Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC
UNION BANK OF THE, G.R. No. 192565
PHILIPPINES and DESI
TOMAS, Present:
Petitioners,
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,*
- versus - ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
SERENO,**
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. Promulgated:
February 28, 2012
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review in this Rule 45 petition, the decision[1] of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Makati City (RTCMakati City) in Civil Case No. 09-1038. The petition seeks
to reverse and set aside the RTC-Makati City decision
dismissing the petition for certiorari of petitioners Union
Bank of the Philippines (Union Bank) and Desi Tomas
(collectively, the petitioners). The RTC found that the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 63, Makati City (MeTCMakati City) did not commit any grave abuse of discretion
in denying the motion to quash the information for perjury
filed by Tomas.

material matter before a competent person

authorized to administer oath which the
law requires to wit: said accused stated in
the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of
merit of a complaint for sum of money
with prayer for a writ of replevin docketed
as [Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay City,
that the Union Bank of the Philippines has
not commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same issues in
another tribunal or agency, accused
knowing well that said material statement
was false thereby making a willful and
deliberate assertion of falsehood.[2]

The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union

Banks two (2) complaints for sum of money with prayer for
a writ of replevin against the spouses Eddie and Eliza
Tamondong and a John Doe. The first complaint, docketed
as Civil Case No. 98-0717, was filed before the RTC,
Branch 109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The second
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 342-000, was filed
on March 15, 2000 and raffled to the MeTC, Branch
47,Pasay City. Both complaints showed that Tomas executed
and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping.
Accordingly, she was charged of deliberately violating
Article 183 of the RPC by falsely declaring under oath in the
Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint
that she did not commence any other action or proceeding
involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency.
Tomas filed a Motion to Quash, [3] citing two
grounds. First, she argued that the venue was improperly
laid since it is the Pasay City court (where the Certificate
against Forum Shopping was submitted and used) and not
theMeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum
Shopping was subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the
perjury case. Second, she argued that the facts charged do
not constitute an offense because: (a) the third element of
perjury the willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood was
not alleged with particularity without specifying what the
other action or proceeding commenced involving the same
issues in another tribunal or agency; (b) there was no other
action or proceeding pending in another court when the
second complaint was filed; and (c) she was charged with
perjury by giving false testimony while the allegations in the
Information make out perjury by making a false affidavit.

The Antecedents
Tomas was charged in court for perjury under
Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for making a
false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The
Information against her reads:
That on or about the 13th day of March
2000 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully
and
feloniously
make
untruthful statements under oath upon a

The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to

Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction over the case since the
Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized
in Makati City.[4] The MeTC-Makati City also ruled that the
allegations in the Information sufficiently charged Tomas
with perjury.[5] The MeTC-Makati City subsequently denied
Tomas motion for reconsideration.[6]
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before
the RTC-Makati City to annul and set aside the MeTCMakati City orders on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion. The petitioners anchored their petition on the
rulings in United States v. Canet[7] and Ilusorio v.

Bildner[8] which ruled that venue and jurisdiction should be

in the place where the false document was presented.
The Assailed RTC Decision
In dismissing the petition for certiorari, the RTCMakati City held:
[I]nsofar as the petitioners stance is
concerned[,] the more recent case of [Sy
Tiong Shiou v. Sy] (GR Nos. 174168 &
179438, March 30, 2009) however,
reaffirms what has been the long standing
view on the venue with respect to perjury
cases. In this particular case[,] the high
court reiterated the rule that the criminal
action shall be instituted and tried in the
court of the municipality or territory where
the offense was committed, or where any
of its essential ingredients occurred. It
went on to declare that since the subject
document[,] the execution of which was
the subject of the charge[,] was subscribed
and sworn to in Manila[,] then the court of
the said territorial jurisdiction was the
proper venue of the criminal action[.]

that the facts in Ilusorio showed that the filing of the

petitions in court containing the false statements was the
essential ingredient that consummated the perjury. In Sy
Tiong, the perjurious statements were made in a General
Information Sheet (GIS) that was submitted to the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Interestingly, Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz
shared the petitioners view. In his Manifestation and Motion
in lieu of Comment (which we hereby treat as the Comment
to the petition), the Solicitor General also relied
onIlusorio and opined that the lis mota in the crime of
perjury is the deliberate or intentional giving of false
evidence in the court where the evidence is material. The
Solicitor General observed that the criminal intent to assert a
falsehood under oath only became manifest before
the MeTC-Pasay City.
The Issue
The case presents to us the issue of what the proper venue of
perjury under Article 183 of the RPC should be Makati City,
where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was
notarized, or Pasay City, where the Certification was
presented to the trial court.

xxxx
x x x Given the present state of
jurisprudence on the matter, it is not amiss
to state that the city court of Makati City
has jurisdiction to try and decide the case
for perjury inasmuch as the gist of the
complaint itself which constitute[s] the
charge against the petitioner dwells solely
on the act of subscribing to a false
certification. On the other hand, the
charge against the accused in the case of
Ilusorio v. Bildner, et al., based on the
complaint-affidavits therein[,] was not
simply the execution of the questioned
documents but rather the introduction of
the false evidence through the subject
documents before the court of Makati City.
[9]
(emphasis ours)
The RTC-Makati City ruled
that
the MeTCMakati City did not commit grave abuse of discretion since
the order denying the Motion to Quash was based on
jurisprudence later than Ilusorio. The RTC-Makati City also
observed that the facts in Ilusorio are different from the
facts of the present case. Lastly, the RTC-Makati City ruled
that the Rule 65 petition was improper since the petitioners
can later appeal the decision in the principal case. The RTCMakati City subsequently denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.[10]

The Courts Ruling

We deny the petition and hold that the MeTCMakati City is the proper venue and the proper court to
take cognizance of the perjury case against the
petitioners.
Venue of Action and Criminal Jurisdiction
Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in
criminal cases. It determines not only the place where the
criminal action is to be instituted, but also the court that has
the jurisdiction to try and hear the case. The reason for this
rule is two-fold. First, the jurisdiction of trial courts is
limited to well-defined territories such that a trial court can
only hear and try cases involving crimes committed within
its territorial jurisdiction.[12] Second, laying the venue in
the locus criminis is grounded on the necessity and justice of
having an accused on trial in the municipality of province
where witnesses and other facilities for his defense are
available.[13]
Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue
in criminal cases carries jurisdictional consequences.
In determining the venue where the criminal action is to be
instituted and the court which has jurisdiction over it,
Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides:
(a)

The Petition
The petitioners pray that we reverse the RTCMakati City decision and quash the Information for perjury
against
Tomas.
The
petitioners
contend
that
the Ilusorio ruling is more applicable to the present facts
than our ruling in Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy Chim. [11] They argued

Subject to existing laws, the criminal

action shall be instituted and tried in
the court or municipality or
territory where the offense was
committed or where any of its
essential ingredients occurred.
[emphasis ours]

The above provision should be read in light of

Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure which states:
Place of commission of the offense. The
complaint or information is sufficient if it
can be understood from its allegations
that the offense was committed or some
of its essential ingredients occurred at
some place within the jurisdiction of the
court, unless the particular place where it
was committed constitutes an essential
element of the offense charged or is
necessary for its identification.
Both provisions categorically place the venue and
jurisdiction over criminal cases not only in the court where
the offense was committed, but also where any of its
essential ingredients took place. In other words, the venue
of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged
where the Information states that the offense was committed
or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Information Charging Perjury
Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, contains the requirement for a
Certificate against Forum Shopping. The Certificate against
Forum Shopping can be made either by a statement under
oath in the complaint or initiatory pleading asserting a claim
or relief; it may also be in a sworn certification annexed to
the complaint or initiatory pleading. In both instances, the
affiant is required to execute a statement under oath before a
duly commissioned notary public or any competent person
authorized to administer oath that: (a) he or she has not
theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim
involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasijudicial agency and, to the best of his or her knowledge, no
such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is
such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of
the present status thereof; and (c) if he or she should
thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has
been filed or is pending, he or she shall report that fact
within five days therefrom to the court wherein his or her
aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. In
relation to the crime of perjury, the material matter in a
Certificate against Forum Shopping is the truth of the
required declarations which is designed to guard
against litigants pursuing simultaneous remedies in different
fora.[14]
In this case, Tomas is charged with the crime of
perjury under Article 183 of the RPC for making a false
Certificate against Forum Shopping. The elements of
perjury under Article 183 are:
(a)

That the accused made

a statement under oath or
executed
an
affidavit upon
a material matter.

(b)

That the statement or affidavit

was made before a competent

officer, authorized to receive and

administer oath.
(c)

That in the statement or

affidavit, the accused made
a willful and deliberate assertion
of a falsehood.

(d)

That the sworn statement or

affidavit containing the falsity
is required by law or made for a
legal purpose.[15] (emphasis ours)

Where the jurisdiction of the court is being assailed

in a criminal case on the ground of improper venue, the
allegations in the complaint and information must be
examined together with Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. On this basis, we find
that the allegations in the Information sufficiently support a
finding that the crime of perjury was committed by Tomas
within the territorial jurisdiction of the MeTC-Makati City.
The first element of the crime of perjury, the
execution of the subject Certificate against Forum Shopping
was alleged in the Information to have been committed
in Makati City. Likewise, the second and fourth elements,
requiring the Certificate against Forum Shopping to be
under oath before a notary public, were also sufficiently
alleged in the Information to have been made
in Makati City:
That on or about the 13th day of
March 2000 in the City of Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make
untruthful statements under oath upon a
material matter before a competent person
authorized to administer oath which the
law requires to wit: said accused stated in
the Verification/Certification/Affidavit x x
x.[16]
We also find that the third element of willful and
deliberate falsehood was also sufficiently alleged to have
been committed in Makati City, not Pasay City, as indicated
in the last portion of the Information:
[S]aid
accused
stated
in
the
Verification/Certification/Affidavit
of
merit of a complaint for sum of money
with prayer for a writ of replevin docketed
as [Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay City,
that the Union Bank of the Philippines has
not commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same issues in
another tribunal or agency, accused
knowing well that said material statement
was false thereby making a willful and
deliberate assertion of falsehood.[17]
(underscoring ours)

Tomas deliberate and intentional assertion of

falsehood was allegedly shown when she made the false
declarations in the Certificate against Forum Shopping
before a notary public in Makati City, despite her knowledge
that the material statements she subscribed and swore to
were not true. Thus, Makati City is the proper venue
and MeTC-Makati City is the proper court to try the perjury
case against Tomas, pursuant to Section 15(a), Rule 110 of
the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as all the
essential elements constituting the crime of perjury were
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati City,
not Pasay City.

false statement was made. As supporting jurisprudence, we

cited the case of Villanueva v. Secretary of Justice [19] that, in
turn, cited an American case entitled U.S. v. Norris.[20] We
ruled in Villanueva that
Perjury is an obstruction of
justice; its perpetration well may affect the
dearest concerns of the parties before a
tribunal. Deliberate material falsification
under oath constitutes the crime of
perjury, and the crime is complete when a
witness' statement has once been made.
The Crime of Perjury: A Background

Referral to the En Banc

The present case was referred to the En Banc primarily to
address the seeming conflict between the division rulings of
the Court in the Ilusorio case that is cited as basis of this
petition, and the Sy Tiong case that was the basis of the
assailed RTC-Makati City ruling.
The Cited Ilusorio and Sy Tiong Cases
The subject matter of the perjury charge
in Ilusorio involved false statements contained in verified
petitions filed with the court for the issuance of a new
owners duplicate copies of certificates of title. The verified
petitions containing the false statements were subscribed
and
sworn
to
in Pasig City,
but
were
filed
in Makati City and Tagaytay City. The question posed was:
which court (Pasig City, Makati City and/or Tagaytay City)
had jurisdiction to try and hear the perjury cases?
We ruled that the venues of the action were
in Makati City and Tagaytay City, the places where the
verified petitions were filed. The Court reasoned out that it
was only upon filing that the intent to assert an alleged
falsehood became manifest and where the alleged untruthful
statement found relevance or materiality. We cited as
jurisprudential authority the case of United States. v.
Caet[18] which ruled:
It is immaterial where the affidavit was
subscribed and sworn, so long as it
appears from the information that the
defendant, by means of such affidavit,
"swore to" and knowingly submitted false
evidence, material to a point at issue in a
judicial proceeding pending in the Court
of First Instance of Iloilo Province. The
gist of the offense charged is not the
making of the affidavit in Manila, but
the intentional giving of false evidence in
the Court of First Instance of Iloilo
Province by means of such affidavit.
[emphasis and underscoring deleted]
In Sy Tiong, the perjured statements were made in
a GIS which was subscribed and sworn to in Manila. We
ruled that the proper venue for the perjury charges was
in Manila where the GIS was subscribed and sworn to. We
held that the perjury was consummated in Manila where the

