Candano Shipping vs.

Sugata-on, March 13, 2007

Labor Law; Employees Compensation; The employees may invoke either the Workmens
Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the consequence that the
choice of one remedy will exclude the other and that the acceptance of the compensation
under the remedy chosen will exclude the other remedy.In its Petition, Candano Shipping
argues that the application of the measure stipulated under Article 194 of the Labor Code is
erroneous since it applies only to death compensation to be paid by the Social Security
System to the beneficiaries of a deceased member, to which proposition Florentina
concedes. We agree. The remedy availed by Sugataon in filing the claim under the New Civil
Code has been validly recognized by the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter. In the case
of Floresca v. Philex Mining Company, 136 SCRA 141 (1985), we declared that the
employees may invoke either the Workmens Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil
Code, subject to the consequence that the choice of one remedy will exclude the other and
that the acceptance of the compensation under the remedy chosen will exclude the other
remedy. The exception is where the claimant who had already been paid under the
Workmens Compensation Act may still sue for damages under the Civil Code on the basis of
supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy.
Same; Same; An employee cannot pursue both remedies simultaneously but has the option
to proceed by interposing one remedy and waiving his right over the other.Stated
differently, save for the recognized exception, an employee cannot pursue both remedies
simultaneously but has the option to proceed by interposing one remedy and waiving his
right over the other. As we have explained in Floresca, this doctrinal rule is rooted on the
theory that the basis of the compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act is
separate and distinct from the award of damages under the Civil Code, thus: The rationale
in awarding compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act differs from that in
giving damages under the Civil Code. The compensation acts are based on a theory of
compensation distinct from the existing theories of damages, payments under the acts
being made as compensation and not as damages (99 C.J.S. 53). Compensation is given to
mitigate harshness and insecurity of industrial life for the workman and his family. Hence,
an employer is liable whether negligence exists or not since liability is created by law.
Recovery under the Act is not based on any theory of actionable wrong on the part of the
employer (99 D.J.S. 36). In other words, under compensation acts, the employer is liable to
pay compensation benefits for loss of income, as long as the death, sickness or injury is
work-connected or work-aggravated, even if the death or injury is not due to the fault of the
employer (Murillo v. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689). On the other hand, damages are awarded to
one as a vindication of the wrongful invasion of his rights. It is the indemnity recoverable by
a person who has sustained injury either in his person, property or relative rights, through
the act or default of another (25 C.J.S. 452).
Same; Same; Life Expectancy Formula; When the employee died or was injured in the
occasion of employment, the obligation of the employer for indemnity automatically
attaches, which indemnity may partake of the form of actual, moral, nominal, temperate,
liquidated or exemplary damages, as the case may be depending on the factual milieu of
the case and considering the criterion for the award of these damages.The employer shall
be liable for the death or personal injury of its employees in the course of employment as
sanctioned by Article 1711 of the New Civil Code. The liability of the employer for death or
personal injury of his employees arose from the contract of employment entered into
between the employer and his employee which is likewise imbued with public interest.
