Talks to reinfoce the Ph

ilippines 1940
Under War Plan Orange, it was agreed between the US Army and Navy that t
he US forces in the Philippines would hold onto the Manila Bay area against any
and all attacks until the Pacific Fleet could arrive and use the facilities as i
ts bases to relieve the besieged forces. The Navy sought to hold the islands whi
le the Army viewed them as a liability. The Army had decided to maintain its tro
ops around Manila area but not to reinforce them as it was to be used as a sacri
ficial force; the decision was due in part to the United State's decision to gra
nt the Philippines its independence in 1946. However, some officers opposed the
current tenants of War Plan Orange. Lt.Col.Carl Spaatz was the division chief of
the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps (OCAC). On 1 September, 1939 Spaatz si
gned a memorandum for the attention of Maj.Gen.Henry Arnold, the air corps chief
. In it he developed an ambitious airpower strategy for the Philippines which wa
s completely opposed to the War Department policy. The memorandum was written by
Capt.Hoyt Vandenberg and in it he called for reinforcing the Philippines with t
wo heavy bomber groups, three medium bomber groups and two pursuit groups, inclu
ding supporting and reconnaissance aircraft, for a total of aprox.393 airplanes.
His plan while visionary, was impossible to implement in 1939 or even 1940. Whi
le he called for 68xB-17 there were only 15 in the entire Army Air corps and it
would be a year before the last of hte next batch came off the assembly line-77
B and C models-delivered. To obtain the 160 fighter planes he needed to fill the
two pursuit groups he would have to transfer 3/5 of the available P-35s and P-3
6s in the entire AIr Corps arsenal. Furthremore in the heretical report, Vandenb
erg called for the Philippines to be used as a base for future offensive actions
. He planned to eventually be able to strike industrial targets in Japan itself.
Also listed in Vandenbergs plan was at the outbreak of hostilities, that a furt
her six bomber groups and six supporting long range reconnaissance squadrons to
provide the striking power adequate enough to cause damage in Japan. In total, h
is plan called for 208xB-17 plus 64 long range recon planes, which was completel
y impossible for the production levels of 1940 American to reach.
Besides the impossibility of producing all the aircraft he called for, Vandenber
g's plan was surprisingly invalid. He based his plan on the supposed fact that t
he B-17 could fly 2000 mile with full combat load to deliver bombs over industri
al areas of Japan. However, the latest models of the B-17 did not pocess the ran
ge necesary for such long range strikes. In spite of this, Arnold submitted Vand
enbergs plan to the War Department, but it was filed away. It wasn't until late
February, 1940 that the department began to pay attention to air power in the Ph
ilippines. On 21 February of that year the Navy and Army held a joint meeting. T
He navy argued for even a minor increase in air reinforcements to deter Japan fr
om attacking the Philippines. Two days after the board meeting, the WPD proposed
the deployment of 4411 aircraft to the Philippines. The group also included B-1
7s into the air power, though only one heavy bombardment group as opposed to the
two that Vandenberg recomended. However, it would cost $22.9 million to upgrade
Luzon's airfields adequately to accomodate the proposed air force; $3.8 million
to transport the aircraft to the Philippines, and $99.3 million to replace the
wing in the US from which the aircraft would be drawn. However, the US governmen
t at the time was dropping the military budget and so the proposal was dropped f
or the time being.
Philippi
ne Department (Maj.Gen.George Grunert)

The 4th Composit

e Group (July, 1940) (Col.Lawrence Churchill)
------------------------------------------------------------3rd Pursuit Squa
dron: 28xP-26A Peashooters (out of 34 shipped in 1937) (9 pilots)
28th Bombardment
Squadron: 17xB-10B Bombers (recieved 1937-39) (7 pilots)
2nd Observation
Squadron:10xO-46A Observation planes (recieved 1935) (10 pilots)
5xZO-19E observation craft
3xfabric biplanes used for liason and courier duties
-Keystone ZB-3A bomber
-Douglas OA-4 amphibian
-Douglas OA-9 amphibian
The American Air precense in the Philippines up until World War two cons
isted of the 4th Composite Group. It was first formed from the Great Wars 2nd, 3
rd, and 28th aero quadrons in 1919. The 2nd Aero squadron had served in teh Phil
ippines beginning in 1915 and it was transferred back from Rockwell field, Calif
ornia in 1920 after training duties in the United States during the war. The 3rd
aero squadron was also stateside training unit during the war and was transferr
ed from Mitchel Field New York in 1920. The 28th Squadron had served in combat o
n the Western Front and was transfered to the group in 1922. Shortly after the f
ormation, the units were redesignated as the 2nd Observational Squadron, 3rd Pur
suit Squadron, and the 28th Bombardment Squadron, which reflected the missions o
f each squadron. Their collective mission was to train for coastal defense and s
o exercises and maneuvers with Arm yground forces and naval forces were a regula
r and important part of its mission. Another important task for the 4th Composit
e Group during the 1920s was aerial mapping of the Philippines; this was primari
ly done by the 2nd Observational Squadron.
The air units in the Philippines and Panama canal zones were notorious for getti
ng second line aircraft; they were the dumping ground for obsolete and unwanted
airplanes within the army air force. Some of the planes were so obsolete they we
re given the prefix "Z" in their designation which included the Thomas-Morse Z-1
9E observation biplane dating from 1931 and the Keystone ZB-3A bomber of 1930 vi
ntage. The commander of 4th Composite Group, Col.Lawrence Churchill was disturbe
d just as much about the lack of personnel as he was about all the obsolete airp
lanes. His squadrons were completely understaffed and the Philippines was not an
ideal place to train new pilots and crews. The grips of Col.Churchill and his p
ilots were heard and shared by commander of the Philippine Department, Maj.Gen.G
eorge Grunert. Beginning in July, 1940 he began bombarding the US War Department
with requests for reinforcements, particularly in the air arm. On 22 July he de
scribed his aircraft and his air peronnel situation. He requested that his obsol
ete aircraft be upgraded to modern aircraft and that he be given 10 additional l
ight bombers so that he could at least acquaint his pilots with them. He pointed
out that the three tactical squadrons at the time were grossly undermanned. The
3rd Pursuit had 9 of its authorized 21 pilots; the 28th Bomb Squadron had 7 of
its 14 authorized pilots, and the 2nd Observation Squadron had 10 of its 15 auth
orized pilots. He asked the war department to provide him with an additional 39
army air officers to bring his squadrons up to assigned strength. In spite of Gr
unert's repeated messages, Washington did not reply.

Grunerts request for modern aircraft and more pilots met with disapproval of hte
army air corps chief, General Arnold. No modern aircraft should be sent as a re
placement, although 3xB-18s and 4xO-49s would be added to Grunnerts force by 1 J
uly, 1941. Grunerts request to replace the old obsolete P-26s with more modern p
ursuit planes was flatly denied by Arnold and he notified the WPD on 8 August, 1
940 of this decision. He also refused to give up flying peronnel for the Philipp
ines. The War department accepted Arnolds decision and on 12 September, the WPD
returned his endorsement with a message saying that his request for modern aircr
aft and additional pilots, "had not been favorably considered." However, interna
tional events went on to influence the development of American air power in the
Philippines. Japan seized areas of Indo-China from Vichy France in a poorly disg
uised "agreement". American international policy shifted to economic embargo tow
ard Japan and now were taking increasingly hardlined approaches to deter Japan f
rom beginning a war; the Army was now under pressure from the Navy and Grunert t
o supply the Philippines with more modern aircraft. In mid October, 1940 Marshal
l and Stimson developed a plan to take over a shipment of sixty Seversky EP-1 pu
rsuit planes that had been contracted for Sweden and send 48 of them to the Phil
ippines instead. On 18 October, Stimson secured the presidents approval of the p
lan, despite the fact that the decision ran counter to national policy to *not*
reinforce the Philippines.
The issue from this decision was simply, who would fly the planes when there wer
e only nine pursuit pilots currently in the Philippines? Army Air Corps chief, M
aj. "Hap" Arnold initially resisted Marshalls call for two of his few stateside
based pursuit squadrons to be transfered to the Philippines, but on 16 October h
e reluctantly directed his own plans division to prepare a plan for assigning pi
lots from the two pursuit squadrons for stationing in the Philippines Department
. On 18 October the 1st Pursuit Groups 17th Pursuit Squadron based at Selfridge
Air Base, Michigan and the 35th Pursuit Groups 20th Pursuit Squadron based at Ha
milton Field, Claifornia, were ordered to depart for Philippines duty. On 24 Oc
tober, the New York Times gave the decision to send aerial reinforcements to the
Philippines front page billing. That same day, Navy Secretary Knox snapped, "We
can defend anything!".

Patrol Wing 10
In September 1939, Navy squadron VP-21 flew to the Philippines via Wake Atoll, M
idway, and Guam. It was equipped with 14xPBY-4 flying boats and their purpose wa
s to provide long range recon around the Philippines and detect incoming invasio
n fleets. Their main base was at Sangley Point in Manila Bay. Since the seaplane
s at Sangley Point were unfinished, they were moored at buoys that had been set
by the tender USS Langley. The pilots had to live aboard the Langley for the tim
e being. The pilots of the flying boats practiced horizontal bombing from 10,000
to 12,000 ft. Torpedo bombing training happened only sprasley. Gunnery practice
was done almost never. Eventually, the Flying boats were stationed at Sangley P
oint and the pilots would live there and in 16 December, 1940 VP-26 was selected
to join VP-21 in the Philippines and was put under a combined command called Pa
trol Wing 10. In June 1940, VP-26 flew to the Philippines with their 14xPBY-14 a
nd traded their new flying boats with VP-21 and from there they flew those flyin
g boats to Hawaii where they recieved their much needed overhaul before flying t
hose planes back to Sangley point. The two squadrons were then redesignated: VP21 became VP-101 and VP-26 became VP-102. Eight days after VP-102 joined VP-101
in the Philippines, the USS Childs joined Patrol Wing 10 as its second seaplane
tender. A few months later the USS William B. Preston had also joined them. The
Childs and Preston were converted 4 stack destroyers from world war 1 and they w
ere significantly faster than the old Langley; the two ex-destroyers could make
25 knots. Shortly afterwards, the seaplane carrier USS Heron joined Patwing-10.
The Heron was responsible for the utility squadrons 4xJ2F "Ducks", Five Vought O

S2U Kingfishers and one Courtiss SOC Seagull. The USS Langley also carried 2xSOC
Seagulls. A second seaplane base was established at Olongapo on Subic bay. Gene
rally, VP-102 was at Olongapo and VP-101 at Sangley Point. Since Olongapo lacked
main maintenance and recreation facilities, the two squadrons would trade every
6 months. The squadron was commanded by Captain Frank Wagner. Patrols were init
ially limmited to the Philippines with a few to Borneo and Celebes. With Japanes
e-American politics deteriorating rapidly, the squadron began patrolling Camranh
Bay in French Indochina. Each patrol was made with 2 planes covering adjacent s
ectors.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------The 4th Composite Group was the air force assigned to the Philippines. T
he 3rd Pursuit Squadron had been assigned to it since 1919 and since 1936 it had
been equipped with the P-26A "peashooter". Under orders from Henry Knox, on 23
November, 1940 the 20th Pursuit Squadron arrived in the Philippines from Hamilto
n field in California and on 5 December, the 17th Pursuit Squadron arrived from
Selfridge Field in Michigan. The 17th Pursuit had arrived on the Army transport
Etolin and with it were the 56xP-35A in their crated boxes that had been command
eered from the Swedish. Initially, the 17th Pursuit was handed 8xP-26A at Nichol
s field; Maj.Kirtley Gregg was dismayed to realize that one of the planes was th
e *same* one he had flow in 1934-1935 as it had his initials in the left panel.
He was the commander of the 17th Pursuit and currently he had 19 pilots under h
is command. With the pilots and all the maintenance and administrative personnel
, the 17th PS had 157 enlisted men and was stationed at Nichols. However, of the
19 pilots, five were selected for service in other squadrons of the 4th Composi
te Group and upon arriving in the Philippines, three others were reassigned to t
he 3rd Pursuit Squadron; they were Grant Mahony, Gerry Keenan, and Bob Hanson. A
round 10 January, 1941 Grant Mahony upon landing his P-26A at Iba field, nosed u
p bending the prop and putting the plane out of commission, much to the amusemen
t of his flying mates. On 10 February, the Etolin arrived at Pier 7 in Manila Ba
y amid much fanfare; it offloaded 24 additional pilots for the 4th Composite Gro
up. The morning before, Gregg had led 18xP-26A in formation flight over the Etol
in as it approached; it was the first time the 4th Composite Group managed to ge
t more than eight planes airborne at once. The day they arrived there was a part
y put forth at the Army-Navy club and Gregg warmly welcomed Nathaniel "Cy" Blant
on, Jack Dale, George Kiser, and David Obert to his squadron. On 21 February, 19
41 the pilot Doug Lebee, a member of the 3rd PS attempted to impress some filipi
no mill workers south of Manila with daredevil flying. Whilte attempting to fly
inverted just above the ground, he misjudged his flight and flew into the ground
with his P-26A killing himself. By this time the P-35s were being assembled, bu
t the air corps was still equipped with obsolete aircraft. The 4th Composite Gro
up still was using 24xP-26A, 12xB-10B, 10xO-46A, and 2xO-19E. Back in Washington
, throughout February, the command generals bickered as to what reinforcements-i
f any- should be sent to the Philippines. While the P-35s were still being uncra
ted in February, it was decided on a compromise to send a squadron of "modern" P
-40B and a squadron of B-18 bombers from Hawaii to the Philippines. Of course, t
he P-40B was not an adequate pursuit aircraft at this time, but the argument fel
l on deaf ears. Progress in equipping the air forces continued so that by 28 Feb
ruary, 14xP-35A were operational with twenty-two unoperational. Also, in January
the War Department intercepted a shipment of 9xA-27 attack trainers that were i
n shipment to Siam and rerouted them to the Philippines to be used as trainers.
Each squadron got three, though, its unknown how many were kept operational at a
ny time.
Philippine Department (M
aj.Gen. Grunert)

4th Composite Group (Col.Lawrenc

e Churchill) (10 February, 1941)
3rd Pursuit Squadron (Maj.Robbie Robert
son)
-8xP-26A
-3xA-27 trainers
17th Pursuit Squadron (Maj.Kirtley Gregg
) (15 pilots)
-

-8xP-26A
-3xA-27 trainers
20th Pursuit Squadron (Maj.Orrin Grover)
-8xP-26A
-3xA-27 trainers
28th Bombardment Squadron (Maj.Lester Ma

itland)
-12xB-10B
2nd Observation Squadron
10xO-46A
2xO-19E
*52xP-35A had arrived in crates and a
re being assembled*
By 7 March, 1941 there was over 30xP-35A in commission and they were being divid
ed up between the three pursuit squadrons. The new Class 40-H graduates fresh of
f the Etolin were confined to flying the P-26A for training while the 24 "oldies
" in the three pursuit squadrons each got their own P-35A to train with. The old
er pursuit pilots were enjoying their new fighters as they were faster, more man
ueverable, closed cockpit, newer, and better looking. The newer pilots were requ
ired to train and orient themselves in the P-26s and by the beginning of March,
Andry Krieger had got some 20 hours in the peashooter. By the end of March, betw
een the 3rd, 17th, and 20th Pursuit Squadrons there were now 42xP-35A in commiss
ion (out of 52) and still 22xP-26A in commission. By the end of March, it was ru
mored that Brig.Gen.Henry Clagett would be taking over command of the 4th Compos
ite Group and it was also rumored that two additional pursuit squadrons would be
arriving.
On 4 May, 1941 the "China Clipper" arrives carrying Brig.Gen.Henry Clagett and h
is chief of staff Col.Harold George. An 18 plane formation of P-26A met the clip
per as it flies in and escort it. Two days later Clagett took over his position
of commanding the Philippine Department Air Force which was established that day
on 6 May. On 8 May, a huge crowd headed to Pier 7 in Manila Bay. The transport
Washington had just docked with another group of reinforcements for the Philippi
ne Department. The passengers included 39 new graduate pilots from class 41-B. E
ach pursuit squadron was assigned 8 pilots from this batch. On 9 May, Clagett in
stitutded sweeping command reforms to the 4th Composite Group. Col.Churchill was
relieved of command of the Group and then Gregg was made CO of the 4th Composit
e Group (minus the 28th Bomb Squadron and 2nd Observation Squadron) and Maj.Orri
n Grover was appointed to serve as the group operations officer that same day. F
irst, Lt.Boyd "Buzz" Wagner was ordered to replace Gregg as CO of the 17th Pursu
it Squadron. 1st Lt.Joseph Moore was ordered to replace Grover as the 20th Pursu
its CO and finally Maj.William Maverick was selected as CO of the 3rd PS as Rob
bie Robertson was scheduled to leave 14 May on the USAT Washington for a statesi
de tour. In Mid-May they commenced their training program initially in their Nor
th American A-27 two seat plane. Then they graduated to the P-35A with each pilo
t putting 50 hours into it before they began training for the P-40B. A shipment
of 31 of these fast-new fighters arrived on 17 May and were uncrated and assembl
ed by the Air Depot. The 20th Pursuit recieved 25 of these fighters with the oth
er two squadrons each recieving three to familiarize themselves with them.

Philippi
ne Department (Brig.Gen.Henry Clagett)
4th Composite Gr
oup (17 May 1941) (Maj.Kirtley Gregg *only of pursuit squadrons*)
3rd Pursuit Squadron (Ma
j.William Maverick)
-18xP-35A
-aprox.8xP-26A
-3xA-27 trainer
-3xP-40B *still
in crates*
17th Pursuit Squadron (L
t.Boyd "Buzz" Wagner)
-18xP-35A
-aprox.8xP-26A
-3xA-27 trainer
-3xP-40B *still
in trainer*
20th Pursuit Squadron (1
st Lt.Joseph Moore)
-18xP-35A
-aprox.6xP-26A
-3xA-27 trainer
-25xP-40B *still
in crates*
28th Bombardment Squadro
n (Maj.Lester Maitland)
-12xB-10B
-18xB-18 *still
in crates*
2nd Observation Squadron
(Maj.Lester Maitland)
-10xO-46A
-2xO-19E
-10xO-52 *schedu
led for shipment to the Philippines*

The situation that Clagett found the Far Eastern Air Force in was only marginall
y better than in 1940. The airplane allotment was as follows as mentioned above
but the infrastructure was even worse. There were two first rate grass airfields
at Clark and Nichols with a depot located at Nichols. There was a dirt strip at
Iba that was used as gunnery practice and an auxiliary base at Nielson, but it
lacked the facilities to operate large numbers of planes. The only anti air defe
nses was a single battery located at Fort Wint at the entrance to Subic Bay. The
re were minor auxiliary airbases with essentially no facilities at Vigan, Aparri
, Tuguegarao, Laoag, and Rosales. On 20 May, the first B-18 that was delivered w
as assembled at Nichols and it was assigned to the 27th Material Squadron. The s
quadron noted they were better than the ancient B-10s but they were still inadeq
uate bombers and did not relish having to use them in combat should war break ou
t. In spite of the fact that the war department recognized that its airplanes we
re woefully obsolete, it had still told the Philippine department in April that
it would send 18xB-18 bombers and 31xP-40B. While the P-40B were being uncrated
and assembled at Nichols depot, all 56xP-35A by this time were operational and p
ainted. The color of the noses indicated which squadron they belonged to; red fo
r the 3rd, white for the 17th, and blue for the 20th.

Besides training and building up his pursuit and bombardment squadrons, Clagett
was also building up his Air Warning Service (AWS). Upon taking control of the A
WS and setting up the Philippine Deartment Air Force, the AWS comprised as follo
ws. A central Information and Operation Center manned by three officers and 11 e
nlisted men that was set up to receive messages from 509 observation centers man
ned by 860 local observers throughout hte islands, using five radio, two telegra
ph, and ten telephone networks. While sounding impressive, it was regarded as in
adequate with reports getting halted at relay points; much information being inn
acurate and late on arrival; poorly coordinated at the facilities; and the hundr
eds of Filipino's who made up the backbone of the watchers were not well trained
at observation.
Billy Maverick of the 3rd PS at Nichols was involving his pilots in a strict tra
ining routine. The eight 41-B pilots assigned to him off the Washington were sch
eduled to fly the P-35s from 5:45AM to 6PM, with ahlf an hour off for lunch. The
emphasis was on aerial gunnery practice. He then introduced additional flying f
rom 6PM until 9:30PM three times a week. He even had his pilots fly all day on s
unday, 18 May, which of course was not popular among his pilots. While the 20th
Pursuit was to be totally requipped with the new P-40B, the other two Pursuit Sq
uadrons were to recieve two each to train with to aquaint their pilots to eventu
ally transition to the P-40E. However, the P-40B's that arrived were shipped wit
hout the Prestone coolant that was required for their liquid cooled engines. Sin
ce running the engines for more than a few seconds without it would completely r
uin it, the 31 P-40B sat idly lined up at Nichols Field depot with the pilots un
able to use them.
Plans for Bomber reinforcements
of the Philippines
Meanwhile events at Washington cast their shadow over the future of the Philippi
ens air force. Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Roosevelt met at t
he Argentia Conference on 7 August, 1941 and a decision was made to reinforce Ma
cArthur with strategic bombers to increase their offensive capability. The Army
Air Force began arrangements to begin ferrying the B-17s from Wake Atoll to Midw
ay Atoll to Clark. That month the Army began the so called Victory Program. Arno
lds planning officers began to estimate the number of planes needed and the tota
l came to four groups of heavy bombers (a total of 275 B-17s and B-24s) in AWPD/
I in order to maintain "a strategic defense in asia and for the protection of Am
erican interests in the Philippines." On 12 September, 1941 the first 9xB-17 arr
ived in the Philippines. This was viewed as having shifted the strategic initiat
ive in the Philippines and it was recognized that B-24s could reach Kyushu with
a full bomb load and back. Pirority for all B-17s produced was given to the Phil
ippines; 95 out of the 128xB-17s that would be produced in February, 1942 were s
lated for the Philippines while 35 of the 95xB-24s of that same period were plan
ned to reach the Philippines.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Philippine Army
Air Corps
The roots of the PAAC began with the Philippine Air Service which began

in the early days of aviation. By 1921, however, it ended operations due to lack
of government support. By 1933, it was revived by Major General Basilio Valdez,
Chief of the Philippine Constabulary and was renamed the Philippine Constabular
y Air Corps. By 1935, with the formation of the Philippine Army, the PCAC was th
en renamed the Philippine Army Air Corps on 1 December, 1935. The first official
airfield of the PAAC was Camp Murphy (now located at Quezon City and presently
known as Camp Aguinaldo) which was later named Zablan Field, after Major Profiri
o Zablan, a Filipino pilot who died on 17 June, 1935 while undergoing advanced f
lying training in the US in preparation for his becoming the first PCAC Commandi
ng Officer. The first 10 Stearman 73-L3 trainers arrived in the Philippines in 1
936 with an additional batch of 25 Stearman 76D-1/3 armed trainers the following
year; these formed the first aircraft of the PAAC. Overtime, the total armament
of trainers would be about 40-49. Its not known if all 49 were delivered to the
PAAC, however, that many were built. The total Stearman trainers built for the
PAAC is as follows:
7x73L-3 (delivered between 1936/37)
3xA73L-3 (delivered 1938)
12xA74L-3 (delivered in 1941)
3x76D-1 (delivered between 1937/41)
24x76D-3 (delivered between 1938/39)
The insignia chosen for the PAAC was a blue diamond insignia with a white border
, having no boundary between the shapes. The design was made by 1st Lt.Basilio F
ernando and it was first applied to the Stearman 73L-3 primary trainer plane No.
36-2. It was the first plane in the PAAC to fly. Slowly, the force expanded with
other airfields built. When the 3rd Pursuit Squadron switched to the P-26A arou
nd 1936, they gave some of their P-12E fighters to the PAAC. By 1941 the US seri
als 31-579 and 31-581 were still operational. Its unknown how many were original
ly given. Significantly (for the small PAAC), as the 4th Composite Group recieve
d reinforcements in personnel and airplanes, their obsolete P-26A's were gradual
ly replaced with P-35s and P-40s and so those that remained operational were giv
en to the PAAC. In addition, as the 28th Bombardment Squadron switched over to o
ver a dozen B-18 bombers, they handed over some of their remaining B-10 bombers
to the PAAC. One was an airframe only which was used for instruction, while two
others were operational. In addition, the PAAC had two Stinson SR-7B aircraft fo
r liason purposes. The following serials were originally handed over to the PAAC
:
US Serials of P26A "Peashooters"
33-54
33-59: Involved in a mid
air collision with 33-99 over Quezon city on 26 August, 1941. Pilot Godofredo
M.Juliano managed
to bail out succesfully. The plane was destroyed
33-99: Involved in mid a
ir collision over Quezon city with 33-59 on 26 August, 1941. Pilot Ruperto
B. Luzon bailed o
ut succesfully. The plane was destroyed.
33-61
33-31
33-38
33-50
33-138: Crashed 13 Octobe
r, 1941 at Lipa, Batangas. Pilot Ruperto Luzon was killed.
33-102
33-105
33-120
33-131

US Serials for B
-10
34-35, 34-47, 34-49
In addition to these twelve fighters, two other P-26A were being used by instruc
tors which would fly back and forth from Nielson. The three fighters that were d
estroyed in the accidents were eventually replaced, so that the 6th Pursuit at t
he outbreak of war was equipped with twelve P-26A, and an additional two used by
instructors. Each peashooter had a three digit number, which was displayed on t
he rudder of the plane. The first number was "3" which stood for the 6th Pursuit
Squadron, followed by a two digit number identifying the plane (301-312). The t
wo instructor planes had a simple 1 and 2 on the cowling. Plane numbers 301, 302
, 303, and 305 were still in their US blue with yellow wings. Plane No.303 inter
estingly had a red outline over its insignia. The 6th Pursuit was in the process
of camoflaging their planes when war began. Plane numbers 304, 306, and 307 had
been painted olive drab/dark green over neutral gay. Plane number 309 was under
going paint when war began and so it stopped and was left in an all light neutra
l gray. Of the instructor planes, Numbers 1 and 2 were olive drab faded with fre
sh deark green paint with irregular cammo pattern.
On 15 August, 1941 the PAAC was incorporated into the Far Eastern Air Force, und
er the command of its commander. Since it was equipped with obsolete aircraft, i
t was to be used as an armed reconnaissance force in the event of war. The 6th P
ursuit squadron maintained half of its strength at Zablan field, and the other h
alf at Batangas airfield, with the two groups rotating over time. Its strength w
as the following at the end of October, 1941
Philippine Army Air Corp
s (Maj. Charles Backes)
1st School Squadron: Zablan field (Lt.Andres Cru
z)
-Stearman 73 and 75 trainers
2nd Depot Squadron: Zablan field (Lt.Ramon Zosa)
ZB-3A; SR-9; D-18
3rd Depot Squadron: Zablan field (Lt.Jose Ramos)
4th Air Base Squadron: Zablan field (Lt.Arsenio
Sebastian)
5th Photo Recon squadron: Zablan field (Lt.Seltz
er Douglas)
Beechcraft D-18 (fitted for aerial photo
graphy)
6th Pursuit Squadron: Zablan field (Capt.Jesus V
illamor)
-14xP-26A
7th School Squadron: Maniquis Field, Cabanatuan
(Lt.Benito Ebuen)
-Stearman 75 trainers
8th Air Base Squadron: Maniquis Field, Cabanatua
n (Lt.Napoleon De Leon)
9th Observation Squadron: Lahug Field, Cebu Isla
nd (Maj.Oscar Sales)
-4xO-46
10th Bombardment Squadron: Maniquis Field, Cabana
tuan (Lt.Pedro Molina)
-2xB-10B (a third was just an airframe)
11th Air Base Squadron: Lahug Field, Cebu Island
(Lt.Victor Ay-ay)
PAAC HDQ: Zablan Field (Lt.Jonas Victoria)

PAAC Supply Depot: Zablan Field (Maj.Mariano Reye

s)
Primary Flying School: Zablan Field (Lt.Andres Cr
uz)
Basic and Advanced Flying School: Maniquis Field,
Cabanatuan (Capt.Eustacio Orobia)
Total Planes
14P-26A fighters (two fo
r instruction)
2xP-12E fighters
3xB-10B Bombers (One air
frame only for instruction)
1xZB-3A bomber
3xO-46 observation plane
2xD-18 transport (one fo
r photographic purposes)
1xSR-7 Liason plane
1xSR-9 Liason plane
Spearman Trainers: 49
-7x73L-3
-3xA72L-3
-12xA75L-3
-3x76D-1
-24x76D-3

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------On 24 June, another US Army transport, the USAT President Pierce arrived at Pier
7 in Manila Bay. Among the disembarking passengers of the President Pierce were
96 fresh graduates of flying school. 68 came from class 41-C and 28 from 41-D.
The pilots from 41-D were literally just out of school having been commissioned
as 2nd Lieutenants just a week before boarding the President Pierce in San Fraci
sco. The new arrivals were taken to the army-navy club for an impromptu party. T
he 3rd PS was getting 22 of the new pilots, the 17th was assigned 21, and the 20
th was assigned 20. The pilot strength of each squadron was doubled. They were i

nformed that all tactical squadrons were being ordered to Clark field by the end
of hte month for construction at Nichols field to overcome a flooding problem.
The 17th Pursuit pilots had been flooded out of their tents and were obliged to
park their planes outside so they could live in the hanger for hte last 2 weeks.
During the rainy season the landing field was under water and it was to be prop
erly drained and lengthened, and a second, concrete runway was to be built in an
ticipation of five pursuit squadrons being assigned ot the field. Additional bar
racks and officers quarters were also being built.
Following a letup of the rain, on 2 July, the pilots of 3rd and 20th Pursuit beg
an shuttling their planes to Clark. The 3rd PS had 12xP-35A and 7xP-26A in commi
ssion. By the end of the day the 20th Pursuiters had shifted their commissioned
14xP-35A and 6xP-26A, but none of their 25xP-40B which were still grounded on Ni
chols without their Prestone coolant. The 17th PS was assigned to Iba field for
gunnery training and had moved its flyable 13xP-35A and 7xP-26A from Nichols fie
ld. At Clark field in early july, the 3rd and 20th Pursuit were commencing their
training program for the 42 noobs assigned to the two squadrons. The 41-C and 4
1-D trainees were starting off with 3 to 4 hours in the A-27 trainer, then movin
g up to the P-26A for 12 hours of flying time, followed by graduation to the P-3
5A. By mid-July the 41-B pilots had put in their 50 hours in the P-35A and thus
completed their own training program. By the end of the first week of July, the
Prestone coolant finally arrived and the pilots of the 20th Pursuit could finall
y start up their 25xP-40B fighters and they were moved to Clark. Over at Iba, th
e 21 noobs of the 17th Pursuit arrived from Clark but were unable to start train
ing until 8 July due to incessant rain caused by a typhoon. Meanwhile, while tes
t flying one of the P-40B lt.Ozzie Lunde on 8 July, forced landed in Manila Bay
with little damage to the plane.
The 3rd Pursuit was quickly racking up a record of accidents in their P-35's. Th
e CO Billy Maverick was the first to ground-loop on 2 July at Clark starting a s
tring of them. Five days later, Ray Gehrig ground looped another at Nichols. On
10 July, Bob Newman wrecked his P-35A in a landing at Clark. On 18 July, Ed Smit
h suffered a freak accident at Clark when the exhaust ring and firewall of his P
-35A blew out and hte .50 cal ammo in the right wing gun exploded. On 28 July, C
harley Sheeley went into a spin over Paombong, Bulacan and was unable to recover
. He fortunately parachuted out in time, but his P-35A had hit the rice paddy wi
th such force that it burried itself in the watery ground so deep that recovery
crews were unable to locate it. The loss of 5xP-35A was eased somewhat with the
transfer of additional P-35A from the 20th Pursuit which was transitioning to it
s P-40B. By the end of July, the 3rd Pursuit had 22xP-35A of which 14 were in co
mmission. Meanwhile, the 17th Pursuit at Iba was also having its own streak of a
ccidents. At the end of July, most of the 4th Composities P-26A were transfered
to the Philippine Air Force. Five of the 17th PS P-26's were transfered and five
others from the 3rd and 20th PS were likewise transfered at this time. This lef
t 12 in the three squadrons as hacks. On 25 July, all the pilots were in a good
mood as they were going to spend the weekend in Manila, which was a welcome brea
k from the monotony of training at camp. At noon, the leaves were canceled howev
er. A PBY had spotted a large fleet of Japanese ships heading south in the South
China Sea. Its likely course was Indo-China but there was still a chance it cou
ld turn east and head toward the Philippines. PDAF HQ ordered that all the P-35s
be bore sighted and ammunition loaded, and that all leaves canceled. All forces
on the island were instructed to observe blackout rules. One flight from each s
quadron was to stand by for immediate takeoff at all times of the day and night.
In accordance with subsequent orders, Wagner instructed that all aircraft be ca
mouflaged after they had been combat loaded and then made ready for action. The
planes were to be dispersed around the short, narrow field at night so they woul
d not be in a straight line in the event of an attack. Meanwhile, the airfield a
t Clark was overflowing with aircraft. In addition to the 28th Bombardment Squad
ron, there was the 2nd Observation Squadron and the 3rd and 20th Pursuit Squadro
ns stationed on the airfield. They followed the same procedures, attaching bomb

racks to the wings of the fighters, and dispersed the aircraft all around the ai
rfield with many at the far ends of them. This invited disaster; on 30 July, Joh
n Geer of the 20th Pursuit landed too far down the runway in his P-40B and had j
ust begun to gun his plane to try and take off again when he crashed straight in
to one of hte 3rd Pursuits P-26s. The heavy fighter completely demolished the ob
solete monoplane and crushed one of the 3rd Pursuits crew chiefs to death since
he was filling out paperwork standing behind the wing. He died a few hours later
in the hospital. On 29 July, Grant Manley nosed up one of the squadrons three r
emaining P-26A when he hit his brakes too hard while taxiing. That same day Maur
ice Hughett, a 41-B graduate, incurred Wagern's wrath when he landed one of the
squadrons two A-27s with its wheels up. The following day, Jim Ross ground-loope
d a P-35A. Wagner grounded all three pilots.On 18 August, during a storm, pilot
Kiser nosed up his Seversky wrecking it, though it wasn't his fault. Meanwhile,
work on two additional airfields at Roscales and Del Carmen proceeded slowly. Me
anwhile, the 28th bomb squadron was also grounded during the indochina scare. Th
e squadron had 16xB-18 operational (the two others were given to different units
for transportation purposes) and on clark they were concealed under the overhan
ging trees along the airfields perimeter. The following day, all the squadrons a
ircraft were painted in camouflage colors and the pilots were restricted to base
. The total losses suffered by the pursuit squadrons from training in July are a
s follows:
3rd Pursuit Squadron: 5xP-35A de
stroyed in landing accidents
1xP-26A de
stroyed by 20th PS landing accient
17th Pursuit Squadron: 3xP-35A d
estroyed in landing accidents (one ground loops; a collission of two others whil
e taxi)
1xP-26A d
estroyed in nose-up landing
1xA-27 da
maged in wheels up landing
20th Pursuit Squadron: 2xP-40B d
estroyed
2xP-35A d
estroyed
2xP-26A d
estroyed
*No other squadron lost aircraft
from accidents*
On 26 July, it was announced that General Douglad MacArthur was being recalled t
o active duty and assuming command of all US army forces in the islands, which w
ere named U.S. Army Forces in the Far East. It now meant that the 4th Composite
Group was transfered to the USAFFE instead of hte Philippine Department. Things
began to speed up in that on 31 July, the War department notified MacArthur that
they would be sending him a squadron of B-17s as soon as it could be confirmed
they had an airfield ready for them. Twelve days later, he received another War
Department telegram notifying him that they were sending him 50xP-40E to reinfor
ce Luzon; they would arrivei n early September. With these reinforcements arrivi
ng, the USAFFE commander suddenly decided that his newly inherited air force nee
ded a plan to cover all aspects of the expanded operations the war department ev
idently had in mind for. MacArthur called forth Col.George on Clagetts staff (cl
agett was away on a mission in Singapore at the time) to prepare a study for the
recomended equipment needed from the USAFFE point of view. After two weeks of i

ntensive thought and writing, George came up with a draft plan that corresponded
to his ambitions for MacArthur's air arm. He essentially came up with a plan to
be able to strike at all Japanese targets within range of the Philippines to se
rve as a deterent to Japanese expansion to the S and SW. Strikes against Formosa
, Indochina, and the small Japanese islands south of Japan proper, but not any o
f the major home islands. George was not timid in his recomendation for aircraft
. He believed three pursuit wings were needed (9 pursuit groups or 27 pursuit sq
uadrons) for a total of 729 pursuit aircraft. He said he would need three heavy
bomber wings (10 groups plus supporting recon units) giving a total of 320 heavy
bombers. Goerge also wanted two light bombardment/dive-bomber wings in order to
allow him to carry out short range missions against Japanese landing forces. Th
e total number of aircraft envisaged for the two wings was 294. Next, he estimat
ed that he would need 56 airfields, each capable of accomomodating heavy bombers
. He estimated construction cost of these fields to be $83 million, including $5
million already received for upgrading or building six fields including, Clark,
Nichols, Bataan, and O'Donnell on Luzon and Malabang and Zamboanga on Mindanao.
As george was writing his ambitious recomendations, the War department asked Ma
cArthur how many planes his current airfields could operate and were projected t
o operate. A week later, MacArthur responded that the existing fields could acco
modate an additional ten pursuit squadrons, seven medium bomb squadrons, and thr
ee heavy bomb squadrons. By mid November he believed he could handle three more
heavy bomb squadrons, and by mid february three more pursuit and two more medium
, and four more heavy bomb squadrons. Also, on 25 August, Gregg was promoted to
a desk job (something he was bitterly against) and command of the 4th Composite
Group when to Maj.Grover.
Reinforcements to the Ph
ilippines
On 12 September, the first 9xB-17D from the 5th and 11th BS arrived at C
lark field. They were flying to Nielson field, however, they were told by a radi
o operator that a heavy typhoon was hitting them and they were to make their way
to Del Monte. "Rosie" O'Donnell who was leading the nine bombers, had never hea
rd of Del Monte and didn't have any maps with it marked on it. He radioed he was
coming in to clark anyways, in spite of the heavy storm conditions. Capt.Bill F
isher was flying one of the B-17D when he came in to land. Because of the poor v
isability, he could not see that the landing strip he chose was under constructi
on still. As he taxied after landing, Fisher failed to notice a B-18 at the edge
of the field and hooked it in the nose, ripping up his B-17s tail section, putt
ing it out of action for the time being. Meanwhile, important organizational cha
nges were occuring. With changes in command, flights would no longer be made up
of 6 aircraft in the pursuit squadrons, but rather they would be made up of 3 ai
rcraft. Then, on 16 September, some major organizational changes were made. Gene
ral MacArthur's General Order No.1 established the 24th Pursuit Group which comp
rised the 3rd, 17th, and 20th Pursuit Squadrons from the 4th Composite Group. Th
e 24th Pursuit Group was activiated on 1 October with it under the command of Ma
j.Grover. Meanwhile, the trainees of the 17th PS commenced their gunnery trainin
g in the first week of September by shooting at ground targets. Each pilot was a
ssigned one of the 6'x10' paper targets lined up in an isolated spot at the sout
h end of the field. The pilots would make a steep dive onto the target, fire a b
rief burst, and then pull up and loop around for another run. Some of the senior
members were also experimenting with flying in 2 plane formations instead of 3
plane formations; they found it freed up both pilots to look for planes. Meanwhi
le, on 29 September, a shipment of 50xP-40E arrive at Manila crated up aboard th
e SS American Press
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Japanese preparations
In early September, the Japanese began forming the units necesary for th
e Philippines operations. They began assembling reisen units at Takao for them t
o commence training. The first, was a group of freshly trained, no experienced p
ilots in 18xType 96 Kansen that flew from Kanoya to Formosa via Okinawa to take
on their new assignments. A few days after their arrival, FPO1c Saburo Sakai lan
ded at Takao with more than 20 other pilots who were all veterans from the China
battles. The hikotaicho Taii.Hideki Shingo had arrived at Takao on 10 September
, and was sorely diappointed that he had two chutai of outdated fighters with in
experienced pilots and only a few combat veterans from China (most would be assi
gned to the 3rd ku). There was not even any maintenance staff at the base, and h
te new air groups commaner had not yet arrived. It would not be until 1 October,
that the formal transfer was made and the creation of the Tainan Ku made offici
al. In the interm, the newbies met the China aces. In addition to Saburo Sakai,
there was FPO2c Kuniyoshi Tanaka who was being assigned from the Kanoya Kokutai;
CFPO.Gitaro Miyazaki who was transferred from the 12th kokutai; and Taii.Masao
Asai who had flow earlier from the carrier Akagi. Of the forty-five pilots assig
ned to the Tainan ku, 21 had China experience. The nine in Shingo's 1st Chutai e
ach had over a thousand hours flying time. With the arrival of Capt.Masahiso Sai
to on 1 October, the group was transfered to the Tainan airbase, in spite of the
fact that construction of it was ongoing; they were to begin intense training i
mmediately. It was decided that a chutai of the Type 96 Kansen would put on an
acrobatic show upon their arrival at Tainan. A wrong call by the Chutai leader,
however, led to one of the Type 96s to stall upon a manuever and then hit two ot
her fightes. One flown by Shinko Ito, of the 1st Shotai, was damaged sufficientl
y that he had to bail out, while two of the other fighters were damaged. Humorou
sly, everyone watching the spectacle on the ground (civilians) thought it was pa
rt of the show and were deeply impressed by it; everyone began applauding, someo
ne yelling, "My god, they really do spectacular acrobatics!".
On 3 October, Vice Admiral. Tsukahara Nishizo and his chief of staff, Rear Admir
al. Onishi Takijiro met with other commanders to plan a three day exercise in ho
w they would attack the Philippines. Originally, Onishi had gained hte support o
f the navy section of IGHQ in having three carriers allocated to the attack forc
e; Akagi, Soryu, and Hiryu. These would combine with the 11th Fleets light carri
ers Ryujo, Zuiho, and Taiyo. However, there was still serious doubts about linki
ng the carrier aircraft up with the land based rikko units. Use of the carrier f
leets air arm against American bases at Luzon was a critical component of Admira
l Onishi's plan and dated back some time. Conventionaly, the land based Reisen s
imply did not have enough range for the 1100 miles round trip including combat t
ime over American airfields. As the discussions continued, there were various po
ints of doubt about operating with onishi's plan:
1.) Would it really be possible to link up the carrier r
eisen with the land-based Rikko at the right time?
2.) What if enemy fighters attacked while the reisen and
rikko were attempting to link up?
3.) What if the carriers were spotted and subsequently a
ttacked by US submarines based in the Philippines before they could launch reise
n?
4.) What if bad weather prevented the Reisen from taking

off the carrier decks?

After these points were discussed, Onishi asked if there were any other points t
o consider before preparations to carry out this plan. At this moment, a represe
native of the 3rd Kokutai, Commander. Takeo Shibata, the groups executive office
r (hikocho). He was 34 years old and a graduate of Etajima; he had insisted on t
he aspects of speed and range for the design of the Reisen that led to its succe
sful creation. He stood up at the table and declared that in China, the 12th Kok
utai were able to cover the 430 nautical miles (495 statute miles) from their Ha
nkow base to attack Chengtu and return. Furthermore, he stated that Lt.Tamotsu Y
okoyama, the 3rd Kokutai's flying leader, told him that hte 3rd Ku made a 1000 n
autical mile (1,150 statute miles) round trip when it attacked Chungking. Shibat
a then pointed out that since the straight line distance from Takao to Clark fie
ld was about 450 nautical miles, and to Manila and Nichols Field 480 and 410 Nau
tical miles respectively, "It should therefore be possible to attack Luzon direc
tly from Formosa, provided that strict fuel consumption were observed."
The confrence room fell silent; none of the officers listening had imagined such
a proposal had been possible. Chief of Staff Onishi asserted that Shibata's pro
posal was not based on practical experience and was not supported by precise dat
a sufficient to warrant changing operational planning based on use of carriers.
Onishi then forced a smile and declared while looking at Shibata, "What you ahve
said would be useful only as data for the flying experiment department of the K
ugisho Naval Air Technology center." Meanwhile, the flying leader of 3rd Ku, Lt.
Tamotsu Yokoyama was busy in the air groups oeprations area at Kanoya Field, put
ting his new charges through an intensive training program. The 3rd Ku was origi
nally formed in April of that year as a Rikko unit, however in september it was
reorganized as a fighter outfit, with China veteran Yokoyama assigned as its Hik
otaicho. At beginning of October, it was equipped with 41 Reisen, 9xType 96 kans
en, and 9xType 98 recon planes. The Tainan Ku was equipped with almost exactly t
hat same amount of aircraft. However, compared to the Tainan Ku, the 3rd Ku's ra
tio of senior, experienced pilots was high, many having transfered from the old
12th Kokutai which ad introduced the zero to the world in air combat over China
in September, 1940. Even the units lesser experienced pilots had over 1000 hours
of flying time. Yokoyama first gave priority to formation flying instruction, t
he first need when a new group was formed. During the first month following the
units establishment, he taught his pilots a formation that allowed them to make
quick movements for an attack. The conduct of mock dogfights between two individ
ual planes was also emphasized. Aerial gunnery practice from all angles was anot
her important component of Yokoyama's training program. Night flying training wa
s also included and gradually extended from dusk takeoffs and landings to pitchdark night operations.
From 1 October, the 4th Carrier Division, built around carrier Ryujo was assigne
d to the 11th Fleet for training operations. After it arrived in Kagoshima bay,
facing the Kanoya base, shipboard landing and takeoff drills from 11th to 19th O
ctober were scheduled for those pilots in Yokoyama's kokutai who lacked such exp
erienced. Yokoyama was opposed to such operations. A majority of his pilots lack
ed experience in operating from carriers that he and some of his most senior pil
ots had, so it would not be easy to train these inexperienced pilots in carrier
landings and takeoffs, but he was forced to do so by the orders of 11th Fleet HQ
. It argued that since the 3rd Ku would be operating from carriers it was necesa
ry for operations that the 3rd Ku become proficient from carrier operations.
While the 3rd Ku trained on carrier Ryujo in Kanoya, the Zuiho was assigned to t
rain with the Tainan Ku near Takao base around the same time. The inexperienced
pilots at first practiced on a marked off part of the airfield to simulate a car
rier deck before moving onto landing on the carrier. The Zuiho arrived off the c
oast of Takao on 14 October giving the Tainan Ku 10 days of training aboard her.
Meanwhile, at Kanoya the 3rd Ku's ten day training aboard Ryujo ended on 19 Oct

ober. With the conclusion of the training, Yokoyama could now lead his pilots to
Formosa to their new base at Takao. The 11th Air Fleet HQ was also moving to Ta
kao, as was the Takao Kokutai with its six Chutai of Type 1 Rikko. The month and
a half of training at Kanoya was well recieved by commander Yokoyama who believ
ed that much progress had been made with his pilots. On 23 October, Yokoyama led
his pilots on a nonstop flight 900 miles S across the East China Sea to Takao.
All 41xReisen of the 3rd Ku made the trip without incident and landed at their n
ew base without problems.
On the last week of October, a meeting was called at Takao air base for the flyi
ng leaders with the subject written on a chalkboard in the center of the room, "
Feasibility of direct attack on Luzon in the Philippines." All the major leaders
of the 11th Air Fleet and the flying units were there. Onishi first called on S
hingo to offer his opinion on the subject of discussion: Would it be possible to
fly nonstop to attack the American air bases on Luzon? Shingo was deeply iritat
ed at having not been notified of this serious topic beforehand and blurted out,
"I don't know! How could oen be expected to reply immediately to such a questio
n? The Tainan Ku was only formed at the beginning of this month and is still in
the process of training. It would take a month before we could say whether we co
uld carry out a direct attack from Formosa on the Philippines or not." Onishi re
plied, "Flying leader shingo, you said that you don't know about the direct atta
ck plan because you don't want to go, isn't that so?" Shingo realizing Onishi is
trying to bait him replies, "No, I simply said that I don't know because I don'
t know. No position on this subject can be taken in less than a month." Onishi:
"You are afraid to go, aren't you? Tell us if you are afraid." To this Shingo re
mained silent, refusing to be baited by Onishi into being forced to accept the p
osition simply because he was being accused of cowardice. For the rest of the mo
rning, members of the meeting expressed conflicting viewpoints on the subject. W
ith the First Air Fleet's Akagi, Soryu, and Hiryu withdrawn on 10 October for So
uthern operations (they had secretly been assigned to the Pearl Harbor attack),
the 11th Air Fleet had only available Ryujo, Zuiho, and Taiyo. Some commanders s
upporting using the three small carriers. However, others leaned toward the idea
of relying exclusively on zeros makign a direct attack. These adherents doubted
that the two reisen groups had sufficient training to be able to do the operati
on from carriers without minimal operational losses. Furthermore, only a total o
f 68 reisen could operate from the three small carriers, and the loss of pilots
and aircraft in takeoffs and landings was a liklihood. When hte meeting broke up
, there was still no consensus on how the operation would unfold.
The 3rd Ku's Hikocho was convinced that a direct attack from Formosa was possibl
e. Undaunted by Onishi's criticisms of him in early October, Takeo Shibata was s
till working on his direct attack plan. He was supported by his hikotaicho, Yoko
yama. On his own, after arriving at Takao on 23 October, Hikotaicho Yokoyama beg
an to train for the direct attack plan (which had not even been officially discu
ssed much less decided upon yet). He aimed to reduce the reisens fuel consumptio
n by 10% from 125 liters an hour to 115. Even allowing for hte heavy fuel use th
at would be required in combat over the Luzon airfields, Yokoyama felt that his
pilots could extend the range of their zeros by 10% through stringent fuel savin
g techniques. On 30 October, Shibata was ready to put his final proposal before
his 3rd Ku comrades for approval to transmit it to the 11th Fleet HQ. Captain K
amei had invited Shibata, Yokoyama, each of the 3rd Ku's four Chutaicho, and hte
engineering straff to hear final arguments on Shibata's views in the 3rd Ku com
mander office. It was a flimsy shack and the officers sat down on the floor and
some chairs. Shibata opened up, "Today we would like to reach our conclusions re
garding the question of direct attack by zeros on the Philippines, which so far
we have insisted on". Lt.Yokoyama requested permission to speak stating, "Follow
ing my instructions to each buntaicho to extent the range of their zeros for a t
housand nautical miles (1,150 miles) round trip to Luzon plus allow for one half
hour combat time, we have succeeded in reaching an almost satisfactory level af
ter a months training." He continued,"I therefore conclude that this plan will b

e possible to carry out with sufficient margin." The three small carriers would
not bee needed and they could be deployed for other purposes. One by one, his fi
ve buntaicho: Lieutenants Takeo Kurosawa, Ichiro Mukai, Takaichi Hasuo, and Zenj
iro Miyano, and Ensign Tsuneo Nakahara, took the floor and backed up Yokoyama in
reporting their training progress. The meeting went on for two hours and it was
decided by all including Captain Kamei that he would submit the plan to 11th Fl
eet HQ, asking that Shibata put it into written form.
The task at hand left Hikocho Shibata tense. He felt overwhelmed at having to su
mmarize the arguments and do so in a way to convince the obstinant 11th Fleet HQ
, as well as having to face Onishi. At that, Shibata vowed that he would not be
defeated, recalling Onishi's condesension days earlier. Shibata started off in w
riting the disadvantages of using aircraft carriers for the operation. Next, he
presented in great detail the conclusions he had derived from the results of tra
ining to date for an attack on a target at a distance of 450 nautical miles (518
miles) based on the oral presentation Yokoyama had made at the meeting:
1.) Its possible to extend the range of our zeros for a round trip by ab
out 100 nautical miles (115 miles) if we limit our combat time to 20 minutes or
less.
2.) We can extend the round trip by about 10% by using 320 liters of fue
l in the drop tank on the outward leg of the mission and returning on the fuel i
n the
fuselage and wing tanks. The saving in weight of about 320 kg of the
full drop tank on the return trip plus the reduced air resistance following
jettisoning the drop tank make this range extension possible.
3.) The reduction in cruising speed to that of the Rikko group that the
zeros wil lbe escorting on the outward leg means that the fuel in the drop tank
should
be adequate for the needs of the outward trip
4.) Constant employment of optimum air mixture control-except during the
combat period-and reducing cruising speed wherever appropriate to save fuel wil
l help
further in extending the range.
5.) By utilizing the nine-plane chutai formation of three three plan sho
tai and giving each buntaicho the freedom to make appropriate engine power adjus
tments
for his nine zeros, fuel consumption will be much less than when fly
ing in "show" formation typically giving rise to greater fuel requirements.
Synthesizing his arguments, Shibata concluded that, "it is possible to carry out
the attack operation covering a 450 nautical mile range with a safety margin of
about 20% provided that the weather is fine. However, anticipating the likely o
pposition of the 11th Fleet staff, he acknowledged the weaknesses of his plan:
1.)In the event of deterioration of the weather, there is a risk of forc
ed landings due to additional fuel requirements.
2.) Considering the need to strike the Luzon targets at daybreak, there
is a risk of accidents during night takeoffs.
However, in response to these two points, he proposed situating picket boats in
the water between Formosa and Luzon to pick up the pilots of any ditched zeros a
nd honing the pilots skills with intensive night training, respectively. He cont
inued the argument saying that it wasn't true that using carriers would reduce t
he range requirement. Once the zeros from the carriers entered into combat over
the target, they would have to jettison their drop tanks and thus would have to
return to Formosa on only whatever fuel remained in their main tanks. This was t
he same situation faced by zeros under the direct attack option. He further coun
tered that in the event of bad weather, operational difficulties would be much g
reater operating from carriers than from airfield. He concluded, "The conviction