To have a better appreciation of the issue facing the

Court, a look at the historical background of how the crime
of perjury (specifically, Article 183 of the RPC) evolved in
our jurisdiction.
The
RPC
penalizes
three
forms
of
false
testimonies. The first is false testimony for and against the
defendant in a criminal case (Articles 180 and 181, RPC);
the second is false testimony in a civil case (Article 182,
RPC); and thethird is false testimony in other cases (Article
183, RPC). Based on the Information filed, the present
case involves the making of an untruthful statement in
an affidavit on a material matter.
These RPC provisions, however, are not really the
bases of the rulings cited by the parties in their respective
arguments. The cited Ilusorio ruling, although issued by this
Court in 2008, harked back to the case of Caetwhich was
decided in 1915, i.e., before the present RPC took effect.
[21]
Sy Tiong, on the other hand, is a 2009 ruling that
cited Villanueva, a 2005 case that in turn cited United States
v. Norris, a 1937 American case. Significantly,
unlike Canet, Sy Tiong is entirely based on rulings rendered
after the present RPC took effect.[22]
The perjurious act in Caet consisted of an
information charging perjury through the presentation in
court of a motion accompanied by a false sworn affidavit.
At the time the Caet ruling was rendered, the prevailing law
on perjury and the rules on prosecution of criminal offenses
were found in Section 3, Act No. 1697 of the Philippine
Commission, and in Subsection 4, Section 6 of General
Order No. 58[23] for the procedural aspect.
Section 3 of Act No. 1697 reads:
Sec. 3. Any person who, having
taken oath before a competent tribunal,
officer, or person, in any case in which a
law of the Philippine Islands authorizes an
oath to be administered, that he will
testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or
that any written testimony, declaration,
disposition, or certificate by him
subscribed is true, willfully and contrary
to such oath states or subscribes any
material matter which he does not believe
to be true, is guilty of perjury, and shall be
punished by a fine of not more than two
thousand pesos and by imprisonment for
not more than five years; and shall
moreover, thereafter be incapable of

holding any public office or of giving

testimony in any court of the Philippine
Islands until such time as the judgment
against him is reversed.
This law was copied, with the necessary changes,
from Sections 5392[24] and 5393[25] of the Revised Statutes of
the United States.[26] Act No. 1697 was intended to make the
mere execution of a false affidavit punishable in our
jurisdiction.[27]
In turn, Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order
No. 58 provided that the venue shall be the court of the
place where the crime was committed.
As applied and interpreted by the Court in Caet,
perjury was committed by the act of representing a false
document in a judicial proceeding.[28] The venue of action
was held by the Court to be at the place where the false
document was presented since the presentation was the act
that consummated the crime.
The annotation of Justices Aquino and GrioAquino in their textbook on the RPC [29] interestingly
explains the history of the perjury provisions of the present
RPC and traces as well the linkage between Act No. 1697
and the present Code. To quote these authors:[30]
Art. 180 was taken from art. 318
of the Old Penal Code and art. 154 of Del
Pans Proposed Correctional Code, while
art. 181 was taken from art. 319 of the old
Penal Code and Art. 157 of Del Pans
Proposed Correctional Code. Said arts.
318 and 319, together with art. 321 of the
old Penal Code, were impliedly repealed
by Act 1697, the Perjury Law, passed
on August 23, 1907, which in turn was
expressly repealed by the Administrative
Code of 1916, Act 2657. In view of the
express repeal of Act 1697, arts. 318 and
321 of the old Penal Code were deemed
revived. However, Act 2718 expressly
revived secs. 3 and 4 of the Perjury
Law. Art. 367 of the Revised Penal Code
repealed Act Nos. 1697 and 2718.
It should be noted that perjury
under Acts 1697 and 2718 includes false
testimony, whereas, under the Revised
Penal Code, false testimony includes
perjury. Our law on false testimony is of
Spanish origin, but our law on perjury (art.
183 taken from sec. 3 of Act 1697) is
derived from American statutes. The
provisions of the old Penal Code on false
testimony embrace perjury committed in
court or in some contentious proceeding,
while perjury as defined in Act 1697
includes the making of a false
affidavit. The provisions of the Revised
Penal Code on false testimony are more
severe and strict than those of Act 1697 on
perjury. [italics ours]
With this background, it can be appreciated that
Article 183 of the RPC which provides:

The penalty of arresto mayor in its

maximum
period
to prision
correccional in its minimum period shall
be imposed upon any person, who
knowingly makes untruthful statements
and not being included in the provisions of
the next preceding articles, shall testify
under oath, or make an affidavit, upon
any material matter before a competent
person authorized to administer an oath in
cases in which the law so requires.
[emphasis supplied; emphases ours]
in fact refers to either of two punishable acts (1) falsely
testifying under oath in a proceeding other than a criminal
or civil case; and (2) making a false affidavit before a
person authorized to administer an oath on any material
matter where the law requires an oath.
As above discussed, Sy Tiong decided under Article
183 of the RPC essentially involved perjured statements
made in a GIS that was subscribed and sworn to
in Manila and
submitted
to
the
SEC
in Mandaluyong City. Thus, the case involved the making of
an affidavit, not an actual testimony in a proceeding that is
neither criminal nor civil. From this perspective, the situs of
the oath, i.e., the place where the oath was taken, is the
place where the offense was committed. By implication, the
proper venue would have been the City of Mandaluyong the
site of the SEC had the charge involved an actual testimony
made before the SEC.
In contrast, Caet involved the presentation in
court of a motion supported and accompanied by an
affidavit that contained a falsity. With Section 3 of Act No.
1697 as basis, the issue related to the submission of the
affidavit in a judicial proceeding. This came at a time when
Act No. 1697 was the perjury law, and made no distinction
between judicial and other proceedings, and at the same
time separately penalized the making of false statements
under oath (unlike the present RPC which separately deals
with false testimony in criminal, civil and other proceedings,
while at the same time also penalizing the making of false
affidavits). Understandably, the venue should be the place
where the submission was made to the court or the situs of
the court; it could not have been the place where the
affidavit was sworn to simply because this was not the
offense charged in the Information.
The case of Ilusorio cited the Caet case as its
authority, in a situation where the sworn petitions filed in
court for the issuance of duplicate certificates of title (that
were allegedly lost) were the cited sworn statements to
support the charge of perjury for the falsities stated in the
sworn petitions. The Court ruled that the proper venue
should be the Cities of Makati and Tagaytay because it was
in the courts of these cities where the intent to assert an
alleged falsehood became manifest and where the alleged
untruthful statement finds relevance or materiality in
deciding the issue of whether new owners duplicate copies
of the [Certificate of Condominium Title] and [Transfer
Certificates of Title] may issue. [31] To the Court, whether the
perjurious statements contained in the four petitions were
subscribed and sworn in Pasig is immaterial, the gist of the

offense of perjury being the intentional giving of false

statement,[32] citing Caet as authority for its statement.
The statement in Ilusorio may have partly led to the
present confusion on venue because of its very categorical
tenor in pointing to the considerations to be made in the
determination of venue; it leaves the impression that the
place where the oath was taken is not at all a material
consideration, forgetting that Article 183 of the RPC clearly
speaks of two situations while Article 182 of the RPC
likewise applies to false testimony in civil cases.
The Ilusorio statement would have made perfect
sense had the basis for the charge been Article 182 of the
RPC, on the assumption that the petition itself constitutes a
false testimony in a civil case. The Caet ruling would then
have been completely applicable as the sworn statement is
used in a civil case, although no such distinction was made
under Caet because the applicable law at the time (Act No.
1697) did not make any distinction.
If Article 183 of the RPC were to be used, as what
in fact appears in the Ilusorio ruling, then only that portion
of the article, referring to the making of an affidavit, would
have been applicable as the other portion refers to false
testimony in other proceedings which a judicial petition for
the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of a Certificate
of Condominium Title is not because it is a civil proceeding
in court. As a perjury based on the making of a false
affidavit, what assumes materiality is the site where the oath
was taken as this is the place where the oath was made, in
this case, Pasig City.
Procedurally, the rule on venue of criminal cases
has been subject to various changes from the time General
Order No. 58 was replaced by Rules 106 to 122 of the Rules
of Court on July 1, 1940. Section 14, Rule 106 of the Rules
of Court provided for the rule on venue of criminal actions
and it expressly included, as proper venue, the place where
any one of the essential ingredients of the crime took
place. This change was followed by the passage of the 1964
Rules of Criminal Procedure, [33] the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure,[34] and the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure which all adopted the 1940 Rules of Criminal
Procedures expanded venue of criminal actions. Thus, the
venue of criminal cases is not only in the place where the
offense was committed, but also where any of its essential
ingredients took place.
In the present case, the Certification against Forum
Shopping was made integral parts of two complaints for sum
of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the
respondent spouses Eddie Tamondong and Eliza B.
Tamondong, who, in turn, filed a complaint-affidavit against
Tomas for violation of Article 183 of the RPC. As alleged in
the Information that followed, the criminal act charged was
for the execution by Tomas of an affidavit that contained a
falsity.
Under the circumstances, Article 183 of the RPC is
indeed the applicable provision; thus, jurisdiction and venue
should be determined on the basis of this article which
penalizes one who make[s] an affidavit, upon any material
matter before a competent person authorized to administer
an oath in cases in which the law so requires. The
constitutive act of the offense is the making of an affidavit;

thus, the criminal act is consummated when the statement

containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly
authorized person.
Based on these considerations, we hold that our
ruling in Sy Tiong is more in accord with Article 183 of the
RPC and Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure. To reiterate for the guidance of the
Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury committed through
the making of a false affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC
is committed at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to
his or her affidavit since it is at that time that all the
elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When the
crime is committed through false testimony under oath in a
proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the
place where the testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of
or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a
proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a written sworn
statement is submitted, venue may either be at the place
where the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath
was taken as the taking of the oath and the submission are
both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all
cases, determination of venue shall be based on the acts
alleged in the Information to be constitutive of the crime
committed.
WHEREFORE, premises
considered,
we
hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. Costs against
the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

Thereafter, the provincial prosecutor filed a petition for

change of venue before this Court, attaching thereto a letter
from the victims wife expressing fear for her life and that of
the other witnesses.[8]

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
- versus JOSEPH JOJO V. GREY, FRANCIS B. GREY, and
COURT OF APPEALS-CEBU CITY,
EIGHTEENTH DIVISION,
Respondents.
DECISION

The Secretary of Justice, in a Resolution dated January 4,

2007, dismissed the petition for review and respondents
counter charge of perjury. He found no error to warrant the
modification or reversal of the prosecutors resolution. The
Secretary of Justice ruled that the evidence adduced against
respondents was sufficient to establish probable cause for
the offense charged. Respondents motion for reconsideration
was denied on January 30, 2007.[9]
Subsequently, the prosecution withdrew their motion for
change of venue before this Court, citing financial
difficulties in bringing witnesses to Manila.[10] Respondents
opposed the motion and prayed that all proceedings be
suspended until after the May 14, 2007 elections.[11]
However, on February 19, 2007, respondents filed their own
petition for change of venue before this Court, alleging that
the presiding judge who took over the case, Judge Roberto
Navidad, was a pawn in the political persecution being
staged against them.[12] In its August 22, 2007 Resolution,
this Court denied the petition for lack of merit and directed
Judge Navidad to hear the case with dispatch.[13]

NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court filed by the People of the Philippines,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), seeking
the nullification of the Court of Appeals (CA) (Cebu CityEighteenth Division) Resolution[1] dated March 13, 2007,
Decision[2] dated May 8, 2007, and Resolution[3] dated
October 8, 2007, in CA-G.R. SP No. 02558, entitled Mayor
Joseph Jojo V. Grey and Francis B. Grey v. Hon. Roberto A.
Navidad, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Calbayog City, Branch 32, and the People of the
Philippines.
On December 11, 2006, an Information for Murder was filed
against respondent Joseph Grey, former Mayor of San Jorge,
Samar; his son, respondent Francis Grey; and two others for
the death of Rolando Diocton, an employee of the San Jorge
municipal government, before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 41, Gandara, Samar. The Information was
accompanied by other supporting documents and a motion
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.[4]
Respondents filed a petition for review with the Secretary of
Justice. Meanwhile, RTC Branch 41 Presiding Judge
Rosario Bandal denied the motion for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. Judge Bandal found the prosecutions
evidence to be insufficient to link respondents to the crime
charged. She directed the prosecution to present, within five
days, additional evidence that would show that accused were
the assailants or that they conspired, confederated, or helped
in the commission of the crime charged.[5]
The prosecution then filed an Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and a motion for the inhibition of Judge
Bandal.[6] The judge inhibited herself but denied the motion
for reconsideration.[7]

