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Journal of Pragmatics 44 (2012) 1115--1127

www.elsevier.com/locate/pragma

Inequity in the pursuit of intimacy: An analysis of

British pick-up artist interactions
Oliver Hambling-Jones, Andrew John Merrison *
Centre for Languages & Linguistics, York St John University, Lord Mayor's Walk, York, YO31 7EX, UK
Received 24 June 2011; received in revised form 2 March 2012; accepted 19 April 2012

Abstract
The data presented here come from a collection of surreptitious audio recordings of naturally occurring talk-in-interaction between
previously unacquainted women and male Pick-Up Artists (PUAs) in the UK. Our approach draws on close observations of these
interactional data to demonstrate how PUAs move from a state of unacquaintedness towards more intimate forms of interactional
involvement.
A prototypical PUA is a male who seeks to be successful at seducing women. PUA is not a category label given to the individual, but
is one that he claims for himself within an existing PUA Community of Practice. A common community belief is that the means of seduction
are not rooted in physical attractiveness, social status or wealth, but in the interaction. The claimed art in pick-up artistry may be seen in
the relative speed with which the protagonist may gain INTIMACY with their fellow interlocutor. The PUA operates, as Goffman (1967b)
describes it, where the action is; they are every bit the gambler in a high-stakes game where risky plays -- which include issues of
im/politeness and IN/EQUITY -- can have high payoffs. The focus of this paper is how PUAs actually play the game.
2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Pick-up artist; Intimacy; Solidarity; Familiarity; Affect; Rapport management; Equity and equilibrium

1. Introduction
In this paper, we wish to do some very preliminary sorts of things.
We introduce a novel group of language users engaged in their stated interactional goal of picking-up women -- as
Goffman (1967b:210) puts it -- instigating sexually potential relationships. The claim of these Pick-Up Artists (PUAs) is
that they achieve their goals chiefly by how they manage their talk-in-interaction. It is our aim to interrogate and
demonstrate the observable ways in which these PUAs go about this activity and to show how its status as a particular
variety of talk might be warranted.
In analysing this talk, we offer detailed observation on the establishment of INEQUITY (cf. Clark, 1996; Spencer-Oatey,
2008) and ritual disequilibrium (Goffman, 1967a) and in so doing, we show how this may license later reparative action
that could not warrantably have occurred otherwise. Critically, we argue that the magnitude of these later actions is also
greater than they otherwise could have been, as they are ostensibly employed to offset some prior offence or debit. We
suggest that opportunities for doing these objects of greater-magnitude serve as a resource for accelerating the INTIMACY
in the initial stages of a given relationship -- as characterised by solidarity, familiarity and affect (Svennevig, 1999).
In addition, following Haugh (2007), we hope to continue to make a case for using a broadly conversation analytic
approach to the analysis of im/politeness and face. We also offer a brief argument for a methodology involving
retrospective consent.

* Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 1904 430380.

E-mail addresses: o.hambling-jones@o2.co.uk (O. Hambling-Jones), a.merrison@yorksj.ac.uk (A.J. Merrison).
0378-2166/$ -- see front matter 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2012.04.008

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O. Hambling-Jones, A.J. Merrison / Journal of Pragmatics 44 (2012) 1115--1127

Ultimately, however, what we present via our discussion of equity is a means to explain the occurrence of some
interactional behaviours where we do not feel a categorical im/politeness analysis is currently adequate.
1.1. Pick-Up Artists
A full ethnography of the pick-up community is clearly outwith the scope of this paper (though anyone interested in such
details might begin by consulting journalist, Neil Strauss's (2005) reportage, The Game). However, because we are
confident that many will not already be aware of this group (despite its massive global presence), we first provide a general
introductory description.
A prototypical PUA is a male who seeks to be successful at picking-up (or seducing) women; this is a categorisation
that he claims for himself.1 The individual PUA invariably operates as a member of the wider pick-up community -- a
highly organised Community of Practice (CofP, Eckert and McConnell-Ginet, 1992; Wenger, 1998) emanating from the
USA. While they are likely to self-identify qua PUAs within the community, they generally prefer their membership not to be
overtly public. A core belief, within this CofP, is that the means of seduction are not rooted in physical attractiveness, social
status or wealth, but in the interaction. As such, the PUA's primary activities concern developing aspects of their social
skills (with men as well as with women). They appear to go about this in three general ways. (1) They engage with the
community to learn interactional material and techniques developed by other PUAs. This takes place predominantly
online, but may also involve attending seminars and workshops by other PUA trainers. There are many differing
schools (methods) of pick-up that co-exist in the community. These schools often exist as PUA-owned and PUA-run
businesses which disseminate their own brand of teachings in such forms as books, DVDs, online websites and forums,
boot-camps and conferences. (2) They go into the field to practice what they have learnt and refine their methods
at picking up women -- it is this practical activity that we present in this paper. (3) They report their in-field experiences
back to the community (usually online). This appears to serve, in part, as a tool for reflecting on their interactions and
discussing -- often dialogically -- what did or did not work for them.
Undoubtedly, there is questionable morality to some pick-up activities which may be difficult to navigate for a
researcher.2 However, our interest has only ever been sited in the talk-in-interaction: we take it that the participants
realities are constituted in their talk such that it represents their concerns of the moment, and as analysts, those are
necessarily the limit of our concerns, at least, for current purposes.
2. Theoretical stance(s)
2.1. Our own position
The summary of our own position is this: as interactional sociolinguists, what we are essentially interested in is in situ
action. We firmly believe that we are not in a position to make grand theoretical claims; we strive only to provide accounts
of social behaviours that are grounded in actual instances of actual actions and it is for that reason that we take
interlocutors construal of these behaviours -- as expressed through their talk -- as the primary resource for our analyses.
We believe that it should be uncontentious that a globalised theory of im/politeness is untenable (and that is why
scholars are reporting different issues for Western and Eastern practices). However, to our mind, that is simply not going
far enough. Nationally (or otherwise geographically) derived models are also unlikely to offer a robust analysis that would
necessarily explicate individual behaviours. Tying analysis into the norms of particular Communities of Practice has been
suggested as an answer. However, it is not unreasonable that at least two members of the same community may have
different views of what was (or was not) polite or impolite in any interactive exchange (see Haugh, 2007:308).
We would argue that even those methodologies that try to tap directly into the agent's view of the world by asking them
about it in interview are fundamentally flawed. We concur with Bousfield's (2010:107) assertion that lay users tend to
have an idealised, socially constructed idea of what constitutes appropriate and inappropriate behaviour in a specific
situation and within a given community of practice. Certainly, individuals come to interaction with pre-existing sociopragmatic methods for interpreting and evaluating behaviour (cf. Davidson, 2006 [1986]) however, we argue (see also
section 2.4) that these are not necessarily operational absolutes in the moment of interaction and instead what
interactants tend to orient to, are locally, interactionally negotiated practices (cf. also Merrison et al., 2012, section 2.1).
Furthermore, any post factum report of an interaction is likely to be an unreliable representation of an individual's