of the 3rd Ku of sure victory is based on intensive training and on the premise
that we take off from our base on Formosa, not from carriers." At 8 AM on 31 Oc
tober, he entered Capt.Kamei's office. Kamei took the paper and went over it, an
d responded with a simple, "good". From there they went to see commander of the
23rd Air Flotilla and he then invited Admiral Onishi to the discussion. Shibata
went over the paper point by point with Admiral Onishi. At the end of it, Onishi
announced, "Okay, I am going at once to see Admiral Yamamoto and have him accep
t the proposal. The 23rd Koku Sentai should immediately suspend training for car
rier landings and make every effort to improve its skilsl for air combat." He th
en ordered Takenaka to implement a training program for night takeoffs and for m
aking a long distance attack. The reisen would immediately conduct training for
long-ranged flying. The reisen could hold a total amount of 855 liters: 145 lite
rs in the fuselage tank, 195 liters in each wing tank and then the 320 liters of
the extenernal fuel tank. Every bit of it would be needed for the attack on Luz
on. In any event, Onishi did not go to see Yamamoto personally. He sent his seni
or staff officer, Captain.Chihaya Takahashi arrived at Saeki Bay in early novemb
er on a Type 96 Rikko and he reported the results of Shibatas research and reque
sted the Combined Fleet Staffs approval for the proposed change of plans. Yamamo
to approved of the changes, and in a radio message to Tsukahara on 5 November, n
otified him to proceed with it. The 11th Fleet cancelled its air operations agai
nst the Philippines with Carrier Division 3 (Zuiho) and Carrier Division 4 (Ryuj
o and Taiyo).
In early November, 11th Air Fleet Command was becoming increasingly concerned ab
out the possibility of recon over its bases on Formosa by American aircraft in t
he Philippines. Already, on 13 October, a PBY had been spotted circling the isla
nd twice at an altitude of 1500 meters before disappearing SE. Admiral Tsukahara
on 3 November ordered all aircraft and submarines in the south china sea to be
on the lookout for American patrol planes. Intrudcing PBYs continued to be spott
ed from time to time in November over southern Formosa. On 27 November, the Japa
nese government filed a formal protest with the US State Department about an int
rusion at 12:30 PM on 20 November over Garampi on the southernmost tip of Formos
a, 58 miles NE of Takao base. Whenever the air warning was raised about an intr
uding PBY, attempts were always made to intercept it, but proved unsuccesful eac
h time. On 21 November, the 11th Air Fleet and other Combined Fleet units had be
en authorized, "to use force in self-defense" in case they were challenged. On 2
December, the IJAAF gave explicit orders to shoot down, "even before D-Day" any
plane "which is sighted over Formosan territory and recognized as hostile."
Following the 5 November order to abandon the carrier based attack on Luzon, the
Tainan Ku and 3rd Ku began intense long-range flying training. Test flights wer
e conducted with six selected planes to measure airspeed and fuel consumption pe
r hour employing different cruising altitudes, different power and RPM settings,
and different fuel densities. The test results indicated that the optimum cruis
ing altitude was 4000 meters (13,100 ft), and optimal cruising speed was 115 kno
ts (132 mph) which was close to the speed of the Type 1 Rikkos they would be esc
orting. The mixture control was set at a point just before the zeros 950 hp Saka
e 12 engine would start malfunction. It was very nervwracking and anxiety ridden
training. It was calculated that the maximum acceptable fuel consumption rate w
ould be 90 liters (23.8 gallons) per hour, with an average of 80-85 liters (21.1
-22.5) gallons) estimated. Saburo Sakai managed the record of the Tainan Ku of g
etting his fuel consumption rate down to 67 liters an hour (17.7 gallons). The 3
rd Ku which had begun their training a month earlier, benefited from it and at t
he end of their training, every one of the 3rd Ku pilots proved himself capable
of flying for ten hours and reducing fuel consumption to 70 liters per hour. Som
e had even gotten it down to 67 liters.
Back at 11th Fleet HQ, Capt.Chihaya Takahashi, the senior staff officer in the 1
1th Fleet was concerned about hte lack of accurate information on teh buildup of
US airpower in Luzon. On 1 November, the Japanese consul in Manila sent a distu

rbing message to the foreign office in Tokyo that reported 1283 army aircraft in
the Philippines, including 29 large bombers, and 819 pursuit aircraft. The cons
ul failed to confirm these numbers despite the foreign offices request, so the 1
1th Fleet decided to obtain first hand information and mount reconnaissance flig
hts from Formosa. It had been more than six months since the last recon flight o
ver Luzon which had used modified Type 96 Rikko with cameras; the information wa
s now totally out of date. The initial recon mission was given to the Tainan and
3rd Ku's reconnaissance section. From the Tainan Ku, Lt.Masami Miza, the leader
of the six Type 98 recon planes, would serve as an observer in one of them whil
e his equivelant of the 3rd Ku, Lt.Tetsutaro Suzuki, would also serve as an obse
rver in one of his planes.
At 8:30AM on 21 November, Lt.Masami Miza and his pilot FPO1c Mitsuru Ohara take
off in their two-seat Type 98 recon plane from Tainan base. Its hinormaru had be
en painted over, and the two had removed their rank insignias from their uniform
s. Mizas orders were to carry out photoreconnaissance of Iba and Clark fields an
d the PBY base at Olongapo at an altitude of 7000-8000 meters (23,000 to 26,000
ft). One other Type 98 recon plane was to reconnoiter the Mariveles coast at the
southern tip of Luzon, while a third aircraft was to cover the Philippine Army
Air Corps field at Batangas and the Asiatic fleet base at Cavite. If he was disc
overed and chased by American pursuit planes, he was to "escape" to the islands
south of the Philippines. Obviously, his plane did not have hte fuel capacity to
"escape"; it was a more polite way of saying don't lead the Americans back to t
heir home base. Also, in an effort to exceed their maximum speed of 303 MPH, the
rear Type 92 7.7mm MG was removed. About an hour and a half after taking off, O
hara climbed ot 8000 meters. Miza planned to fly to Olongapo first, then clark,
and finally Iba. But at 10:30 AM they found they were ahead of schedule, so they
killed 20 minutes, rambling over the eastern part of hte South China Sea, befor
e approaching Olongapo. From 8500 meters they could not see any flying boats at
the base at 10:50. Arriving over Clark, they did not spot any fighters while on
the field below he confirmed the presence of three parge planes and 22 small one
s. As they reversed course for another pass, Ohara yelled, "Two enemy fighters t
o the rear on the left!" and applied full power and headed west to the East Chin
a Sea, travling at its maximum speed of 368 MPH, the Type 98 recon plane easily
outdistanced the the pursuing P-40s. Ohara then cautiously flew to Iba where the
y spotted 16 planes on the field and three flying at low altitude. Back at Taina
n, Miza reported the results of their mission. When all plane numbers were talli
ed, the Japanese counted only three hundred American planes-only one fourth the
number the consul reported, much to the relief of Command.
While Lt.Miza flew clandestine flights over Clark, the fighter echelon was impro
ving its gunnery capabilities. On the same day, 21 November, the hikotaicho orga
nized a gunnery competition between each of the units shotaicho, to test the ski
ll level they attained in air-to-ground gunnery training. Shingo had arranged fo
r the three pilots of each shotai to fire at a cloth the size of a zero that had
been placed flat on the beach. Saburo Sakai vowed to get the highest score in a
ccuracy, along with his two wingmen, FPO2c Kazuo Yokokawa and FPO3c Toshiaki Hon
da. Sakai's Shotai was the last of 15 shotai to perform their strafing runs. The
y climbed to 500 meters, turned left, and formed a line with Sakai in the lead.
One by one they began diving at an angle of 30 degrees. When they dropped to the
minimum 50 meter altitude limit they fixed the white target fully in their elec
tric gun sights and pressed the trigger. Each zero had 60x7.7mm shells in each g
un. It was announced that the top shotai in accuracy was Sakai's with 27 hits. A
s a reward, Sakai and his two wingmen were presented two dozen bottles of beer.
During this time, the 3rd Ku was also finishing up its air-to-ground gunnery tra
ining in the same method, though not as a competition. During the last weeks of
november, Yokoyama also put his pilots through exercises in night takeoffs and l
andings, air combat in formation, dogfighting tactics, and the use of radio comm
unications. Some 3rd Ku pilots were logging over 100 hours of flying time a mont
h, compared to an average of 25-30 hours flown by pilots in other naval air unit

s. This put a heavy strain on the mechanics to keep its reisen in top flying ord
er. Top priority was given to the scheduled overhaul of aircraft after every 100
hours of flying time. This was to ensure that as many of hte units 45xreisen wo
uld be available on D-Day as possible. The various Rikko units also conducted in
tensive bombing training during this period. Starting at 29 November all contact
with the outside world was banned and all pilots were confined to base.
At 11:36 on 2 December, Lt (j.g.) Yoshio Matsuda lifted of in his Type 98 recon
plane of the Tainan Ku for anotehr secrt flight over Luzon. He headed for the Lu
zon Straight and he was to determine whether there were any aircraft carriers in
the straight. He returned at 2:28 pm and reported he had spotted none. Since 17
November, the 11th Fleet had been intercepting communications from airborne B-1
7s and PBYs to glean information on activities in the Luzon and Manila area. Suc
h radio conversations provided the 11th air fleet with detailed info about the 1
9th groups daily bombing practice and patrol missions. Back on the bases, the wa
rplanes were all combat loaded with their fuselage, wing, and drop tanks full of
fuel and were in readiness for immediate takeoff. On 3 December, Capt.Masahisa
Saito called his pilots to his operations tent at Tainan. He made a brief statem
ent, then turned to his deputy, Commander.Yasuna Kozono to speak. Kozono spoke,
"Japan is facing the most serious threat ever to its existence. Our country is b
eing encircled by the ABCD powers, led by the Americans and the British, who are
cutting off our supply of raw materials. They don't allow even a drop of petrol
eum to our country, even though there is an abundant supply in the world. The sh
ortage of petroleum is a matter of life or death for us. If they don't sell it t
o us, we must go and take it by force! And it is available to us, just one jump
from Formosa. You pilots will be the spearhead of the forces to invade hte petro
leum area of the south." The other commanders made the decision for war known to
their pilots on this day. At Taichu, the Kanoya Kokutai still had 54xType 1 Rik
ko based at the airfield. However, on 4 December the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Chutai tr
ansfered to Saigon to join the 22nd Kokutai in operations against Manila, in res
ponse to the British Fleet sending capital ships to Singapore. The remaining 4th
, 5th, and 6th Chutai of the Kanoya Kokutai were led by the detachment leader, L
ieutenant Commander Toshiie Irisa.
On 6 December at the operational shack of the Tainan Ku, the leader gathered his
four buntaicho and eight shotaicho and handed each a thick mimeographed documen
t with a white cover on it. On the front cover was written, "The great Japanese
empire had decided to open the war against the US., Great Britain, and the Nethe
rlands at 00:00 ON 00 day of 00 month. There was a notation that the date would
be provided later. That Tainan Ku was to attack Clark after it was bombed by 27x
Type 96 Rikko of the 1st Ku from Tainan and 27xType 1 Rikko of the Takao Ku from
Takao. The 3rd Ku's reisen taking off from Takao would hit nichols field after
it was bombed by three Chutai of Kanoya Ku and three chutai of the Takao Ku. It
should be noted that one Chutai of the Tainan Ku and two Chutai of the 3rd Ku ar
e transfered to Indo-China for the Malaya operations on 26-27 November. Then, Lt
.Yukio maki was attached to the 3rd Ku with his Chutai at Takao leaving the Tain
an Ku with just 36xreisen to carry out its mission. Lieutenant Masami Miza, the
buntaicho of the six Type 98 recon planes of hte Tainan Ku was also given a copy
of these operation plans. The previous morning on 5 December, his shotaicho Lt.
Wataru Furukawa with FPO2c Yohinori Kamibeppu in the pilots seat had taken his T
ype 98 recon plane south on another Philippine recon mission. They passed Iba at
eight and then over Clark field at 8:20. Upon landing back at Tainan at noon, F
urukawa reported to Capt.Saito that they had observed twenty-three enemy fighter
s on Iba Field and thirty-two large planes and seventy-one fighters at Clark. At
Takao, the 3rd Ku's FPO1c Shinichi Shimada landed in his Type 98 recon plane at
10:10 AM after 6 hours of flying to Olongapo and Del Carmen. He had seen nine f
lying boats in the harbor at Olongapo and at Del Carmen, nine planes in the air
and about 25 of them on the ground.
On 7 December, the regular pilots were called to the commanders office in Tainan

and Takao. There, they were met by their respective commanders. For the Tainan
Ku, Saito reported to his pilots, "Early tomorrow morning, at 6:30, our air grou
p will attack enemy air force at Clark Field. It is the day we have all been wai
ting for. All our training, day after day, was meant for this day. I ask you all
to fight courageously with the skills you have developed during your intensive
training to destroy the enemy's air force. I am also thinking that not all you 3
6 pilots who are in this room will be gathered here tomorrow night. Therefore I
ask you to look each other in the face now." The pilots then took leave of their
commander and walked to the dining room. A special meal of red colored rice (se
ki han) and a small amount of sake was served to each pilot. They then retired t
o their barracks. Masaaki Shimakawa took out a map and began outlining his exact
flight plan. He marked every thirty and sixty nautical miles on the five hudnre
d nautical mile course and calculated the time needed to reach each point, based
on a cruising speed of 140 knots for his reisen enroute. He would need to keep
his chart with him so he could make it back to base on his own if he became sepe
rated. He next occupied himself with the browning pistols belonging to his shota
icho, CFPO Gitaro Miyazaki and his Chutaicho, Lt.Masao Asai. Then he cleaned his
own pistol; every pilot had been given a pistol. He then checked all his person
al belongings and put them in his duffel bag, to be given to his family in the e
vent of his death. Finally, he began writing his will. It was after 10PM when Sh
imawkawa finally climbed into his hammock. He was a farm boy only 19 years old,
who now had 490 hours of flying time and was poised in the front lines of the st
art of the Pacific War.
At Takao, during the 3rd Ku's operational meeting, it was the Hikotaicho, Lt.Yok
oyama that conducted the operational meeting for the enlisted pilots. He emphasi
zed the importance of their mission against Nichols the next day and gave a moti
vational speech. He also made sure that each of his 53 pilots (including Lt.Yuki
o Maki and his Chutai borrowed from the Tainan Ku) fully understood hte battle p
lan. They would take off immediately after the 81 Rikko of the Takao and Kanoya
Ku had cleared the field; their take off beginning at 2:30 AM. After three Chuta
i of Kanoya Ku and three Chutai of Takao Ku bomb Nichols, Yokoyama's pilots woul
d strafe the field and other targets in the Manila area after having cleared hte
sky of any American interceptors. The groups senior buntaicho, Lt.Takeo Kurosaw
a fully expected 2/3 of the 3rd Ku's pilots would be killed the next day in comb
at against the Americans. Lieutenant Commander Irisa had led his three Chutai of
Type 1 Rikko from Taichung on this day and now joined the 54xType 1 Rikko of th
e Takao Ku. He was notified he would be taking off at 2:30 AM the next morning f
or Nichols, along with three Chutai of Takao Ku under Commander Suda. The Takao
Ku's other three Chutai under the command of Lt.Cmdr.Taro Nonaka would meet up w
ith three chutai of the 1st Ku under Lt.Cmdr.Takeo Ozaki and bomb Clark. The slo
wer Type 96 Rikko would take off at 1:30 to allow them time to rendezvous with N
onaka's Type 1's. At 11th Fleet HQ, Lt.Cmdr.Koichi Shimada, a staff officer, was
very nervous about the coming operations. At 10:30 PM, he was ordered to fly as
an observer on one of hte two 2nd Weather Reconnaissance Unit Type 96 Rikko tha
t was being sent up to check the weather in the area betwen Formosa and Luzon. T
wo hours earlier, two other Type 96 Rikko of the 1st Weather Reconnaissance Unit
had been dispatched for the same purpose.
On the same day 1400 miles SE of Formosa, 29 year old Lt.Takahide Aioi was feeli
ng quite uneasy. He was the leader of the carrier aircraft aboard Light Carrier
Ryujo as it sailed toward Davao, Mindanao. He was to lead his groups 12xType 96
Kansen-obsolete fighters-and escort the carriers 13xType 97 Kanko (old and new m
odels mixed) to attack Davao Field. Not only were his planes obsolete, his pilot
s had not had adequate time to train for hte operation. Earlier in the day, Aioi
had been shown a cable sent by Rear Admiral Kakaji Kakuda, commander of the 4th
Carrier Division, to the Ryujo's captain: "Air raid on Davao at dawn on Decembe
r 8. Each group should fight courageously according to the already-established p
lan." The aircraft were scheduled to takeoff when Ryujo reached a point 140 mile
s to the east, which was expected at about 5AM. Aioi was a veteran carrier pilo

t and he had been assigned his new command on 28 November, just before Ryujo lef
t Seki for Palau. On 11 November, Aioi had inherited 12xType 96 Kansen (They wer
e supplied from the Tainan Ku and 3rd Ku with each giving six of the fighters) f
rom which he would provide them training for carrier operations. On 28 November,
his twelve fighters along with six others fly on board Taiyo at Sasebo and it t
hen departs. It makes a stop at Takao on 1 December before continuing to Palau,
arriving on 6 December. There, Lt.Aioi flies his 12xType 96 Kansen aboard the Ry
ujo as the other six fighters fly to Peleliu for defense of the base. Aioi had b
een given the Tainan and 3rd Ku's least qualified pilots and the unwanted remena
nts of the Type 96 fighters. Aioi wondered how long Japan could last against Ame
rica if Japan couldn't even supply all their air units with the zeros.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------At Clark, Joe Moore started his 20th Pursuiters in night flying practice in late
september; they were also flying recon missions in their P-40's. On 13 October,
Moore was leading a flight of 9xP-40b in mock strafing infantry near manila. Wh
ile flying in a tight formation at over 300 MPH "buck" Weaver momentarily got ou
t of position. In trying to return to his slot, he flew under Max Louk's P-40 hi
tting Louk's wing. The two planes wing locked and weaver's ship was thrown into
louk's propeller, which cut into weaver's canopy. With his plane in a dive, Weav
er did not bail out until he was only 50 ft off the ground which was not enough
time for his parachute to open killing him. Louk was able to land his damaged pl
ane unhurt. That same day a 17th Pursuiter named Allison Strauss was leading B F
light in formation flying the P-35's. When Strauss called for reforming into two
ship configurations from the three ship formations they were flying, Joe Kruzel
came barreling into position, but too cose to Bill Hennon's plane before easing
back on the throttle. Kruzel's prop cut the rear fuselage and tail off Hennons
ship just behind the cockpit. While almost being knocked unconcious, Hennon mana
ged to bail out in time as his plane spiraled toward the earth and landed safely
in a nearby field.
At the Philippine Air Depot at Nichols field, the 50xP-40E were hurriedly uncrat
ed and assembled to be distributed to the 3rd and 17th Pursuit Squadrons. The 17
th was to recieve the first 25 Tomahawks following their return to Nichols from
Gunnery training at Iba on 17 October. The 3rd Pursuit was to shift to Iba to un
dergo its own gunnery training while the 17th recieved its planes and would have
to wait for a period after to recieve their own P-40E's. On 23 October, Elmer P
owell experieced a motor failure in his new P-40E while flying between Clark and
Nichols. He was too far from a field to make an emergency landing so he opted t
o set his aircraft down on the narrow black ribbon of highway 3 below him. As he
was rumbling down the highway, a bus came into view and he instinctively kicked
the left rudder hard, gunned the engine to give more pull for a turnout, and hu
rtled off the road in a ground loop. His plane was a total wreck but Powell was
safe. On 30 October, another P-40E suffered engine failure for its liquid-cooled
Allison engine. Jack Dale was at 400 ft when his engine quit over the field. He
attempted to glide the ship in but he kept the nose too high in the landing and

it stalled and began spinning at 100 ft. The P-40E crashed and was a total wrec
k and in spite of serrious injury, Dale would survive. Around the same time, a 2
0th Pursuit pilot Erwin Crellin ignored radio warnings about following too close
behind Moore when landing their P-40B. When the two P-40B touched down, Crellin
was obliged to hit the brakes hard to avoid hitting Moore's plane, which caused
his plane over on his back. He was not injured, but his $50,000 aircraft was a
total wreck.
On 23 October, 10 new pilots arrived on the Army Transport Tasker H. Bliss and w
ere attached to the 24th Pursuit Group HQ squadron to begin undergoing training,
as Grover didn't want to put fresh recuits in his three tactical squadrons whic
h were completing their own training already. Also on this day, aboard the Holbr
ook, a total of 548 ground officers and men of the 10th Bombardment Group arrive
d at Manila at Pier 7. On 31 October, 8xB-17 arrived at Clark and one other arri
ved on 2 November. On 3 November, a total of 15xB-17C/D arrived at Clark airfiel
d to join the 19th Bombardment Group. On 4 November, 42 P-40s and P-35s were str
ung out in three plane V formations above Manila flying low to impress the inhab
itants. They then headed east to meet a PanAm clipper bringing the new commandin
g general of the USAFFE Air Force, Maj.Gen.Lewis Brereton. After some difficulty
intercepting the boat, the pursuit pilots began performing areial acrobatics to
the terrified pilots of the clipper. Four days later on 8 November, the 3rd Pur
suit finally recieved its full allotment of 25xP-40E. The responses were mixed,
but generally favorable. The pilots believed it was good enough to match the ger
man ME-109's, which is what they expected the Japanese would be flying should wa
r occur. Although all groups had a full quota of P-40s, they would not be used f
or gunnery practice. Each plane had six 50. caliber guns and .50 caliber ammunit
ion was in short supply in the Philippines. All groups would still target practi
ce with the P-35's and when finished, they would be handed over to the Philippin
e Air Force. The 3rd Pursuit now had 25xP-40E and 18xP-35A and as such he was sh
ort of crew chiefs among his enlisted men. The new CO Thorne, assigned half of h
is pilots to work as crew chiefs, pending the arrival of additional aircraft mec
hanics being sent the squadron. The .50 caliber guns for the P-40E only began ar
riving at Iba at this time and the pilots were assigned to begin unpacking them
and installing them into the P-40's. Major Brereton instituted a much more rigid
training schedule for the 24th Pursuit Group and required at least 40% of the t
raining time to be done at night. By the third week of November there had been t
wo more crashes of the 17th Pursuits P-40s which were due to the carelessness of
pilots. One was repairable while another was completely wrecked. Also of import
ance, at the end of November, 26xB-17's arrive at Clark as part of the bomber re
inforcements. By October 1941, patrols by Patwing-10 were turned into war patrol
s. The planes flew alone along the coast of China checking on Japanese military
activity. The flying boats were often shadowed by Japanese warplanes.
Reinforcements were pouring into the Philippines; Clark field was now completely
jam packed with planes, equipment, but most especially men. There was the 500+
men of hte 19th BS, the 200th Coast Artillery Regiment, the 194th Tank Battalion
, the 20th Pursuit Squadron, the 28th BS, the 14th BS, and many other ground per
sonnel. MacArthur gave the orders around this time for additional housing and bu
ildings constructed at Del Carmen, Cabanatuan, Lip, O'Donnell, and Rosales Field
s, with plans that each airfield would have a group consisting of a HQ squadron
and four combat squadrons. Housing at Del Carmen was top priority, for MacArthur
had been informed that hte personnel of the 27th Bomb Group (light) were schedu
led to sail from San Francisco for the Philippines on 1 November. Six days later
, he requested an additional $5 million in funds to carry out the construction p
rogram. On 29 October, Col.George increased the request, wanting MacArthurs engi
neers to carry out construction of facilities at Del Monte Field on Mindanao, in
cluding housing for 339 officers and 2743 enlisted men. It was formerly planned
as an emergency field, but Del Monte was now upgraded to an active airfield. The
request was granted, though housing construction was not to begin until January
, 1942. MacArthur had been notified the schedule of his reinforcements; in addit

ion to the 26xB-17 en route to the Philippines, he would be receiving 33 more in

December, 51 in January, and 46 in February.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------On 20 November, the transport President Coolidge arrived at Pier 7 in Ma
nila bringing a large number of pilots. It brought experienced pilots of the 27t
h Bombardment Group (light) and the 35th Pursuit Group. 2nd Lt.Hall was commande
r of the 34th Pursuit Squadron and he arrived with 14 other pilots of the squadr
on. Arriving with him was 13 pilots of the 21st Pursuit Squadron. They were inte
nded as only the first echelon for the entire 35th Pursuit Group and for the tim
e being the pilots were brought to Nichols field and temporarily assigned to the
24th Pursuit Group until their HQ arrived. While it was intended that the two s
quadrons would be equipped with P-40's, as they had not yet arrived, they were g
iven the discarded P-35's of the 24th Pursuit Group until their own P-40's had a
rrived. None of the pilots had ever piloted the P-35 before and to make matters
worse, the aircraft were over-used from gunnery training. On 26 November, the 17
th Pursuit which was sharing Nichols with 21st and 34th squadrons turned over al
l its remaining P-35A's to the two newly arrived squadrons. The 34th which would
be assigned to Del Carmen was given between 12 to 15 P-35A's before they flew o
ff leaving only a few for the 21st Pursuit. The 21st Pursuit would be assigned t
he 3rd Pursuits P-35A's after it had finished gunnery training at Iba.
The pilots and mechanics were appalled at the P-35's. Not only were they complet
ely obsolete, but they were entirely worn-out. The heavy gunnery training and fl
ying left their engines long past the required point for an engine change. The .
30 caliber nose guns were in bad shape from excessive firing on the gunnery rang
e and their quality at this point was questionable. That evening the 34th Pursui
ts 3 officers and 218 enlisted men began moving out from Nichols to Del Carmen,
which was 15 miles south of Clark. The next day the pilots flew their P-35A's to
Del Carmen. Since the pilots had never flown the P-35's before, a total of 6 of
them flipped their planes in ground loops. One of the last arriving planes coll
ided with a parked P-35A in a ground loop. The next days were spent with the per
sonnel building Lewis gun emplacements and revetments around the field. Meanwhil
e the 21st Pursuit attempted to framiliarize itself with the few P-35's left, bu
t it would soon be reequipped with the P-40's. A total of 24xP-40E arrived at Ma
nila crated up by freighter on 25 November, which was the first half of 50xP-40s
that was to equip the 35th Pursuit Group. The squadron was eagerly at Nichols h
elping to dissasemble the crates and reassembling the P-40's. To bring the squad
ron up to strength, 6 pilots from the 3rd, 17th, and 20th were temporarily assig
ned to the 21st Pursuit giving the squadron a total of 19 pilots. On 26 November
, a lone B-17D with General Brereton landed at Clark, returning from his mission
in Australia. Brereton was very displeased with the "disperal" of planes on the
airfield. All 34xB-17s of the 19th BG at Clark were lined up. Parked even close
r together was the 20th PS 17xP-40B and the 28th BS's 8xB-18.
On 27 November, Thanksgiving Day all squadrons were put on alert since the new r
adar set at Iba picked up high-flying airplanes, which were japanese recon plane
s. The alert was called off later in the day, but it was decided to make all air
craft war-ready. The readiness came just as gunnery training for the 3rd Pursuit
came to an end which meant its P-35's were no longer needed. On 30 November, a
C-39 landed at Iba. It brought 17 pilots of the 17th Pursuit which was to pick u
p the spare P-35s of the 3rd Pursuit and fly them back to Nichols for use by the
21st Pursuit. Four of the birds were held back by the 3rd Pursuit for use as ha
cks. Meanwhile, following Breretons order on 28 November, both the 17th and 21st
Pursuit on Nichols were at readiness status. All the 17th's pilots were at one
hours notice to take off in their combat loaded P-40E's and intercept any Japane

se attack. All flying was suspended as they waited. For the 17th Pursuit, traged
y struck on 27 November when pilot Grant Manley was on a routine flight 25 miles
northwest of Nichols when his plane exploded in midair. Finally, on 4 December,
the 21st Pursuit at Nichols recieved its
24xP-40E. That same day it happily turned over its P-35's to the 34th at Del Car
men. The 34th would have to wait for the next shipment of 18xP-40's. At the mome
nt the crates were still at sea on the freighter Blomfontein which was scheduled
to arrivate at Manila on 4 January. In addition to these P-40's, another 20 wer
e on board the freighter Ludington which would arrivat at Manila on 10 January.
The 17th Pursuit pilots were all skilled in flying in two plane formations thank
s to much practice. Unfortunately, the squadron had not once practiced any inter
ception training during all their training at Iba in P-35's. There had been no i
nterception practice in the new P-40E's either. The only bomber interception don
e was by the few senior pilots at night against a B-18 at clark for only two nig
hts. With the loss of Grant Manley's plane 10 days earlier, the squadron was dow
n to 21 planes out of its original 25; two of these had suffered accidents in No
vember and were only now back in commission. The .50 cal MG's had been bore sigh
ted, but none fired. When the planes were recieved in October, the armorers were
ordered by the depot to plug the inlet of all the hydraulic gun charger valves,
making the automatic gun charger inoperative. It was stated in the manual that
this order would remain in effect until further notice making it necesary to man
ually charge the guns with a wire under the wing before each takeoff. This would
also mean it would be impossible to clear jammed guns in air. While the armorer
s believed this to be unnecesary and cumbersome, they followed the order regardl
ess.
The 21st Pursuit at Nichols had dispersed its P-40E's in the woods at the edge o
f the field on the orders of its CO, Ed Dyess. Around each plane, the squadrons
armorers had stacked wooden boxes of .50 caliber ammunition. The aircraft were c
ombat ready. Following the delivery of 10xP-40E on 4 December, the 21st had reci
eved another 10 on 6 December and 2 more were scheduled to be turned over to the
squadron on 8 December. None of the new aircraft had been flown for more than 2
hours. At Iba, the 3rd Pursuit CO Hank Thorne had organized his planes into thr
ee 6 plane flights with A flight under Thorne, B flight under Ed Woolery, and C
flight by Herb Ellis. Just like the 17th Pursuit, Thorne believed that not enoug
h time had been spent on bomber interception and not enough time had been spent
familiarizing themselves with the P-40E. With the loss of only one P-40E the 3rd
Pursuit had 24 planes of which 18 were kept in commission at all times. The squ
adron also retained four of its P-35A and one A-27 trainer. The first week of De
cember was spent arming the fighters with their .50 caliber guns. It wasn't unti
l the evening of 7 December that all the guns were installed into the fighters.
The same manual-charging of the machineguns was also enforced by the armorers, m
uch to the annoyance of the pilots. Another problem was the fact that at Iba, th
ere was no available adapters to transfer oxygen from the high pressure tanks to
the pilot during high-altitude flights. This meant that 3rd Pursuit pilots coul
d not fly above 15,000 ft for more than a few minutes. Thorne was also obliged t
o park his fighters right along the landing strip since there was no available s
pace from which to disperse his planes. Native landowners refused to allow him t
o park his fighters on their land and no revertments had been constructed to pro
tect the fighters; they were completely exposed. For AA defense, the squadron ha
d been supplied 12x.30 caliber Lewis Machineguns. Men of the squadron prepared p
ositions around the airstrip to their own "inventiveness" so the nests were not
standardized. Some foxholes were also dug on the sides of the airfields. Main ai
r defense was the SCR-270B radar set that was set up at Iba to provide advance w
arning; it was operational by 7 December.
At Clark, AA defense was better than at Iba or other FEAF fields. Located at str
ategic positions around the field and adjoining Fort Stotsenburg were a mobile b
attalion of 3 inch guns and a battalion of 37mm AA guns of the 200th Coastal Art

illery Regiment, tasked with defense of Clark and Fort Stotsenburg. To protect i
ts 23xP-40B the 20th Pursuit, engineers and members of the squadron built revetm
ents around the airfield made of drums filled with sand to protect each plane. M
any foxholes and v shaped trenches were built around Clark for bomber defense. U
nlike other pursuit commanders, Moore had divided his pilot strength into two se
ctions of 18 pilots each for flying the 18 ready aircraft and he planned to alte
rnate the two sections on all missions. Since first recieving the P-40B's, they
had used up their current engines by late november and required engine changes,
which after intensive work, was completed on all fighters by 7 December. Meanwhi
le, the 34th Pursuit was having difficulties operating at Del Carmen. The living
conditions were primitive and the dust made it very difficult to operate the fi
ghters on the base; engineers had taken to spraying molasses down on the runway
in a vain attempt to keep the dust down. Following the transfer of 21st Pursuit
aircraft on 4 December, the number of P-35A that belonged to the 34th Pursuit wa
s now 22. He had squadron members dig machinegun pits and revetments for the fig
hters with 6 lewis gun nests completed by 7 December.
Men of Patrol Wing 10 expected war to begin any day and preparations were made.
Besides being very well trained and having various auxiliary seaplane bases scat
tered throughout the Philippines, other measures were taken to prepare for war.
The USS Childs in Manila Bay placed a tarp over its guns in a vain attempt to al
ter the ships appearance. It was futile though, and soon after the tarp was take
n down. At Olongapo, with considerable effort, CM1c Goerge Gaboury built two ply
wood PBY decoys. He was told by pilots that from 5000 ft they looked like the re
al thing. With Japanese intentions becoming clearly toward war, the squadron was
spread out. The USS William Preston with 3xPBY-4 were sent to the Gulf of Davao
in Malalong Bay to set up a small base and patrol the eastern approaches to the
Celebes Sea. The USS Heron with 4xOS2U-2 Kingfishers was sent to the South East
ern section of Palawan Island in Coral Bay to patrol the western approaches to t
he Celebes Sea. As the days went on, the squadron came across the large fleets o
f Japanese merchant ships and warships in Indochina waters. It was clear it was
an invasion fleet of some sort, though as to where it was unknown.
Just after midnight on 7/8 December, the radar operator in the SCR-270B tent at
Iba noted blips on his scope again, indicating that aircraft about 115 miles NW
of Iba. These would be the 4xType 96 Rikko of the 1st and 2nd Weather Reconnaiss
ance Units that had been sent out from Formosa around 10AM to report on weather
on Luzon. Word was passed to the 3rd Pursuit. Throne's squadron began its practi
ced nighttime interception as the blip continued on toward corrigador. Six P-40'
s were kept at standby at night in preparation for this event and they were prom
ptly woken as their planes engines were warmed up. Within 5 minutes, Thorne led
his flight off the field in a cloud of dust with orders to shoot down the intrud
ers. Thorne flew to the area of the blips, but they did not make contact. Thorne
returned dissapointed to Iba.

IJNAF Co
mmitted to the Philippines
21st Koku Sentai
(Rear Admiral. Tada)
1st Koku
tai (Tainan, Formosa)
4x Type 96 Rikko

Toko Kok
utai (Palau with operation locations on Formosa)
26xType 97 Flying boats
13xType 96 Kansen (operating at Palau)
Kanoya K
okutai (Takao, Formosa)
36xType 1 Rikko
1001 Kok
utai (Chiai-Formosa)
25xType 96 Transport
21st Kok
u Sentai Transport Unit (Tainan, Formosa)
23rd Koku Sentai
(Rear Admiral.R.Takenaka)
3rd Koku
tai (Takao, Formosa) (Capt.Kamei Yoshio)
53xReisen
7xType 96 Kansen (deployed to Palau)
8xType 98 Recon Plane "Babs"
Tainan K
okutai (Lt. Hideki Shingo) (Tainan, Formosa)
54xReisen
6xType 96 Fighters (deployed to Palau)
8xType 98 Recon Plane "Babs"
Takao Ko
kutai (Takao, Formosa)
72xType 1 Rikko
23rd Kok
u Sentai Transport Unit (Takao, Formosa)

IJAAF Committed
to the Philippines
14th Arm
y (air units under direct control of the 14th Army)
24th Hiko Sentai(Maj.Takahashi Takeshi)
12xKi-27b (Heito)
24xKi-27b (Choshu)
5th Hiko
Shidan (Heito, Formosa) (Lieutenant General. Hideyoshi Obata)
76th
Recon Buntai (Heito, Formosa)

9xKi-15-II "Babs"
2xKi-46-II "Dinah"
11th
Transport Buntai (Taichu, FOrmosa)
9xKi-57 "Topsy"
12th
Transport Buntai (Phnom Penh, Indo-china)
9xKi-57 "Topsy"
4th
Hikodan (Heito, Formosa)
8th Hiko Sentai (Kato, Formosa)
27 Ki-48 "Lily"
9 Ki-15 "Babs"
2 Ki-46 "Dinah"
14th Hiko Sentai (Choshu, Formosa)
18 Ki-21 "Sally"
16th Hiko Sentai (Kato, Formosa)
31 Ki-30 "Ann"
50th Hiko Sentai (Maj.Makino Yasuo) (Koshun)
36 Ki-27b "Nate"
10th
Dokoritsu Hikotai (Tainan, Formosa)
52nd Light Bomber Butai (Heito, Formosa)
13 Ki-51 "Sonia"
74th Observation Butai, (Heito, Formosa)
10 Ki-36 "Ida"
1 Ki-9 "Spruce"
24th
Airfield Battalion
28th
Airfield Battalion
48th
Airfield Battalion
13th
Airfield Company
32nd
Airfield Company
1st
Air Communication Regiment
3rd
Air Intelligence Unit
2nd

Field Meteorological Battalion HQ

3rd Meteorological Company
4th Meteorological Company
4th
Airfield Construction Unit
9th
Airfield Construction Unit
297t
h Independent Motor transport Company
298t
h Independent Motor transport Company
111t
h Land Duty Company
123r
d Land Duty Company
56th
Construction Duty Company
40th
Field AA Battalion
*Heito= Pingtung*
*Kato= Chiatung*
*Choshu= Chauchou*
*Koshun= Hengchun*
*Taichu= Taichung*

FEAF (277 Aircra

ft)
5th Interceptor Command,
Clark Field
24th Pursuit Gro
up (Grover)
3rd Purs
uit Squadron (Hank Thorne) Iba Field: 18 P-40E (24 in total), 4xP-35A, 1xA-27
17th Pur
suit Squadron:(Buzz Wagner) Nichols Field: 18 P-40E (21 in total)
20th Pur
suit Squadron: (Joe Moore) Clark Field: 18 P-40B (23 in total)
35th Pursuit Gro
up
21st Pur
suit Squadron (Ed Dyess): Nichols Field: 18 P-40E (22 in total)
34th Pur
suit Squadron: (Sam Marett) Del Carmen Field: 18 P-35A (22 total)
5th Bomber Command, Clar
k Field
19th Bombardment
Group: Clark Field: 3 B-17C, 4xB-18
28th Bom
b Squadron: Clark Field: 8 B-17, 6xB-18
30th Bom
b Squadron: Clark Field, 8 B-17
14th Bom
b Squadron: Del Monte Field: 1xB-17C, 7xB-17D
93rd Bom

b Squadron: Del Monte Field: 1xB-17C, 7xB-17D

5th Air
Base Group: Del Monte Field: 2xB-18
27th Bom
bardment Group, Nielson Airfield (3xB-18)
2nd Observation
Squadron: Nichols Field
2xO-46A,
3xO-49, 11xO-52
Additional Aircr
aft
-8xA-27
unoperational based at Clark
-1xA-27
under repair at Nichols
-10xB-10
bombers based at unknown airfields
Philippine Army Air Corp
s (Zablan Airfield)
6th Pursuit Squa
dron (Capt.Jesus Villamor): Batangas airfield: 12 P-26A
10th Bombardment
Squadron: 1xB-3A, 3xB-10B
9th Observation
Squadron: 4xO-46
- About
60 trainers of all types

Patrol W
ing 10 (Capt.Wagner)
Patrol Squadron
101: 14xPBY-4 (2 in overhaul)
Patrol Squadron
102: 14xPBY-4
Utility Squadron
10: Manila Bay- 4xJ2F-2 "Duck"
1xOS2U "Kingfisher"
1xSOC "Seagull"
USS Herod: 4xOS2
U "Kingfisher"
*These notes pertain to air operations on Luzon. All other air o
perations against Mindanao and other secondary Islands will be detailed
in their respective campaign folders I have assigned them*

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Plan
The Japanese deemed the seizure of the Philippines as a top priority ope
ration and assigned General Homa's 14th Army to the operation. However, MacArthu
r's forces had been pouring in air reinforcements into the Philippines, and if t
he 14th Army was to land without suffering serious casualties, the Far Eastern A
ir Force would have to be eliminated first. Since Army aircraft were of limited
range and combat potential, the operational would require the Navy's assistance
as it pocessed the Rikko's and the new Reisen. In addition, the planes would be
required to eliminate any of the Asiatic Fleet's warships that would attempt to
counterattack in the Philippines. Within the summer of 1941, the units assigned
to the 14th Army were located in the following:
48th Division (Formosa and Hainan Island)
16th Division (Kyoto, Japan)
65th Brigade (Three infantry regiments in Japan)
5th Hiko Shidan (Northern Manchurai with orders to assem
ble at Formosa)
The main force of the 14th Army was to assemble on Formosa and hte Ryukyu island
s, while the elements of the advance force which were to attack the Philippines
would assemble at Mako and Palau; this concentration would make every effort to
conceal itself. Orders were given for the units to attack any Allied forces that
attacked them, while if negotiations with the US were succesful, all forces wou
ld cease operations immediately. The naval air forces were ordered to assemble o
n Formosa in September from their previous areas of operation. Aproximately 150
naval fighter pilots from China were assembled at Hankow before being moved to T
ainan, Formosa where they would be organized into the Tainan Kokutai with 54 rei
sen and 8 Type 98 recon plane. At Takao, another 150 pilots were assembled and f
ormed the 3rd Kokutai with 53 reisen and 9 Type 98 recon planes. The Type 96 Kan
sen that were assigned to each unit were assembled at Peleliu, Palau and formed
into the Palau fighter detachment with 13xType 96 Kansen under the command of Lt
.Shiro Kawai. The unit may have been assigned to the 24th Koku Sentai. Near the
same time, the Takao Kokutai was assembled at Takao, Formosa with 72xType 1 Rikk
o with 6 active Chutai. On 18 November, the 1st Kokutai with 48xType 96 Rikko tr
ansfered to Tainan and 22 November, the Kanoya Kokutai with 36xType 1 Rikko depl
oyed at Taichu. The plan was for a knockout blow to be given to the FEAF at the
commencement of hostilities. The flight from Tainan to Manila, however, was fart
her than any flight that fighters had flown before and it was originally planned
to use light carriers Ryujo, Zuiho, and Shoho to launch reisen to fly cover for
the bombers which would take off from Formosa. However, the carriers could only
carry a bombined 50 fighters and it seemed useless to use them for this purpose
when Taiwan was within range.
As soon as the units assembled, they began round-the-clock training. The fighter
units began practicing long ranged flights so as to conserve as much fuel as po
ssible. The Reisen was designed to operate in the air for a maximum of 6 to 7 ho
urs; the Tainan began to stretch that figure from 10 to 12 hours. To conserve fu
el, the reisen began cruising at 132 MPH at 12,000 ft. The propeller revolutions
were reduced to only 1700 to 1850 rpm's and throttled the air control valve to
its leanest mixture. With this extensive training, it was reported that the reis
en units could make the 500 miles to Nichols one way and back for approximately
1200 mile long flights! Meanwhile, Vice Admiral Tsukahara began sending reconnai
ssance over the Philippines on 2nd, 4th, and 5th of December and they began taki
ng pictures of the airfields that the 11th Fleet was to attack. The photographs
at Clark showed 32xB-17 lined up neatly on the field and 71 smaller aircraft. Th
e Navy estimated that on Luzon there were some 300 combat planes of all types. T

hey would have to be eliminated before the 14th Army could land in force. The Ja
panese estimates in FEAF air strength on Luzon were amazingly accurate with only
a small margin of error. Imperial intelligence estimated MacArthur had 110 figh
ters based at different fields on Luzon. It was estimated there would be 30xP-35
at Clark, 30xP-35 at Nichols, about 25xP-40 at Del Carmen, and about 25xP-35 at
Iba. They believed they would only be slightly outnumbered by American fighters
, though they believed 3/4 of them were the "relatively old types" of P-35 with
the other quarter the "very good fighters". The rest of the airpower was estimat
ed to be 30xB-17 at Clark, 7-10 B-17 and B-18 at Nichols. The B-17D model was co
nsidered "a very good bomber because of its maneuverability and attack capabilit
y".
The final decision to go to war came on 1 December, and the next day the histori
ce "Climb Mount Niitaka 1208" had gone out to all IJN forces which declared that
X-Day was to be on 8 December. The last full dress rehearsal involving pre-dawn
take offs of fighters and Rikko was conducted on 5 December and thereafter, all
personnel were confined to base. As prearranged, the Kanoya Ku moved down from
Taichu to Takao on 7 December. That evening, the commanders of each kokutai anno
unced to the personel of their respective units on the commencement of hostiliti
es with the Allies. Sunrise on Manila was to be at 0609 local time. It was going
to be a dangerous raid since the Pearl Harbor strike would occur at roughly 020
0 and so the Americans in the philippines would have roughly 5 hours to prepare
for a Japanese air attack since it was impossible to launch the raid before sunr
ise as targets would be obscured by darkness. The plan for the strke on 8 Decemb
er called for the 11th Fleet to takeoff at 0130 and after a time consuming assem
bly in the dark followed by a fuel conserving slow cruise, hit their targets hos
rtly after dawn at 0630. The plan callled for 27xType 1 Rikko of Takao Ku, 27xTy
pe 1 Rikko from the Kanoya Ku, escorted by 54xReisen from the 3rd Ku and Tainan
Ku to attack Nichols Field, which was the main American fighter base on the outs
kirts of Manila. The second group consisted of 27xType 1 Rikko of Takao Ku, 27xT
ype 96 Rikko of 1st Ku, and 36 Reisen from Tainan Ku to attack the main bomber b
ase at Clark. It was hoped that these early-as-possible raids would catch most o
f the Americans on the ground. Meanwhile, the FEAF had recieved a war warning an
d its forces were prepared for an outbreak in hostilities. As part of this war w
arning, the 19th Bombardment Group was ordered to concentrate their 32 operation
al B-17C/D to Del Monte airfield on Mindanao. This move was only partially compl
ete by X-Day with 18xB-17C/D still stationed on Clark Field. It is unknown as to
why this move had not been completed. The Army Air Force would also conduct its
own raids in support of Army operations in the Philippines. On X-Day the Apari
and Vigan invasion forces would be steaming to their objectives and the 24th and
50th Hiko Sentai with their Ki-27's would fly cover for the invasion force. It
was planned that they would transfer to Batan airfield once it was captured on X
-Day and from there could fly support for the Army detachments when they landed
at Apari and Vigan as the Ki-27 was a short wave fighter and Batan would increas
e its operational distance. Meanwhile, the 8th Hiko Sentai would bomb an auxilia
ry airfield being improved by engineers at Tuguegarao airfield and the 14th Hiko
Sentai would bomb an Army base at Baguio where it hoped to inflict casualties o
n a large number of officers that were expected to be vacationing there.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

8 December

Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, Secretary of War S

timpson sent tcalegram 736 to USAFFE commander at 3:22 PM (US time):
"HOSTILITIES BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES COMMA BRITISH COMMONWEA
LTH COMMA AND DUTCH HAVE COMMENCED STOP JAPANESE MADE AIR RAID ON PEARL HARBOR T
HIS
MORNING DECEMBER SEVENTH STOP CARRY OUT TASKS ASSIGNED IN RAINBOW FIVE SO FAR AS
THEY PERTAIN TO JAPAN STOP IN ADDITION COOPERATE WITH TEH BRITISH AND DUTCH TO
THE UTMOST WITHOUT JEOPORDIZING THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF YOUR PRIMARY MISSION OF DE
FENSE OF THE PHILIPPINES STOP YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO DISPATCH AIR UNITS TO OPERAT
E TEMPORARILY FROM SUITABLE BASES IN COOPERATION WITH THE BRITISH OR DUTCH STOP
REPORT DAILY MAJOR DISPOSITIONS AND ALL OPERATIONS STOP YOU HAVE THE COMPLETE CO
NFIDENCE OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT AND WE ASSURE YOU OF EVERY POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE AN
D SUPPORT WITHIN OUR POWER" - MARSHALL
In Manila, MacArthur was awakened in his penthouse apartment in the Manila Hotel
at 3:30 AM by a call from his chief of staff. Brig.Gen.Richard Sutherland. He w
as informed of the Pearl Harbor attack; 25 minutes later he received confirmatio
n of hte attack through Admiral Hart. At 4:30 AM as he prepared to go to his off
ice at 1 Calle Victoria in the walled city, he was handed a radiogram from Marsh
all that had been received at USAFFE HQ informing him that the Japanese planned
to break off negotations. After arriving at HQ, he assembled his staff at 5AM to
inform them of the situation and prepare an adequate response. Then at 5:30AM h
e was given the above message from Marshall. Two hours later at 7:55AM, MacArthu
r picked up his phone for a long-distance call from Washington. He confirmed tha
t he had recieved the above message and a second one ordering him to respond imm
ediately as to the situation in the Philippines: the war department had thus far
recieved no word from the Philippines on if they had been attacked or not. MacA
rthur did not offer any excuse or reason for not responding immediately. When as
ked if he had been attacked, MacArthur replied, "No attack at all, however, rada
r operators reported a Japanese bombing squadron the previous night". He was ref
ering to the 1st and 2nd Weather unit which flew a total of 4xType 96 Rikko modi
fied for weather reconnaissance which had turned back 30 miles from shore. He al
so reported that in the last half hour, radar had picked up planes about 30 mile
s off the coast, and notified the War Department that pursuit craft had taken of
f to meet them. This was refering to the 8th Sentai and 14th Sentai. Gerow reque
sted that MacArthur confirm their conversation by radio, "as quickly as possible
," and to reporto n his situation. He also would make a report on the receipt of
the two war department messages and on the two japanese air incursions he had m
entioned to gerow. Gerow ended the conversation by emphasizing that MacArthur sh
ould expect an air raid later in the day. At about 8:30 AM MacArthur partially r
esponded to Gerow's requests. He didn't refer to his conversation with Gerow in
a radiogram to Marshall, but did acknowledge receipt of Marshalls two messages.
He reported his, "interceptor prusuit" was now in contact, "with about 13 enemy
planes north of Clark Field". He also indicated that Davao had been bombed and t
hat he had just received word of a, "bombing attack on Camp John Hay" in Baguio.
********************************************************************************
********************************************************************************
*******
Japanese on Taiwan
At 2230 on 7 December, a fog began to build up in the Tainan area which was unus
ual for this time of year. By midnight the fog had become extremely thick and it
had spread to the Takao area as well. At 0100 Vice Admiral Nishio Tsukahara cal
led a meeting of subordinate commanders. Everyone was very anxious as it was pas
t 11 PM and no reports from the 1st or 2nd Weather units had been recieved yet (
though at this time the 3rd PS was scrambling to attempt an interception of the
four Rikko). They had urgent need for weather information because any deteriorat

ion of conditions over the attack forces route would seriously affect the 2:30AM
takeoff. The two weather units had taken off at 8:35 and 10:35 respectively and
were ordered to only use their radio's if they detected adverse weather. So, so
me staff officers were optimistic since the lack of radio information indicated
that the weather was satisfactory. A little later, a messenger arrived from the
Takao Naval Communications unit which was monitoring US radio communications on
Luzon with its high-powered equipment. The staff officers had been notified earl
ier that Clark and Iba fields were on 15 minute standby alert, but this time the
message was more ominous: six American fighters had taken off at midnight from
Iba to attack unidentified planes approaching the base. Commander Takeo Yasunobu
, the 23rd Kokusentai's senior staf member and looked at Lt.Cmdr.Ryosuke Nomura,
the flotilla's staff officer in charge of air operations and asked, "How could
the Americans have detected our reconnaissance planes on such a dark night?" The
ir new anxiety was that the succesful interception of the Japanese weather plane
s could jeapordize the Hawaii operation. Tensions eased after a new report of in
tercepted American radio transmission reported that the interceptors failed to s
ight any of the Japanese planes and had returned to base. However, just as they
were feeling relieved, the staff officers recieved bad news again. The Tainan ba
se, 24 miles to the north was covered with a thick fog; it would be too dangerou
s to have its air units attack in such conditions. Onishi was upset and declared
they would have to modify their planes. Staff officer Nomura was ordered to dri
ve to the Tainan base and convey a change of orders: the departure of the Tainan
attack groups is to be delayed. Onishi was taking no chances that a telephone m
essage to Tainan on this critical subject would be intercepted by the Americans.
Nomura reached Tainan base shortly after 12:30 AM and gave the leaders of hte tw
o attack groups a simple message: only the Takao attack groups would take off as
scheduled. After returning to Takao HQ he reported that the fog was so thick on
e could not see one meter ahead in the light of hte headlights on the car. Meanw
hile, the pilots at Tainan had been awakened around midnight where they readied
themselves for the days operations. The mechanics had been working all night on
the Tainan Ku's 36xReisen at Tainan airbase. Saburo Sakai had gotten an unexpect
edly sound sleep and he and the rest of his pilots approached their planes to wa
it for the order to take off. Masaaki Shimakawa gave his reisen an affectionate
pat and asked it to do its best. He gave it his own personal check before headin
g to the mess hall for an early breakfast, which again was sekihan. After breakf
ast, Shimakawa prepared the items thath e and his shotaicho would be taking with
them, including the lunch of vinegar rice in a pouch of fried bean curd. He wen
t back to his V-135 and put the items in the cockpit, then walked over to his sh
otaicho's plane for the same purpose. After returning to his own aircraft, Shima
kawa climbed into the cockpit and sat for awhile, waiting in vain for hte fog to
dissipate. This morning went similarly for all the Tainan Ku's pilots. Suddenly
, the stillness of the night was interupted by a loud speaker ordering the Taina
n Ku's pilots to report immediately to the operations area. With all 36 pilots a
ssembed before him according to their chutai, the Hikotaicho Hideki Shingo issue
d them a final and detailed briefing of their mission. He emphasized their role
in defending the 1st Kokutai's 27xType 96 Rikko, but they were also to clear the
sky over Clark of any enemy fighters. Only when all aerial opposition had been
eliminated were they to strafe the planes and base facilities at Clark. He remin
ded his pilots that they would have only ten minutes for combat over the airfiel
d. If there were still enemy aircraft over Clark after ten minutes of combat, th
ey were to break off and head back to base to avoid using up too much fuel. Afte
r completing their attack, they were to assemble in the vicinity of Mount Pinatu
ba north of Manila ("Smaller than Fuji" as Shingo explained). If they needed to
ditch, they were to head to Aparri where the IJA would land two days from then,
and he concluded by declaring, "as soon as the fog dissipates, we'll take off."
The pilots then looked at the chart that Shingo had put up: Shimakawa would be f
lying with Lt.Asai's Chutai, as he always had. The pilots broke up for further m
eetings with their chutaicho, and then their shotaicho for further instructions
before heading back to their planes to await take off. At 2:30 AM the tension wa