Accordingly, Judge Navidad proceeded with the preliminary

inquiry on the existence of probable cause, and, in an Order
dated February 20, 2007, ruled that the finding of probable
cause was supported by the evidence on record. He then
issued warrants of arrest against respondents and all but one
of their co-accused.[14]
Respondents filed a Petition[15] for Certiorari and
Prohibition before the CA, alleging that Judge Navidad
gravely abused his discretion in issuing the February 20,
2007 Order, and seeking a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and/or a writ of preliminary injunction. They alleged
that the filing of the murder charges against them on the
basis of perjured statements coming from their political
opponents supporters smacks of political harassment at its
foulest form.[16] Respondents pointed out that the criminal
complaint was filed barely two months after Joseph Grey
declared his intentions to challenge incumbent Congressman
Reynaldo S. Uy, a former ally, in the May 2007
congressional elections. Likewise, respondents claimed that
one of the witnesses, Urien Moloboco, who executed an
affidavit before the Provincial Prosecutor, was the subject of
an Alias Warrant of Arrest for murder issued by the RTC of
Gandara, Samar on June 26, 2006, and, hence, was a
fugitive from the law at the time of the filing of the criminal
complaint against respondents. Respondents maintain that
the fact that Moloboco was not arrested when he executed
his affidavit before the prosecutor, spoke of the power and
clout of the witness protectors.[17]
The CA Eighteenth Division issued a TRO on March 13,
2007.[18] After oral arguments, the CA issued a
Decision[19] dated May 8, 2007, making the TRO permanent,
ordering that warrants of arrest be set aside, and dismissing
the criminal case without prejudice.
The CA held that Judge Navidad failed to abide by the
constitutional mandate for him to personally determine the

existence of probable cause.[20] According to the CA,

nowhere in the assailed Order did Judge Navidad state his
personal assessment of the evidence before him and the
personal justification for his finding of probable cause. It
found that the judge extensively quoted from the Joint
Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor and the Resolution
of the Secretary of Justice, and then adopted these to
conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the
finding of probable cause. The CA held that the Constitution
commands the judge to personally determine the existence
of probable cause before issuing warrants of arrest.[21]
Moreover, the CA also ruled that the Information was not
supported by the allegations in the submitted affidavits.[22] It
pointed out that the Information charged respondents as
principals by direct participation, but the complaint-affidavit
and supporting affidavits uniformly alleged that respondents
were not at the scene of the shooting.[23] The CA further
found that the allegations in the complaint-affidavit and
supporting affidavits were insufficient to establish probable
cause. It said that there was nothing in the affidavits to show
acts that would support the prosecutions theory that
respondents were also charged as principals by conspiracy.
[24]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the CAs May 8,

2007 Decision was denied in a Resolution dated October 8,
2007.[25] Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioner argues that respondents committed forum
shopping, which would warrant the outright dismissal of
their petition below. Petitioner alleges that respondents
petition for change of venue before this Court and their
petition for prohibition before the CA actually involve the
same subject matter, parties, and issues that of enjoining
Judge Navidad from proceeding with the trial of the criminal
case against them.[26] Moreover, these two proceedings have
resulted in conflicting decisions, with this Court resolving to
proceed with the case and with the CA enjoining the same.
[27]

Petitioner also argues against the CAs ruling that Judge

Navidad failed to personally determine the existence of
probable cause. It said that although the judge adopted the
findings of the prosecutors as to the sufficiency of evidence
constituting probable cause, the language of the Order
clearly reflects that the judge himself personally examined
the records and found that there was probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrest.[28] Moreover, the judge was
correct in finding probable cause based on the sworn
statements of the witnesses submitted to the court.
[29]
Petitioner avers that the CA disregarded the fact that the
Information alleged conspiracy.[30] In any case, petitioner
asserts that a perceived defect in the Information is not
jurisdictional as the same may be amended anytime before
arraignment or with leave of court after arraignment.[31]
Petitioner also claims that respondents had not shown any
clear and unmistakable right to the relief they sought. It said
that there are more than enough plain, speedy, and adequate
remedies available to respondents. Their constitutional
rights are amply protected in the enforcement of the
warrants of arrest. They can likewise apply for bail or move
to quash the allegedly defective Information.[32]

Petitioner also argues that this Court has laid down the rule
that criminal prosecution cannot be enjoined, and any
exception to this rule must be convincingly established.
[33]
On the other hand, the comparative injury to the People
in permanently enjoining a criminal case is beyond any of
respondents speculative claim of injury.
Thus, petitioner is praying that the CAs May 8, 2007
Decision and October 8, 2007 Resolution be reversed and
set aside, and the writ of injunction be dissolved.[34]
In their Comment, respondents assert that the trial court
issued its February 20, 2007 Order in gross violation of the
Constitution and prevailing jurisprudence on the matter.
[35]
Respondents claim that the trial courts violation is
evident in the indecent haste with which it issued the Order
and Warrants of Arrest, and in its own admission in the
Order itself.[36] Respondents also maintain that the trial court
acted whimsically, capriciously, and with grave abuse of
discretion when it concluded that there was probable cause
to issue warrants of arrest against respondents.
[37]
Respondents likewise assert that the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion when it reversed the finding of
Judge Bandal, who first heard the case.[38]
The petition is impressed with merit.
Initially, we decide the issue of forum shopping raised by
petitioner.
Petitioner maintains that respondents committed forum
shopping when it filed a petition for change of venue before
this Court and a petition for prohibition before the CA.
Forum shopping is an act of a party, against whom an
adverse judgment or order has been rendered in one forum,
of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in
another forum, other than by appeal or special civil action
for certiorari. It may also involve the institution of two or
more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on
the supposition that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition.[39]
Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis
pendentia are present, and where a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in the other. The elements
of forum shopping are: (a) identity of parties, or at least such
parties as would represent the same interest in both actions;
(b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts; and (c) identity of the two
preceding particulars such that any judgment rendered in the
other action will, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.[40]
The elements of res judicita are: (a) the former judgment
must be final; (b) the court which rendered judgment had
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter; (c) it
must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be,
between the first and second actions, identity of parties,
subject matter, and cause of action.[41]
A reexamination of the two actions in this case, in light of
the foregoing jurisprudence, is in order.
In the petition for change of venue filed on February 19,
2007, respondents prayed for the transfer of the criminal

case to any court in Metro Manila,[42] alleging that the

prosecution was politically motivated and designed to
hamper the plan of respondent Joseph Grey to run for a
congressional seat in the May 2007 elections.[43] They
contended that it would be extremely pernicious to the
interest of justice if trial of this case and (of) the other two
cases are held in Samar, especially in the City of Calbayog,
where the said (Congressman) Reynaldo Uy is a resident
and absolutely wields power.[44] They also asked the Court to
hold the proceedings in abeyance until after the May 14,
2007 elections.
In its August 22, 2007 Resolution, the Court denied the
petition for transfer of venue for lack of merit. It also
directed Judge Navidad to hear the case with dispatch.[45]
On March 5, 2007, while their petition for change of venue
was pending before this Court, respondents filed a petition
for certiorari before the CA. They prayed, first, for the
issuance of a TRO and/or a writ of preliminary injunction to
prohibit Judge Navidad from proceeding with Criminal Case
No. 4916 and from causing the implementation of the
warrants of arrest against respondents; and second, for the
Court to set aside Judge Navidads February 20, 2007 Order
and the corresponding warrants he issued.[46] The TRO was
granted on March 13, 2007, and the CA Decision making
the same injunction permanent and setting aside the
warrants of arrest was promulgated on May 8, 2007, a few
days before the May 14, 2007 elections.
The CA correctly ruled that respondents were not guilty of
forum shopping when they filed the two actions.
Respondents raised different issues and sought different
reliefs in the two actions, although both were grounded on
the same set of facts.
The issue in the petition for change of venue is whether the
trial of the case was to be moved to another court in light of
respondents allegations that the same was being used as a
tool for their political persecution. On the other hand, the
issue in the petition for certiorari before the CA was
whether Judge Navidad gravely abused his discretion in
issuing the February 20, 2007 Order and the warrants for
respondents arrest.
Thus, this Courts Resolution would not have amounted
to res judicata that would bar the petition
for certiorari before the CA.
We now resolve the substantive issues.
Respondents, in their petition before the CA, questioned the
alleged lack of personal determination of probable cause by
Judge Navidad in issuing the warrants for their arrest.
Judge Navidads Order reads:
In this separate, independent constitutionally-mandated
Inquiry conducted for the purpose of determining the
sufficiency of the evidence constituting probable cause to
justify the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest, the Court
perforce, made a very careful and meticulous and (sic)
review not only of the records but also the evidence
adduced by the prosecution, particularly the sworn
statements/affidavits of Mario Abella, Uriendo Moloboco
and Edgar Pellina.[47]

The language of the Order clearly shows that the judge

made his own personal determination of the existence of
probable cause by examining not only the prosecutors report
but also his supporting evidence, consisting mainly of the
sworn statements of the prosecutions witnesses.
It is well to remember that there is a distinction between the
preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest and
the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains
whether the offender should be held for trial or be
released. The determination of probable cause for purposes
of issuing the warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The
preliminary investigation proper whether or not there is
reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the
offense charged is the function of the investigating
prosecutor.[48]
The duty of the judge to determine probable cause to issue a
warrant of arrest is mandated by Article III, Section 2 of the
Philippine Constitution:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
In Soliven v. Makasiar,[49] the Court explained that this
constitutional provision does not mandatorily require the
judge to personally examine the complainant and her
witnesses. Instead, he may opt to personally evaluate the
report and supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor or he may disregard the prosecutors report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses. Thus, in Soliven, we said:
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and
personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself
of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of
the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established
doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the
report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis
thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
fiscals report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion
as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges
would by unduly laden with the preliminary examination
and investigation of criminal complaints instead of
concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before
their courts.[50]

What the law requires as personal determination on the part

of a judge is that he should not rely solely on the report of
the investigating prosecutor.[51] This means that the judge
should consider not only the report of the investigating
prosecutor but also the affidavit and the documentary
evidence of the parties, the counter-affidavit of the accused
and his witnesses, as well as the transcript of stenographic
notes taken during the preliminary investigation, if any,
submitted to the court by the investigating prosecutor upon
the filing of the Information.[52]
The Court has also ruled that the personal examination of
the complainant and his witnesses is not mandatory and
indispensable in the determination of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. The necessity arises only
when there is an utter failure of the evidence to show the
existence of probable cause.[53] Otherwise, the judge may
rely on the report of the investigating prosecutor, provided
that he likewise evaluates the documentary evidence in
support thereof.
Contrary to respondents claim, Judge Navidad did not
gravely abuse his discretion in issuing the same.

d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of

authority (Planas v. Gil, 67 Phil. 62);
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance
or regulation (Young v. Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng
v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang v.
People and Avendia, 109 Phil. 1140);
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense
(Lopez v. City Judge, L-25795, October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA
616);
h. Where there is a case of persecution rather than
prosecution (Rustia v. Ocampo, CA-G.R. No. 4760, March
25, 1960);
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by
the lust for vengeance (Recto v. Castelo, 18 L.J. [1953],
cited in Raoa v. Alvendia, CA-G.R. No. 30720-R, October 8,
1962; Cf. Guingona, et al. v. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4,
1984, 128 SCRA 577); x x x

A perusal of the assailed Order bears out this fact.

