PUBCORP CASES

COQUILLA VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 151914, 31 July 2002 [Citizenship; Reacquisition]
FACTS:
Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern
Samar. He grew up and resided there until 1965, when he was
subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen after joining the US
Navy. In 1998, he came to the Philippines and took out a
residence certificate, although he continued making several
trips
to
the
United
States.
Coquilla eventually applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171
which was approved. On November 10, 2000, he took his oath
as
a
citizen
of
the
Philippines.
On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of
Butunga, Oras, Eastern Samar which was approved in 2001. On
February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating
that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for 2 years.
Incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was running for re-election
sought to cancel Coquillas certificate of candidacy on the
ground that his statement as to the two year residency in Oras
was a material misrepresentation as he only resided therein for
6
months
after
his
oath
as
a
citizen.
Before the COMELEC could render a decision, elections
commenced and Coquilla was proclaimed the winner. On July
19, 2001, COMELEC granted Alvarez petition and ordered the
cancellation
of
petitioners
certificate
of
candidacy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Coquilla had been a resident of Oras, Eastern
Samar at least on year before the elections held on May 14,
2001
as
what
he
represented
in
his
COC.
RULING:
No. The statement in petitioners certificate of candidacy that

he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for two years

at the time he filed such certificate is not true. The question is
whether the COMELEC was justified in ordering the cancellation
of his certificate of candidacy for this reason. Petitioner made a
false representation of a material fact in his certificate of
candidacy, thus rendering such certificate liable to
cancellation. In the case at bar, what is involved is a false
statement concerning a candidates qualification for an office
for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. This is a
misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the cancellation
of petitioners certificate of candidacy. The cancellation of
petitioners certificate of candidacy in this case is thus fully
justified
DE LA TORRE vs COMELEC
258 SCRA 483, 1996
Facts: Petitioner Rolando P. Dela Torre was disqualified by the Commission
on Elections from running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in the
May 8, 1995 elections. The ground cited by the COMELEC was Section
40(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991. Said section provides that
those sentenced by final judgement for an offense involving moral turpitude
or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more imprisonment within
two (2) years after serving sentence are disqualified from running for any
elective local position. It was established by the COMELEC that the
petitioner was found guilty by the Municipal Trial Court for violation of the
Anti-Fencing Law. It was contended by the petitioner that Section 40(a) is
not applicable to him because he was granted probation by the MTC.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude.
2. Whether or not a grant of probation affects Section 40(a)s applicability.
Held: The Supreme Court held that actual knowledge by the fence of the
fact that property received is stolen displays the same degree of malicious
deprivation of ones rightful property as that which animated the robbery or
theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. Anent the
second issue, suffice it to say that the legal effect of probation is only to
suspend the execution of the sentence. Petitioners conviction of fencing

which already declared as a crime of moral turpitude and thus falling

squarely under the disqualification found in Section 40(a), subsists and
remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation.

MERCADO VS MANZANO

FACTS:
Manzano and Mercado are vice-mayoral candidates Makati City in
the May 11, 1998 elections. Manzano got the highest number
votes while Mercado bagged the second place. However,
Manzanos proclamation was suspended in view of a pending
petition
for
disqualification
on
the
grouFACTS:
Manzano and Mercado are vice-mayoral candidates Makati City in
the May 11, 1998 elections. Manzano got the highest number
votes while Mercado bagged the second place. However,
Manzanos proclamation was suspended in view of a pending
petition for disqualification on the ground that he is an American
citizen.
In his answer, Manzano admitted that he is registered as a
foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration and alleged that he is a
Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father
and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States (San
Francisco, CA) on Sept. 14, 1955 and is considered an American
citizen under US laws (jus soli). But notwithstanding his
registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino
citizenship.
The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition and
cancelled Manzanos certificate of candidacy on the ground that
he is a dual citizen. Under the Local Government Code (sec. 40),

dual citizens are disqualified from running for any position.

The COMELEC en banc reversed the divisions ruling. In its
resolution, it said that Manzano was both a US citizen and a
Filipino citizen. It further ruled that although he was registered as
an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration and was using
an American passport, this did not result in the loss of his
Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine
citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the US.
Moreover, the COMELEC found that when respondent attained the
age of majority, he registered himself as a Philippine voter and
voted as such, which effectively renounced his US citizenship
under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had US
citizenship.
Hence,

this

petition

for

certiorari.

ISSUES:
o Whether or not Manzano was no longer a US citizen
o Whether or not Manzano is qualified to run for and hold
elective office

HELD:
DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION
Dual

Citizenship

vs.