s broken by a message passed to the pilots from the operations staff. Takao base
HQ had just recieved word that hte Hawaii task force had succeeded in conductin
g a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. This gave way to shouts and cheers for hte
victory. Though, everyone was still concerned about the fact that the fog was no
t letting up and the knowledge that Americans would have hours of advance warnin
g before they would finally arrive over Luzon.
Meanwhile, upon returning to 11th Fleet HQ at Takao air base, Staff officer Nomu
ra was upset to find that the fog now enveloped Takao air base as well. Admiral
Onishi was then obliged to delay the takeoff time for the air groups at Takao ai
r base as well. At 1:30 AM he changed the departure time for 4AM. The attack was
originally scheduled to take place at 6:30 would now take place at 8AM; 1 hour
and 51 minutes after sunrise. The change in time also followed a change in targe
ts. Admiral Tsukahara had called a meeting of his 11th Fleet HQ staff at 1AM to
discuss changes in the operations plan occasioned by the near-interception of th
e photoreconnaissance planes. Instead of Nichols field, they would hit Iba. The
radio transmissions had shown that Iba was an important P-40 base. If they stuck
with the original plan to attack Clark and Nichols, the American pursuiters who
were already alerted by the weather reconnaissance aircraft would be ready for
them to attack the flanks of their bombers as they flew down Luzon and again dur
ing their return to Formosa. The downside to this plan would be that the two squ
adrons of B-17s that had left Clark had presumably landed at Nichols (The Japane
se were as of yet, unaware of Del Monte airfields on Mindanao and assumed that t
he bombers switched to Nichols, the only other base capable of supporting heavy
bombers). The revised plan now had Yokoyama's 3rd Ku attacking Iba instead of Ni
chols and other targets in the Manila area. Since Iba was considered such a smal
l target, after their strafing the 3rd Ku was then to proceed to Clark after the
Tainan Ku finished strafing and use up remaining ammunition on whatever targets
remained; this would release some of Shingo's Tainan Ku to make strafing attack
s against Del Carmen after they finished strafing Clark. Finally at about 3:20AM
the fog began to thin out. A little later, as conditions began to improve, Tsuk
ahara again revised the attack plan. The Kanoya Ku would take off ahead of hte o
ther groups and proceed to the vicinity of Iba, where they would maneuver close
to the field and draw off the P-40s based there. They would attempt to keep a sa
fe distance from the interceptors for two hours and then rejoin the rest of hte
strike force in all out attacks on Iba and Clark just as the Iba P-40s landed fo
r refuel. Fortunately for Tsukahara and the Kanoya Ku, the fog began to thicken
again at about 5AM and the feint by the Kanoya Ku was dropped. With the fog agai
n thickening, the Japanese plan was appearing increasingly grim. Radio intercept
s confirmed that Admiral Hart had been notified of the Pearl Harbor strike and J
apanese plans relied on them having the initiative in air strikes against the Ph
ilippines. The Japanese could reasonably expect the Americans to bomb them first
with their B-17s while their whole forces were stranded on the ground awaiting
takeoff. As almost all aircraft were devoted to offensive operations, little def
ensive preparations were complete. The AA guns at each airbase were inadequate;
no air-raid shelters had been built; the air raid warning system was totally ina
dequate, and furthermore there was hardly any aircraft available for interceptio
n. All aircraft were involved in offensive operations and as such there was only
24xType 96 Kansen available in the whole southern Formosa (The Tainan Ku and 3r
d Ku supplied 12 each). At 6AM the weather reconnaissance Type 96 Rikko carrying
Lt.Cmdr.Koichi Shimada that had left at 10:30PM arrived back over Takao air bas
e. He was dismayed to see it covered in fog and so the pilot as obliged to conti
nue all the way north to Taichu to get beyond the thick fog. The fog finally beg
an to clear at 7:50AM and Admiral Tsukahara issued a revised takeoff timetable.
The 1st Kokutai with its 27xType 96 Rikko would take off at 8:15 from the Tainan
base and then the other attack groups would depart at 9:15. After linking up ov
er Luzon, they would launch coordinated attacks on Iba and Clark at 12:30PM. For
tunately for the 11th Fleet, Brereton's plans to raid Formosa first were hindere
d by MacArthur's chief of staff Sutherland. Fucking egomaniac idiot. Good for th
e Japanese though. A benefit to taking off late, however, was the Rikko and reis

en would be allowed greater flight time over their targets. They didn't need as
much time taking off and assembling in the air because of the dark, so the total
time for aircraft to reach their targets after takeoff would be reduced from th
e 4 to 5 hours original schedule.
For the Army, meanwhile, at 4AM at Choshu 25 miles SE of Takao, 1st Lt.Yoshiaki
Kubo was preparing to board his Ki-21IIA bomber to which he was assigned as obse
rver/commander for the mornings scheduled raid. The eighteen Mitsubishi Type 97
bombers would bel eading the Army's initial attacks on northern Luzon, as per th
e Army-Navy agreement. Kubo had graduated nine months earlier at the Army Air Ac
ademy and had been posted to the 14th Hiko Sentai. This morning he would be flyi
ng in the second aircraft, 3rd Chutai which like the other two Chutai operated o
nly six bombers. Just as at Tainan and Takao, fog blanketed Choshu air base and
so at the scheduled takeoff time of 4AM, the bombers were delayed an hour. At 5:
21 the fog had cleared enough for takeoff and the 18xKi-21IIA lifted off from Ch
oshu led by Capt.Ryosuke Motomura, leader of the 2nd Chutai. Each Type 97 bomber
was loaded with 10x100 kg bombs. Meanwhile, 10 miles south of Choshu was the ne
wly constructed army air base of Kato where the 8th hiko sentai was based. A tot
al of 25xKi-48Ib had been scheduled to take off at 4AM and attack Tuguegarao air
; while the fog was not thick enough to delay this departure time, a different f
actor did. The Army high command at Heito was concerned that the 2:30AM attack t
ime of Hawaii would leave the American pursuit planes alerted to intercept their
bombers, so they ordered the 8th sentai to send one of their recon planes over
NE Luzon to determine if Americans were patrolling the area. When the Mitsubishi
Ki-15II of the 1st Chutai landed from its surveillance mission, the pilot repor
ted it had not met any enemy aircraft in the sky. Relieved, the 5th hikoshidan H
Q decided that htey could go ahead with the unescorted strike as planned. As the
leader of the 3rd Chutai, Capt.Kyosato Goto was about ot board his plane, he sa
w the 8th Sentai adjutant running out from HQ building toward the commanding off
icer with a piece of paper in his hand. After talking, the adjutant came around
to each of buntaicho showing the message: "In the predawn hours today, the Imper
ial Navy succeeded in a surprise attack on Hawaii." In full formation by Chuta,
25xKi-48 began taking off. Takeoff time is not recorded, but as the Ki-15 would
have returned around 5:30 and the sun had not yet shown any signs of rising over
Choshu, 5:30AM is the approximate time of takeoff of the four Chutai.
At about the time that the 14th Sentai was crossing over Northern Luzon, the fog
finally lifted over Tainan airfield at 7:50AM. Everyone was relieved that no B17s had arrived over the field to rain ruin down upon their concentrated aircraf
t. Final arrangements for takeoff of both flying groups were now made. At 8:18,
the pilots of the Tainan Ku watched from the side as the 1st Ku taxied to the ta
keoff field with 27xType 96 Rikko fully loaded with fuel, bombs, and ammunition.
In the lead bomber was the hikotaicho Lt.Cmdr.Ozaki Takeo who was sitting in th
e pilots seat. The 1st Ku's ground crews were lined up along the runway waving t
heir caps to say goodbye to teh flying crews as they took off on this momentous
mission. Each of the Rikko was loaded with 12x60kg bombs which they would unload
upon Clark. The Rikko began taking off, one by one. However, as the seventh Rik
ko rolled down the runway and accelerated, the bombers landing gear suddenly col
lapsed. The ship veered to the right and the right wing touched hte runway. A li
ttle fire on the ship seemed to touch the gas tank and burning gasoline spread o
ver hte fuselage. As members of the crew jumped out the bombers hatches to escap
e, the fire set off the machinegun ammunition, which in turn set off the bombs a
nd the bomber errupted with several giant explosions, killing the whole crew. Fi
re engines immediatly arrived to put out the fires and recover the five crewmemb
ers bodies. Within a few minutes, ground crews cleared hte runway of the wreckag
e and the 1st Kokutai's remaining Rikko took off.
Following the departure of the 1st Kokutai, the pilots of the Tainan Ku climbed
into the reisen and prepared for takeoff. Like the Rikko, each reisen was fully
loaded down. They had their two 190 liter wing tanks, the 145 liter fuselage tan

k, and the 330 liter drop tank were all full of aviation gasoline. Each of the t
wo 20mm machine cannons were loaded with 60 rounds of explosive ammunition and t
here was a total of 600 rounds of 7.7mm ammunition for the two nose machineguns.
However, hikotaicho Shingo had ordered the Tainan Ku to remove their 29 kg (44
lb) radios, which were close to useless and weighed the fighters down more. This
saved some weight. Masaaki Shimakawa had put his pistol against his chest, hold
ing it in position with the straps of his jacket. He then palced the flight char
t beside his left foot. Ordinarily he would have put on his parachute harness, b
ut today he didn't. He noticed that hte other pilots were not taking their harne
sses to attach to their parachutes either. No one wanted to run the risk of capt
ure in the evento f bail out over enemy territory. His reisen had V-135 painted
on its tail to identify it as his plane. At 9:45AM, Lt.Shingo began leading his
eight other pilots of his 1st Chutai down the runway. The pilots were worried ab
out puncturing their tires over the scattered remains of wreckage from the expld
oed Type 96 Rikko, but fortunately, none did. He was next followed by Lt.Masuzo
Seto's 2nd Chutai with his eight pilots. Then came Lt.Masao Asai's 3rd Chutai wi
th Shimakawa number 24 for takeoff. Bringing up the rear was Lt.Akira Wakao's 4t
h Chutai wight his eight pilots. After retracting his landing gear, Shimakawa se
t his engine for 1800 rpm to save fuel. Using hte manual pump, he then switched
to the belly tank. While the pilots had been told to not to do so at such a low
altitude, Shimakawa and other pilots did so anyways. The reisen circled above th
e base to form up before heading south. He now adjusted his distance from the ot
her ships by increasing his rpm. Saburo Sakai's plane was V-107.
At Takao, the Takao Kokutai with 27xType 1 Rikko had begun taking off at 9:30AM
led by Lt.Cmdr.Taro Nonaka; fifteen minutes ahead of the Tainan Ku to the north.
Their destination was Clark field. Eight minutes later, Commander Yoshizo Suda
led his 27xType 1 Rikko into the air for Iba airfield. Beginning at 9:55AM the K
anoya Ku began taking off which was led by Commander Toshii Irisa, who was takin
g his 27xType 1 Rikko for Iba as well. Just after the Rikko had completed their
takeoff, Lt.Tamotsu Yokoyama began leading his group of 53 reisen from the 3rd K
u to takeoff point according to the prearranged positions of each aircraft. Yoko
yama's command chutai of six reisen was in the lead. Right behind was the 1st Da
itai with 12 reisen led by Lt.Takeo Kurasawa, followed by the 2nd Daitai command
ed by Lt.Ichiro Mukai with 12 reisen as well. Behind Mukai came the 3rd Daitai w
ith 17 reisen under the command of Lt.Zenjiro Miyano which included the Tainan K
u Chutai under Lt.Yukio Maki. Finally in the trail position, were six reisen of
Lt.Takaichi Hasuo's rear defense chutai. The five reisen units circled above Tak
ao and formed up into beautiful formation for the flight south. Yokoyama and his
five other reisen formed the lead with Kurosawa's reisen directly bheind him. M
ukai formed up on Yokoyamas right and Miyano's large daitai formed up on the le
ft. Hasuo's men brought up the rear behind Kurosawa's group. Way off to the righ
t, the 3rd Ku pilots could see Irisa's 27 Rikko formed up in their beautiful V o
f V formation. Yokoyama was filled with immense pride at the grand sight around
him. Never before had he led 53 fighters into combat.
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At 2:30AM at Nielson Field, Private Norman Tant (409th Aviation Signal c
ompany) pulled a coded message off the Teletype machine and began decoding it. H
e was shocked at its content, "Attenion all commanders. Japan has begun hostilit
ies. Conduct yourselves accordingly." Tant immediatly passed on the order to 5th
Interceptor Command. At around 4:30AM, Brereton was notified that the Japanese
attacked Pearl Harbor. Upon learning, Brereton ordered units to prepare to attac
k Formosa; he expected the Japanese to attack any time after daylight. At 5AM, B
rereton reached Fort Santiago to see MacArthur and discuss his plan to bomb Japa
nese bases on Formosa. Instead, he was met by Sutherland who informed him that M
acArthur was in conference and was unable to see him. Brereton informed him that

he wanted, "to mount all his available B-17s at Clark for missions previously a
ssigned" against Formosa and prepare the B-17s at Del Monte for movement to Clar
k, where htey would be refueled and bombed up for the same purpose. Sutherland a
greed with Breretons plans and told him to go ahead with preparations, but that
he would need MacArthur's approval before he mounted any attacks. Sutherland add
ed that he himself, "would obtain Gernal MacArthur's authority for the daylight
attacks.".
Back at the Philippines, around 4AM, pilots began recieving the orders to report
for duty. Buzz Wagner at Nichols were ordered to lead a mission, but recieved n
o further instructions. He assigned pilots to the three-6 plane flights. Willie
Feallock would lead one flight, while Johnny Brownewell and Wagner himself would
lead the other two flights. The squadrons seasoned pilots: Russ Church, Walt Co
ss, Red Sheppard, and Allison Strauss would fly as element leaders. With not one
pilot in uniform, Wagner taxied in the dark with his 18 other pilots before tur
ning their engines off waiting for orders to take off; flying with Wagner was Cy
Blanton and Dave Obert. Meanwhile, Ed Dyess and the 21st PS also at Nichols had
been roused at 2:30 AM and told to report to squadron tent. Dyess said their wa
s an emergency, but after 10 minutes ordered the pilots back to their quarters.
Only two hours later the pilots were again awoken with officer Colemen shouting
that Pearl Harbor had been attacked. They were soon ordered with the 17th PS to
their planes and taxied to the opposite side of Nichols. Just with the 17th, Dye
ss ordered his 17 other pilots to turn off their engines to prevent overheating
until orders to take off were given; the pilots got out of their cockpits and wa
ited under the wings of their fighters. At clark, 20th PS commander Joe Moore or
dered 18 pilots to the flight line between 4:30-5 AM. They waited at the ready a
t their planes for several hours until at around 7AM they were told to go back t
o their quarters for sleep as they would be relieving the next section at 10AM.
Meanwhile at Del Carmen, news of Pearl Harbor did not arrive until 8AM. Marett
immediately ordered his squadron put on alert with pilots at their planes ready
to take off. At Iba, the 3rd Pursuit was in the mess hall at 6AM. Thorne had man
aged only 2 hours sleep after the failed interception. It was here they recieved
news of Pearl Harbor over the radio from Don Bell in Manila. Thorne called the
whole squadron together outside the barracks. Thorne ordered squadron made ready
to take off. Thorne led his 5 other pilots of A flight to their aircraft. Ed Wo
olery led his 5 pilots of B flight to their aircraft and Herb Ellis did the same
with his 5 pilots of C Flight.
At 6:30AM Col.Eubank landed at Nielson Field from Clark in a B-18 and headed to
the V shaped building on the field that housed the offices of Brereton's FEAF HQ
. The building and the nearby hangar was out in the open for air attack. Gathere
d in Breretons office were senior staff members of both his HQ and hte 5th Inter
ceptor Command. Brereton's chief of staff, Col.Brady was conducting the meeting.
Also of the FEAF staff, Lt.Col.Caldwell, Lt.Col.Campbell of AWS; Maj.Lamb of si
gnal; Capt.Eads of engineering were there. Also Col.George, Capt.Sprague, and Ca
pt.Ind were there representing 5th Interceptor Command. Their chief, General Cla
gett, was in and out, reflecting his marginalized status following Breretons arr
ival. Someone asked Eubanks about his B-17 force at Clark, and he responded irri
tatedly that they were ready, but he didn't know what to do with them. Brady fin
ally called hte meeting to order. He told everyone that Brereton was still at US
AFFE, "but we'll ahve a plan ready for him when he comes." The objective was to
decide a course of action following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and the
time was now 7AM. A great deal of arguing back and forth ensued before a unami
nous decision was reached that Takao Harbor should be bombed. Col.Caldwell asked
Ind if the objective folders he was preparing for targets on Formosa were ready
. When Ind answered in the affirmative, Breretons G3 told him: "Go check them ov
er. Be absolutly sure. We're playing for keeps now. And it looks we'll be dealin
g out a hand any minute." At the time, Clark had 19xB-17's based at the airfield
(4xB-17C and 15xB-17D) with one of those unflyable due to the landing accident
in September. At Del Monte, 2xB-17C and 14xB-17D were stationed at the airfield.

Earlier that morning at 5:30AM Wheless and Teborek had taken off north to patro
l the waters from Luzon to Formosa and bomb any ships they came in contact with;
however they were for some stupid reason armed with only 100lb bombs which woul
dn't do much good against any ship of a serious size.
Across the town at MacArthur's USAFFE HQ in Instramuros, it was 7:15AM when Brer
eton returned for his second visit of the morning. Again as he entered Sutherlan
ds office anxious to know MacArthur's decision. Sutherland told him that the gen
eral had not responded to his request. Brereton was irritated and told Sutherlan
d that he wanted to discuss the matter with MacArthur in person. Sutherland ackn
owledged that MacArthur was aloned, but for some reason would not allow Brereton
to enter. Sutherland said, "I'll ask the general" and then slipped into MacArth
ur's office. He was back a moment later and said, "The General says no. Don't ma
ke the first overt act." Brereton was obviously and logically upset at this argu
ing with Sutherland that the bombing of Pearl Harbor *was* an overt act. Even mo
re troubling, MacArthur should have been alerted already about the Japanese raid
against Davao. Sutherland did not budge from his position. Sutherland expressed
the belief that Brereton lacked sufficient information on targets on Formosa to
justify offensive operations, and instructed the FEAF commander to maintain a d
efensive stance while awaiting further orders. Brereton immediatly got back in h
is car for FEAF HQ where he would tell his staff about Sutherlands obtusive reac
tion. At 8AM Brereton arrived back at FEAF HQ at Nielson and responded to a ques
tion from his staff, "No, we can't attack until we're fired on." He told his str
aff about his discussions with Sutherland. The bombers were to be prepared for a
ction, but they would remain on standby until USAFFE HQ issued hte order to atta
ck. In further discussions, Brereton and his staff agreed that further preparati
ons on target information would be found by 3xB-17s sent on photo reconnaissance
in the meantime, "without delay". The highest priority were bases at Takao, Rei
garzo, Koshun, Okayama, and Laito. The rest of the the 5th Bomber Command and 5t
h Interceptor Command would remain on alert. As the meeting broke up, Eubank was
mentioning to Brady the possible need to get his Clark-based B-17s in the air i
f necessary when Col.George interrupted them saying,"Just a while ago, a large f
orce was reported to be heading in fron Lingayen and that Clark Field had been n
otified." Eubanks replied, "we can't be taking off for every alarm." However, he
changed his mind and headed for the telephone to put through an emergency call
to Clark. Col.George grimly headed for his office and called Maj.Grover at Clark
to get his pursuit squadrons in the air to meet the threat to the north. Back i
n his own office, Brereton placed a call to USAFFE HQ. He wanted to find out if
Sutherland and MacArthur had changed their minds on the stance of bombing Formos
a. At 8:50AM, Sutherland called back. He told Brereton, "Hold off bombing of For
mosa for the present."
Patrol Wing 10
At 0315, Ensign Arthur Jacobson at Cavite Naval Base recieved the following mess
age, "JAPAN STARTED HOSTILITIES GOVERN YOURSELVES ACCORDINGLY." He immediately s
pread the alarm to VP-101 which was stationed just north at Sangley Point. The n
ews reached Olongapo at 0400 and VP-102 was ordered to report to the hangar for
an emergency meeting. Meanwhile, the PBY-4's of PatWing10 were each loaded with
4x500 lbs bombs; 2 on each wing. Everything was looked over on the planes while
crews carried boxes of .30 caliber and .50 caliber ammo boxes onto the plane; th
ere were not armor piercing rounds available; they were all training rounds as i
t was all they had. At Sangley, VP-101's plane taxied over to the USS Langley to
draw bombs and ammo. By 0600 the first patrols were off. Seven PBY's were held
at Olongapo as a scouting unit while 7 more were deployed to the USS Childs in M
anila bay as an attack group. Five PBYs formed another scouting group at Cavite,
and four were sent to Laguna de Bay, 80 miles south of Manila to form a second
attack group. Three PBY's were already in malalag Bay at the southern tip of Min
danao with the USS Preston. Only 2xPBY-4 were currently unoperational and they w
ere undergoing overhaul in hangar X-34. The USS Heron was SE of Palawan Island w

ith 4 kingfisher flying boats while the remaining aircraft of the utility squadr
on: 4xJ3F Ducks, 1xOS2U-2 Kingfisher, and 1xSOC Seagul were in Manila Bay, perfo
rming anti-submarine patrol. They were also loaded with bombs and went off on an
ti-submarine patrol in the area. Meanwhile, 2 of the PBY's in Malalag Bay were d
estroyed by Type 96 Kansen from carrier Ryujo during a raid while Type 97 Kanko
dropped bombs on the Preston but missed. The third PBY was out on patrol and mis
sed the raid.
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Japanese army air raid
The time was 7:50AM at Cape Bojeador at the extreme NW tip of Luzon. The
men of air warning company were ordered there on 5 December and were trying to
get their SCR-270B radar unit operational. They had arrived to this distant loca
tion at 2AM on 7 December. While they were still trying to prepare their radar s
et, they heard the roar of airpalnes and looked up. A flight of twin-engined air
craft were passing overhead, heading south. These were the 17xType 97 Army bombe
rs of the 14th Sentai heading south toward Baguio. First Lieutenant Robert Arnol
d hurried over to the oepratiosn van to radio the sighting to FEAF HQ at Nielson
. However to his frusteration, he could not get through. The AWS was not listeni
ng on the agreed channel. Unknown to Arnold, the SCR-197 radio trailer at FEAF H
Q had been removed that morning for use at MacArthurs' command post and the radi
o set substituting for it was operating on a different frequency. As the bombers
continued south, at 8:15 the 16th Naval District Communications Center in Manil
a recieved a message that seventeen planes had been sighted over San Fernando he
ading south. The 14th Sentai was flying south toward Baguio, only 30 miles furth
er. The pickup that was mentioned in the above notes at FEAF HQ at Nielson was m
ade by SCR-270B at Iba, as San Fernando was easily within the radars 150 mile ra
dius. It informed AWS at Nielson and then passed the message on to Clark. MacArt
hur's office diary records that, "high flying planes" were reported to USAFFE at
, "about 08:30".
By 8:30AM the whole of FEAF was alerted to the Japanese Army bombers approaching
from the north. In response to the report he recieved from the AWS and then Maj
.George at FEAF HQ, Mag.Orrin Grover at 24th Pursuit HQ had ordered the 2nd sect
ion of Joe Moore's 20th Pursuit to take off in their 18xP-40B and head north to
the Tarlac area to be ready to intercept the Japanese planes reporting heading d
own northern Luzon. Maj.Grover then contacted Buzz wAGNER AT nICHOLS fIELD AND D
IRECTED HIM TO AHVE HIS 17th Pursuit take off and patrol the area west of the 20
th Pursuits position. Finally, Sam Marett's 34th Pursuit at Del Carmen was order
ed to take off and cover Clar Field. At 8:45, Maj.Gibbs, the acting commander of
hte 19th Bomb Group in Eubanks absence, was also ordering all the groups flyabl
e B-17s and B-18s to take off the field in response to the AWS message he had re
cieved via Maj.Joe Daly, the Clark Field CO. The bombers were to stay clear of C
lark and patrol within control tower range of hte field until ordered to land. T
here was no coordination between 24th PG and 19th BG on takeoff procedures. The
20th Pursuit; the 19th BG HQ; the 28th and 30th Bomb Squadrons; and the 28th Bom
b Squadrons B-18s were all roaring down the sod strips of Clark FIeld in all dir
ection, often coming dangerously close to each other. By 9AM all flyable aircraf
t on Clark had taken off. A number of B-17s were still left on the ground. Two w
ere in Hangar 3 and one was in Hanger 4 being painted in olive drab camouflage.
Two other B-17s were out of service. John Carpenters B-17D (40-3075) had been le
ft behind by his 93rd Bomb Squadon when it went to Del Monte on 5 December becau
se a problem with generators constantly burning out and was still undergoing rep
airs. Over on the far end of hte field, B-17D (40-3093) with the 14th Bomb Squa
dron was still inoperative with a damaged tail. Back at Del Monte, Earl Tash too
k off in a fully loaded B-17D for Clark; his plane was in need of repairs that t

he primitive Del Monte field could not give. As preparations to bomb formosa wer
e still underway, many of the bombers that took off from Clark were only partial
ly loaded with bombs/fuel and so their flying times were not consistent; they wo
uld fly aimlessly for the next hour avoiding the expected raid.
Meanwhile, having been spotted at aproximately 8:15AM over San Fernando, the 14t
h Sentai finally arrived over Baguio shortly after. They had flew within sight o
f Luzons west coast all the way South and then turned East toward the city. Whil
e they had taken off with 18xKi-21IIb for the mission, one of the bombers droppe
d out of formation and headed back to base and returned to Choshu. At about 8:25
the bombers passed over Camp John Hay in Baguio at 13,000 ft. On the signal of
Capt.Ryosuke Motomura in the lead ship, the Mitsubishi Type 97 bombers began unl
oading their 100kg bombs on the barracks and installations. The pilots were hopi
ng that General MacArthur was at the USAFFE summer retreat. Theyh ad been told p
rior to the mission that their attack on the camp was predicated on that assumpt
ion. After the bombing run, the bombers turned right and headed west to Lingayen
Gulf before heading north along Luzons west coast back toward Choshu. All the c
rewmembers were relieved that no American fighters had intercepted them. At that
same time, the 25xKi-48Ib of the 8th Sentai were approaching Tuguegarao airfiel
d. Capt.Kiyosato Goto and other pilots were keeping a sharp eye out for hte expe
cted interceptor planes. When they arrived over Tuguegarao airfield at about 8:3
0, they were all dissapointed to see that it had no installations what so ever.
It was just two runways ocnnected in an L-shape, one larger than the other. Neve
rtheless, the three chutai began their bomb runs and Goto watched as the lead 2n
d Chutai bombs hit midway along hte longer runway. Following behind, his own Chu
tai dropped its bombs on the angle of the L while the 4th Chutai, bringing up th
e rear, landed their bombs in the same place as 2nd Chutai. With their mission c
omplete, the 8th Sentai wheeled and headed back for Kato, 460 miles to the north
. It wasn't until 9:30 that G2 at FEAF recieved a message stating that Tuguegara
o was being raided. This only records when the messages were recieved, however,
not when the events occured.
At 8:45 the 18xP-40E of the 17th Pursuit reached Tarlac and began patrolling the
area at 12,000 to 15,000 ft. Buzz Wagner thought he spotted 2 large japanese pl
anes coming from the north. After leading his 6 plane flight in a dive, they dis
covered they were actually B-17s. They patrolled for awhile more but after 2 hou
rs of flight they had to return due to low gas. The 20th Pursuit patrolled east
of the 17th Pursuit but none of Sneeds 18xP-40B spotted any Japanese aircraft an
d eventually flew back to base. Meanwhile, the 8th Sentai arrived over Tuguegara
o airfield shortly after 9AM and its 25xType 99 Kawasaki light bombers bombed it
. Around the same time, 17xKi-21 of the 14th Sentai arrived over Baguio. They ci
rcled over Baguio at 12,000 ft and on their second pass they lined up targeting
Camp John Hay letting loose their bombs. They had hoped to catch large numbers o
f American officers there; though the war warning had them all sent to their pos
ts. The 18th Mitsubishi bomber that had taken off that day had broken off to fly
recon over a small airstrip under construction. At Iba, the 3rd Pursuit was sti
ll at standby at their aircraft, and around 11 AM the 17th and 20th Pursuit land
ed at Clark to refuel. The pilots of the 17th Pursuit taxied their planes to the
front of hangars 1 and 2 where they parked their planes wingtip to wingtip for
refueling. Charley Sneed led the 20th Pursuit back to their usual perimeter loca
tions in the revetted positions, also for regassing. When the pilots reported in
at 24th Groups operations hangars, they recieved shocking news: Baguio and Tugu
egarao to the north had been bombed by the Japanese.
At 10AM, Lt.Col.Eubank was meeting with his chief of staff, Gen.Brereton in the
FEAF HQ building. Brereton had put another call through to MacArthur's chief of
staff, Brig.Gen.Richard Sutherland as USAFFE HQ. Brereton continued to urge offe
nsive action, and Sutherland continued to insist that the FEAF maintain a defens
ive position; fucking idiot. Brereton, who had recieved a report half an hour ag
o that Baguio and Tuguegarao had been bombed, felt extremely angry at Sutherland

's incomprehensible lack of action. Fearing that Clark might be taken out from a
n attack and ending any offensive action by the 19th BG, Brereton had his chief
of staff, Col.Francis Brady, to make a note of his conversation with Sutherland.
After his telephone exchange with Sutherland, Brereton told Eubank to get the 1
9th BG ready for a mission to Formosa and in anticipation of eventual approval o
f a strike on the Japanese, prescribed hte bomb load to be carried. His chief of
staff advised it was not a wise idea to have fully loaded bombers on the ground
in case of a Japanese attack, so Brereton changed his mind. Eubank should focus
on preparations for the photorecon mission over suthern Formosa, which sutherla
nd had just told Brereton MacArthur now approved. Eubank took off in his B-18 at
10:10 for Clark field to take charge of the bombing operations. At the time, mo
st of his bombers were milling around over central Luzon, still airborn after th
at mornings scramble. Six of the 19th bombardment Groups airplanes in the air we
re the aging B-18s of the 28th Bombardment Squadron. Meanwhile, 1st.Lt.Shorty Wh
eless flying in a B-17D (40-3070) from the 30th BS had scrambled with the other
bombers and were now over Luzon straight patrolling for Japanese ships. By 10:30
they had still not spotted any Japanese forces in the waters north of Luzon. At
the same time, 10:30, 1st.Lt.John Carpenter was able to take off on his recon m
ission, with the generator on his plane having been repaired. At this time, Clar
k field radioed an all clear for all bombers to fly back to Clark for servicing.
The two B-17s out on patrol at this point, were ordered to continue with their
mission.
********************************************************************************
********************************************************************************
*******
Japanese and American ac
tivites before Raid
The Tainan Ku was over Garampi Point, Formosa at 10:15 AM. Flying Petty Officer
2nd Class Yoshimi Hidaka in Lt.Seto's Chutai was forced to return to base when h
is landing gear failed to retract leaving the Tainan Ku with 35 reisen, which we
re flying at 9,840 ft in loose formation. As they flew over Garampi point, Hidek
i Shingo spotted a formation of large aircraft below and haead of him, heading n
orth over the water toward Formosa. From his position sixth in line from Shingo,
Saburo Sakai saw them too. Around this time, the Garampi watch station reported
to 11th Fleet HQ that a force of unidentified aircraft was approaching. Believi
ng them to be B-17s on the way to bomb bases, Vice Admiral Tsukahara issued an a
ir-raid alarm. He also ordered his remaining Type 96 Kansen to scramble and inte
rcept. The 5th Hikoshidan (whose bombers were being mistaken for Americans) also
took defensive measures at their base. Such was the level of uncoordination bet
ween the two branches that both did not even recognize their returning bombers!
Anyways, Shingo had designated three shotai to intercept any American planes on
the way to Formosa, and so the nine reisen dived down at the bombers. However, j
ust before opening fire, Sakai saw the hinomaru on the wings and held his fire.
Sakai and the others immediately broke off their attack and began climbing to re
join formation. One of the pilots, FPO3c Shizuo Ishii, was slow in identifying t
he intruder; he spent extra time getting into an interception angle. By the time
he realized they were Army airplanes, he could no longer find any of his squadr
on mates. Alone, he had no alternative but ot turn around and head back to Taina
n base for Formosa. This left FPO1c Yoshimichi Saeki, all alone, having lost bot
h his squadron mates. The Tainan Ku was now down to 34 attacking fighters. Saeki
slid into position 50 meters above and behind his chutai leader, Lt.Masuzo Seto
, determined to do his best to protect him. It was the 14th Sentai that the Tain
an Ku had almost shot down.
Shingo had designated each Chutai's responsibility. Lieutenant Masao Asai's 3rd
Chutai was designated to protect the 1st Kokutai during its bomb run. The slower
Type 96 Rikko's were ahead and the Chutai expected to have caught up to them ov

er central Luzon where they would fly escort for the last ten minutes of the out
ward flight, just before arriving over Clark. Shingo with another twenty reisen
was leading a group assigned control of maintaining air control over the target
, while the remaining pilots would escort the Takao Ku's three chutai over Clark
. A single Type 98 recon plane flown by Lt.Masami Miza was also flying in the gr
oup; he had been charged with observing the results of the attack. Over Bashi st
raight, the tainan Ku pilots were drowsy. Shimakawa had gotten hardly any sleep
the night before and the flight was long with little change. He tried to eat som
e food but was too sleepy to deven do that. He fully expected most of the unit w
ould be wiped out in the attack and was sure he would die in this attack. As he
daydreamed, he almost colided with his shotaicho Gitaro Miyazaki. Shimakawa thou
ght, "If I ever return alive from this mission, I'll be reprimanded." Ahead of S
himakawa in Shingo's shotai, FPO1c Kuniyoshi Tanaka was also bored of hte long f
light and reached into his bag to eat some bananas. He brought some for outward
trip and then the return trip. Other reisen pilots were drinking cider and chewi
ng caramels to keep themselves occupied during hte long monotonous flight.
At the same time that the Tainan Ku almost shot down bombers of the 14th Sentai
over Garampi point, at 10:14 Brereton recieved a call from MacArthur, much to hi
s surprise. It was the first time in the day that the USAAFE commander had made
direct contact with him. Brereton informed him that hte Japanese planes reported
earlier had not attacked Clark and his bomber force remained intact. Accordingl
y, he had ordered Eubank to mount a photorecon mission over southern Formosa and
was holding his B-17s in readiness until the recon reports were received. Howev
er, in the abscense of such reports he wanted to attack formosa that afternoon.
MacArthur informed Brereton that the decision for offensive action was his to ma
ke, which was a relief for Brereton. It appears Sutherland was making the decisi
ons on his own as MacArthur had just countermanded his chief of staffs orders ju
st fourteen minutes after Sutherland had issued them. Given the authority he nee
ded, he called his staff to another meeting to decide on the action to take. The
plan to attack formosa airfields was completed by 10:45 and Brereton approved i
t. Two squadrons of B-17s loaded with 100 lb and 300 lb bombs would attack airfi
elds on southern Formosa south of 23 degrees, 10 minutes north latitude, "immedi
ately before darkness" to neutralize Japanese airpower on the island. Meanwhile,
two squadrons of B-17s at Del Monte would be moved up to San Marcelino airfield
on Luzons west coast, "at the earliest practicable moment" then would shift to
Clark Field after dark and prepare for daybreak operations on the 9th.
Lieutenant Colonel Eubank and his operations officer, Major Welsh landed at Clar
k in their B-18 at 11AM from Nielson following their meeting with Brereton and h
is staff minutes before. There they found that the 19th BG had issued a scramble
order a few hours before and recently the "all clear" signal had been given, or
dering the B-17s to return to Clark. By 11:20, all the B-17s (except for the pat
rol recon missions flown by Wheless and Carpenter) had returned to Clark, as had
a few of the B-18s. They taxied over to dispersal positions around the field, i
ncluding horseshoe-shaped revetments made of dirt heaped 15 ft high. Gas trucks
were sent out to refuel as the crews walked to the mess hall for lunch. There we
re five dummy B-17s made of wood parked in front of hte officers quarters as dum
my's. Around this time, the 20th Pursuit returned from their fruitless patrol ov
er Tarlac and they all taxied back to their usual locations for servicing. The 1
7th Pursuit also landed at Clark, and as they had no dispersal locations, taxied
their planes and parked wingtip to wingtip in front of hangars 1 and 2 for serv
icing. The piltos from the two pursuit squadrons headed over to 24th PS operatio
ns hangar to report on the Tarlac patrol. Maj.Grover informed them that while th
ey were on patrol, the Japanese had bombed Baguio and Tuguegarao, much to the sh
ock of the airmen.
At around 11:15 the Tainan Ku finally spotted the land of Luzon. Shimakawa in hi
s excitement felt the need to urinate, and so took out a receptical and with som
e difficulty relieved himself and then tossed it out the canopy, being careful n

ot to hit the fuselage. He mused, "My first bullet of the war!". The cruising sp
eed for the reisen was 180 knots (207 mph) and thus far the tainan Ku had covere
d 302 miles from their takeoff at 9:45AM and allowing ten minutes to climb to a
ltitude. The cruising speed for the Type 1 Rikko's was 183 mph while the average
cruising speed for the Type 96 Rikko was 132 mph. Given these speed specifics,
the 1st Kokutai would have reached Luzon around 10:45. Unknown to Shimakawa and
his flying mates, they were being picked up by radar as they proceeded in their
different formatiosn down Luzon's central valley after reaching a point about 15
0 miles short of Clark, the outer range of Iba's SCR-270B set. To their right, o
ff Luzons western shore, the Kanoya Ku and the other three Chutai of the Takao K
u led by Commander Suda Yoshizo with 53 reisen of the 3rd Ku under Yokoyama foll
owing behind, were also being picked up by the radar set as they entered range.
At 11:20AM, Private Tom Lloyd who was working the SCR-270B set at Iba picked up
airplanes. One group was headed south, coming toward Iba from the west, 129 mile
s out. Seven minutes later he reported that it was farther south, about 70 miles
west of hte Lingayen Gulf. A second group was also spotted as it headed south o
ver Luzon toward Clark Field. He was unable to determine the number of planes, a
s it was a primitive radar set, nor could he determine their altitude. However,
the strength of the echoes made it apparent that both groups had a large number
of aircraft. After reporting his findings, Sgt.Wade Nelms radioed the sightings
to the AWS at FEAF HQ at Nielson. Private Maurice Chartoff, an AWS radio operato
r, received the report, which gave the tracks of the planes heading toward Clark
and Iba, and passed it to the officers in the AWS room at 11:37AM. In the AWS p
lotting room in the FEAF HQ building, the members were busy plotting hte courses
of the spotted incoming aircraft. They also were recieving phone calls from var
ious watchers throughout Luzon that spotted the incoming planes heading south. B
y now, Col.George and his operations officer Bud Sprague; and intelligence offic
er Allison Ind had joined Lt.Col.Alexander Campbell, Maj.Harold Coyle, and Capt.
Sam Lamb along with Brereton himself. At about 11:30 and again at 11:45, Campbel
l had warning messages sent out to all FEAF untis by radio and by teletype, wher
e availble. They were teletyped to the Clark Field communications center, locate
d in the 24th Pursuit Groups operations hangar. Campbell evidently acted on the
11:27 sighting of hte Iba bound Japanese bombers over Lingayen Gulf heading sout
h, as the Clark bound Japanese were impossible to acurately track, owing to the
mountains of central Luzon. After absorbing the information radioed to the AWS b
y the Iba radar detachment, Brereton walked back to his office. Then at 11:55 Su
therland was on the telephone to him again. He informed Brereton that MacArthur
wanted to be brought up to date on air operations developments since his call to
Brereton at 10:14. Berereton briefed Sutherland on the Iba radar reports. The j
apanese were operating in two groups, with from 15 to 24 planes in each group. T
hus far there was no actual contact with them. Brereton then informed Sutherland
of his plans to strike the FOrmosa bases late in hte afternoon and that he woul
d be shifting two squadrons from Del Monte to San Marcelino in the evening for o
perations on the 9th.
Back at the 24th Pursuit Group HQ at Clark. The teletype machine in the rear of
hte 24th Groups operations hangar had been surrounded with sandbags a few days e
arlier and was manned by Pfc.Sam Litchfield. In addition to the radar sightings,
reports by Filipino civilian spotters were flooding into group operations from
the AWS, including via its big SCR-197 radio communications van just outside hte
hangar as well as over hte Teletype machine. From 11AM on, 1st Lt.George Armstr
ong (detailed from the 17th Pursuit as an expert communications officer) and the
24th Group HQ communications men struggled to identify the accurate messages fr
om the many they were recieving. At about 11:30, Grover recieved the teletype re
port from AW of a large formation of bombers over the China sea, which he believ
ed was headed for Manila. Fifteen minutes later at 11:45 he recieved the other t
eletype report of a bomber formation headed south over the Lingayen Gulf. The 11
:30 report prompted Grover to order the 3rd Pursuit at Iba to attempt to interce
pt the bombers heading in from the China sea. The SCR-197 radio operator was ins

tructed to transmit orders to Thorne at Iba to get his 18xP-40E airborne immedia
tely and to wait over Iba at 15,000 ft for hte incoming Japanese. When the 11:45
came in, Grover realized it meant that the Japanese might attack Clark. However
, neither his clark based 20th Pursuit nor the visiting 17th Pursuit had been co
mpletely refueld and rearmed. This left him with the 34th Pursuit at Del Carmen,
with its 18xP-35A and the 21st Pursuit at Nichols, with its brand new 18xP-40E.
The 34th was ordered ot patrol over Manila. Just after receiving the 11:45 mess
age, however, Grover radioed orders over the SCR-197 instructing the 21st pursui
t to take off and cover Clark field.

The 3rd Pursuits radio operator at Iba handed a message to his CO 1st Lieutenant
. Hank Thorne that stated simply, "Point Iba, 15,000 ft". Thorne passed the inst
ructions on to this three flight leaders, who had been impatiently waiting since
early morning for takeoff orders. Thorne and his 17 other pilots began taking o
ff at 11:45AM. Thorne was with his wingmen along with 2nd element leader Bob Han
son with his wingman and 3rd element leader Gerry Keenan and his wingman. A flig
ht would take off to the north. While taking off, A flight created a stir of sod
which obscured the airfield. B flight leader Ed Woolery could not see the south
end of the field as a result. Woolery elected to take off where he was then wit
h his wingman andy krieger behind him. Ray Gehrig was doing the same thing along
with his wingman Hawk Root. Third element leader Don Steele and his wingman Shi
p Daniel brought up the rear. The take off of A and B flight really fucked thing
s up for C flight leader Herb Ellis. Since south section was obscured and B flig
ht changed plans taking off in opposite direction, Ellis was expecting to see B
flight taxi past him. He was confused when he seen B flight take off past him. H
e began taxing to the south through the dust just as Thorne had done, but lost t
he other 5 planes of his flight. He took off and climbed to 1000 ft attempting t
o find the rest of his flight. He caught sight of his flight taking off from nor
th to south (opposite direction the took off from) but soon lost him. Unable to
find his flight, he climbed to 15,000 ft to patrol. His wingman, Bill Powell, un
able to find his element leader, joined up with 2nd element leader fred roberts,
who had also lost his wingman george ellstrom in the confusion. Fred Roberts, B
ill Powell, Frank Neri, and "Chubby" Allen of C Flight caught sight of B flight
ascending and joined up with them. A few minutes later several of the pilots pi
cked up a radio call from the 24th Pursuit Group at Clark ordering them to Manil
a instead of patrolling Iba. Grover makes no mention of changing their orders so
it is unknown who made the change of orders. Perhaps the 3rd Pursuit misinterpr
eted radio orders for the 34th or 21st Pursuit; it is impossible to determine.
Woolery turned his 10 plane flight to Manila; meanwhile, A flight did not pick u
p the radio message and continued to patrol Iba as originally instructed. At thi
s time, Herb Ellis and George Ellstrom were both flying solo unable to find the
rest of their flight or wingmen.
3rd Pursuit Squa
dron on 8 December (1st Lt.Henry Thorne)
A Flight (Thorne)
1st Elem
ent: Henry Thorne/Gordon Benson
2nd Elem
ent: Bob Hanson/Vern Ireland
3rd Elem
ent: Gerry Keenan/Howard Hardegree
B Flight: (Ed Woolery)
1st Elem
ent: Ed Woolery/Andry Krieger

2nd Elem
ent: Ray Gehrig/"Hawk" Root
3rd Elem
ent: Don Steele/Ship Daniel
C Flight: (Herb Ellis)
1st Elem
ent: Herb Ellis/Bill Powell
2nd Elem
ent: Fred Roberts/George Ellstrom
3rd Elem
ent: Frank Neri/"Chubby" Allen
At Nichols field, the 13 pilots of the 21st Pursuit and the 5 attached pilots fr
om 3rd and 17th Pursuit climbed out of their cockpits at 11AM following orders f
rom Ed Dyess since it was then believed that the Japanese bombers had already ra
ided and were returning back to Taiwan; they were having an early lunch of samwh
iches and coca cola. At 11:45 a phone call from Grover at Clark ordered Dyess t
o lead 21st Pursuit to patrol Clark with the simple call, "Tally ho, Clark Field
". Dyess ordered his pilots, "Tally ho, Clark field!". Dyess led the 12 PxP-40E
of A and B flight toward Clark. Bob Clark's C Flight was delayed in takeoff by 5
minutes by engine difficulties. When C Flight finally got airborne, they could
not find the rest of their squadron. Bob Clark decided to take his flight to Lag
una de Bay to test fire their .50 caliber machineguns. However, clark and May ra
dioed the rest of their flight that oil from their engines were shooting up at t
heir windshield and they were obliged to abort the mission and return to Nichols
. Meanwhile, after takeoff Dyess radioed Grover that he was taking his squadron
up to 24,000 ft and headed toward Clark. However, he was shortly after ordered t
o fly to a point over Manila Bay midway between Corregidor and Cavite and interc
ept an expected Japanese attack. With Clark flying back to Nichols, Sam Grashio
was left in charge and having not recieved the radio call from Grover, he took h
is 3 remaining pilots to Clark as originally ordered.
21st Pursuit Squ
adron on 8 December (Ed Dyess)
A Flight (Ed Dyess)
B Flight (Ben Irving)
C Flight (Bob Clark)
1st Elem
ent: Bob Clark/Jimmy May
2nd Elem
ent: Sam Grashio/Gus Williams
3rd Elem
ent: Joe Cole/Johnny McCown
At 11:30 some 40 senior officers of the 19th BG were summoned to the group HQ at
the west end of the airfield, summoned by Eubank. He was to inform the officers
of their orders (that he had recieved just minutes before) to strike airfields
in southern Formosa with 16xB-17 before dusk that day. Eubank gave the three 30t
h Squadron pilots the photorecon mission. 1st.Lt. Ed Broadhurst would lead the m
ission joined by 1st Lt.Sig Young and Ray Schqanbeck. He instructed them to repo
rt back at noon with their flight crews for a briefing on the mission. Since the
ir B-17s did not have cameras, Eubank ordered that a B-18 be sent up from Nichol
s field with the K-7 cameras they were to use to take the photographs. Eubank ne
xt discussed the plans for the raid against Formosa. Each B-17 was to be gassed
up and bombed up with 14x300 pound bombs each, ready to take off at about 2PM. W

hile his order specified 16xB-17 to fly the mission, Eubank only had 13 actually
available. Two were still on patrol duty, one was not in commission (40-3093),
and three had just been assigned to the photorecon mission. Shortly after noon,
Broadhurst, Schqanbeck, and Young showed up at HQ for the photorecon mission. Th
eir B-17s were ready to go, except the cameras from Nichols still had not yet ar
rived.
At 3000 meters over central Luzon and about 65 miles due north of Clark at 12:15
PM, the Tianan Ku's 34 pilots began final preparations for the attack. In anothe
r 20 minuts they would be over Clark airfield. Shotaicho Saburo Sakai reached fo
r his oxygen mask and put it on, prepatory for a gradual climb to 7000 meters (2
2,966 ft). As Sakai and others ascended in their reisen, they tightened up their
loose formation. First according to Chutai, then by Shotai, so as to be in the
best possible position in teh event they were attacked by American fighters. By
this time, Asai's 3rd Chutai had almost caught up with the 1st Ku they were to b
e escorting; Shimakawa could make them out ahead of him, off to his right, headi
ng south. There were no enemy planes in the air; everything was so peaceful. Lt.
Masami Miza was in his Type 98 recon plane flying in formation with the reisen a
nd was bewildered that there were now patrolling Americans. He told his pilot, "
Ohara, we will reconnoiter the fighting over Clark and then head to Iba and Del
Carmen." Back at the SCR-270B, the atmosphere had become tense as the members tr
acked the large 'blips' south; one heading toward Iba and the other from Clark.
Around this time, they reported to their commanding officer that the group headi
ng toward Iba was 37 miles from it.
Lieutenant Colonel Campbell was becoming increasingly anxious as he watched the
reports radioed in from Iba at 12:15 inside the AWS center at Nielson. Half an h
our had passed since the 11:45 warning message about the Clark-bound radar sight
ing had been sent to Clark via teletype. However, no further warnings had gone o
ut. Campbell had urged Col.George and Capt.Sprague to send out another warning t
o Clark, but the officers were waiting for hte aircraft to reach a certain dista
nce before ordering the fighters to scramble. At 12:15, Sprague wrote out a mess
age and showed it to Col.George and Lt.Col.Campbell. Sprague took the message to
the Teletype room for transmission to the 24th Group operations.
At this time, Ed Woolery's 10 plane impromptu flight was arriving over Manila. A
t 12:10AM they were spotted at 6000 ft by watchers at Caridad, 10 miles SW of Ma
nila; their presence was reported to 16th Naval District at Manila as "Nationali
ty unkonwn." Only some 12 miles south of 3rd Pursuits B flight, but 10,000 ft hi
gher was 12xP-40E of Ed Dyess's 21st Pursuit, A and B flights. Woolery's group c
ircled Manila for a time hoping to recieve new orders when Andry Kriger heard "T
ally Ho, Clark Field! Tally Ho, Clark Field! All Pursuit to Clark! Messerschmitt
s over Clark!" The radio call was probably recieved around 12:17 and the group w
ould arrive over Clark at 12:30. Having heard the call, Ed Woolery led his squad
ron toward Clark. However, his 3rd Element Don Steele and Ship Daniel were the "
tail end charlies" of the group and did not hear the radio call; they did not re
alize the gravity of the situation and followed slowly behind their group soon f
alling 30 miles behind. In Woolery's group were now his 1st and 2nd element; C f
lights 3rd Element, and Fred Roberts and Bill Powell. Woolery's 3rd Element was
seperated but heading toward Clark as well.
17th Pursuit Squ
adron on 8 December (Buzz Wagner)
A Flight (Buzz Wagner)
1st element: Buzz Wagner/Cy Blanton
2nd Element: Dave Obert

B Flight (Willie Feallock)

