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Contemporary Ethical Theories and Jurisprudence
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CONTEMPORARY
AND
ETHICAL
THEORIES
JURISPRUDENCE
George Nakhnikian
(1) What are the definitions and premises which will permit us to
view the contents of the legal order (i.e., the legal propositions or precepts
or any part of them) as a logically (in the syllogistic sense) self-consistent
system? [Analytical Jurisprudence.]
(2) What is the ideal, or what are the ideals, to which we ought to seek
to make the legal order conform? What ought it to do for the men
whose conduct it governs? [Ethical Jurisprudence.]
(3) What are the actual effects of the law upon the attitudes and behavior
of the men whose conduct it governs, and what are the effects of these2
attitudes and behavior upon the legal order? [Sociological Jurisprudence.]
Of these three subdivisions of jurisprudence, only the first and the second
are directly affected by ethical theory.
Contemporary ethics in turn divides into ethical theory and normative
ethics. Ethical theory concerns itself with such questions as these: What is
the semiotical status (roughly, the "meaning") of ethical words such as
'good,' 'right,' 'duty,' 'obligation'? Can any one of such terms be an adequate
primitive for defining the rest? Can ethical terms be defined in nonethical
1.
2.
GEORGE NAKHNIKIAN
terms? Are ethical sentences judgments capable of being true or false? Are
they, like the statements in the field of the natural sciences, confirmed or
"disconfirmed" by the evidence obtained from experimentation and observation? These and similar questions which may be asked in ethical theory are
questions about the typical meanings or standard functions of, and logical
connections among, certain words and sentences. They are not questions
about what we ought to do or what we ought to value.
Questions about what we ought to do and value are normative questions.
Traditionally such questions have been regarded as belonging to normative
ethics or moral philosophy. Normative ethics is that branch of philosophy
which seeks to discover, justify, and communicate normative principles (rules
of conduct, rules enjoining certain kinds of disposition, etc.) which are
objective.3 These are some familiar examples of purportedly objective
principles about values and obligations: Happiness is the highest good; Truth
telling is an unconditional duty; Whenever a conflict exists between one's
prima facie obligation to keep a promise and his prima facie obligation to
relieve suffering, the latter obligation is his actual duty. Whether or not a
normative principle is objective and in what sense objective is one of the
problems of ethical theory. Those who deny that normative ethics is a
theoretical investigation (i.e., an investigation capable of yielding objective
conclusions) do not deny that we utter moral judgments. What they in
effect deny is that such utterances are objective. The issues here involved
will be explained below.
Any conclusion reached regarding the objectivity of normative utterances
has certain consequences for the status and procedures of ethical jurisprudence.
If we accept a philosophy which countenances normative ethics, in our
ethical jurisprudence we shall have to look for philosophically established
norms by which to criticize legal norms. This is a logical consequence of
our definitions of 'jurisprudence' and 'normative ethics.' The appeal to
natural law as the justifying ground of legal rules is a case in point. Natural
law theories seek to prove (a) that normative ethics is a theoretical discipline,
a kind of science, and (b) that from purely factual premises, be they scientific
or metaphysical, it is possible to come to ethical conclusions. It is held that
the factual premises are not merely psychologically persuasive. They are
logical reasons for accepting the ethical conclusions. Every one of the ethical
3. The notion of objectivity is complicated by the many senses of the word "objective."
For our purposes, we shall take it that a principle is objective if, and only if, there are
justifying grounds for adopting it. Moreover, those justifying grounds must entitle us to
say truly that the principles they justify are criteria for criticizing the ethical validity of a
given moral code. For, unless this second condition is satisfied, we can criticize principles
only within a moral code. We can never criticize a moral code as a whole.
GEORGE NAKHNIKIAN
(1951).
60 PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW 44
In
this sense, any ethical theory is naturalistic if it claims to define ethical words by nonethical
words, scientific or otherwise, and/or claims to derive, deductively or inductively, ethical
sentences from nonethical sentences, scientific or otherwise. In this sense of the word, a
theological ethics which defines 'X is good' as 'X is what God wills' is naturalistic. According to the usage here adopted, however, John Dewey is an ethical naturalist; a theological
ethical theorist is not. We could equally well render this sense of "ethical naturalism" by
the label "ethical empiricism."
