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SEC 6

MACEDA VS. VASQUEZ


Petitioner Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda seeks the review of the
following orders of the office of the Ombudsman:
1.) The order dated September 18, 1991 denying ex parte motion
refer to the SC filed by the Petitioner and
2.) The order dated November 22, 1951 denying the petitioner's
motion for reconsideration and directing petitioners to file his
counter affidavit and other controverting evidences.
In his affidavit-complaint, respondent Napoleon Abiera asserts that
petitioner falsely certified that all civil and criminal cases which
have been submitted for decision or determination for a period of
90 days have been determined and decided on or before January
31, 1998 where in truth and in fact, petitioner knew that no
decision had been rendered in the cases that have been submitted
for decision. Respondent Abiera further alleged that petitioner
similarly falsified his certificate of service.
Petitioner counters that he had been granted by this court an
extension of 90 days to decide said cases, and that the
Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case since the offense
charged arose from the judge's performance of his official duties,
which is under control of this Court.
ISSUE: Whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain
criminal complaints for the alleged falsification of a judge's
certification submitted to the supreme court to the SC, and
assuming that it can, whether a referral should be made first to the
SC.
HELD: The Court disagrees with the first part if the petitioners basic
argument, there is nothing in the decision in Orap that would
restrict it only to offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his
official duties. A judge who falsifies his certificate is

administratively liable to the SC for serious misconduct and


inefficiency under Sec. 1 Rule 140 of the rules of Court and
criminally liable to the state under the revised Penal Code for his
felonious Act.
However, we agree with petitioner that in the absence of any
administrative action taken against him by this Court with regard
to his certificate of service, the investigation being conducted by
the Ombudsman over all courts and its personnel, in violation of
the doctrine of separation of powers.
Articles VIII, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the
SC administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel,
from the presiding Justice of the CA that can oversee the judge's
and court personnel's compliance commit any violation thereof. No
other branch of government may intrude into this power, without
running afoul of the doctrine separation of power.
The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the
powers granted to it by Constitution, for such a justification not
only runs counter to the specific mandate of the constitution
grating supervisory powers to SC overall courts and their
personnel, but likewise undermines the independence of the
judiciary.
Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's
certificate of service to this court for determination of whether said
certificate reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the
Court has the necessary records to make such determination. The
Ombudsman cannot compel this court, as one of the three
branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its
personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by public
respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint.
The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is evident in this
case. Administratively, the question before us is this, should a
judge, having been granted by this court an extension of time to
decide before him, report these cases in his certificate of service.
As this question had not yet been raised these cases less resolved

by, this Court how could be the Ombudsman resolve the present
criminal complaint that requires the resolution of this question.
In fine, where the criminal complaint against a judge or other court
employees arises from their administrative duties, the ombudsman
must defer action on said complaints and refer the same to this
Court for determination whether said judge or court employee had
acted within the scope of their administrative duties.
Wherefore, the instant petition is hereby granted. The Ombudsman
is hereby directed to dismiss the complaint filed by the public
respondent Atty. Napoleon Abiera and to refer the same to this
court for appropriate action.
Raquiza v. Judge Castaeda, Jr.
The cases involves a petition to order the transfer of Special
Proceedings No. 6824 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
(Testate Estate of the late Don Alfonso Castellvi) from the sala of
respondent judge, Hon. Mariano Castaeda to another branch and
administrative complaint against the same judge for (1) violation of
the Anti-Graft Law (2) rendering decision knowing it to be unjust

and illegal (3) extortion by means of oppression and (4) bribery.


The court refers the administrative complaint to Justice Bautista of
CA for investigation. After the conduct of the investigation, Justice
Bautista recommends the dismissal of the charges against the
respondent judge for lack of merit.
ISSUE: WON there is a basis on the recommendation of the
investigator to dismiss the complaint of the petitioner.
HELD: The Court reviewed the records, testimonies of the
witnesses, and other evidences submitted by the parties and find
the recommendation of the investigator as fully supported with
enough evidence to merit the dismissal of the complaint against
the respondent judge. The court held that a ground for removal of
a judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable doubt
most specially if it involves misconduct, corruption and
incompetence.

SEC 7

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