C Flight (Johnny Brownewell)
At the 24th Operations Hangar at Clark, 1st Lt.Buzz Wagner and his two flight le
aders waited anxiously for the order to take off; but Maj.Grover seemed unable t
o make up his mind on a course of action. Earlier he had ordered the 3rd Pursuit
to patrol over Manila instead of intercepting the bombers over Iba. He then ord
ered the 21st Pursuit to switch its patrol area from Clark Field to Manila Bay.
Apparently, Grover believed the Japanese target was Manila. He had not recieved
any other warning since the 11:45 warning of bombers over Lingayen heading for C
lark, which he distrusted. Responding to the anxiety of Buzz Wagner and his two
flight leaders, Grover finally ordered the 17th Pursuit to take off at about 12:
10. They were to patrol the Manila area at 18,000 ft and intercept any Japanese
bombers approaching from the west. Wagner yelled for his pilots and they all beg
an taxiing down the field to take off. The exceptions were B flight leader Feall
ock and Dave Obert in A flight, who were delayed due to engine trouble. Minutes
later, another teletype message came in from Col.George at 5th Interceptor Comma
nd instructing the 24th Group CO to intercept Japanese aircraft approaching Clar
k Field. Grover, in response to this order had his SCR-197 transmitters radio fo
r all airborne pursuit ships to fly back to Clark post-haste; the infamous, "Tal
ly ho, Clark Field!" order. While the order was going out, Grover was holding th
e 20th Pursuit on the ground. Sitting in their cockpits, Joe Moore and his 1st S
ection anxiously awaited takeoff orders while eating sandwiches sent out to them
by their CO. Meanwhile at the Clark Field HQ building, the base adjutant genera
l hadj ust received a disturbing call from his counterpart at Fort Stotsenburg,
a few thousand yards to the east. Capt.Garry Anloff there had received a call fr
om the postmaster at Tarlac, just 21 miles to the north, saying that about 25 un
identified planes had been spotted in the vicinity of Tarlac at 12:25 and were h
eading south toward Clark Field. The post master had also called and notified th
e AWS at Nielson as well.
Overhead, Ed Woolery's group arrived from the Manila area with 4 members of C fl
ight minus Don Steele and Ship Daniel who were still far behind. They circled bu
t there were no Japanese planes yet. They spotted two airplanes and moved to int
ercept, but they were P-40's; most likely they were two planes from Thorne's A f
light, 3rd Pursuit, which had splintered while patrolling Iba at 12:15. Krieger
concluded that the "Tally Ho" call was a false alarm and nothing was coming from
the radio group below them at Clark. Woolery now decided to lead his group back
to Iba for new orders and refueling. However, Roberts and Powell had become sep
erated and while they headed back to Iba too, they were considerably behind his
flight which was now down to 6 fighters. As Woolery's group was leaving, 4 other
P-40's arrived over Clark at a considerably higher altitude. Sam Grashio and hi
s 3 other pilots from C Flight, 21st Pursuit. They circled Clark for a few minut
es before spotting a flight of single engined planes headed west toward the Chin
a Sea. Grashio assumed they were P-40's from A and B flights of his squadron th
at had flown to Clark ahead of his squadron. He took after them with his squadro
n mates behind him. As Grashio approached them, he realized they were indeed P-4
0's, but there were only 6 of them, half hte number of Dyess's formation. They w
ere Ed Woolery's formation and they did not notice Grashio's formation approachi
ng them from the rear. The time was now 12:35
Disposition of F
EAF on 8 December, 12:35 PM
3rd Pursuit (Thorne)
------------------------------------A Flight: Patrolling ove

r Iba
- 2 planes had s
plintered at 12:15 and were flying near Clark
B Flight (Woolery): Flyi
ng toward Iba from Clark
- Consisted of E
d Woolery, Andy Krieger, Ray Gehrig, Hawk Root, and 3rd Element, C Flight (6 pla
nes)
- Don Steele and
Ship Daniel flying toward Clark after falling behind from the Manila area
C flight (Herb Ellis): C
ompletely scattered
-Herb Ellis and
George Ellstrom were flying solo: whereabouts unknown at this time
-Frank Neri and
Chubby Allen were flying with B Flight under Woolery
-Fred Roberts an
d Bill Powell were flying toward Iba with B Flight from Clark but got seperated
17th Pursuit (Wagner)
-------------------------------------- All planes too
k off from Clark and were flying toward Manila area
20th Pursuit (Moore)
-------------------------------------- All planes wai
ting orders to take off at Clark
21st Pursuit (Dyess)
-------------------------------------- A and B flight
s were patrolling over Manila
- C flight minus
Bob Clark and Jimmy May were following behind Woolery's 6 plane formation towar
d Iba
with Woolery n
ot aware of this.
- Bob Clark and
Jimmy May at Nichols field with maintenance problems with their engines
34th Pursuit (Marret)
-------------------------------------- All aircraft s
till on Del Carmen readying to takeoff for Clark.
Upon recieving word that war existed between America and Japan, Lt. Godo
fredo Juliano led Lts. Kare and Rivera from Zablan airfield in their P-26A fight
ers to Clark airfield to recieve instructions for the 6th Pursuit. They were ord
ered to recon the coast of Bataan to Lingayen and report any sighting of enemy a
ctivity in those vicinities. They did not find anything so they flew back to Za
blan Field. Half of the 6th Pursuit was based at Zablan while the other half was

based at Batangas airfield. Other than this recon mission, the PAAC would play
no role in this days operations.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Clark Attack
The Tainan Ku arrived first over Clark, at 12:28 flying at 7000 meters (
22,400 ft). At that time, Lt.Masao Asai's chutai was flying with the 1st Ku whi
ch was a few miles north still, and the reisen circled above not having been spo
tted by the American, apparently. In Shingo's Chutai, Kuniyoshi Tanaka spotted "
five" P-40's 7000 ft below them and saw that they were climbing. This was most l
ikely Ed Woolery's four planes from B flight and two planes from C flight, 3rd P
ursuit, who were climbing for the return to Iba over the mountains. They were ev
idently too focused on the situation on Clark below, to notice the reisen above
them. Tanaka notified Shingo by firing a burst of 7.7mm over Shingo and flipping
his wings. Shingo had noticed them to, but shook his head, a signal to Tanaka t
o not attack; following orders Tanaka returned to his position off Shingo's wing
. Shingo felt that the entire operation may become confused if his-the command c
hutai-got involved with a small number of enemy planes. Their Chutai must stick
to his instructions and let the other Chutai deal with them if they attacked as
his Chutai was flying top cover. Saburo Sakai in Shingo's 3rd Shotai had noticed
Woolery's group to; he banked his wings to signal to his two wingmen and then d
ropped his drop tank; the white stream of gasoline went streaming out as it fell
to teh ground. Sakai knew his orders however, and refrained from attacking; the
y were to await the bombers first, only attacking if the Americans attacked them
or went after the bombers. Meanwhile, in the rear of the Tainan Ku formation, C
FPO Yoshimitsu Harada, a member of Lt.Akira Wakao's 4th Chutai, noticed Sakai's
shotai jettisoning its belly tanks. Assuming that it was the sign that combat wa
s commencing, Harada and his two wingmen dropped their tanks as well. The Tainan
Ku continued to fly wide circles high above Clark. A few minutes later, they ob
served the 1st Ku and the Takao Ku arriving below them escorted by Asai's Chutai
. Soon after, the 1st Ku began its bombing run with the Takao Ku closely behind.
Lt.Cmdr.Takeo Ozaki had his three chutai flying at 6000 meters (20,000 ft) at 1
32 mph. He saw neither AA fir or any American fighters rising to intercept his g
roup as they prepared to pass overhead on their bombing run. As soon as Ozaki ga
ve the order, the bombadier released his full load of 12x60 kg bombs at 12:35; t
he other Rikko seeing this released theirs at the same time in a perfect checker
board pattern. The three chutai of Takao Ku Type 1 Rikko led by Lt.Cmdr.Nonaka T
aro came in right after dropping their bombs parallel to and slightly south of t
he position that the 1st Ku's bombers were landing; like the 1st Ku each bomber
was loaded with 12x60 kg bombs. All aboard the bombers were impressed at how the
field dissapeared within a thick cloud of smoke and dust.
Moore was still outside the 20th Pursuit operations shack at Clark at 12:35 wait
ing for orders from Maj.Grover at 24th Group operations to scramble his pilots f
or takeoff. Suddenly, one of hte squadron's crew chiefs standing near the shack
cried, "Good God Almighty, yonder they come!" Moore looked up and saw the long l
ine of planes flying very high in a V of Vs.Moore immediately ordered the squadr
ons red flag run up to signal the pilots of his 1st section waiting in their coc
kpits near the flight line to take off immediately. Running to his waiting P-40B
, he yelled to his crew chief to, "Wind her up!". Behind Moore's ship, his wingm
an 2nd Lt.Randy Keator was standing next to his P-40B. In the number 3 position
was 2nd Lt.Edwin Gilmore and behind him near the operations shack, was A flights
other three P-40B. Spread out in the squadrons dispersal areas, the pilots of B
and C flights also reacted to the signal to take off. Meanwhile, Sgt.Bill King

saw the high flying bombers and fired his pistol three times in the air as a war
ning before rushing into the 20th Pursuits operations shack to phone group opera
tions. First Lieutenant Benny Putnam answered. King told him to sound the air-ra
id alarm because the Japanese planes were just about over the airfield. Putnam p
ass the message to his chief, Maj.Grover who questioned the identification of th
e planes, "How does he know they are Japanese planes?" Overhearing the conversat
ion on the phone, King yelled, "We don't have so goddamn many!" A few moments la
ter, someone burst into the hangar and shouted that there were bombers overhead.
Just as everyone ran outside for cover, they saw the bombs of the first chutai
falling and at that moment the air raid siren came on. Grover elected to stay in
the hangary, huddling in the sandbag area for protection.
Major Eubanks was conducting his briefing for the B-17 crews slated for the reco
nnaissance mission over southern Formosa when the siren went off. "Just a second
, I'll see what it is" he told the assembled men. Just as he stepped outside, th
e first bombs began to explode on the nearby field. All the nearby inhabitants r
ushed to the L shaped trenches in the area for cover; as the bombs began to fall
, Ray Schwanbeck was hit in the leg by a bomb fragment bloodying his pants. All
over Clark, personnel began taking cover as the bombs exploded all around; many
became casualties.
Joe Moore, Randy Keator, and Ed Gilmore of A flight managed to take off with the
bombs of the 1st Ku following them down the runway; the concussions of the bomb
s exploding rocked Ed Gilmore's plane as he lifted off. Immediately behind the t
rio were the other members of A flight: Dan Blass, Max Louk, and Louk's wingman
taxied up to the takeoff positions as the bombs began to fall. From their positi
ons at the north and west ends of Clark, the 12 pilots of B and C flight began s
tarting their engines. Dan Blass began to takeoff and was almost airborn when bo
mb fragments shredded both his tires; he managed to get out of the plane and spr
int to a nearby trench. Behind Blass, Max Louk's plane was hit with a bomb and b
urst into flames. His canopy was jammed shut and he was burned alive. On the nor
th side of the airfield, Fred Armstrong was attempting to lead B flight to takeo
ff diagnally to get them airborne ASAP when two bombs exploded on both sides of
his plane knocking him unconscious. When he came to his plane was on fire; he go
t out and crawling on his hands and knees managed to reach safety through a sea
of fire burning himself severely in the process. Third in position for takeoff i
n Armstrong's B flight, Carl Gies had just started his motor up when the first b
ombs hit only 20 ft in front of his P-40B. His P-40B was riddled with shrapnel a
nd it shut off his engine. He managed to climb out and run to a nearby trench. A
nother pilot, Jim Fossey was taxing to takeoff when he saw a chain of explosions
progressing across the field. He began taxiing to the right toward the last big
explosions but away from the line of progression. He managed to escape the bomb
s this way, but fragments from a nearby bomb knocked a huge hole in his fuel tan
k and just as he was about to take off a mechanic waved him down. He taxied his
fighter which was letting out fuel to a nearby field away from the massive nearb
y fires before ditching it. Directly behind Fossey was Lloyd Mulcahy; as he was
taxxing for takeoff from hsi revetment when a shower of bombs hit directly on hi
s plane killing him instantly. Also Jesse Luker had been taxing toward takeoff w
hen a bomb hit his plane directly killing him. Also, Guy Iversen and Max Halvers
on were both badly burned when their P-40B's caught fire from incendiary hits ne
ar their revetments. Pilot Ross Huguet was in his car when bombs began dropping;
he got out just as a bomb exploded nearby hitting his leg with shrapnel, which
would later cost him the limb; his car didn't recieve a scratch. Major Grover's
P-40B also was hit by a bomb and was destroyed. Over at the 28th Bombardment Squ
adrons operations area, one of the two squadrons young copilots was taxiing Ted
Fisch's B-18 to a refueling pit when bombs started falling. With only his flight
engineer and bombardier on board, the green pilot decided to chance a takeof. T
hey managed to take off succesfully and decided to make for Rosales auxiliary ai
rfield for safety. Within minutes, the 53 Rikko's had unloaded their ordinance o
n Clark were precision checkerboard accuracy. They were all extatic as they had
been expecting stalwart American resistance and yet they effortlessly bombed the

shit out of Clark without a single interception. The American AA fire exploded
harmlessly between 2000-4000 ft short of the formations. The 26xType 96 Rikko an
d 27xType 1 Rikko had dropped a total of 636 Type 97 60 kg bombs on Clark. Also
destroyed were 2xO-46 on the ground.
Overhead, Sam Grashio, Gus Williams, Joe Cole, and Johnny McCown of C Flight, 21
st Pursuit were about to catch up to Woolery's group of 6 fighters heading towar
d Iba when Grashio heard, "All pursuit to Clark Field! All pursuit to Clark Fiel
d! Enemy bombers overhead!" As the voice became hysterical, Grashio could hear b
ombs exploding in his headset. Grashio's flight turned around toward Clark at 13
,000 ft as Woolery's flight continued west to Iba completely oblivious. Grashio
was shocked to see the large pillars of smoke rising with fires. At that same ti
me, Thorne's A Flight, 3rd Pursuit was still circling Iba at 15,000 ft. Thorne h
eard the same frantic calls from Clark as Grashio with the radio operator ending
the call with, "Go get 'em". Thorne turned his A flight to the east toward the
Zambales mountains whence they could take a gentle descent to 12,000 ft the rest
of the way to clark. All of A flight except Gerry Keenan proceeded toward Clark
, as Keenan thought he spotted as "Messerschmitt" over Iba at 15,000 ft and had
gone after it. About 16 miles SE of Clark, 3rd Element, C Flight, 3rd Pursuit (S
teele and Daniel) who had fallen far behind Woolery's group heard someone yell,
"Tally Ho!" over their radios. Another voice screamed that Clark was being blown
up. They immediately picked up speed and sped toward Clark. Meanwhile, flying t
oward Clark from Mount Arayat, was 2nd Lt.Earl Tash's B-17D from Del Monte, whic
h was flying to Clark for repairs to be made. His radio operator reported that C
lark was being bombed and that all aircraft should approach with caution. Immedi
ately, no Japanese planes were spotted. However, as they approached, he eventual
ly saw the field through the overcast and a train of bombs exploding across it.
Tash ordered wheels up and he abandoned the landing. When he reached 4000 ft, he
circled the base to decide what to do. He calculated that he had enough fuel to
circle above Clark for 35 minutes and still be able to make it back to Del Mont
e. Another B-17D flown by 1st.Lt.John Carpenter was returning from its morning p
atrol over Luzon waters. He had just begun heading down when bombs began detonat
ing on the Clark airstrip. Carpenter spotted Tash's B-17 coming in and decided t
o follow it up having abandoned its landing. His radioman called the airfield fo
r instructions and was told not to land but to head to Del Monte instead. Carpen
ter did not have enough fuel to make for Mindanao, so instead made for Mount Ara
yat to fly until the Japanese had departed and it was safe to land.
As the Rikko finished their bombing runs, they made a wide turn to the left and
headed back home with Shingo's 1st Chutai along with Saburo Sakai escorting the
bombers for ten minutes. Asai's Chutai, having been relieved by Shingo's chutai,
continued to fly in wide circles overhead to provide cover for Seto's 2nd and W
akao's 4th Chutai as they went down to strafe. According to Shingo's plan, the 2
nd and 4th Chutai would make three strafing runs each before they reversed roles
with the 1st and 3rd Chutai strafing while being covered by the 1st and 3rd Chu
tai. Each Shotaicho was given the discretion to deviate from the plan if he deem
ed it necessary. The reisen would use both 7.7mm and 20mm ammunition and total t
ime above clark was to be 30 minutes before making for the rendezvous and headin
g home. At 12:38, Seto's 2nd Chutai began descending through the great pillar of
black smoke as he began to lead the strafing attack. Seto's Chutai was down to
seven reisen having lost Hidaka and Ishii at the beginning of the mission after
they had aborted. Shotaicho Yoshimichi Saeki was without wingmen so he flew the
tail end charlie position during the attack. The time now was 12:40 and Sam Gras
hio and his wingman Gus Williams arrived over Clark to see the destruction. They
had become separated from Joe Cole and Johny McCown, but they were in the same
general area. Looking down, Grashio and Williams could see Seto's Chutai making
a strafing run against targets on the airfield. The duo were initially hesitant
to attack, however, a single reisen after finishing its strafing run, started re
turning to a position about 3000-4000 ft below the American fighters. Diving dow
n on the still oblivious reisen, Grashio fired his six .50 caliber machineguns a

nd the reisen fell to the side with smoke coming out of its engine. The only uni
t it could have belonged to was Seto's Chutai, and the only aircraft to recieve
damage in his Chutai was FPO3c Kosaku Minato who recieved only one hit. Grashio
most definately damaged Minato's reisen. Immediately after landing a hit on Mina
to's reisen, Grashio saw another chutai (Wakao's Chutai) flying toward them abou
t 1500 ft below. They seemed oblivious as they moved into position for their str
afing runs. The reisen passed below them and Williams joined Grashio in a tight
diving turn and Williams fired a few bursts into the tail end of the formation.
However, before the two pilots could complete the turn the two lead reisen of Wa
kao's Chutai completed their own tight climbing turn from only a few hundred fee
t in front of the Americans and were then on their tail shooting at them! Willia
ms yelled to Grashio, "Lets get out of here!" and Grashio veered sharply to the
left, but to no avail. A 20mm shell tore through his planes left wing and ammuni
tion cartridge can, causing the P-40E to shudder momentarily. Although already a
t low altitude, Grashio plunged into a steep dive through teh smoke and pulled o
ut just in time at treetop level to the west. Looking back, he was relieved to s
ee the two reisen falling steadily behind, their fire becoming increasingly inna
curate. Williams also employed the same tactic, turning his ship upside down and
pushing his throttle all the way forward, he dove straight for the ground, then
pulled up over the treetops. They both decided to break off their attempted int
erception, and made for Nichols airbase to the south. Cole and McCown also attac
ked Wakao's Chutai as it strafed. As McCown came out of the dive, he found he en
tered the circle of the Japanese formation. He stayed in their formation and clo
sed up on the plane in front of him. When the pilot completed his strafing run a
nd began to turn, he fired his cannons into the reisen. He claimed later to have
shot it down, but this was false. He had succesfully attacked either Yoshimitsu
Harada or Keishu Kamihira, who recieved 10 hits and 12 hits respectively. The d
uo then climbed to higher altitude as the Japanese began to engage and soon trac
ers flew past them. Cole's brand new P-40E began throwing oil on his windscreen
in a non-combat related mechanical issue, and so he decided to break off combat
and make for Nichols. McCown was nearly out of ammunition and so broke off as we
ll and made for Nichols.
Arriving after C flight, 21st Pursuit broke off somewhere around 12:48 as Seto's
and Wakao's Chutai continued to make their strafing passes, were 3rd Pursuiters
Fred Roberts and Bill Powell, and separately, were the 3rd pursuiters Don Steel
e and Ship Daniel. Roberts and Powell had fallen behind Woolery's flight heading
back to Iba and during their flight to catch up, happened to look back and see
the smoke rising from Clark; they turned around and headed for it. The duo saw t
he reisen strafing and so made a diving attack on them. However, when Roberts de
pressed his gun trigger, he was horrified that only one of his guns fired, and i
n Powell's plane, none fired! The Japanese immediately reacted by tight turning
onto their tails as the two continued to pursue the reisen to their front. A ter
rified Powell broke out of hte formation and pointed his ship in the direction o
f Iba; Roberts also decided to break contact and head back for Iba. The reisen b
ehind Roberts had shot his plane to hell leaving him with torn holes in the wing
s, shot out control cables at his feet, and shredded his leg with metal fragment
s. Shotaicho Yoshimichi Saeki of Seto's Chutai had been one of the pilots that d
ogfighted with the four American pilots earlier. He was dove down upon and claim
ed to see three P-40 firing down at him. He dogfighted for a big before finally
getting behind one, but it dived away as he followed it down firing all the way
but not making any hits apparently. With his strafing run disrupted, he made for
the rendezvous point. This left Seto with two shotai. Around the later time, Se
to's two shotai and Wakao's Chutai climbed and began flying top cover as Asai's
Chutai and Shingo's Chutai began their strafing runs. It was at this time that D
on Steele and Ship Daniel arrive at 18,000 ft, shocked at what htey witnessed ov
er Clark. They saw the reisen getting into position to strafe. As the duo went d
own to intercept the strafers, they were cut off by Seto's two shotai which bega
n heading straight for them; Steele and Daniel turned to face them. Steele's pla
ne was holed with 20mm shells which ripped into his left wing while 7.7mm ammuni

tion punctured his fuselage. A piece of metal grazed his forearm causing a six i
nch gash. Only one of Steele's guns fired but he saw 4-5 of his rounds strike th
e reisen. At the last mili-second the Japanese pilot pulled away and as Steele t
urned to look, he saw that the plane was smoking and so he turned to follow it d
own, he saw it go into a spind at about 3000 ft and watched it crash into a moun
tain. This was most likely Hisocho Ryoichi Nakamizo, 2nd Shotaicho of Seto's Chu
tai. Steele then joined Daniel in an attempt to fight the other reisen, but low
on gas, they were forced to head back to Iba. It was about 12:56 now.
Lieutenant Shingo's 1st Chutai reassembled at 13,000 ft over Clark after complet
eing its Rikko escort duty; the time was probably about 12:50. They made final p
reparations to strafe and Asai's Chutai would join them. The airfield below was
obscured by black smoke rising up and they saw no Americans in the sky around th
em. As Shingo led his Chutai down for its first strafing run, FPO1c Kuniyoshi Ta
naka behind him in second position, spotted a B-17 slowly coming out of a burnin
g hangar. Shingo aimed for it and opened fire which set the B-17 on fire. Saburo
Sakai meanwhile led his two wingmen on their strafing run against B-17s parked
on the field, that had been undamaged in the bombing. He was having difficulty s
eeing due to all the smoke and the Americans were firing machineguns and 3inch A
A at them. He brought his shotai down to 1000 ft as he began his strafing run be
hind the others making the west-east sweep of the field. He signaled his instruc
tions to Honda and Yokokawa as he descended and lined himself up with an undamag
ed B-17. Finally at just 35 ft above the ground and with the B-17 350 ft in fron
t of him he opened fire. He saw that his fire had caught the B-17 wing on fire.
Behind him, Yokokawa had also suceeded in lighting a B-17 on fire while Honda's
B-17 did not light up. Minutes later, Shingo's Chutai was back around for its se
cond strafing run. At this time, Thorne's A flight, 3rd Pursuit (minus Keenan) a
rrived over Clark. They passed over it not seeing the reisen below them due to a
ll the smoke obscuring their vision. At this moment, Sakai looked behind him bef
ore firing during his strafing run, and he saw the flight of 5xP-40. While Thorn
e's flight apparently did not see Shingo's Chutai below them, as the fighters we
re flying in their direction, Sakai thought they were in attack position. Sakai
signaled for Honda and Yokokawa to abandon their strafing runs and he instantly
jerked the stick and rudder pedal and spiraled sharply to the left, then yanked
back on the stick for a sudden climb. At this moment, Thorne recieves a despera
te radio call from Iba reporting that they were under attack, and requesting all
pursuit to return. Thorne made a quick turn and led his flight around back to I
ba. However, Vern Ireland apparently spotted the rapidly climbing shotai and ins
tead of turning right into the cloud with his Flight, turned left, evidently to
fight the reisen. Sakai climbed and approached the P-40E from below and the Irel
and half-rolled and began a high loop. With the distance narrowed, sakai framed
Ireland's belly into his gunsight from just 120 ft back and pulled the gun trigg
ers. The fire struck irelands wings and fuselage and he saw the canopy blow out
and the ship staggard, then turned left before spinning throug hteh scattered cl
ouds. Honda saw the P-40 crash into the ground. Elated, Sakai signaled his two w
ingmen to reassemble for the return trip to Tainan and headed for the designated
assembly point 30 miles north at an altitude of 13,800 ft. Sakai's shotai would
miss the subsequent action with the 34th Pursuit.
Meanwhile, and somewhat earlier than Shingo's strafing run, Asai's chutai began
its strafing run against clark. Masaaki Shimakawa flying in the sixth position i
n Gitaro Miyazaki's shotai with Toshio Ota as his third wingman, prepared for th
e strafing attack. He switched his fuel cock to the main tank, set his engine fo
r 2400 rpm, and turned on his electric gun sight as he descended with the others
for their turn at strafing American planes at Clark. As Miyazaki and Ota in fro
nt of him lined up to fire on the parked B-17s, Shimakawa noticed a P-40 radidly
climbing about 3000 ft in front of him. He dropped his belly tank in anticipati
on of combat and broke off his preparations for strafing. He fixed the P-40 into
his gunsight. He felt the distance was too great, but in his excitement depress
ed the gun trigger anyway; his 20mm cannons didn't work but his 7.7mm guns did.

The P-40 went into a dive and he saw white smoke coming out from the underside
of its left wing. Suddently, the smoke turned black and the stricken American ve
ered to the left, and headed toward the ground in a tight spiral. He did not see
the P-40 crash, however, as thick black smoke obscured his vision. He decided t
o report it as an uncertain victory. Looking around him, he found himself alone
and slightly north of Clark. American flak followed his reisen. No longer with h
is comrades, he decided to head north to the rendezvous point and link up with a
ny others there. Applying maximum power, he started climbing to the agreed altit
utde for reassembly. On the way at about 10,000 ft, he spotted Lt.Asai and his w
ingman also heading north for the return trip. Its unknown who Shimakawa had att
acked. Robert's plane was heavily damaged by the Tainan Ku around the same time,
however, he seemed to have been engaged with multiple reisen. It may have also
been Benson, who had become separated from A flight, 3rd Pursuit, but Thornes gr
oup probably had not yet arrived and its unknown if Bensons plane suffered any d
amage. It may have been Roberts plane that Shimakawa had heavily damaged.
The American ground crews, meanwhile, attempted to repel the Japanese strafers.
The men of the 200th Artillery fired their 3 inch guns against the strafing reis
en, however, they could not traverse nearly fast enough and to make matters wors
e, in some cases only one out of ten shells would actually explode. One 37mm AA
gun managed to shoot down a reisen, which all the gunners saw explode into flame
s and crash into the ground. Another gunner hit and shot down another reisen, mo
st likely from Wakao's chutai.
At 12:35, Joe Moore, Randy Keator, and Edwin Gilmore headed in a western directi
on intending to intercept the outbound Japanese bombers. At about 21,000 ft the
leading 2 of the three P-40B leveled off some 30 miles west of Clark. Keator was
now 100 ft below and 12000 ft behind Moore to his right. Gilmore was still clim
bing, trailing 2500 ft behind and 2000 ft below moore. At 1:10 Moore noticed a f
light of planes at his altitude rapidly approaching from the right. He thought h
tey were P-40's from Iba and wagged his wings. When they were about even with Mo
ore's wing, they went into a diving right turn; it was a Chutai of Reisen fighte
rs. Seemingly oblivious to Moore, the Chutai of zero's dove after Keator and Gil
more below him. Reacting quickly, Moore went into a hard 180 degree diving turn
and ended up just behind and above the Japanese. He closed to the nearest one, f
ired, and then continued in his dive with only some of his guns working. Below m
oore, Keator also had turned tightly to the right and now found himself face to
face with the lead zero. He fired hitting the zero's engine and canopy causing t
he zero to explode with Keator flying through the debris field. This zero was pi
loted by Flight Petty Officer 3rd Class Yoshio Hirose, wingman to the chutaicho
Lt.Sachio Maki. The chutai was flying toward Clark after strafing Iba. As he be
gan to pull out, he looked back and saw a zero lining him up in his sights, clos
ing in fast on his tail. Instinctively, he nosed his P-40 into a near verticle d
ive which allowed him to escape the zero. He pulled the stick back hard and blac
ked out; when he came to he was in a steep climb and the zero was gone. After le
veling off, he saw a few thousand ft below his altitude of 19,000 ft was Moore d
iving on a Zero's tail, but a zero was on moore's tail too. Keator dove on the s
econd zero causing the Japanese to break off his attack. The Zero went into a ti
ght right climbing turn with keator closing in fast following it in the turn wat
ching as his tracers ripped into the zero. But the zero continued in a tighter t
urn losing Keator, forcing Keator to break off or stall. Keator went into anothe
r diving turn, then returned to the scene of combat in a fast climb; though he w
as completely alone now, though he noticed "three planes" burning on the ground.
Moore had gotten in a second firing pass from behind and above at the zeros bef
ore a shotai broke off and went after him. Trying to shake the zeros he was swin
ging his head side to side and jerked hte oxygen mask off his face in annoyance.
No matter what he did, he could not elude the Zeros as they fired at him. He fi
nally dove for hte ground and outran them. Gilmore was the object of the zeros a
ttack. At the beginning he turned sharply to the right to engage the zeros. One
of the zeros immediately got on his back and he made a diving turn to the left,

pulling it up sharply to the right, blacking out temporarily. Having eluded his
pursuers, he decided to make for Del Carmen. Keator climbed to 22,000 ft and sta
rted back for clark. Flying at about 5000 ft, he came across an airplane who he
couldn't identify. He waited for it to pass under him and then dove out of hte s
un approaching it from the rear. It was a zero and he opened up on it. The zero
did not take any evasive action as keator leveled out behind it and fired at clo
se range, his tracers striking the tail and canopy. The zero started to burn, sl
owly rolling upside down and entering the clouds inverted, having been shot down
.
Back at Del Carmen, the 34th Pursuit could see the bombing of Clark from a far d
istance. The bombers appeared as black dots. The 34th had arrived back at their
airfield at 11 after their patrol over Clark; they had been waiting impatiently
for new orders since. Apparently, they missed the 11:30 order for the pursuit gr
oup to patrol Manila Bay. Now that they seen the bombs hitting Clark and the smo
ke arising, CO Sam Marett ordered the squadron to take off. Marett and his wingm
an Frankie Bryant led 16 other worn out P-35's down the strip creating a large c
loud of dust. Only 500 ft off the ground, Marett and Bryant were suddenly jumped
by 2 zero's coming from Clark; probably from the Tainan ku. Bryant's plane took
some damage, but it wasn't shot down. Sam Marett discovered his guns weren't wo
rking and flew back to Del Carmen to get them repaired. Since there was no oxyge
n equipment, the fighters were restricted to 8000 ft. Approaching Clark at this
altitude, the 17xP-35 of 34th Pursuit encountered 6 zero's. While they clearly o
utnumbered the Japanese fighters, they 34th Pursuit was at a deceisive disadvant
age. Japanese planes were better, pilots better trained and more experience, and
the old P-35 armament was not as effective. Stewart Rob managed to shoot down a
zero, but had his plane badly damaged as a result. All P-35's were damaged to s
ome degree but amazingly none were shot down. Stewart Rob's plane managed to mak
e it back to Del Carmen but did a ground loop upon landing, making his plane goo
d for nothing more than scrap. Meanwhile, at 12:50 the minesweeper Lark in Manil
a bay reported 17 "enemy planes" over the bay. These were actually the P-40E of
the 17th Pursuit which were arriving at their patrol area; they were completely
unaware of hte Japanese attack. Also, Flight's A and B of the 21st Pursuit were
arriving over their assigned patrol area above Cavite Naval Yard. They were also
mistaken for the Japanese, and this time they were fired upon.

Meanwhile, Patrol Plane 3 of Patwing-10 had just returned from a patrol when it
was ordered to unhook its bombs at the USS Langley in Manila Bay. This PBY-4 was
ordered to fly Rear Admiral William Glassford to his flagship, the Houston, in
Iloilo Bay. The crew had difficulty starting hte plane with the dozen or so pass
engers anxiously awaiting the plane to start as Japanese bombers buzzed in the d
istance and smoke rose from Clark. Eventually it started and went on a long run
across the Bay. Throughout the day the PBY's would fly patrol off Philippine coa
st looking for Japanese aircraft carriers that everyone believed had launched th
e Japanese air raid. Obviously, none were found and everyone felt defeated in th
at the Japanese had gotten through their recon efforts. The day ended with P-4 a
nd P-7 destroyed at Malalag Bay by Type 96 Kansen from the carrier Ryujo. It is
notable as being the only time the Type 96 Kansen was used as a front line aircr
aft in the Pacific War.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Iba attack
At 12:40, Lt.Tamotsu Yokoyama arrived over Iba at 20,000 ft leading 51 r

eisen. During the flight to the area, two of the reisen had aborted. They flew i
n a large circle, searching for American planes in the sky protecting the base,
and he was puzzled to have found none. About 3000 ft above Yokoyama, Commander Y
oshizo Suda was spreading out the Takao Ku's 27xType 1 Rikko in preparation for
their NW-SE bombing run over the airfield. His own Chutai under Lt.Jiro Adachi w
as in perfect formation, with the Chutai under Lt.Hirose Mine behind and on his
left and Koshiro Yokomizo behind and on his right. Each bomber was loaded with 1
2x60kg bombs and would unload them at 3 second intervals as it passed over hte f
ield so that hte bombs would carpet the base below. Seated in front of Suda at t
he controls of hte lead Rikko, Lieutenant Adachi observed the target from on hig
h as he prepared to lead his chutai over it. The Takao Ku's senior buntaicho and
a veran of many attacks against Chungking in earlier years, Adachi was piloting
the lead bomber in his chutai's first attack against the Americans. Adachi's bo
mbadier, Seiji Ozaki was also looking down at the base. Flying as observer/comma
nder in the lead Rikko of the second three plane shotai in Adachi's Chutai was L
t (jg) Kokichi Nakahara. He was impressed with the size of hte field located so
cloast to the coast. At that moment, he spotted three planes flying low about to
land. All eyes were on Adachi's plane; as soon as he dropped his bombs all the
other Rikko would drop theirs. It was 12:44 when Adachi's plane began releasing
its bombs followed by his entire force. After a minute, his entire force had unl
eashed their bomb in a perfect carpet of destruction. He ordered his formation t
o swing right, toward the China Sea, and drop down to 16,000 ft. They would crui
se at that height during the return to Takao. They were pleasantly surprised tha
t there was no AA fire; they had been expecting 3 inch and 37mm AA fire and had
planned a high-altitude bombing for that reason. Trailing immediately behind Sud
a's formation at 132 mph was Commander Toshii Irisa's 26xType 1 Rikko and they b
egan their bombing run a minute after Suda's. During the flight to the base, one
of the Kanoya Ku's Rikkos had to abort its mission, leaving twenty six for the
mission. Each plane would drop a single 500 kg bomb plus 6x60 kg bombs. Iba airf
ield was blanketed with explosions. A total of 480x60 kg bombs and 26x500 kg bom
bs were dropped on Iba and they completely blasted Iba planting potholes all ove
r the airfield, destroying all buildings, and destroying the radar set. On the a
irfield they destroyed the 3rd Pursuits 4 remaining P-35s; the FEAF sole remaini
ng operational A-27; and four of the squadrons six spare P-40E fighters.
Before the bombing, At 15,000 ft, Herb Ellis of C Flight, 3rd Pursuit was circli
ng above, still looking for his flight. Suddenly, Ellis spotted another P-40 and
moved to join up with him. As they were joining up in formation, Ellis noticed
that the P-40 was shooting at him! This was probably Gerry Keenan who thought he
seen a "Messerschmit" and had broken off from Woolery's group earlier on. Enway
s, Ellis did a split S to escape the P-40 that had mistaken him for a Japanese f
ighter. He escaped his advesary and leveled out and began a circling climb, reac
hing 5000 ft within a few minutes. At that point he seen a cloud of shiny bombs
falling toward Iba from the largest formation of aircraft he had ever seen. He e
stimated they were flying at 25,000 ft. In spite of their altitude, Ellis was go
ing to try and intercept the Rikkos, in spite of the P-40E's limitations as a hi
gh-altitude interceptor. Meanwhile, Woolery and his 5 pilots from B and C flight
returned to Iba from their 11:45 patrol that had taken them to Manila and then
Clark field. As they approached, Frank Neri from C flight called instructions fr
om Iba tower and recieved the reply, "Do not land, enemy planes overhead!". The
4 pilots of B flight began their decent anyways as they were low on fuel while N
eri and his wingman "chubby" allen remained high having recieved this warning. W
oolery's wingman, Andy Krieger descended only to 5000 ft to provide top cover fo
r the others. With flaps down, Woolery cleared the fence at the south end of hte
field and touched down in a three point landing just as bombs began exploding a
t the far end of hte field. As he continued down the field, a bomb landed just b
eneath his plane and blew his tail off. Woolery without hesitation jumped out of
his plane at that point and ran to a Lewis gun position. Behind Woolery, Gehrig
was leveling off when the first stick of bombs hit at the far end of the strip.
He went to full combat RPM and pulled away and went into a climb. Gehrig's wing

man Richard "Hawk" Root aborted his landing and began to apply power just as Geh
rig. However, as he was about to clear th north end of the strip his plane was h
it by shrapnel and crashed nearby, killing him instantly. Meanwhile Neri and his
wingman decided to check on a small boat at the coast while this was occuring.
On their return, they were startled as the bombs began to explode over them and
the both of them had to fly through the debris of hte exploding barracks. Neri b
ecame separated from his wingman Allen. Alone, he began a slow climb for altitud
e to intercept the bombers that were now heading SW. Andy Krieger who was behind
Woolery switched to full combat RPM before landing; he soon overheated his engi
ne and had to level off at 12,000 ft. Just like the other pilots, he was effecti
vely unable to intercept the fleeing bombers.
After circling the airfield at high altitude, Lt.Yokoyama was sure there were no
American fighters in the sky over Iba, and so at 12:46 signaled all his pilots
to begin strafing Iba. Prior to departing Takao, he instructed his pilots to lim
it their total time over Iba, which included strafing, to just 15 minutes in ord
er to have enough time left to attack Clark Field afterward. Yokoyama left one c
hutai behind to fly top cover and began descending from 20,000 ft with the other
s. When they had descended sufficiently, they formed up into the nine plane stri
ngs in which they would fly their strafing pattern. The distance between each re
isen in each strafing formation was 660 to 1000 ft. They flew in their box forma
tion at very low altitude, pouring fire into spare or out of service aircraft on
the airfield and its structures including fuel depots. Suddenly, CFPO Chitoshi
Isozaki, shotaicho of the Tainan Ku Chutai attached to Yokoyama for this sortie,
found a P-40E had penetrated his formation and was firing on others. He tried t
o attack the intruder while maintaining the straffing pattern, but without resul
t. Turning around in his lane afterwards, he wondered if there were any other P40s that had broken into their strafing pattern, but he did not see any. The pil
ot was most likely Andy Krieger who entered Maki's formation. The reisen wasn't
shot down, just hit with a few rounds. Meanwhile, the half-dozen Lewis gun empla
cements around Iba opened up on the Japanese strafers. Early on, one of the Lewi
s guns landed a few hits on a reisen and saw a piece come off of it. The strafer
s would remain over Iba for apox.15 minutes, departing for Clark officially at 1
:05. One reisen was lost over Iba, though whose plane it is is unknown; it was l
ost most likely from Herb Ellis's stealthy attack.
Still climbing, Herb Ellis realized it was impossible to intercept the Japanese
bombers now. Well over the South China Sea, Ellis decided to head back to Iba. A
rriving over Iba he encountered the 3rd Kokutai strafing it. At about 17,000 ft
he kept track of their strafing pattern, and dived down and came in over the top
of one of hte zeros then leveled out behind another at about 500 ft. He opened
fire so close to the zero that he was shooting both sides of its fuselage. At th
e last moment before collision, he flew under the zero. As soon as he was clear,
he pulled hte P-40 up to the left and got into position to make a second run. H
e used the same tactic flying under the Zero so the pilot couldn't see him and f
ired his guns again. He made this pass a 3rd time, and by the 4th time none of h
is guns fired. At no time did the zero's ever break out of formation; nor react
to his presence. Perhaps Ellis was never noticed during his firing runs. With al
l his guns jammed, he decided to fly to Clark since Iba was impossible. The Reis
en he had hit, most likely was shot down by him as the Iba strafers lost only on
e reisen over Iba and its unknown who it was or how it got shot down. Since the
Japanese didn't notice Ellis and he recalled pumping the fuselage with rounds, h
e probably shot down his unsuspecting opponent. He flew toward Clark at about 1:
05. At 12:58 Fred Roberts and Bill Powell of C flight, 3rd Pursuit (who had bee
n flying with Woolery's B Flight) arrived at Iba from Clark. Seeing it in flames
and zero's strafing it, Roberts made a diving attack toward one of the strafers
. The zero went into a tight turn and as Roberts tried to stay on the pilots tai
l, another zero came up behind him and opened fire. With only 10 gallons of fuel
left and his P-40E was smoking badly. He decided to head to sea and beach his s
hip as close to shore as possible. Diving at 120 MPH, he misjudged his approach

and hit the water with his plane nosing down about 150 yds offshore. Some squadr
on mates on the ground rushed out into the water and pulled Roberts from his pla
ne while he was dazed and rescued him. While Roberts was engaged in the dogfight
, Powell circled Iba with no guns working. He then spotted a zero coming after h
im from the sea. He decided to climb away and head for auxiliary field at Lingay
en, 58 miles to the north. He turned 180 degrees to get headed in the right dire
ction and straightened out, not paying attention to the zero. He opened the thro
ttle to 300 MPH and after a few minutes he was gaining ahead of hte zero, but it
managed to score some hits on his P-40E. At 12:59, Hank Thorne and his 2 remai
ning pilots of A flight reached Iba from Clark. Thorne saw the Japanese bombers
flying north over Iba (they had swung around after their bombing run and were no
w heading north back over Iba toward home). They were too far up for Thorne to i
ntercept at 23,000 ft but they began to power climb anyways. After about 9 minut
es they reached 21,000 ft but they were still 2000 ft below the bombers. They we
re getting headaches from lack of oxygen and their planes were reacting sluggish
ly due to the rareified oxygen and fuel was running low. Some 20 miles north of
Iba just out over the China Sea, Thorne decided to break off the interception at
tempt. Thorne called out over his radio for all 3rd Pursuit to land at Roscales.
Chubby Allen, the separated Frank Neri wingman called out over the radio, "Go t
o hell, you Japanese bastards!" who was apparently confused and frusterated thin
king the Japanese were tricking him. Meanwhile, at 12:47 at 12,000 ft, Andy Krie
ger was trying to decide whether to attempt to intercept the departing Rikko. Lo
oking down, he saw what he thought were P-35A circling around trying to land. He
soon realized, however, that they were reisen and he saw them strafing the airf
ield at will. Krieger was alone and decide to call for help, "All pursuit to Iba
" he yelled over his radio. Immediately, however, a different call came over his
reciever, "All pursuit to Clark", which was from some pilot over the airfield,
which was also being strafed at this moment. Looking over and seeing the smoke r
ising from the direction of Clark, Krieger changed his call, "All 3rd Pursuit to
Iba!". Alone, he decided to intercept the strafers on his own. He dived into a
chutai, though was unable to line up his gun sights on them when they were withi
n firing range because they were flying too low to pass under them. He boldly el
ected to enter their traffic pattern. As he was firing his .50 caliber guns at a
reisen in front of him, tracers came flying past him. He kept firing at the rei
sen in front of him, however, and saw that he was scoring hits. A moment later i
t began smoking. Looking to the rear, he saw a shotai firing like hell at him. K
rieger swung out of the strafing formation and applied power as he hauled back o
n the stick and pulled his P-40E in a power climb. He was relieved to see that t
he reisen chose to continue their strafing attack, rather than pursue krieger. L
ow on fuel, he called over the raido for instructions, and then heard Thorne's v
oice tell him to head for Rosales.
Frank Neri and Chubby Allen had separated from Woolery's group briefly while the
y were attempting to land at Iba to fly to the coast to check out some boats. On
their return, they witnessed the airfield get blown up. Neri flew through smoke
and debris form a barracks getting blown up and coming out, realized he had bec
ome separated from Chubby Allen. Alone, he saw the bombers up high and decided t
o attempt an interception. Going full throttle for a time, he did his best to cl
imb up to their altitude. As should be expected of the P-40E, however, it was in
adequate for high-altitude interception, especially when required to climb extre
me altitudes quickly. He missed out on the strafing of the airfield and around 1
2:57 his engine wouldn't allow him to climb any higher, and so he gave up his in
terception attempt. Flying alone, he called out on the 3rd Pursuits radio freque
ncy, "Anyone around?" He immediately picked up a response from his best friend,
Gerry Keenan. Having been separated from Thorne's A flight earlier on and having
attacked Herb Ellis mistaking him for a Messerschmitt, he began patrolling away
from Iba. Keenan replied to Neri, "Where are you" to which Neri responded, "I'm
over Pinatuba at 8000 ft." Neri replied that he would wait for Keenan to join u
p with him there, and Keenan told his friend he would be coming from the south.
Neri circled Mount Pinatuba at 5000 ft waiting to be joined by Keenan. The time

was past 1:05 now and Yokoyama's 50 reisen were now heading for Clark for a last
strafing attack. Lieutenant Maki's Chutai, attached from the Tainan Ku happened
upon both Neri and Keenan on their way to Clark. Neri noticed his plane vibrati
ng. He checked his engine but noted that it was fine. He was wondering what was
causing the vibrations when he spotted three airplanes approaching him and calle
d out on his radio, "Hey, Gerry, is that you?" Keenan replied in the affirmative
and Neri asked, "But who are you with? " Keenan replied, "noboddy" to which Ner
i yeled, "Oops, you've got two nips on your tail!" Then Neri thought, that if Ke
enan had Japanese on his tail, he might have some as well. He looked back and su
re enough, a reisen was sitting on his own tail, lights blinking as it filled hi
s fuselage with 7.7mm rounds. Neri shoved his plane forward, sending his plane i
n a sudden dive, heading straight down. He pulled up after several thousand feet
and started a climbing turn that would allow him to size up his situation. Howe
ver, after coming only a fourth of the way up the oblique loop, he saw the reise
n was cutting way inside him. He became desperate and immediately headed for som
e low-lying clouds and plunged into them. When he finally came out he was reliev
ed to see that the zero was no longer on his tail. Instead, he was heading right
at another reisen-possibly the same one that was chasing him- and he let loose
his machine guns, though all his rounds missed and the reisen eluded him, dissap
earing in another cloud formation. Neri looked for Keenan but couldn't find him;
he decided to head east to Clark and size up the situation there. At about 1:05
meanwhile, Don Steele came in over Iba field in his shot up P-40E. Much to his
chargin, the entire base was enshrowded in smoke punctured by flames. He could n
ot make out any airplanes blow and the landing strip was pocked with bomb crater
s. He thought he saw a destroyer offshore shelling the airfield too. Concluding
that Iba was, "Strictly an unhealthy place to be," Steele with his rapidly dwind
ling fuel supply, realized he hand to land somewhere fast. He decided to head to
San Marcelino strip, 32 miles down the coast. Not far behind steele was Ship Da
niele who was also looking for a place to land. All six of his .50 caliber guns
were jammed and he was too low on gas to consider heading for Rosales. Despite t
he pock-marked condition of Iba, he figured he had no choice. As he touched down
, he manuevered his plane to avoid the bomb craters and brought his plane to a h
alt without damaging it.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Tainan Ku Operat
ions
At 1PM, 18xP-35A which were all well worn out began taking off from Del
Carmen for Clark, after they saw the thick plumes of smoke rising up from it. Th
ey had not recieved an order from Maj.Grover to scramble, their CO 1st Lt. Sam M
arett decided on his own that they should take off and intercept any enemy aircr
aft remaining over Clark. At the head of his formation, Marett was joined by his
wingman Lt.Frankie Bryant. They were barely 500 ft off the ground when two reis
en diving out of the overcast 6000 ft above jumped them. Taking off from Del Car
men behidn Marett and Bryant, 2nd Lt.Stewart Robb, the head of his six plane fli
ght, thought the intruders were A-27s. He realized they were Japanese when he sa
w tracers coming from their nose machine guns. Startled by fire from behind, Bry
ant flipped his P-35A over on its back and pulled back on the stick, almost coll
iding with one of the other fighters taking off from the ground. His plane had t
aken some hits, but it wasn't badly damaged. Behind Bryant, in the third positio
n, 2nd Lt.Don Crosland was 300 ft into his climb when he reacted to the reisen f
iring on Bryant by turning his fighter toward it and firing two long bursts. Cro
sland then went into a tight turn but was unable to maintain it when his plane s

talled out. Having straightened out and climbed up over the reisen, Bryant caugh
t the fighter in his gun sight, though when pulling the trigger he was disgusted
that his guns would not fire. After their frusterating experience with the two
reisen, Bryant and Crosland climbed to rejoin the other pilots, who were continu
ing on toward Clark. Marett was no longer leading them, having dropped out and r
eturning to Del Carmen when he discovered his guns were not working. Frist Lieut
enant Bent Brown took command of the formation and leveled off at 8000 ft becaus
e their planes had no oxygen equipment.
Around this time, the individual movements of the various reisen becomes hard to
track. What is clear is that around 1PM, Shingo's, Seto's, and Wakao's broke of
f from their strafing attacks over Clark and instead headed south, toward Del Ca
rmen which was 15 miles away. The reconaissance report made on 5 December report
ed there were about 34 pursuit planes there, and the Japanese hoped to catch the
m on the ground. Its unknown on exact numbers, however, Seto's chutai was down t
o two shotai, while Shingo's Chutai had at most two shotai as Saburo Sakai's sho
tai was already flying to the rendezvous point. Of Wakao's Chutai, Kamihira and
Fujibayashi most likely weren't in the chutai due to large combat damage. Howeve
r, barely outside Del Carmen, the Japanese reisen encounter squadrons of P-35A w
hich had just taken off from Del Carmen. Haruo Fujibayashi in Wakao's Chutai, at
first thought they were friendly planes, until they started shooting at his chu
tai as they crossed in front of the Americans while they were climbing. When his
chutai had an altitude advantage of between 1700 to 2000 ft, they began their a
ttack. The P-35A's did not counterattack, but despite firing at them three times
, Fujibayashi and others failed to score any hits.
As they approached Clark at the base of the overcast, the 34th Pursuit pilots en
countered six Japanese fighters. Despite being outnumbered, the Japanesep pilots
attacked very aggressively. Brown made a 19 degree pass at a two plane element,
landing a few deflector shots on one of them. The 34th Pursuiters realized, how
ever, they were at a clear disadvantage against the superior reisen. Robb was pl
eased to see that he was getting good hits that caused flame and smoke to belch
from the engine of one of the zeros firing at a P-35A in front of it. A moment l
ater, he was horrified when his windshield exploded before his eyes. He had not
noticed another reisen behind him that was making hits against his plane. He tri
ed to escape by making a tight verticle turn to the right, but it was in vain. A
stream of fire stitched across almost the entire length of his wing. The reisen
overshot Robb's slower plane and went into a tight loop. While Robb was still i
n his own turn, the reisen completed his loop and came around behind the hapless
American, ripping his P-35A with fire, "from stem to stern." Slightly injured f
rom glass and metal fragments, and with his engine apparently shot out, he spun
out of his right turn. Recovering moments later, he looked around but found the
reisen had taken off, apparently believing he had shot down Robb. Shaken but gra
teful, Robb flew back to Del Carmen.
Meanwhile, Lt.Maki's Chutai had separated from Yokoyama's group after their stra
fing against Iba. Instead of proceeding to Clark, they headed directly for the r
endezvous location for their flight back to Takao. It was just before 1:10 when
at that moment, Shotaicho Chitoshi Isozaki noticed another fighter climbing towa
rd him. At first he assumed it was another reisen, but upon closer examination,
recognized it as a P-40. It looked to him that the American (Randy Keator) was
attempting to intercept Maki's shotai rather than his own. He saw Keator fire on
one of Maki's wingmen and stared in shock as the reisen blew up, pieces tumblin
g down to hit the ground, "goddamn" Isozaki mumbled to himself figuring hte pilo
t must not have been paying attention. As Isozaki made a turn that would put him
in position to attack from above, a glance at the oil temperature gauge on the
control panel told him that his engine was overheating. He immediately opened th
e falps on his engine cowling to cool the engine down. The maneuver caused his s
peed to drop suddenly, and he found he could not get within firing range of the
P-40B, which was by then 7000 ft below him in a steep dive. Isozaki broke off hi

s chase and rejoined the others. It was now 1:15 when they turned to head back t
o Takao. The pilot that was blown up by Randy Keator in this engagement of Yoshi
o Hirose.
Meanwhile, at about 1:10, Joe Moore glanced at his altimeter as it wound past 21
,000 ft some 30 miles west of Clark. He had taken off from Clark at 12:35 and ap
plying full throttle, had attempted to intercept the Japanese Rikko. His wingman
, Randy Keator, was about 100 ft below and 1200 ft behind Moore on his right. St
ill climbing, Ed Gilmore trailed about 2500 ft behind and 3000 ft below his CO.
As Moore and Keator leveled off they noticed a flight of planes at about their h
eight rapidly approaching from the right. Assuming they were P-40s from Iba Fiel
d, Moore waggled his wings as a signal for them to join up with him. Closing rap
idly in their tight V formation, they were about even with Moore's right wing wh
en tey began a diving turn to their right. At that moment, Moore saw there were
nine of them and saw the hinomaru on their wings. To his surprise, they went aft
er Gilmore who was about 500 ft below them. Moore led Keator in a diving right t
urn, intent on coming out behind and above teh reisen. As he closed with the nea
rest one, he fired his two fifties and four thirties then continued his dive. Wh
en Keator completed his turn, he found himself face to face with the lead plane
at the apex of the V shaped column. Like Moore, firing his guns for hte first ti
me, Keator saw his tracers strike the reisen engine and cockpit canopy. The reis
en suddenly exploded, filling hte sky in front of Keator with debris. This was H
irose, of Maki's Chutai, Tainan Kokutai. Keator pulled up after diving away from
the reisen and spotted reisen closing in on his tail fast. He immeditely went i
nto a near vertical dive to escape. His head hit the canopy and his feet left th
e rudder pedals: he had forgotten to fasten his seat belt and shoulder harness d
uring their hurried takeoff. He blacked out for a bit and upon regaining conscio
usness he found he was in a steep climb. He leveled out after reaching 19,000 ft
and fastened his seat belt and harness. He spotted a P-40B a few thousand ft be
low him diving on the tail of a reisen but with another reisen on its tail. He f
igured it was Joe Moore's plane. Keator dived down on Moore's pursuer and cause
d the pilot to break off from his attack. The reisen went into a climbing turn t
o the right with keator closing fast and following it around through part of a c
ircle while firing tracers into the plane. He only landed a couple of rounds. Th
e reisen, obviously, tightened its turn to a point where Keator had to break of
f his attack or go into a stall. He executed another diving turn, then leveled o
ut and began a climb that took him back to the area of hte original combat. He s
earched the sky for Moore and Gilmore, but saw no sign of them anywhere. He did,
however, spot three planes burning on the ground far below. This was probably H
irose's plane which had broken into several sections from the explosion.
Moore was still in combat, out of Keator's sight. He had completed a second firi
ng pass on the Japanese when a shotai broke and went after him with a vengeance.
He desperately tried to shake the Japanese from his tail, his head swinging sid
e to side. He was unable to get rid of Maki's pilots. He was startled to see tra
cers flash past him. Finally, out of options and about out of hope, he put his p
lane into a steep dive and at last shook his pursuerers as they couldn't match h
is dive speed. Meanwhile, Gilmore faced the brunt of the onslaught. He had turne
d sharply to the right like his squadron mates in an attempted interception, but
a reisen got onto his tail immediately and began firing at him. He went into a
diving turn to the left, and after building up sufficient speed, pulled up sharp
ly to his right, causing him to black out momentarily. He checked his rear and f
ound he had shook the Japanese. Seeing no planes in sight, friend or foe, he dec
ided to make for Del Carmen as he figured Clark was too cratered. Meanwhile, Kea
tor was flying alone at 22,000 ft and was heading back to Clark as the dogfighti
ng was over. Several minutes later, he spotted a plane below him flying south on
top of a solid bank of clouds at 5000 ft. He couldn't identify it from the dist
ance so he decided to go down closer. He was able to determine its identity afte
r spotting its hinomaru after plunging down from the sun onto its rear. Keator p
ulled the trigger and was surprised that the reisen made no eveasive movements.