6. E.g., A. C. Ewing, C. D. Broad, G. E. Moore, Sir David Ross.
7. E.g., A. J. Ayer, R. Carnap.
GEORGE NAKHNIKIAN
maximum good'), so that statements about duties would also turn out to be
empirically verifiable.
If naturalistic ethical theories are correct, their first consequence is that
normative ethics is possible. If ethical judgments are cognitive and empirical,
they can be discovered, justified, communicated by the same devices as those
used in the physical and social sciences. Reasonable men can debate matters
of moral principle objectively, antecedently assured that in time agreement
can be achieved on what is true or false in morals. For even a general first
principle of normative ethics such as the principle of utility is put forth by
some naturalistic moral philosophers not as an arbitrary axiom nor as a selfevident truth, but as an empirically justifiable "hypothesis." Being a first
principle, the utility principle cannot be deduced from a more basic principle.
But there may be other ways of empirically "justifying" first principles. "Is
the principle of utility susceptible of any direct proof?" asks Bentham. "It
should seem not: for that which is used to prove everything else, cannot itself
be proved: a chain of proofs must have their commencement somewhere.
To give such proof is as impossible as needless." 8 Nevertheless, the utility
principle can in some manner be justified. A moral principle has to be
practical; it has to be capable of determining and guiding conduct by resolving conflicts among less general principles. Bentham's argument in favor of
the utility principle simply comes down to this. Since human beings are (i)
motivated by desire for pleasure and aversion from pain and (ii) capable of
unselfish conduct, the Principle of Utility is the only principle which can
function as an ultimate norm. There is no other principle which could be
ultimate and practical. 9 More generally speaking, Bentham's "proof" may
be phrased as follows: Given the data of morality, including moral disagreements and the disputes they engender, the utility principle is the most useful
"hypothesis" so far proposed for systematizing the data of morality coherently
among themselves and in relation to nonmoral facts, as well as for providing
a psychologically realistic regulative principle for the undogmatic and reasonable discussion of moral disagreements.
Whether Bentham's defense is cogent or not is not here in question. What
interests us is (1) the considered opinion of a representative naturalistic
moral philosopher that first principles of conduct can be justified; and (2)
the proposed manner of justification, which is very different from the a priori
8. J. BENTHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION C. 1,
para. 11.
9. Cf. Hall, The "Proof" of Utility in Bentham and Mill, 60 ETHICS, No. 1 (Oct., 1949),
esp. pp. 13 ff. Also my Intrinsic Good and the Ethical Ought, 51 JOURNAL OP PHILOSOPHY
788 (1954), esp. pp. 792-94. Also my Value and Obligation in Mill, 62 ETHICS 33 (1951).
GEORGE NAKHNIKIAN
legal systems. For example, the logical structure of English law may not
coincide (be isomorphic) with that of German law. One would first have
to codify logically restricted legal domains and then look to see whether
or not the logical structures they exhibit have anything in common.
There are serious reasons for doubting that legal domains are capable of
logical axiomatization in the way that mathematics is. There are competent
scholars who aver that by its nature the law is disjointed, loosely knit and
"unfinished," in ways that mathematics is not. At any rate, no one to date
has attempted a rigorous axiomatization of legal domains. But the issues
involved have not been fully explored; and until they are, the question must
remain open. This is one of the principal problems of analytical jurisprudence.
II
P. B. Rice, Ethical Empiricism and its Critics, 62 PHILOS. REv. 355 (1953).
13. See his book, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (Macmillan, 1953). For an illuminating commentary on Wittgenstein's attack on Platonistic theories of meaning, see Paul
Feyerabend, Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, 64 PHILOS. REv. 449 (1955).
GEORGE NAKHNIKIAN
GEORGE NAKHNIKIAN
III
Next on our list are the non-cognitivists. This group consists of the Logical
Positivists, C. L. Stevenson, and the Oxford philosophers of ordinary language
('Oxford philosophers' for short).
The Logical Positivists are typically represented by A. J. Ayer in his
Language, Truth and Logic. Ayer agrees with G. E. Moore and the intuitionists at large that naturalistic definitions of ethical terms are faulty for the
reason advanced by the intuitionists: the normative force of the definiendum
has no counterpart in the definiens. But Ayer's explanation of this is very
different from the intuitionists'. We recall that for intuitionism the normative
meaning of normative words derives from their naming some nonnatural
normative property. Ayer's explanation is that normative words are "pseudoconcepts." They do not name any qualities or relations, either empirical or
logical. And, since for Ayer genuine concepts are either empirical or logical,
ethical concepts are not genuine concepts at all. Normatively functioning
concepts and sentences are "purely 'emotive.'"