It was only through a review of the proceedings before the
prosecutor that could have led Judge Navidad to determine
that the accused were given the widest latitude and ample
opportunity to challenge the charge of Murder which
resulted, among others, (in) a filing of a counter-charge of
Perjury.[54] Likewise, his personal determination revealed no
improper motive on the part of the prosecution and no
circumstance which would overwhelm the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functions.[55] Thus,
he concluded that the previous Order, denying the motion
for the issuance of warrants of arrest, was not correct.[56]
These statements sufficiently establish the fact that Judge
Navidad complied with the constitutional mandate for
personal determination of probable cause before issuing the
warrants of arrest.
The CA likewise overlooked a fundamental rule we follow
in this jurisdiction. It is an established doctrine that
injunction will not lie to enjoin a criminal prosecution
because public interest requires that criminal acts be
immediately investigated and prosecuted for the protection
of society.[57]
However, it is also true that various decisions of this Court
have laid down exceptions to this rule, among which are:
a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights
of the accused (Hernandez v. Albano, et al., L-19272,
January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice
or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions (Dimayuga,
et al. v. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez v. Albano,
supra; Fortun v. Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104
SCRA 607);
c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is
sub[-]judice (De Leon v. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202);

j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the

accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been
denied (Salonga v. Pao, et al., L-59524, February 18, 1985,
134 SCRA 438)[; and]
[k.] Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme
Court to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners
(Rodriguez v. Castelo, L-6374, August 1, 1953).[58]
Respondents insisted that political persecution by their
political rivals was the underlying reason for the filing of
criminal charges against them, and used this as basis for
asking the appellate court to stop the proceedings in the trial
court.
Indeed, this Court has recognized that, in certain instances,
political persecution or political motives may have impelled
the filing of criminal charges against certain political rivals.
But this Court has also ruled that any allegation that the
filing of the charges is politically motivated cannot justify
the prohibition of a criminal prosecution if there is
otherwise evidence to support the charges.[59]
In this case, the judge, upon his personal examination of the
complaint and evidence before him, determined that there
was probable cause to issue the warrants of arrest after the
provincial prosecution, based on the affidavits presented by
complainant and her witnesses, found probable cause to file
the criminal Information. This finding of the Provincial
Prosecutor was affirmed by the Secretary of Justice.
To establish political harassment, respondents must prove
that the public prosecutor, not just the private complainant,
acted in bad faith in prosecuting the case or has lent himself
to a scheme that could have no other purpose than to place
respondents in contempt and disrepute.[60] It must be shown
that the complainant possesses the power and the influence
to control the prosecution of cases.[61]

Likewise, the allegation that the filing of the complaint was

politically motivated does not serve to justify the
nullification of the informations where the existence of such
motive has not been sufficiently established nor substantial
evidence presented in support thereof.[62]
Other than their own self-serving claims, respondents have
adduced absolutely no proof of the perceived political
persecution being waged by their rivals. Respondents have
not shown any evidence of such a grand design. They have
not alleged, much less proved, any ill motive or malice that
could have impelled the provincial prosecutor, the judge,
and even the Secretary of Justice to have respectively ruled
in the way each of them did. In short, respondents are
holding tenuously only on the hope that this Court will take
them at their word and grant the relief they pray for. This
Court, however, cannot anchor its ruling on mere
allegations.
Needless to say, a full-blown trial is to be preferred to ferret
out the truth.[63] If, as respondents claim, there is no evidence
of their culpability, then their petition for bail would easily
be granted. Thereafter, the credibility of the prosecutions
and the accuseds respective evidence may be tested during
the trial. It is only then that the guilt or innocence of
respondents will be determined. Whether the criminal
prosecution was merely a tool for harassment or whether the
prosecutions evidence can pass the strict standards set by the
law and withstand the exacting scrutiny of the court will all
be resolved at the trial of the case.
The criminal Information in this case was filed four years
ago and trial has yet to begin. The victims kin, indeed, all
the parties, are awaiting its resolution. Any further delay will
amount to an injustice.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the
Court of Appeals Decision dated May 8, 2007 and
Resolution dated October 8, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 02558
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
Permanent Injunction is hereby DISSOLVED. The Order of
the Regional Trial Court of Calbayog City, Samar, dated
February 20, 2007, is hereby REINSTATED.
The Regional Trial Court of Calbayog City, Samar,
isDIRECTED to proceed with hearing, and to decide
Criminal Case No. 4916 with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

Pareja, Wonina Bonifacio, Elvira Cruz, Cornelio Zafra,

Vicente Ortueste, Victoria Gomez Jacinto, Jurencio Pereche,
Ricardo Loyares and Peter Suchianco, who are trustees of
PEPCI, Trennie Monsod, a member of PEPCI (collectively,
the accused), and a certain John Doe, the administrator of
the website www.pepcoalition.com.

FIRST DIVISION

WONINA M.
BONIFACIO,
JOCELYN UPANO,
VICENTE ORTUOSTE
AND JOVENCIO
PERECHE, SR.,

G.R. No. 184800

Petitioners,

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

Present:

CARPIO MORALES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus -

BERSAMIN, and

PEPCI appears to have been formed by a large group of

disgruntled planholders of Pacific Plans, Inc. (PPI) - a
wholly owned subsidiary of Great Pacific Life Assurance
Corporation, also owned by the Yuchengco Group of
Companies (YGC) - who had previously purchased
traditional pre-need educational plans but were unable to
collect thereon or avail of the benefits thereunder after PPI,
due to liquidity concerns, filed for corporate rehabilitation
with prayer for suspension of payments before the Makati
RTC.

Decrying PPIs refusal/inability to honor its obligations

under the educational pre-need plans, PEPCI sought to
provide a forum by which the planholders could seek redress
for their pecuniary loss under their policies by maintaining a
website on the internet under the address
of www.pepcoalition.com.

VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF MAKATI,
BRANCH 149, and
JESSIE JOHN P.
GIMENEZ,

Promulgated:
May 5, 2010

Respondents.
x---------------------------------------- - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Via a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners
Wonina M. Bonifacio, et al. assail the issuances of Branch
149 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati (public
respondent) Order[1] of April 22, 2008 which denied their
motion to quash the Amended Information indicting them
for libel, and Joint Resolution[2] of August 12, 2008 denying
reconsideration of the first issuance.

Private respondent Jessie John P. Gimenez[3] (Gimenez) filed

on October 18, 2005, on behalf of the Yuchengco Family (in
particular, former Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and
Helen Y. Dee (Helen) and of the Malayan Insurance Co.,
Inc. (Malayan),[4] a criminal complaint,[5] before the Makati
City Prosecutors Office, for thirteen (13) counts
of libel under Article 355 in relation to Article 353 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) against Philip Piccio, Mia
Gatmaytan and Ma. Anabella Relova Santos, who are
officers of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI),
John Joseph Gutierrez, Jeselyn Upano, Jose Dizon, Rolanda

Gimenez alleged that PEPCI also owned, controlled

and moderated on the internet a blogspot[6] under the website
address www.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com, as well as a
yahoo e-group[7] atno2pep2010@yahoogroups.com. These
websites are easily accessible to the public or by anyone
logged on to the internet.

Gimenez further alleged that upon accessing the abovestated websites in Makati on various dates from August 25
to October 2, 2005, he was appalled to read numerous
articles [numbering 13], maliciously and recklessly caused
to be published by [the accused] containing highly
derogatory statements and false accusations, relentlessly
attacking the Yuchengco Family, YGC, and particularly,
Malayan.[8] He cited an article which was posted/published
on www.pepcoalition.com on August 25, 2005 which stated:

Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga

Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan kong
pagbagsak ng negotiation because it was done prematurely
since we had not file any criminal aspect of our case. What
is worse is that Yuchengcos benefited much from the
nego. x x x . That is the fact na talagang hindi dapat
pagtiwalaan ang mga Yuchengcos.

LETS MOVE TO THE BATTLEFIELD. FILE THE

CRIMINAL CASES IN COURT, BSP AND AMLC AND
WHEREVER. Pumunta tayong muli sa senado,
congreso, RCBC Plaza, and other venues to air our
grievances and call for boycott ng YGC. Let us start within
ourselves. Alisin natin ang mga investments and deposits
natin sa lahat ng YGC and I mean lahat and again
convince friends to do the same. Yung mga nanonood

lang noon ay dapat makisali na talaga ngayon specially

those who joined only after knowing that there was a
negotiation for amicable settlements.

FOR SURE MAY TACTICS PA SILANG NAKABASTA

SA ATIN. LET US BE READY FOR IT BECAUSE THEY
HAD SUCCESSFULLY LULL US AND THE NEXT TIME
THEY WILL TRY TO KILL US NA. x x x [9] (emphasis in
the original)
By Resolution of May 5, 2006,[10] the Makati City
Prosecutors Office, finding probable cause to indict the
accused, filed thirteen (13) separate Informations[11] charging
them with libel. The accusatory portion of one Information,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-876, which was raffled
off to public respondent reads:

That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City,

Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of
the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then
the trustees of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition and as
such trustees they hold the legal title to the
website www.pepcoalition.com which is of general
circulation, and publication to the public conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping with one another
together with John Does, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and publicly and maliciously
with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and
integrity, character and reputation of complainant Malayan
Insurance Co. Inc., Yuchengco Family particularly
Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and for
further purpose exposing the complainant to public hatred
and contempt published an article imputing a vice or defect
to the complainant and caused to be composed, posted and
published in the said websitewww.pepcoalition.com and
injurious and defamatory article as follows:
Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos.
Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak ng
negotiation. x x x x x x x x x
For sure may tactics pa silang nakabasta sa atin. Let us be
ready for it because they had successfully lull us and the
next time they will try to kill us na. x x x
A copy of the full text of the foregoing article as
published/posted in www.pepcoalition.com is attached as
Annex F of the complaint.
That the keyword and password to be used in order to post
and publish the above defamatory article are known to the
accused as trustees holding legal title to the above-cited
website and that the accused are the ones
responsible for the posting and publication of the
defamatory articles that the article in question was posted
and published with the object of the discrediting and
ridiculing the complainant before the public.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[12]
Several of the accused appealed the Makati City Prosecutors
Resolution by a petition for review to the Secretary of

Justice who, by Resolution of June 20, 2007,[13] reversed the

finding of probable cause and accordingly directed the
withdrawal of the Informations for libel filed in court. The
Justice Secretary opined that the crime of internet libel was
non-existent, hence, the accused could not be charged with
libel under Article 353 of the RPC.[14]
Petitioners, as co-accused,[15] thereupon filed on June 6,
2006, before the public respondent, a Motion to Quash[16] the
Information in Criminal Case No. 06-876 on the grounds
that it failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; the acts
complained of in the Information are not punishable by law
since internet libel is not covered by Article 353 of the RPC;
and the Information is fatally defective for failure to
designate the offense charged and the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense of libel.
Citing Macasaet v. People,[17] petitioners maintained that the
Information failed to allege a particular place within the trial
courts jurisdiction where the subject article was printed and
first published or that the offended parties resided
in Makati at the time the alleged defamatory material was
printed and first published.

By Order of October 3, 2006,[18] the public respondent, albeit

finding that probable cause existed, quashed the
Information, citing Agustin v. Pamintuan.[19] It found that the
Information lacked any allegations that the offended parties
were actually residing in Makati at the time of the
commission of the offense as in fact they listed their address
in the complaint-affidavit at Yuchengco Tower in Binondo,
Manila; or that the alleged libelous article was printed and
first published in Makati.
The prosecution moved to reconsider the quashal of the
Information,[20] insisting that the Information sufficiently
conferred jurisdiction on the public respondent. It
cited Banal III v. Panganiban[21] which held that the
Information need not allege verbatim that the libelous
publication was printed and first published in the
appropriate venue. And it pointed out that Malayan has an
office in Makati of which Helen is a resident. Moreover, the
prosecution alleged that even assuming that the Information
was deficient, it merely needed a formal amendment.
Petitioners opposed the prosecutions motion for
reconsideration, contending, inter alia, that since venue is
jurisdictional in criminal cases, any defect in an information
for libel pertaining to jurisdiction is not a mere matter of
form that may be cured by amendment.[22]
By Order of March 8, 2007,[23] the public respondent granted
the prosecutions motion for reconsideration and accordingly
ordered the public prosecutor to amend the Information to
cure the defect of want of venue
The prosecution thereupon moved to admit the Amended
Information dated March 20, 2007,[24] the accusatory portion
of which reads:
That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City,
Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of
the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then
the trustees of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition and as
such trustees they hold the legal title to the
website www.pepcoalition.com which is of general
circulation, and publication to the public conspiring,

confederating together with John Does, whose true names,

identities and present whereabouts are still
unknown and all of them mutually helping and aiding one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and publicly and maliciously with intention of
attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character
and reputation of complainant Malayan Insurance Co. Inc.,
Yuchengco Family particularly Ambassador Alfonso
Yuchengco and Helen Dee and for further purpose exposing
the complainant to public hatred and contempt published an
article imputing a vice or defect to the complainant and
caused to be composed, posted and published in the said
website www.pepcoalition.com, a website accessible in
Makati City, an injurious and defamatory article, which
was first published and accessed by the private
complainant in Makati City, as follows:
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring in the original; italics
supplied)
Petitioners moved to quash the Amended
Information[25] which, they alleged, still failed to vest
jurisdiction upon the public respondent because it failed to
allege that the libelous articles were printed and first
published by the accused in Makati; and the prosecution
erroneously laid the venue of the case in the place where the
offended party accessed the internet-published article.
By the assailed Order of April 22, 2008, the public
respondent, applying Banal III, found the Amended
Information to be sufficient in form.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration[26] having been denied
by the public respondent by Joint Resolution of August 12,
2008, they filed the present petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition faulting the public respondent for:
1. NOT FINDING THAT THE ACTS ALLEGED IN THE
INFORMATION ARE NOT PUNISHABLE BY LAW;
2. ADMITTING AN AMENDED INFORMATION
WHOSE JURISDICTIONAL ALLEGATIONS
CONTINUES TO BE DEFICIENT; and
3. NOT RULING THAT AN AMENDMENT IN THE
INFORMATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF CURING
JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS IS ILLEGAL.[27]

With the filing of Gimenezs Comment[28] to the petition, the

issues are: (1) whether petitioners violated the rule on
hierarchy of courts to thus render the petition dismissible;
and (2) whether grave abuse of discretion attended the
public respondents admission of the Amended Information.
The established policy of strict observance of the judicial
hierarchy of courts,[29] as a rule, requires that recourse must
first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising
concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court.[30] A regard for
judicial hierarchy clearly indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against first level courts
should be filed in the RTC and those against the latter
should be filed in the Court of Appeals.[31] The rule is not
iron-clad, however, as it admits of certain exceptions.

