NERI

GR
No.L-47799,
74 PHIL 185

v.
May

21,

AKUTIN
1943

FACTS: This is a case where the testator Agripino Neri in his will
left all his property by universal title to the children by his second
marriage, the herein respondents, with omission of the children by
his first marriage, the herein petitioner. The omission of the heirs in
the will was contemplated by the testator with the belief that he had
already given each of the children portion of the inheritance,
particularly a land he had abandoned was occupied by the
respondents over which registration was denied for it turned out to be
a public land, and an aggregate amount of money which the
respondents were indebted to their father.
ISSUE: Should there be cancellation of the will, in view of the
omission of heirs? Is there disinheritance in this case?
HELD: Yes. The Court annulled the institution of heirs and declared
a total intestacy on the ground that testator left all his property by
universal title to the children by his second marriage, without
expressly disinheriting the children by his first marriage but upon the
erroneous belief that he had given them already more shares in his
property than those given to the children by his second marriage.
Disinheritance made without a statement of the cause, if contested,
shall annul the institution of heirs in so far as it is prejudicial to the
disinherited person. This is but a case of preterition which annuls the
institution of heirs.

Nuguid vs Nuguid
Facts: Rosario died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate.
Surviving her were her legitimate parents Felix and Paz, and 6
brothers and sisters.Remedios, one of the sister filed in court a
holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario instituting the former
as the sole, universal heir of all her properties. She prayed that said
will be admitted to probate and that letter of administration be issued
to her.Felix and Paz opposed to the probate of the will on the ground
that by the institution of Remedios as universal heir of the deceased,
oppositors who are compulsory heirs in the direct ascending line
were illegally preterited and that in consequence, the institution is
void.
Article 854 provides that preterition of one, some or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall
annul the institution of heir.
Petitioners contention is that the present is a case of ineffective
disinheritance rather than one of preterition drawing the conclusion
that Article 854 does not apply in the case at bar.
Issue: Whether or not the institution of one of the sister of the
deceased as the sole, universal heir preterited the compulsory heirs.
Held: Yes. Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or
illegitimate, but she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her
parents, and her holographic will does not explicitly disinherit them
but simply omits their names altogether, the case is one of preterition
of the parents, not a case of ineffective disinheritance.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the
forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not
mentioned therein, or, through mentioned, they are neither instituted
as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Disinheritance, in turn, is a

testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share

in the legitime for a cause authorized by law.

the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the
institution of heir, but the devises and legacies shall be valid

Where the one sentence will institutes the petitioner as the sole,
universal heir and preterits the parents of the testatrix, and it contains
no specific legacies or bequests, such universal institution of
petitioner, by itself, is void. And intestate succession ensues.
Solano vs. CA, Bienvenido/Emeteria Garcia

The intention of the decedent is to favor Sonia with certain portions

of his property which the testator had the right to such so that it
should be upheld as to the one-half portion of the property that the
testator could freely dispose of Sonias share is hereby declared to be
4/6 of the estate and Garcias 1/6 each. The usufruct in favor of will
should not be invalidated all together.

GR L 41971 November 29, 1983

ACAIN vs. IAC

FACTS:

October 27, 1987

Bienvenido and Emeteria filed an action for recognition against

Melita Solano Meliton died during the pendency of the petition and
his daughter substituted him while asking for the probate of the will
of the decedent. RTC specified the legal issues as 1) the recognition
of Garcias, 2) correct status of Zonia, 3) the hereditary share of each
of them in view of the probated will. In deciding, RTC declared
Garcias as illegitimate children of late Meliton.; the institution of
Sonia as sole heir declared null and void, the 3 children shall share
equally the estate CA affirmed.

FACTS:

ISSUE:
Whether or not total intestacy resulted from the declaration that the
institution of sole heir from decedents will.
RULING:
That being compulsory heirs, the Garcias were preterited from
Melitons will, and as a result, Sonias institution as sole heir is null
and void pursuant to Art. 854
The preterition or omission of one, some or all of the compulsory
heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of

Constantino filed a petition for the probate of the will of the

late Nemesio. The will provided that all his shares from properties
he earned with his wife shall be given to his brother Segundo (father
of Constantino). In case Segundo dies, all such property shall be
given to Segundos children. Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio.
The oppositors Virginia, a legally adopted daughter of the
deceased, and the latter's widow Rosa filed a motion to dismiss on
the following grounds:
(1) the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings;
(2) he is merely a universal heir and
(3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited.
ISSUE:
Was there preterition?