For Ayer, there are two
dimensions of meaning, the cognitive and the emotive. The empirically
verifiable and the logically certifiable exhaust the cognitive. All else is
emotive. To say that an expression is emotive means that it either evinces or
arouses an emotion. To evince an emotion is distinct from stating that one
has the emotion. A blush, a yawn, an interjection, a stimulus, "whoa" to
move a horse, a command to a man, "Stand up !"-all are lumped together
into the emotive (non-cognitive) category. They assert nothing, not even
about feelings. They merely evince feeling.
Words like 'good,' 'bad,' 'ought,' 'lovely,' 'worthy,' are, from this view,
like blushes and yawns. "If I say to someone, 'you acted wrongly in stealing
that money,' I am not stating anything more than if I had simply said, 'You
stole that money.' In adding that this action is wrong I am not making any
further statement about it. . . . If now I generalize my previous statement
and say, 'stealing money is wrong,' I produce a sentence which has no factual
meaning-that is, expresses no proposition which can be either true or false.
It is as if I had written 'Stealing money! !'-where the shape and thickness
of the exclamation marks show, by a suitable convention, that a special sort
of moral disapproval is the feeling which is being expressed." IS
Ayer is careful to point out that it is only the normative use of 'X is
18.
GEORGE NAKHNIKIAN
GEORGE NAKHNIKIAN
GEORGE NAKHNIKIAN
267 (1944).
Sears." Philosophers who recognize arguments of this type admit that they
are neither deductive nor inductive. They call such arguments ethical inferences. Now the logical positivists would rule out as meaningless such ethical
inferences, because for them an inference is either inductive or deductive.
Stevenson does not go this far. He agrees with the logical positivists that
this type of inference is not subject to the valid-invalid distinction. But this
fact does not make meaningless the very concept of this sort of inference.
Instead of trying to include these patterns of inference among the formal
deductive or inductive patterns, he classifies them as persuasive patterns.
Factual reasons are often powerfully persuasive. They are successful in
redirecting attitudes. Roughly, in a logical argument, the end result is a
cognition. In a persuasive argument the end result is an attitude.
On the whole, the consequences of Stevenson's ethical theory for jurisprudence are the same as those of logical positivism. For analytical jurisprudence, the consequences are these: any adequate analysis of normative
legal concepts must take into account their emotive meaning. There are
no natural or nonnatural normative properties. The normative function of
normative legal terms and of normative legal principles is determined by their
capacity to arouse attitudes in interpreters. So far in the analysis, there is
no reason why the syntax of the language of the law could not be formalized,
or why we should not codify as much of the legal system as lends itself to
codification within a formal logic sufficiently enriched to handle sentences of
the imperative family.
Stevenson's theory rules out normative ethics as a theoretical discipline.
The answers to the ethical jurisprudential questions are not contained in
some objective ethical norms, but rest in some persuasive methods whereby
it is hoped agreement in attitudes can be reached.
GEORGE NAKHNIKIAN
Let us now proceed to the Oxford philosophers. I have included the
Oxford ordinary language philosophers among the non-cognitivists because
they deny the central theses of naturalism and intuitionism. In this they
agree with Stevenson and the logical positivists. Oxford philosophy represents
a revolutionary conception of philosophical activity. Its influence is growing
daily, and its conception of how we should philosophize has far-reaching consequences for the methodology of analytical and ethical jurisprudence. These
are two important reasons for becoming familiar with their views.2
Philosophers of the Oxford persuasion who have written important books
or articles bearing upon ethical theory include S. Toulmin,3 0 R. M. Hare,3 1
H. P. Nowell-Smith,3 2 J. 0. Urmson, Stuart Hampshire, J. L. Austin, and
H. L. A. Hart. Of these men, Hart is the only specialist in jurisprudence.
He is currently Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford.
Hart is exclusively concerned with the problems of analytical jurisprudence. In the immediately following paragraphs, I shall report what it is
that Hart is trying to do in the field of analytical jurisprudence. I shall
then consider the views of Toulmin and Hare as they relate to the problems
of ethical jurisprudence.