Thus, a strict application of the rule is unnecessary when

cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve
factual but purely legal questions.[32]
In the present case, the substantive issue calls for the Courts
exercise of its discretionary authority, by way of exception,
in order to abbreviate the review process as petitioners raise
a pure question of law involving jurisdiction in criminal
complaints for libel under Article 360 of the RPC whether
the Amended Information is sufficient to sustain a charge for
written defamation in light of the requirements under Article
360 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No.
4363, reading:
Art. 360. Persons responsible.Any person who shall publish,
exhibit or cause the publication or exhibition of any
defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be
responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or
business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial
publication, shall be responsible for the defamations
contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author
thereof.
The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of
written defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall be
filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where the libelous article
is printed and first published or where any of the offended
parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense: Provided, however, That where one of the offended
parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of
Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the
action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City
of Manila or of the city or province where the
libelous article is printed and first published, and in case
such public officer does not hold office in the City of
Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where he held office at the
time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous
article is printed and first published and in case one of the
offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be
filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city
where he actually resides at the time of the commission of
the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first
published x x x. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place

where the crime was committed determines not only the
venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of
jurisdiction.[33] This principle acquires even greater import in
libel cases, given that Article 360, as amended, specifically
provides for the possible venues for the institution of the
criminal and civil aspects of such cases.
In Macasaet,[34] the Court reiterated its earlier
pronouncements in Agbayani v. Sayo[35] which laid out the
rules on venue in libel cases, viz:
For the guidance, therefore, of both the bench and the bar,
this Court finds it appropriate to reiterate our earlier
pronouncement in the case of Agbayani, to wit:

In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the

criminal action for written defamation, the complaint or
information should contain allegations as to whether, at the
time the offense was committed, the offended party was a
public officer or a private individual and where he was
actually residing at that time. Whenever possible, the
place where the written defamation was printed and first
published should likewise be alleged. That allegation
would be a sine qua non if the circumstance as to where
the libel was printed and first published is used as the
basis of the venue of the action. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Congressional Record of May 20, 1965, pp. 424-5; Time,

Inc. v. Reyes, L-28882, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 303, 311).

It becomes clear that the venue of libel cases where the

complainant is a private individual is limited to only either
of two places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually
resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2)
where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first
published. The Amended Information in the present case
opted to lay the venue by availing of the second. Thus, it
stated that the offending article was first published
and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City. In
other words, it considered the phrase to be equivalent to the
requisite allegation of printing and first publication.

If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and

first published are used by the offended party as basis for the
venue in the criminal action, the Information must allege
with particularity where the defamatory article was printed
and first published, as evidenced or supported by, for
instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in
the case of newspapers, magazines or serial publications.
This pre-condition becomes necessary in order to forestall
any inclination to harass.

The insufficiency of the allegations in the Amended

Information to vest jurisdiction in Makati becomes
pronounced upon an examination of the rationale for the
amendment to Article 360 by RA No. 4363. Chavez v. Court
of Appeals[36] explained the nature of these changes:
Agbayani supplies a comprehensive restatement of the rules
of venue in actions for criminal libel, following the
amendment by Rep. Act No. 4363 of the Revised Penal
Code:
Article 360 in its original form provided that the venue of
the criminal and civil actions for written defamations is the
province wherein the libel was published, displayed or
exhibited, regardless of the place where the same was
written, printed or composed. Article 360 originally did not
specify the public officers and the courts that may conduct
the preliminary investigation of complaints for libel.
Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal
action for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction where
the libelous article was published or circulated, irrespective
of where it was written or printed (People v. Borja, 43 Phil.
618). Under that rule, the criminal action is transitory and
the injured party has a choice of venue.
Experience had shown that under that old rule the
offended party could harass the accused in a libel case by
laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or
distant place.
Thus, in connection with an article published in the Daily
Mirror and the Philippine Free Press, Pio Pedrosa, Manuel
V. Villareal and Joaquin Roces were charged with libel in
the justice of the peace court of San Fabian, Pangasinan
(Amansec v. De Guzman, 93 Phil. 933).
To forestall such harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 was
enacted. It lays down specific rules as to the venue of the
criminal action so as to prevent the offended party in
written defamation cases from inconveniencing the
accused by means of out-of-town libel suits, meaning
complaints filed in remote municipal courts (Explanatory
Note for the bill which became Republic Act No. 4363,

x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Clearly, the evil sought to be prevented by the amendment to
Article 360 was the indiscriminate or arbitrary laying of the
venue in libel cases in distant, isolated or far-flung areas,
meant to accomplish nothing more than harass or intimidate
an accused. The disparity or unevenness of the situation
becomes even more acute where the offended party is a
person of sufficient means or possesses influence, and is
motivated by spite or the need for revenge.

The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it

pertains to defamatory material appearing on a website on
the internet as there would be no way of determining
the situs of its printing and first publication. To credit
Gimenezs premise of equating his first access to the
defamatory article on petitioners website in Makati with
printing and first publication would spawn the very ills that
the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to
discourage and prevent. It hardly requires much imagination
to see the chaos that would ensue in situations where the
websites author or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts
messages therein could be sued for libel anywhere in
the Philippines that the private complainant may have
allegedly accessed the offending website.
For the Court to hold that the Amended Information
sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts
of Makati simply because the defamatory article
was accessed therein would open the floodgates to the libel
suit being filed in all other locations where
the pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or capable of
being accessed.
Respecting the contention that the venue requirements
imposed by Article 360, as amended, are unduly oppressive,
the Courts pronouncements in Chavez[37] are instructive:
For us to grant the present petition, it would be necessary to
abandon the Agbayani rule providing that a private person
must file the complaint for libel either in the place of
printing and first publication, or at the complainants place of
residence. We would also have to abandon the subsequent
cases that reiterate this rule in Agbayani, such
as Soriano, Agustin, and Macasaet. There is no convincing
reason to resort to such a radical action. These limitations
imposed on libel actions filed by private persons are
hardly onerous, especially as they still allow such persons
to file the civil or criminal complaint in their respective
places of residence, in which situation there is no need to
embark on a quest to determine with precision where the
libelous matter was printed and first published.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

IN FINE, the public respondent committed grave abuse of

discretion in denying petitioners motion to quash the
Amended Information.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Order of April 22, 2008 and the Joint Resolution of August
12, 2008 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Br. 149 is hereby DIRECTED TO QUASH
the Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 06-876 and
DISMISS the case.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 122641. January 20, 1997]

BAYANI SUBIDO, JR. and RENE

PARINA, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In this petition for certiorari under

Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the
petitioners seek to set aside, on ground
of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction, the following acts
of the respondent Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 22825: (a) the
Resolution of 25 October 1995 which
denied the petitioners Motion to Quash
of 28 August 1995 and Supplementary
Motion to Quash of 7 October 1995; (b)
the Order of 10 November 1995 which
denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration; and (c) the Order of 10
November 1995 which entered a plea of
not guilty for the petitioners and set pretrial on 12 January 1996.
[1]

[2]

[3]

In Criminal Case No. 22825, the

petitioners were charged with Arbitrary
Detention, defined and penalized by
Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), under an information dated 17
July 1995 (but filed on 28 July 1995), the
accusatory portion of which reads as
follows:
That on or about June 25, 1992, or sometime
subsequent thereto, in Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, Bayani Subido, Jr.,
being then a Commissioner of the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID) and
accused Rene Parina, being then a BID
Special Agent, while in the performance of
their official functions, and conspiring and
confederating with each other, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
cause the issuance and implementation of a
warrant of arrest dated June 25, 1992 against
James J. Maksimuk, said accused knowing
fully well that the BID Decision dated June
6, 1991, requiring Maksimuk's deportation
has not as yet become final and executory
considering the pendency of a Motion for
Reconsideration, resulting in the detention
of the latter for a period of forty-three (43)
days and, thus, causing him undue injury.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

[4]

The arraignment was originally set for

28 August 1995.
[5]

On 28 August 1995, however, the

petitioners filed a Motion to Quash,
contending that in view of the effectivity
of R.A. No. 7975 on 6 May 1995,
amending 4 of P.D. No. 1606, the
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over
both the offense charged and the
persons of the accused. They argued
that: (1) Arbitrary Detention did not fall
[6]

[7]

[8]

within Chapter II, 2, Title VII of the RPC,

but within 1, Chapter 1, Title II (Crimes
Against the Fundamental Laws of the
State), hence, not covered by R.A. No.
7975 and, therefore, the case should
have been filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila; (2) R.A. No.
7975 should be given prospective
application and at the time the case was
filed, petitioner Subido was already a
private person since he was separated
from the service on 28 February 1995;
while petitioner Parina did not hold a
position corresponding to salary grade
27; and (3) penal laws must be strictly
construed against the State.

proceeding was discretionary upon the

Commissioner, hence could not be
subject to a charge of arbitrary
detention; (3) petitioner Subido was
separated from the service before the
effectivity of R.A. No. 7975, hence
retroactive application thereof would be
prejudicial to him; and (4) at the time the
information was filed, petitioner Parina
was
not
occupying
a
position
corresponding to salary grade 27 or
higher, as prescribed by R.A. No. 6758.
[11]

In its Rejoinder filed on 20 October

1995, the prosecution maintained that
with 4 of MO No. 04-92, Salazar v.
Achacoso, and Gatchalian v. CID, the
only instance when an alien facing
deportation proceedings could be
arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest
was when the Commissioner issued the
warrant to carry out a final order of
deportation, which was absent in this
case due to the pendency of the motion
for reconsideration timely filed. It further
reiterated that the basis of the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over the
case was the position of the accused
when the crime was committed, not
when the information was filed; in any
event, petitioner Subidos position as a
Commissioner of the Bureau of
Immigration was classified even higher
than grade 27 under the Compensation
and Classification Act of 1989.
[12]

[13]

In compliance with the order of the

Sandiganbayan, the prosecution filed its
Opposition to the Motion to Quash on
28 September 1995. It contended that it
was clear from 4(b) of R.A. No. 7975
that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction
over both the offense charged and the
persons of the accused considering that
the basis of its jurisdiction xxx is the
position of the accused in the
government service when the offense
charged was committed and not the
nature of the offense charged, provided
the said offense committed by the
accused was in the exercise of his
duties and in relation to his office. The
fact then that accused Subido was
already a private individual was of no
moment.
[9]

[14]

In its Resolution of 25 October

1995, the Sandiganbayan denied the
petitioners Motion to Quash and the
Supplement thereto, ruling:
[15]

In a Supplement to the Motion to

Quash filed on 9 October 1995, the
petitioners further asserted that: (1) the
allegations in the information were
vague; (2) under 1, Rule VIII of
Memorandum Order (MO) No. 04-92
(Rules of Procedure to Govern
Deportation Proceedings), the grant or
denial of bail to an alien in a deportation
[10]

1. [T]he jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan

remains not only over the specific offenses
enumerated in Sec. 4 of P.D. 1606 as
Amended by R.A. 7975 but over offenses
committed in relation to their office,

regardless of the penalty provided that the

salary of the accused is at Grade 27 under
[R.A. 6758] or that he is occupying any of
the position described in Sec. 4(a)e of the
law, which includes the position of Deputy
Commissioner.

resolved to give due course to the

petition and required the parties to file
their respective memoranda, which they
subsequently complied with.

2. [A]t this time the position of the

prosecution in response to this Court's
misgivings stated in its Order of August 28,
1995, appears to be that aliens may not be
arrested except upon execution of a
deportation order, a matter which can be
taken up at further proceedings after the
arraignment of the accused.

Sections 2 and 7 of R.A. No. 7975

pertinently provide as follows:

It likewise set arraignment on 10

November 1995. To abort arraignment,
the petitioners filed on 9 November 1995
a motion for reconsideration and
submitted that under the vast power of
the Commissioner of the Department of
Immigration, he could authorize the
arrest and detention of an alien even
though a deportation order had not yet
become final, in light of the preventive,
not penal, nature of a deportation order.
[16]

The petition must be dismissed.