1
There are women who self-identify as members of the pick-up community, though it appears their involvement tends to be in a training role for
other PUAs.
2
As with any social group, there is great individual variance in the attitudes and actions of members in the pick-up community and we would
argue that pick-up is not necessarily immoral per se.

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in situ evaluations during that interaction since the report will be situated within a different participation framework
(Goffman, 1981) and thus within a (potentially) different set of face concerns -- in short, what interactants say they do may
have little or no bearing on what they actually do. In addition, such reporting simply creates another text with its own new
concomitant analytical dilemmas (see Haugh, 2007:310).
So what options are left open to us? In this paper, the analytical heritage with which we primarily align ourselves is that
of Conversation Analysis (CA) -- a methodology which espouses the key assumption that all talk is recipient designed. And
that means that it is designed only for the immediately relevant participants in any particular interaction.3 It is for this
reason that we limit ourselves to explicating particular examples of actual instances of actual interactional behaviours.
2.2. Initial interaction: getting acquainted
The data we present in this paper show a number of pick-up artists and women interacting for the first time. Furthermore,
the interactions we examine here are all doubly incipient as the data fragments we discuss are all from the beginnings of
these initial interactions. In Svennevig's (1999) terms, our data might therefore be considered as displaying the PUAs and
women getting acquainted. While we would certainly agree with his argument that the talk of those getting acquainted is
observably different from talk between acquainted parties such as friends or lovers (for example, lovers do not usually reintroduce themselves every time they meet, nor do strangers ask to borrow the other's car) what interests us, is the nature of
the relational strategies involved in this process of incipient acquaintedness for this particular variety of talk.
These strategies are manifestly constrained where personal relations are limited. This poses a distinct problem for the
pick-up artist who is in the rapport business with a clientele of strangers. The relational aspects of talk that we are
therefore interested in are those that might contribute to an accelerated reduction of social distance, and it is for this
reason that we are glossing this work not merely as getting acquainted, but rather as the pursuit of INTIMACY.
Previous research has shown that in incipient relationships, initial interactions tend to be characterised by a
conservative orientation towards face maintenance and low-level rights and obligations. This can be seen, for example, in
the deployment of self-presentational sequences (Svennevig, 1999) in order to alight on common ground and safe topics
(cf. Brown and Levinson, 1987:112--124) in the navigation of the tricky beginnings of the initial stages of talk (cf. also
Maynard and Zimmerman, 1984; Sibthorpe, 2008). The interactants in the PUA data with which we are concerned do not
show such tentativeness. Rather, as we will demonstrate in the analysis (section 4), there seems to be an orientation to a
much more radical interaction order where higher-level rights (and obligations) are at play.
2.3. Intimacy and social relationships
When we speak of INTIMACY, we are referring, not to categories of varying intimate relationships (such as friends,
family, partners) -- nor of sexual intimacy -- but rather to intimate forms of interactional involvement. We are, therefore,
not presenting analyses which claim to demonstrate the transition of unacquainted individuals into, for example, friends,
despite the fact that these are category terms we do find invoked. Instead, we are concerned with the more subtle joint
projects (Clark, 1996) which emerge moment-by-moment between individuals who are in some sort of relational standing.
In this respect, we echo Maynard and Zimmerman (1984:302):
We regard relationship as something that is subject to on-going, step-by-step management within talk by persons,
rather than as a state of affairs that underlies their talk.
Our use of INTIMACY is thus meant to subsume the various activities that construct relative closeness in the social
relationship -- we are not claiming that any individuals are intimate per se, but rather, what we observe is people doing
INTIMACY. What we need, then, is a more nuanced conceptualisation of the social relationship to more clearly explicate the
relational import of these doings, and for this we return to Svennevig.
Drawn from a broad discussion of social psychological perspectives, Svennevig (1999:2) posits three components that
make up the characteristics of any interpersonal relationship:

solidarity, involving a set of mutual rights and obligations

familiarity, involving mutual knowledge of personal information

affect, involving mutual liking (or dislike)
Each of these components represents its own scale and not all components are necessarily in equal measure -- or
even apparent -- in any given relationship.

We assume that relevancy does not require active participancy.