HELD:
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the
forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned
therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor
are expressly disinherited.
Insofar as the widow is concerned,
Article 854 may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from
the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Even if the surviving
spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is
omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line.
The same thing cannot be said of the other respondent
Virginia, whose legal adoption by the testator has not been
questioned by petitioner. Adoption gives to the adopted person the
same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter
and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be
denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the
testator and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of
at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not
expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition of the legally
adopted child.
Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment
throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance. The only
provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and
devises made in the will for they should stand valid and respected,
except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his
brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in
totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such
institution of universal heirs - without any other testamentary
disposition in the will - amounts to a declaration that nothing at all
was written.

In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a

probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the
will, or in the property to be affected by it. Petitioner is not the
appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee there being no
mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual
item of personal or real property he is called upon to receive. At the
outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir. However,
intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted
child and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not
an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the
probate of the will left by the deceased.

Dy Yieng Seangio, et al. v. Hon. Amor Reyes, et al., G.R. No.

140371-72, November 27, 2006,
Facts:
There was a petition for the probate of an alleged holographic will
which was denominated as Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana. The
private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate
proceedings primarily on the ground that the document purporting to
be the holographic will of Segundo did not contain any disposition of
the estate of the deceased and thus did not meet the definition of a
will under Article 783 of the Civil Code. According to private
respondents, the will only showed an alleged act of disinheritance by
the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all
other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee
or legatee, hence there was preterition which would result to
intestacy. Such being the case, private respondents maintained that
while procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on the
extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into the
intrinsic validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal of the
petition for probate when on the face of the will it is clear that it
contains no testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent.

Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss

contending that: (1) generally, the authority of the probate court is
limited only to a determination of the extrinsic validity of the will;
(2) private respondents question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic
validity of the will; (3) disinheritance constitutes a disposition of the
estate of a decedent; and (4) the rule on preterition did not apply
because Segundos will did not constitute a universal heir or heirs to
the exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs.
The RTC issued an order dismissing the petition for probate
proceedings, hence, a petition for certiorari was filed where
petitioners argued as follows:
First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4
of the Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which respectively mandate the
court to: (a) fix the time and place for proving the will when all
concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and cause
notice of such time and place to be published three weeks
successively previous to the appointed time in a newspaper of
general circulation; and (b) cause the mailing of said notice to the
heirs, legatee and devisees of the testator Segundo;
Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution
of an heir, but rather, as its title clearly states, Kasulatan ng Pag-alis
ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance of a compulsory heir.
Thus, there is no preterition in the decedents will and the
holographic will on its face is not intrinsically void;
Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs,
petitioners and private respondents alike, with the sole exception of
Alfredo, to inherit his estate. None of the compulsory heirs in the
direct line of Segundo were preterited in the holographic will since
there was no institution of an heir;
Fourth, as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic
will that it is both intrinsically and extrinsically valid, respondent

judge was mandated to proceed with the hearing of the testate case;
and,
Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate
case will work injustice to petitioners, and will render nugatory the
disinheritance of Alfredo.
Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the
document executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic
will.
Held: A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil
Code, must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the
testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or
out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
The document, although it may initially come across as a
mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a
holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by
the hand of the testator himself. An intent to dispose mortis
causa(Article 783) can be clearly deduced from the terms of the
instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of
the latters property, the disinheritance of the son nonetheless, is an
act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results
in the disposition of the property of the testator in favor of those who
would succeed in the absence of the eldest son.
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the
will of the testator, expressed in the form and within the limits
prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in
succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and
give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the
testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be
given effect.
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one
who is not learned in the law should be construed more liberally than