He leveled out and began firing at close range, observing tracers hitting its ta
il and canopy. The plane started to burn, the nrolled upside down and entered th
e cloudbank inverted. Its impossible to know who the pilot was or what unit the
reisen was in.
3rd Ku Operation
s
The 3rd Ku had departed Iba at about 12:50 and just as the Tainan Ku was
departing for Del Carmen, the 3rd Ku was arriving over Clark with its forty-two
reisen to begin strafing Clark. Looking down after arriving over Clark, Yokoyam
a spotted what he thought was a mix of P-40 and P-35 guarding the airfield at 14
,000 ft(they were most likely just P-35). The group that Yokoyama spotted were m
ost likely the same group that the Tainan Ku were engaging just a little south.
Yokoyama who was highly excited at the prospect of engaging the enemy, rushed ah
ead toward the Americans. He signaled for his pilots to maintain an appropriate
distance and approach the enemy from above. Yokoyama's command chutai of 6 reise
n along with Lt.Mukai's 2nd Daitai of 12 reisen, and the 6 remaining reisen of M
iyano's 1st Chutai, 3rd Daitai, were to engage in combat with the P-35A of the 3
4th Pursuit (one other reisen of Miyano's chutai aborted after strafing Iba befo
re reaching Clark). Kurosawa's 1st Daitai with its 12 reisen was to fly top cove
r for them. Yokoyama caught up with the enemy's lead plane and engaged in a dogf
ight with it. Shells from his 20mm cannon struck the P-35A wing and sent the pla
ne plunging toward the earth when part of its wing blew off. In reality, the Ame
rican fighter managed to escape back to Del Carmen, though the fighter was proba
bly a wreck. Soon, the sky was empty of American fighters; they all managed to m
ake it back to base though all were damaged to varying degrees. After confirming
that there were no more enemy planes in the air, Yokoyama left Miyano's chutai
to fly top cober at 14,000 ft while the others descended for their strafing atta
cks against Clark, passing through the black smoke left from the carnage over Cl
ark. Each Daitai split into two-six plane chutai to approach from different dire
ctions in a string formation, weaving through the heavy smoke obscuring the fiel
d and firing on those planes not yet destroyed. After completing several passes,
Yokoyama and his chutai claimed setting fire to two B-17s and destroying anothe
r, and destroying four B-18s, and burning one P-40 and destroying four others. F
ire form their 20mm cannons ignited what appeared to be a fuel storage building,
resulting in a huge explosion that belched fire reaching almost up to Yokoyama'
s plane. As the chutai strafed, besides Miyano's remaining Chutai, Tsuneo Nakaha
ra's chutai of six reisen, 1st Daitai also remained outside the attack area wher
e it could provide support and watch.
Anti-aircraft fire from Clark failed to hit any of Yokoyama's planes in his chut
ai. However, Lt.Takeo Kurosawa's chutai recieved heavy ground fire against his c
hutai. On their third pass, shotaicho Shigeo Sugio's plane was hit three times.
As they formed up after the pass, Suguio noticed his buntaicho had a large hole
about a square foot in his right wing. Kurosawa signaled, "I am out of action, s
o you fellows go down and give them the works." Sugio then noticed his own ship
was also damaged and that it was leaking gas from a fuel tank. He expected to cr
ash and began heading west toward the China Sea, with Kurosawa alongside him. Ho
wever, when he saluted Kurosawa and indicated his intention to ditch, Kurosawa s
miling back at Sugio signaled, "Don't! Don't!". Sugio felt like crying because o
f his defeatism, but he kept following Kurosawa, continuing to lose fuel, but ma
king, "every effort to use the remaining fuel as economically as possible." When
Kurosawa reached 14,000 ft, he was surprised to find a "jet black P-40" coming
at him. He reduced his prop pitch to the lowest setting and revved the engine, t
rying to gain power. His actions were too late, as the P-40 caught up to him and
engaged Kurosawa in a dogfight. He discovered that in spite of his reisen's bat
tle damage, he could still out-manuever the American pilot. Within seconds he wa
s on the American's tail, but as he was about to fire his 7.7mm guns (out of 20m
m ammunition), the P-40 pilot went into a power dive, easily distancing himself

from Kurosawa, whose speed had been down to begin with. The American pilot was m
ost likely from the 20th Pursuit, either Moore or Gilmore. Meanwhile, flying top
cover for Yokoyama's straging group, Miyano and his five other pilots flying at
14,000 ft kept an eye out for the fighters they had routed during their earlier
engagement. During the twenty-five minutes they remained over Clark after their
arrival at 1PM, they engaged American fighters at several locations, claiming a
total of five shot down against no hits scored on their six reisen. High above
all the activity below at 28,000 ft, Lt.Masami Miza and his pilot FPO1c Mitsuru
Ohara were flying in their Type 98 recon plane observing the results. At 1:15 Mi
za made a notation that they had seen six big planes, two medium sized planes, a
nd two small planes burning on the field. Then out of the corner of his eye, Oha
ra spotted two enemy fighters coming up from their left. Miza immediately broke
off his observation of hte field as Ohara headed his fast plane in the direction
of Iba to escape the interception attempt, not that it would have suceeded anyw
ay.
Meanwhile, about 1:15 time, as the 20th Pursuiters engaged Maki's Chutai west of
Clark, Herb Ellis, the leader of C element, 3rd Pursuit arrived over Clark. See
ing the huge smoke columns rising above the airfield, he realized he made a poor
choice in finding a safe field to land on. As he neared Clark, he noticed flak
bursting around his fighter. Clark field around this time was being strafed or h
ad just finished being strafed by the 3rd Ku and the AA gunners understandably t
hought he was Japanese. He pitched his P-40E violently down to get out of hte li
ne of fire. When he figured he was at a safe altitude of 5000 ft he leveled out.
Apparently, a reisen of Yokoyama's buntai dove out of a cloud bank Ellis was us
ing for protection and happened upon his fighter without Ellis realizing it. The
reisen fired a long burst into the planes fuel tank behind the cockpit and into
the rear fuselage. As Ellis turned, it followed him in his line of flight. He p
itched his plane down knowing the reisen couldn't out dive him. Moments later he
smelled burning paint. He couldn't see any flames so he cranked his canopy open
ed and looked; he was horrorfied to see the whole rear half of his plane on fire
. He realized his only option was to bail out. He needed to reduce the speed of
the plane first, but whent he pulled back, the plane didn't respond and there wa
s no tension in the joystick. The fire had burnt away the fabric of hte horizont
al control surface and he had no control of hte plane now. Pulling the canopy ba
ck, he managed to get his head and shoulders out of the cockpit, but the wind ja
mmed him against the crash pad. Desperately digging his elbows into the canopy a
nd hte edge of the cockpit, he somehow succeeded in wiggling far enough out that
the wind caught him and pulled him free. He ducked his head back, but his head
still hit the horizontal stabilizer in the small of his back. He was briefly cau
ght behind the knees by the stabilizer, then banged his head when the wind threw
him back up against the bottom of it.
Last Actions
Overhead, John Carpenter was attempting to bring his B-17D in to land a
t Clark, his fuel supply very low. In spite of the mess from all the destruction
, he managed to put his bomber down on the field without hitting any craters or
wrecked planes.
The time now was about 1:25. Having completed their strafing runs against Clark,
Yokoyama's pilots began climbing for the long return flight to Takao. Ten minut
es earlier, the eight surviving members of Maki's Chutai, Tainan Ku, also began
their flight to Takao. They would all assemble at the rendezvous point some 30 m
iles north of Clark for the homeward journey. Halfway to Del Carmen to the south
, the pilots of three Tainan Ku chutai broke off their attacks between 1:20 and
1:25 and headed for the rendezvous area, joined by Lt.Asai's chutai which had re
mained to strafe Clark. It was about 1:30 when the first of the fighters began
appearing in shotai groups at 14,000 ft over Santa Ignacia, 28 miles NW of Clark

, the designated meeting point. Before heading off, two reisen of the Tainan Ku
made a short strafing attack against Del Carme, though didn't inflicted hardly a
ny damage. This was before the 34th Pursuit would land. In Asai's Chutai, Shimak
awa, who had not eaten since that morning, was very hungry and decided to eat hi
s lunch at this time. hikotaicho Shingo, noticed a lone P-40E approaching his s
hotai from the rear. He regarded the pilot as very brave to attempt an intercept
ion with his shotai. Shingo and his two wingmen engaged the outcassed American i
n a dogfight and sent him spinning down in flames. This was George Ellstrom of t
he 3rd Pursuit. It burst into flames and fell toward the earth, with Ellstrom ba
iling out. Ellstrom landed and complained of severe stomach pains. His shatterd
watch had stopped at 1:20. Ellstrom said he had been on a routine reconnaissance
over the Zambales mountains. He did not know Japanese were over Luzon and appar
ently had happened upon the Japanese rendezvous location on accident. American p
ropaganda had Ellstrom shooting down several reisen and then being strafed in hi
s parachute after being shot down. However, witnesses of the 21st Field Artiller
y Regiment such as Col.Richard Mallonee who witnessed the whole action, were abl
e to confirm that Ellstrom had not been strafed in his parachute. In addition, H
ideki Shingo in interviews after the war stated that his pilots did not strafe e
nemy parachuters this early in the war. Meanwhile, Lt.Masami Mizo's Type 98 reco
n plane was joined by four Tainan Ku pilots around 1:30; each was flying a damag
ed plane. Ryokei Shinohara was flying back with a hit above his left eye from gr
ound fire at Clark which hit his windshield. His shotaicho Lt.Masao Asai was als
o returning having recieved three hits. In Wakao's hard-hit chutai, Keishu Kamih
ara had sustained twelve hits from Clark strafing hit while his shotaicho Yoshim
itsu Harada had recieved ten hits from Clark. They began flying toward Formosa.

Aftermat
h
At about 1:05 just as the zero's ceased strafing, Don Steele of B flight, 3rd Pu
rsuit approached Iba in his severely damaged P-40E looking for a place to land a
s he was low on fuel. Iba was too dangerous to land on so he looked south, and n
oted up a dried up riverbed a few miles out, in the direction of San Marcelino,
30 miles further south, and opted to land there. Somehow, he landed in one piece
at the riverbed. As he rolled his plane into the jungle for cover, he was surpr
ised to find that A flight, 3rd Pursuiter Gordon Benson had also landed his P-40
E at the same area! Together, they set off on foot for San Marcelino. Meanwhile,
Ship Daniel was not far behind Steele as he approached Iba. Iba was full of wre
ckage and craters, but he was too low on fuel to make for Roscales so he decided
to risk it. He managed to land and avoid the craters, though his P-40E was too
damaged to fly again. Daniel wanted to take off in one of the squadrons other P40's. Ed Woolery had taken off in one after the Japanese departed, and of the 5
P-40's, one was still in flying condition after the attack. Daniel took off in t
he P-40E and headed north. At Lingayen, 58 miels north of iba, Bill Powell was d
escending for a landing at 1:13 after an 11 minute dash at 330 MPH. He had manag
ed to outrun a zero in level flight. He came in for a landing at a Philippine Ar
my parade ground just as he ran out of gas. He then hid the P-40E in some trees
with the help of some Philippine soldiers stationed there. About 58 miles miles
from Iba, Andy Krieger landed at Rosales at 1:20 just as his gas ran out. He fou
nd his CO Hank Thorne there as well as Bob Hanson and Howard Hardegree. A few mi
nutes later, Frank Neri landed at Rosales at around 1:28. His plane was badly sh
ot up; left tire ripped to shreds, aileron and left wingtip badly damaged, and h
oles in the propeller. There was a long stitch of holes along the fuselage just
stopping short of the cockpit. His plane was no longer flyable. Another P-40 fle
w near Rosales, but it buzzed the strip and headed for Manila.
The 17th Pursuit completed its ordinary patrol over Manila Bay having been compl

etely unaware of what was occuring. The 18xP-40E landed at Nichols and were shoc
ked and horrorfied to learn what had transpired. Flights A and B of the 21st Pur
suit also completed their patrols over Manila area and returned to Nichols for t
he same shocking news. Shortly after, Sam Grashio landed at Nichols in his damag
ed P-40E. Gus Williams and Johnny McCown had also landed their fighters at Nicho
ls before Grashio and they were relived that each other was okay. Shortly afterw
ards, 3rd Pursuitor Ray Gehrig lands at Nichols with only 3 gallons remaining in
his P-40, having attempted to land at Clark but was unable to, he made for Nich
ols after escaping the attack on Iba. Then Ed Woolery of 3rd Pursuit lands at Ni
chols with his second P-40E which he flew in after his first was destroyed at Ib
a. At Del Carmen, the 34th Pursuit was shell shocked after their lop-sided battl
e with the Tainan Kokutai. Though none were shot down, every one of the 18 flyab
le P-35's were damaged to some extent. Stewart Robb's had made a dead-stick land
ing and his plane was now useless. They learned that the 2 zero's that had origi
nally jumped them went on to strafe Del Carmen for a short amount of time, causi
ng little damage. Edwin Gilmore of the 20th Pursuit who managed to escape the Ta
inan Ku landed at Del Carmen. It is unknown where "Chubby" Allen and Keenan of t
he 3rd Pursuit landed.
At Rosales, Thorne, Krieger, Hanson, Hardegree, and Neri began the time consumin
g process of manually loading the 5 remaining P-40E's with fuel. Meanwhile, Powe
ll at Lingayen with the help of Army folks repaired his .50 caliber guns and wit
h some difficulty managed to hitch a ride to Rosales to get fuel for his plane.
South of Iba, Steele and Benson arrived at an Army base that refused to aid them
. So with a pistol they commandeered a Filipino vehicle and got a ride to the na
val base at Olongapo where they located drums of gasoline and loaded them up for
their fighters. They decided to stay and have a feast with the navy men though
they radio'd Hank Thorne as to their whereabouts. The 24th Pursuit HQ survivors
with 1st Lt.Benny Putnam and 230 men began moving their HQ to a new site about 3
miles from Clark. Ellis managed to hitch a ride to Clark but was dismayed to se
e the place in shambles and the 24th Pursuit almost nonexistant. There was a mas
s panic at Iba as rumors of the Japanese landing spread and there was a mass eva
cuation to Manila that began that night. At 5:30 an order was given to the 17th
and 21st Pursuit from Nielson to relocate their squadrons to Clark. The 36xP-40B
took off in the evening and flew to Clark. Three of the 17th Pursuit's 21xP-40E
required minor repairs from the two patrols that day and remained behind at Nic
hols with pilots Obert, Blanton, and Kruzel. Of the 21st Pursuit, 4xP-40E were l
eft behind: those flown by Cole, Clark, and May had been shooting oil on the win
dshield and were left to be repaired while the plane of Grashio was shot up beyo
nd repair. The engineers at Clark managed to fill in enough of hte craters in a
small auxiliary field of Clark to allow the 18xP-40E of the 21st Pursuit to land
. Since the landing operation was taken too long, Buzz Wagner led his squadron
to Del Carmen as it got dark, but conditions were little better with shittons of
dirt obscuring the field. A total of 17 of the 17th Pursuit fighters landed at
Del Carmen with one pilot, John Posten, losing formation and opting to land at C
lark. Meanwhile at Rosales, Thorne finally recieved orders to fly his 4 flyable
fighters to Nichols without delay. Leaving Frank Neri in charge of operations at
Rosales (his plane was fatally damaged), Hank Thorne took off at Dusk with Andr
y Krieger, Bob Hanson, and Howard Hardegree for Nichols. Left behind were Gerry
Keenan and Ship Daniel who had also landed at Rosales and were to fly to Nichols
in the morning. In the dark, while landing Hanson's P-40 ground looped damaging
the propeller. The quartet were reunited with Ray Gehrig and Ed Woolery at Nich
ols. It would be days before Thorne could tally the losses of 3rd Pursuit. Root,
Ireland, and Ellstrom were KIA with Ellis and Roberts also shot down but fine.
Woolery's original fighter was destroyed on landing and Daniel's, Neri's, and Po
well's fighters were fatally damaged. In addition, 4 of the squadrons spare figh
ters were destroyed in the attack on Iba; in total 13 of the squadrons fighters
were destroyed including 5 of 6 in C flight. At night, Powell arrived at Rosales
and met Neri, Daniel, and Keenan where Neri notified him that Daniel and Keenan
would fly to Nichols in the morning. Powell stocked up on fuel and oil and head

ed back to Lingayen to service his fighter.

At 3:50, General Brereton appeared at the entrance to I Calle Victoria in Intram
uros for a meeting with General MacArthur. In his 1:12 call to Sutherland, he ha
d informed the chief of staff of his intnetion to bomb airfields in southern For
mosa that night. In additional to his B-17s, he was going to use three B-18s. Ho
wever, after learning of the extent of hte destruction to his bombers that day,
he informed MacArthur he needed to modify his attack plan. With virtually no bom
bers available at Clark, he decided to modify his attack plan in having the 16xB
-17 from Del Monte come in during daytime on the 9th instead of that night. Rath
er than San Marcelino, they would come directly to Clark. MacArthur approved of
Brereton's plan.
Meanwhile, Lt.Cmdr.Koichi Shimada was at Takao airfield with other staff officer
s from the 11th Air Fleet HQ watching as the first Rikko made their landing appr
oaches at 3:40. The first group was three chutai of the Takao Ku, in which all t
he officers were relieved that they all had made it back. After climbing out of
their bombers, the crewmen excitedly reported to the 11th Fleet and 23rd Kokusen
tai officers about their attacks, "Are we really at war?" and, "We met no opposi
tion", "What is the matter with the enemy?".Ten minutes later, the three other c
hutai of the Takao Ku arrived after their attack against Iba; again no damage wa
s sustained. Twenty minutes later at 4:10, Lt.Tamotsu Yokoyama and forty reisen
of the 3rd Ku began landing at the airfield, which had been cleared of the Rikko
. Admiral Tsukahara and his chief of staff, Admiral Onishi and other staff offic
ers including Capt.Kamei and Commander Takeo Shibata, were on hand to greet Yoko
yama. He was overwhelemed at their success in their attack against the Americans
, and made many comments about the weakness of the American oppsosition at Iba a
nd Clark. The spirit of the 3rd Ku pilots was extremely high. They were surprise
d to find that the P-40s performed so poorly. However, ground fire inflicted muc
h damage. Kurosawa's reisen had a big hole in the right wing and his shotaicho S
higeo Sugio had barely managed to get back to base with fuel leaking from his pl
ane from three hits over Clark. His gas gauge red empty when he touched down at
Takao. From Lt.Maki's attached Chutai, three pilots had landed at Takao earlier
at 3:45, the pilot of one of them badly injured. Shotaicho Yoshio Koike was hit
in the face by a bullet through his windshield, and had been escorted to Takao b
y his two wingmen. On being assisted out of his reisen, Koike fainted, blinded i
n one eye and only able to distinguish light and darkness with the other. Low on
gas, Maki and the other four surviving pilots of his chutai landed at 3:20 at K
oshun about 48 miles south of Takao. At 4:30 the Kanoya Ku began landing at Taka
o with 24 Rikko. Early after taking off, one had been forced to abort due to eng
ine trouble leaving 26 for the attack against Iba. After landing, Commander Tosh
ii Irisa reported that one of his bombers had flown to Tainan and another had cr
ash-landed short of Takao, heavily damaging its fuselage. Three of its crewmembe
rs died and four were seriously injured. As was the case with the other units, t
he Kanoya Ku pilots remarked on the ease of the operation.
At Tainan at 2:45, twenty-six Type 96 Rikko of the 1st Kokutai arrived back at t
heir base. Then, just before 4PM, twenty-nine reisen from the Tainan Ku began la
nding. Of the thirty-six reisen that had taken off that morning of the Tainan Ku
, two had been forced to abort before the mission. Four other reisen were report
ed missing: Shotaicho Ryoichi Nakamizo in Seto's 2nd Chutai; shotaicho Yasuhisa
Sato, Yasujiro Kawano, and Yoshio Aoki of Wakao's 4th Chutai. Only one pilot amo
ng the thirty survivors who participated in the attack returned nonstop to Taina
n. Shimakawa and twenty-eight others were obliged to land at Koshun airfield, 75
miles short of their destination, to refuel before continuing on back to Tainan
. With them was Lt.Miza having guided the four damaged reisen to the airfield. A
fter all the shotaicho reported to Shingo, it appeared to Shingo that the Tainan
Ku accounted for shooting down six aircraft, with an additional four unconfirme
d. They reported destroying six aircraft and burning thirteen others during thei
r strafing attacks on Clark.

In the early evening, Shimada and other staff officers were going over the after
action reports submitted by each kokutai following their operations, at the Tak
ao Headquarters. It was now clear to Shimada that the airfields had not been eva
cuated prior to the attacks as they had assumed, and the lack of opposition was
not intentional, as was the case in China. He was surprised that the bombers had
not been intercepted by any American fighters, but most astonishing, was that t
he American planes were lined up on the targeted fields as if in peacetime. It s
eemed to Shimada and others, "almost as if the enemy did not know the war had st
arted." They wondered if the Philippines had received no warning from Pearl Harb
or following the attack their. While studying reports, however, they were alert
for possible over-exagerated claims. Lieutenant Miza's Type 98 recon plane repor
ts did not jibe with the Tainan Ku's claims for damage. The 3rd Ku's Type 98 rec
on plane had survewed the results over Iba at 1PM and indicated in its report th
at of the ten small planes on the field, three were burning and seven were heavi
ly damaged. Miza reported at 1:15 that six large planes, two medium sized, and t
wo other planes were burning. While at Del Carmen at 1:20 there was one plane in
the air and twelve on the ground, one of which was burning. The 3rd Ku reported
shooting down 10xP-40 and one P-35a in air combat, while destroying 2xB-17, thr
ee medium sized planes, and four small planes on the ground and leaving 6xB-17,
six medium sized planes, and one small plane burning at Iba and Clark. In the en
d, the 11th Fleet concluded that the total American losses at Clark and Iba from
the bombings and strafings amounted to 102 planes. These included ehavily damag
ed planes as well as those destroyed. A report of the total claimed losses of th
e Americans, as well as their own combat losses-seven reisen and one Rikko- was
sent to IGHQ in Tokyo. Now, the 11th Air Fleet was busy modifying their 9 Decemb
er attack plans because of changes made in the 8 December plans. Nichols airfiel
d was now designated the primary target for the 9 December attack. They decided
to open up tomorrows raid with a night raid by a chutai of the 1st Ku, followed
by a massive daytime raid. Assigned to the nigh-bombing mission was a chutai of
9xType 96 Rikko commanded by Lt.Yoshiro Kaneko.
On the first day of operations, the Japanese had achieved greater success than t
hey had dared believe possible. In one stroke, they had destroyed 12xB-17 (a fur
ther three out of commission but would be repaired later) out of a total force o
f 35xB-17; they had destroyed 34xP-40 out of a force of 92xP-40. The Japanese ha
d eliminated two pursuit squadrons as fighting forces, with the additional third
heavily hit and equipped with entirely obsolete P-35 fighters which stood no ch
ance against the Japanese reisen. Just as damaging, was the fact that the Iba SC
R-270 radar set had been destroyed. Iba airbase was entirely knocked out and mos
t maintenance facilities and servicing facilities at Clark were destroyed along
with the airfield being heavily pot-marked. Secondary losses were 8xB-18 destroy
ed at Clark out of ten (one flew to Rosales at opening of attack while a second
was undamaged), eight out of commission A-27 trainers at Clark destroyed, 4xP-35
A at Iba destroyed along with the 24th Pursuits sole remaining A-27 trainer at I
ba. In total, the 20th Pursuit lost twenty of its twenty-three P-40B leaving onl
y three operational. The 3rd Pursuit lost thirteen P-40E with only eleven operat
ional. In addition, the 21st Pursuit had one of its planes damaged beyond repair
. The human cost was also significant. Nine of the 24th Pursuit Groups pilots we
re KIA plus 26 enlisted men and a ground officer KIA. The 19th BG lost 10 flight
crewmen and 21 ground personnel. The 7th Material Squadron attached to the 19th
Group lost 4 enlisted men and its commanding officer. Five of the 30 en in the
Iba Air Warning service were killed in the attack on Iba. MacArthur totaled the
total loss of life at Clark as being, "about 55 killed and 110 wounded" while at
Iba, "3 officers and 19 enlisted men killed and 16 officers and 22 enlisted men
wounded." Just as seriously, the morale of the FEAF was wiped down with the sig
nificant losses as everyone knew they had lost that days air battle badly. Japan
ese losses were slightly more significant than most sources state. The 1st Ku lo
st a Type 96 Rikko on take off with its full crew killed. A second Type 1 Rikko

of the Kanoya Ku crashed for an unknown reason on FOrmosa on the return trip wit
h three crewmembers killed and the rest seriously wounded. Seven reisen were sho
t down over the Philippines (two of the 3rd Ku and five of the Tainan Ku) with a
total of 16 reisen from both groups damaged (most lightly). A few were damaged
severely and at least two pilots were wounded (one was permenantly blinded).
The 20th Pursuit with its 23xP-40B were caught completely unprepared on Clark wi
th the sections readying to take off after a delayed order from the 24th PG. Thr
ee pilots: Moore, Keator, and Gilmore managed to take off before 53 Rikko bomber
s arrive in two waves to drop 636x60 kg bombs onto the airfield in an expert che
ckboard pattern. The 20th Pursuit would lose 20 of its 23xP-40B fighters. A tota
l of 12xB-17 had been destroyed outright (Three model C and nine Model D). Euban
k's B-17D had survived the attack with only moderate damage while Al Mueller's B
-17C which had been hidden under a tree escaped serrious damage as well; these t
wo would be repaired and in commission by the end of the day. Three other B-17D
were damaged, but could be repaired and put back in commission within several da
ys. First Lieutenant John Carpenter landed his B-17D at Clark undamaged, followe
d later by Wheless's B-17D. They were ordered to transfer to Clark on the follow
ing day. The three fighters engaged the Tainan Ku after gaining altitude; Keator
shot down a confirmed 2 and damaged a 3rd with Moore and Gilmore managing to fl
ee. Moore's Section 1 suffered Max Louk, Jesse Luker, Tod Mulcahy, and Jim Drake
KIA; Armstrong, Iversen, and Halverson WIA which totaled 40% casualties. Of the
squadrons enlisted men, 5 were KIA and 6 WIA which was 7% casualties out of 163
men. Moore and Keator would land at Clark while Gilmore would land at Del Carme
n. Meanwhile another 53 Rikkos arrive over Iba field and bombard it as well. The
3rd Pursuit had a total of 24xP-40E including 6 on the ground at Iba. Four of t
he squadrons fighters are destroyed on the ground while Ed Woolery's plane is bo
mbed while landing and Hawk Root's plane downed by shrapnel killing him. Vern Ir
eland (KIA) is shot down by Saburo Sakai over Clark; George Ellstrom (KIA) is sh
ot down by Hideki Shingo 30 miles north of Clark; Herb Ellis is shot down over C
lark by 3rd Ku after having shot down a reisen over Iba; and Fred Roberts after
being damaged by Tainan Ku over Clark is shot down by the 3rd Ku over Iba. Don S
teele shoots down a Tainan Ku reisen over Clark while Ship Daniel's plane is fat
ally damaged by Tainan Ku over Clark. Frank Neri's aircraft is fatally damaged b
y Tainan Ku over Clark and Bill Powell's aircraft is fatally damaged by 3rd Ku w
hile flying to Lingayen. The 3rd Pursuit loses 13xP-40E leaving only 11xP-40E op
erational. The 34th Pursuit took off from Del Carmen to intercept Japanese plane
s over Clark, but they were jumped by Reisen fighters twice. Their 18xP-35A outn
umbered the shotai greatly, but they were all outmanuevered. Stewart Robb shot d
own a Tainan Ku Reisen, but in exchange all 18 of hte P-35's were damaged to var
ying degrees but amazingly none are shot down. At least 3 are fatally damaged th
ough many more would have maitanance issues making them unflyable in the followi
ng days. Flights A and B of 21st Pursuit patrol over Manila, while C flight enga
ges Japanese. Two P-40's had oil shoot at their windshild and fly back to Nichol
s while Grashio, Williams, Cole, and McCown engage Tainan Ku over Clark. Grashio
shoots down a Tainan Ku Reisen but is fatally damaged himself while Cole's figh
ter has oil shooting at his windshield. The 17th Pursuit flies a normal patrol o
ver Manila and lands without incident, though 3 of its fighters need maintanance
. The radar at Iba had been completely destroyed as well as all the airplane ser
vicing facilities at the field; it would be completely evacuated by the end of t
he night. Clark was mostly destroyed as an airbase with planes able to operate i
n the auxiliary fields around it. The 24th Pursuit Group ceased to function for
the time as an organized unit with its facilities destroyed. In total, 80 were k
illed with another 150 people wounded in the attacks and an additional 25-30 mis
cellanious aircraft were destroyed on the two airfields. Only 58xP-40's are oper
ational after the air raid on 8 December and only 20xB-17 are operations with an
additional three repaired later.

Disposition of O
perational FEAF on Morning of 9 December
24th Pursuit Group (54xP-40)
---------------------------------------------------Clark Airfield (21xP-40)
21st Pur
suit Squadron (18xP-40E)
20th Pur
suit Squadron (2xP-40B) *Moore and Keator*
17th Pur
suit Squadron (1xP-40E) *Posten*
Nichols Airfield (12xP-40)
17th Pur
suit Squadron (3xP-40E under repair) *Obert, Blanzen, Kruzel*
21st Pur
suit Squadron (3xP-40E under repair) *Clark, May, Cole*
3rd Purs
uit Squadron (6xP-40E) *Thorne, Hanson, Hardegree, Krieger, Woolery, Gehrig*
Del Carmen Airfield (18xP-40)
34th Pur
suit Squadron (18xP-35A) *all damaged*
17th Pur
suit Squadron (17xP-40E)
20th Pur
suit Squadron (1xP-40B) *Gilmore*
Rosales Auxiliary Airfield
3rd Purs
uit Squadron (2xP-40E) *Neri, Keenan, Daniel*
River Bank
3rd Purs
uit Squadron (2xP-40E) *Steele, Benson*
Lingayen
3rd Purs
uit Squadron *Bill Powell*
Unknown location
3rd Purs
uit Squadron (1xP-40E) *Allen*

19th Bombardment Group (17xB-17C/D)

------------------------------------------------------------Clark Airfield (3xB-17)

*three o
thers are undergoing repair*
Del Monte (16xB-17)
*Under o
rders to fly to Clark in the morning*

Patrol Wing 10 (24xPBY-4)

------------------------------------------------------------------------Units sc
attered all over the Philippines. Main bases are located at Olonapo and
Sangley
Point. with some PBY's operating out of Laguna de Bay.

19th Bombardment Squadron inform

ation
--------------------------------------------------------------------Clark Airfield
B-17C: 40-2048:
40-2067:
40-2072:
40-2077:

Destroyed
Destroyed
Undamaged
Destroyed

in
in
in
in

attack
attack
attack
attack

B-17D: 40-3059:
40-3063:
40-3068:
40-3069:
40-3070:
40-3075:
40-3076:
40-3088:
40-3093:

Destroyed in attack
On recon during attack
Destroyed in attack
Destroyed in attack
On recon during attack
Destroyed in attack
Destroyed in attack
Destroyed in attack
Damaged in September lan

ding; survived attack *repaired later*

40-3094: Destroyed in attack
40-3095: Destroyed in attack
40-3096: Damaged during attack; r
epaired later
40-3098: Damaged during attack; r
epaired later
40-3099: Destroyed in attack

40-3100: Slightly damaged in atta

ck; repaired later that day
Del Monte
B-17C: 40-2045: 14th BS
40-2062: 93rd BS
B-17D: 40-3061:
40-3062:
40-3064:
40-3066:
40-3067:
40-3072:
40-3073:
40-3074:
40-3078:
40-3079:
40-3086:
40-3087:
40-3091:
40-3097:

14th
93rd
93rd
14th
93rd
93rd
93rd
93rd
14th
14th
14th
93rd
14th
14th

BS
BS
BS
BS
BS
BS
BS
BS
BS
BS
BS
BS
BS
BS

Unknown to the Americans, during the day the Japanese had seized Batan and Calay
an Islands with a small land detachment. Immediately a small auxiliary airstrip
on Batan was seized and work began to use it to land the 24th and 50th Sentai to
cover the pending Aparri and Vigan landings. Elements of the 74th and 52nd Sent
ai's landed on Batan to make a small recon of it, and they reported it was barel
y capable of operating any airplanes. It would serve as a staging area for fight
ers in the coming days for a few days before the base was no longer needed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

9 Dece
mber
By 1AM, Bill Powell had gassed up his P-40 at Lingayen and attempted to
take off in the moonlight. He was having issues with his damaged fighter and in
the dark hit a sandy hole which brought his fighter down onto its belly damaging
it beyond repair. Meanwhile, as mentioned the 1st Kokutai launched a chutai in
a night raid against Nichols led by Lt.Yoshiro Kaneko. On the way to the target,
two were forced to abort leaving seven to reach their objective. At 2AM the sle
ep of the 20th and 21st Pursuit Pilots at Clark was interuptted by the unsyncren
ized drone of 7xType 96 Rikko. Their target was Nichols field which had been lef

t untouched during the day attack. At Del Carmen, Buzz Wagner recieved orders to
get a 6 plane flight in the air to intercept the bombers. Wagner passed the job
onto Willie Feallock who rounded up 5 pilots. One by one they took off; Fealock
followed by Jim Rowland, then Walt Coss. Larry Lodin prepared for takeoff, he m
istook a light on Red Sheppard's P-40E as a guide light and taxied into it colli
ding with Sheppards plane. Lodin's plane sommersaulted, grazed the plane of Maur
ice Hughett, and immediately caught fire. 17th Pursuiters rushed over to his pla
ne and attempted to rescue Lodin, but it was no use the heat and exploding ammun
ition made it impossible to get near; Lodin was burned alive in his plane. 17th
Pursuit suffered its first casualty and was now down to 20xP-40E. After taking o
ff, Feallock, Rowland, and Coss became separated from the others. They flew arou
nd attempting unsuccesfully to locate and intercept the Japanese bombers. Eventu
ally, the fighters managed to land safely back at Del Carmen.
At nichols, the air raid siren gone off around 0130. After a half hour, the all
clear sounded, however, and all personnel went back to bed. After 45 minutes, th
e air raid siren went off again and this time everyone could hear the annoying d
rone of the engines. Then at 3:15 the bombs hit Nichols. Men of the 27th Materia
l Squadron began shooting at the high flying Nells with 7x.30 caliber Lewis Mach
ine guns in emplacements scattered around the perimeter with the tracers flying
visably through the sky. As the seven bombers were flying at 16,000 ft, they wer
e completely out of range. The first string of 60 kg bombs blew up the veterinar
y hospital, one corner of the bachelor officers quarters, and a corner of the nu
mber 4 hangar at Nichols. Fires erupted in these areas. Two P-40's had taken off
from Nichols to attempt to intercept the bombers, but failed make contact. As
they returned, one Lewis gun operator opened fire on the P-40 as it landed but t
hankfully no damage was inflicted. Two officers in the BOQ as well as a private
had been killed and 15 wounded. No.4 hangar was destroyed and one B-18 and an O52 were damaged. The raid was a precurser to the massive raid the navy had plann
ed for Nichols later in the day. Unfortunately, the weather began deteriorating
rapidly, and as the seven Rikko went in to land, one of them crashed with the wh
ole crew perishing.
The main mission for the 24th Pursuit on this day was to cover the expected land
ing of the remaining B-17's from Del Monte; they would be used to attack Japanes
e bases on Formosa in a counterattack. As first light came out, Ed Dyess and his
wingman followed by Sam Grashio took off. Fourth in position, Bob Clark, was be
ginning to take off, but dust on the airfield had not yet settled. Disoriented i
n the dark and dust, he was heading to the edge of the airfield without realizin
g. Dyess and others yelled frantically over the radio to prevent the collission,
but it was in vain; Bob Clark crashed straight into a B-17 parked at the edge o
f the field and both planes immediately exploded in a brilliant fireball. This w
as the 21st Pursuit's first casualty and now it was down to 20xP-40E. The B-17D
was one that had survived the previous days attack with damage and was under rep
air. With the collision, it was now junk. Next in line was John Posten and he to
ok off without incident, though disturbed by the incident. Charley Burris was si
xth in position followed by Jack Donalson. The take off at night at Clark was ve
ry fucking reckless; L.A. Coleman taxied into a bomb crater wiping out his P-40E
. Johnny McCown managed to take off succesfully, but his brand new Allison engin
e shut down at 100 ft and he subsequently crashed into trees which tore his P-40
E apart, though he escaped without serious engury. Another pilot got off course
during takeoff and struck a field light destroying his P-40E. In this risky and
idiotic takeoff (why the fuck couldn't Maj.Grover wait until some light was out
before taking off; its not like the fucking bombers would be their until the sun
was up anyways!?!?!) the 21st Pursuit Squadron lost 4xP-40E and one of its pilo
ts plus a repairable B-17; the squadron was now down to 17xP-40E. Sam Grashio al
most crashed himself. At 7000 ft his engine suddenly started cutting in and out
and losing power. He managed to regain composure of his plane but it was still l
osing air speed; he went in for an emergency landing at Clark. Since he didn't h
ave time to follow the proper procedure and was coming in an unusual direction,

the 200th Coast Artillery gunners fired at him. He managed to land safely at Cla
rk, even as the gunners continued to fire at him, though they failed to score a
single hit. Overhead, most of the pilots had reached their assigned altitude and
met up, except Burris and Donalson who had failed to link up. After two hours o
f flight and no sign of the B-17's Ed Dyess led his squadron to Rosales to refue
l. The FEAF was also concerned as to where the flight of bombers were. It wasn't
until 2:30 that the 6xB-17 arrive at Clark; they explained that their takeoff a
t Del Monte had been delayed. American/Filipino AA gunners were very trigger hap
py on this day; there were many incidents of friendly planes being shot at from
the ground. This culmilated in a O-52 observation plane from the 2nd Observation
Squadron being shot down by gunners from Clark.
Meanwhile, at 5:45, Hank THorne had gone to the new base command post of the eas
t side of Nichols field and telephoned Col.George of the 5th Interceptor Command
HQ at Nielson field for orders. Throne's orders was to maintain air alert at Ni
chols all day for the expected Japanese air raid. To guard against a surprise ai
r raid, Thorne divided his strength of 8 pilots and planes in half in order to p
rovide alterning covering patrols. The patrol flight would cover the relief flig
ht as it took off and then the relief flight would cover the patrol flight while
it landed and so on. Starting at dawn, Hank Thorne and Cy Blanton (who had been
left behind by the 17th Pursuit as his plane was undergoing maintenance) took t
urns leading the patrols. Assigned to the flights were 3rd pursuiters Bob Hanson
, Andy Krieger, Ray Gehrig, Ed Woolery, and Howard Hardegree. Dave Obert (also f
rom the 17th Pursuit) had missed the morning meeting and was told that the morni
ng patrol had just taken off. Since his plane was pending a check up, he was tol
d he could take Hanson's plane out and join them. He took it and climbed to 17,0
00 ft and searched for the others. He looked for the others for hours but couldn
't find them and after exhausting his fuel landed back at Nichols. It seemed des
erted and a single person told him that he was ordered to take off immediately t
o avoid the expected Japanese air raid. Frusteratingly refueling his plane, Ober
t took off as soon as he was able to and climbed to 15,000 ft but saw no planes,
American or Japanese. Bored, Obert began to do some acrobatics in the air; his
heart stopped when he saw 4 planes bearing down at him. He shouted over the radi
o, "don't shoot its Obert!" The next moment they pulled off, which meant they *
were* P-40's. Meanwhile, Don Steele and Benson had managed to fuel up their plan
es at the dried up riverbed and flew to Nichols where they met Obert after he an
d his 4 3rd pursuit pilots landed. Ship Daniel had also flown in from Rosales th
at morning. Back with Oberts squadron, they took off from Del Carmen on patrol a
t 7AM and patrolled south of Clark, then landed at Clark. At 1PM they took off a
gain for Del Carmen patrol where they later landed at Nichols. After refueling,
Buzz Wagner led his squadron back to Clark, minus Bill Rowe, who had slightly da
maged his wing tip in landing at Nichols. Wagern only took twelve of his P-40's
back to Clark; besides Rowe he left behind Feallock, Earl Stone, Forrest Hobrech
t, Wilson Glover, Jim Phillips, and Dub Balfanz. At 5 PM, Bill Powell finally ar
rived at Nichols after comandeering a car from Lingayen.
When Buzz Wagner and his 12xP-40E arrived back at Clark in the late afternoon, t
hey were informed by Maj.Grover that the 17th and 20th Pursuit would henceforth
have their planes pooled and share flying them. Late in the afternoon at Del Car
men, the 34th Pursuit was notificed that it was to move their P-35A to San Marce
lino, a newly completed airstrip 30 miles west of the China Sea coast. The FEAF
believed San Marcelino was still unknown to the Japanese and they reasoned that
Del Carmen was due for a Japanese air raid. The squadron had also recieved two p
ilots from the 20th Pursuit which now had a surplus to pilots to planes. Ed Hous
eman and Bill Akins were selected by Joe Moore to transfer to the 34th. At Dusk,
on approaching San Marcelino, the 34th pilots noticed another group of big plan
es flying in a southerly course at about 2000 ft but could not identify them in
the fading light. Then suddenly, AA fire exploded around them forcing the pilots
to break up. The P-35A circled around and headed for the bombers again and both
groups opened fire at each other. Soon, they realized that they were both frien

dlies, and hten they were again fired on by ground forces as both groups began l
anding at San Marcelino. Bryant missed the runway and hit a foxhole destroying h
is landing gear, and consequently his P-35A.
Patrol Wing 10
Meanwhile, Patrol Wing 10 was still convinced that Japanese carriers were offsho
re. Before dawn on this day, patrols were against sent out to locate the nonexis
tant Japanese carriers. About 80 miles out, P-19 flown by Al Gray and Frank Rals
ton spotted a small freighter NW of Olongapo; the ships was steaming toward Mani
la. The ship was flying no flags and when the ship flashed light signals at the
PBY, the crew did not respond. Al Gray wanted to confirm it wasn't Japanese so h
e dropped to wave level altitude and came up on the ship from astern. They were
100 ft out amidship whne MG fire burst from the bridge and it chopped up the rud
der cutting a control cable. Gray immediately ramped up the RPM while the waist
gunner fired his 50.cal at the ship. The radio operator sent out, "HAVE BEEN OPP
OSED BY ENEMY VESSEL RIGHT RUDDER CONTROL BROKEN TAIL DAMAGED REPAIRABLE. I AM R
ETURNING TO BASE...". The message gave the ships position but no other informati
on. Three PBY-4 flown by Lt.Bill Deam, Leroy Deede, and Bob Swenson took off rom
Laguna de Bay to attack the freighter. It turned out the freighter was a Norweg
ian ship named the SS Ulysses and they believed they had just driven off a Japan
ese bomber. They mistook the red circle in the star of the US insignia painted o
n in the early days of hte war, as a Japanese hinomaru. Bill Deams 3 plane secti
on arrived over the SS Ulysses at 10,000 ft. The section released their bombs; 1
2x500 lbs bombs fell down as teh SS Ulysses attempted to evade. All the bombs mi
ssed, fortunately. The next morning the Manila Bulletin ran two, side by side he
adlines, "PBYS BOMB JAP SHIP" and "FREIGHTER REPELS JAP BOMBERS." The men of Pat
wing10 found the episode humerous. Meanwhile, P-21 flown by Earl McConnel and J.
C. Watson was returning to Olongapo from patrol. As they approached Subic Bay fr
om landward, the PBY descended to 300 ft setting up for hte approach to Subic. A
Filipino AA battery opened up at them. Rounds slammed into the plane destroying
instruments, radios, and puncturing the fuel tank. Watson was hit in the right
elbow. AMM2c Thomas Marbry was hit hard in the knee with a slug that nearly seve
red his leg. RM2c James Gray was hit in the groin. Pilot McConnel immediately se
t down on the water. The plane was heavily damaged and Marbry would die 5 hours
later from shock and loss of blood. With two planes undergoing overhaul at Sangl
ey point, two PBYs destroyed at Malalag bay the previous day, and now a PBY seve
rely damaged by friendly AA fire, Patwing10 had only 23 out of its original 24 P
BYs operational on just the second day of the war.
The 5th Hiko Shidan began direct preparations for its next stage of operations;
because the weather was so horrible it was like the navy, also unable to fly and
repeat its raid of the previous day. Though, elements of the 24th and 50th Sent
ai transfered to basco field on Batan and continued to patrol the area for any A
merican planes that might be flying patrol in the Bashi Straight. The weather wa
s so terrible, that the planned raids against the Philippines by the Navy had to
be postponed as well. The Tainan Ku and 3rd Ku which had taken off for the raid
became entangled in a terrific storm and had to turn back. Amazingly inspite of
the severity of the storm, all reisen managed to make it back to Formosa. Howev
er, 2xType 96 Rikko from the 1st Ku failed to return from search missions, evide
ntly lost due to the atrocious weather.
FEAF Disposition on evening of 9 Decembe
r (51xP-40, 12xP-35A, 15xB-17)
Clark Airfield (15xP-40) (at lea
st 10 or 11 B-17)
17th Pursuit Squadron (12xP-40E)
20th Pursuit Squadron (3xP-40B) (Moore,
Keator, Gilmore)

14th Bombardment Squadron (6xB-17)

30th Bombardment Squadron *possibly 1 fl
yable B-17 with 2 others being repaired)
Nichols Airfield (20xP-40E)
3rd Pursuit Squadron (9xP-40E) * Thorne,
Krieger, Daniels, Benson, Steele, Hanson, Hardegree, Powell, Woolery, Gehrig*
17th Pursuit Squadron (8xP-40E) *Obert,
Rowe, Stone, Hobrecht, Glover, Phillips, and Balfanz*
21st Pursuit Squadron (3xP-40E) *Cole, C
lark, May*
Rosales
21st Pursuit Squadron (13xP-40E)
3rd Pursuit Squadron (1xP-40E) *Keenan*
San Marcelino
34th Pursuit Squadron (unknown number of
P-35A)
93rd Bombardment Squadron (7xB-17)
Casualties
17th Pursuit Squadron (Est. 16 o
perational P-40E)
1xP-40E destroyed on takeoff. Larry Lodi
n KIA
4xP-40E undergoing maintenance at Nichol
s *Rowes plane clipped his wing*
3rd Pursuit Squadron (Est. 11 op
erational P-40E)
*all pilots except Keenan, Allen, Robert
s, and Ellis are reported in at Nichols*
21st Pursuit Squadron (Est. 13 o
perational P-40E)
3xP-40E undergoing maintenance at Nichol
s
4xP-40E destroyed in takeoff accidents a
t Clark. Bob Clark KIA
1XP-40E undergoing maintenance at Clark
20th Pursuit Squadron (Est. 3 op
erational P-40B)
34th Pursuit Squadron (unknown n
umber of P-34A operational)
1xP-35A destroyed while landing at San M
arcelino
19th Bombardment Group (Est. 15x
B-17C/D operational)
1xB-17D destroyed at Clark from P-40E Co
llision on ground. It was undergoing repair from previosu days attack.
2xB-17D undergoign repair at Clark from
damage the previous day
2nd Observation Squadron

2xO-52 One destroyed during bombing raid

on Nichols. Second shot down by friendly AA fire.
1xB-18 One destroyed during bombing raid
against Nichols.
Patrol Wing 10
1xPBY (P-21) damaged by friendly AA fire
on landing at Olongapo base
- Thomas Marbry with a wound in
the leg. Dies of wound.
- J.C.Watson wounded in the elbo
w
- James Gray wounded with a roun
d in the groin
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

10 December
The 10th of December was to be the date of the first Japanese landings o
n Luzon; compared to Lagaspi and Lingayen Gulf they were to be minor, but for th
ey would change life for the men in the FEAF for a week bringing the full brunt
of the 5th Hiko Shidan against them. It is necesary to go over their operations.
As mentioned in other notes, the seizure of Apari and Vigan were viewed as nece
sary so that the 5th Hiko Shidan would have close airfields from which to suppor
t the drive to Manila. A pre-requisite was the seizure of Basco airfield on Bata
n Island which occured on 8 December; something that the Allies were completely
unaware had even happened. The airfield was found to be inadequate, barely able
to support the activities of a small number of fighters. Nevertheless, the some
elements of the 24th and 50th Sentai began operations there the next day along w
ith recon aircraft from the 74th and 52nd Sentai. The fighter units were coverin
g the Apari and Vigan invasion forces. Vice Admiral Ito Takahashi led the North
Philippine Cover Force personally on his flagship Heavy Cruiser Maya and Ashigar
a; each cruiser carried 2xType 95 recon seaplane and a Type 0 recon seaplane. Le
ading the destroyers was light cruiser Kuma with a Type 94 recon seaplane follow
ed by 5th Destroyer Divisions Asakaze and Matsukaze. They would provide a distan
t naval covering force for the two respective invasion forces. The Apari Invasio
n Unit was escorted by the 5th Destroyer Squadron under command of Rear Admiral
K.Hara which consisted of flagship light cruiser Natori and destroyers Harukaze,
Hatakaze, Fumitsuki, Minazuki, Nagatsuki, and Satsuki. The force also consisted
of two submarine Chaser Divisions, a gunboat division, 3 minesweepers detached
from the 2nd Konkyochitai, and the transport Keiyo Maru. The Army supplied 6 tra
nsports which carried the Tanaka detachment which consisted of II Battalion, 2nd
Taiwanese infantry, 48th Division plus the 1st and 2nd companies of III Battali
on; I Battalion, 48th Mountain Artillery Regiment less one battery; 1st Company,
48th engineer regiment less 2 platoons; and a whole lot of support personnel. T
he Vigan Invasion Force would be escorted by 4th Destroyer Squadron with Light C
ruiser Naka and destroyers Harusame, Marusame, Samidare, Yudachi, Asagumo, Mineg
umo, and Natsugumo. Providing additional support was the 21st Submarine Chaser D
ivision with six sub chasers; the 31st Submarine Chaser Division with three subm
arine chasers, and six minesweepers detached from the 1st and 2nd Konkyochitai.
The Army provided six transports carrying the Kanno Shitai which consisted of I
Battalion less 2 companies, and III Battalion, 2nd Taiwanese Infantry, 48th Divi
sion; 1st Company, 48th Mountain Artillery Regiment; and a platoon of the 48th E

ngineer Regiment. The entire force departs Mako in the Penescores Islands on 7 D
ecember. On the 9th, the commander of 5th Hiko Shidan issued 5th Hiko Shidan Ope
rational Order, A, No.136 which was as follows:
"On 10 December, the 10th Hiko Sentai will carry out photographic reconn
aissance of the various landing points in Lingayen Gulf and the Vicinity of San
Fabian and Pozorrubio and hte road between Pugo and Rosario. The 24th Sentai wil
l support the landing of the Kanno Shitai. In teh event that the capture of Viga
n airfield is succesful, elements of the 24th may use this airfield. The 4th Hik
odan commander will direct the 16th and 50th Sentai to support the anchorage and
landing of the Tanaka Shitai and the 8th Sentai to support the landing at the K
anno Shitai. In addition the brigade commander will direct the 14th Sentai to at
tack Clark Field with secondary target at Del Carmen at 1100."
24th Pursuit Group Attacks again
st Vigan
For the FEAF, operations began at 2AM when Nichols Field Base Operations Officer
Grant Mahony recieved a call from Maj.Grover at Clark, commander of the 24th Pu
rsuit Group. Grover recieved an order from the 5th Interceptor Command to send o
ne of his fighters to reconnoiter Vigan-San Fernando area for any activity of ve
ssels and to report the number and size of any spotted. Reports from those on th
e beach indicated that Japanese ships were offshore but the FEAF needed aerial c
onfirmation. So at 0210, Grant Mahony took off from Nichols in a P-40E and heade
d north. In spite of the night sky, he was able to make out offshore 6 transport
s, a cruiser and 10 destroyers. However, on the return trip to Nichols, friendly
AA gunners stupidly fired on his P-40E shooting it out and obliging Mahony to b
ail out in the darkness. Bob Hanson saw what happened and angrily ordered the Fi
lipino's to hold their fire; fortunately Mahony was not hurt in his jump. The tw
o pilots went to Nichols Base and telephoned what he had saw in his recon report
at 5:13 to Col.Francis Brady, chief of staff of General Brereton at FEAF HQ. Qu
ickly, at 5:30 Brader radioed the news to USAFFE which anxiously awaited news of
the recon. After 15 minutes of recieving the report, USAFFE HQ ordered the FEAF
to attack the Japanese landing with all available forces. In a quick response,
Clark based B-17's and P-40's took off on separate strike missions just before d
awn. The planned morning raid against southern formosan bases was cancelled so a
s to concentrate the bombers against the invasion force.
The first flight to take off was 12xP-40 of the 17th Pursuit based at Clark for
Vigan. John Brownewell and Al Strauss were selected to lead the 2x6 plane flight
s with 20th Pursuiter Buzz Wagner joining them. On taking off, however, Brownewe
ll found that none of his .50 caliber machineguns worked and he was forced to la
nd at Clark. Jack Dale took over his flight. It was still dark out, with only th
e small fuselage lights and hte exhaust fires from their engiens for them to see
each other. Dale and Strauss arrived over Vigan at 7:15 and found that their fl
ights were splintered. Below them was Light Cruiser Naka; Destroyers Harusame, M
urasame, Samidare, Yudachi, Asagumo, Minegumo, and Natsugumo; submarine chasers
Ch-4, ch-4, ch-6, ch-16, ch-17, ch-18, ch-10, ch-11, ch-12; Minesweepers W-9, W10, W-11, W-12, W-17, and W-18; Army Transports Brisbane Maru, Hawaii Maru, Oiga
wa Maru, Sanko Maru, Shunko Maru, and Takao Maru. Cy Blanton came over Vigan by
himself and dived at Naka and strafed her with his .50 caliber machineguns not c
ausing any damage, however. Walt Coss and three other fighters begin strafing a
different warship; what might have been destroyer Murasame. The warship was towi
ng a raft with a machinegun mounted on it that was firing at them. Having inflic
ted little to no damage and Japanese AA fire becoming thick, Dale and Strauss br
oke off their strafing runs at 8AM and led their two flights back to Clark retur
ning safely. The 24th Sentai was flying cover at this time for the Kanno shitai,
and attempted interception of the American fighters, though they inflicted no d
amage.