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We find these terms useful in talking about social relationships in an analytical way. Fundamental to our treatment is the
sense that we are not talking about mere categorial, stative terms, but observable, collaboratively achieved activities,
consisting of various kinds of joint projects. It is these projects (these doings) which we take to be the true reification of
social relationships.
2.4. Im/politeness, face and equity
Much of the data reported in the im/politeness literature is concerned with (intentional) conflict and alienation (see, for
example, Culpeper, 1996, 2005; Bousfield, 1999, 2008; Graham, 2007; and the papers in Bousfield and Locher, 2008).
Because of this, the types of behaviours that are reported tend to be so uncontentious that we have no problem in
accepting those authors analytical claims of impoliteness -- irrespective of their theoretical stance. However, there is not a
whole pile of data which demonstrate the getting-alongness of social interactions (though see Haugh, 2010, 2011; Haugh
and Bousfield, 2012). Thus, what we hope to bring to the im/politeness party is data which redress the heavily antagonistic
bias. What we have to offer are cases where people are ostensibly getting along but where some of the interactants take a
line which could be analysed as face aggravating behaviour and thus could be considered impolite. While analysing these
data in this way might potentially be acceptable, we do not believe that such an analysis is fully adequate. To theoretically
account for behaviour as impolite when the participants themselves display no overt orientations to such impoliteness
within their turns at talk, to us, makes little sense and we would argue that to do so risks obviating complex subtleties in the
organisation of the interaction order.
People do not routinely respond to explicit, face-threatening/rude/aggressive (etc.) behaviours with explicit
orientations (Haugh, 2007:312). Goffman (1967a:6) notes: A person tends to experience an immediate emotional
response to the face which a contact with others allows him; he cathects his face; his feelings become attached to it. In
keeping with the assumption that in social situations, people try to maximise their outcomes -- their benefits minus their
costs (Clark, 1996:290, see section 2.4.2), we might, therefore, reasonably not expect interactants to make overt
displays relating to the offensiveness of any act for which they have insufficient (i.e. couldnt-care-less-ness) feelings
(see section 2.4.1 on rapport management). This presents a very practical problem in relation to what analysts can
meaningfully point to and label as im/politeness phenomena. Of course, this is also a problem for CA-based analyses.
Haugh (2007:311) makes a similar observation:
while conversation analysis provides considerable traction for validating the analyst's interpreting of the
participants evaluations as being consequential in the sequential organization of talk (procedural relevance), it
does not necessarily establish that the analysis itself is viable with respect to the interactional achievement of
(im)politeness1, or what Arundale (2006) terms interpretive relevance
Haugh does suggest, however, that the participants evaluations and an analyst's interpretation of the participants
evaluations need not be isomorphic -- only that this interpretation has value within a theory of (im)politeness or wider
theory of facework (2007:311). We feel confident that the nomenclature we employ is not of the sort that the participants
would use in their metapragmatic evaluations of interactional behaviour -- i.e. we clearly do not take an im/politeness1
approach.
However, we also do not feel comfortable in taking a fully theoretically-oriented im/politeness2 approach. For us, a
theory must be firmly empirically grounded and able to explain all the data it claims to account for. Crucially, it must also
have predictive power -- and from our perspective, a predictive model of human behaviour is simply untenable. All that we
can offer is an explication of the orderliness of talk and thus the coherence of social actions. Although we are interested in
actions and not (lay persons) perceptions, we are interested in perceptions of actions which are tied up in the way people
respond to action -- recognising also that inaction is more or less taking a stance: inaction is itself an action (cf. Haugh and
Bousfield, 2012). We also acknowledge, however, that we discuss these actions in ways that are an abstraction from the
local understanding(s) and it is for this reason that we would claim our approach is neither solely im/politeness1 nor im/
politeness2, but a hybrid of the two -- something like im/politeness1.5.
As well as using Svennevig's model of interpersonal relationships (section 2.3) we also use the concepts of equity and
ritual equilibrium which we believe give the most cogent account of the social actions we present here.4 We would argue
that equity and ritual equilibrium (see sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2) are fundamental operators in the regulation of social order
and we take it that face is at the interface of this regulatory behaviour.

4
Where we appropriate concepts from existing theories, models, and principles we do so only to the extent that they inform our analyses
beyond the sequential organisation of talk. We recognise that as a consequence of our bricolage, they may not be thought to hold the same values
as they do in their original conceptual contexts.

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To illustrate this, consider the two main methods for the dilemma of dividing a restaurant bill between a group of diners.
One way is for each diner to contribute exactly their portion of the overall cost (the calculating payer method). The other is
to divide the whole cost equally by the number of diners (the equal payer method).5 Taking the first method absolutely
guarantees financial equity. Taking the second method means that some will pay slightly more and some slightly less than
the actual cost of their meal, and thus, financial inequity is virtually guaranteed. However, method-2 can also be seen to
have associated social benefits which, by virtue of their absence in method-1, can be considered as method-1's losses
(or costs). Over and above making for an easier calculation, dividing the bill equally also has at least the following face
gains: it engenders a sense of group solidarity, and it may demonstrate commitment to the future(s) of the ongoing
relationship(s) between the participants, since, over time, the financial loss on this particular occasion will potentially be
recouped in some future exchange. However, we would argue that there is also a potential social loss for the calculating
payer since this behaviour carries a negative other-assessment by those who value ritual, social equilibrium over the
financial. For the equal payer, the absence of this cost is effectively a further benefit. And yet, despite the apparent
benefits of dividing the costs equally, there are calculating payers who choose to forego them.6
In a comprehensive account of social action, we must remember that people are driven by things other than face alone.
For example, people can cheat, abuse and lie, but the explanation for this cannot always be that they actually have no
concerns for face -- it just so happens that agents may reckon that, in maximising their outcomes, there is more to be
gained (or less to be lost) than by orienting to those concerns. Indeed, as Brown and Levinson (1987:62) note: Face can
be, and routinely is, ignored, not just in cases of social breakdown (affrontery) but also in cases of urgent cooperation, or in
the interests of efficiency. However, whilst we take it that face is foremost an interpersonally achieved construct, we are
talking not just about (not) paying face due to others, but also (not) choosing to display concern for the treatment of our
own face, contingent upon rationalising our wants vs. needs for dues from others. We would argue then, that while face
and ritual social equilibrium are invariably (and ordinarily) at play, equity always is.7
We further describe this principle of equity in section 2.4.2, but first we outline the concepts that we apply to our
analyses from Spencer-Oatey's model of rapport management.
2.4.1. Rapport management
Spencer-Oatey (2008) posits that the management of social relationships is essentially the management of harmony-disharmony. She levels criticism at the negative face concerns that Brown and Levinson (1987) identify, and questions
whether these are really face concerns at all. Underlying her claim appears to be an adherence to Goffman's definition of
face8 whereas Brown and Levinson (1987:61f) -- despite claiming that their definition is derived from Goffman -- offer
revisions which, in their use of the term negative face move away from Goffman's idea of face as a positive social value.
Spencer-Oatey (2008:18), then, setting out with Goffman's original definition, suggests that many actions are, in fact, not
necessarily face sensitive:
For instance, if someone tries to force us to do something, and we feel s/he has no right to expect us to do this, s/he
threatens our perceived rights to equitable treatment. Similarly, if someone speaks to us in a way that is too personal
for our liking, we may feel s/he has threatened our rights to (non-)association. In all these cases, we are likely to feel
annoyed or irritated, but we do not necessarily feel a loss of face [i.e. positive social value].
This argument is reflected in her model by the move to conceptualise the dichotomy of autonomy--imposition away from a
component of face to a framework of personal/social entitlements -- in her terminology, sociality rights and obligations.
These sociality rights and obligations form one of three interconnected bases of rapport alongside face sensitivities and
interactional goals, each with its own typology of rapport threatening behaviour, namely: rights-threatening/obligationomission; face-threatening and goal-threatening respectively. For our purposes, we only briefly address sociality rights
and obligations as it is this which has the most bearing on our analysis (section 4).
Spencer-Oatey (2008:16) posits that all persons presume a set of sociality rights and obligations that are most
commonly derived from normative behaviour. From an extended set of socio-pragmatic interactional principles (SIPs)
she outlines two fundamental principles to this basis of rapport:

5
While we (perhaps simplistically) use these two methods for splitting a restaurant bill to illustrate our basic point, we do of course recognise
that such activities are likely to be culturally dependant.
6
We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out that solidarity and considerateness can be shown by splitting a bill according to what each
individual consumed, particularly in cases when it is known that there are some who are short of money.
7
We do not find this view to be at odds with Goffman, who himself states that Ordinarily, maintenance of face is a condition of interaction
(1967a:12, emphasis added).
8
The term face may be defined as the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken
during a particular contact (Goffman, 1967a:5, original emphasis).

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(1) Association
(i) Interactional involvement--detachment (the expectancy of an appropriate (reasonable, minimum) amount of
interaction and the right to refuse a claim that is not commensurate with the relationship). Spencer-Oatey clearly
states that an appropriate amount is variable, based not solely on norms but also personal preference, which we
would argue must be locally managed at the interactional level.
(ii) Affective involvement--detachment (the expectancy that only some things can be felt/shared that are
commensurate with the relationship).
(2) Equity
(i) We should not be unduly imposed upon; and where there is imposition,
(ii) costs and benefits should be kept roughly in balance through the principle of reciprocity.
Much of the behaviour in our data we analyse as having a basis in the above principles -- and it is these rightsthreatening/obligation-omitting behaviours which affect the solidarity dimension of the relationship. Clearly there is
synergy between rapport management and our broader use of equity. In the following section, we give an overview of its
use in other literature.
2.4.2. Equity and equilibrium
Our conceptualisation of equity is closely aligned with Clark's Equity Principle (1996:295) which claims that individuals
enter into joint projects presupposing a method for maintaining equity. The similarity with Goffman's description of face
maintenance as a condition of interaction, not its objective (1967a:12) is obvious: we maintain that the reason for this is
that both concepts are fundamentally interconnected. Where Clark is concerned with balancing costs vs. benefits,
Goffman was concerned with the balancing of the ritual order achieved via facework. The latter conceptualisation can be
seen in Goffman's references to ritual equilibrium. For example, when participants attempt to correct for the effects of a
ratified threat then:
At this point one or more participants find themselves in an established state of ritual disequilibrium or disgrace, and
an attempt must be made to re-establish a satisfactory ritual state for them [. . .] the imagery of equilibrium is apt here
because the length and intensity of the corrective effort is nicely adapted to the persistence and intensity of the
threat [. . .] the sequence of acts set in motion by an acknowledged threat to face, and terminating in the reestablishment of ritual equilibrium, I shall call an interchange.
(Goffman, 1967a:19, original emphasis)
In this description, Goffman clearly identifies ritual, mutual consideration for face as a driver for the kind of balancing
behaviour we are talking about, but it need not be. Following Davies et al. (2007) and Merrison et al. (2012), we want to
advance the financial metaphor of credit earned and debt incurred that exist as if on a balance-sheet of the relation
between s[peaker] and h[earer] (Leech, 1983:125). For example, a request recipient might choose to grant a request in
order to gain some credit from the exchange that they may later cash in -- and such an exchange may have little to do
with face per se. However, we do not wish to paint a picture of a necessarily selfish, nor a zero-sum game but only of the
everyday things that people do for each other; clearly, the level of equity will be different between colleagues, friends and
spouses and the history of these payings in and takings out is not necessarily a process of conscious record keeping.
As we have said above, equity is not necessarily driven by face alone (though face is invariably involved). In the
calculation of maximising our outcomes (weighing up our benefits minus our costs) -- in the successful achievement of our
goals -- the equilibria within our relationships are necessarily upset. All that matters, though, is that the participants can find
some method for restoring a balance or for re-negotiating the relationship -- and it just so happens that, more often than
not, such restoration and re-negotiation is effected in the interaction by appealing to face. As Goffman (1971:149,
emphasis in original) notes:
After an offense has occurred, the job of the offender is to show that it was not a fair expression of his attitude, or,
when it evidently was, to show that he has changed his attitude to the rule that was violated. In the latter case, his job
is to show that whatever happened before, he now has a right relationship -- a pious attitude -- to the rule in question,
and this is a matter of indicating a relationship, not compensating a loss.
2.5. Summary
In section 2.1 we laid out our argument for the use of a CA-based method for analysing issues of im/politeness within
talk-in-interaction. In section 2.2 we noted that initial interactions tend to be characterised by a conservative orientation
towards face maintenance and low-level rights and obligations and that this poses a problem for the PUA in his pursuit of
INTIMACY. In section 2.3 we set out our definition of INTIMACY and our conceptualisation of the social relationship in terms of