I shall refer to two of Hart's papers. The first paper, "The Ascription of
Responsibility and Rights," appeared in 1951. 3 3 The second paper is Hart's
inaugural address at Oxford, delivered in May, 1953, on the occasion of his
assuming the chair of Jurisprudence. 3 4 I shall use the first paper as a
commentary on the second.
The task of analytical jurisprudence, according to Hart, is to dispel the
perplexities which confront us when we realize that we know perfectly well
how to operate with legal concepts and yet we. do not understand them.
This sort of perplexity cannot be resolved by consulting dictionaries. Nor
can they be resolved by citing examples of rights, contracts, corporations and
the like. A competent student of the law knows the dictionary definitions
and can recognize examples of rights and the like. Yet he is puzzled, and he
is puzzled because legal words, compared with ordinary words, are in different
35
ways anomalous.
29. For more examples and a somewhat general characterization of the new Oxford movement, see Gilbert Ryle, Ordinary Language, 62 'PHILOS. REv. 167, and Morris Weitz,
Oxford Philosophy, id. at 187 (1953). These papers will suggest further reading for those
whose curiosity may be aroused.
30.
31.
32.
33.
ESSAYS
34.
35.
QUARTERLY
REVIEw 37 (1954).
One anomaly is illustrated by the words 'legal right.' Hohfeld has distinguished four species under the general category of legal rights: right,
privilege, power, and immunity. Is the word 'right' applied to these four
very different species a mere homonym? We have a pre-analytic conviction
that the word is not a mere homonym, and that there is a principle behind
the application. Yet we are at a loss to say just what that principle is.
Another anomaly of some legal words is that unlike words such as 'chair' or
'horse' they have no obvious counterparts in the world. And so the traditional
theories propose certain unobvious counterparts. The legal Platonists propose
disembodied universals. The American Realists aver that the word 'right'
refers to our predictions as to the probable behavior of courts or officials. The
Scandinavian jurists say that a right is a fictitious entity.
These attempts, according to Hart, are misleading. They formulate the
problems in the form of questions such as these: What is law? What is a
state? What is a right? What is possession? But these are requests for
definitions. These requests, in turn, presuppose that legal concepts are
capable of being defined by specifying necessary and sufficient conditions for
their application. Formulating the problem in this manner, Hart thinks, has
led at certain points to a divorce between jurisprudence and the study of
the law at work. It has created the impression that certain fundamental
legal concepts cannot be elucidated "without entering a forbidding jungle of
philosophical argument." The remedy Hart suggests is to take a fresh look
at the ways in which these legal concepts do their work in the language of
the law as it exists. The philosopher's job is to elucidate these specialized
functions. This is an application of the methodological principle espoused
by Oxford philosophers: to be clear about what law, contract, etc. are is to
be clear about the ways in which the words 'law,' 'contract,' etc. are used in
legal language.
The basic reason why it is futile to try to define legal terms by reference
to necessary and sufficient conditions for their application is that in the
language of the law legal terms perform functions which are radically unlike
the way words or phrases such as 'chair' or 'heavier than' do their work.
This latter class of words is used to describe facts or name publicly observable
things and properties. We are in no doubt as to the general class to which
chairs belong. It is, therefore, possible, if we so choose, to look for the specific
differences between chairs, tables, stools and the like. It is, in short, possible
to give a definition of 'chair' in terms of a genus and a differentia which are
necessary and sufficient for the application of the word. A phrase like 'heavier
than' can also be defined in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. In
this case, however, the-necessary and sufficient formal conditions are not given
GEORGE NAKHNIKIAN
wallet.' In the present context, 'This is your wallet' ascribes a right, and
any such ascription is defeasible. Moreover, my unofficial utterance is, nevertheless, like the utterance of a judge in court. It is a conclusion of law.
In a different context, 'This is yours' can function primarily and, indeed,
purely descriptively, as for instance when I say 'Yes' to a patient who is just
coming out of anesthesia and who asks me if the hand he sees on his bedsheet
is his. It is the context that determines the function. In legal contexts,
sentences used to ascribe responsibilities and sentences used to make claims
or confer rights are alike in that they are all defeasible.