During the early morning, the 34th Pursuit returned back to Del Carmen from San
Marcelino. On landing, Jack Hall taxied into a hole, bending a blade of his plan
es propeller; though maintenance personnel dragged it out of the hole and straig
htened its propeller with a rock rendering it fit. At 8:30 that morning, the 34t
h Pursuit could muster 12xP-35A for a mission against the Vigan invasion force.
A thirteenth fighter- Claude Paulger's- was expected to participate too, but its
engine refused to turn over forcing Paulger to drop out. The thick clouds of du
st at Del Carmen forced the pursuit pilots to take off individualy and wait seve
ral minutes before takeoffs to let the dust settle. Finally, the all twelve mana
ged to assemble with CO Sam Marett leading the first flight of 6 fighters and Be
n Brown the second flight. However, when they arrived over Vigan at 9:30 Marett
had only 5xP-35A and Brown had only three; the other 4 were forced to return to
Del Carmen because of engine trouble. Such was the problem of using overly flown
old fighters in need of overhaul. Then, just as the fighters were approaching t
he invasion fleet, the motor of Ed Houseman, one of Brown's wingmen, sputtered o
ut and he was forced to parachute out with his plane crashing. This reduced the
34th Pursuit flight to only 7xP-35A. Ben Brown and his wingman dove and began st
rafing members of the Kanno shitai who had already landed on the beach. Sam Mare
tt and his wingman "Shorty" Crosland led the other three of their flight down to
100 ft to strafe what they believed to be a 10,000 ton transport, but what was
in reality a 630 ton minesweeper W-10. Attacking below deck level, Marett's pla
ne began strafing and his fire hit depth charges stacked on the rear deck settin
g them off and causing a huge explosion. The blast blew off Marett's right wing
and his plane spiraled into the water killing him. The explosion caused W-10 to
sink immediately with 79 sailors killed and 17 wounded.
Pilot Crosland pulled up as soon as he could to avoid the debris and the three o
ther Px35A scattered as the Japanese warships began to circle and fire at them.
Crosland climbed to 5000 ft to look at the results and noticed a "cruiser" firin
g at them close to where W-10 had sunk. He dove down and strafed the warship and
then began strafing the Daihatsu that were landing Japanese troops and supplies
. Crosland then flew back to Del Carmen as he was about out of ammo. In the mean
time, Jack Hall and Don Pagel were heavily strafing two transports and managed t
o set ablaze the Oigawa Maru. As a result, 16 of its complement including the ca
ptain were wounded, though none were killed. Ben Brown strafed a different trans
port but was forced to head back to Del Carmen because of engine trouble. Out of
the original 12xP-35A, four aborted the attack due to engine trouble; one crash
ed when its engine shut off; one was destroyed in the attack killing its pilot a
nd the CO of the 34th Pursuit. Five of the fighters landed at Del Carmen, while
a sixth piloted by Bill Coleman landed at Clark. Meanwhile, back at Del Carmen,
one of the 17th Pursuiters recieved word that the 17th Pursuit at Clark would be
taking off and he was told to join them. Around 9AM, "Red" Sheppard climbed int
o his newly repaired P-40E (which had been grazed in Lodin's crash) and took off
. He didn't know his squadron mates had already landed and as he flew toward Vig
an was looking for them. As he approached Vigan, he was unexpectedly joined by a
P-40 with the pilot (most likely from the 20th Pursuit) flying for the second
attack from Clark. Then, 3 miles inland from the Luzon coast near Vigan, Sheppar
d and the other pilot spotted 3xKi-48 from the 8th Hiko Sentai flying support fo
r the Kanno Detachment. The shotai was part of a chutai which was flying cover f
or the Kanno shitai. They were in front of them at their altitude of 15,000 ft.
Attacking from the rear of the bombers, he held down his trigger firing at them
as he flew past them, but noticed only two of his six .50 caliber guns were firi
ng. He swung around for another attack and poured more fire into the bombers dur
ing a second, then a third pass. Pieces of the bomber he was targeting began to
fall off. However, fire from the bombers ventral gun position was damaging his f
ighter as well during his passes. After the third pass, he noticed the coolant t
emperature warning light had come on. His prestone cooling system had been hit a
nd his fighter was doomed as his engine was about to overheat and shut off. As h
e looked for a place to land or bail out, he noticed that two of the Ki-48's wer
e falling out of formation smoking, with one of the planes having an engine knoc

ked out. Eventually one of these planes would crash while the other would make i
t back to base. Sheppard flew as far away from Vigan as possible but near Bangue
d his engine burst into flames and he bailed out safely. He hitched a ride to Ba
ngued where he was surprised to meet 34th Pursuit pilot Ed Houseman who, as ment
ioned, was forced to bail out when the engine on his P-34A gave out.
Back at Clark, the 12xP-40E of the 17th Pursuit returned at about 8:45 and were
immediately refueld and rearmed. Since Buzz Wagner had taken part in the previou
s mission, Joe Moore would take part in this one and he assigned 20th Pursuit pi
lots to the fighters. Moore's wingman, Randy Keator was feeling apprehensive as
he would be flying a P-40E for the first time in his life; for the same supporti
ng wing structure, the E model weighed 9200 pounds as opposed to the B model whi
ch was 7600 pounds. Third in line was Edward Gilmore who was taxiing into positi
on; because of the dust thrown up by Moore and Keator he failed to notice a bomb
crater in front of him. One of his wheels fell into the crater causing his figh
ter to fall onto its side; once his propeller hit the ground it stopped turning.
This wrecked his P-40. Randy Keator pulled overhead in the sky but realized he
was alone. In fact, the entire flight had become separated upon takeoff. Arrivin
g over Vigan, Keator began strafing a large transport but only two of his guns w
ere working. As he began making another pass at it another one of his guns jamme
d and he barely made it over the mast as he focussed on this jam. Clearing the s
hip, he held his P-40E barely above the water to avoid the AA bursts all around
him. Once out of range of the guns he began to pull up and then spotted a group
of Ki-27 "Nates" of the 24th Sentai diving at him from 8000 ft. Keator applied m
aximum RPM to outrun his attackers at low altitude and he soon left them far beh
ind heading back to Clark. All the other pilots made individual but ineffective
strafing attacks against the Japanese fleet as well. By 11:15 the 20th Pursuit p
ilots flying in the 17th Pursuit airplanes arrived back at Clark and began landi
ng. One of the 20th Pursuit pilots, Jim Fossey was unused to landing in the much
heavier E model. He came in too high at too low of a speed causing his plane to
stall. He applied max RPM in an attempt to avoid it, but it was no use as his p
lane hit the ground and swerved 45 degrees to the left. The plane then crashed i
nto some trees killing Jim Fossey and destroying his P-40E.
As ordered, the 5th Hiko Shidan was actively flying support missions for the Apa
ri and Vigan invasions. The 24th Sentai was now operating from Basco field, Bata
n Island and it flew six missions in support of the Kanno Shitai at Vigan. The K
i-27 attempted to intercept two P-40E on separate occasions (one piloted by Rand
y Keator) but they failed to cause any damage to them due to the P-40E's superio
r speed. At this time, the 8th Sentai flew three missions in support of the Kann
o Detachment. They dive-bombed and strafed enemy vehicles in the vicinity of San
tiago destroying approximately thirty cars and motor trucks that were moving nor
th of hte road Vigan and San Fernando. One of their shotai was intercepted by "R
ed" Shepard of the 17th Pursuit and he shot down one Ki-48 while heavily damagin
g another, but the bombers in return managed to shoot down Sheppard. Meanwhile,
the 16th and 50th Sentai supported the Tanaka Shitai at Apari bombing the roads
from AParri to Tuguegarao, but did not encounter any American planes. As directe
d, the 14th Sentai took off to bomb Clark Field but it could not do so due to cl
ouds and so it bombed the deserted Iba airfield.
19th Bombardment Group's Attack
Against Aparri and Vigan
With news of the Japanese landing at Vigan, the B-17's were ordered to a
ttack the Japanese landing force. At least 16xB-17 were available for a bombing
mission against Vigan (seven at San Marcelino, nine at Clark) with approximately
2-3 undergoing repair. A total of 5xB-17D/C of the 14th Bombardment Squadron to
ok off from Clark to attack Japanese ships offshore of Vigan and Aparri; they wo
uld make their attacks individually. Major "Rosie" O'Donnel who was the squadron

s CO made five runs over his target before his bombs would release; it is unknow
n from my source as to *what* his target was. Captain Elmer L. Parsel's B-17C bo
mbed transports at Aparri; unknown if he caused any damaged. A B-17D flown by Lt
.Earl Tash was flying reconnaissance over the area (unrelated to the bombing rai
ds) and was on its way to Clark after the raid when he was spotted by 2nd Lt.Kan
amaru and three other pilots of the 50th Sentai flying cover for the invasion fr
om Formosa. The Ki-27s attacked vigorously with SSgt M Bibin recieving serious w
ounds and some damage inflicted on the bomber. However, the gunners hit Kanamaru
's fighter claiming it as a kill. His fighter was hit in the engine and he manag
ed to make it to Colayan island. Lt.G.R Montgomery's B-17C was loaded with only
one 600 lb bomb as there was no time following the order to take off. He dropped
it and missed transports off Aparri and then returned to Clark airfield to rear
m. This time he was loaded with 20x100 lbs bombs and returned to Aparri attackin
g the transports again; all the while wondering what damage he could inflict wit
h 100 lb bombs. Presumably, because of the naval air raid over Manila area, Mont
gomery attempted to fly back to Del Monte. However, it appears he ran out of fue
l and he was forced to ditch only 4 miles out though all of the crewmembers were
rescued. Lt.George Schaetzel's B-17C was carrying 8x600 lb bombs which he dropp
ed over Aparri. He was spotted by 2nd Lt.Kanamaru and his three wingmen (before
their encounter with Tash) and they attacked his bomber. They riddled its wing a
nd one of its engines with their bullets but it managed to escape into clouds wi
th a ruptured oil tank and landed safely at San Marcelino. The bomber was 40-30
91 and after landing at San Marcelino, he was ordered to fly back to Del Monte.
However, after taking off, he was forced to come down at Cebu with a broken aile
ron cable. The plane subsequently reached Del Monte on 13 December, and a week l
ater it was flown to Australia where it was canabalized for parts. Colin Kelly's
B-17C was carrying only 3x600 lb bombs. Kelly ignored the landing at Vigan and
flew to Aparri to search for a Japanese aircraft carrier reported to be in the a
rea. Not finding any, he then flies back to Vigan to bomb the fleet at 22,000 ft
. Two of his bombs miss, but one of them lightly damages light cruiser Naka with
a near miss. There are many misreported "facts" concerning Colin Kelly's attack
. Sources give varying names for the ships he attacked as: Battleship Haruna, He
avy Cruiser Ashigara, Light Cruiser Natori, and Light Cruiser Naka. Battleship H
aruna was hundreds of miles away as a cover force with battleship Kongo while He
avy Cruiser Ashigara was 200 miles West of Vigan in the South China Sea as part
of the North Philippines Cover Force. In his memoir, Saburo Sakai mentions that
he and members of the Tainan Kokutai flew to Vigan to fly cover for the invasion
after circling Clark airfield where they encountered and shot down Colin Kelly'
s B-17C (It could only have been his as Kelly's B-17 was the only B-17 shot down
on 10 December). Since Kelly flew to Vigan invasion force, it could only have b
een Light Cruiser Naka which he encountered, as Light Cruiser Natori was flagshi
p of the 5th Destroyer Squadron which was stationed to guard the Aparri invasion
force. The ship that Kelly managed to slightly damage with a near miss was Ligh
t Cruiser Naka at Vigan.
Saburo Sakai was alerted to Kelly's presence far above him when he saw the bombs
exploding in the ocean. The Tainan Ku fighters then intercepted the bomber as i
t flew back to clark and attacked it. Waist gunner Sgt.Delhany was decapitated b
y a burst of MG fire and Pte Altman was wounded. Finally, due to damage inflicte
d by Saburo Sakai during the running battle, a fire broke out in the bomb bay an
d as Kelly stayed at the controls to keep the bomber level and attempt to land a
t Clark, he allowed his co-pilot Lt.Donald Robbins and four other crewmembers to
bail out. There are verifiably false reports that the Tainan ku then attempted
to strafe the parachuting crewmembers; Saburo Sakai was the only reisen that rem
ained with Kelly's stricken B-17 when it went down and he did not follow it thro
ugh the clouds when it was going to crash so he certainly did not strafe anyone
parachuting; in fact because he did not witness the bomber crashing he was denie
d credit for the kill by his commanding officer. To back this up, Col.Frank Kurt
z who was on Clark and witnessed Kelly's plane attempting to land saw the crewme
mbers bailing out and never saw any japanese planes attempting to strafe the sur

vivors. This was purely American propaganda, just like the lies that the Tainan
Ku had strafed George Ellstrom on 8 December as he parachuted out. Of the 5xB-17
C that had taken off to bomb Japanese ships, only two returned undamaged. One di
tched at sea near Del Monte; one was heavily damaged at San Marcelino; and Colin
Kelly's B-17C 40-2045 became the first B-17 lost to combat over the Pacific. In
addition, Tash's bomber had recieved some damage, but it was still in commissio
n. This left only 17xB-17 in commission, though, at least two at Clark were stil
l undergoing repairs and would eventually be put back in commission. Their total
damage against Japanese forces was negligable. Its almost impossible to determi
ne which plane caused what damage, however, Minesweeper W-19 off Aparri was hit
with a bomb and wrecked, being forced to beach itself to avoid sinking and was g
iven up as a total loss. In addition, also off Aparri, destroyer Harukaze and li
ght cruiser Natori recieves a near-miss which causes slight damage. At Vigan, li
ght cruiser Naka recieves a near miss causing light damage, and its possible it
was the B-17s which were responsible for hitting transport Takao Maru, forcing i
t to be beached as a loss.

Japanese raids over Manila Area

Because of the heavy torrential rain and shitty weather that occured on
the 9th combined with the scattered landings because of the fog on the 8th, the
morning of the 10th was spent reassembling the various units; refueling and rear
ming them. First, Lt.Shingo takes off from Tainan with 17 reisen of the Tainan K
u to patrol Vigan; the formation is guided by a Type 98 recon plane being used f
or navigation. One of the reisen was forced to return to base because of mechani
cal issues. Lieutenant Commander Ozaki then led three chutai (27xType 96 Rikko)
in takeoff from Tainan, with their objective being to bomb Cavite naval yard. Li
eutenant Commander Suda led three chutai of the Takao Ku to bomb Nichols airfiel
d while Lieutenant Commander Nonaka led the other three chutai of the Takao Ku i
n a bombing mission against Del Carmen. To escort Nonaka was 22 additional reise
n of the Tainan Ku and another Type 98 recon plane to guide them to the target.
To escort Ozaki and Suda's Rikko, the 3rd Ku launched 34 reisen led by Lieutenan
t Yokoyama to cover the bombs and engage American fighters, they being led by th
ree Type 98 recon planes to the target areas. Nearing the target area, one of th
e Type 96 Rikko from Ozaki's formation was forced to return due to mechanical is
sues, while of the 22xreisen that were to strafe Del Carmein ahead of the Nonaka
's Rikko, four were forced to abort the mission due to mechanical issues leaving
only eighteen. The combined Army and Navy planes totalled approximately 200 on
this day; they planned (and would deliver) a knockout blow to the Americans on t
his day.
At 1222, Lt.Cmdr.Nonaka decided to abort the planned bombing of Del Carmen. He f
ound that the target was shrowded completely with clouds and it would be a waste
of bombs to drop them on a target he could not observe from his high altitude.
Instead, he went after the secondary target, which was to bomb shipping in Manil
a bay. At practically the same moment that Nonaka was switching targets to head
toward Manila Bay, the 3rd Ku arrived over Manila bay, and seconds to minutes la
ter, the 18 reisen of the Tainan Ku arrived over Del Carmen. The airfield was de
fended by only six Lewis guns and whoever had rifles; it was almost defenseless
against the Japanese reisen. The zero's caught the P-35s out in the open, five o
f them being refueled and rearmed when the strafing began. Del Carmen radioed th
ey were under attack.
At 12:28 the air raid sirens at Clark went off. Bill Coleman who had met up with
34th Pursuiter Frankie Bryant (who had flown in on a B-17 from San Marcelino th
at morning) both ran to Coleman's P-35A. Bryant squeezed in the baggage compartm
ent as Coleman took off and flew for Del Carmen. While flying they were apparent
ly intercepted by Reisen of the Tainan Ku, but they managed to safely land at De

l Carmen where they both got out and ran for cover. At this time, 18 Reisen from
the Tainan Kokutai begin strafing Del Carmen as the six Lewis Gun operators aro
und the airfield open fire at the strafers. However, four of the guns jammed on
their first burst of .30 caliber fire. The Reisen begin strafing the vulnerable
P-35A that were on the ground. A mayday was sent out to the 24th Pursuit Group H
Q. Meanwhile, the fighters at Clark were ordered to scramble before the expected
raid, many without adequate gas, ammo, or pilot equipment. One of the pilots on
taking off, Bob Newman, who was detached to the 21st Pursuit from the 3rd Pursu
it, plowed into a B-17 upon takeoff taking off its wing and breaking its fuselag
e though amazingly was unhurt; though both planes were destroyed. Ed Dyess upon
taking off met up with Buzz Wagner while Edwing Gilmore in his P-40E met up with
Al Strauss of the 17th Pursuit. Minutes later the call over the radio, "Tally H
o, Del Carmen! Tally Ho, Del Carmen!" was recieved as they recieved the distress
call when the Tainan Ku was strafing. As Strauss and Gilmore approached Del Car
men, they noticed two reisen above the overcast preparing to strafe the base. Gi
lmore signaled he would take the one on the left. Diving down from 2000 ft on th
e reisen's tail, he opened fire. After only one burst, however, all his guns fai
led to fire again. He was unfamiliar with the E model and did not know the charg
ers had been disconnected. He considered ramming the Zero, but noticed smoke com
ing from its engine which he figured he had hit; with his guns not working he pu
lled away for cover.
Jack Dale also picked up the call from Del Carmen and was heading there to inter
cept Reisen. He attempted to intercept a strafer at Del Carmen but discovered th
at none of his guns worked and so he was forced to break off; he would fly to Ni
chols to get his guns working again. Parker Gies's P-40E arrived over Del Carmen
with his 20th Pursuit comrade Henry Rancke in response to the distress call. Gi
es dived down from the overcast and caught one of the reisen strafing where he p
oured fire into it sending it smoking toward the ground. When Gies rejoined Ranc
ke, they immediately were jumped by 3 Reisen. Undaunted, Gies turned into them a
nd set one afire while scattering the other two though he took heavy damage to h
is P-40E. The Reisen shot down by Gies was piloted by NAP 1/C Masaharu Higa of t
he Tainan Kokutai. Another Reisen of the Tainan Ku was heavily damaged and crash
-landed off the coast of Formosa on his return trip; this was most likely the Re
isen that was damaged by Gilmore. The 18 Reisen of the Tainan Ku strafed Del Car
men for 21 minutes. Of the 15xP-35A on the airfield during the attack, 7 were de
stroyed and 3 heavily damaged. Only 5 were left undamaged and they were all out
of commission. Ben Brown assumed command of the squadron following Sam Marett's
death and ordered the 34th personnel to evacutate the field for the nearby sugar
central of Del Carmen; the airfield was temporarily abandoned as its personel t
ook cover in the woods outside of the base. Besides Masaharu Higa, three other r
eisen were damaged in the strafing attack (as mentioned one ditched in the sea w
ith the pilot recovered). Tainan Ku pilots Ishihara, Nishiyama, and Shimada each
claimed one P-40 shot down from ten engaged, while buntaicho Wakao and another
pilot were credited with one probable apiece. Additionally, the 3rd and 6th Chut
ais claimed between them six aircraft in flames and 14 more destroyed or damaged
on the ground. It is unknown if the 24th PG lost any fighters over Del Carmen.
Yokoyama's fighter sweep
As will be mentioned later in my notes, the 3rd Ku arrived first over th
e Manila area. A chutai descended into Manila bay to strafe the flying boats; tw
o would be made unoperations, while a reisen is shot down by defensive fire. Dur
ing the scramble from Clark at 12:30, Dyess and many others picked up the call o
n their radios from 24th Group HQ at Clark reporting that Japanese bombers passe
d over Clark without attacking and were apparently on their way to Manila instea
d; this was Nonaka's Rikko's on their way to bomb Manila Bay. They were ordered
to intercept. Also responding was John Posten who was halfway to Manila when he
was jumped by Reisen, possibly of the 3rd Ku. He dogfighted but had his right ti

re, gas tank, both wings, and tail riddled with bullets and decided to break off
the fight by going into a steep dive from 15,000 and then flies back up into a
cloud bank managing to shake the reisen. He flew back to Clark. Dyess made it to
Manila and saw the Rikko bombing Cavite. He decided to test his guns before eng
aging and found that none of them fired! He decided to land at a small auxiliary
base at Manila to get his guns cleared and recharged. Milton Woodside of the 20
th Pursuit was flying in Buzz Wagner's P-40E with no ammunition after the frenzi
ed takeoff from Clark. Some 20 miles NE of Manila near the Ipo Dam he was jumped
from behind by Reisen. His instrument panel was shattered in the attack and he
put his ship in a dive and jumped out, landing near the town of Bocaue. Meanwhil
e, another 20th Pursuiter from Clark named Kiefer White was also jumped by a Rei
sen from behind near the same area. His Allison engine conked out and lit on fir
e so he opted to bail out.
Around the time the 3rd Ku arrived in the area, at Nichols, the flight led by Ha
nk Thorne had just landed after patrolling Clark earlier that day for the expect
ed raid that never occured. Bill Powell, Hank Thorne, Howard Hardegree, Ship Dan
iel, and three other 3rd pursuiters were eating lunch when Grant Mahony took off
with six other pilots for the relif flight: Don Steele, Bob Hanson, Dub Balfanz
, Wilson Glover, Jim Phillips, and Forrest Hobrecht. They were covered by Willie
Feallocks flight of ten P-40s which were low on gas after their long patrol. Hi
s flight included Andy Krieger, Ray Gehrig, Bill Rowe, Gus Williams, John Burns,
Gordon Benson, Earl Stone, and two others. While circling for a landing, Feallo
cks radios crackled that Cavite was being bombed! Looking toward the naval base,
Feallock and others saw swarms of reisen over the area. With not enough gas for
ten minutes of combat and already in landing configuration, Feallock radioed th
e tower for instructions. The tower told him to use his own judgement, and so Fe
allock decided to go in and attack. Swinging around in a climb, he went after a
shotai of reisen at low altitude, five miles off his right wing over Zablan airf
ield. They were circling it looking like they were preparing to strafe. Retracti
ng his landing gear, he closed in fast from the west behind the reisen. He was h
orrorfied when he drew, "a fine bead" on one of them, and upon pulling the trigg
er found out none of his guns would fire! Then, the reisen saw Feallock and turn
ed into him; after only two turns with the japanese pilot, he was behind Fealloc
k in the turn. He was being fired at from the pilot and now opted for a straight
chase over Fort McKinley and Nichols Field AA units, hoping their firepower cou
ld knock out the pursuer. When down to less than 100 ft and heading at 360 MPH a
s he zig zagged around trees and buildings, he felt/heard the noise of 7.7mm and
20mm cannons hitting his plane all behind him. His controls were now getting mu
shy and hte engine was running rough. Then he noticed a burning smell and his sh
ip began to smoke. He pulled his plane up to 200 ft as 50 ft was not enough alti
tude to bail out at. As his plane continued to climb, he bailed out around 500800 ft as his plane was turning into a flaming wreck. He hit the ground hard in
a field near Rosario, Pasig, 8 miles west of Manila. He sprained both ankles in
his hard landing and his plane crashed 60 ft away.
Next describes the ordeals of Feallocks other pilots. Andy Krieger, realizing th
ey were heavily outnumbered, decided to fire arbitrarily on any aircraft he enco
untered. He records that he managed to get a "good shot" at a reisen and saw it
stagger and fall off just as his own plane was hit from behind. The reisen was o
nly damaged, however. Krieger half-rolled and saw that he had a huge shell hole
in his tail. He did an immelmann which shook the reisen, and as he rolled out, h
e caught two reisen in his sights. Just as he was about to pull the trigger, his
engine ran out of gas and quit. He dove quickly, but the two reisen he was targ
eting quickly got onto his tail. They began shooting and hitting his tail as he
banked with his plane rolling onto its back and beginning to spin. He managed to
get out of it somehow, just barely touching the water of a little creek. His en
gine was running in spits and starts using the last of his gasoline, so he attem
pted to flee at ground level, with the two reisen still on his tail firing at hi
m. He went on a reckless flight at treetop level in an attempt to shake the reis

en pilots. He continued to recieve fire and soon his plane was a wreck. His engi
ne quit entirely, as he climbed to 500 ft and bailed out, opening his chute at 1
00 ft. He landed at Barrio Pasacola, Caloocan just north of Manila. Ray Gehrig i
n Feallocks flight, was attacked by a shotai from above, with none of his guns w
orking. He was hit by 20mm shells in the canopy which blew it away and most of h
is instruments. He went into a tight turn and in a moment entered some clouds; h
e was slightly injured from the attack. He started for Del Carmen to the north.
However, before he arriving there he saw the Tainan Ku strafing the airfield, so
he turned east to the small civilian field at Plaridel, 25 miles SE of Del Carm
en. He was almost to the field when he ran out of gas and crashed into a mango t
ree wrecking his fighter and the gunsight smashing into his face breaking his ch
eeckbone and upper jaw. Bill Rowe in Feallocks flight was leading an element of
21st pursuiters when reisen encountered him after he spotted the Rikko bombers a
bove Manila/Cavite. One of the reisen got onto his tail, but he shook him in a s
teep dive. However, after manuevering for several minutes, the more nimble reise
n who managed to outturn him every time, he decided to break off of combat and h
ead for Del Carmen to land, as his fuel was near empty. As he neared the field,
he was told it was being strafed, so he headed for Clark. He ran out of gasoline
in one tank and so switched to another when he looked up and saw tracer fire go
ing on by him. Two reisen came up from behind and began shooting him; Rowe went
into a half roll and dove straight down at top speed, then pulled out. He had sh
aken the reisen, though, in his nervous state he almost fired on another P-40 wh
ich was approaching Clark for a landing, then cut off a B-17 as it was landing.
Gus Williams who had been flying with Rowe at the beginning of the patrol in Fea
llocks flight, was also coming in to land at Nichols at 12:40; his gas gauge reg
istered almost empty. However, as he turned on the base leg, Nichols tower radio
ed, "There are aircraft strafing at the end of hte field!" Williams saw no aircr
aft however, so he continued into his landing pattern. However, as he set the wh
eels of his P-40E down in preparation for landing, he noticed planes strafing pl
anes and hangars at the far end of the field. Too late to abort his landing, he
rolled his wheels to a stop after touching down and ran off the runway onto the
golf course for protection, just as three chutai of Type 1's droned on overhead
and began releasing their bombs. John Burns who had also been in Feallocks fligh
t, was just about out of gas and unable to land at Nichols or Del Carmen as they
were under attack. He decided to fly to the PAAC Maniquis field, 60 miles north
of Manila, near Cabanatuan. On approaching, he found the field covered in obsta
cles and buzzed it so the Filipino's would remove them. However, in his anxious
state of mind, and the fact that his fuel tank was about empty, he came in and c
rash-landed right through drums blocking the airfield. He was unhurt, but his P40E was a total wreck. Another man in Feallocks flight was Gordon Benson. Pursue
d by two reisen, he led them low across Nichols field during the strafing attack
as men of the 27th Material Squadron fired at them. However, the reisen set his
plane ablaze anyways and moments later crashed into Manila bay just a half mile
oppsoite of the 27th Material Squadrons position. Benson managed to get out wit
hout injury, thankfully.
Willie Feallocks flight
(10xP-40E)
--------------------------------------------------William Feallock (17th PS): Shot down by
reisen.
Andy Krieger (3rd PS): Damages a reisen.
Shot down.
Ray Gehrig (3rd PS): Damaged by reisen.
Runs out of fuel. WIA.
Bill Rowe (17th PS): Landed at Clark saf
ely.

Gus Williams (21st PS): Lands at Nichols

; plane probably destroyed in bombing.
John Burns (21st PS): Crash-lands on Man
iquis field.
Gordon Benson (3rd PS): Shot down by rei
sen.
Earl Stone (17th PS): Lands at Batangas
airfield.
two unknown pilots
The relief flight for Thorne's flight had just taken off from Nichols at 12:35 a
nd had just gotten their wheels up and were at 2000 ft when they were hit by a b
unch of reisen that had minutes earlier hit Feallocks flight. The seven P-40E le
d by Grant Mahony were in for the fight of their lives. The flight splintered, a
nd Don Steele found that two reisen had gotten onto his tail. They turned and tu
rned, losing altitude as the two reisen kept shooting at Steele. He could hear 2
0mm shells striking the armor plate behind the cockpit. He finally managed to ge
t into some clouds that were 1000 ft high over Manila. A reisen followed him in
and hte other one turned and went back just before he went into the clouds. When
he came out, the reisen was just ahead and below him, rocking his wings frantic
ally looking for Steele. He skidded oover onto the tail of the reisen and gave i
t one burst, which completely blew up the fighter. The remains of the reisen rol
led over onto its back and crashed onto the shore of Laguna de Bay. Steele now h
eaded due north, climbing up to 15,000 ft, and returned to Manila. There he saw
twelve bombers above him at 20,000 ft with about 25 reisen about 2000 ft above t
hem, heading NW. Approaching Nichols field, Steele saw it in flames from the bom
bers, and decided to make for Batangas field 55 miles south of Nichols. There, h
e was met by Earl Stone from Feallocks flight. Only Don Steele, Grant Mahony, Bo
b Hanson, and Balfanz managed to get their fighters down safely. Wilson Glovers
plane was hit in the instrument panel by a 20mm shell. With his electrical syste
m and guns subsequently knocked out and his engine starting to overhead, he head
ed north to Clark field. However, 18 miles short near San Fernando, he was force
d to bail out. Jim Philipps was on the tails of two reisen that had been attacki
ng two PBYs moored in Manila Bay. However, one of them got onto his tail as he h
eaded back over Sangley Point. As they flew over it, a marine AA battalion opene
d up on them and hit his P-40E shooting it down; he bailed out over Manila bay a
nd was rescued by the navy. Another fellow 17th Pursuiter, Forrest Hobrecht was
low over Nichols field during the strafing raid of 12:40-45. Shortly after takeo
ff, a reisen latched onto his tail. When about 3/4 across the field, 20mm shells
from the reisen set his fighter on fire. In his attempt to bail out, he hit hte
stabilizer and fell to the ground in Barrio Navarro, about 3 miles east of Nich
ols, his parachute unopened.
Grant Mahony's flight (7
xP-40E)
---------------------------------------------------Grant Mahony (17th PS): Lands safely.
Don Steele (3rd PS): Shoots down a reise
n. Lands safely.
Bob Hanson (3rd PS): Lands safely.
"Dub" Balfanz (17th PS): Lands safely.
Wilson Glover (17th PS): Shot down by re
isen.
Jim Phillips (17th PS): Shot down by fri
endly AA fire.
Forrest Hobrecht (17th PS): Shot down by
reisen. KIA.

On this date, the 6th PS moved from Batangas airfield to Zablan airfield. Around
12:40-45, some reisen of the 3rd Ku descend and strafe Zablan airfield. They se
t on fire some of the trainers, a beechcraft 18 transport, the Keystone ZB-3A bo
mber, and a P-12E fighter. Captain Jesus Villamor and Lieutenants Juliano, Gozar
, and Manzano rise up in their four P-26A in an attempted interception of the re
isen. Lieutenant Gozar's guns jam and he attempts to ram a reisen in an attempt
to disperse their formation, but fails. Villamor claims to have downed a reisen,
though no reisen were lost to him.
The 3rd Kokutai had arrived over Manila and circled looking for any interceptors
, but found none. So, they descended to strafe various targets and it was here t
hey encountered Feallocks and Mahony's flights from Nichols airfield, as well as
others from Clark that were making their way to Manila area. One of the reisen
was shot down by Don Steele while another was shot down by defensive fire from a
PBY-4 in manila bay. They were FPO1c Tokiharu Tezuka and FPO2c Tamotsu Kojima.
Thirteen other reisen recieved damage to varying degree with aproximately 3 to 4
crash landing either in Bashi straight or on land in Formosa, though all pilots
were recovered. At Nichols airfield which had been bombed and strafed, most of
the 2nd Observation Squadrons O-52s and O-46s were destroyed, as well as three B
-18s which had been bombed up for a planned raid against the Vigan invasion forc
e. Nichols suffered heavy damage with its hangars, fuel tanks, and various other
workshops and barracks destroyed from the bombing. The 3rd Ku also went down an
d strafed Zablan airfield, which riddled a number of Stearman 73 trainers. Also
destroyed was the Keystone ZB-3A bomber, a Beechcraft 18 light transport of the
Philippine Air Lines, and a visiting P-12E fighter. Maniquis airfield was also s
trafed which destroyed the 10th BS's two flyable B-10 bombers (which were underg
oing repair following training accidents) as well as five Stearman trainers of t
he 7th School Squadron. The 3rd Ku also destroyed/heavily damaged three PBY-4 of
Patrol Wing 10; one in flight and two taking off from Manila Bay.
Bombing of Cavite
Cavite Naval Yard was until the outbreak of hostilities the main base of
the Asiatic Fleet. It contained all the repair and overhaul facilities as well
as the harbor to house the fleet. It contained storehouses for ammunition and ev
en shops to produce replacements parts as needed of the fleet. After giving a cr
ippling blow to American air power in the area, the Japanese viewed it as necesa
ry to knock out the base of operations for enemy naval actions in the Philippine
s. In spite of its importance, it was only defended by three Marine AA Batteries
armed with relatively small 3inch guns. Battery A was across the bay at Canacao
Golf Course on the tip of Sangley Point; Battery B at Carridad; and Battery C a
t Binacayan one mile south. Each battery was armed with 4x3" .50 caliber dual pu
rpose guns with a maximum range of 15,000 ft. Battery D was divided to support e
ach position with 5x.50 caliber machine guns. In spite of the fact that American
high command had recieved word of the Japanese landings at Vigan and Aparri, th
ere was no alarm at Cavite. Most of hte workers were civilians and they were goi
ng about their work as normal. It is unfortunate that there were really no air r
aid shelters, trenches, or foxholes in the vicinity with Admiral Rockwell's HQ b
eing the sole exception within the complex. The Asiatic fleet had shifted its op
erations to the South of the Philippines, however, some of its forces still rema
ined at Cavite. At 0745 that morning the river gunboat Mindanao arrived from Hon
g Kong with 10 prisoners on board; crew of a Japanese fishing vessel No.3 South
Advance Maru that it had intercepted on its way to Manila; the prisoners were tu
rned over to the 16th Naval District. The gunboat was ordered to proceed to Sang
ley Point to refuel and take on water and then report to the commander of the in
shore patrol for duty. The plan was to equip all three river gunboats with mines
weeping gear and depth charges. At 1115 the destroyer USS John Ford moored at th
e Sangley Point fuel dock, refilled her oil bunkers. Meanwhile, entering Manila

bay were two old small british destroyers; the HMS Thanet and HMS Scout. They we
re to be provisioned and fueled at Manila before they departed for Singapore.
Moored along the west side of Machina Wharf was a nest of vessels. Closest to th
e pier was submarine Seadragon. Tied to her hull was the submarine USS Sealion;t
ied to her her hull parallel to her was the minesweeper Bittern; tied to her hul
l was the minesweeper USS Quail, and finally tied next to her was the submarine
rescue vessel USS Pigeon. The USS Quail, Bittern, and Pigeon were all in the yar
d to complete various repairs and refit work. Crews worked hard the past two day
s to reassemble Quail's engines and complete other repairs. On the morning of th
e 10th the Quail was nearly ready; her engines were being tested but there was l
ittle ammo on board. The USS Pigeon had entered the yard for quick repair work,
particularly on her steering gear which had been damaged a few days earlier duri
ng a storm when she was escorting the Oahu and Luzon from Shanghai. The Bittern
had her engines still partially disassembled and much other work was needed to g
et the sweeper ready for the sea. It was estimated it would take several days be
fore she was ready to get under way. The USS Otus had arrived at Cavite that mor
ning from Mariveles in order to complete conversion from a merchant vessel to a
destroyer tender and it was moored at the end of Machina Wharf. She weighed 5,70
0 tons and was by far the largest ship in the yard that morning. Anchored a few
hundred yards south of Otus was the river gunboat Luzon. Also a few hundred yard
s from the base was the patrol yacht Isabel which was being armed with depth cha
rges. The yard tug Santa Rita was installing the equipment on the Isabel. The de
stroyers, USS Peary and USS Pillsbury were moored on either side of Central Whar
f that morning. THey had suffered damage in a collision in October and were comp
leting repairs. Pillsbury was closer to being ready to return to action, but nei
ther was operational that morning. Pillsbury had been fueled and had steam up in
her No.1 boiler to provide power for shipboard operations. Peary was in a less
ready state. She was receiving power from the Yard and her engines were being re
assembled. Her bow was still under repair and she was incapable of independent m
ovement. The submarines Sealion and Seadragon were undergoing overhaul and it wa
s viewed as urgen to complete it so they could get back out to sea. Sealion's en
gines were still disassembled but Seadragon's were assembled though work was sti
ll on going; it was planned to have her put to sea in three or four more days. A
lso in the bay were the minesweepers Finch, Tanagier, Quai, Lark, and the Whippo
rwill. The oilers Pecos and trinity were nearby as well about 40 merchant ships
in the harbor of various sizes.
Admiral Rockwell's straff received a report of approximately 50 japanese bombers
near San Fernando, flying southward toward Manila at 1230. This prompted the a
ir raid siren to be let loose at 1235. Minutes earlier, the USS Ford completed f
ueling at Sangley Point and headed east toward Manila bay for room to manuever.
At 1245, personel at the base spotted 27xType 1 Rikko of the Takao Ku flying ove
r the base south toward Nichols; which they would shortly thereafter bomb. At ar
ound 1300, 26xType 96 Rikko of the 1st Kokutai appeared from the direction of Ma
nila heading for Cavite. The formation crossed Manila Bay from the north as they
approached their target and each was armed with 12x60 kg bombs, with a few arme
d 250 kg bombs. Marines rushed to the veranda of the Marine Barracks and watched
the bombers approach. They were widely assumed to be FEAF even though anyone wh
o knew anything should have known that the FEAF did not have in operation even h
alf that number of bombers. Before anything was done, the 1st Kokutai began bomb
ing the naval base. As they were flying at 23,000 ft they were safe from AA fire
or intercepting fighters and so each Chutai would carefully line up their bombi
ng runs individually. It was only when the bombs began to be dropped did the mar
ines and civilians alike realize it was a Japanese air raid.
Before the bombers arrived, the 3rd Kokutai arrived at the scene and began their
strafing runs in the bay against Patrol Wing 10 which was attempting to take of
f; their casualties will be mentioned in a different section. Essentially, of 4x
PBY-4 in the bay, two were crippled while defensive fire from a Lewis gun manage

d to shoot down a Reisen. On its first pass, the 1st Ku did not drop any bombs;
at 1302 they were directly over Sangley Point. The various 3 inch AA batteries
opened up, though it was ineffective as their range was about 15,000 to 16,000 f
t but the 1st kokutai was flying at over 24,000 ft. The 1st Ku swung around for
another pass without dropping its bombs. Under Lieutenant Commander Ozaki, the 1
st Kokutai broke up into its three Chutai to make individual bombing passes as t
he naval base was too narrow for a mass formation to drop its bombs at once. One
Chutai approached from the east and dropped its first bombs before 1314. Many o
f these first bombs struck the water in Canacao Bay between Sangley and Cavite.
However, enough bombs hit the base to begin the process of destruction.Battery E
on top the Naval Ammunition Depot opened up as the bombs hit first on one side
of their building and then on the other. The rangefinders showed that the Japane
se bombers were flying well above the maximum altitude of the 3inch guns, howeve
r, the Marine's were ordered to fire away anyways, albeit ineffectively. Battery
A at Sangley Point ceased fire after the first Chutai began dropping its bombs.
Battery B on Carridad also tried to hit the Japanese but its 280 rounds were wa
sted. Capt.Ted Pulos commanded Battery F which had 2x.50 caliber MGs located on
the Guadalupe Pier. He ordered his men to open fire but after the initial bombin
g ordered his men to cease firing as it was an obvious waste of ammunition. Priv
ate 1st class Thomas Wetherington was killed by bomb fragments. Private first cl
ass George Sparks and Capt.John Clark were wounded. The 1st Kokutai continued to
lay the bombs onto the naval yard and the little fires raged into big fires swe
eping through the wreckage as flames engulfed the entire station. Pretty much an
y and every storehouse in the complex was destroyed in the bombing and the ensui
ng fires. Worst of all, the warehouse holding the hundreds of submarine Torpedo'
s became engulfed in flames and they began to explode sporatically. Literally th
e entire yard was set ablaze with the power plant, dispensary, repair ships, war
ehouses, barracks, and radio station recieving direct hits. The casualties were
devastating with an estimated 500 killed or seriously wounded at the base and th
e destruction of the torpedo warehouse deprived the Asiatic Fleet of over 200 to
rpedoes.
The Chutai didn't just aim for the base, they also aimed for the ships docked or
near Cavite. The Isabel was straddled by bombs that burst all around her; she c
ut the lines to the floating barge so she could get under way, while at that tim
e, the tug Santa Rita took a direct hit and immediately sank. The yacht managed
to pull away from the yard. When the first bombers appeared over the yard, USS Q
uail opened up with its 2x3" guns mountained forward of the bridge. The skippers
of Quail and USS Pigeon communicated with hand signals to each other that they
would depart as one as they were still lashed together. As soon as the lines to
USS Bittern were cut, the Quail went to full speed. They barely managed to avoid
a collission with the gunboat Luzon as it too attempted to get out of the harbo
r. They got out and then cut the lines, but they elected to head back to the nav
y yard to help rescue other ships. Meanwhile the minesweeper Whippoorwill reture
nd from a mission in the outter bay and announced its intention to go to the aid
e of other ships and try to fight fires in the yard. The Quail and Pigeon follow
ered her in through the hail of bombs and fire.
Laying immobile alongside Central Whard was destroyer Peary. Many near misses la
nded near it, but it wasn't until a third Chutai dropped its bombs was she final
ly hit. One bomb burst on the foremast, above the unarmored bridge. The entire f
orward part of the ship was showed with fragments and the mast crashed down. Bu
rning fragments set Peary's bridge afire. The pier and the USS Pillsbury were al
so set on fire from burning fragments of the bomb. The ships commanding Officer
H.H.Keith who was on the bridge was serriously wounded in both legs and XO Lt.A.
E.Gates was fatally wounded. All the men on the gun director platform above the
bridge were killed. She was covered in small fires and had shrapnel damage every
where; 5 of Peary's 8 officers were wounded (the XO mortally wounded) while of h
er enlisted men, 8 were KIA while 15 WIA. The men on USS Pillsbury began to hose
the fires on teh Peary and then the Minesweeper Whippoorwill arrived. After sev

eral attempts to pull the USS Peary from the burning wharf (which was now an inf
erno and torpedo's exploding in a wharehouse nearby added to the sense of urgenc
y), it was realized some of her lines were still connected. These were cut and t
he "Whip" was able to pull the USS Peary from the pier. She was damaged and out
of a company of roughly 130 officers and men, 23 were dead or mission and 19 wou
nded. While the USS Pillsbury was not hit, she had recieved shrapnel damage from
the USS Peary and her decks were covered with dead and wounded. In spite of the
fact that her engines were untested, she started them and pulled away from the
pier and then slowly made her way from the yard to the more open waters of the b
ay. She had suffered 2 KIA, 16 WIA, and 12 MIA. The missing men were ashore and
were most certainly killed during the bombing, as in the case of the USS Peary.
The two submarines, USS Sealion and Seadragon also took a pounding. Within the f
irst few bombing passes, 2x60 kg bombs scored direct hits on USS Sealion; one on
the conning tower and the other on the aft engine room hatch. Four sailors in t
he engine room were killed. Fragments from the bomb penetrated the conning tower
of hte nearby Seadragon and killed Ensign S.J.Hunter. Meanwhile, a lighter fill
ed with nearly 50 torpedoes was hit by a bomb and capsized spilling its weapons
into the harbor. Fires spread alogn Machina Wharf as Sealion's crew abandoned sh
ip; their submarine was sinking by the stern. On board the Seadragon, the paint
cans on her deck were now on fire, and more ominously, she was tied to the immob
ile minesweeper Bittern which had been struck by bomb fragments and was now abla
ze. The crew of both submarines were ordered ashore. Seadragon's crew had not be
en ashore long when her commander decided to get back on board his sub. When the
y arrived, the Pigeon was returning, looking to help any ship it could. It passe
d a line to Seadragon and the submarine rescue vessel lived up to its intended n
ame and towed the damaged submarine away from certain doom of the burning wharf
and ships. It was a lucky escape because just as it was towed into the channel,
a big fuel tank on the wharf exploded sending a wall of flame in a horizontal di
rection scorching the hulls of both vessels. The Pigeon helped it reach open wat
ers; from here the Seadragon made for the sub tender Canopus lying camouflaged a
longside the Manila City waterfront. The USS Sealion, meanwhile, had been sunk.
Meanwhile, the USS Quail returned and helped the burning Bittern. With much effo
rt, a line was attached to Bittern and it was pulled clear and taken out into th
e bay. She was badly damaged, but it would never be an active ship again. Beside
s her damage, much of her machinery had been ashore and was now destroyed by the
bombs and fires. Otus managed to gain power and get underway, though some of he
r crew were ashore. A total of 2 officers and 6 men of her crew were wounded.
Around the time the 1st Kokutai was finishing its bomb runs, the three Chutai of
the Takao Kokutai that was to bomb Del Carmen arrived over Cavite. Heavy cloud
coverage had obscured their vision and so they now went after shipping in the Ma
nila area. They dropped salvo after salvo, but only managed to score a hit on US
freighter SS Sagoland (5334 tons) which crippled and eventually sunk her with u
nknown casualties. After this, the Takao Ku unloaded their remaining bombs onto
the already burning Cavite. While Sangley Point was close, it was spared from de
struction with only a few bombs landing in the vicinity. The Japanese had droppe
d aproximately 450 bombs onto the Cavite area and had managed to *completely* de
stroy the large Cavite Naval Base with all its ammunition, equipment, spare part
s, shops, warehouses, and supplies. Precise casualty figures are impossible to f
igure, but its estimated over 500 people were killed or wounded in the bombing.
For no casualties of their own, the 1st Ku and Takao Ku managed to sink the subm
arine USS Sealion, freighter SS Sagoland, and tug Santa Rita. Damaged with a dir
ect hit was destroyer USS Peary while Submarine USS Seadragon and Destroyer USS
Pillsbury were damaged by bomb fragments. They managed to cripple Minesweeper US
S Bittern which would never return to service. The 3rd Kokutai which strafed the
bay had managed to cripple P-5 and P-28 while two other PBYs managed to escape.
Also managing to escape were 4xKingfisher seaplanes. For their strafing attack,
one reisen of the 3rd Ku was visably shot down and crashed into the bay in flam
es.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Patrol Wing 10 Operations

At 0500, 3xPBY-4 take off from Manila Bay, fanning out over patrol secto
rs that swept East to West across the seas north of Luzon. Al Gray covered the l
eft sector, Clarence Keller had the center, and Leslie Pew had the right sector.
At 0645 Nick Keller and his copilot Andy Reid found the Japanese. They knew the
y were close at 0630 when they saw a recon seaplane below them, then 15 minutes
later they saw what htey thought were two battleships, a heavy cruiser, and four
destroyers. What Keller had found was Vice Admiral Ito Takahashi's North Philip
pine Cover Force with Heavy Cruisers Maya and Ashigara; light cruiser Kuma; dest
royers Matsukaze and Asakaze. For some reason, as Reid was going to make the rep
ort, Keller told him no. He believed they were the British Repulse and Prince of
Whales. They notified Patwing-10 nevertheless about the sightings, and then con
tinued patrol northward. However, 30 minutes after sending the report, Capt.Wagn
er ordered them to fly back over the squadron of ships and "make MO's", two dash
es followed by three dashes, sent continuously for other planes to home in on. T
hirty minutes later Keller's PBY approached the fleet from dead astern and a bit
off to starboard. Banking the PBY, Keller cut across the stern of the last ship
in line. As he passed astern a distance of about 7000 yds at 50 ft altitude (wh
y not stay super high fucking idiot!?) the Japanese ships open fire with AA and
flak beings bursting all around them about 200 yds astern. The ships soon began
firing at the water below them hoping the water spout would knock the plane out
of the air. The PBY was under fire for 3 minutes before Keller climbed to 2500 f
t and ducked into some cumulus clouds. He then sent contact report, "1 KUMA CLAS
S CL 4DDS 2 KONGO CLASS BBS POSITION 6-40X8-10 COURSE 180 SPEED 10." The message
was recieved by Patwing10 at 0800 and Wagner ordered Peterson's Los Banos attac
k group to attack the target. The five PBY's were already gassed up and armed wi
th 4x500 lb bombs when the decision was made to change to torpedoes. After 45 mi
nutes, Petersons 5xPBY had been rearmed with torepdo's and were readying for tak
eoff when they were again ordered to change back to bombs! Finally, at 0910 the
5xPBY-4 armed with bombs take off from Laguna de Bay, swung out over Mariveles a
nd settled on a course 310 degrees true. At 1050 they picked up Keller's MOs and
at 1105 they changed course to 328 degrees homing in on the signal. Keller, mea
nwhile had been tracking the Japanese ships for over 3 hours and everyone was wo
ndering where the bombing group was. Suddenly, Keller observed 8 floatplanes rap
idly climbing toward the PBY. The floatplanes are unknown origin. The only seapl
ane carrier around was the Sanuki Maru and it was at Camiguin Island north of Ap
ari with 6 operational Type 95 recon seaplanes and 2 in reserve. It may have bee
n the Takahashi's force launched all seven of their recon seaplanes: 2xType 0, 4
xType 95, and 1xType 94 recon seaplanes. Either way, Keller dove into the cloud,
performing a maneuver that would shortly become a standard defensive tactic for
PBY pilots. He would keep an eye on the fleet while dodging into cloud after cl
oud. With the large amount of G forces exerted on it, their radio antenae snappe
d off and the circuit shorted out creating a fire within the hull near the tunne
l gun. Smoke and flames filled the after part of the plane. Ed Bedford jumped up
from his radio set, grabbed a CO2 bottle, and emptied the contents on the fire
putting the fire out. Switching to an emergency antenna, Bedford again started p
ounding out MOs.
At that moment, Petersons five PBY arrived over the Japanese ships about 10 mile
s away. They also spotted the Japanese seaplanes 9000 ft below them. Peterson le

d his group up to 15,000 ft to start their bombing run. The ships were making 23
knots and zig-zagging with the PBYs approaching from their starboard beam. Pete
rson led his group 360 degrees around and headed for the largest cruiser in the
center; they would be bombing out of the sun. As Peterson's PBY's approached, th
e Japanese opened up with AA. According to the report, at 1205 the PBYs unloaded
their 20x500 lb bombs in a salvo at one of the cruisers in the center of the fo
rmation. The planes dove into the clouds and scattered as the Japanese floatplan
es attempted to intercept. Peterson circled around to observe the results: the p
attern was good but all the bombs missed by about 25 yds astern. Three bombs hit
very close on the port quarter about 20 ft away and one burst 15 ft astern. How
ever, none of the Japanese ships were hit and if there was any damage, it would
have been minor superficial damage, nothing that could bring down their combat e
ffectiveness. The cruiser Ashigara was observed turning continuously in a circle
after the bombing; it may have been that the concussion caused temporary damage
to her rudder control, but it would have been quickly repaired. Five miles aste
rn from the japanese ships the planes met back up and at 1230 Peterson sent the
message, "ATTACK COMPLETED." Capt.Wagner was uncertain as to what this meant, bu
t nevertheless ordered two of Petersons PBY's to relieve Keller's patrol and he
would ready another five PBY's for a second attack.
The second 5 plane bombing run ran into major problems from the start. Robert Sn
yder and William Jones were flying P-12 when they came across an unidentified fr
eighter. They bombed it and claimed to have hit it leaving it dead in the water
and listing. They were recalled shortly after the attack. As Snyder was coming i
n to land at Laguna de Bay, a 3rd Kokutai pilot intercepted them and remained un
seen by the crew. He attacked from below and behind only opening fire from point
blank range hitting the hull, wings, and engines. The plane shuddered, black sm
oke belched from both engines, and she exploded. None of the crewmembers survive
d. The other four planes were at Sangley base and had been rearmed each with 2x5
00 lb bombs on one wing and a torpedo on the other wing. As they were starting t
heir takeoff runs, the Japanese arrived over Cavite naval base. Before the 1st K
okutai was bombing the naval base reisen of the 3rd Ku began to strafe targets i
n the harbor. Ensign McConnell's P-28 had just taken off when a shotai descended
onto his plane and opened fire. His plane was immediately heavily damaged with
one engine dead and gasoline spewing from the wings. Flying at treetop level, he
staggered to Laguna de Bay where he put the crippled plane down as fast as he c
ould. Harmon Utter's P-5 was barely airborne at Sangley when a shotai of reisen
attacked his plane. 20mm shells began exploding in the hull with control cables
getting shot away and plexiglas panels glazed. One of the reisen flew past the P
BY and the bow gunner with his .30 caliber gun claimed to have seen his tracers
hit the plane and watched it crash into the bay. Another reisen came in from the
front firing at him; shot up the starboard engine knocking it out and puncturin
g the fuel tanks. Fuel ran from the wings and oil poured from the starboard engi
ne. The plane barely above the water slapped down onto the water and the Japanes
e pilots figured they had destroyed the plane. At that time, 3xJ2F "Ducks" and a
OS2U "Kingfisher" took off from the base to get away and made for Laguna de Bay
. A fourth J2F flown by Don Chay was almost caught on the water when his engine
refused to start. At the last second as the reisen began to arrive, his engine s
tarted and he took off and flew at treetop level to safety at Laguna de Bay. The
remaining PBY in the harbor had better luck. Robinson and Burgess were in their
PBY when reisen arrived over the bay. Their engine would not start; since they
looked like they were dead in the water the Japanese pilots ignored his plane. T
hey got on the wing and cranked the engines to start later on and then took off.
They met up with the other PBY that had taken off in time and avoided the Japan
ese, Lt.Cmdr.Clayton Mary and Georrge Webber. They flew to the last known locati
on of Takahashi's task force but failed to locate the cruiser.
Patrol Wing 10 had come out of the Japanese raid a lot better than they could ha
ve. On this day, plane P-12 was shot down by a reisen over Laguna de Bay with th
e loss of its whole crew and two PBY-4 caught in the water at Sangley Base were

badly shot up. P-28 had landed at Laguna de Bay and it was prematurely written o
ff while P-5 could be repaired. McConnell and his crew looked P-28 over once the
y had landed and noted the shot up engine, leaking fuel tanks, and watching wate
r rising in the bilge; they concluded the plane was a total loss. Stripping it o
f guns and other useful equipment, they destroyed the bomb-sight and slashed the
electrical cables in the two junction boxes behind the pilots seat. They then l
eft P-28 to her fate and returned to land. Utter and Robert's P-5 was a mess at
Cavite. One engine was shot out, some control cables had been shot away, the hul
l was full of holes, and fuel was dropping from both wings. Nevertheless, they m
anaged to taxi from Fortune Island, about 29 miles SW of Corregidor, to a cove o
n southern Luzon. Working all night, they patched up their wreck and flew it bac
k to Cavite the next day. Since Cavite was now untentable, they were sent down t
o Laguna de Bay. Sangley point was spared the destruction; a few scattered bombs
hit the seaplane base but no serious damage was inflicted. Overhaul hangar X-34
was superficially damaged with shrapnel holes, but the two PBY in there were fi
ne; in fact P-13 would be ready to fly the next day. Captain Wagner wishing to a
void the destruction of the wing, dispersed the flying boats at Los Banos in Lag
una de Bay and Olongapo on Subic Bay. Some PBY's would still operate from Manila
Bay, but only on an as-needed bases. He then moved his HQ aboard the tender USS
Childs. At 1500 Petersons attack group landed at Los Bantos. Meanwhile, P-3 whi
ch had at the start of the war had flown Admiral Glassford to his HQ was operati
ng off Mindanao. It was ordered ot join the Preston at Polloc Harbor. While on p
atrol, Campbell and Armbruster spotted a Japanese Type 97 Kawanishi of the Toko
Kokutai performing recon. They reported the contact and returned to Polloc harbo
r. The USS Preston after the Malalag Bay incident two days prior, was not taking
any changes and was evacuating this staging area. After the other planes had le
ft, however, Campbell's plane refused to start! He attempted a one engine takeof
f but he was unable to get airborne. He taxied to a sheltered area, threw out an
anchor, radioed ComPatWing that he needed a new carburetor and set down to wait
.
Morale was still high in Patrol Wing 10. They knew the Japanese had landed to th
e north and that the FEAF had taken a huge beating over the past 3 days, but the
y believed that any day the Pacific Fleet would arrive and beat the shit out of
the Japanese. They did not comprehend the thought that withint a few days they w
ould be forced to evacuate the Philippines. After three days of operations, they
had lost P-4 and P-7 at Malalag Bay to Type 96 kansen from light Carrier Ryujo
on 8 December. They had also lost P-12 to a Reisen near Los Bantos by a member o
f the 3rd Ku on 10 December. P-21 had been heavily damaged by friendly fire on
the 9th and P-5 and P-28 had been badly shot up in Manila Bay on the 10th and we
re temporarily out of action (P-28 was abandoned, but would be repaired later on
). P-3 was having engine problems at Polloc Bay and was not operational and two
other PBY-4 were undergoing overhaul at Sangley Point. This left only 19xPBY-4 o
perational in the squadron.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Aftermath
The American air counterattacks at Vigan and Aparri inflicted minor dama
ge on the Japanese. Two strikes of 12xP-40E each at Vigan had inflicted hardly a
ny damage if any at all on the invasion fleet and landing force. The 34th Pursui
t managed to get 12xP-35A in the air with a thirteenth being worked on. During f
light four had to turn back to Del Carmen due to mechanical issues while a fifth
's engines shut off and crashed with the pilot surviving leaving only seven to m
ake the strafing attacks. Sam Marett's plane managed to sink minesweeper W-10 ki
lling 79 sailors and wounding 17 others. However, the explosion knocked his wing

off and his plane crashed into the ocean killing Marett. The other strafing pla
nes managed to set afire Army transport Oigawa Maru wounding 16 including the ca
ptain. The six P-35A returned to base. One P-40E piloted by Sheppard was flying
with another unidentified P-40 when he intercepted a shotai of the 8th Hiko Sent
ai. The ensuing action shot down a Ki-48 and heavily damaged another, but as a r
esult he was shot down. The 24th Sentai claims to have intercepted and shot down
a P-40 over Vigan, though this claim is suspect and unverifiable. Meanwhile the
19th Bombardment Group launched 5xB-17D from Clark to bomb Japanese ships. At V
igan they managed to land a hit on Takao Maru setting her on fire while at Aparr
i they managed to land a bomb on minesweeper W-19 forcing it to beach itself; it
was given up as a total loss. Light Cruiser Natori suffers very light damage fr
om a near miss and a destroyer Harukaze also recieves light damage from a near m
iss. Colin Kelly's B-17C is intercepted by Tainan Ku Reisen and is shot down nea
r Clark while a second B-17 is heavily damaged by 50th Sentai Ki-27b but manages
to land at San Marcelino. It would eventually fly back to Del Monte, too damage
d to be included in air operations. The plane would then make for Australia wher
e it was used for spare parts. A third B-17 attempts to land at Del Monte due to
the Japanese raids but runs out of fuel and ditches at sea. The Kuma and Tanaka
Shitai both capture their respective airfields without ground resistance. Meanw
hile, Patrol Wing 10 launches a 5 plane bombing raid against the Northern Philip
pine Cover Force but all 20x500 lb bombs miss.
The 3rd Kokutai arrives over Nichols airbase and Manila Bay with 34 reisen while
the Tainan Kokutai arrives over Clark and Del Carmen with 18 Reisen while anoth
er 16reisen arrive over Vigan to aid in covering it. On the ground at Del Carmen
several Shotai strafe the airfield for 20 minutes and completely destroy 7xP-35
A on the ground while heavily damaging 3 others. The five remaining P-35A are un
operational due to mechanical problems and so the 34th Pursuit no longer has any
fighters to fly. The three chutai of Takao Ku bombers abandoned their raid over
Del Carmen due to clouds coverage and switched to secondary target of shipping
in Manila Bay. Of the four pursuit groups, the total days operations including c
ombat losses and operational losses resulted in a loss of 23xP-40E on this day l
eaving only 28xP-40; of which six were damaged and required maintenance. The Tai
nan Kokutai lost a reisen over Del Carmen and a second crash lands off Formosan
coast due to damage inflicted by a fighter. The 3rd Kokutai suffered two reisen
shot down and not more than 16 others damaged to varying degrees; one shot down
by Don Steele while another shot down by P-5's defensive fire. The 3rd Kokutai m
anaged to shoot down a PBY-4 with its whole crew over Los Bantos and further sho
t up two others in Manila Bay knocking them out of action. The 1st Kokutai bombe
d the fuck out of Cavite naval base completely destroying everything in it; all
the overhaul stations were gone as well as the Torpedo storehouses and all the s
pare parts within the facility were fucked. The 1st Kokutai landed two bombs on
submarine Sealion sinking it and a massive amount of casualties were inflicted w
hen the base went up. Three Chutai of the Takao Ku were to bomb Del Carmen but a
s it was obscured by clouds, they instead flew over the Manila area and bombed s
hipping in the harbor only managing to sink a 5000 ton freighter SS Sagoland. An
other three Chutai of the Takao Ku bomb Nichols field and destroy many ground fa
cilities and pot mark the airfield with bomb craters. The 14th Hiko Sentai took
off with at least 8xKi-21 from Choshu as instructed and attempted to bomb Del Ca
rmen. Just as with the Takao Ku, clouds obscured the field and so it flew to Iba
airbase and bombed the deserted airfield, though this was unnoticed by the Amer
icans due to the more noticable air raids. Some of the bomber formations flew ou
t via the north channel between the island fortress of Corregidor and hte southe
rn tip of Bataan. The 60th Coast Artillery fired several hundred 3 inch rounds a
nd claimed to have shot down one of the bombers. This didn't occur, however, app
arently some of the bombers were heavily damaged by the AA fire. The total loss
of the Rikkos is as follows: 1xType 1 Rikko of Takao Ku makes forced landing at
Vigan air strip due to engine trouble, another Type 1 Rikko makes a forced landi
ng in southern Formosa, and 2xType 96 Rikko ditch near their home base due to ad
verse weather conditions; all crews were rescued. The Sanuki Maru set up a seapl

ane base at Camiguin Island and launched its 6xType 95 recon seaplanes to cover
the Aparri landings, however, the waters were so rough that upon landing, all si
x seaplane were damaged beyond repair and the seaplane base was abandoned. In th
e evening, the first shotai of the 50th Sentai landed at Aparri airfield.
Casualties Recieved
24th Pursuit Group: 23xP-40 destroyed (o
perational losses and Combat losses)
13xP-35A destroyed/d
amaged (no operational P-35s at end of day)
19th Bombardment Group: 3xB-17 destroyed
(operational losses and combat losses)
2xB-17 damaged
2nd Observation Squadron: Most O-52 and
O-46 destroyed
Patrol Wing 10: 1xPBY-4 destroyed (P-12
shot down by 3rd Ku; no survivors)
3xPBY's crippled (P-5 an
d P-28 shot up in Manila Bay and are unoperational. P-3 had engine trouble)
PAAC: 5xStearman trainers destroyed on M
aniquis field
2xB-10B bombers destroyed on Maniq
uis Field
Keystone ZB-3A bomber destroyed at
Zablan field
Beechcraft D-18 transport destroye
d at Zablan field
Boeing P-12E fighter destroyed at
Zablan field
Tainan Kokutai: FPO1c Masaharu Higa shot
down
4xreisen damaged (1 ditc
hing off formosa coast. The pilot is rescued)
3rd Kokutai: FPO1c Tokiharu Tezuka shot
down
FPO2c Tamotsu Kojima shot d
own
12xreisen damaged.
*The Tainan Ku and 3rd Ku suffer
a collective 16 reisen damaged to varying degrees*
1st Kokutai: 2xType 96 Rikko ditch in ba
shi straight. Crews are rescued
Takao Kokutai: 1xType 1 Rikko makes emer
gency landing at Vigan arifield
1xType 1 Rikko crash-land
s in southern formosa; crew survives.
8th Sentai: 1xKi-48 shot down