Accordingly, when the employee died or was injured in the occasion of employment, the
obligation of the employer for indemnity, automatically attaches. The indemnity may
partake of the form of actual, moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or exemplary damages,

as the case may be depending on the factual milieu of the case and considering the criterion
for the award of these damages as outlined by our jurisprudence. In the case at bar, only
the award of actual damages, specifically the award for unearned income is warranted by
the circumstances since it has been duly proven that the cause of death of Melquiades is a
fortuitous event for which Candano Shipping cannot be faulted. The formula for the
computation of unearned income is: Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy x (gross annual
income reasonable and necessary living expenses). Life expectancy is determined in
accordance with the formula: 2 / 3 x [80 age of deceased at the time of death]
Same; Same; Same; The formula for life expectancy has been repeatedly adopted in our
jurisprudence in fixing the amount of indemnity for the death of a party; In several cases,
the Supreme Court reduced the life expectancy multiplier considering the medical history
such as when the deceased previously underwent a major surgery or when it was shown
that he was treated for chest pains, backache or occasional feeling of tiredness and the fact
that the deceased has been consistently engaged in a dangerous and risky activity tending
to shorten his life.The argument raised by Candano Shipping that the formula for
determining the life expectancy under Villa Rey cannot be automatically applied without
proof of the basis for the expected length of life of a Filipino does not merit our
consideration. The formula for life expectancy has been repeatedly adopted in our
jurisprudence in fixing the amount of indemnity for the death of a party. This was adopted
from the American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the Actuarial of Combined Experience
Table of Mortality which was used by insurers in determining the capital sum to be charged
for annuity. Admittedly, in several cases, this Court reduced the life expectancy multiplier
considering the medical history such as when the deceased previously underwent a major
surgery or when it was shown that he was treated for chest pains, backache or occasional
feeling of tiredness and the fact that the deceased has been consistently engaged in a
dangerous and risky activity tending to shorten his life. Failing to prove, however, that any
of these circumstances is attendant in the case at bar, Candano Shipping cannot validly
assert that the standard life expectancy factor laid down in Villa Rey cannot be applied in
this case.
Escasinas vs. Shangri-las Mactan Island Resort, March 4, 2009
Labor Law; Labor Standards; Art. 157 of the Labor Code does not require the engagement
of full-time nurses as regular employees of a company employing not less than 50 workers.
The resolution of the case hinges, in the main, on the correct interpretation of Art. 157
vis-a-vis Art. 280 and the provisions on permissible job contracting of the Labor Code, as
amended. The Court holds that, contrary to petitioners postulation, Art. 157 does not
require the engagement of full-time nurses as regular employees of a company employing
not less than 50 workers.
Same; Same; An employer which employs more than 200 workers is mandated to furnish
its employees with the services of a full-time registered nurse, a part-time physician and
dentist, and an emergency clinic which means that it should provide or make available such
medical and allied services to its employees, not necessarily to hire or employ a service
provider.Shangri-la, which employs more than 200 workers, is mandated to furnish its
employees with the services of a full-time registered nurse, a part-time physician and
dentist, and an emergency clinic which means that it should provide or make available such
medical and allied services to its employees, not necessarily to hire or employ a service
provider. As held in Philippine Global Communications vs. De Vera (459 SCRA 260 [2005]):
x x x while it is true that the provision requires employers to engage the services of medical
practitioners in certain establishments depending on the number of their employees, nothing
is there in the law which says that medical practitioners so engaged be actually hired as

employees, adding that the law, as written, only requires the employer to retain, not
employ, a part-time physician who needed to stay in the premises of the non-hazardous
workplace for two (2) hours.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The term full-time in Art. 157 cannot be construed as
referring to the type of employment of the person engaged to provide the services, for
Article 157 must not be read alongside Art. 280 in order to vest employer-employee
relationship on the employer and the person so engagedthe phrase services of a full-time
registered nurse should thus be taken to refer to the kind of services that the nurse will
render in the companys premises and to its employees, not the manner of his engagement.
The term full-time in Art. 157 cannot be construed as referring to the type of
employment of the person engaged to provide the services, for Article 157 must not be read
alongside Art. 280 in order to vest employer-employee relationship on the employer and the
person so engaged. So De Vera teaches: x x x For, we take it that any agreement may
provide that one party shall render services for and in behalf of another, no matter how
necessary for the latters business, even without being hired as an employee. This set-up is
precisely true in the case of an independent contractorship as well as in an agency
agreement. Indeed, Article 280 of the Labor Code, quoted by the appellate court, is not the
yardstick for determining the existence of an employment relationship. As it is, the provision
merely distinguishes between two (2) kinds of employees, i.e., regular and casual. x x x The
phrase services of a full-time registered nurse should thus be taken to refer to the kind of
services that the nurse will render in the companys premises and to its employees, not the
manner of his engagement.
Same; Same; Employer-Employee Relationship; Independent Contractors; Determinants.