Let us return to the example from contracts to see how Hart supports
his thesis that legal concepts are not susceptible of definition by necessary and
sufficient conditions. In the first place, the distinction between the positive
(i.e., necessary) conditions for the prima facie existence of a contract and the
defenses is legal and not formal. Call the positive conditions 'P-conditions'
and the defenses 'D-conditions.' We can always make a conjunction of the
P-conditions with the negated D-conditions. Thus we can say a contract
exists if, and only if, P 1 P 2 P 3 Di D2 D2 ... Dn. Formally, there is no
difference between, say, P, and D1 . If either P1 fails or D1 fails, the contract is either voidable or weakened. But, as the law actually works, there
is a legal difference between the P- and the D-conditions. The P-conditions
are determined by legal precedent to be necessary for the prima facie existence
of a contract. A lawyer does not file action in contract if one of the Pconditions is clearly absent. The D-conditions usually come up later when
the case is before the judge and jury. Legally, then, the list of P-conditions
is complete. This is not to say, of course, that decisions as to the existence
or absence of any of the P-conditions are mechanical. Words like 'offer'
and 'acceptance' are vague. Their application sometimes calls for legal
decision. But this vagueness is also shared by the D-conditions. The significant respect in which the P- and D-conditions differ is that the D-conditions
are not spelled out in exact detail. The conjunction P1 P2 P3 D1 D2 D 3
. Dn
D is open-ended. In a book on contracts we may find what looks like
an exhaustive list of defenses. But the language in which they are stated does
not supply the judge with mechanical criteria of application. For example,
one defense is undue influence. This is an umbrella term which covers a
multiplicity of particular facts which may have nothing in common except
that they come under the same rule. It will not do to say that the term 'undue
influence' is meant to rule out some positive condition such as the absence of
a state of mind characterized as 'full and free consent.' The judge decides
only on the publicly supportable evidence. His job is not to take the evidence
of economic pressure. or social pressure as evidence for the existence of a
GEORGE NAKHNIKIAN
common state of mind induced by these two dissimilar types of coercion. The
legal cash value of undue influence is just the proved fact of some particular
pressure, social, economic or otherwise: "...
the defense, e.g., that B entered
into a contract with A as a result of the undue influence exerted upon him by
A, is not evidence of the absence of a factor called 'true consent,' but one of
the multiple criteria for the use of the phrase 'no true consent."' 3 6 To say,
then, that P 1 P 2 P 3 D1 D 2 53 is open-ended is to call attention to this fact,
namely, that no exhaustive and detailed list of defenses can be supplied
antecedently to any particular occasion of a judge's decision. This is different
from saying that umbrella terms are vague or ambiguous. When new defenses
are legally made to fall under the rule of undue influence, this in no way
affects the vagueness or ambiguity of the phrase 'undue influence.'
This peculiarity of the open-endedness of the defeating conditions rules
out the possibility of defining a word such as 'contract' as used in the law
by reference to necessary and sufficient conditions. Hence any theory which
rides upon the back of such definitions is bound to misrepresent the practice
and procedure of the law.
The proper method of elucidating such legal words as 'contract,' 'right,'
and the like is to ask not: What is a contract? What is a right? The proper
way is first to elicit the conditions under which decisions such as 'A has a
contract with B' or 'A has a right with respect to B' are true and, second,
to describe the peculiar job that such utterances perform in legal discourse.
As a model of this sort of analysis, Hart gives an elucidation or analysis of
'a legal right.'
(1) A statement of the form 'X has a legal right' is true if the following
conditions are satisfied:
(a) There is in existence a legal system [with all that this implies
by way of general obedience, the operation of the sanctions of the
system and the general likelihood that this will continue].
(b) Under a rule or rules of the system some other person Y is, in
the events which have happened, obliged to do or abstain from
some action.
(c) This obligation is made by law dependent on the choice either
of X or some other person authorized to act on his behalf so that
either Y is bound to do or abstain from some action only if X (or
some authorized person) so chooses or alternatively only until X (or
such person) chooses otherwise.
(2) A statement of the form 'X has a right' is used to draw a conclusion
3T
of law in a particular case which falls under such rules.
36.
37.
Op. czt. supra, note 34 at 49. The bracketed material is interpolated from id. at 42.