the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances

surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the
testator. In this regard, the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan
ng Pag-alis ng Mana, was intended by the testator to be his last
testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in
the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated, the
disinheritance cannot be given effect.
BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, Petitioner, vs. CFI OF MANILA, et
al., Respondents
G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981
Facts: Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y
Tuason, died. He was survived by his widow, Filomena Races, and
their seven children: (Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena, Benito,
Alejandro and Jose). The real properties left by Benito were
partitioned in three equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo and
Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz
who were represented by Benito F. Legarda.
Filomena died intestate and without issue. Her sole heiress was her
mother, Filomena Races. Mrs. Legarda executed an affidavit
adjudicating to herself the properties which she inherited from her
deceased daughter, Filomena. As a result, Filomena Races succeeded
her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the
properties held proindiviso by her other six children.
Mrs. Legarda executed two handwritten Identical documents wherein
she disposed of the properties, which she inherited from her
daughter, in favor of the children of her sons, Benito, Alejandro and
Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). Mrs. Legarda and her six
surviving children partitioned the properties consisting of the onethird share in the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason which the
children inherited in representation of their father, Benito Legarda y
De la Paz.

Mrs. Legarda died. Her will was admitted to probate as a holographic

will. The decree of probate was affirmed by the CA.
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of
the testatrix, filed a motion to exclude from the inventory of her
mother's estate the properties which she inherited from her deceased
daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said properties
are reservable properties which should be inherited by Filomena
Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and not by the children of
Benito, Alejandro and Jose. That motion was opposed by the
administrator, Benito F. Legarda.
Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Beatriz filed an
ordinary civil action against her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces
and her mother's estate for the purpose of securing a declaration that
the said properties are reservable properties. Lower court dismissed
the action of Beatriz.
Issue: whether the properties in question are subject to reserva
troncal under art.
Held: In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by
gratuitous title property from an ascendant or from a brother or
sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another ascendant or is
acquired by him by operation of law from the said descendant, and
(3) the said ascendant should reserve the said property for the benefit
of relatives who are within the third degree from the deceased
descendant (prepositus) and who belong to the line from which the
said property came.
3 transmissions are involved: (I) a first transmission by lucrative title
(inheritance or donation) from an ascendant or brother or sister to the
deceased descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by operation of
law (intestate succession or legitime) from the deceased descendant
(causante de la reserve) in favor of another ascendant, the reservor
or reservista, which two transmissions precede the reservation, and

(3) a third transmissions of the same property (in consequence of the

reservation) from the reservor to the reservees (reservatarios) or the
relatives within the third degree from the deceased descendant
belonging to the line of the first ascendant, brother or sister of the
deceased descendant .
The persons involved in reserve troncal are (1) the ascendant or
brother or sister from whom the property was received by the
descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the descendant
or prepositus (prepositus) who received the property, (3) the reservor
(reservista) the other ascendant who obtained the property from the
(prepositus) by operation of law and (4) the reserves (reservatario)
who is within the third degree from the prepositus and who belongs
to the (line o tronco) from which the property came and for whom
the property should be reserved by the reservor.
Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. illegitimate
relationship and relationship by affinity are excluded. Gratuitous title
or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission wherein the recipient gives
nothing in return such as donacion and succession.
The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death
of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of
his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line
from which the property came.
The properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in
the hands of Mrs. Legarda. She was a reservor. The reservation
became a certainty when at the time of her death the reservees or
relatives within the third degree of the prepositus Filomena Legarda
were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen
grandchildren the reservable properties which she had inherited from
her daughter Filomena because the reservable properties did not form
part of her estate. The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis

causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees survived

the reservor.
Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be
inherited by all the nearest relatives within the third degree from
the prepositus who in this case are the six children of Mrs. Legarda.
She could not select the reservees to whom the reservable property
should be given and deprive the other reservees of their share
therein.
To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition
of the reservable properties in favor of the reservees in the third
degree and, consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second
degree would be a glaring violation of article 891. That testamentary
disposition cannot be allowed.