The existence of an independent and permissible contractor relationship is generally
established by considering the following determinants: whether the contractor is carrying on
an independent business; the nature and extent of the work; the skill required; the term
and duration of the relationship; the right to assign the performance of a specified piece of
work; the control and supervision of the work to another; the employers power with respect
to the hiring, firing and payment of the contractors workers; the control of the premises;
the duty to supply the premises, tools, appliances, materials and labor; and the mode,
manner and terms of payment. On the other hand, existence of an employer-employee
relationship is established by the presence of the following determinants: (1) the selection
and engagement of the workers; (2) power of dismissal; (3) the payment of wages by
whatever means; and (4) the power to control the workers conduct, with the latter
assuming primacy in the overall consideration.
Ysmael Maritime vs. Avelino, June 30, 1987
Jurisdiction; Actions; Workmens Compensation; Damages; An employee or his heirs may
choose between availing themselves of the benefits under the WCA or giving in the regular
courts under the Civil Code for higher damages from the employer by reason of negligence
but once the election is exercised, employee or his heirs are no longer free to opt for the
other remedy.Petitioner invokes the case of Robles vs. Yap Wing, L-20442, October 4,
1971, 41 SCRA 267, to support its contention that all claims for death or injuries by
employees against employers are exclusively cognizable by the Workmens Compensation
Commission regardless of the causes of said death or injuries. That case no longer controls.
In the recent case of Floresca vs. Philex Mining Company, L-30642, April 30, 1985, 136
SCRA 141, involving a complaint for damages for the death of five miners in a cave-in on
June 28, 1967, this Court was confronted with three divergent opinions on the exclusivity
rule as presented by several amici curiae. One view is that the injured employee or his
heirs, in case of death, may initiate an action to recover damages [not compensation under

the Workmens Compensation Act) with the regular courts on the basis of negligence of the
employer pursuant to the Civil Code. Another view, as enunciated in the Robles case, is that
the remedy of an employee for work-connected injury or accident is exclusive in accordance
with Section 5 of the WCA. A third view is that the action is selective and the employee or
his heirs have a choice of availing themselves of the benefits under the WCA or of suing in
the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages from the employer by reason of
his negligence. But once the election has been exercised, the employee or his heirs are no
longer free to opt for the other remedy. In other words, the employee cannot pursue both
actions simultaneously. This latter view was adopted by the majority in the Floresca case,
reiterating as main authority its earlier decision in Pacaa vs. Cebu Autobus Company, L25382, April 30, 1982, 32 SCRA 442. In so doing, the Court rejected the doctrine of
exclusivity of the rights and remedies granted by the WCA as laid down in the Robles case.
Three justices dissented. It is readily apparent from the succession of cases dealing with the
matter at issue that this Court has vacillated from one school of thought to the other. Even
now, the concepts pertaining thereto have remained fluid. But unless and until the Floresca
ruling is modified or superseded, and We are not so inclined, it is deemed to be the
controlling jurisprudence vice the Robles case.
Palisoc vs. Easways September 11, 2007
Labor Law; Seafarers; Employees Compensation; Permanent Total Disability; The Labor
Codes provision on permanent total disability, particularly Article 192(c)(1), applies to
seafarers.The issue of whether the Labor Codes provision on permanent total disability,
particularly Article 192(c)(1), applies to seafarers is already a settled matter. Article 192(c)
(1) of the Labor Code provides: ART. 192. Permanent Total Disability. x x x (c) The following
disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent: (1) Temporary total disability lasting
continuously for more than one hundred twenty days, except as otherwise provided for in
the Rules; x x x x In Remigio v. National Labor Relations Commission, petitioner, a seafarer,
applied for permanent total disability under Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code. The Labor
Arbiter ruled that Section 30 of the 1996 POEA-SEC did not provide for the payment of
compensation benefits for cardiac catheterization or heart bypass. The NLRC affirmed the
Labor Arbiter. The Court of Appeals also ruled that heart ailment was not included among
the compensable sickness and injuries under the 1996 POEA-SEC. When the case was
brought to this Court, private respondents argued that petitioner erred in applying the
provision of permanent total disability under the Labor Code and the cases under the
Employees Compensation Commission because the case involves a contractual claim under
the 1996 POEASEC. The Court ruled in favor of petitioner. The Court affirmed the application
of the Labor Code concept of permanent disability to the case of seafarers. The Court held
that [t]he standard employment contract for seafarers was formulated by the POEA
pursuant to its mandate under E.O. No. 247 to secure the best terms and conditions of
employment of Filipino contract workers and ensure compliance therewith and to promote
and protect the well-being of Filipino workers overseas.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is the company-designated physician who should determine
the degree of disability of a seaman or his fitness to work.In this case, petitioner was
under the care of a company-designated physician. Petitioner only sought the intervention
of another physician when Dr. Quiambao refused to assess his disability grade and after Dr.