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1121

solidarity, familiarity and affect. Finally, in section 2.4 we outlined a problem that data such as ours present -- cases where
people are ostensibly getting along but where some of the interactants are taking a line which could be analysed as face
aggravating behaviour. While analysing these data in terms of impoliteness might potentially be acceptable, we do not
believe that such an analysis is fully adequate and we propose equity as a means to account for such behaviour.
3. Methodology
In this section, we briefly attend to details relating to selection of informants, the methods of gaining consent, and make
a case for the ethical validity of retrospective consent.9 We also cover some technical aspects of the recordings.
3.1. Selecting informants
Prior to data collection, Hambling-Jones spent some months gaining an acquired immersion (Garfinkel and Wieder,
1992) in the PUA community by browsing online community websites and forums. Through one of these forums, he was
able to organise a face-to-face meeting with one PUA and was offered contact details of a separate, larger group of PUAs
who were recruited for research. This prior research underpinned our approach and design of the procedural aspects of
the data collection and gave Hambling-Jones a sufficient amount of jargon to communicate effectively with community
members and gain their acceptance.
3.2. Gaining consent
The data we present come from surreptitiously audio-recorded interactions between women and male PUAs. Studying
a specific CofP where its members are not observably public necessitated that we seek them out in a way that the women
informants were not. Thus from the outset, there was an apparent power imbalance between the PUAs who were
confederates in the research and the women who had no prior knowledge of it. Had informed consent been pre-obtained,
this would have represented obvious problems of validity,10 though this was not our only concern in considering a suitable
methodology.
We argue here that retrospective consent, in this case (and perhaps more generally) may actually be more beneficial
for informants. The unscriptedness of conversation can (and does): lead to talk that can be damaging to the self or other;
call for polite agreement (where individuals would rather not agree); be embarrassing, rude, unsavoury, etc. Given this,
informants cannot ever know precisely what they will be committing to the discourse record if consent is obtained before
the event. Though the obligatory right to withdraw should serve as a catch-all, the power relation between informant and
researcher must not be underestimated. It is harder to renege on a contract where a pseudo-legal document has been
signed, than where no prior agreement has been made. With retrospective consent, the informant has made no such
promises and has the benefit of hindsight. Surely, this is the most informed consent that one could hope to gain.
Only one group of women declined to give consent to the use of their recordings and the sound file was deleted in front
of them. Interestingly in this case, their orientation was not to any deception but instead to their involvement in anything
that was not their ongoing social activity. We therefore find a further advantage to this particular method: had consent been
sought beforehand, this would have required the participants to put their current activities on hold and knowingly attend to
some other incongruent (overt research) activity. Though this might also be said of the approaches from the pick-up
artists, such interactions are in keeping with the situational contexts, and arguably would have happened even outwith the
research. Following debriefing, the women did not treat the surreptitiously recorded interactions as fake or worth-less,
evidenced by their continued social involvement with the PUAs, even while they knew recording was still going on. In
effect, then, we believe that retrospective consent can reduce the imposition caused by research on anyone going about
their everyday business.
3.3. Recording interactions
Surreptitious audio recording presents very practical problems. To ensure we obtained the best recording quality
possible, a solid state recorder (Zoom H4) was used in conjunction with a professional grade, lavalier microphone (AKG
C417 PP). This type of microphone is discreet, and designed for placement close to the source -- advantageous in

9
The research presented in this paper was conducted in accordance with the research governance requirements of York St John University,
York, UK.
10
We argue that this is not so problematic in terms of the PUA informants as they are engaging in their normal activities (whilst already being
metalinguistically aware) thereby minimising problems associated with the observer's paradox.

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O. Hambling-Jones, A.J. Merrison / Journal of Pragmatics 44 (2012) 1115--1127

environments with high ambient noise. The microphone head was attached near the wearer's neck-line and the lead was
hidden inside clothing, trailing down to the Zoom H4, worn in a belt holster. The PUA informants self-selected to wear the
recording equipment. It is, of course, incumbent on any researchers who are studying self-selecting participants to
recognise that by the very nature of their self-selection they necessarily cannot be considered truly representative of any
wider groups in which they operate. However, PUAs are already motivated to (and do) introspect on their own interactional
involvements. Their motivation to be recorded is therefore more transparent and thus is less of a methodological concern
to the current research.
We must make clear at this point the one research-prescribed limitation that we placed on the recordings. The PUA
methodology we have encountered assumes a set of closings, or exit points (from the interaction). For moral reasons, it
was agreed that the women would be made aware of the research not beyond a point where the PUA(s) might initiate a
number close (obtaining a woman's telephone number).
4. Analysis
In this section we discuss three fragments of data to illustrate how INEQUITY may serve in the pursuit of INTIMACY.
(Transcription conventions are essentially Jeffersonian (see Appendix A). $ signs indicate sing-song voice. All
participants names that appear in the transcripts have been anonymised.)
The first data fragment to be analysed is taken from an interaction in a pub between two PUAs (P1, P2) and four women
(W1--4).
Fragment 1: Libby's Boobs
P1: Hey guys
2
W1: Hi: (.) whady [fink ]?
P1:
[88how ]s it goin88
4
P1: (0.6) I love it
W1: HA HA HA (.) awww I bet (you)
6
P1: I kno:w
P2: Cheer [s ]
8
W2:
[d ]ont even know er very well
((clink of glasses))
10 P1: So what are you guys celebratin tonight? Anything good?
W3: (1.0) Pardon?
12 P1: What are you celebrating
(1.0)
14 W3: Bein (gir: [ls ]).
W4:
[Li ]bbys boo:bs (.) have [you seen (how X ] X X)=
16 W3:
[(bein gir:ls)]
W2: =HA HA HA HA
18
(1.2)
W4: Are ya g(h)ay
20 P1: Im qui- not- theyre just actua [lly (0.4) ginorm"ous" ]
():
[(Dylike) Libbys boo:bs ]
22
(.) theyre $(X]X) [(being) gir::ls]$
W1:
$[(bhehing) gir::rls ]$ hehhehehheh
24 P1: Its redic- IW2: Big girl.
26 P1: Please dont tell me you like had a boob job recently
to like get them e [ven bigger]=
28 W1:
[NO::]
P1: =youre like YEA:::H [(.) just let them come ] OU::T
30 ():
[<its a::ll na [trel]> ]
P2:
[Shes ] like
32
I wear this top I get served re:al quick at the ba:r,=
(): =.hh hehhehheheh
34 P2: Im tryin a new concoction tonight
(1.0)