1xKi-48 heavily damaged

Sanuki Maru hiko buntai: 6xType 95 recon
seaplanes destroyed while landing off Camiguin island
Operational planes at en
d of 10 December
24th Pursuit Group: 22xP-40 operational
and 6xP-40 requiring repair
19th Bombardment Group: 12xB-17 operatio
nal and 3 requiring repair
Patrol Wing 10: 19xPBY-4 Operational
4xJ3F "Ducks" Operationa
l
5xOS2U "Kingfisher" Oper
ational
3xSOC "Seagul" Operation
al
Phillipines Army Air Force: est. 12xP-26
A operational
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------11 December
The weather over Taiwan was very poor on the eleventh and so the bombing
raid was cancelled just as it was on the 9th. For the 24th Pursuit Group, with
only 22 operational P-40's at the moment, orders were given to the pilots to avo
id air combat with the Japanese in an attempt to preserve their precious little
air strength. In addition, the remaining fighters were to be employed for reconn
aisance since the 2nd Observation Squadron's O-46's and O-52's had by now been d
estroyed or damaged. None of the pilots were thrilled with this, but orders were
orders. The scattered P-40's were grouped 10 at Clark and 12 at Nichols. Flying
orders were to be issued directly from the FEAF. The first pilot back was Grant
Mahony. After landing at 7:25AM on Nielson strip he reported negative Japanese
activity in the SW of Luzon and the west coast of Mindoro to the south. Forty Fi
ve minutess later, Bob Hanson reported no Japanese vessels observed 30 miles nor
th of Lingayen Gulf to Subic Bay. The Clark based fighters would be flying recon
over Vigan and Aparri. At 9:30 George Amrstrong was ordered to fly to Aparri to
observe the quantity and types of Japanese vessels in the area and he was order
ed to fly at high altitude and avoid combat. He took off at 10:47. An hour later
, another pilot from his recon over Vigan reported seeing 5 small transports and
one large one as well as a naval vessel (cruiser Naka) and three destroyers. Th
e surveillance of Japanese vessels continued into the afternoon. At 2:25 a missi
on was ordered to reconnoiter Aparri again. Russel Church went over and landed a
t 7:05 that evening and reported 6 transports and 10 small and three larger nava
l craft. FEAF ordered new missions to be undertaken at daybreak the next day aga
inst Aparri and Vigan. For all intents and purposes, the various pursuit squadro
ns no longer existed; only a conglomerated group of pilots that had all be offic
ially ceased their unit identities as they pooled planes and pilots. The 11th wa
s quiet for the men of the FEAF. However, the B-17s based at Clark on this day f
ell back to Del Monte on Mindanao; no longer would the 19th Bombardment Group at
tempt to use Clark as a forward operating base. They could muster a total of 16x

B-17s at Del Monte, with one on Cebu due to damage it suffered the previous day.
The Clark B-17s had been repaired and now the base was vaccant of bombers. At N
ichols, the pilots flying reconnaissance missions were living under better condi
tions than those living in the jungle at Clark; they were also eating well at th
e Army and Navy Club in Manila. Members of the 3rd Pursuit who had been at Iba o
n the 8th also began arriving at Nichols on this day after a strenuous trek thro
ugh the jungle/mountains having fled Iba following the Japanese bombing.
The same bad weather that would hamper the navy also hampered the 5th Hiko Shida
n on this day. An element of the 24th Sentai that had landed at Vigan the previo
us day flew cover over the field while other elements of the squadron flew to Vi
gan. In addition to this, however, the 8th Sentai flew 22 sorties of ground supp
ort action for the Kanno shitai in its drive southward. Commander of the 5th Hik
o Shidan issued Operations Order A, No.139 which read: "The 4th hikodan HQ from
Heito to Aparri 14-15, 8th Hiko Sentai from Kato to Aparri, the 3 light bomber s
quadrons to make the move during the period 15-16 and the Headquarters reconnais
sance squadron to move during hte period 18-19; the 16th Hiko Sentai after movin
g to Aparri on the 12th and 13th, was to move to Vigan on the 16th and 17th; the
15th Hiko Sentai after moving to Aparri on the 12th and 13th, was to advance to
Vigan on the 15th and 16th. The 24th Hiko Sentai was to move to Vigan on the 12
th. The 52nd Squadron after moving to Vigan on the 13th was to advance to Laoag
on the 15th and 16th; the 74th squadron was to move to Vigan on the 15th and 16t
h." The Army air force would have organized its logistics for these movements in
support of the southward drive of the Tanaka and Kanno detachments and prepare
themselves to eventually cover the main landing at Lingayen Gulf. On this day, a
total of 34 Ki-27b from the 24th and 50th Sentai landed at Aparri airfield, hav
ing staged at Basco island. In the afternoon, 18xKi-27b from the 24th Sentai fle
w from Aparri to Vigan airfield for their planned operations.
Just like the rest of the Philippine front, the 11th was a quiet day for Patrol
Wing 10. P-3 which remained stranded at Polloc bay after the USS Preston had dep
arted the previous day, simply waited at anchor as the crew performed maintenanc
e and cleaned the weapons; they were still waiting for the carberator. However,
even on this quiet day, Patrol Wing 10 still managed to lose a PBY. John Ogle an
d Bob Swenson had made a single engine emergency landing on Laguna de Bay and we
re taxiing toward Los Banos. As they were taxiing, a single Type 97 Kawanishi ap
peared above them and unloaded its bombs and strafed the PBY. The bombs landed f
ar above them creating a lot of noise, but the strafing bullets completely chewe
d up the salvagable engine making it useless. With only one engine and the other
unable to be prepared, P-2 was useless for Patwing10 now. The wing now had only
18 planes in commission.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------12 December
Significant to the air war and ground war was the Japanese landing at Le
gaspi, South East of Manila. The South Cover Force after raiding Malalag Bay on
8 December split up. Light Carrier Ryujo; Heavy cruisers Myoko and Nachi; destro
yers Shiokaze and Yukikaze sailed and met up with the Legaspi Invasion Force. Li
ght Cruiser Nagara led Heavy cruiser Haguro; seaplane carriers Chitose and Mizuh
o; destroyers Kawakaze, Suzukaze, Umikaze, Yamakaze, Tokitsukaze; Minesweepers W
-7 and W-8; minelayer Aotaka; Submarine chasers Kyo Maru, Kyo maru #13 and Toko
Maru; minecraft tender Ikushima Maru; transports Myoken Maru, Matsumoto Maru, Sh

inryu Maru, and Yamafuku Maru; Army transports Haruna Maru, Myoko Maru, Shinaoga
wa Maru, and Yasukawa Maru; and oiler Hayamoto. On the 11th planes from Ryujo fl
ew over the target area guarding it and flying recon and in the early morning of
the twelth the Kure 1st SNLF detachment (575 men) along with the Army's Kimura
Detachment landed at Legaspi and quickly captured the area without a fight. It c
onsisted of the 33rd Infantry (less I Battalion) of the 16th Division; 4th Compa
ny of the 22nd Mountain Gun regiment with 4xType 94 7.5cm mountain guns, and a c
ompany of the 16th Engineer Regiment less a platoon.
Early in the morning, the 3rd Pursuit was ordered by FEAF HQ to move int
o de la Salle College in Manila where the squadron would be regrouped and reorga
nized having been scattered over the last several days. The order was also given
to the 21st Pursuiters who had remained behind at Nichols after most of hte squ
adron had been placed at Clark. Meanwhile, the 5th Hiko Shidan began to carry ou
t the first of its unit transfers to the Philippines to bring their air units to
the front lines. The 24th Sentai was by this time arrived at Aparri and its pla
nes took off and landed at the Vigan air strip where it would be posted. The 50t
h Sentai began transfering some of its units to Aparri airfield where it would b
e able to cover the 8th Sentai as it flew cover missions for the southward advan
cing Tanaka shitai. Also, the 16th Sentai began to transfer its first units to A
parri.
At 6:15 AM, Buzz Wagner of the 17th Pursuit took off from Clark field to fly rec
onnaisance over Aparri. Running into a heavy overcast at 5000 ft, he turned on h
is oxygen and climbed to 16,000 ft. He flew by instruments alone for 200 miles a
nd broke through at 8000 ft about 10 minutes north of Aparri right over two Japa
nese destroyers. They immediately threw up an AA barrage at Wagner and he nosed
down and dived to within a few feet of the water and swung inland several miles.
As he approached Aparri flying into the sun, he noticed tracer fire streak past
him. He looked behind him and seen 2xKi-27 behind him and then 3 more overhead.
He nosed up and continued to climb into the sun at full throttle. He managed to
lose the two fighters doing this and then went into a half barrel roll onto the
ir tails fromhis upper position and attacked them from the rear. They were flyin
g in close formation and he shot them both down in flames. He was then over Apar
ri airport and reported seeing 12xKi-27 on the ground. Wagner strafed the airfie
ld making two passes and reported seeing 5 of the fighters on fire after he was
finished. As he pulled up from his second pass, he seen the 3xKi-27 coming in fr
om behind after him. He dove for treetop level and gunned the engine quickly out
distancing them and heading back to Clark. If his observations were accurate, wh
ich they plausibly are, Buzz Wagner managed to shoot down 2xKi-27 and destroy an
other 5 on the ground; all belonging to the 50th Hiko Sentai. The entire unit wa
s not yet based at Aparri but a large section of it had only just arrived; eithe
r the evening before or just that morning.
That same morning at 6:40, the USAFFE was notified that the Japanese had come as
hore at Legaspi. The higher ups discussed making a B-17 attack against the Japan
ese landing force, but it did not materialize. However, two pilots at Nichols fi
eld were selected to make an attack. They were to dive bomb the Legaspi-Manila r
ailroad terminus and thus, it was hoped slow the Japanese progress north to Mani
la. Grant Mahony and Bob Hanson were selected for this mission. Hanson's P-40 wa
s not equipped with bomb racks so he was responsible for flying cover for Mahony
. When they arrived over the target, Mahony bombed and strafed the target area i
n several passes as Hanson guarded him overhead. After Mahony was out of ammunit
ion, Hnason dove down through the thick AA fire and strafed the newly occupied a
irstrip wrecking some equipment and scattering troops. He then attacks transport
s and the various landing craft unloading troops flying so low that some troops
jumped into the water. He then noticed a Type 97 Kawanishi attempting to take of
f from the water under cover from a nearby destroyer. He shot it down as it lift
ed off and then targeted the destroyer claiming to have strafed one of its AA gu
ns out of commission. On this day members of the 24th Pursuit were ordered to us

e their destroyed aircraft as decoys which was a succesful tactic. Taking spare
parts from damaged and destroyed fighters, the 20th Pursuit managed to make oper
ational 2xP-40B on this day bringing the number of P-40s on Clark on this day to
five.
Japanese actions
Following the seizure of Legaspi and Daraga airport, supplies were unloa
ded and workers began to make the airfield usable for navy planes. Meanwhile, th
e Tanaka shitai that landed at Aparri was ordered to seize Tuguegarao airfield s
ince the Aparri airfield was smaller and more primitive than expected. They acco
mplished this task shortly after 5AM without enemy resistance. At aproximately 8
AM members of the Kanno Shitai that landed at Vigan occupied Laoag airfield, whi
ch was also captured without resistance. At 1800 the commander issued 5th hiko s
hidan operational order A, No.141 covering the air activities of the group for t
he following day. Protect the Tanaka and Kanno Shitai and the advance airfields
and ordered the annihilation of the remaining American aircraft. With the captur
e of Tuguegarao airfield, it was decided that the 16th Sentai would base there.
With the weather cleared up, the Imperial Naval air forces could once again, giv
e their heavy raids against the Americans.The 1st Ku took off with all four Chut
ai with 36xType 96 Rikko led by Lt.Masami Matsumoto, which departed at first lig
ht. The 1st and 2nd Chutai were to bomb Clark while the 3rd and 4th Chutai were
to bomb Iba. The Kanoya Ku, which was left out of the 10 December attacks, was a
ble to participate in raids this time. Three chutai of 27xType 1 Rikko led by Lt
.Cmdr.Irisa was also to bomb Iba. The Takao Ku launched two formations of three
Chutai each to bomb Batangas airfield; first formation was led by Lt.Cmdr.Nonaka
while the second formation of 25xType 1 Rikko was led by Lt.Adachi. As escorts,
the Tainan Ku despatched 29 reisen and a Type 98 recon plane under Shingo's com
mand to Clark to protect the 1st and 2nd Chutai of 1st Ku. while Lt.Seto's 2nd C
hutai which was led by another Type 98 recon plane was to strafe Subic Bay, wher
e Patrol Wing 10 flying boats were stationed. The 3rd Ku led by Lt.Takeo Kurosaw
a sent a formation of 25 reisen to Manila area led by a Type 98 recon plane to s
trafe targets of opportunity throughout the area and provide general escort for
the Takao Ku bombers.
Seto's Chutai while flying toward Subic bay, happened upon seven PBY-4s flying,
and covertly followed them back to their base; they landed at Olongapo bay where
Patrol Wing 10 head a base set up. Shortly after landing, Seto led his Chutai d
own and with only a few passes, happened to set all seven on fire. A good victor
y for the Tainan Ku! Seto reported they left four burning and three others damag
ed; in reality all were destroyed. The main formation of reisen under Shingo arr
ived over Clark and found it covered by dense clouds. Its unknown if any reisen
strafed there, however, 1st Chutai under Shingo made for Iba where the nine pilo
ts made strafing attacks claiming three Curtiss fighters burned and three more d
estroyed on the ground. In reality no operational aircraft were at Iba as it was
all but abandoned as a air base. Some of the ground personnel that had not yet
abandoned the field opened fire with small arms including the lewis machineguns
and managed to damage Saburo Sakai's reisen, which obliged him to make an emerge
ncy landing at Vigan. After repairs, he was able to fly back to Formosa the next
day. The third Chutai of the Tainan Ku, meanwhile, flew to Tarlac airfield from
Clark, but discovered there were no aircraft there. Meanwhile, the two Chutai o
f the 1st Ku arrived over Clark. The heavy cloud cover forced the Rikko to drop
altitude to fly below the clouds in order to make their bombing runs. This made
the Rikko vulnerable to the Marine Battalion AA gunners with their 9x3 inch AA g
uns. The resulting ground fire damaged several Rikko; one piloted by Harada was
hit in the engine and made a forced landing east of Clark where his crew was cap
tured. The bombs didn't inflict any more serious damage as Clark was already bom
bed to hell.

The Kanoya Ku along with the 3rd and 4th Chutai of the 1st Ku made their bombing
runs against Iba cleaningly, though, the base was pretty much abandoned as it h
ad been completely destroyed, so no additional damage was inflicted. Presumably,
the Japanese weren't aware that the base was no longer being used. Meanwhile, t
he Takao Ku was arriving over Batangas airfield with their 52xType 1 Rikko escor
ted by 25 reisen. Earlier that morning, Lt.Ceaser Basa lifted off from Batangas
airfield in his P-26 for a recon mission around Luzon. Upon recieving warning of
the incoming bombers, Capt.Jesus Villamor took off from Batangas, leading Lieut
enants Manuel Conde, Geronimo Aclan, Alberto Aranzaso, Godofredo Juliano and Ant
onio Mondigo in an attempt to intercept the bombers. Contrary to what Villamor a
nd many other websites and sources claim, there were no Type 96 Rikko above Bata
ngas. In addition, the Takao Ku was flying at high altitude which was above the
normal operational ceiling of the P-26A, which the 6th Pursuit Squadron was equi
pped with. Captain Villamor rose up trying to intercept the bombers while his th
ree other pilots tangled with the 3rd Kokutai. The reisen manage to shoot down M
ondigo and he bails out. Allegedly (something I am skeptical of) the 3rd Ku atte
mpted to strafe Mondigo in his parachute, but Lt.Juliano intervense and dives at
any reisen attempting to strafe Mondigo. Lieutenant Gozar is shot down and kill
ed, and Juliano's P-25A is riddled with bullets while Aclan's is also heavily da
maged, having to make a forced landing at Maniquis airfield. In addition, Lt.Bas
a returning to Batangas from his patrol, is intercepted by reisen and killed. Th
e 6th Pursuit claims to have shot down two reisen and one Type 96 Rikko, though,
no Japanese aircraft were lost over Batangas on this day. For their action, the
6th Pursuit lost 2xP-26A shot down (Basa KIA) and two others put out of commiss
ion with damage. After the raid, the three remaining airworthy P-26A of the squa
dron evacuate Batangas and Zablan to Langilang Elementary Flying School field, a
nd then to La Lama field, where they would remain until 23 December. The Takao K
u begins its bombardment of Batangas and causes unknown damage. The 3rd Ku's cla
ims were: 1st Shotai (Lt.T.Hasuo, FPO1c B.Nakajima, and FPO3c S. Shoji) claim tw
o shot down; 2nd Shotai (WO K.Kubo, FPO1c F.Ohsumi, and FPO1c S.Tojiri) claimed
two shot down; 3rd Shotai (FPO1c S.Sugio, FPO2c K.Nakano, and FPO1c M.Masuyama)
claimed four shot down. The shotai certainly double claimed when they attacked a
ll together. Having escorted the rest of the bombers to safety, the 3rd kokutai'
s 2nd Chutai then made for Subic bay. Lt. Z.Miyano, FPO2c S.Okazaki, and FPO1c Z
.Matsumoto dived down and strafed the PBY's that had already been destroyed by t
he Tainan Ku and also strafed some other facilities at Olongapo. The Tainan and
3rd Ku suffered no casualties this day, while the 1st Ku suffered several bomber
s damaged from AA fire from Clark, plus one bomber shot down with its crew presu
med KIA.
Patrol Wing 10
Early in the morning, Filipino coast watchers reported five Japanese bat
tleships escorted by five destroyers headed toward Manila Bay. A second report c
ame in shortly afterwards reporting the precense of an aircraft carrier. Given t
he fleets last known location, its direction and speed, the Olongapo command est
imated the Japanese would be off Subic Bay by dawn. Acting on the information, L
t.Cmdr.Marcy ordered every PBY loaded with bombs and then led 7xPBY-4 (including
his own) on a search for the Japanese task force with two of the flying boats f
rom the previous "Kongo" raid. For four hours after their 0500 takeoff they sear
ched Mindoro to Lingayen Gulf without finding any sign of a Japanese force; the
report was entirely false actually. By 0900 the seven PBY's began landing at Olo
ngapo, taxiing to buoys or throwing out anchors. For the next hour the planes we
re refueled while the crews settled down in their planes to wait. They were stru
ng out across the water in a rough line near the seaplane ramp. At 1010, many me
mbers of Patwing10 saw several planes flying and everyone knew they were Japanes
e. However they soon flew out of sight. Everyone relaxed when shortly afterwards
AA fire erupted from Fort Drum at the entrance to Subic Bay. Immediately 5xReis
en popped up low over the hill near the entrance to the bay and swooped in low a
cross the water toward the PBY's. By then the guns in the planes opened fire, t

hough as noted awhile back in my notes, they didn't have AP rounds. Tom McCabe h
ad ordered his crew over the side of his PBY when the first run started knowing
it was suicide to stay in the plane, however McCabe elected to stay and ran towa
rd the bow gun to fire at the strafers. Within a minute or two five of the PBY's
were burning on the water while the other two put up a fight with their guns. O
ut of P-29's crew, Ensign J.C.Watson and ACMM George Seeke had been killed. Foll
owing the strafing run, 47 survivors gathered in the hangar to exchange stories.
Rumors circulated that they were attacked by German Messerschmitts and that "tw
o or three" had been shot down by the vague .50 caliber machineguns from shore.
The rumor was further authenticated in that two pilots had parachuted out and tu
rned out to be caucasian. A total of 11 crewmembers had been killed and 4 wounde
d. The serials for the planes destroyed was P-10, P-16, P-17, P-18, P-19, P-20,
and P-21.
Capt.Wagner arrived at Olongapao at 1300 to assess the situation; he quickly dec
ided that patrol operations based on Luzon were no longer tenable. Ten of his 28
PBY-4 had been destroyed since the war started just five days earlier and four
were damaged and not flyable. In spite of this, the personel losses were remarka
bly low; 11 KIA and 4 WIA. After completing his inspection, Wagner ordered Marcy
to move his crew to Los Bantos. They would be driven there that night in an 8 t
ruck convoy where they were issued small arms. Andy Reid was given a special ass
ignment; he was to be sent ot Sangley Point and pick up P-13 which was just out
of overhaul. Andy Reid piloted P-13 to Los Bantos while Nick Keller was also sen
t to Sangley Point to pilot a replacement plane. His was one that was already in
the bay being tended by USS Childs and he was told they were going hunting for
the Japanese. On one wing was a Torpedo while on the other 2x500 lb bombs. Befor
e they could takeoff though, they were ordered to dump their load and evacuate.
The top command realized that the heavy casualties suffered by Patrol Wing 10 wi
thout having contributed anything to the campaign as well as the Army's inabilit
y to defend them made it necesary to evacuate the Philippines.
Casualties Suffered
Patrol Wing 10
7xPBY-4 destroyed in the water by Seto's
Chutai, Tainan Ku at Olongapo flying boat base.
1st Kokutai
1xType 96 Rikko shot by AA over Clark; H
arada and his crew survived and were captured.
6th Pursuit Squadron
2xP-26A shot down by 17xReisen over Bata
ngas. Pilots Lt.Ceasar Basa is KIA while Lt.Jose Mondingo parachutes
to safety. At least two other P26A are badly damaged and then out of commission.
Toko Kokutai
1xType 97 Kawanishi shot down while taki
ng off in Legaspi Bay by Bob Hanson
50th Hiko Sentai
2xKi-27 shot down by Buzz Wagner over Ap
arri airfield
5xKi-27 strafed and damaged/destroyed by
Buzz Wagner at Aparri airfield.

19th Bombardment Group

1xB-17C dissapears flying to Mindanao an
d is never seen again.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

13 Decem
ber
At 6AM pilots Marshall Anderson and Walt Coss lifted off in their P-40s
from Clark on the first reconnaissance missions of the day. Anderson was flying
toward Vigan while Coss flew to Aparri. After lifting off to altitude, Coss ran
into overcast over northern Luzon; he flew above it and out to sea 20 to 30 mile
s north of Aparri then turned back south and dropped down into the overcast. He
would drop below the overcast for a minute to search around below it and then cl
imb back up into it for several minutes for cover. Apparently, 2xKi-27 of the 50
th Sentai spotted him and began tracking his direction. Coss eventually flew bac
k below the overcast right in front and below the two Army fighters. One of the
fighters fired at his plane hitting it; he dove away from the nates but at about
1000 ft his engine quit throwing up smoke. He rolled the plane over onto its ba
ck, unbuckled his belt and opened hte canopy falling out at 800 ft. He opened hi
s chute at about 200 ft and he was right over the middle of the Cagayan river an
d several miles north of the town of Gattaran. One of the Ki-27s strafed Coss fo
ur or five times but he managed to evade it. The 17th Pursuiter was assisted by
local natives who provided him with food, clothing, guides, and a .25 caliber pi
stol to replace his missing .45 colt that he lost in the jump. He then set out i
n the direction of Clark. Marshall Anderson arrived back from Vigan at 9:25 AM a
nd reported that he saw two transports off Vigan, but, "nothing else of interest
." Meanwhile another pilot had flew recon over Legaspi and Poliqui bay and he id
entified a carrier, a cruiser, two destroyers, and seven unknown. However, USAFF
E wanted more information before sending a bombing mission. At 11:40, FEAF order
ed another reconaissance mission from Nichols. To fly this mission was Bob Hanso
n and Andy Krieger were to take off as Grant Mahony had arrived back that evenin
g from a mission. At 12:40 the pilots were on the way to their planes when the J
apanese Rikko arrived over Nichols to begin their bombing runs. The bombs from t
he first wave were missing and landing right where the two pilots took cover, an
d fragments hit Bob Hanson in the chest killing him. While Krieger was in a daze
over the experience and losing his friend, he still had to fly the mission. Man
y of the bombs had missed Nichols entirely and landed in Barrio Baclaren causing
civilian casualties. Later on, during a lull in the Japanese bombing operations
, a lone B-18 departed Clark at 1800 for Del Monte with spares and parts salvage
d from burned out aircraft. Also aboard this aircraft was Maj.David R. Gibbs who
was to take command of that airfiel. The B-18 dissapeared enroute with all hand
s perishing. Evidently, it ran into foul weather and crashed.
Japanese operations

The 5th Hiko Sentai put into effect the operations outlined in the order
of the previous day. Beginning, 8xKi-27 of the 24th Sentai strafe Del Carmen be
ginning at daybreak strafing the decoy planes. At 1030, 9xKi-27 of the 50th Sent
ai at Aparri arrive over Clark and strafe the decoys there. Then, at 1300, 10xKi
-27 from the 50th Sentai strafe Cabanatuan airfield though did not encounter any

aircraft on the ground. Following this, the 24th Sentai at Vigan strafed Clark
at 1100 with 6xKi-27 and then Cabanatuan airfield at 1400 with 9xKi-27. Now it w
as the bombers turn. At 1130 the 14th Sentai bombs Clark airfield with 6xKi-21 b
ombers flying at 13,000 ft and dropping 60xType 94 instantaneous fused 50kg bomb
s against the decoys on the airfield. One P-40 attempts to intercept the bomber
formation and the 14th Sentai claims to have shot it down with defensive fire. N
o japanese bombers are lost or damaged. The 14th Sentai bombs clark again at 143
0 again claiming damage. During the two attacks some of the Ki-21 were hit by AA
fire but all managed to return to base safely. The 8th Sentai which was still b
ased at Kato takes off at 0900 with 17xKi-48 and bombs Tarlac barracks and the A
merican HQ at Baguio at 1100 with 17xKi-48 and returned to their base at 1400. O
nly light bombs were used as this was the maximum combat radio the Kawasaki Type
99 light bomber. Remaining army activity consisted of 24 sorites from the 52nd
and 75th Buntai's which were covering the Vigan anchorage.
Following the Army raids, the Imperial Naval Air Force opens up a more serious r
aid operations. The Takao Ku launches 26xType 1 Rikko led by Lt.Adachi to bomb O
longapo and Iba on the west coast, while 26xType 1 Rikko led by Lt.Masayuki Miya
ke bombed Del Carmen. Behind them came 26xType 1 Rikko of hte Kanoya Ku led by L
t.Cmdr.Irisa at the head of the chutai. Finally 26xType 96 Rikko of the 1st Ku l
ed by Lt.Cmdr.Ozaki were to bomb Nichols field. Flying escort were Lt.Ichiro Muk
ai from the 3rd Ku with 15 reisen guided by one Type 98 recon plane; Lieutenant
Masao Asai led 18 reisen of the Tainan Ku and was guided by two Type 98 recon pl
anes. The bombers arrived at 12:40 and began their operations. The Kanoya Ku dro
pped a total of 215x60 kg and 16x250 kg bombs while the 1st Ku dropped 316x60 kg
bombs over Nichols while AA fire from the base damaged 11 of the Rikko to varyi
ng degrees. One Chutai missed Nichols completely, however, with their bombs land
ing on Barrio Baclaren causing many civilian casualties. Three chutai of the Tak
ao Ku arrived over Olongapo at 1155 dropping their bombs. Several hit the town o
f Olongapo starting fires, though most of the marines had evacuated the base by
this time so there were few marine casualties. One was serriously wounded and ab
out a dozen civilians in the town were killed with 40 wounded. After seeing the
bombers away, the 3rd Ku sent one shotai down to strafe Del Carmen, with them cl
aiming four P-40 destroyed and six damaged on the ground. The rest of the unit t
hen went down and claimed one large and eight small training aircraft burned, an
d a further P-40 damaged. However, FPO2c Kaneo Suzuki failed to return, probably
downed by AA fire. Another pilot-FPO1c Fumio Ohsumi-was also hit and forced lan
ded at Vigan with severe injuries. A Filipino at Del Carmen claimed to have shot
a pilot in the head with a springfield bringing it down, and this may have been
Suzuki who was killed. A little later the Tainan Ku undertook a similar attack
against Nichols Field and Camp Murphy. The unit had been reduced to 14 on the wa
y to the target; four reisen had been forced to turn back due to various reasons
. As the fighters dived to attack the airfield, leaving one chutai above as top
cover, a lone P-40 was seen. This was attacked by Lt.Juichi Sasai and FPO3c S.Is
hii of the 4th Chutai's 2nd shotai and was claimed probably shot down. The third
pilot of this section, FPO3c Hiroshi Kuratomi, failed to return from the strafe
, probably shot down by ground fire or possibly the P-40. The seven reisen of 3r
d Chutai strafed Nichols and Nielson meanwhile, claiming two large aircraft in f
lames, plus three large and seven small aircraft badly damaged. A shotai encount
ered a Philippines Air Lines Beechcraft 18 transport off the eastern tip of Cebu
and inflicted much damage upon the airplane. It was piloed by operations manage
r Paul Gunn; the air line was now operating its six beechcraft from a hastily pr
epared airstrip in the Grace Park Cemetery in Manila, and continued to fly passe
ngers to various locations, including food and supplies to the air base at Del M
onte. The damage that Gunn recieved obliged him to return to Grace Park bringing
his damaged transport across Zablan airfield, where Filipino gunners opened fir
e believing him to be Japanese. They shot him out of the sky and he crash landed
at Nichols in darkness, surviving the ordeal unhurt.

Patrol Wing 10
On the night from 13th to 14th December, nearly all of Patrol Wing 10's
aircraft were hidden along the shore on Laguna de Bay. Two hours before dawn, me
ssengers went from plane to plane alerting the crews for takeoff. With the plane
s hidden in the foliage and it being night, at least 3 planes are missed. At 043
0 the crews of planes 1,8,9,11,23, and 25 strip the camo branches off their plan
es and start their engines and moved out to the offshore buoys. Thirty minutes l
ater they begin taking off while along the shores of Laguna de Bay, three crews
slept unaware of the takeoff order. John Hyland's P-23 was acting up; it carried
1200 gallons of gasoline, 4x500 lb bombs and an extra man aboard. It was a heav
y load but usually enough for the PBY's to take off with. They attempted to take
off but after 2 miles during their run Hyland attempted to pull off the water bu
t it simply crashed back down onto the water. Hyland cut the power and the broke
n engine cowl flapped wildly. The crew decided to dump one of the 500 lb bombs.
Five hundred pounds lighter, P-23 took off on its next attempt. With 6xPBY-4 tak
ing off, another two would take off on the 14th to join Petersons group at Lake
Lanao; the recently completed P-13 from overhaul and an unknown flying boat numb
er, leaving four flyable PBY-4 and three unflyable PBYs undergoing repair; P-2,
P-14, and P-28. One was McConnell's P-28 which had been abandoned on Laguna de B
ay on 10 December. Two to three days later, right about this time, Lt.Joseph Ant
onides had heard a report of a stray PBY-4 drifting on the lake. It was actually
anchored near Los Bantos, completely covered with foliage lashed in place with
copper wire. An elderly Filipino man told the navy officer he had found the plan
e adrift and , "figured it belonged ot someone." He covered it with branches usi
ng wire he had found on board. Antonides dug out 10 pesos and gave it to the man
for his help. Completing the survey, he found that although it was badly damage
d, P-28 could be made flyable relatively quickly. Ironically, the most severe da
mage had been inflicted by the crew attempting to make her useless on 10 Decembe
r; they had successfully deactiviated the entire electrical system. Battle damag
e consisted of shot up fuel and oil tanks, a smashed magneto in the starboard en
gine, and a bullet hole in an intake manifold on the same engine. They were able
to fix the battle damage and fly it back to Manila; the biggest chore was cutti
ng all the copper wire to get all the branches off the plane. The second unflyab
le plane was Bob Swanson's P-2 which had recieved a shot up engine on 11 Decembe
r and a replacement was required. However, by the time the order went out for a
spare, the USS Childs still in Manila bay had loaded the last of them onto her a
long with as much spare parts and munitions as she could carry, as well as Capt.
Wagner and as many pilots as could be fit on board. She was to sail south to Jav
a and evacuate Manila area. The last spare engine was left ashore and a call wen
t out for volunteers to deliver it to Los Banos. That night a three vehicle conv
oy left Sangley point for Los Banos; the lead car was filled with armed sailors,
followed by Burkholder driving the engine laden truck followed by another car f
illed with armed sailors. The convoy arrived shortly after the six planes had ta
ken off on the early morning of the 14th and the engine was hoisted off the truc
k. Also to evacuate was 2xJ2F "Ducks" of the utility squadron filled with as man
y 5 gallon containers as could be carried. They were piloted by Lt.Cmdr.J.C Rena
rd and Ensign A.L.Seaman. The planes were flying for Mindanao where they would b
e loaded with additional fuel for the evacuation to the south. Nearing Mindanao
at 12,000 ft in formation, P-23's port engine begins to fuck around again heatin
g up too much and the breather began throwing a cloud of oil and hte engine hack
ed and sputtered. The fourth unflyable PBY was probably P-5 which would have bee
n undergoing repair from damage recieved on the 10th (my assumption). Apparently
, several of the earlier damaged flying boats were against flyable. Rest of acco
unt will continue on 14 December notes.
Casualties Inflicted:

17th Pursuit Squadron: Walt Coss is shot down by the 50t

h Sentai at Aparri.
*Possibly a P-40 is shot down by Tainan Ku over
Nichols*
3rd Kokutai: FPO2c Kaneo Suzuki shot down by AA fire. KI
A
FPO1c Fumio Ohsumi damaged by AA fire, forc
e landing at Vigan. WIA
Tainan Ku: FPO3c Hiroshi Kuratomi shot down by AA fire.
KIA

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------14 Decem
ber
The 5th hiko shidan continued its attacks against American airfields. T
he 14th Sentai sent 6xKi-21 escorted by 11xKi-27b of the 50th Sentai against Del
Carmen. During their attack they sighted no American aircraft. While this raid
occured, fighters from the 24th Sentai strafed Del Carmen, Clark, and Cabantuan.
The 50th Sentai was fully based at Aparri and the 24th Sentai was fully based a
t Vigan. While this occured, the 16th Sentai HQ and one Chutai arrived at Aparri
airfield from Taiwan as directed by the 5th Hiko Shidan on the 11th. However, A
parri was found to be so small that it was difficult for the 16th Sentai to use
it. The commander noted, however, that the Americans were switching their remain
ing aircraft from airfield to airfield to avoid their attacks; their appared to
be three large aircraft undamaged at Clark field and five at Del Carmen. At 1400
the commander of 5th Hiko Shidan issued order no.144 calling for attacks in wav
es on Del Carmen airfield by all units. The following is a chart of the orders:
5th Hiko Shidan disposition for 15 Decem
ber attacks
Unit

Airfield
Mission
Time
Strength
remarks
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------24th Sentai . Vigan
. 1st attack Del Carmen . 1030 . 1 Chutai
in each attack . Coordinate with the 14th Sentai
. 2nd attack Del Carmen . 1200 .
.
. 3rd attack Clark
. 1330 .
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------50th Sentai Aparri
Coordinate attack with
0900
1 Chutai
in each attack
Fuel can be acquired at Tuguegarao and Vigan
16th Sentai
1500
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------16th Sentai Aparri
1st attack Del Carmen
0900
1 Chutai

2nd attack Clark

1500
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------8th Sentai
Kato
Tarlac and Baguio
1400
1 Chutai
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------14th Sentai Heito
1st attack Del Carmen
1030
1 Chutai
in each attack
Attack artillery positions or installations
2nd attack Del Carmen
1200
at Clark field
3rd attack Clark
1330
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------76th dokoritsu
Heito
recon of results of
around 1 aircra
ft each area
buntai
attacks at Del Carmen
1430
and clark and enemy
situation at Iba
The Imperial navy only undertook a single raid on this day, with three chutai of
26xType 1 Rikko of the Takao Ku going to bomb shipping in Manila bay with an es
cort of 9 reisen from the 3rd Ku. The Army wasn't the only group that was moving
its units onto the Philippines. With the capture of Legaspi and the subsequent
making its airstrip operational, the Takao Ku sent 6xType 1 Rikko and the Tainan
Ku sent Seto's 2nd chutai of reisen and 2xType 98 recon planes; they arrived ar
ound midday. However, two of the reisen overturned upon landing on the uneven ai
rstrip which most likely destroyed them, though the pilots were unharmed.
The 19th Bombardment Group launched its raid against Legaspi on this day with 6x
B-17D. The leader was 1st Lt.James Connally; the flight would take off from Del
Monte. Connally's plane, however, blew a tire as it taxied to take off and had t
o abort leaving only five B-17 for the mission. However, Lt.Walter Ford and Lt.L
ee Coats were forced to abort the mission to Legaspi in the air leaving only thr
ee for the bombing mission; each flying independently. As one passed over Catand
uanes Island, a F1M from Chitose attempted to intercept it, but without success.
Lt.Jack Adams arrived over Legaspi and unloaded all his bombs upon the landing
ships, claiming to have sunk a transport (none were damaged). Two reisen from Le
gaspi had been scrambled from Legaspi on patrol, and as the first B-17 approache
d it was attacked by FPO1c Yoshimichi Saeki and FPO2c Yoshimi Hidaka; the latter
managed to shoot it down. The pilot of the B-17, Lt.Jack Adams was able ot cras
h land his airplane on a beach on nearby Masbate Island with four crewmembers wo
unded. They subsequently got to friendly territory, and able to return to their
unit after a three week ordeal. As two more bombers were spotted approaching, th
ree more reisen took off, flown by FPO1c Toshio Kikuchi, FPO3c Kosaku Minato, an
d FPO3c Saburo Nozawa. The first of the two B-17s flown by Lt.Eliott Vandevanter
, released its bombs and made its escape without interception, claiming they had
sunk a transport and damaged two others (once again, no transports were damaged
). The other, flown by Capt.Hewitt Wheless, was attacked by all five mentioned r
eisen. One of his engines had been giving him trouble on approach to Legaspi, wh
ich had forced Wheless to drop down to 9,500 ft and it was at this height he rep
orted being attack by two fighters. Bullets ripped through its fuselage while th
e gunners claimed a reisen shot down (none were). He estimated ten more reisen a
ppeared (no such number in the area), diving to attack and soon one of his engin
es was shot out. With another faulty engine sputtering, Wheless dropped down to
3500 ft. As the reisen closed in, gunner W.Williams claimed to have shot down tw
o more reisen, and possibly a third (no reisen were lost or damaged). In the ens
uing attacks, Williams was hit and seriously wounded in the thigh and gunner W.K
illin was killed, while his colleague Gunner Russell Brown suffered a broken wri
stbone. Bullets smashed into the cockpit, one grazing Wheless's face and another

hitting his right hand. The reisen after this long running battle were now runn
ing low on fuel and broke off the attack, leaving Wheless and his crew to their
fate. Wheless managed to nurse his bomber back to Del Monte, reaching it in semi
-darkness. He found that the airfield was obscured by heavy clouds and so he was
forced to crash land at Caguayan; 1200 bullet holes were later found in the B-1
7! Following the raid (which had done absolutly no damage) it was decided that t
he remaining B-17s would be withdrawn to Batchelor field in Northern Australia.
Six would leave on the 17th and four more the next day.
The 19th Bombardment Group was not the only planes making an attack against Lega
spi on this day. Grant Mahony was on his way back to Nichols from a cross countr
y mission to Mindanao. On his way back, he decided to fly over Legaspi to observ
e the situation there. He had lost his friend Bob Hanson the day before and woul
d looking for some revenge. He arrived at 4:30 PM and dove from 13,000 ft at a r
adio shack raking it with .50 caliber fire. As he dove, AA fire began to fire at
him from the airstrip and so he turned away to avoid the fire. He spotted 6xTyp
e 1 Rikko, some Reisen, and a LO transport on the airstrip. As he looked around
before making his attack against the strip, he spotted four zero's in the air di
ving at him almost completely vertically. Mahony swung over toward the parked bo
mbers and fighters leading the zeros out of the line of their dive. and began to
strafe the aircraft on the ground as the zero's and ground fire fired at him, b
arely hitting him. During his strafing attack, he managed to damage 2xReisen and
5xType 1 Rikko rendering them unoperational. Mahony then flew over to Mount May
on just 5 miles NW of Legaspi town with the zeros still on his tail. He decided
to fly around the mountain over and over; the zeros split into 2 groups going in
opposite directions to get at him but htey couldn't tell which was which. He ma
naged to fly away leaving the zeros circling the mountain confused. From two day
s of operations, two additional zeros would be operational losses, most likely i
n landing accidents on the rough landing strip, or perhaps from defensive fire f
rom the raiding B-17s on that day. Either way the Commander of Legaspi acknowled
ged two days later on 16th that 4 out of the 9 Reisen were unoperational and fiv
e of the six Rikko were unoperational. To save face, he stated two zeros were fl
ying high overhead and did not see the P-40 make its attack.
Patrol Wing 10
On the night from 13th to 14th December, nearly all of Patrol Wing 10's aircraft
were hidden along the shore on Laguna de Bay. Two hours before dawn, messengers
went from plane to plane alerting the crews for takeoff. With the planes hidden
in the foliage and it being night, at least 3 planes are missed. At 0430 the cr
ews of planes 1,8,9,11,23, and 25 strip the camo branches off their planes and s
tart their engines and moved out to the offshore buoys. Thirty minutes later the
y begin taking off while along the shores of Laguna de Bay, three crews slept un
aware of the takeoff order. John Hyland's P-23 was acting up; it carried 1200 ga
llons of gasoline, 4x500 lb bombs and an extra man aboard. It was a heavy load b
ut usually enough for the PBY's to take off with. They attempted to takeoff but
after 2 miles during their run Hyland attempted to pull off the water but it sim
ply crashed back down onto the water. Hyland cut the power and the broken engine
cowl flapped wildly. The crew decided to dump one of the 500 lb bombs. Five hun
dred pounds lighter, P-23 took off on its next attempt. With 6xPBY-4 taking off,
another two would take off on the 14th to join Petersons group at Lake Lanao; t
he recently completed P-13 from overhaul and an unknown flying boat number, leav
ing four flyable PBY-4 (P-5, P-22, P-27, and P-29) and three unflyable PBYs unde
rgoing repair; P-2, P-14, and P-28. One was McConnell's P-28 which had been aban
doned on Laguna de Bay on 10 December. Two to three days later, right about this
time, Lt.Joseph Antonides had heard a report of a stray PBY-4 drifting on the l
ake. It was actually anchored near Los Bantos, completely covered with foliage l
ashed in place with copper wire. An elderly Filipino man told the navy officer h
e had found the plane adrift and , "figured it belonged ot someone." He covered

it with branches using wire he had found on board. Antonides dug out 10 pesos an
d gave it to the man for his help. Completing the survey, he found that although
it was badly damaged, P-28 could be made flyable relatively quickly. Ironically
, the most severe damage had been inflicted by the crew attempting to make her u
seless on 10 December; they had successfully deactiviated the entire electrical
system. Battle damage consisted of shot up fuel and oil tanks, a smashed magneto
in the starboard engine, and a bullet hole in an intake manifold on the same en
gine. They were able to fix the battle damage and fly it back to Manila; the big
gest chore was cutting all the copper wire to get all the branches off the plane
. The second unflyable plane was Bob Swanson's P-2 which had recieved a shot up
engine on 11 December and a replacement was required. However, by the time the o
rder went out for a spare, the USS Childs still in Manila bay had loaded the las
t of them onto her along with as much spare parts and munitions as she could car
ry, as well as Capt.Wagner and as many pilots as could be fit on board. She was
to sail south to Java and evacuate Manila area. The last spare engine was left a
shore and a call went out for volunteers to deliver it to Los Banos. That night
a three vehicle convoy left Sangley point for Los Banos; the lead car was filled
with armed sailors, followed by Burkholder driving the engine laden truck follo
wed by another car filled with armed sailors. The convoy arrived shortly after t
he six planes had taken off on the early morning of the 14th and the engine was
hoisted off the truck. Also to evacuate was 2xJ2F "Ducks" of the utility squadro
n filled with as many 5 gallon containers as could be carried. They were piloted
by Lt.Cmdr.J.C Renard and Ensign A.L.Seaman. The planes were flying for Mindana
o where they would be loaded with additional fuel for the evacuation to the sout
h. Nearing Mindanao at 12,000 ft in formation, P-23's port engine begins to fuck
around again heating up too much and the breather began throwing a cloud of oil
and hte engine hacked and sputtered. The fourth unflyable PBY was probably P-5
which would have been undergoing repair from damage recieved on the 10th (my ass
umption). Apparently, several of the earlier damaged flying boats were against f
lyable.
Petersons group of six PBY-4 met up with the three flying boats that had arrived
earlier, which had operated off of the USS William Preston. Upon landing, the c
rew would gas up all Nine of the PBYs which was a very long, back-breaking job.
Eventually, two PBYs from Luzon who had missed the formation flight to Lake Lana
o took off, and joined Person at Lake Lanao. The total plane numbers at Lake Lan
ao as I have confirmed were: 1,3,6,8,9,11,13,23,24,25,and 26 for a total of
11 operational PBY-4. Of these number, P-23 was suffering from engine trouble, h
owever. After a long day of refueling the PBYs and with evening approaching, it
was planned to send the crews ashore to Dansalan (now Marawi) for the night, lea
ving each plane at anchor. However, a storm approached and as such, the crews we
re ordered to stay at their planes. The wind and waves began dragging the anchor
s of each plane and as such, many pilots had to start their planes and taxi back
toward the water to prevent their planes from crashing ashore. Unlike the flyin
g boats, however, the two J2F "Ducks" were not manned during the night.
Meanwhile, two Vichy French ships were taken into "protective custody" on orders
from Admiral Hart. One was an old freighter loaded with flour and other provisi
ons, was sent to Mariveles where her cargo was to be put ashore at the navy cons
truction base. The other was the modern motor vessel MS Marechal Joffre. As she
could not be protected in Manila, she was to be taken away. The seizures were ma
de with force, though with help from some memebers of the French crew who suppor
ted De Gaulle. Lt.E.R. Little led an armed group aboard Marechal Joffre in the p
redawn grey and met with the Free French represenatives. They were given five mi
nutes for hte crew to sort out their loyalties; those that chose Vichy were sent
into an internment camp. In all, 62 french sailors chose to stay aboard knowing
their ship would be pressed into American service. While Little was securing th
e Marechal Joffre, the USS Childs was alreading set to head south. Aboard was Ca
pt.Wagner, his staff, and several Patwing10 pilots. The tender was scheduled to
stop for fuel at Cebu before proceeding to Menado where she would refuel and ten

d the PBYs enroute to Surabaja from Lake Lanao. That evening running at 25 knots
through the unlit channels, she made her escape south.
Losses Suffered
19th BG: 2xB-17D shot down/crash land in
an attack against Legaspi by reisen of the Tainan Ku
Tainan Ku: 2xReisen destroyed in strafin
g attack by Buzz Wagner
2xReisen damaged upon landing
at Legaspi
Takao: 5xType 1 Rikko from Takao Ku dest
royed on ground at Legaspi from Buzz Wagner's strafing
1xLO Transport destroyed on the g
round by Buzz Wagner's strafing at Legaspi

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

15 December
Attacks against American airfields by the IJAAF continued on this day, w
ith the goal of keeping the airfields neutralized. The 24th Sentai flew 23 sorti
es with the 14th Sentai flew 18 sorties in attacking the northern part of Del Ca
rmen airfield three times. The 14th Sentai each time dropped 60xtype 94 instanta
neous fuzed 50 kg bombs at a height of 13,000 ft. They claimed 10 small aircraft
destroyed as well as other facilities. Also, the 50th Sentai with 18xKi-27 and
the 16th Sentai flew with 11xKi-30 against Del Carmen and Clark field. The 16th
Sentai dropped 20x50kg bombs on Del Carmen at a height of 4900 ft claiming destr
oyed four small and one medium aircraft. Then in a dive bombing attack against C
lark, they droped 24x50 kg bombs claiming destroyed three aircraft. The 8th Sent
ai then bombed Tarlac and Baguio with a chutai of Ki-48s. The Navy also continue
d with its raids in a smaller scale. Three chutai of the Takao Ku consisting of
26xType 1 Rikko with 15 reisen of the 3rd Ku raiding Nichols, Del Carmen, and Ma
nila Bay. The reisen went down to strafe, claiming one large and one small aircr
aft badly damaged at each of the airfields. Over Nichols, FPO1c Shigeru Yano was
hit by AA fire and damaged, while three other pilots landed at Vigan low on fue
l, returning to Takao on the next day. It was recognized that the Philippine air
defenses had been mostly eradicated at this point. The estimated number of airc
raft destroyed and damaged was more than twice of what was in existance. However
, their estimate of of the remaining forces was pretty accurate. From reconnaiss
ance flights as well as operational reports, the 11th Fleet estimated there were
10 heavy bombers, 10 flying boats, and 20 fighters still operational. By now it
was clear that the Asiatic fleet was no longer operating from the Philippines a
nd it was reported that only 2-3 destroyers and 2 submarine tenders remained in
Manila bay. The total number of losses due to all causes (operational and combat
) was reported as: 4xType 1 Rikko, 6xType 96 Rikko, 23 Reisen, and 1 LO transpor
t. Flight personnel losses were four Rikko crews, 14 reisen pilots, and one tran
sport crew. Truly minimal losses for the destruction of the FEAF. The 19th BG wa
s preparing to abandon the Philippines. There was no fighter escort for their ev

er dwindling supply of B-17 bombers and it was no longer possible to operate on

Luzon as the airfields were under constant attack. They would eventually fly sou
th to Australia and operate from there.
At the secret airfield at Lubao, the 21st Pursuit just arrived to begin aiding t
he Filipino's 71st Engineering Battalion in building it with 400 Filipinos. Whil
e Ed Dyess had been told that the airfield would be ready on the 14th, he found
that this was not the case and additional work was necesary. Not only that, but
the largest problem now was how to camouflage the airfield to prevent the prowli
ng Japanese recon planes from discovering its location.]? It was being built in
Pampanga province, 7 miles west of Lubao town, jsut off the main road from Lubao
leading into Bataan, over which heavy traffic passed. The 3600 ft NW/SE runway
would be divided down the middle, with one half of the 180 ft width left standin
g in growing sugar cane and the sugar cane on the other half cut down. The secon
d half would then be covered with windrows of dead cane, which from the air look
ed like it had been cut during harvesting and left to rot. The dead cane would b
e swept aside by the men to allow aircraft ot take off and land on this half of
the field. After take off the wheel tracks would be brushed out and that side re
covered by dead cane. Now, he just had to figure out how to camouflage the plane
s which were expected to arrive soon. Parking strips were constructed at right a
ngles to the airstrip, with revetments dug into the ground wide and deep enough
for the plane and sandbagged to a depth of five feet. At the corner of each reve
tment, a bamboo pole was erected, with chicken wire streching across the top of
the poles over each revetment and adjoining the wire of hte other revetments dow
n the length of hte field. Put through the wire mesh were short top section of c
ane that had been freshly cut and notched, their tops level with the tops of the
live cane across the field. These top section were changed every two or three d
ays to keep th cane sections fresh over the revetments and parking strip areas.
In front of each of hte 12 revetments, each 40'x20', a line of bamboo cups about
2 ft in length and 2 ft apart were emplaced in the soil. Sugar cane sections we
re then stuck into these cups carefully so that their tops also matched the heig
ht of hte live cane growing on the other half of hte field. These walls of cane
could then be pulled out in a moment to allow a plane in a revetment to run onto
the field. From the air, Lubao field on completion was indistiguishable from a
cane field that was partly harvested. Neither directly nor at an angle overhead
could an aircraft be detected in its revetment.
Patrol Wing 10 was officially abandoning the Philippines. The group of eleven PB
Y-4 still rested at Lake Lanao on northern Mindanao along with two of the utilit
y squadrons J2F "Ducks". The USS William Preston with two of Heron's OS2U "Kingf
ishers" strapped ackwardly aboard her, had made Balikpapan on 13 December, and t
hen departed with the Asiatic fleet that day for Makassar, Celebes Island. The U
SS Heron was sailing toward Balikpapan where it would refuel and so was the USS
Langley. After refueling at Balikpapan, the Langley was to establish a fueling c
enter at Makassar for the PBYs to operate from. In the meantime, the USS Childs,
having just departed Manila Bay the previous day, quickly refueld at Cebu, havi
ng just missed a small raid by 3xType 97 Kawanishi of the Toko Kokutai. It then
continued south to Menado. The four flyable PBY-4 were still in Luzon operating
from Los Banos at Laguna de Bay, while the three unoperational PBY were still be
ing frantically repaired.