dela Cruz-de Leon issued the medical certification that he was fit to work. In Sarocam v.
Interorient Maritime Ent., Inc., 493 SCRA 502 (2006), the Court, citing German Marine
Agencies v. NLRC, 350 SCRA 629 (2001), ruled that it is the company-designated physician
who should determine the degree of disability of a seaman or his fitness to work. The Court
ruled that the only requirement stated in the POEA-SEC is that the doctor be companydesignated, and no other.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Even in the absence of an official finding
by a company-designated physician that a seafarer is unfit for sea duty, he is deemed to
have suffered permanent disability where his inability to work is for more than 120 days;
Permanent disability refers to the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120
days, regardless of whether he loses the use of any part of his body .While the Court
rejects the medical certificate issued by Dr. Rigonan, we note that the fit to work
certification was issued by Dr. dela Cruz-de Leon only on 20 August 1997. Petitioner was
repatriated on 23 March 1997. Petitioner was unable to perform his job for more than 120
days from the time of his repatriation, which entitles him to permanent disability benefits.
Even in the absence of an official finding by a company-designated physician that petitioner
is unfit for sea duty, he is deemed to have suffered permanent disability because of his
inability to work for more than 120 days. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
petitioners operation involving the removal of his gallbladder is not a compensable injury,
disease, or illness under Appendix 1 of the POEASEC. Permanent disability refers to the
inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether he
loses the use of any part of his body. What determines petitioners entitlement to permanent
disability benefits is his inability to work for more than 120 days.
Vicente vs. ECC, 193 SCRA190
Labor Law; Employees Compensation; Disability; While permanent total disability invariably
results in an employees loss of work or inability to perform his usual work; permanent
partial disability on the other hand occurs when an employee loses the use of any particular
anatomical part of his body which disables him to continue with his work.It may therefore
be inferred from the Courts pronouncements that while permanent total disability
invariably results in an employees loss of work or inability to perform his usual work,
permanent partial disability, on the other hand, occurs when an employee loses the use of
any particular anatomical part of his body which disables him to continue with his former
work. Stated otherwise, the test of whether or not an employee suffers from permanent
total disability is a showing of the capacity of the employee to continue performing his work
notwithstanding the disability he incurred. Thus, if by reason of the injury or sickness he
sustained, the employee is unable to perform his customary job for more than 120 days and
he does not come within the coverage of Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensability (which, in a more detailed manner, describes what constitutes temporary
total disability), then the said employee undoubtedly suffers from permanent total
disability regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body.
Same; Same; Construction; The sympathy of the law on social security is towards its
beneficiaries, and the law by its own terms, requires a construction of utmost liberality in
their favor.The court takes this occasion to stress once more its abiding concern for the
welfare of government workers, especially the humble rank and file, whose patience,
industry, and dedication to duty have often gone unheralded, but who, in spite of very little
recognition, plod on dutifully to perform their appointed tasks. It is for this reason that the
sympathy of the law on social security is toward its beneficiaries, and the law, by its own
terms, requires a construction of utmost liberality in their favor. It is likewise for this reason
that the Court disposes of this case and ends a workingmans struggle for his just dues.