Dual

Allegiance

To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance.

The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application

of the different laws of two or more states, a person is

simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For
instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents
are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli.
Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his
part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is
possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to
possess
dual
citizenship:

1. Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign

countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
2. Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien
fathers if by the laws of their fathers country such children
are citizens of that country;
3. Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country
the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or
omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines
may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of another state;
but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional
provisions
on
citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which
a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two
or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.

LGC

prohibits

Dual

Allegiance

not

Dual

Citizenship

The phrase dual citizenship in the LGC must be understood as

referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere
dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those
with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict
process with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it would suffice if, upon the filing
of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering
that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting
laws
of
different
states.
By Electing Philippine Citizenship, the Candidate forswear
Allegiance
to
the
Other
Country
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same
time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are
also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It
may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its
laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign
citizenship.
That
is
of
no
moment.
PETITIONERS ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
The COMELEC en bancs ruling was that Manzanos act of
registering himself as a voter was an effective renunciation of his
American citizenship. This ruling is in line with the US Immigration
and Nationality Act wherein it is provided that a person who is a
national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization,
shall lose his nationality by: (e) Voting in a political election in a
foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to

determine the sovereignty over foreign territory. But this provision

was declared unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court.
Nevertheless, our SC held that by filing a certificate of candidacy
when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected
Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American
citizenship.
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he
is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or
immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the
Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance
thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private
respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned,
effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which
he
may
have
said
before
as
a
dual
citizen.
On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the
Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his
youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his
profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this
country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfil his
undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there
are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu
v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the
country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a
naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad
that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be
taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship,

renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act

constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.nd that he is
an
American
citizen.
In his answer, Manzano admitted that he is registered as a
foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration and alleged that he is a
Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father
and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States (San
Francisco, CA) on Sept. 14, 1955 and is considered an American
citizen under US laws (jus soli). But notwithstanding his
registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino
citizenship.
The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition and
cancelled Manzanos certificate of candidacy on the ground that
he is a dual citizen. Under the Local Government Code (sec. 40),
dual citizens are disqualified from running for any position.
The COMELEC en banc reversed the divisions ruling. In its
resolution, it said that Manzano was both a US citizen and a
Filipino citizen. It further ruled that although he was registered as
an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration and was using
an American passport, this did not result in the loss of his
Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine
citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the US.
Moreover, the COMELEC found that when respondent attained the
age of majority, he registered himself as a Philippine voter and
voted as such, which effectively renounced his US citizenship
under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had US
citizenship.
Hence,

this

petition

for

certiorari.

2.

ISSUES:
Whether or not Manzano was no longer a US

citizen
o
Whether or not Manzano is qualified to run for
and hold elective office

HELD:
DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION
Dual

Citizenship

vs.

Dual

Allegiance

To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance.

The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application
of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For
instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents
are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli.
Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his
part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is
possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to
possess
dual
citizenship:

1.

Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in

foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;

Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and

alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers country such
children are citizens of that country;
3.
Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters
country the former are considered citizens, unless by their
act or omission they are deemed to have renounced
Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines
may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of another state;
but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional
provisions
on
citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which
a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two
or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.
LGC

prohibits

Dual

Allegiance

not

Dual

Citizenship

The phrase dual citizenship in the LGC must be understood as

referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere
dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those
with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict
process with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it would suffice if, upon the filing
of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering
that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting
laws
of
different
states.
By Electing Philippine Citizenship, the Candidate forswear

Allegiance

to

the

Other

Country

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same

time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are
also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It
may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its
laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign
citizenship.
That
is
of
no
moment.
PETITIONERS ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
The COMELEC en bancs ruling was that Manzanos act of
registering himself as a voter was an effective renunciation of his
American citizenship. This ruling is in line with the US Immigration
and Nationality Act wherein it is provided that a person who is a
national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization,
shall lose his nationality by: (e) Voting in a political election in a
foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to
determine the sovereignty over foreign territory. But this provision
was declared unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court.
Nevertheless, our SC held that by filing a certificate of candidacy

effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which

he

may

have

said

before

as

dual

On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the

Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his
youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his
profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this
country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfil his
undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there
are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu
v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the
country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a
naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad
that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be
taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship,
renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act

when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected

constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American

RODRIGUEZ vs. COMELEC

citizenship.
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he
is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or
immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the
Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance
thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private
respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned,

citizen.