Chua v. CFI
Facts:Jose Frias Chua had 2 marriages. First with Patricia, he had 3
children- Ignacio, Manuel and Lorenzo. When Patriciadied, he
married Consolacion de la Torre and had one child- Juanito Frias
Chua. Jose Frias Chua died intestate.After the intestate proceeding
the court adjudicated half of lot in question to Consolacion and the
other half totheir only son, Juanito. The two sons in the first
marriage, Lorenzo and Ignacio, received P3k and P1550respectively.
(Manuel already died).Juanito also died intestate without issue.
Consolacion de la Torre executed a declaration of heirship
adjudicating inher favor the pro-indiviso share of her son Juanito in
the lot in question. When dela Torre died, Ignacio and theheirs of
Lorenzo filed a complaint praying that the one-half portion of the Lot
be declared as a reservable propertyfor the reason that the lot
in question was subject to reserval troncal pursuant to Article
981 NCC.Lower court dismissed complaint.Issue: WON property in

question was acquired by Juanito Frias Chua from his father Jose
Frias Chua gratuitously(as first requisite of Reserva Troncal).Held:

second marriage upon the death of his father JoseFrias Chua was by
means of a hereditary succession and therefore gratuitous.

YesRatio:

As long as the transmission of the property to the heirs is free from

any condition imposed by thedeceased himself and the property is
given out of pure generosity, itg is gratuitous

In order that a property may be impressed with a reservable

character the following requisites must exist,to wit: (1) that the
property was acquired by a descendant from an asscendant or from a
brother or sisterby gratuitous title; (2) that said descendant died
without an issue; (3) that the property is inherited byanother
ascendant by operation of law; and (4) that there are relatives within
the third degree belongingto the line from which said property came.
All of the foregoing requisites are present. Thus, as borne out by the
records, Juanoito Frias Chua of thesecond marriage died intestate in
1952; he died withour leaving any issue; his pro-indiviso of 1/2 share
of Lot No. 399 was acquired by his mother, Consolacion de la Torre
died, Juannnito Frias Chua who diedintestate had relatives within the
third degree. These relatives are Ignacio Frias Chua and
DominadorChua and Remidios Chua, the suppose legitimate children
of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, who arethe petitioners herein
According to Manresa, "The transmission is gratuitous or
by gratuitous title when the recipient does notgive anything in
return." It matters not whether the property transmitted be or be not
subject to any priorcharges; what is essential is that the transmission
be made gratuitously, or by an act of mere liberality of the person
making it, without imposing any obligation on the part of the
recipient; and that the personreceiving the property gives or does
nothing in return.
"the essential thing is that the person who transmits it does so
gratuitously, from pure generosity,without requiring from the
transferee any prestation." It is evident from the record that the
transmissionof the property in question to Juanito Frias Chua of the

EDROSO vs SABLAN
FACTS:Spouses MarcelinaEdroso and Victoriano Sablan had a son
named, Pedro who inherited two parcels of land upon the death of his
father. Subsequently, Pedro died, unmarried and without issue, the
two parcels of land passed through inheritance to his mother. Hence
the hereditary title whereupon is based the application for
registration of her ownership. The two uncles of Pedro, Pablo and
Basilio Sablan (legitimate brothers of Victoriano) opposed the
registration claiming that either the registration be denied or if
granted to her, the right reserved by law to them be recorded in the
registration of each parcel. The Court of Land Registration denied
the registration holding that the land in question partake of the nature
of property required by law to be reserved and that in such a case
application could only be presented jointly in the names of the
mother and the said two uncles. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the property in question is in the nature of a
reservable property.
Whether or not MarcelinaEdroso has the absolute title of the
property to cause its registration.
RULING:A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary
title is one without a valuable consideration (gratuitous tile), and it is
so characterized in Article 968 of the Civil Code, for he who acquires
by inheritance gives nothing in return for what he receives; and a

