintiffs by defendant
City of Cebu, the agreement was submitted to the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City. The sanggunian authorized the City
Budget Officer to include in Supplemental Budget of the City . . .the amount of P30,000.00 for financial assistance to the
parents of the late Reynaldo de la Cerna
The agreement was also submitted to the RTC which rendered a judgment (f)inding the same to be in conformity with law,
morals and public policy and enjoining the parties to comply strictly with the terms and conditions thereof.
About 11 months later, however respondent COA disallowed the financial assistance thus granted to the spouses de la Cerna,
saying that no real or substantial relation to the public health, morals, or general welfare of the community can be perceived from
the act of giving such financial assistance.
The City of Cebu filed an MR, and the same denied due course by respondent Commission. Respondent ruled that the motion
was filed more than a year after receipt by the City government of notice of its Decision and thereforethe decision had already
become final and executory.
In behalf of the City of Cebu, Mayor Osmea has come to this Court ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the COA and its
Members in so disallowing the citys appropriation of P30,000.00 made conformably with the compromise agreement in the civil
suit against the City, embodied in due course in the Trial Courts judgment.
Hence this petition for certiorari
ISSUE: WON COA commited grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the payment of P30,000.00 for the compromise agreement
between the parties herein involved.
HELD: Petition granted. The assailed COA decisions are hereby nullified and set aside. Respondent COA is ORDERED to
approve and allow in audit the appropriation of P30,000.00 of Cebu City approved in connection with the judicial compromise
executed by it in the Civil before the RTC of Cebu City
YES
There is to be sure no question that under the Constitution, respondent COA has the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit,
and settle all accounts pertaining to revenue and receipts of, and expenditures, and uses of funds and property, owned or held in
trust by, or pertaining to the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned
or controlled corporations with original charters.
A compromise is a bilateral act or transaction that it expressly acknowledged as a juridical agreement by the Civil Code and is
therein dealt with in some detail. A compromise, declares Article 2208 of said Code, is a contract whereby the parties, by
making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. The Civil Code not only defines and
authorizes compromises, it in fact encourages them in civil actions.
The participation by the City in negotiations for an amicable settlement of a pending litigation and its eventual execution of a
compromise relative thereto, are indubitably within its authority and capacity as a public corporation; and a compromise of a civil
suit in which it is involved as a party, is a perfectly legitimate transaction, not only recognized but even encouraged by law.
That the City of Cebu complied with the relevant formalities contemplated by law can hardly be doubted. The compromise
agreement was submitted to its legislative council, the Sangguniang Panlungsod, which approved it conformably with its
established rules and procedure, particularly the stipulation for the payment of P30,000.00 to the de la Cerna family. Neither may
it be disputed that since, as a municipal corporation, Cebu City has the power to sue and be sued, it has the authority to settle or
compromise suits, as well as the obligation to pay just and valid claims against it.
Obviously, respondent refused to take account of the foregoing legal principles in relation to the antecedents of the provision in
the supplemental budget of the City for payment of P30,000.00. It failed to realize that payment thereof was part of the
consideration, not merely for the settlement of a claim, but for the settlement of an actual controversy, and constituted one of
the reciprocal concessions which the law considers the very heart and life of every compromise.
By making reciprocal concessions, the parties in the civil case before the trial court put an end to the action in a manner
acceptable to all of them. The City thus eliminated the contingency of being made to assume heavier liability in said suit for
damages instituted against it in connection with its operation and management of the Cebu City Medical Center, activities being

undertaken by it in its proprietary (as distinguished from its government) functions and in accordance with which it may be held
liable ex contractu or ex delito, for the negligent performance of its corporate, proprietary or business functions.
It is noteworthy that the compromise in question was approved by, and embodied in the judgment of, the Court, which
pronounced it to be in conformity with law, morals and public policy and enjoined the parties to comply strictly with the terms
and conditions thereof. 23
This judicial compromise is conclusive and binding on all the parties, including the City of Cebu. It is enforceable by execution, as
above stressed. There was no reason whatever to object to it, much less disallow any disbursement therein stipulated. It should
have been approved as a matter of course.
NOTES:
Article 2029 of the Civil Code states:
The Court shall endeavor to persuade the litigants in a civil case to agree upon some fair compromise. And in line with this
policy, the Code directs
(a) the suspension, pursuant to the Rules of Court, of every civil action or proceeding:
(1) if willingness to discuss a possible compromise is expressed by one or both parties, or
(2) if it appears that one of the parties, before the commencement of the action or proceeding, offered to discuss a possible
compromise but the other party refused the offer, as well as
(b) the mitigation of the damages to be paid by the losing party who has shown a sincere desire for a compromise.
The law regards compromises as standing on a higher plane than ordinary agreements, for it declares them, once entered into,
to constitute res judicata, although judicial execution thereof is permitted only with respect to judicial compromises.