O. Hambling-Jones, A.J. Merrison / Journal of Pragmatics 44 (2012) 1115--1127

1123

P1's utterance in line 12 (What are you celebrating) is interesting to note from a sequential aspect as it serves to be
quite powerful in generating some ensuing talk. Button and Casey (1985:3f) note that a topic initial elicitor e.g., What
have you been up to? may not generate a topic initial where there is a no-news report, such as, Not much. On the other
hand, the itemised news enquiry, such as used in line 12, projects a specific mentionable (the cause for celebration)
which carries the proposal that the speaker has some access to or knowledge about that mentionable. The nature of such
a proposal means that it is more often observed between acquainted speakers who share knowledge about each other,
but that is not the case here. P1 may have reasonably good contextual resources for asserting that he observes a
celebration, though the dispreferred in line 13 and the generality of the response in line 14 suggest that the women were
not actually engaged in celebrating anything at all. The assertion of the celebrate-able could have been rejected, e.g.
Nothing in particular, but instead, line 14 (and 15) orients to this projection of a relevant mentionable. Doing so necessarily
commits these women to interactional involvement. Indeed, the newsworthiness may appear upgraded in line 15 where
boobs is offered as the topical bid. There appears, in line 16, some sort of attempt to downgrade this (by W3) to the prior bid of
line 14 -- perhaps representing some assessment of inappropriacy of that topic with the present company; the boobs topic is,
however, followed by robust laughter by W2 in line 17, suggesting that not all of the women feel this way. Clearly then, within
the group of women, there is some sensitivity to affective involvement--detachment with these PUAs.
P1's dispreferred silence at line 18 clearly projects a problem for him in orienting to this boobs talk which becomes
evident in line 19. W4 appears to take P1's silence to be disaffiliative (manifest in her challenge to P1's sexuality): P1's
apparent reluctance to engage is taken as affective detachment from the current topic, and this carries a threat to ongoing
rapport. Clearly, however, the emergent discourse here, is neither guarded nor conservative, and yet P1 nevertheless
disattends. Contra W4's gay challenge, P1's disattendance to this boobs topic has little to do with sexuality (and we
would argue that W4 knows this) but much to do with solidarity. At line 20, with his initial false starts, P1 potentially displays
that his polite, non-observant silence was, rather, sensitive to the impropriety of engaging in an un-safe, sexual topic so
very early on in the relationship. However, because the women have oriented to the topic as safe, W4's challenge
seems to index that it was improper for P1 not to engage. Thus, having been given this additional warrant, P1 then
felicitously shifts to a more than full engagement with the topic. Following this warrant, the PUA no longer shows his
previously displayed restraint: now being in a solidary, proper standing, he engages in more intimate activities,
hyperbolically teasing W1 on the size of her ginorm"ous" breasts (lines 20--29) and the propriety of this action is
demonstrated by the women's laughing and playing along (Glenn, 2003:125).
In this example, we notice that the PUA has not had to work very hard in the pursuit of more intimate types of activities
(talk of a sexual nature, teasing and general playful banter) but was nonetheless sensitive to the appropriacy of this
affective involvement within the currently established framework of rights and expectations (solidarity). In the following
exchange, where the woman does not show such a proactive orientation to interactive involvement, we can see the PUA
doing more work. The conversation takes place outside a club; the fragment begins just a few minutes into the talk.
Fragment
P:
2
W:
4
P:
6

W:
P:

8
10

W:
P:

12
14
16

W:
P:
P:
W:
P:

2: You Dirty Smoker

So you bin smo:kin
(1.0)
8Yea::h8=
=YOU DIRTY SMO:KER = Sorry (.) I didnt mean it
(.)8I didnt mean it8=
=Thats alright.
I used to smoke you know like (.) five years ago?
(.)
(8yeah8)=
=You know theyre like the worst smokers though arent they (.)
You know the ones that used to smoke and then they stopped (.)
An then they always have a go at the people who smo:ke but
I only smoke when [(
)]
[when drinkin li:ke?]
Yeah socia- social smoker.
8Social smoker.8
Yea:::h thats the way it should be though I fink.

We can observe that P's question at line 1 projects some sort of aspersion on smoking and/or smokers as its mentioning is
oriented to with guilty admission (line 3). At line 4, P uses a bald, emphatic, negative other-assessment that we might claim
is hearably impolite. The basis for this rests on his latched apology and subsequent denial (lines 4 and 5) by which P
begins his display of his own sensitivity to the potentially hearable offensiveness of the untoward act. At line 6, W's

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O. Hambling-Jones, A.J. Merrison / Journal of Pragmatics 44 (2012) 1115--1127