GEORGE NAKHNIKIAN
fore used to predict the future as the American Realists say; it refers to the
present . . . but unlike ordinary statements does not do this by describing
present or continuing facts." 4 1 (3) The assertion 'X has a right' stated by
a judge in deciding the case has a different meaning than the like statement
uttered out of court. The judge's utterance is official, authoritative, and, let
us assume, final. The utterance out of court is none of these. Still, in spite
of these differences, the statements are alike; they are both conclusions of
law. Be they official or unofficial, they are decisions made by appealing to
relevant rules and relevant facts, but they neither mention nor describe either
the rules or the facts. They thus perform a special job, which is different
from the job done by descriptive or emotive utterances. (4) "In any system,
legal or not, rules may... attach identical consequences to any one of a set
of very different facts." 42 Take the game of baseball: you are "out" if
you either struck out, popped out, or are tagged out. No two of these ways
of being "out" need have anything in common except that they come under
the same rule which attaches identical consequences to them, namely, that you
stop playing until your next turn comes up.
What Hart is doing here is typical of the Oxford analysts. Philosophical
analysis aims to elucidate language, and the way to elucidate is to see, in
typical contexts, how whatever you are trying to elucidate is typically
employed. Thus, the evaluative use of 'good' is to prescribe or commend.
Any analysis which overlooks this linguistic fact or proposes a use for 'good'
not in conformity with its standard use is ipso facto wrong. The task of the
philosopher is not "to devise or sanction linguistic usages-especially when
this activity involves misrepresenting our existing concepts. It is more his
business to analyze the sense of [the concept in question] (and the criteria
[for its application]), which are already implicit in our ethical discussions, and
whose existence cannot be explained away . . ." 43
The Oxford analysts deny that ethical words are, simply descriptive or
simply prescriptive. They maintain, however, that the prescriptive meaning
of these words is primary. R. M. Hare, for instance, argues that the prescriptive sense remains constant for every class of objects whereas the descriptive
sense varies with each class; that the descriptive sense can be made to change
by using the prescriptive sense, but not vice versa; and that it is possible to
teach the typically prescriptive sense of 'good' in total isolation from any
of its descriptive functions. Moreover, when 'good' is used purely descrip41.
42.
Id. at 43.
43.
S. TOULMIN,
Id. at 44.
bridge, 1950).
(Cam-
The Oxford philosophers' distinction between the prescriptive or commendatory meaning of 'good' and other evaluative words and the empirical
44. R. M.
GEORGE NAKHNIKIAN
GEORGE NAKHNIKIAN
cannot; for, by hypothesis, each has made a rationally grounded choice. The
basic mistake of traditional normative ethics has been the belief that there is
a higher criterion for judging ultimate commitments which are rational in
the above sense. According to Oxford philosophers, there are good reasons
for making ultimate moral commitments; but these good reasons are not
objective in the sense that traditional normative ethics would have it. Ultimate
moral choices, although based on cognitions, are themselves not cognitions
but decisions. And the moral principles which are the linguistic correlates
of these decisions are not descriptions of scientific or metaphysical states of
affairs. They are injunctions as to how to live. This is the fundamental
reason why it is proper to classify the Oxford analysts as non-cognitivists.
As in the case of Stevenson and the logical positivists the non-cognitivism
of the Oxford philosophers does not prevent them from uttering normative
injunctions. Moral exhortation is one thing. Philosophical analysis is something else. Moral exhortation is not the proper function of a philosopher in
the role of a philosopher. Like everyone else, the non-cognitivists, too, have
moral convictions. What needs to be emphasized, however, is that on noncognitivist views these moral convictions are not objectively true statements
describing scientific or metaphysical facts.
The extrusion of normative ethics from philosophy makes a difference to
ethical jurisprudence. If normative ethics is not a theoretical science, the
validity of legal norms cannot be established by "higher" objective norms
discovered by recondite philosophical investigations. In particular, the rejection of normative ethics amounts to a wholesale removal of natural law
theories from jurisprudence.
Let us recall that natural law theorists are ultimately in search of a consistent way of deriving the "ought" from the "is." They seek to do this
in such a way that the objective validity of one and only one ethical code
would follow as a corollary. These theories are overtly or covertly premised
upon the assumption that there is such a thing as the nature or essence of
man. This premise coupled with the premise that man ought to live in
accordance with that essence implies that there is one and only one correct
way to live. This amounts to believing in the possibility of normative
ethics. Even though some Oxford philosophers countenance the passage
from the descriptive ("is") to the prescriptive ("ought"),46 this is not enough
to sustain natural law. All Oxford philosophers agree that there is no "nature
of man" in the sense just described, and therefore that normative ethics is
not possible. This is the root of their quarrel with natural law.