259 SCRA 296, 1996

Facts: The petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez was a candidate for

Governor in the Province of Quezon in the May 8, 1995
elections. His rival candidate for the said position was
Bienvenido O. Marquez, Jr., herein private respondent. Private
respondent filed a petition for disqualification before the
COMELEC based principally on the allegation that Rodriguez is
a fugitive from justice. Private respondent revealed that a

charge for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and

attempted grand theft of personal property is pending against
the petitioner before the Los Angeles Municipal Court.
Rodriguez is therefore a fugitive from justice which is a
ground for his disqualification/ ineligibility under Section 40 (e)
of the Local Government Code according to Marquez.

Rodriguez, however, submitted a certification from the

Commission of Immigration showing that Rodriguez left the US
on June 25, 1985- roughly five (5) months prior to the
institution of the criminal complaint filed against him before the
Los Angeles Court.

Issue: Whether or not Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice.

Held: No. The Supreme Court reiterated that a fugitive from

justice includes not only those who flee after conviction to
avoid punishment but likewise who, being charged, flee to
avoid prosecution. The definition thus indicates that the intent
to evade is the compelling factor that animates ones flight
from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be
an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is
knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted
indictment or of a promulgated judgement of conviction.
GAMBOA VS AGUIRRE [310 SCRA 867]
A vice-governor who is concurrently an acting governor is
actually a quasi-governor. For the purpose of exercising his
legislative prerogatives and powers, he is deemed a non
member of the SP for the time being. A Vice-Governor who is
concurrently an Acting Governor is actually a quasi-Governor.
This means, that for purposes of exercising his legislative
prerogatives and powers, he is deemed as a non-member of
the SP for the time being.

Being the Acting Governor, the Vice-Governor cannot continue

to simultaneously exercise the duties of the latter office, since
the
nature of the duties of the provincial Governor call for a fulltime occupant to discharge them. 19 Such is not only
consistent with but also appears to be the clear rationale of the
new Code wherein the policy of performing dual functions in
both offices has already been abandoned. To repeat, the
creation of a temporary vacancy in the office of the Governor
creates a corresponding temporary vacancy in the office of the
Vice-Governor whenever the latter acts as Governor by virtue
of such temporary vacancy. This event constitutes an "inability"
on the part of the regular presiding officer (Vice Governor) to
preside during the SP sessions, which thus calls for the
operation of the remedy set in Article 49(b) of the Local
Government Code concerning the election of a temporary
presiding officer. The continuity of the Acting Governor's (Vice
Governor) powers as presiding officer of the SP is suspended so
long as he is in such capacity. Under Section 49(b), "(i)n the
event of the inability of the regular presiding officer to preside
at the sanggunian session, the members present and
constituting a quorum shall elect from among themselves a
temporary presiding officer.
RODOLFO
E.
AGUINALDO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LUIS SANTOS, as Secretary of the Department of Local
Government, and MELVIN VARGAS, as Acting Governor of
Cagayan, respondents.
NOCON, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory
injunction and/or restraining order, petitioner Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo assails
the decision of respondent Secretary of Local Government dated March
19,1990 in Adm. Case No. P-10437-89 dismissing him as Governor of
Cagayan on the ground that the power of the Secretary of Local
Government to dismiss local government official under Section 14, Article I,
Chapter 3 and Sections 60 to 67, Chapter 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code, was repealed by the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution.

The pertinent facts are as follows: Petitioner was the duly elected Governor
of the province of Cagayan, having been elected to said position during the
local elections held on January 17, 1988, to serve a term of four (4) years
therefrom. He took his oath sometimes around March 1988.
Shortly after December 1989 coup d'etat was crushed, respondent
Secretary of Local Government sent a telegram and a letter, both dated
December 4, 1989, to petitioner requiring him to show cause why should
not be suspended or remove from office for disloyalty to the Republic, within
forty-eight (48) hours from receipt thereof.
On December 7, 1989, a sworn complaint for disloyalty to the Republic and
culpable violation of the Constitution was filed by Veronico Agatep, Manuel
Mamba and Orlino Agatep, respectively the mayors of the municipalities of
Gattaran, Tuao and Lasam, all in Cagayan, against petitioner for acts the
latter committed during the coup. Petitioner was required to file a verified
answer to the complaint.
On January 5, 1990, the Department of Local Government received a letter
from petitioner dated December 29, 1989 in reply to respondent Secretary's
December 4, 1989 letter requiring him to explain why should not be
suspended or removed from office for disloyalty. In his letter, petitioner
denied being privy to the planning of the coup or actively participating in its
execution, though he admitted that he was sympathetic to the cause of the
rebel soldiers. 1
Respondent Secretary considered petitioner's reply letter as his answer to
the complaint of Mayor Veronico Agatep and others. 2 On the basis thereof,
respondent Secretary suspended petitioner from office for sixty (60) days from
notice, pending the outcome of the formal investigation into the charges against
him.
During the hearing conducted on the charges against petitioner,
complainants presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove the
charges. Petitioner neither presented evidence nor even cross-examined
the complainant's witnesses, choosing instead to move that respondent
Secretary inhibit himself from deciding the case, which motion was denied.
Thereafter, respondent Secretary rendered the questioned decision finding
petitioner guilty as charged and ordering his removal from office. Installed
as Governor of Cagayan in the process was respondent Melvin Vargas,
who was then the Vice-Governor of Cagayan.