very definite conclusion of law also is that the uncles are within the
third degree of blood relationship.
Article 811. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant
property which the latter acquired without a valuable consideration
from another descendant, or form a brother or sister, is under
obligation to reserve what he has acquired by operation of law for
the relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line
where the property proceeded.
MarcelinaEdroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him the
two parcels of land which he had acquired without a valuable
consideration that is, by inheritance from another ascendant, his
father Victoriano. Having acquire them by operation of law, she is
obligated to relatives within the third degree and belong to the line of
Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez (parents of Victoriano),
where the lands proceeded. The trial courts ruling that they partake
of the nature property required by law to be reserved is therefore in
accordance with the law.
The conclusion is that the person required by Article 811 to reserve
the right has, beyond any doubt at all, the rights to use and usufruct.
He has, moreover, the legal title and dominion, although under a
condition subsequent. Clearly he has under an express provision of
the law the right to dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose
of is to alienate, although under a condition. He has the right to
recover it, because he is the one who possesses or should possess it
and have title to it, although a limited and revocable one. In a word,
the legal title and dominion, even though under a condition, reside in
him while he lives. After the right required by law to be reserved has
been assured, he can do anything that a genuine owner can do.
On the other hadnt, the relatives within the third degree in whose
favor of the right is reserved cannot dispose of the property, first
because it is no way, either actually or constructively or formally, in
their possession; and moreover, because they have no title of

ownership or of the fee simple which they can transmit to another, on

the hypothesis that only when the person who must reserve the right
should die before them will they acquire it.
SIENES vs ESPARCIA
FACTS:Lot 3368 originally belonged to SaturninoYaeso. With his
first wife, Teresa Ruales, he had four children named Agaton,
Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana, while with his second wife, Andrea
Gutang, he had an only son named Francisco. According to the
cadastral records of Ayuquitan, the properties left by Saturnino upon
his death were left to his children as follows: Lot 3366 to Cipriana,
Lot 3367 to Fernando, Lot 3375 to Agaton, Lot 3377 (southern
portion) to Paulina, and Lot 3368 (western portion) to Francisco. As
a result of the cadastral proceedings, an OCT covering Lot 3368 was
issued in the name of Francisco.
Because Francisco was a minor at the time, his mother administered
the property for him, declared it in her name for taxation purposes,
and paid the taxes due thereon. When Francisco died at the age of 20,
single and without any descendant, his mother, as his sole heir,
executed the public instrument and sold the property in question to
appellants in consideration of the sum of P800.00. Andrea Gutang
died on December 13, 1951, the lone reservee surviving her being
CiprianaYaeso who died only on January 13, 1952. Said vendees
demanded from Paulina and her husband, the surrender of the OCT
which was in their possession, the latter refused, thus giving rise to
the filing of the corresponding motion in the cadastral, which was
denied.
ISSUE:Whether or not the reservable property in question is part of
and must be reverted to the estate of CiprianaYaeso.
RULING:As held by the trial court, it is clear upon the facts already
stated, that the land in question was reservable property.

In connection with reservable property, the weight of opinion is that

the reserve creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death
of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of
his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line
from which the property came. This Court has held in connection
with this matter that the reservista has the legal title and dominion to
the reservable property but subject to a resolutory condition; that he
is like a life usufructuary of the reservable property; that he may
alienate the same but subject to reservation, said alienation
transmitting only the revocable and conditional ownership of the
reservists, the rights acquired by the transferee being revoked or
resolved by the survival of reservatarios at the time of the death of
the reservista.
The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was,
therefore, subject to the condition that the vendees would definitely
acquire ownership, by virtue of the alienation, only if the vendor died
without being survived by any person entitled to the reservable
property. Inasmuch much as when Andrea Gutang died,
CiprianaYaeso was still alive, the conclusion becomes inescapable
that the previous sale made by the former in favor of appellants
became of no legal effect and the reservable property subject matter
thereof passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana.
On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the sisters
Paulina and CiprianaYaeso in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and
Paulina Sienes was subject to a similar resolutory condition. The
reserve instituted by law in favor of the heirs within the third degree
belonging to the line from which the reservable property came,
constitutes a real right which the reservee may alienate and dispose
of, albeit conditionally, the condition being that the alienation shall
transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the reservee
survives the person obliged to reserve. In the present case,
CiprianaYaeso, one of the reservees, was still alive when Andrea
Gutang, the person obliged to reserve, died. Thus the former became

the absolute owner of the reservable property upon Andrea's death.