response is latched to the prior turn -- this preferred turn-shape and unstressed delivery displaying unproblematic denial of
any offence taken (where a delayed response or marked stress may do the opposite). Here then, we have a hearably
impolite case treated not-as impolite.11
P treats the offence in line 4 as doing a large dose of INEQUITY, which is displayed in his reparatory moves in lines 4 and
5 (and beyond). Whilst this offensive talk is evidently disaffiliative, P topicalises smoking to do self-disclosure revealing
that he is an ex-smoker (line 7). This engenders familiarity.
In lines 10--12, P's topicalisation of smoking by talking about judgemental ex-smokers is interesting as this carries some
sense of self-denigration -- it references both the category of ex-smokers and the earlier face-threat at line 4, but he does not
claim actual agency, instead choosing a 3rd person referent (they). This formulation with the tag question (line 10)
constructs a frame for agreement where both can affiliate with the (presumed) shared experience of hypocritical ex-smokers
that P has earlier given voice to. W orients to P's prior talk as critical and tries to mitigate this by claiming -- it seems -- that she
is not a proper smoker. P and W work collaboratively to (re)categorise W as a social smoker (lines 13--16) which gets
endorsed by P in line 17. Clearly, we are not witnessing P and W getting on like a house on fire, but we can observe P doing
some noticeable non-adherence to a safe topic and manifestly threatening rapport -- he is taking risks. The flavour of the talk
is not the interrogative style observed by Maynard and Zimmerman (1984) and yet he occasions self-disclosure (offers
something of himself) without the typically required invitation and negotiates affiliation (however small) with W.
The next data fragment shows another PUA striking up a conversation. A general observation of this stretch of talk is
the significant number of requests that P makes of W1 right from the beginning of the interchange.
Fragment 3a: Can I borrow ya for a sec
P:
Can I borrow ya for a sec.
2
W1: Yeh.
P:
One quick second.
4
W1: >What what what<
P:
I need to talk t ya [like really quick(ly)].
6
W1:
[>what what what what what<]
P:
Im minglin wheres ya friends?
8
W1: Err::::::::: (0.4) there:::s someone::
P:
Right over there?
10 W1: Right over there.
W1: Whats up [darlin]
12 P:
[Intro]duce me (.) >introduce me tya fwhats your name?<
((Lines 14--18 omitted in which there is an insertion sequence pertaining to W's name))
W1: So how come you [re mingling?]
20 P:
[>>(Oh) youre names atchly-<<]
P:
(X) Err=
We want to focus, first on the PUA's formulations at lines 1, 3 and 5. With the preparatory Can I borrow ya (line 1), the
time understater for a sec, and also the lexical choice of borrow projecting with it, a giving back, the design of
these turns displays particular sensitivity to reducing the level of imposition. All of this mitigation seems oriented to the
INEQUITY of P's request for interactional involvement.
Lines 1, 3 and 5 build to create a problem for which W1 is to provide some sort of solution. In lines 4 and 6, she orients
to P's problem as time-sensitive and displays her responsiveness and readiness to be told about it. At line 7, the generality
of P's news announcement does not, therefore, seem congruent with the prior sequence of talk (displayed by W1's enquiry
in line 11 as to the yet unstated problem). As this is disattended by P, we see W1 orient to it again in line 19, this time,
displaying the conditional relevance of mingling, which she infers might relate to the problem. This is not only
disattended again, but interrupted in line 20. Clearly, in her pursuit of an account of the problem, W1 shows concern to a
breach of norms (contiguity/reciprocity).
Although P shows no explicit reciprocal concern, we cannot help but notice the speed of delivery of P's contributions (lines
12 and 20), the onsets of which come before the completion of W1's prior turns. There is significant interactional import in this
intersection of turns (cf. Local and Drew, 2009) -- if a turn is not hearable it is not attendable. In this way, P may get his stuff
done whilst warrantably disattending to W1's stuff. By proposing W1 attend to an ostensible problem (which she does)
whilst nevertheless manifestly stringing her along, P's non-reciprocity, we would argue, is doing INEQUITY.
11

And the same is true even if line 6 is W's unproblematic acceptance of P's apology.

O. Hambling-Jones, A.J. Merrison / Journal of Pragmatics 44 (2012) 1115--1127

1125

Fragment 3b: Can I borrow ya for a sec (continued)

22 W1: =Ysee cause if I take you all the way over to my friends,
they are about to leave an then itll just be li::ke
24 P:
Awww thats rubbish no: you just talk
(for) me for like [five seconds ].
26 W1:
[I will talk to ] you for
five sec [onds definitely ]
28 P:
[>Aww youre really sweet< ]
[youre really cool ].=
30
[((P puts arm over Ws shoulder))]=
W1: =Melanie, this is my new fri [end ]
32 P:
[>Hi hello< ]=
W2: =[[Hi:: ]
34 W1: [[This is ] [my other friend ].
P:
[>(Ive) got a new friend< ]
36 P:
Hi Melanie
In line 12, P issues a bald imperative which gets taken up with an account of non-compliance (lines 22--23). W1's laboured
delivery caused by the emphasis on all, friends and leave displays reluctancy to comply with this imperative,
presumably, because this will impose on her friends leaving. P makes an explicit, negative assessment of the implicit
(problematic) proposition that he cannot meet W1s friends (Awww thats rubbish, line 24) and issues another imperative
for her to talk to him, again using a time understater for like five seconds (line 25). Important to note, is the commonsense operation at work when speakers use these formulaic time understaters; they are clearly ostensible, and yet we
see in P, a persistent, overt display of concern for her rights to interactional detachment. At the surface level, he claims only a
(hyper)reasonable amount of interactional involvement. However, in W1's response (in lines 26--27), she shows explicit
recognition of P's sensitivity to her rights but to the extent that her agreement is also manifest at the surface level as granting
his basic rights to some talk which is definitely reasonable as if P's claim were literal rather than merely ostensible.
The question then, is this: how, if only being granted his most basic rights to interactional involvement with a stranger,
could he (in lines 28--29) reasonably make such an overt, affective display as youre really sweet youre really
cool? The answer, as we hope to have shown, is that P has already demonstrably taken more than he has claimed:
there has been an unspoken agreement that W1 has in fact committed herself to the interactional involvement more than
could reasonably be expected -- prior to line 26, P has engineered a state of inequity that legitimises his compliment.
Thereafter, in line 28 (youre really sweet) P emphasises this affective display, simultaneously uttering youre
really cool and putting his arm over W1's shoulder (line 30). It is interesting to note that line 31 is latched to this
physical display with W1 categorising P as my new friend presumably as W2 has recently come within proximity -- and
must have seen the embrace. What, though, are the other viable resources available to W1 to categorise this stranger? P
cannot be introduced by name, as he has not yet disclosed it. In addition, there may be undesirable corollaries associated
with using a generic label like some guy, and even worse, to ask sorry, what was your name? which could well indicate
something less than full discernment relating to physical intimacy with strangers.
What we notice, then, is the PUA doing inequity by pushing the boundaries of sociality rights. This can be observed in
P's explicit orientation to mitigating the level of imposition (lines 1, 3, 5, 25), despite making a host of impositions on W1:
borrowing; pursuing introduction to friends; and otherwise being demanding of (yet disattentive to) interaction. There is
some sort of (micro) balancing act going on (for example in lines 24 and 25 with the brashness of you talk [to] me being
offset by just and for five seconds). We also notice the absence of P's reciprocity of coordination, disattending
W1's questions (lines 11 and 19). This amounts to a lot of take (debit) by P until we get to lines 28--30 where there is
suddenly a (we would argue, disproportionate) lot of give (credit) on a macro scale.
The co-construction of this affective display has resulted in mutual categorisation of the relationship as one of friends
(lines 31 and 35), and this now enables P to reasonably claim sociality rights beyond those of a mere stranger.
5. Summary and conclusion
In the course of this paper, we have seen that the behaviours of these PUAs demonstrably extend beyond merely
getting acquainted and this we have glossed as the pursuit of INTIMACY. This manifests itself in a non-conservative
approach to interactional involvement with strangers which, we suggest, has doing inequity at its foundation.
Unlike Davies et al. (2007), who demonstrate interactants getting back into the black before going into the red, we
observe the PUAs going into the red before getting into the black by first building inequity into the relationship (via their
talk) before subsequently redressing it by some method. Despite how extreme some of these inequitous behaviours