Sec. 2. Section 4 of [P.D. No. 1606] is

hereby further amended to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan
shall exercise original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of
the Revised Penal Code, where one or more
of the principal accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting
or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense;

[17]

On 10 November 1995, the

Sandiganbayan
issued
an
Order denying the petitioners motion
for reconsideration, and a second
Order entering a plea of not guilty in
favor of the petitioners since they
objected to arraignment, setting pre-trial
on 12 January 1996, and making of
record that arraignment was conducted
with the reservation of the petitioners to
seek redress with this Court from the
denial
of
their
motion
for
reconsideration.
[18]

[19]

Hence, this special civil action,

where the parties, in the main, reiterate
the arguments they raised before the
Sandiganbayan. In
due
time,
we

(1) Officials of the executive branch

occupying the positions of regional director
and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27
and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:
xxx
(5) All other national and local officials
classified as Grade 27 and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by
the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in
relation to their office.

c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to

and in connection with Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused
are occupying positions corresponding to
salary grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in
said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers
occupying the rank of superintendent or
higher, or their equivalent, exclusive
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case
may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129.
Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all
criminal cases in which trial has not begun
in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the
proper courts.

(2) other offenses or felonies committed by

public officers and employees in relation to
their office, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled
corporations, whether simple or complexed
with other crimes, where the penalty
prescribed by law is higher than prision
correccional or imprisonment for six (6)
years, or a fine of P6,000.00: PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies
mentioned in this paragraph where the
penalty prescribed by law does not
exceed prision correccional or
imprisonment of six (6) years or a fine
of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper
Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal
Circuit Trial Court.
In Aguinaldo
v.
Domagas, and
subsequently in Sanchez v. Demetriou,
Natividad v. Felix, and Republic v.
Asuncion, we ruled that for the
Sandiganbayan to have exclusive
original jurisdiction over offenses or
felonies committed by public officers or
employees under the aforementioned
4(a)(2), it was not enough that the
penalty prescribed therefor was higher
than prision
correccional or
imprisonment for six years, or a fine
of P6,000.00; it was likewise necessary
that the offenses or felonies were
committed in relation to their office.
[21]

[22]

[23]

[24]

R.A. No. 7975 took effect on 16 May

1995, or one year, ten months and
twenty-one days after the alleged
commission of the crime charged in
Criminal Case No. 22825 before the
Sandiganbayan. The provisions of 4 of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended by E.O. No.
184, but prior to their further amendment
by R.A. No. 7975, are then the
applicable provisions. 4 of P.D. No. 1606
then pertinently provided as follows:
[20]

SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan

shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in all
cases involving:
(1) violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379,
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code;

[25]

The information in Criminal Case No.

22825 before the Sandiganbayan
charged the petitioners with the crime of
arbitrary detention which was committed
while in the performance of their official
functions, or, evidently, in relation to their
office. As the detention allegedly lasted
for a period of 43 days, the prescribed
penalty
is prision
mayor, with
a
duration of six years and one day to
twelve
years. Indisputably,
the
[26]

Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the

offense charged in Criminal Case No.
22825.
The petitioners, however, urge us to
apply 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended
by R.A. No. 7975, the law in force at the
time of the filing of the information in
Criminal Case No. 22825. They submit
that under
the new law, the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over
the offense charged and their persons
because at the time of the filing of the
information, petitioner Subido was
already a private individual, while the
classification of petitioner Parinas
position was lower than grade 27.
We
are
not
persuaded. The
petitioners overlook the fact that for
purposes of 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, the reckoning point is the
time of
the
commission
of
the
crime. This is plain from the last clause
of the opening sentence of paragraph
(a), 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as further
amended by R.A. No. 7975.

arbitrary detention is of no moment. He

is prosecuted as a co-conspirator of
petitioner Subido, a principal accused,
who held a position higher than grade
27. The following provision of 4 of P.D.
No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No.
7975, then applies:
In cases where none of the principal accused
are occupying the positions corresponding to
salary grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in
the said Republic Act No. 6758 ... exclusive
jurisdiction therefor shall be vested in the
proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case
may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129.
Finally, the petitioners invocation of
the prohibition against the retroactivity of
penal laws is misplaced. Simply put,
R.A. No. 7975 is not a penal law. Penal
laws or statutes are those acts of the
Legislature which prohibit certain acts
and establish penalties for their
violation; or those that define crimes,
treat of their nature, and provide for their
punishment. R.A. No. 7975, in further
amending P.D. No. 1606 as regards the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction, mode of
appeal, and other procedural matters, is
clearly a procedural law, i.e., one which
prescribes rules and forms of procedure
of enforcing rights or obtaining redress
for their invasion, or those which refer to
rules of procedure by which courts
applying laws of all kinds can properly
administer
justice. Moreover,
the
petitioners even suggest that it is
likewise a curative or remedial statute;
one which cures defects and adds to the
means of enforcing existing obligations.
As noted by the petitioners, previous
to the enactment of R.A. No. 7975:
[28]

Petitioner Subido never denied the

respondents claim that as commissioner
of Immigration and Deportation [now
Bureau of Immigration] at the time of the
commission of the crime [he was]
classified as having a position even
higher than grade 27. Both parties are,
however, agreed that at such time
petitioner Parina was holding a position
with a classification much lower than
salary grade 27. There can, therefore,
be no doubt that the Sandiganbayan
had jurisdiction over the crime allegedly
committed by Subido.
[27]

That petitioner Parina held a position

with a salary grade of less than 27 at the
time of the commission of the alleged

[29]

[30]

[31]

As before, not [sic] matter what kind of

offense, so long as it is alleged that the crime
is committed in relation to the office of the
public official, the Sandiganbayan had
jurisdiciton to try and hear the case, such
that in many cases accused persons even
from the far away parts of the country,
Mindanao, Visayas and the northern parts of
Luzon had to come personally to Manila to
attend and appear for cases filed against
them, considering that the Sandiganbayan
has its office/court in Manila.
The said R.A. No. 7975 changed this lamentable
situation. For no as so provided in the said law,
there ha[s] been a modification that benefits [the]
accused xxx in the sense that now where none of
the principal accused are occupying positions
corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher as
prescribed by Republic Act No. 6758 xxx
exclusive jurisdiction there shall be vested now in
the proper Regional Trial and Metropolitan Trial
Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the
case may be xxx.

FIRST DIVISION

RUPERTO A. AMBIL,
JR.,

G.R. No. 175457

- versus -

[32]

All told, as a procedural and curative

statute, R.A. No. 7975 may validly be
given retroactive effect, there being no
impairment of contractual or vested
rights.
[33]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is

DISMISSED, and the questioned
resolution and orders of the respondent
Sandiganbayan are AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

SANDIGANBAYAN and
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

ALEXANDRINO R.
APELADO, SR.,
Petitioner,

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Melo,

Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 175482

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,

- versus -

CARPIO,*
BERSAMIN,

Practices Act, as amended. On September 22,

DEL CASTILLO, and

1999, the new President of the IBP, Eastern Samar

VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Chapter, informed the Ombudsman that the IBP is

no longer interested in pursuing the case against
petitioners. Thus, he recommended the dismissal of

Promulgated:

the complaint against petitioners.[8]

PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,

Nonetheless, in an Information[9] dated January 31,

2000, petitioners Ambil, Jr. and Alexandrino R.

July 6, 2011
Respondent.

Apelado, Sr. were charged with violation of Section

3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, together with SPO3 Felipe A.
Balano. Upon reinvestigation, the Office of the
Ombudsman

issued

Memorandum[10] dated

August 4, 2000, recommending the dismissal of the

x------------------------------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

complaint as regards Balano and the amendment of

the Information to include the charge of Delivering
Prisoners

DECISION

from

Jail

under

Article

156 [11] of

the Revised Penal Code, as amended, (RPC)

against the remaining accused. The Amended

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Information[12] reads:

Before us are two consolidated petitions for review

on certiorari filed by petitioner Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr.
[1]
[2]

and

petitioner

assailing

September

Alexandrino

the
16,

R.

Apelado

[3]

Decision promulgated
2005

and

Sr.
on

Resolution [4] dated

November 8, 2006 of the Sandiganbayan in

Criminal Case No. 25892.
The present controversy arose from a letter[5] of Atty.
David B. Loste, President of the Eastern Samar
Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), to the Office of the Ombudsman, praying for
an investigation into the alleged transfer of then
Mayor Francisco Adalim, an accused in Criminal
Case No. 10963 for murder, from the provincial jail
of Eastern Samar to the residence of petitioner, then
Governor Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. In a Report[6]dated
January

4,

1999,

the

National

Bureau

of

Investigation (NBI) recommended the filing of

criminal charges against petitioner Ambil, Jr. for
violation of Section 3(e)[7] of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
3019, otherwise known as theAnti-Graft and Corrupt

That on or about the 6th day

of September 1998, and for
sometime prior [or] subsequent
thereto, [in] the Municipality of
Borongan, Province of Eastern
Samar, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
[the]
above-named
accused,
Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr.[,] being then
the Provincial Governor of Eastern
Samar, and Alexandrino R. Apelado,
being then the Provincial Warden of
Eastern Samar, both having been
public
officers,
duly
elected,
appointed and qualified as such,
committing the offense in relation to
office, conniving and confederating
together and mutually helping x x x
each other, with deliberate intent,
manifest partiality and evident bad
faith, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally order and
cause the release from the
Provincial Jail of detention prisoner
Mayor Francisco Adalim, accused in
Criminal Case No. 10963, for
Murder, by virtue of a warrant of

Arrest issued by Honorable Arnulfo

P. Bugtas, Presiding Judge, RTCBranch 2, Borongan, Eastern Samar,
and thereafter placed said detention
prisoner (Mayor Francisco Adalim)
under accused RUPERTO A.
AMBIL, JR.s custody, by allowing
said Mayor Adalim to stay at
accused Ambils residence for a
period of Eighty-Five (85) days,
more or less which act was done
without any court order, thus
accused in the performance of
official
functions
had
given
unwarranted benefits and advantage
to detainee Mayor Francisco Adalim
to the prejudice of the government.

of

Eastern

Samar

from

1998

to

2001. According to him, it was upon the advice of

Adalims lawyers that he directed the transfer of
Adalims detention to his home. He cites poor
security in the provincial jail as the primary reason
for taking personal custody of Adalim considering
that the latter would be in the company of inmates
who were put away by his sister and guards
identified with his political opponents.[15]
For her part, Atty. White stated that she is the
District Public Attorney of Eastern Samar and the
sister of Mayor Adalim. She recounted how Mayor
wedding in Sulat, Eastern Samar, on September 6,

BAIL
BOND
RECOMMENDED: P30,000.00
each.[13]
On arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty and
posted bail.

1998. According to Atty. White, she sought the

alternative custody of Gov. Ambil, Jr. after Provincial
Warden and herein petitioner Apelado, Sr. failed to
guarantee the mayors safety.[16]
Meanwhile, Francisco Adalim introduced himself as

At the pre-trial, petitioners admitted the allegations

in the Information. They reason, however, that
Adalims transfer was justified considering the
imminent threats upon his person and the dangers
by

Governor

Adalim was arrested while they were attending a

CONTRARY TO LAW.

posed

Petitioner Ambil, Jr. testified that he was the

his

detention

at

the

provincial

jail. According to petitioners, Adalims sister, Atty.

Juliana A. Adalim-White, had sent numerous
prisoners to the same jail where Mayor Adalim was
to be held.

the Mayor of Taft, Eastern Samar. He confirmed his

arrest on September 6, 1998 in connection with a
murder case filed against him in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Borongan, Eastern Samar. Adalim
confirmed Atty. Whites account that he spotted
inmates who served as bodyguards for, or who are
associated with, his political rivals at the provincial
jail. He also noticed a prisoner, Roman Akyatan,
gesture to him with a raised clenched fist. Sensing
danger, he called on his sister for help. Adalim

Consequently, the prosecution no longer offered

admitted staying at Ambil, Jr.s residence for almost

testimonial evidence and rested its case after the

three months before he posted bail after the charge

admission of its documentary exhibits. Petitioners

against him was downgraded to homicide.[17]

filed a Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to

Evidence with Reservation to Present Evidence in
Case of Denial[14] but the same was denied.

Petitioner Apelado, Sr. testified that he was the

Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern Samar. He recalls
that on September 6, 1998, SPO3 Felipe Balano

At the trial, petitioners presented three witnesses:

fetched him at home to assist in the arrest of Mayor

petitioner Ambil, Jr., Atty. Juliana A. Adalim-White

Adalim. Allegedly, Atty. White was contesting the

and Mayor Francisco C. Adalim.

legality of Mayor Adalims arrest and arguing with the

jail guards against booking him for detention. At the

provincial jail, petitioner was confronted by Atty.