Petitioner relies on three grounds for the allowance of the petition, namely:
(1) that the power of respondent Secretary to suspend or remove local
government official under Section 60, Chapter IV of B.P. Blg. 337 was
repealed by the 1987 Constitution; (2) that since respondent Secretary no
longer has power to suspend or remove petitioner, the former could not
appoint respondent Melvin Vargas as Governor of Cagayan; and (3) the
alleged act of disloyalty committed by petitioner should be proved by proof
beyond reasonable doubt, and not be a mere preponderance of evidence,
because it is an act punishable as rebellion under the Revised Penal Code.
While this case was pending before this Court, petitioner filed his certificate
of candidacy for the position of Governor of Cagayan for the May 11, 1992
elections. Three separate petitions for his disqualification were then filed
against him, all based on the ground that he had been removed from office
by virtue of the March 19, 1990 resolution of respondent Secretary. The
commission on Elections granted the petitions by way of a resolution dated
May 9, 1992. On the same day, acting upon a "Motion to Clarify" filed by
petitioner, the Commission ruled that inasmuch as the resolutions of the
Commission becomes final and executory only after five (5) days from
promulgation, petitioner may still be voted upon as a candidate for governor
pending the final outcome of the disqualification cases with his Court.
Consequently, on May 13, 1992, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with
this Court, G.R. Nos. 105128-30, entitled Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo v.
Commission on Elections, et al., seeking to nullify the resolution of the
Commission ordering his disqualification. The Court, in a resolution dated
May 14, 1992, issued a temporary restraining order against the Commission
to cease and desist from enforcing its May 9, 1992 resolution pending the
outcome of the disqualification case, thereby allowing the canvassing of the
votes and returns in Cagayan to proceed. However, the Commission was
ordered not to proclaim a winner until this Court has decided the case.
On June 9, 1992, a resolution was issued in the aforementioned case
granting petition and annulling the May 9, 1992 resolution of the
Commission on the ground that the decision of respondent Secretary has
not yet attained finality and is still pending review with this Court. As
petitioner won by a landslide margin in the elections, the resolution paved
the way for his eventual proclamation as Governor of Cagayan.
Under the environmental circumstances of the case, We find the petition
meritorious.

Petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered

the administration case pending before Us moot and academic. It appears
that after the canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered the most number of
votes among the candidates for governor of Cagayan province. As held by
this Court in Aguinaldo v. Comelec et al., supra,:

2nd 4011; Montgomery v. Newell, 40 S.W. 23rd 418; People

ex rel Bashaw v. Thompson, 130 P. 2nd 237; Board of
Com'rs Kingfisher County v. Shutler, 281 P. 222; State v.
Blake, 280 P. 388; In re Fedula, 147 A 67; State v. Wald, 43
S.W. 217)

. . . [T]he certified true xerox copy of the "CERTITICATE OF

VOTES OF CANDIDATES", attached to the "VERY
URGENT MOTION FOR THE MODIFICATION OF THE
RESOLUTION DATED MAY 14, 1992["] filed by petitioner
shows that he received 170,382 votes while the other
candidates for the same position received the following total
number of votes: (1) Patricio T. Antonio 54,412, (2)
Paquito F. Castillo 2,198; and (3) Florencio L. Vargas
48,129.