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O. Hambling-Jones, A.J. Merrison / Journal of Pragmatics 44 (2012) 1115--1127

might appear, we feel there is a very rational underlying reason for them. If we were to imagine that Fragment 3 (Can I
borrow ya for a sec) had been turned on its head, and that P1 had made the overt, affective display at the very beginning
of the talk, we believe the effect would have been very different. To say such a thing (perhaps even to say anything
complimentary or nice) to someone whom you know little or nothing about may seem a little creepy. If there is not a
mutually recognisable basis for this kind of doing, then it may appear improper and be taken as sleazy, because it is
displays of this kind of commitment that act as cues that the participants may be willing to venture the relationship beyond
a cursory meeting. What building (and redressing) inequity does then, is potentially engineer slots that frame these more
intimate kinds of work (affiliation, compliments, displays of affect) as rightly occasioned and ritually proper.
The PUA operates, as Goffman (1967b:210) describes it, where the action is:
Adult males may define a female as an object to initiate a sexually potential relationship with. The risk is rebuff,
misalliance, responsibility, betrayal of prior relationships, or displeasure of other males; the opportunity is for the
kind of confirmation of self that success in this area alone can bring.
The PUA is every bit the gambler, and what we hope to have demonstrated in this paper is that, in this variety of talk,
risky plays can have high payoffs. In short, it would appear that on balance, there is indeed much to be gained by doing
inequity in the pursuit of INTIMACY.
Acknowledgements
We are genuinely indebted to the anonymous reviewers who provided invaluable comments which enabled us to write
a much better paper than we otherwise would have done. Excellent proof-reading services were kindly provided by Helen
Phillips and Jack J. Wilson. Thanks also go to Jack not only for helpful comments on earlier drafts and bibliographic
services, but also for his good humour throughout many late-night pizza-eating writing sessions. We are also massively
grateful to both Rosie and Sally for their persistent extensive forbearance over way too long a period -- they clearly love us
more than we deserve.
Appendix A. Transcription conventions12
[
]

When there is already someone speaking, a single left bracket [ marks the start of overlapped talk.
The offset (end) of all overlapped contributions is shown by a right bracket at the appropriate points in the turns of both
participants.
[[
When there is no current speaker, onset of simultaneous contributions from both participants is marked using double left brackets.
=
An utterance that immediately follows the preceding utterance without a gap is said to be a latched utterance. It is
transcribed with a pair of = signs: one at the end of the preceding stretch of talk and one immediately prior to the onset
of the latched utterance.
(.)
A micro pause of less than 0.2 seconds.
(0.0)
Longer pauses are timed to the nearest tenth of a second and are put within parentheses. (3.1) therefore represents
a silence of 3.1 seconds. Where silences cannot be attributed to a speaker, the pause is marked on its own line.
><
Talk delivered at a faster rate than surrounding talk is transcribed within angled brackets pointing inwards (or >> << for
much faster talk).
<>
Talk delivered at a slower rate than surrounding talk is transcribed within angled brackets pointing outwards.
Indicates the utterance is cut off mid-flow.
:
Elongation of the preceding sound. The more colons, the longer the sound.
?
Gradual rising intonation.
.
Gradual falling intonation.
,
Fall--rise intonation.

Text surrounded by degree signs is quieter than the surrounding talk. The more degrees there are, the quieter the
utterance: quiet, very quiet.
CAPITALS Louder than the surrounding talk.
""
Notably higher shift in pitch for the text between the upward pointing arrows.
underlining Other emphasis/stress.
h
Audible outbreath (number of hs corresponds to length of breath).
.h
Audible inbreath (number of hs corresponds to length of breath).
ha/heh
Syllable of laughter.
((cough))
Representations of non-verbal behaviour are transcribed within double parentheses.
( )
Parentheses indicate talk that cannot be accurately transcribed. Any transcription within the parentheses indicates
merely a possible hearing. An X within the parentheses represents a syllable.
odd spelling Non-conventional spelling represents the pronunciation of words.

12

This is a brief version of the conventions in Bloomer et al. (2005:43--48).

O. Hambling-Jones, A.J. Merrison / Journal of Pragmatics 44 (2012) 1115--1127

1127

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Oliver Hambling-Jones enjoys pretty much every trapping of the academic life except for writing -- a problem which he has apparently met head
on with a flooding style psychotherapeutic approach. He hopes for a good long-term prognosis. If he has not got his hands in one of several
metaphorical, academic pies (relishing many disciplines), then he has his hands on some literal ones; Cornish pasties a particular favourite. He
cannot currently conceive of any reasonable method for restoring equity with AJM.
Andrew John Merrison is a mac-using erstwhile incipient accountant viola player who, if lucky, occasionally gets to play bridge and golf. He
spends most of his life studying CA and the socio-pragmatics of inter-action, too much money on books, way too much time on Facebook, and
nowhere near enough with Sally, Ben and Joe. With Aileen Bloomer and Patrick Griffiths, he co-authored Introducing Language in Use: A
Coursebook and co-edited Language in Use: a Reader. He has been an executive member of the Linguistic Politeness Research Group since
2000. Invariably quite cheerful, his favourite words are minimum and outwith.