Consequently,

the

Sandiganbayan

sentenced

White who informed him that he was under the

petitioner Ambil, Jr. to an indeterminate penalty of

governor, in the latters capacity as a provincial

imprisonment for nine (9) years, eight (8) months

jailer. Petitioner claims that it is for this reason that

and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and four (4)

he submitted to the governors order to relinquish

months. In favor of petitioner Apelado, Sr., the court

custody of Adalim.[18]

appreciated the incomplete justifying circumstance

of obedience to a superior order and sentenced him

Further, petitioner Apelado, Sr. described the

to imprisonment for six (6) years and one (1) month

physical condition of the jail to be dilapidated and

to nine (9) years and eight (8) months.

undermanned. According to him, only two guards

were incharge of looking after 50 inmates. There

Hence, the present petitions.

were two cells in the jail, each housing 25 inmates,

while an isolation cell of 10 square meters was

Petitioner Ambil, Jr. advances the following issues

unserviceable at the time. Also, there were several

for our consideration:

nipa huts within the perimeter for use during

conjugal visits.

On September 16, 2005, the Sandiganbayan, First

Division,

[19]

promulgated

the

assailed

Decision[20] finding petitioners guilty of violating

WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 3(e)

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, AS
AMENDED,
APPLIES
TO
PETITIONERS CASE BEFORE THE
SANDIGANBAYAN.

Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The court ruled that

in moving Adalim to a private residence, petitioners
have conspired to accord him unwarranted benefits
in the form of more comfortable quarters with
access to television and other privileges that other
detainees do not enjoy. It stressed that under the
Rules, no person under detention by legal process
shall be released or transferred except upon order
of the court or when he is admitted to bail.[21]
The Sandiganbayan brushed aside petitioners
defense that Adalims transfer was made to ensure
his safety. It observed that petitioner Ambil, Jr. did
not personally verify any actual threat on Adalims
life but relied simply on the advice of Adalims
lawyers. The Sandiganbayan also pointed out the
availability of an isolation cell and nipa huts within

II
WHETHER OR NOT A PUBLIC
OFFICER SUCH AS PETITIONER
IS A PRIVATE PARTY FOR
PURPOSES OF SECTION 3(e),
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, AS
AMENDED.
III
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER
ACTED
WITH
DELIBERATE
INTENT, MANIFEST PARTIALITY,
EVIDENT BAD FAITH OR GROSS
INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE IN
THE CONTEXT OF SAID SECTION
3(e).
IV

the 10-meter-high perimeter fence of the jail which

could have been used to separate Adalim from other
prisoners. Finally, it cited petitioner Ambil, Jr.s failure
to turn over Adalim despite advice from Assistant
Secretary Jesus Ingeniero of the Department of
Interior and Local Government.

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER

AS PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR AND
JAILER UNDER SECTIONS 1730
AND 1733, ARTICLE III, CHAPTER
45 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
CODE OF 1917 AND SECTION 61,

CHAPTER V, REPUBLIC ACT 6975

HAS THE AUTHORITY TO TAKE
CUSTODY OF A DETENTION
PRISONER.
V
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER
IS ENTITLED TO THE JUSTIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE
OF
FULFILLMENT OF A DUTY OR THE
LAWFUL EXERCISE OF A RIGHT
OR OFFICE.

THE COURT A QUOS BASIS IN

CONVICTING BOTH ACCUSED
AMBIL AND HEREIN PETITIONER
OF HAVING
GIVEN MAYOR
ADALIM
UNWARRANTED
BENEFITS AND ADVANTAGE TO
THE PREJUDICE x x x OF THE
GOVERNMENT IS, AT THE MOST,
SPECULATIVE.[23]
The issues raised by petitioner Ambil, Jr. can be
summed up into three: (1) Whether he is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e),

VI
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER
SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACQUITTED
BECAUSE THE PROSECUTION
EVIDENCE DID NOT ESTABLISH
HIS
GUILT
BEYOND
[22]
REASONABLE DOUBT.
For his part, petitioner Apelado, Sr. imputes the
following errors on the Sandiganbayan:
I
THERE WAS MISAPPREHENSION
OF
FACTS
AND/OR
MISAPPLICATION OF THE LAW
AND
JURISPRUDENCE
IN
CONVICTING
ACCUSED
APELADO, EITHER AS PRINCIPAL
OR IN CONSPIRACY WITH HIS
CO-ACCUSED AMBIL.
II
IN
THE
ABSENCE
OF
COMPETENT PROOF BEYOND
REASONABLE
DOUBT
OF
CONSPIRACY
BETWEEN
ACCUSED AMBIL AND HEREIN
PETITIONER,
THE
LATTER
SHOULD BE ACCORDED FULL
CREDIT FOR THE JUSTIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE
UNDER
PARAGRAPH 6, ARTICLE 11 OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
III

R.A. No. 3019; (2) Whether a provincial governor

has authority to take personal custody of a detention
prisoner; and (3) Whether he is entitled to the
justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty under
Article 11(5)[24] of the RPC.
Meanwhile, petitioner Apelado, Sr.s assignment of
errors can be condensed into two: (1) Whether he is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section
3(e), R.A. No. 3019; and (2) Whether he is entitled
to the justifying circumstance of obedience to an
order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose
under Article 11(6)[25] of the RPC.
Fundamentally, petitioner Ambil, Jr. argues that
Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 does not apply to his
case because the provision contemplates only
transactions of a pecuniary nature. Since the law
punishes a public officer who extends unwarranted
benefits to a private person, petitioner avers that he
cannot be held liable for extending a favor to Mayor
Adalim, a public officer. Further, he claims good faith
in taking custody of the mayor pursuant to his duty
as a Provincial Jailer under the Administrative Code
of 1917. Considering this, petitioner believes himself
entitled to the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of
duty or lawful exercise of duty.
Petitioner Apelado, Sr., on the other hand, denies
allegations

of

conspiracy

between

him

and

petitioner Ambil, Jr. Petitioner Apelado, Sr. defends

that he was merely following the orders of a superior

when he transferred the detention of Adalim. As

well, he invokes immunity from criminal liability.
For the State, the Office of the Special Prosecutor
(OSP) points out the absence of jurisprudence that
restricts the application of Section 3(e), R.A. No.
3019 to transactions of a pecuniary nature. The

discharge
of
his
official,
administrative or judicial functions
through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations
charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.

OSP explains that it is enough to show that in

performing

their

have

In order to hold a person liable under this provision,

accorded undue preference to Adalim for liability to

the following elements must concur: (1) the accused

attach

OSP

must be a public officer discharging administrative,

maintains that Adalim is deemed a private party for

judicial or official functions; (2) he must have acted

purposes of applying Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019

with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross

because the unwarranted benefit redounded, not to

inexcusable negligence; and (3) his action caused

his person as a mayor, but to his person as a

any undue injury to any party, including the

detention prisoner accused of murder. It suggests

government, or gave any private party unwarranted

further that petitioners were motivated by bad faith

benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge

as evidenced by their refusal to turn over Adalim

of his functions.[26]

under the

functions,

petitioners

provision. Further, the

despite instruction from Asst. Sec. Ingeniero. The

OSP also reiterates petitioners lack of authority to

As to the first element, there is no question that

take custody of a detention prisoner without a court

petitioners are public officers discharging official

order. Hence, it concludes that petitioners are not

functions and that jurisdiction over them lay with the

entitled to the benefit of any justifying circumstance.

Sandiganbayan. Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan

over public officers charged with violation of the

After a careful review of this case, the Court finds

Anti-Graft Law is provided under Section 4 of

the present petitions bereft of merit.

Presidential Decree No. 1606,[27] as amended by

Petitioners were charged with violation of Section

3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act which provides:
Section. 3. Corrupt practices
of public officers. - In addition to acts
or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law,
the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and
are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury
to
any
party,
including
the
Government, or giving any private
party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the

R.A. No. 8249.[28] The pertinent portions of Section

4, P.D. No. 1606, as amended, read as follows:
SEC.
4. Jurisdiction.The Sandiganbayan s
hall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act
No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, where one or more of the
accused are officials occupying the
following
positions
in
the
government,
whether
in
a
permanent,
acting
or
interim

capacity, at the time

commission of the offense:

of

the

accused are occupying positions corresponding to

salary grade 27 or higher shall exclusive jurisdiction

(1) Officials of the

executive branch occupying
the positions of regional
director
and
higher,
otherwise
classified
as
Grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989
(Republic
Act
No.
6758), specifically including:

be vested in the lower courts. Here, petitioner

(a)
Provincial
governors,
vicegovernors, members
of the sangguniang
panlalawigan and
provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers
and other provincial
department heads[;]

ways by which a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.

xxxx
In cases where none of the accused
are
occupying
positions
corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or
higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act No. 6758, or military
and PNP officers mentioned above,
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof
shall be vested in the proper
regional trial court, metropolitan trial
court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the
case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdiction as provided
in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended.
xxxx
Thus, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over
petitioner Ambil, Jr. is beyond question. The same is

Apelado, Sr. was charged as a co-principal with

Governor Ambil, Jr., over whose position the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. Accordingly, he
was correctly tried jointly with said public officer in
the proper court which had exclusive original
jurisdiction over them the Sandiganbayan.
The second element, for its part, describes the three
3019 may be committed, that is, through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence.
In Sison v. People,[30] we defined partiality, bad faith
and gross negligence as follows:
Partiality is synonymous with
bias which excites a disposition to
see and report matters as they are
wished for rather than as they are.
Bad faith does not simply connote
bad judgment or negligence; it
imputes a dishonest purpose or
some moral obliquity and conscious
doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn
duty through some motive or intent
or ill will; it partakes of the nature of
fraud. Gross negligence has been so
defined as negligence characterized
by the want of even slight care,
acting or omitting to act in a situation
where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently
but
wilfully
and
intentionally with a conscious
indifference to consequences in so
far as other persons may be
affected. It is the omission of that
care which even inattentive and
thoughtless men never fail to take
on their own property. x x x[31]

true as regards petitioner Apelado, Sr. As to him, a

Certification[29] from

the

Provincial

Government

In this case, we find that petitioners displayed

Department Head of the HRMO shows that his

manifest

position as Provincial Warden is classified as Salary

transferring the detention of Mayor Adalim to

Grade 22. Nonetheless, it is only when none of the

petitioner Ambil, Jr.s house. There is no merit to

partiality

and

evident

bad

faith

in

petitioner Ambil, Jr.s contention that he is authorized

he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-

to transfer the detention of prisoners by virtue of his

done by his subordinate or he may even decide to

power as the Provincial Jailer of Eastern Samar.

do it himself.[34]

Section 28 of the Local Government Code draws

On the other hand, the power of supervision means

the extent of the power of local chief executives

overseeing or the authority of an officer to see to it

over the units of the Philippine National Police within

that the subordinate officers perform their duties.

their jurisdiction:

[35]

If the subordinate officers fail or neglect to fulfill

their duties, the official may take such action or step

SEC. 28. Powers of Local
Chief Executives over the Units of
the
Philippine
National
Police.The extent of operational
supervision and control of local chief
executives over the police force, fire
protection unit, and jail management
personnel
assigned
in
their
respective jurisdictions shall be
governed by the provisions of
Republic Act Numbered Sixty-nine
hundred seventy-five (R.A. No.
6975), otherwise known as The
Department of the Interior and Local
Government Act of 1990, and the
rules
and
regulations
issued
pursuant thereto.

as prescribed by law to make them perform their

duties. Essentially, the power of supervision means
no more than the power of ensuring that laws are
faithfully executed, or that subordinate officers act
within the law.[36] The supervisor or superintendent
merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he
does not lay down the rules, nor does he have
discretion to modify or replace them.[37]
Significantly, it is the provincial government and not
the governor alone which has authority to exercise
control and supervision over provincial jails. In any
case, neither of said powers authorizes the doing of
acts beyond the parameters set by law. On the
contrary, subordinates must be enjoined to act

In particular, Section 61, Chapter 5 of R.A. No.