While it may be true that the sale made by her and her sister prior to
this event, became effective because of the occurrence of the
resolutory condition, we are not now in a position to reverse the
appealed decision, in so far as it orders the reversion of the property
in question to the Estate of CiprianaYaeso, because the vendees did
not appeal therefrom.
FLORENTINO vs FLORENTINO
FACTS: In 1890, Apolonio II died leaving a notarial will. He was
survived by his ten children and his widow as heirs. Apolonio III
received in the partition of the subject property. When Apolonio III
died, the said property were inherited by his mother Severina, who
latter died, leaving a will instituting her only daughter as her
universal heiress. Herein appellants demands from Mercedes to
deliver their corresponding share in the reservable property but
Mercedes refused. CFI dismissed the complaint of specific
performance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property in question is reservable
property
HELD: Even if Severina left in her will said property together with
her own property to her only daughter, nevertheless, this property
had not lost their reservable nature in as much as it originated from
the common ancestor of herein appellants. The property was
inherited by the son and was transmitted by operation of law to his
mother. Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property while there are living within the 3rd degree relative of the
latter, is nothing but a life usufructuary or a fiduciary of the
reservable property received. But if afterwards, all of such relative
die, the said property become free property by operation of law, and
is thereby converted into the legitime of the ascendant heir who can
transmit it at his death to his legal succession. There are seven

reservatoris who are entitled to the reservable property left at the

death of Apolonio III:
3 children of the 1stmarriage;
3 children who are represented by their own children (nephews/
nieces);
Mercedes
All of the appellants are the relatives of the posthumous son within
the third degree. Hence, they are entiled as reservatarios to the
property which came from the common ancestors.
Mendoza
GR
No

v
176422,

Delos
March

20,

Santos
2013

MARIA MENDOZA, in her own capacity and as Attorney-infact of DEOGRACIAS, MARCELA, DIONISIA, ADORA CION,
all surnamed MENDOZA, REMEDIOS MONTILLA, FELY
BAUTISTA, JULIANA GUILALAS and ELVIRA MENDOZA,
Petitioners,
vs.
JULIA POLl CARPIO DELOS SANTOS, substituted by her
heirs, CARMEN P. DELOS SANTOS, ROSA BUENA
VENTURA, ZENAIDA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE MATEO,
LEONILA P. DELOS SANTOS, ELVIRA P. DELOS SANTOS
VDA. DE JOSE, TERESITA P. DELOS SANTOS-CABUHAT,
MERCEDITA P. DELOS SANTOS, LYDIA P. DELOS SANTOS
VDA. DE HILARIO, PERFECTO P. DELOS SANTOS, JR., and
CECILIA
M.
MENDOZA,
Respondents.
FACTS:
The properties subject in the instant case are three parcels of land
located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan are presently in the name of
respondent Julia Delos Santos (respondent). Lot No. 1646-B, on the

other hand, is also in the name of respondent but co- owned by

Victoria Pantaleon, who bought one-half of the property from
petitioner
Maria
Mendoza
and
her
siblings.
Petitioners are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza (Placido) and
Dominga Mendoza (Dominga). Petitioners alleged that the properties
were part of Placido and Domingas properties that were subject of
an oral partition and subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel. After
Exequiels death, it passed on to his spouse Leonor and only
daughter, Gregoria. After Leonors death, her share went to Gregoria.
In 1992, Gregoria died intestate and without issue. They claimed that
after Gregorias death, respondent, who is Leonors sister,
adjudicated unto herself all these properties as the sole surviving heir
of Leonor and Gregoria. Hence, petitioners claim that the properties
should have been reserved by respondent in their behalf and must
now revert back to them, applying Article 891 of the Civil Code on
reserva
troncal.
DECISION
OF
LOWER
COURTS:
(1) RTC: granted their action for Recovery of Possession by Reserva
Troncal,
Cancellation
of
TCT
and
Reconveyance.
(2) CA: reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed the
complaint filed by petitioners. CA also denied their motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUES:
A. THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES ARE NOT
RESERVABLE PROPERTIES, COMING AS THEY DO FROM
THE FAMILY LINE OF THE PETITIONERS MENDOZAS.
B. THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS MENDOZAS DO NOT
HAVE A RIGHT TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES BY VIRTUE
OF
THE
LAW
ON
RESERVA
TRONCAL.