*No recordable l
osses*
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

16 December
At 5:50 AM, Russel Church and Buzz Wagner took off from Clark in 2xP-40E
. Each one carried 6x30 lb instantaneous fused fragmentation bombs under their w
ings. They both took off for Vigan airfield and were joined by Allison Strauss w
ho would fly top cover for them. Arriving over Vigan, they were met by intense A
A fire. Strauss remained at 15,000 ft while Wagner went into a dive followed a h
alf mile behind by Church. The 24th Sentai had 25xKi-27b parked on the airfield,
a Ki-56 "Thalia" transport, and 5-6 other aircraft. At 2500 ft, Wagner dropped
his bombs claiming several direct hits. However, when Church went into his dive,
Japanese AA fire scored hits on his nose which burst into flames which engulfed
his entire plane. Instead of pulling up, Church dived straight at the parked bo
mbs, dropped his bombs and hten leveled out so he crashed into row after row of
fighters. Following the death of Russel Church, Wagner and Strauss dived down fo
r a strafing pass against the fighters. Just then a Ki-27b managed to get off th
e ground. While Wagner saw it, the fighter was half-hidden from sight by Wagner'
s own wing so he flipped his fighter on its back only feet above the ground for
a clear view. Wagner got the Nate in his sights then righted his plane and throt
tled back to allow the Ki-27b to gain speed. He then let loose a burst of .50 ca
liber fire which sent the Ki-27b down in flames. With their ammunition exhausted
, the two flew back to Clark airfield. They managed to destroy an estimated ten
Army aircraft; most if not all were Ki-27b and they also burst a fuel tank. Mean
while, Joe Moore flew a mission to Aparri with Marshall Anderson as his wingman;
they also carried wing bombs. The compass of Moore's P-40 went out and conseque
ntly he was forced to abort his mission as he ended up off course.
During this day, the 5th Hiko Shidan prepared for renewed attacks against US bas
es while the 52nd and 74th buntai's continued to closely monitor the American an
d Filippino bases. The Army planes dedicated themselves to supporting the Tanaka
Shitai's advance south from Vigan as it prepared to meet up with the main 16th
Division landings at Lingayen Gulf in a week. The four flyable PBY-4 still on Lu
zon were being withheld to fly important US officers from the Islands, because t
hey were too fucking cowardly to fight with the other 100,000 troops they left b
ehind. The bigwigs were just waiting for events to make their fleeing the Philip
pines seemingly justified. However, Admiral Hart sent his chief of staff, R.Adm.
William Purnell to Surabaja this day. One of the three PBYs was brought from Lag
na de Bay to Manila to pick up Admiral Purnell. In the predawn darkness, John Sl
aotman and his crew puled the camoflage foliage off P-29 and cast off the tail l
ine and hauled in the anchor. As the pilots began to take off they heard a heavy
thump. The plane continued to race forward, but she was now sluggish and would
not get up on the step. Jack Grayson got out of the right hand seat and stepped
down into the navigators compartment. He found himself waist deep in water. Sloa
tman cut the power and swung toward the shore to beach the plane in shallow wate
r, however, they would not make it. P-29 sank lower in the water as she churned
toward land, and finally Sloatman ordered everyone over the side. As they paddle
d away, P-29 sank completely beneath the surface with only her propellers showin
g. As Sloatman dealt with this, Dennis Szabo was having similar issues with P-24
at Lake Lanao. He was taxiing P-24 along the beach close to shore when he hit a
submerged rock. The moment he hit, Szabo firewalled the throttled in an effort
to reach the beach. It was too late, however, as P-24 had punctured her hull and
she quickly sank making her a total loss. That afternoon, with P-29 sunk, Clayt
on Marcy flew P-22 flew up to Manila to pick up Admiral Purnell. Because of Japa
nese fighter activity (perhaps patrolling reisen), departure was delayed until d
ark giving P-22 cover of darkness for the flight to Java. Everything went accord
ing to planned and the flight was uneventful. There were now 5xPBY-4 in Manila;

out of that number only one was flyable. On Lake Lanao, there were now only ten
flyable PBY-4, but of that number Hylands P-23 was a lame duck so it left only
nine PBY's ready for operations, though P-23 could still fly. That night, after
hard-work of refueling again, the aircrews at Lake Lanao were sent to the hotel
in Dansalan for a much-needed rest. It was a welcome night-vacation for them.
Losses
24th Sentai: aproximately 10xKi27b destroyed on the ground. One shot down by Buzz Wagner
24th Pursuit Group: Russel Churc
h shot down by AA over Vigan airfield
Patrol Wing 10: P-29 hit a rock
and sank in Laguna de Bay; a total loss
P-24 hit a rock
and sank in Lake Lanao; a total loss
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------17 December
Late in the evening on this day, Grant Mahony was preparing for his last
mission in the Philippines. He was ordered to fly a C-39 transport at Nichols F
ield South to Australia, ferrying pilots of the 24th PG and the planeless 27th B
ombardment Group. In addition to the C-39, 2xB-18 would be flying with him. A to
tal of 20 pilots from the 27th PG and three pilots from the 25th would be evacua
ting on this evening. Mahony was joined by Gery Keenan and Allison Strauss. Whil
e MacArthur lost three of his best pilots, one that was previously assumed lost,
"red" Sheppard, returned. He had been shot down on 10 December after shooting d
own a Ki-48 and heavily damaging another. At Nichols airfield, Obert was given c
ontrol of half of the squadrons maintenance personel and told to get the P-40's
in good shape as they were all worn down having been used continuously since the
war began.At Nielson airfield, 5 miles north of Nichols, 1st Lt.Jim McAfee of t
he 27th BG was in command. He was given 90 men to run the field. Brereton wanted
to use Nielson for courier and reconnaissance missions by a few pursuit planes
to be stationed there. The problem was how to hide the planes that were to be st
ationed there. Despite efforts to camoflage the P-40s and P-35's on the airfield
, they were still visible. Obstructions were also placed on the airfield to help
defend against paratroopers or a surprise landing attempt by the Japanese. Conc
ealed revetments were built for hte planes and kept them from Japanese view from
the air. On this day, General Brereton was able to report to Sutherland that th
ere were 3xP-40 on the airfield all ready for reconnaisance and two days later t
here were 2xP-35 and 2xP-40 operational for the same purpose. Meanwhile, poor we
ather in northern Luzon prevented the 5th Hiko Sentai from carrying out air atta
cks on this day. However, they had reconnaisance planes fly over the various Ame
rican airfields and bases reporting on activity and defenses in preparation for
the attacks planned for the next day. Operations of the Naval air forces are unk
nown.
The 5th hiko shidan had planned to commence full-scale attacks against Manila on
this day, however, the weather did not permit this and so they were delayed. Re
connaissance planes flew over the American airfields, however, and observed the
airplanes on them. In addition, the Tanaka Shitai had joined up with the Kanno S

hitai and was advancing south along the west coast. They had left a company at T
uguegarao airfield and a platoon at Aparri and attached them to the command of t
he 5th Hiko shidan. Its possible weather prevented any more serious operations f
rom the naval air forces on Formosa; they did not partake in operations against
Luzon this day.
On the morning of this day, Commander Peterson recieved orders to proceed with a
ll his planes to Lake Tondano near Menado. The dutch maintained a small seaplane
base on the lake and it was planned to refuel and service the PBYs there. It wa
s actually a bad plan because the facilities at Tondano were inadequate, but nob
ody knew it at the time. There was doubt that Hyland's P-23 at Lake Lanao could
make it and he faced the decision on whether or not to scuttle her. Hyland manag
ed to convince him not to and so at 0900, 10xPBY-4 departed for Lake Tondano, Ce
lebes. As they were flying, they recieved a report from USS Childs at Menado tha
t a Type 97 Kawanishi had attempted to bomb her which alarmed PatWing10. Fearing
additional attacks, Capt.Wagner ordered the flight ot change course for Balikpa
pan. For Hylands P-23 the order was impossible, so he continued for Menado regar
dless of what danger might be awaiting him, while Peterson led the 9xPBY-4 to Ba
likpapan. Around 1300, the USS Childs thought it spotted an incoming Japanese at
tack, but it was actually Hyland's P-23 and the 2xJ2F Ducks. By 1315 the planes
had landed and taxied to the Childs. For the next two hours as the planes were r
efueled, the pilots discussed their next move. By the time it was done it was to
o late to continue the flight to Balikpapan, so P-23 moored at a buoy while the
2xJ2F Ducks flew to Lake Todano to spend the night. After this, the USS Childs s
et sail for Balikpapan. Meanwhile, the 19th BG began its withdraw south; the fir
st contigent of *my memory is shakey and I don't remember the resource* of 10xB17 withdrew to Bachelor field, Australia on this day, leaving Del Monte as an ad
vance air base.
*No recorded losses*
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------18 December
The IJAAF renewed its attacks on the 18th; at 1300 the 16th Sentai raide
d Nichols and Zablan airfields with 10 aircraft (unsure if that was ten aircraft
per target, or total with the Ki-30 flying back to Tuguegarao for fuel and then
hitting Zablan). They were escorted by the 50th Sentai. The 8th Sentai attacked
Camp Murphy airfield at 1410 with 5 aircraft claiming to have destroyed four la
rge and three small aircraft. Six other Ki-48 attacked Tarlac barracks as these
raids occured, with this group being escorted by 8xKi-27b of the 24th Sentai. El
ements of the 50th Sentai flew fighter cover for these attacks. The 50th Sentai
moved from Aparri to Laoag and also provided air cover for Vigan anchorage. Lt.G
eneral Obata issued Operational Order A, No.151 which outlined the mission and m
ovements of hte group in the covering of landing and support of subsequent opera
tions of the 48th Division from Z Day (22 December) to Z plus 20. The following
plan was put into effect:

z Day -2 to -1
Recon provided by 10th dokoritsu hikotai
of the Agoo and Caba landing points and along Lingayen, San Fabian, and Posorru
bio as
well as the rear of these positions. 52n
d Hikotai will fly an airplane over convoy at 0700. The 24th Sentai, flying from
Laoag airfield will provide two "formati

ons" for cover from 0700 to 1200. The 50th Sentai from Vigan will fly cover with
two
"formations" from 1200 to 1800.
Z Day to Z Day+3
Main force of 10th dokoritsu hiko buntai
will advance as soon as possible to Naguilian airfield and will continue to sup
port
the landing units. The 16th Sentai will
attack enemy's front lintes while the 8th Sentai will attack enemy units operati
ng on
the flank and rear area. As soon as Rina
lonan airfield is occupied it will be put into operating condition
Z Day+3 to Z Day+10
The 10th dokoritsu hiko buntai will reco
nnoiter the enemy positions expected to be on teh hill east of Candaba swamps. B
omber
units will attack the enemy at Tarlac an
d Cabanatuan which is expected to be on our flanks. Fighers and bombers will coo
perate
to annihilate the remaining enemy aircra
ft and bomb the rear areas. Cabanatuan and Bongabon airfields will be occupied a
nd
placed in operations as soon as possible
.
z day+10 to Z Day+15
tHE 10the dokoritsu hiko buntai will con
tinue recon of enemy positions. The main force of hte bomber untis will attack e
nemy
positions and after penetration of the e
nemy positions by our ground units our light bombers shall harass the retreating
enemy.
Z Day+15 to Z Day+20
Attacks on positions around Manila and c
ompletion of an airfield along the Angat River. Manila will not be bombed withou
t
orders.
Z Day -2 to -1
52nd Buntai: One plane fly cover recon o
ver convoy position at 0700.
24th Sentai: Two "formations" fly cover
for convoy from 0700 to 1200; from Laoag Airfield
50th Sentai: Two "formations" fly cover
for convoy from 1200 to 1800; from Vigan airfield
Z Day to X Day+5
50th Sentai: One Chutai provides cover f
or convoy from 0730 to 1200
24th Sentai: One Chutai provides cover f
or convoy from 1200 to 1830
Besides the Army air force operations, the navy also commenced its attacks. The
five remaining reisen of Seto's Chutai at Legaspi were reinforced by four additi
onal reisen on this day. After arriving, the Tainan Ku detachment sent up five r
eisen to perform a strafing attack against Iloilo, Panay Island. During the stra
fing attack against the airfield at Iloio, Lt.Kawamata destroyed a Sikorsky S-43
amphibian (NPC-31) of the Iloilo Negros Air Express Company, which was taxiing
out to evacuate personnel to Santa Barbara, California when Kawamata destroyed i
t. In addition, Kikuchi and Saeki each claimed an aircraft set afire in their st

rafing attacks. Shortly after the five reisen completed their strafing, Iloilo w
as bombed by 18xType 96 Rikko of the 1st Ku and 39xType 1 Rikko of the Takao Ku
from Formosa. The damage inflicted is unknown. Since operations were proceding s
moothly, the Kanoya Ku with 25xType 1 Rikko transfered its base of operations to
Peleliu, Palau Islands in preparations to support the coming invasion of Davao.
Back with the Americans, Hank Thorne was ordered to take seven members o
f his 3rd Pursuit officers and all enlisted men and depart Nichols for the littl
e town of Tanauan, some 40 miles by road SW of Manila. There, they would camoufl
age the auxiliary field near the town and build revetments for aircraft. They de
parted with the utmost secrecy as fifth columnist rumors were thick within the F
EAF and it was believed filipino's sympathetic to the Japanese would reveal the
location of the airstrip. After arrival at Tanauan, they were shown the airdrome
to be camouflaged, which was a rectangular area about one and a half miles long
; they began their work.
Patrol Wing 10 was down under by this time. They only had a total of 11xPBY-4 op
erational with at least 4 others undergoing repair in the hopes that they could
become operational. On the early morning of 18 December, 14 officers and 62 enli
sted men of Patrol Squadron 10 were selected to go on board the MS Marechal Joff
re. While the men were being trucked to Manila to board the Vichy french ship, t
he two J2F Ducks on Lake Tondano on Celebes made the trip to Balikpapan. They we
re loaded with as many 5 gallon containers as they could carry as the distance r
equired the two planes to land several times on the open sea to refuel from the
cans before taking off in order to make Balikpapan, which they succesfully manag
ed. Meanwhile, P-23 took off from Menado for Balikpapan as well. It flew west al
ong the Celebes coast to Stroomen Kapp and then across the Makassar straight to
the Borneo coast. As they neared Borneo at Talok, the port engine started to hea
t up. Soon thick black smoke was pouring from the exhaust stacks as the engine g
ot hotter and hotter. Oil pressure dropped as the engine lost power sputtering a
nd popping. About 200 miles from Balikpapan Hyland shut off the damaged engine.
Slowly P-23 lost altitude with only one engine. For three hours Hyland and Hawk
Barrett nursed their stricken plane to Balikpapan with manifold pressure at the
dangerous level of 34 inches to keep the plane relatively level. They dumped fue
l and threw unessential items off the plane to lighten it to give it more range.
The plane still continued to lose altitude losing 11,000 ft before they spotted
the silver oil tanks on teh hill above Balikpapan. They made it to Balikpapan.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------19 Decem
ber
At 1400 on this day, General Onada issued 5th hiko shidan operational or
der A, No.153 which ordered the 4th hikodan with one chutai of the 24th Sentai t
o attack on the following day, the main American airfields in and to the north o
f Manila. It seems the operations of the Army aircraft were limited on this day,
perhaps just flying CAP and covering the southward advance of the Tanaka Shitai
. The Navy was a bit more active on this day. The Japanese had discovered that t
here was an airfield on Mindanao on 11 December when they intercepted repeated r
adio calls from FEAF asking for weather reports, and on the 18th a reconnassainc

e airplane discovered the location of Del Monte airfield but bad weather prevent
ed any raids from occuring that day. On the 19th, before 4PM 3xB-18 landed at De
l Monte. One of which carried Brigadier General Clagett, who had just been relie
ved of command of the 5th Interceptor Command. He had landed at Del Monte as a s
top over for his trip to Australia. Hidden under coconut leaves were 4xB-17 whic
h was all that remained of the 19th BG as the rest had been transfered to Austra
lia already; they were scheduled to leave that night. At 4:10, Seto's Chutai of
the Tainan Ku arrived over Del Monte with four reisen: Lt.Masuzo Seto, FPO2c Hid
eo Izumi, FPO2c Yoshimi Hidaka and FPO3c Shizuo Ishii. They came in skimming the
tops of hte surrounding pineapple fields and so were unobserved by the lookouts
in the hills. Coming east to west making their strafing runs, one of the B-18s
burst into flames immediately as it was out in the open. Two B-17 were hit and d
amaged to some degree, though they were still flyable. Seto's chutai claimed two
B-17s and three twin engined aircraft in flames and two other B-17s and four tw
in-engined types severely damaged. Though, this amount conflicts with the actual
casualties that I mention above. Meanwhile, The Cavite area remained quiet unti
l 1247 on 19 December when nine Japanese bombers returned with Sangley Point as
their target. The bombers hit the large radio towers and the fuel depot. Numerou
s 55-gallon fuel drums were stored on the golf course, in the hospital compound,
and on the beach. Fuel drums exploded, forcing the evacuation of the wounded. O
ne Marine remembered "the roar of the fire drowned the sound of the motors (of t
he bombers) and the sound of the bombs." The bombs also destroyed hangar X-34 an
d blasted P-14 inside of it to bits. Casualties were 15-20 dead and a few wounde
d. Also, light carrier Ryujo launched a small raid with 6xType 97 Kanko to attac
k a radio station at Cape San Augustin, the tip of the eastern arm of Davao Gulf
while the seaplane tender Chitose launched its planes to reconnoiter Davao. The
Ryujo attack planes also carried out reconnaissance missions of the area, locat
ed aproximately 150 miles East of Davao.
During a FEAF confrence at 10AM, Brereton discussed his displeasure at the dispe
rsal of the remaining aircraft. He did not like that the remaining 23xP-40 and 9
xP-35 that were still in commission still operated from Clark, despite its "dail
y raids" (which is untrue, for the past three days the Japanese had left Clark a
lone). He did not want to use the new secret airstrips like at Lubao until the e
xpected air reinforcements arrived, but believed it necesary to spread out the r
emaining fighters. So, about an hour before dark on this day, the 24th PG reciev
ed orders to move nine of the twelve operational P-40s at Clark to San Marcelino
airfield, ostensibly for inspection and daytime maintenance of hte aircraft. Af
ter the nine pilots were selected for the transfer, "red" sheppard led seven of
them off, including John Posten, Cy Blanton, Jim Rowland, and Ed Erickson just a
s darkness set in. The 9th pilot was Jim Phillips; he took of late as he had bee
n partying all night. Consequently he was unable to find his squadron mates so e
lected to return to Clark. However, he came in wrong and cracked up his plane in
juring himself; the plane was a loss. The remaining eight pilots had to get down
at San Marcelino without the benefit of field lighting. Jim Rowland misjudged h
is landing apprach and dropped from 15 to 20 ft above the airfield breaking his
landing gear and effectively destroying his P-40. They were enraged to discover
the next morning that San Marcelino had no facilities or arrangements at the ai
rfield to work on the seven remaining P-40s and the living conditions were even
worse than at Clark field.
At Tanauan, another new secret airfield site began to be constructed on this day
. The 3rd Pursuit Squadron along with 3,000 Filipino labourers were hired and eq
uipped by the engineers with picks, shovels, and all the equipment needed. All t
his day they worked on the construction of twelve revetments for P-40s and four
revetments for B-17s as well, all made of thrown up earth and bamboo frame, abou
t 200 yds away from the field under a thick cover of trees. One crew of Filipino
's were assigned to build a portable native village of bamboo, to be moved to th
e center of hte runway and laid out to resemble a native settlemtn, then moved o
ff when the runway was to be used. Around the houses, postholes were dug into wh

ich freshly chopped trees were struck every few days and removed when planes wou
ld need to pass. Meanwhile, the FEAF was coming under increasing pressure from G
eneral MacArthur to begin fresh attacks against the Japanese assembling at Vigan
. The Kanno Detachment (less three companies) had joined up with the Tanaka Shit
ai at Vigan and were beginning to push South along Route 3 toward Lingayen, push
ing the Filipino 11th Division back. So, that afternoon, Steve Crosby was ordere
d to head on over to Nielson airfield to pick up a P-35A and ferry it to Clark f
or a mission. After hedgehopping all the way to Clark, Crosby landed safely and
was joined by 5xP-35A already there. All six fighters were loaded with 6x30 lb f
ragmentation bombs under their wings. Their pilots, including three from the 34t
h Pursuit, were informed that they would be making an attack mission the nexts m
orning against a concentration of Japanese troops at Vigan.
While the SS Marechal Joffre was dodging Japanese ships in its trip south to Jav
a, the USS Childs arrived in Balikpapan, joining the 10xPBY-4 and the 2xJ2F Duck
s, as well as the USS Heron which had her 4xOS2U "Kingfishers" from Balabac stra
ight. Meanwhile, those of Patwing10 still in the Philippines were attempting to
repair their 5xPBY-4 still on the island. P-14 had been destroyed in hangar X-34
at Sangley Point as has been mentioned, while P-28 was a short distance away at
Pan American Ramp (crippled during 10 December attacks by 3rd Ku). Four others
planes were on the south end of Laguna de Bay near Los Banos. Two were operation
al and Swensons P-2 would complete its engine change in a few days. P-29 which h
ad hit a rock and sunk on 16 December had been raised and towed close to shore.
It was expected to be on line in about two weeks in spite of its damage.
Losses
1xB-18 destroyed at Del
Monte airfield by Tainan Ku
2xB-17 lightly damaged a
t Del Monte airfield by Tainan Ku
2xP-40 destroyed in land
ing accidents
1xPBY-4 destroyed at San
gley Point during bombing raid
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

20 December
The IJAAF continued its attacks on this day. The 4th hikodan carried out
raids again. The 50th Sentai with 10xKi-27b attacked Nichols; 6xKi-27b of the 2
4th Sentai attacked Del Carmen; 12xKi-48 of the 8th Sentai attacked abandoned Ib
a field, and two Chutai of the 16th Sentai attacked Cabanatuan airfields all at
1300. Only four aircraft were reported sighted on Nichols airfield and these wer
e claimed ot have been destroyed. At 1130 on this day, the group commander was i
nformed by reconnassaince aircraft that there were 30 small aircraft based at Li
may and so ordered 14xKi-27b of the 24th Sentai to attack. However, no planes we
re sighted on the ground or in the air so all the aircraft returned. General Ona
da issued Operational Order No.155 on this day calling for diversionary attacks
on military installations at Baler Bay and Subic Bay areas by bombings of the 4t
h hikodan in an attempt to conceal the real landing point at Lingayen. Meanwhile
, the Navy arrived off of Davao, Mindanao Island on this day and began landing t
he 1st Kure SNLF, Sakaguchi Shitai, and the Miura Shitai and captured Davao and

an airfield there by 1500. Meanwhile, planes from the Ryujo and Chitose covered
the landings. Apparently, 12xType 97 Kanko from Ryujo attacked a 5000 ton Briti
sh tanker south of Savangaui Island, near Davao. Its unknown if any damage was i
nflicted. A seaplane base is established by naval units at Tolomo Bay, south of
Davao. In support of these landings, the Kanoya Ku bombed Del Monte airfields wi
th its full force inflicting severe damage on the facilities there; they were jo
ined by 8xType 97 Kawanishi of the Toko Ku. Finally, six reisen led by Lt.Kawama
ta strafed Dansalang, Malabang, and Cebu, claiming six small aircraft burned and
one damaged. I must note that the book, "Bloody Shambles" states that 54 twin e
ngined bombers hit Del Monte. However, as far as I know, this is incorrect. Only
the Kanoya Ku based at Peleliu had the range and it had roughly half that numbe
r of Type 1s. In addition, Legaspi was the only other airbase with range to hit
Del Monte, and it was too small to handle more than a handful of bombers.
The Americans took off at dark on 20 December, with the 6xP-35A arriving over th
eir target at dawn; a school house just east of Route 3 where some members of th
e Kanno Shitai had bivouacked for the night. The fighters turned east toward the
mountains, gained altitude, and peeled off in a string. Each plane strafed and
released all six 30 pound bombs they each carried. They made several other straf
ing passes before pulling out and heading back to Clark and landing without inci
dent. Later on, Steve crosby was flying patrol and while heading to Manila, he w
as intercepted by Ki-27bs. As mention in the above paragraph, the 24th Sentai wa
s carrying out attacks and this squadron was the six from the 24th Sentai that h
ad strafed Del Carmen. The fighters had intercepted steve cross and he noticed t
racers flying past him. He dropped ten degree flaps and pulled up sharply into a
quick loop, "almost putting me into position on the surprised jap's tail." Whil
e he managed to get behind the one Nate, the leaders wingmen managed to get behi
nd Coss without him noticing as he was focussed on the weaving Nate in front of
him. Fire from their 7.7mm guns immediately shattered Crosby's instrument panel
to bits, punctured his fuel and oil lines, and "caused a bright tongue of flame
to blow back into the cockpit". He had no choice but to abandoned the plane. He
released the canopy, unfastened his safety belt, rolled hte stabilizer all the w
ay forward, did a half roll, and turned loose. At a very low altitude, he hit th
e ground hard and was knocked out, though he survived without any broken bones.
In the meantime, FEAF HQ made arrangements on this day to send Air Corps officer
1st Lt.Tom Gerrity of the 27th BG to Wainwrights North Luzon Force to act as a
liaison officer between the ground forces and the FEAF. It is obvious from this
that the FEAF was going to lift its ban against offensive operations due to the
deteriorating ground war on Luzon.
Losses
- Steve Crosby (17th PS) shot do
wn in a P-35A by a Ki-27b of the 24th Sentai
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------21 December
Air operations in the Philippines for the Japanese entered a new stage.
Following the orders laid out the previous day, the 5th Hiko shidan conducted op
erations in support for the 14th Army convoy which was now sailing for their lan
ding point at Lingayen Gulf. Providing cover for the transports was a top priori
ty, so 20xKi-27 of the 24th Sentai and 24xKi-27 of the 50th Sentai would provide
round the clock escort for the massive invasion force. In the hopes of deceivin
g the enemy, attacks would be carried out in other areas of Luzon in diversion.
The 8th Sentai sends a chutai of 6xKi-48 to make a diversionary bombing against
Nichols field. They claimed to have destroyed 3 large and 5 small aircraft, thou

gh no aircraft were actually destroyed. Another Chutai makes dive bombing attack
s against the fortresses in Subic Bay and Grande Island, claiming to have destro
y four gun emplacements and barracks. The 16th Sentai sends two shotai from two
chutai (6xKi-30) to bomb Baler, and claim to have destroyed the wireless emplace
ment there. In addition, recon aircraft from the 10th dokoritsu hikotai fly over
the known American and Filipino air bases and reports that they spotted a total
of 30 fighters, and 10 large planes left in Luzon. This is fairly accurate; onl
y aprox.20 fighters (P-40 and P-35 plus 3xP-26 of the PAAC) are still operationa
l plus a handful of Stearman trainers from the PAAC. The recon planes note that
Limay airfield appeared to have been the most active base of operations. While t
his occured, the commander of the 10th dokuritsu hikotai, Colonel Komataro Hoshi
flew in a Ki-55 transport of the 52nd Dokuritsu chutai to drop leaflets over Ma
nila calling for the city to surrender to the Japanese. While the operations wer
e being carried out, at 0900, the 5th Hiko shidan commander issued Operational O
rder A, No.157 which covered operations on Z-Day and supplementing the directive
s of Operational order A, No.151. This order was directed against the 76th Dokor
itsu hikochutai which was to make a reconnaissance at 0800 on the 22nd, of hte L
amon landing and enemy situation in the vicinity of Lamon Bay and Manila. On tha
t day, one chutai of the 50th sentai was to cover the anchorate from 0700 to 083
0 and from 0930 to 1530, while the 24th Sentai was to cover the anchorage with t
wo chutai from 0830 to 1030 and with one chutai from 1030 to 1130 and from 1530
to 1830. All aircraft were to be over the anchorage five minutes prior to the gi
ven time to prevent gaps. The 8th Sentai was to attack Clark and other airfields
in the vicinity of Manila. The 14th Sentai (which had just arrived from Hong Ko
ng) was to come under group control after the 22nd and was to dispatch a chutai
to Tuguegarao while the main force was to remain at Choshu to prepare to support
the Army landing at any time.
While Davao base was captured, most of Mindanao was still under American/Filipin
o control. On this day, 25xType 1 Rikko from the Kanoya Ku on Peleliu bomb Del M
onte, Dansalang, and Malabang (apparently a chutai for each base). In addition t
o this, 8xType 97 Kawanishi from the Toko Ku bomg Davao again and also 6xF1M fro
m Chitose made their own attacks against Del Monte. Two other F1M attacked Catab
ato, claiming a hangar destroyed, while other F1M claim to have destroyed a flyi
ng boat in the water at Dansalang. In actuality, this was most likely the flying
boat that had already sank several days prior from hitting a hidden rock and wa
s abandoned by Patrol Wing 10. Also, from Legaspi four reisen take off in two pa
irs to strafe Batangas airfield. Pilots Saeki and Izumi claimed to have destroye
d five fighters on the ground. Its possible they did destroy some trainers that
were left, or perhaps just holed P-26A that were already out of commission. At V
igan, a floatplane base is established. The planes stationed there were 6xF1M fr
om Sanuki Maru, 6xF1M and a E13A1 from Sanyo Maru, and 3xE7K from the light crui
sers Naka and Natori. Its unknown how long the planes operated here before retur
ning to their respective carriers. However, on 23 December it is known that the
Sanuki Maru had just arrived in Davao Harbor when Dutch Dornier Do 24 flying boa
ts arrived to bomb the harbor, and it had four of its F1M in the air to intercep
t. So, after at least a day the flying boats were returned mostly to their sourc
es it would seem. With the Davao area adequately under control, the eight Type 9
7 Kawanishi fly in to the newly established seaplane base at Tolo bay and begins
operating from here against Mindanao.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------22 December
General Homma's 14th Army began landing operations in Lingayen Gulf on t
his day, bringing on the main invasion of Luzon. It was a massive armada, and it

spelled the end for MacArthur's forces in the Philippines. At 12:30, Clark airb
ase was alerted that the Japanese were landing at Lingayen, and all members were
reported to stations with rifles; they were expecting parachute forces to land
at dawn. At about 3AM, eight pilots at Clark were called to go on a strafing mis
sion against Japanese troops at dawn which included Parker Gies, Joe Moore, Erwi
n Crellin, Kiefer White, Bob Duncan, Randy Keator, Percy Ramsey, and Jim Fossey.
The eight 20th Pursuiters reported in at the 24th PG HQ and then went down to t
he line. Since the squadron had only 6xP-40 in commission, they drew lots with D
uncan and Fossey losing (or winning?). The 17th Pursuit also had 6xP-40 in commi
sion at Clark, including four with wing bombs attached. Steve Crosby had flown o
ne of them to Clark the day before from Nichols. Buzz Wagner now assigned pilots
to the six fighters. In addition to himself, he chose Crosby, Red Sheppard, Geo
rge Kiser, Bill Hennon, and Walt Wilcox. With Wagner in the lead, the 12xP-40 to
ok off in the darkness at 5:45, approximately an hour before dawn. After taking
off, the flight immediately went into a thick overcast in the dead of night and
became separated. Wagner and his wingman Bill Hennon, kept circling the airfield
, trying to form up with the rest of hte flight, but in the darkness, they could
not find the others. Finally, after about an hour circling in vain, they headed
for Lingayen together. Arriving over Lingayen at about 7:15, they noticed USAFF
E artillery firing at eight Japanese naval ships, including a cruiser. Proceedin
g up the beach of Lingayen, they then spotted some eighty to ninety transports i
n a long line extending four or five miles north from the town of Agoo. One line
was half a mile from shore while the other line which was a parallel to it was
three miles off shore. Close to shore were three lines of small boats and barges
that were busy discharging troops and supplies.
Wagner now peeled off, followed by Hennon. Their two P-40E carried 6x30 lb fragm
entation bombs under their wings. Hennon aimed his bombs at a group of boats off
shore and troops on the beach. In a fairly steep dive, he released in salvo at 1
500 ft. He couldn't observe the results, but he noticed Wagners had hit hte wate
rs edge near to the boats. The two of them began to strafe the Japanese on the b
each, who in return, fired at them with their rifles from prone positions. Durin
g the strafing, Hennon became separated from Wagner, and now Ki-27b of the 50th
Sentai came in after him; they had at least a chutai flying patrol over the inva
sion force. Chased by "seven" of them, Hennon climbed and headed into a cloud. W
hen he came out, he found there were even more of them above him at 6000 ft. Und
aunted, Hennon made one more pass at the troops, before heading into the mountai
ns to the east, with the Nates all around him. He managed to get under the cloud
s and headed down a valley to central Luzon and Clark. Meanwhile, Wagner flew ov
er the transports in an attempt to elude the fighters of the 50th Sentai and as
a result, met very heavy AA from both the beach and the ships. After strafing a
cruiser and a minesweeper, the CO was jumped by the nates. In a contest he had n
o hope of winning, they riddled his cowling. More damaging 7.7mm fire shattered
his windshield. One bullet hit his left shoulder and glass splinters and pieces
of metal cut his face and both eyes. By now, however, Ed Kiser and Walt Wilcox f
ound their CO and joined up with him, guiding him back as his vision was reduced
to his eye injuries.
Except for Wagner and Hennon, all of the twelve pilots arrived individually over
Lingayen, having never met up due to the darkness and heavy overcast. Steve Cro
sby met up with some other pilots over the landing beach and made several passes
, strafing landing barges until he exhausted his .50 caliber ammunition. Sixth 1
7th Pursuiter was Red Sheppard, who went in alone after the cargo and transport
vessels after arriving over Lingayen alone. After setting a transport afire, he
found a Ki-27 had latched onto his tail and was firing tracers past him. However
, by manuevering in steep dives, high G-turns, and "a sloppy immelmann" into the
overcast, Sheppard managed to shake him. Returning to the scene near the southe
rn end of hte bay, Sheppard spooted what he believed to be a destroyer and expen
ded his remaining ammunition at it in steep diving passes in the face of heavy A
A fire. By this time, his Allison engine was overheating, with pressure troubles

on all liquids because of hits scored earlier by the nate, so he now climbed ba
ck into the cloud cover in preparation for the return trip to Clark. Meanwhile,
of the six 20th Pursuiters, only Moore, Gies, and White managed to reach Lingaye
n. Gies dove out of the overcast at a "battleship and a destroyer," into the fac
e of heavy AA fire. After one pass, he went back into the clouds and then came d
own on the transports near the shore. But after two strafing passes, he found th
at few of his machineguns were working. He then decided to make his way back to
Clark. The other two 20th Pursuiters would have had similar experiences; no dama
ge inflicted (if any had been inflicted) was going to stem the Japanese tide in
the slightest.
Wagner, in spite of his eye injuries managed to land his P-40E back at Clark. He
was taken to the 20th Pursuits camp where medical officer Johnny Rizzolo took t
he biggest piece of glass out of his eyes, then sent him over to Fort Stotsenbur
g hospital. His plane was out of commission, and he wasn't going to be flying in
the Philippines again. Sheppards plane was the only other one damaged from the
strafing attack, though Hennons did have a few holes in it. On approach to Clark
, his engine failed, forcing him to land dead stick. Upon examination, his plane
was found to have over 200 holes in it; it would never fly again. When Randy Ke
ator tried to land at Clark after aborting the mission, he found it closed in by
ground fog, so he headed south to Nichols to land. He arrived at 7:30, almost o
ut of gas, and began taxiing down the runway when bombs began falling; this was
the 8th Sentai. Keator quickly jumped out and made for cover as the Lily's let l
oose their bombs at 15,000 feet altitude. After the attack, Keator got back in h
is P-40E and started taiing it again to a revetment. Before they could make it,
the bombers were back again for a second pass; though bombs landed close, none h
it. Dave Obert took off on a previously scheduled recon to Legaspi in a P-40E af
ter the bombing of Nichols had finished. He saw no real activity except for two
reisen flying above the airfield. He was about to dive down on them, but decided
to test fire his guns first. When none fired, he was relieved he had decided to
check them first and then turned back for Nichols. That same day, Obert became
acting commander of the 17th Pursuit again, since Maurice Hughett had suffered a
n accident. Coming in to land a P-40 at Nielson, Hughett did not notice the barr
icades on the east-west runway in the dusk and plowed through an accumulation of
footlockers and other obstacles. The P-40's wheels collapsed and all his guns s
tarted to fire. The plane was wrecked, but Hughett was only slightly injured, th
ough enough for him to give Obert temporary command.
On the 22nd, only 14xB-17's of the 19th Bombardment Squadron were considered in
commission at Batchelor field in Australia. Because of the landings in Lingayen
Gulf, command decided to launch a, "maxium effort" against hte landings. Only ni
ne of the fourteen were deemed sufficiently servicable to take part in the raids
, and these had been flown to Del Monte on the 21st (the previous day) in the ev
ening. It was planned that they would attack the transports in the Lingayen Gulf
. They were to land at San Marcelino following the attacks to refuel and then re
turn to Australia. Because of the need to carry long-distance fuel tanks in thei
r bomb bays, the bombers carried only half their normal bombload; 4x500 lb bombs
instead of the usual eight. Maj.Cecil Combs was to lead the attack, but one eng
ine of his bomber failed to start at the departure time, and so command was give
n to Lt.Elmer Parsel. Shortly into the flight, Lt.Coats was obliged to return to
Del Monte, leaving only 4xB-17 to make the assault against the transports. As t
he four remaining bombers closed ranks to make some semblance of a formation, th
ey noticed a single Japanese fighter rising to intercept. They simply outclimbed
the fighter and lost him. Lt.Teats arrived over the Gulf on his own having beco
me separated; he spotted 14 fighters (Ki-27) climbing to intercept him. They ope
ned fire on his plane but no damage was inflicted and he was able to release his
bombs on the assemblage of shipping, though they would have missed. The other t
hree bombers escaped interception in the heavy clouds which partly obscured the
Japanese shipping. However, Japanese fighters (Bloody shambles call them reisen,
but it was most likely Ki-27 of either hte 24th or 50th Sentai) trailed them af

ter they had released their bombs (which all missed) as they headed for San Marc
elino. All four then set course for Ambon, NEI although Teats had to land at San
Jose airfield, Mindoro island to refuel before making it ot this destination. O
nce refueled, the quartet returned to Australia the following day. Members of th
e 3rd Pursuit, meanwhile, were waiting anxiously at Tanauan as they were expecti
ng the 6xB-17s to arrive in the early morning of 22 December. They had gone thro
ugh a long list of preparations for the expected arrival, though were dissapoint
ed the next day when no B-17s had arrived and they were sent back to their camp.

Japanese Operati
ons
As planned, the Army fighters provided cover for the invasion force at L
ingayen Gulf. The 50th Sentai flew 44 sorties during the day while the 24th Sent
ai flew 27 sorties in the prescribed schedule given above. In spite of their cov
er, they couldn't prevent the 17th Pursuit from strafing destroyer Nagatsuki and
a minesweeper killing one man and wounding eight. When the Americans arrived ov
er Lingayen (individually) with 9xP-40, it was the 3rd Chutai, 50th Sentai that
was patrolling the area. Corporal Anabuki claimed to have shot down Buzz Wagner'
s fighter, making it his first 'kill'. As stated, Wagner managed to make it back
to base, though wounded and his plane too damaged to fly again. Also, fighters
from the 50th Sentai managed to damage Red Sheppard's fighter enough that it wou
ld never fly again, in spite of it being able to make it back to base. While the
Americans claimed no Japanese fighters shot down, 1st Lieutenant Iguro Yoshihis
a and 2nd Lieutenant Tasumitsu Wada were reported missing. They died for unknown
reasons; perhaps operational failures of some kind or shot down by friendly AA.
Who knows ;/. The remaining combat patrols over the invasion force did not enc
ounter any more enemy fighters.
To support the 48th Division in its advance southward, the 10th Dokoritsu hikota
i provided ground support with its light bombers and the 16th Sentai made 33 sor
ties from its base at Tuguegarao. They attacked tanks and vehicles from Rabon an
d San Fabion with unknown results. A total of 17 aircraft between these two unit
s were damaged by ground fire to varying degrees, though they would all make it
back to base. Meanwhile, in an attempt to keep the American planes on the ground
, the 8th Sentai carried out attacks against airfields. The 8th Sentai attacked
Nichols field with 14xKi-48 at 0730 from 15,000 feet, making two bombing passes.
Its doubtful they inflicted any additional damage to the facility. Nevertheless
, the unit claimed 5 large, 2 medium, and 5 small aircraft destroyed. Then at 13
30, the 8th Sentai with 15xKi-48 nexst bombed Camp Murphy and Liban airfield fro
m 15,000 feet claiming 11 planes destroyed on the ground. Once again, its doubtf
ul any real damage was inflicted. During the day, the commander issued 5th Hiko
Shidan Operational Order A, No.158 which stated: All units are to continue opera
tions as planned. The 74th Kansatsu hikochutai is to move to Naguilian airfield,
while the 16th Sentai was to use Bantay airfield which was in the vicinity of V
igan. The 8th Sentai was to use San Nicholas airfield near Laoag, and it is on t
his day that the 14th Sentai returned to Koshun from Canton, to be under command
of the 5th Hiko shidan once more. It was ordered to fly bombing missions agains
t Limay the next day and airfields in the vicinity of Manila with its main stren
gth, using Tuguegarao and Nicholas airfields as their advanced bases.
The small Tainan Ku detachment at Legaspi made additional missions on this day.
Eight reisen again led by Lt.Kawamata flew from Legaspi to strafe Malabang, Cagu
ayan, Dansalang, Del Monte, Catabato, and Cebu. Two large aircraft were claimed
destroyed (a B-17 at Caguayan), while the same sunken and riddled PBY-4 at Dansa
lang was strafed. Its unknown if the aircraft was a B-17, and if it was, its unk
nown if it was destroyed. Once again, no aircraft were encountered in the air. T
he Kanoya Kokutai from Peleliu launched a raid against Cebu on this day, claimin

g to have sunk a 5000 ton vessel, and the Toko Ku operating from Tolo Bay near D
avao launched a raid against Cebu as well with 8xType 97 Kawanishi. The Chitose
launched 6xF1M which attacked Del Monte again, and 16 others attacked Caguayan,
claiming to have destroyed three more aircraft on the ground. A total of nine fl
ying boats were now based in Tolo Bay, Davao by the 22nd.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------23 December
The Army fighters provided cover for the invasion force as they continue
d to unload, in much the same fashion as they had the previous day. The 24th Sen
tai provided 31xKi-27b throughout the day while the 50th Sentai provided 33xKi-2
7b throughout the day. At least a Chutai was patrolling the area at all times an
d all flights arrived 5 minutes early so that the fleet was covered at all times
. During the day the 50th Sentai encountered several B-17 flying around the area
and attempted to intercept, though without success. At 1030, the 8th Sentai sen
t 16xKi-48 bombers to attack Clark, Del Carmen, and Batangas fields; I estimate
it was a Chutai per target. They claimed four large and three aircraft destroyed
at Clark and seven large and three medium aircraft destroyed at Del Carmen. A s
hotai, meanwhile, provided ground support for the advancing 48th Division. It en
countered some light tanks and reportedly destroyed 6 out of 10 encountered that
were moving north in the vicinity of San Jose. The 16th Sentai flew 21 sorties
supporting ground operations, attacking enemy positions and vehicles on roads; t
hey reported to have destroyed 21 armored cars. Also, elements of the 14th Senta
i flew to Tuguegarao field to begin basing there from their main base at Choshu,
Formosa. Operational Order No.160 placed the 14th Sentai under Group control an
d ordered it to fly strikes against airfields in Manila on the following day. Fo
r the Navy, the 1st Ku raided the Cavite wireless station with a Chutai, inflict
ed unknown damage. Meanwhile, a smaller convoy of 24 transports, a cruiser, and
six destroyers entered Lamon Bay to begin landing another detachment of the Japa
nese, in the hopes of cutting off a large portion of MacArthur's army. The trans
ports were covered by the Tainan Ku based at Legaspi as well as F1M from the sea
plane carrier Mizuho. Down in Mindanao, carrier Ryujo dispatched 7xType 96 Kanse
n and 2xType 97 (model N1's) to the airfield at Davao to provide the bases first
aircraft support. These would be temporarily based here while Ryujo headed Sout
h to support the Jolo invasion.
Four of the five B-17s remaining at Del Monte were prepared for a follow up atta
ck; one against a suspected Japanese base in western Mindanao, but the bomber th
en flew directly to Batchelor field when nothing was found. The other three B-17
s took off for Lingayen but failed to rendezvous, and aborted the mission, one b
ombing Davao on the way back to Australia. The efforts of these bombing raids ov
er the past two days was wasted; they achieved nothing.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------24 December
The landings at Lamon bay occured in the early morning of this day. Unit
s of the 5th hiko shidan continued operations as usual. The 76th HQ reconnaissan
ce chutai flew recon missions in the vicinity of Lamon Bay and hte airfields at
Limay, Clark, and Del Carmen. Throughout the day, the 50th Sentai flew 26 sortie

s while the 24th Sentai flew 31 sorties to cover the landing areas against Ameri
can fighters. The 8th Sentai flew 11 sorties while the 16th Sentai flew 14 sorti
es; both in support of the 48th Division and claimed to have destroyed fifty veh
icles in the vicinity of Cabanatuan. The 10th dokoritsu hikotai also provided su
pported the 48th division. The 8th Sentai also provided a shotai of their light
bombers to support the 16th Division, and claimed to have destroyed ten enemy ve
hciles in the vicinity of pagbilao. In addition, 4xKi-48 from the 8th sentai als
o bombed Clark at 1200 from an altitude of 19,700 ft claiming to have destroyed
seven large and four small aircrafted concealed in the forrest. The 8th Sentai l
ost one plane on this day from an unknown cause. The 14th Sentai flew 17 sorties
in attacking Limay and Camp Murphy, claiming to have destroyed six large and th
ree small enemy planes on the Camp Murphy Field. Meanwhile, several Type 97 Kawa
nishi operating from Legaspi began patroling the area between Legaspi and Lamon
Bay, aiding the 10th dokoritsu hikotai. The 1st Kokutai raided Mainla Harbour an
d Mariveles with its Type 96 Rikko, claiming to have sunk a 7000 ton vessel at M
ariveles, but little else was seen. Most of the shipping in the area had already
fled.
Late in the morning, Joe moore was asking for four volunteers at the 20th PS cam
p off Clark Field. The FEAF was now aware that the Japanese had landed at Lamon
Bay and decided to oppose it with 4xP-35A and 4xP-40 which were all based at Cla
rk. Marshall Anderson volunteered to lead the flight of P-35A, which was selecte
d to attack the Japanese first. Also volunteering were Anderson squadron amtes T
ex Marble, Bill Carter, and LaMar Gillet who was from the 17th Pursuit. The four
P-35A were hidden behind Clark in an area of trees. Each had an inch of dust on
the outside and a quarter of an inch inside. None had functioning radios. The p
ilots taxied and then took off from Clark. They arrived over Mauban area at abou
t noon and went below the overcast for strafing attacks on Japanese shipping and
the troops on the shore. Suddenly, several reisen broke through the overcast an
d engaged the P-35A. These were the reisen of the Tainan Ku operating from Legas
pi airfield.

25-28 December
The Army Air Units provided strategic support for the Army main conquest
down Luzon, so the naval air units were left to targets of their choice and so
from 25th to the 28th of December the Rikko units on Taiwan attacked Allied ship

ping in Manila Bay.

28 December
An advanced echelon of 10 Type 1 Rikko's from the Kanoya Ku which was th
en stationed at Peleliu in the Palau Islands transfered to the newly captured ai
rfield at Davao, on the south coast of Mindanao.

1942
*2-8 January*
The Takao Ku transfered 23 of its Type 1 Rikko bombers to Jolo Island. T
he facilities were not sufficient to operate a large airgroup.
3 January
After a raid against Corrigedor, one Type 1 Rikko is forced to make a la
nding at Vigan airfield after AA fire had damaged its fuel tanks.
4 January
During another raid against corrigador, a Type 1 Rikko is shot down over
by one of the few remaining P-40s on Bataan.
5 January
The remaining aircraft of the Kanoya Ku on Peleliu transfer to the captu
red airfield at Davao. 3 out of 4 J2F-2 "Duck" of Utility Squadron 10 are destro
yed this day at Mariveles Bay. The 4th Duck has a dead engine and is concealed i
n brush until repaired. It flys out on midnight of 9 April, 1941 just hours befo
re Baatan surrenders.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Resource
s
- William H. Bartsch. Doomed at the Start: American Pursuit Pilots in th
e Philippines, 1941-1942
- Saburo Sakai. Samurai!
- Dwight R. Messimer. In the Hands of Fate: The Story of Patrol Wing Ten
8 December 1941- 11 May, 1942
- Osamu Tagaya. Mitsubishi Type 1 Rikko 'Betty' Units of World War 2
- W.G. Winslow. The Fleet the Gods Forgot: The U.S. Asiatic Fleet in Wor
ld War II.

- Japanese Monograph Number 11. Philippines Air Operations Record.

- Martin Bowman. B-17 Flying Fortress Units of the Pacific War.
- Niehorster.org