6975

[32]

on the Bureau of Jail Management and

Penology provides:
Sec. 61. Powers and Functions. The Jail Bureau shall exercise
supervision and control over all city
and municipal jails. The provincial
jails shall be supervised and
controlled by the provincial
government within its jurisdiction,
whose expenses shall be subsidized
by the National Government for not
more than three (3) years after the
effectivity of this Act.
The power of control is the power of an officer to
alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former for that
of the latter.[33] An officer in control lays down the
rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed,

within the bounds of law. In the event that the

subordinate performs an act ultra vires, rules may
be laid down on how the act should be done, but
always in conformity with the law.
In a desperate attempt to stretch the scope of his
powers, petitioner Ambil, Jr. cites Section 1731,
Article III of the Administrative Code of 1917 on
Provincial jails in support. Section 1731 provides:
SEC.
1731. Provincial
governor as keeper of jail.The
governor of the province shall be
charged with the keeping of the
provincial jail, and it shall be his
duty to administer the same in
accordance with law and the
regulations prescribed for the
government
of
provincial
prisons. The immediate custody
and supervision of the jail may be
committed to the care of a jailer to

be appointed by the provincial

governor. The position of jailer shall
be
regarded
as
within
the
unclassified civil service but may be
filled in the manner in which
classified positions are filled, and if
so filled, the appointee shall be
entitled to all the benefits and
privileges of classified employees,
except that he shall hold office only
during the term of office of the
appointing governor and until a
successor in the office of the jailer is
appointed and qualified, unless
sooner separated. The provincial
governor
shall,
under
the
direction of the provincial board
and at the expense of the
province, supply proper food and
clothing for the prisoners; though
the provincial board may, in its
discretion, let the contract for the
feeding of the prisoners to some
other person. (Emphasis supplied.)
This

provision

survived

the Administrative

Code

of

the

provincial

be

insecure

or

insufficient

provision has been superseded by Section 3, Rule

114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended. Section 3, Rule 114 provides:
SEC. 3. No release or
transfer except on court order or
bail.-No person under detention by
legal process shall be released or
transferred except upon order of the
court or when he is admitted to bail.
Indubitably, the power to order the release or
transfer of a person under detention by legal
process is vested in the court, not in the provincial
government, much less the governor. This was
amply clarified by Asst. Sec. Ingeniero in his
communication[40] dated October 6, 1998 addressed
to petitioner Ambil, Jr. Asst. Sec. Ingeniero wrote:
06 October 1996
of

GOVERNOR RUPERTO AMBIL

again,

nowhere did said provision designate the provincial

governor as the provincial jailer, or even slightly
suggest that he is empowered to take personal

Provincial Capitol
Borongan, Eastern Samar

custody of prisoners. What is clear from the cited

provision is that the provincial governors duty as a
jail keeper is confined to the administration of the jail

Dear Sir:

and the procurement of food and clothing for the

prisoners.After all, administrative acts pertain only to
those acts which are necessary to be done to carry
out legislative

policies

and

purposes

to

accommodate all provincial prisoners. However, this

advent

1987. But

jail

already

declared by the legislative body or such as are

devolved upon it[38] by the Constitution.Therefore, in
the exercise of his administrative powers, the
governor can only enforce the law but not supplant
it.

This has reference to the letter

of Atty. Edwin B. Docena, and the
reports earlier received by this
Department, relative to your alleged
action in taking into custody Mayor
Francisco Aising Adalim of Taft,
that province, who has been
previously arrested by virtue by a
warrant of arrest issued in Criminal
Case No. 10963.

Besides, the only reference to a transfer of

prisoners in said article is found in Section
1737[39] under which prisoners may be turned over
to the jail of the neighboring province in case the

If the report is true, it appears that

your actuation is not in accord with

the provision of Section 3, Rule 113

of the Rules of Court, which
mandates that an arrested person
be delivered to the nearest police
station or jail.

Likewise amply established beyond reasonable

doubt is the third element of the crime. As
mentioned above, in order to hold a person liable for
violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, it is
required that the act constituting the offense consist
of either (1) causing undue injury to any party,

Moreover, invoking Section 61 of

RA 6975 as legal basis in taking
custody of the accused municipal
mayor is misplaced. Said section
merely speaks of the power of
supervision
vested
unto
the
provincial governor over provincial
jails. It does not, definitely, include
the power to take in custody any
person in detention.

including the government, or (2) giving any private

party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge by the accused of his
official, administrative or judicial functions.
In the case at hand, the Information
specifically

accused

petitioners

of

giving

unwarranted benefits and advantage to Mayor

Adalim, a public officer charged with murder, by
causing his release from prison and detaining him
instead

In view of the foregoing, you are

hereby enjoined to conduct yourself
within the bounds of law and to
immediately deliver Mayor Adalim to
the provincial jail in order to avoid
legal complications.

at

the

house

of

petitioner

Ambil,

Jr. Petitioner Ambil, Jr. negates the applicability of

Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 in this case on two
points. First, Section 3(e) is not applicable to him
allegedly

because

the

last

sentence

thereof

provides that the provision shall apply to officers

and

employees

of

offices

or

government

corporations charged with the grant of licenses,

Please be guided accordingly.

permits or other concessions and he is not such

government

officer

or

employee.Second,

the

purported unwarranted benefit was accorded not to

Very truly yours,

a private party but to a public officer.

However, as regards his first contention, it appears

(SGD.)
JESUS I. INGENIERO
Assistant Secretary
Still, petitioner Ambil, Jr. insisted on his
supposed authority as a provincial jailer. Said
petitioners usurpation of the court's authority, not to
mention his open and willful defiance to official
advice in order to accommodate a former political
party mate,[41] betray his unmistakable bias and the
evident bad faith that attended his actions.

that petitioner Ambil, Jr. has obviously lost sight, if

he is not altogether unaware, of our ruling
in Mejorada v. Sandiganbayan[42] where we held that
a prosecution for violation of Section 3(e) of the
Anti-Graft Law will lie regardless of whether or not
the accused public officer is charged with the grant
of

licenses

or

permits

or

other

concessions. Following is an excerpt of what we

said in Mejorada,
Section 3 cited above enumerates in
eleven subsections the corrupt
practices of any public officers (sic)
declared unlawful. Its reference to

any public officer is without

distinction or qualification and it
specifies the acts declared unlawful.
We agree with the view adopted by
the Solicitor General that the last
sentence of paragraph [Section 3]
(e) is intended to make clear the
inclusion of officers and employees
of officers (sic) or government
corporations which, under the
ordinary concept of public officers
may not come within the term. It is
a strained construction of the
provision to read it as applying
exclusively to public officers charged
with the duty of granting licenses or
permits or other concessions.
[43]
(Italics supplied.)
In

the

more

recent

case

in legal parlance[46] as distinguished from person

which, in general usage, refers to a human being.
[47]

Thus, a private person simply pertains to one

who is not a public officer. While a private party is

more comprehensive in scope to mean either a
private person or a public officer acting in a private
capacity to protect his personal interest.
In the present case, when petitioners transferred
Mayor Adalim from the provincial jail and detained
him at petitioner Ambil, Jr.s residence, they
accorded such privilege to Adalim, not in his official
capacity as a mayor, but as a detainee charged with
murder. Thus,

for

purposes

of

applying

the

provisions of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, Adalim

of Cruz

v.

was a private party.

Sandiganbayan,[44] we affirmed that a prosecution

Moreover, in order to be found guilty under the

for violation of said provision will lie regardless of

second mode, it suffices that the accused has given

whether the accused public officer is charged with

unjustified favor or benefit to another in the exercise

the

of his official, administrative or judicial functions.

grant

concessions.

of

licenses

or

permits

or

other

[45]

[48]

Meanwhile, regarding petitioner Ambil, Jr.s second

contention, Section 2(b) of R.A. No. 3019 defines a
public officer to include elective and appointive
officials and employees, permanent or temporary,
whether

in

the

classified

or

unclassified

or

exemption service receiving compensation, even

nominal from the government. Evidently, Mayor

The word unwarranted means lacking adequate

or official support; unjustified; unauthorized or

without justification or adequate reason. Advantage
means a more favorable or improved position or
condition; benefit, profit or gain of any kind; benefit
from some course of action. Preference signifies
priority or higher evaluation or desirability; choice or
estimation above another.[49]

Adalim is one. But considering that Section 3(e) of

Without a court order, petitioners transferred Adalim

R.A. No. 3019 punishes the giving by a public officer

and detained him in a place other than the provincial

of unwarranted benefits to a private party, does the

jail. The

fact that Mayor Adalim was the recipient of such

comfortable quarters, provided better nourishment,

benefits take petitioners case beyond the ambit of

was free to move about the house and watch

said law?

television. Petitioners

We believe not.
In drafting the Anti-Graft Law, the lawmakers opted
to use private party rather than private person to
describe the recipient of the unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference for a reason. The term
party is a technical word having a precise meaning

latter

was

housed

readily

in

much

extended

more

these

benefits to Adalim on the mere representation of his

lawyers that the mayors life would be put in danger
inside the provincial jail.
As the Sandiganbayan ruled, however, petitioners
were unable to establish the existence of any risk on
Adalims safety. To be sure, the latter would not be

alone in having unfriendly company in lockup. Yet,

issued for some lawful purpose. Under paragraph 6,

even if we treat Akyatans gesture of raising a closed

Article 11 of the RPC, any person who acts in

fist at Adalim as a threat of aggression, the same

obedience to an order issued by a superior for some

would still not constitute a special and compelling

lawful

reason to warrant Adalims detention outside the

liability. For this justifying circumstance to apply, the

provincial jail. For one, there were nipa huts within

following requisites must be present: (1) an order

the perimeter fence of the jail which could have

has been issued by a superior; (2) such order must

been used to separate Adalim from the rest of the

be for some lawful purpose; and (3) the means used

prisoners while the isolation cell was undergoing

by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful.

repair. Anyhow,

[51]

such

repair

could

not

have

purpose

does

not

incur

any

criminal

Only the first requisite is present in this case.

exceeded the 85 days that Adalim stayed in

petitioner Ambil, Jr.s house. More importantly, even

While the order for Adalims transfer emanated from

if Adalim could have proven the presence of an

petitioner Ambil, Jr., who was then Governor, neither

imminent peril on his person to petitioners, a court

said order nor the means employed by petitioner

order was still indispensable for his transfer.

Apelado, Sr. to carry it out was lawful. In his

capacity as the Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern

The foregoing, indeed, negates the application of

Samar, petitioner Apelado, Sr. fetched Mayor Adalim

the justifying circumstances claimed by petitioners.

at the provincial jail and, unarmed with a court order,

transported him to the house of petitioner Ambil,

Specifically,

petitioner

Ambil,

Jr.

invokes

the

justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful

Jr. This makes him liable as a principal by direct

participation under Article 17(1)[52] of the RPC.

exercise of right or office. Under paragraph 5, Article

11 of the RPC, any person who acts in the fulfillment

An accepted badge of conspiracy is when the

of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office

accused by their acts aimed at the same object, one

does not incur any criminal liability. In order for this

performing one part of and another performing

justifying circumstance to apply, two requisites must

another so as to complete it with a view to the

be

the

attainment of the same object, and their acts

performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a

although apparently independent were in fact

right or office; and (2) the injury caused or the

concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of

offense committed be the necessary consequence

personal

satisfied:

(1)

the

accused

acted

in

of the due performance of duty or the lawful

association,

concerted

concurrence of sentiments.

action

and

[53]

exercise of such right or office. [50] Both requisites are

lacking in petitioner Ambil, Jr.s case.

Conspiracy

was

petitioner Apelado,

sufficiently
Sr.s

demonstrated

willful

cooperation

by
in

As we have earlier determined, petitioner Ambil, Jr.

executing petitioner Ambil, Jr.s order to move

exceeded his authority when he ordered the transfer

Adalim from jail, despite the absence of a court

and detention of Adalim at his house. Needless to

order. Petitioner Apelado, Sr., a law graduate,

state, the resulting violation of the Anti-Graft Law did

cannot hide behind the cloak of ignorance of the

not proceed from the due performance of his duty or

law. The Rule requiring a court order to transfer a

lawful exercise of his office.

person

under

detention

by

legal

process

is

elementary. Truth be told, even petitioner governor

In like manner, petitioner Apelado, Sr. invokes the

who is unschooled in the intricacies of the law

justifying circumstance of obedience to an order

expressed reservations on his power to transfer

Adalim. All said, the concerted acts of petitioners

incomplete justifying circumstance to his credit,

Ambil, Jr. and Apelado, Sr. resulting in the violation

petitioner Apelado, Sr. shall suffer the same penalty.

charged, makes them equally responsible as

conspirators.

WHEREFORE,

the

consolidated

petitions

are DENIED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan in

As regards the penalty imposed upon petitioners,

Criminal Case No. 25892 is AFFIRMED WITH

Section 9(a) of R.A. No. 3019 punishes a public

MODIFICATION. We

officer or a private person who violates Section 3 of

Ambil, Jr. and Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr. guilty

R.A. No. 3019 with imprisonment for not less than

beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e),

six (6) years and one (1) month to not more than

R.A. No. 3019. Petitioner Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr.

fifteen (15) years and perpetual disqualification from

is, likewise, sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of

public office. Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate

imprisonment for nine (9) years, eight (8) months and

Sentence Law or Act No. 4103, as amended by Act

one (1) day to twelve (12) years and four (4) months.

find

petitioners Ruperto

A.

No. 4225, if the offense is punished by a special

law, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which
shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and

With costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

the minimum shall not be less than the minimum

term prescribed by the same.
Thus, the penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan
upon petitioner Ambil, Jr. of imprisonment for nine
(9) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years and four (4) months is in accord
with law. As a co-principal without the benefit of an