APPLICABLE LAW:
The principle of reserva troncal is provided in Article 891 of the
Civil Code:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from
another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit
of relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line
from
which
said
property
came.
(Emphasis
ours)
RULING:
No,
CA
is
correct.
I.
Reserva
troncal
is
not
applicable.
Julia, who now holds the properties in dispute, is not the other
ascendant within the purview of Article 891 of the Civil Code
Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the
return of a reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging
to the line from which the property originally came, and avoid its
being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant.

It should be pointed out that the ownership of the properties should

be reckoned only from Exequiels as he is the ascendant from where
the first transmission occurred, or from whom Gregoria inherited the
properties in dispute. The law does not go farther than such
ascendant/brother/sister in determining the lineal character of the
property. It was also immaterial for the CA to determine whether
Exequiel predeceased Placido and Dominga or whether Gregoria
predeceased Exequiel. What is pertinent is that Exequiel owned the
properties and he is the ascendant from whom the properties in
dispute originally came. Gregoria, on the other hand, is the
descendant who received the properties from Exequiel by gratuitous
title.
Article 891 simply requires that the property should have been
acquired by the descendant or prepositus from an ascendant by

gratuitous or lucrative title. A transmission is gratuitous or by

gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything in return.18
At risk of being repetitious, what was clearly established in this case
is that the properties in dispute were owned by Exequiel (ascendant).
After his death, Gregoria (descendant/prepositus) acquired the
properties
as
inheritance.
Article 891 provides that the person obliged to reserve the property
should be an ascendant (also known as the reservor/reservista) of the
descendant/prepositus. Julia, however, is not Gregorias ascendant;
rather,
she
is
Gregorias
collateral
relative.
II. Petitioners cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios as they
are not relatives within the third degree of Gregoria from whom the
properties came. The person from whom the degree should be
reckoned is the descendant/prepositusthe one at the end of the line
from which the property came and upon whom the property last
revolved by descent. It is Gregoria in this case. Petitioners are
Gregorias fourth degree relatives, being her first cousins. First
cousins of the prepositus are fourth degree relatives and are not
reservees or reservatarios.
They cannot even claim representation of their predecessors Antonio
and Valentin as Article 891 grants a personal right of reservation only
to the relatives up to the third degree from whom the reservable
properties came. The only recognized exemption is in the case of
nephews and nieces of the prepositus, who have the right to represent
their ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are the brothers/sisters of
the prepositus and relatives within the third degree.
OTHER
NOTES:
1. three (3) lines of transmission in reserva troncal. The first
transmission is by gratuitous title, whether by inheritance or
donation, from an ascendant/brother/sister to a descendant called the
prepositus. The second transmission is by operation of law from the
prepositus to the other ascendant or reservor, also called the

reservista. The third and last transmission is from the reservista to the
reservees or reservatarios who must be relatives within the third
degree
from
which
the
property
came.
2.
The
persons
involved
in
reserva
troncal
are:
(1) The ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was
received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title;
(2) The descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received the
property;
(3) The reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the
property from the prepositus by operation of law; and (4) The
reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree from the
prepositus and who belongs to the (linea o tronco) from which the
property came and for whom the property should be reserved by the
reservor.
3. Art. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either
direct or collateral. A direct line is that constituted by the series of
degrees
among
ascendants
and
descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among
persons who are not ascendants and descendants, but who come from
a
common
ancestor.
4. Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed
to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following
articles.
Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children
of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to
the
estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference
among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood.
5. Reservista, has the duty to reserve and to annotate the reservable
character of the property on the title. In reserva troncal, the reservista
who inherits from a prepositus, whether by the latters wish or by
operation of law, acquires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly

transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes of ownership

belong to him exclusively.
Case Digest - Banawa vs. Mirano, No. L-24750, 97 SCRA 517,
May 16, 1980
Case Digest for Statutory Construction
FACTS: Defendants-appellants
spouses
Doroteo
Banawa
and Juliana Mendoza took care of Maria Mirano, Julianas niece,
since Maria is 9 years old and treated her the same way as they
treated the co-appellant Gliceria Abrenica, their legally adopted
child. On May 5, 1921, the spouses bought a parcel of land situated
at Brgy. Iba, Taal, Batangas from Placido Punzalan and registered the
said parcel of land in the name of Maria, because the said spouses
wanted something for Maria after their death.
On July 31, 1949, after a lingering illness, Maria Mirano died. At the
time of her death she left only as her nearest relatives the herein
plaintiffs-appellees, namely Primitiva, who is a surviving sister, and
Gregoria, Juana and Marciano, all surnamed Mirano, who are
children of the deceaseds brother.
The Miranos filed a case in court against the Banawas with regards
to the possession of the Iba property as legal heirs of Maria.
The court ruled in favor of the Miranos. The Banawas appealed to
the Court of Appeals stating that they are entitled to the land in
question by virtue of Section 5, Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court,
the pertinent portion of which reads:
In case of the death of the child, his parents and relatives by nature,
and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs, except as to property
received or inherited by the adopted child from either of his parents
by adoption, which shall become the property of the latter or
their legitimaterelatives who shall participate in the order established
by the Civil Code for intestate estates.

The defendant spouses died during the pendency of the case at

the Court of Appeals and were substituted by their legally adopted
child Gliceria Abrenica and her husband Casiano Amponin.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court. The
Appellants filed at the Supreme Court a petition for review by
certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals regarding its ruling
that Sec. 5, Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court does not apply in the
instant case because Maria Mirano was not legally adopted.
ISSUE: Whether or not, Sec. 5, Rule 100 of the Old Rules
of Court applicable to the instant case?
HELD: NO. It is very clear in the rule involved that specifically
provides for the case of the judicially adopted child and does not
include extrajudicial adoption. It is an elementary rule in statutory
construction that when the language of the law is clear and
unequivocal, the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says.

Teotico vs Del Val

GR No. L18753, March 26, 1965
FACTS:
Maria Mortera died on July 1955 leaving properties worth
P600,000. She executed a will written in Spanish, affixed her
signature and acknowledged before Notary Public by her and the
witnesses. Among the legacies made in the will was the P20,000 for
Rene Teotico who was married to the testatrixs niece, Josefina
Mortera. The usufruct of Marias interest in the Calvo Building were
left to the said spouses and the ownership thereof was left in equal
parts to her grandchildren, the legitimate children of said spouses.
Josefina was likewise instituted, as sole and universal heir to all the
remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed by will. Vicente
Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will but was opposed by

Ana del Val Chan, claiming that she was an adopted child of
Francisca (deceased sister of Maria) and an acknowledged natural
child of Jose (deceased brother of Maria), that said will was not
executed as required by law and that Maria as physically and
mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its execution and
was executed under duress, threat, or influence of fear.
ISSUE: WON defendant has right to intervene in this proceeding.
HELD:
It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to
intervene in a probate proceeding is that he must have an interest in
the estate, will or in the property to be affected by either as executor
or as a claimant of the estate and be benefited by such as an heir or
one who has a claim against it as creditor. Under the terms of the
will, defendant has no right to intervene because she has no such
interest in the estate either as heir, executor or administrator because
it did not appear therein any provision designating her as heir/
legatee in any portion of the estate. She could have acquired such
right if she was a legal heir of the deceased but she is not under the
CIVIL CODE. Even if her allegations were true, the law does not
give her any right to succeed the estate of the deceased sister of both
Jose and Francisca because being an illegitimate child she is
prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her
natural father and that relationship established by adoption is limited
solely to the adopter and adopted and does not extend to the relatives
of the adopting parents except only as expressly provided by law. As
a consequence, she is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of
the adopter.
Hence, defendant has no right to intervene either as testamentary or
as legal heir in the probate proceeding.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE
NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.

G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
FACTS:
Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate
child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He prayed that the child's
middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mother's surname,
and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his
legitimate child and heir, and pursuant to Art. 189 of the Family
Code, she is now known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that
Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname Garcia as her middle
name.
The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her
relationship with her natural mother should be maintained and
preserved, to prevent any confusion and hardship in the future, and
under Article 189 she remains to be an intestate heir of her mother.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural
father, use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name.
RULING:
Yes. there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her
natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mothers
surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
9255, (An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname
Of Their Father) is silent as to what middle name a child may use.
Article 365 of the CC merely provides that an adopted child shall
bear the surname of the adopter. Article 189 of the Family Code,
enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the
matter.

Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) an

legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, Stephanie is entitled to all
the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of
her father and her mother.