46. E.g., S. Hampshire, Fallacies in Moral Philosophy, 58 MIND 466 (1949) and Toulmin,
op. cit. supra, note 43.
GEORGE NAKHNIKIAN
tenet that normative ethics is a science. In matters of science there are criteria
entitling us to say that even though a certain individual or group disbelieves
a certain statement, the evidence is such that he or the group ought to believe
that statement. We do not wait for universal agreement before we feel that
we are justified in making this judgment. I do not see that d'Entrbves has
succeeded in showing that analogous judgments can be made in morals. The
non-cognitivists argue that they cannot. The Oxford non-cognitivists argue
this point by trying to show that the logic of the language of morals is
radically different from the logic of the language of science.
The Oxford rejection of normative ethics has a second consequence for
ethical jurisprudence. Philosophers of the Oxford persuasion would not be
too happy with the generality of the central question of ethical jurisprudence.
As it is usually formulated, that question is: What is the ideal or what are
the ideals which we ought to realize through law? They would rather prefer
to ask less general questions: What sort of law ought we to pass when faced
by a more or less definitely specifiable situation X? According to Stephen
Toulmin, for instance, such a question can be morally answered on two
grounds alone: (a) That we ought to do Y in situation X, because this is
what some principle of the moral code of the society in which situation X
exists demands; or (b) We ought to do Y because that is most conducive
to the welfare of the others in the community.49 We cannot, Toulmin insists,
ask why we should give (a) or (b) as an ultimate good reason, for to give an
ultimate good reason is to give either (a) or (b). By way of interpolation,
let me suggest that (b) is more fundamental than (a). Otherwise we would
have difficulty in explaining the fact that we sometimes approve moral rebels
in a given society.
The moral prophet's exhortations derive their
authority from the fact that they are proposals made in the name of an ideal
transcending both the merely personal preferences of the moral prophet and
the already existing moral rules. Let me further suggest that, upon close
examination, (b) may be found to be an analytic presupposition of the
concept of morality. That is to say, it may be that to be moral entails to
live by (b). Whether this is so or not can be determined only by a careful
examination of the ways in which we use the word 'moral,' a task which
I cannot undertake here. If it should be true that (b) is analytically related
to the concept of morality, then it would follow that Y's being conducive to
the welfare of others in situation X is a logical and not just a causal reason
why Y is our duty. The logic, however, would be imbedded in our linguistic
uses. As philosophers we would simply make explicit what these uses are.
49.
ToULMIN, op.
51.
GEORGE NAHKNIKIAN
Lewis has placed himself in an untenable position. The gist of the charge
is this: Lewis divides all judgments into analytic (and a priori) and synthetic
(and a posteriori). He explicitly denies the existence of synthetic a priori
judgments. Now judgments of valuation are taken care of. They are said
to be empirical, hence synthetic. But how about judgments of obligation?
Not all of these are analytic. 'No rule of action is right except one which is
right in all instances, and therefore right for everyone,' is analytic, according
to Lewis. But is 'Truth-telling is right' also analytic? If not analytic, and
not synthetic (empirical) because it is a judgment of duty, what is it?
Lewis has yet to publish his work on Ethics. My own prognosis is that he
will be able to show that his critics have somehow missed the point of what
he is trying to say. But prognosis aside, his position in his publications to
date is something like this.
In An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation 5 5 Lewis says that there is a
connection between the intrinsically good and the morally imperative, but
'good,' meaning 'useful for conducing to satisfaction,' is something different
from 'good' meaning 'morally justified.' In his more recent paper, "The Rational Imperatives," he tells us what the categorical imperative of conduct is:
The basic imperative is... simply that of governing oneself by the advice
of cognition, in contravention, if need be, to impulsions and inclinations
of feeling. .
ETHICS
95 (1949).
55. At 552.
56. "The Rational Imperatives" in VISION AND ACTION 158.
57. Lewis's argument on this point is very compact. In what follows, I have tried to
spell out what I think Lewis has in mind.
GEORGE NAKHNIKIAN