The underlying theory is that each term is

separate from other terms, and that the
reelection to office operates as a
condonation of the officer's misconduct to
the extent of cutting off the right to remove
him therefor. (43 Am. Jur. p. 45, citing Atty.
Gen. v. Kasty, 184 Ala. 121, 63 Sec. 599, 50
L.R.A. [NS] 553). As held in Comant v.
Bregan [ 1887] 6 N.Y.S.R. 332, cited in 17
A.L.R. 63 Sec. 559, 50 [NE] 553.

xxx xxx xxx

Considering the fact narrated, the expiration
of petitioner's term of office during which the
acts charged were allegedly committed, and
his subsequent reelection, the petitioner
must be dismissed for the reason that the
issue has become academic. In Pascual v.
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, L-11959,
October 31, 1959, this Court has ruled:
The weight of authority,
however, seems to incline to
the ruled denying the right to
remove from office because
of misconduct during a prior
term to which we fully
subscribe.
Offenses committed, or acts done, during a previous term
are generally held not to furnish cause for removal and this
is especially true were the Constitution provides that the
penalty in proceeding for removal shall not extend beyond
the removal from office, and disqualification from holding
office for a term for which the officer was elected or
appointed. (6 C.J.S. p. 248, citing Rice v. State, 161 S.W.

The Court should ever remove a public officer for acts done
prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be
to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers.
When a people have elected a man to office, it must be
assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and
character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or
misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the
court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically
overrule the will of the people. (Lizares v. Hechanova, et al.,
17 SCRA 58, 59-60 [1966]) (See also Oliveros v. Villaluz, 57
SCRA 163 [1974])3
Clear then, the rule is that a public official can not be removed for
administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous
misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The
foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminalcases pending
against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup.
The other grounds raised by petitioner deserve scant consideration.
Petitioner contends that the power of respondent Secretary to suspend or
remove local government officials as alter ego of the President, and as
embodied in B.P. Blg. 337 has been repealed by the 1987 Constitution and
which is now vested in the courts.

We do not agree. The power of respondent Secretary to remove local

government officials is anchored on both the Constitution and a statutory
grant from the legislative branch. The constitutional basis is provided by
Articles VII (17) and X (4) of the 1987 Constitution which vest in the
President the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and
offices and the power of general supervision over local governments, and
by the doctrine that the acts of the department head are presumptively the
acts of the President unless expressly rejected by him. 4 The statutory grant
found in B.P. Blg. 337 itself has constitutional roots, having been enacted by the
then Batasan Pambansa pursuant to Article XI of the 1973 Constitution, Section
2 of which specifically provided as follows
Sec. 2. The National Assembly shall enact a local
government code which may not thereafter be amended
except by a majority vote of all its Members, defining a more
responsive and accountable local government structure with
an effective system of recall, allocating among the different
local government units their powers, responsibilities, and
resources, and providing for the qualifications, election and
removal, term, salaries, power, functions, and duties of local
government officials, and all other matters relating to the
organization and operation of the local units. However, any
change in the existing form of local government shall not
take effect until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite called for the purpose. 5
A similar provision is found in Section 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution,
which reads:
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code
which shall provided for a more responsive and accountable
local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall,
initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local
government units their powers, responsibilities, and
resources, and
provide
for
thequalifications, election, appointment, and removal, term
and salaries, powers and functions and duties of local
officials, and all other matters relating to the organization
and operation of the local units. 6
Inasmuch as the power and authority of the legislature to enact a local
government code, which provides for the manner of removal of local

government officials, is found in the 1973 Constitution as well as in the 1987

Constitution, then it can not be said that BP Blg. 337 was repealed by the
effective of the present Constitution.
Moreover, in Bagabuyo et al. vs. Davide, Jr., et al., 7 this court had the
occasion to state that B.P. Blg. 337 remained in force despite the effectivity of
the present Constitution, until such time as the proposed Local Government
Code of 1991 is approved.
The power of respondent Secretary of the Department of Local Government
to remove local elective government officials is found in Secs. 60 and 61 of
B.P. Blg. 337. 8
As to petitioner's argument of the want of authority of respondent Secretary
to appoint respondent Melvin Vargas as Governor of Cagayan, We need but
point to Section 48 (1) of B.P. Blg 337 to show the fallacy of the same, to
writ
In case a permanent vacancy arises when a governor . . .
refuses to assume office, fails to quality, dies or is removed
from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently
incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office, the
vice-governor . . . shall assume the office for the unexpired
term of the former. 9
Equally without merit is petitioner's claim that before he could be suspended
or removed from office, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required
inasmuch as he is charged with a penal offense of disloyalty to the Republic
which is defined and penalized under Article 137 of the Revised Penal
Code. Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally under the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code, but administratively with the end in view of
removing petitioner as the duly elected Governor of Cagayan Province for
acts of disloyalty to the Republic where the quantum of proof required is
only substantial evidence. 10
WHEREFORE, petitioner is hereby GRANTED and the decision of public
respondent Secretary of Local Government dated March 19, 1990 in Adm.
Case No. P-10437-89, dismissing petitioner as Governor of Cagayan, is
hereby REVERSED.
SO ORDERED