Kuroda vs Jalandoni

Facts:
1. Petitioner Sheginori Kuroda was the former Lt. General of the Japanese Army and
commanding general of the Japanese forces during the occupation (WWII) in the country. He
was tried before the Philippine Military Commission for War Crimes and other atrocities
committed against military and civilians. The military commission was establish under Executive
Order 68.
2. Petitioner assails the validity of EO 68 arguing it is unconstitutional and hence the military
commission did not have the jurisdiction to try him on the following grounds:
- that the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention (War Crimes)
3. Petitioner likewise assails that the US is not a party of interest in the case hence the 2 US
prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not EO 68 is constitutional thus the military tribunal jurisdiction is valid
HELD:
1. EO 68 is constitutional hence the tribunal has jurisdiction to try Kuroda. EO 68 was enacted
by the President and was in accordance with Sec. 3, Art. 2 of Constitution which renounces war
as an instrument of national policy. Hence it is in accordance with generally accepted principles
of international law including the Hague Convention and Geneva Convention, and
other international jurisprudence established by the UN, including the principle that all persons
(military or civilian) guilty of plan, preparing, waging a war of aggression and other offenses in
violation of laws and customs of war. The Philippines may not be a signatory to the 2
conventions at that time but the rules and regulations of both are wholly based on the generally
accepted principles of international law. They were accepted even by the 2 belligerent nations
(US and Japan)
2. As to the participation of the 2 US prosecutors in the case, the US is a party of interest
because its country and people have greatly aggrieved by the crimes which petitioner was being
charged of.
3. Moreover, the Phil. Military Commission is a special military tribunal and rules as to parties
and representation are not governed by the rules of court but the provision of this special law.
CO Kim Chan vs Valdez Tah Keh
Facts of the case: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese
occupation, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the
American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying
that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all
judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law,
lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings
pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under
the Japanese).
The court resolved three issues:
1.
Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese
occupation were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation;
2.
Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he
declared that all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines
than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the
Philippines free of enemy occupation and control invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and
proceedings of the courts;
3.
And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthurs proclamation, those
courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them.
Ratio: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto
government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the

Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported
by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war.
Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed
by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for the existence of a state of
insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the
regular administration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it would not have been
necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them.
The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase processes of
any other government and whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and
judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation.
IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto
governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been liberated,
then it could not have been MacArthurs intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be
in violation of international law.
A well-known rule of statutory construction is: A statute ought never to be construed to violate
the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.
Another is that where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great
mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such
construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and
unequivocal words.
Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and
violate international law, therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed to mean that
judicial proceedings are included in the phrase processes of any other governments.
In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in use
by the occupant, they become his and derive their force from him. The laws and courts of the
Philippines did not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws and
courts of Japan.
It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, law once established continues until
changed by some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE
OF SOVEREIGNTY. Until, of course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change.
Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the
laws and courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said courts and laws
creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it follows that
the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein
before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws creating
and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government.
DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case
no. 3012.
Summary of ratio:
1.
International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws
continue even during occupation unless repealed.
2.
MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be applied on
judicial proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of nations.
3.
Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending before
it.
***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through rebellion (govt gets possession and
control through force or the voice of the majority and maintains itself against the will of the
rightful government)
through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a
territory of the enemy in the course of war; denoted as a government of paramount force)
through insurrection (established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country
who rise in insurrection against the parent state)

Inchong vs. Hernandez 101 PHIL 155

Facts:

the status of law, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for
the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.

The congress of the phils. enacted the act which nationalizes the retail trade business, Republic
Act # 1180, entitled " An act to regulate the retail business" prohibiting aliens in general to
engage in retail trade in our country. Petitioners, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other
alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of RA 1180,
brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said act in unconstitutional.

In Re Garcia 2 SCRA 985

Facts:

Issue:
whether congress in enacting RA 1180 violated the UN charter, the UN declaration of human
rights and the phil-chines treaty of amity.

Arturo E. Garcia,has applied for admission to the practice of law in the phils. without submitting
to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers among others that he is a
filipino citizen born in bacolod city of filipino parentage. He finished Bachillerato Superior in
spain. He was allowed to practice law profession in spain under the provision of the treaty on
academic degrees and the exercise of profession between the republic of the phils.
Issue:
Whether treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the phil. bar.

Held:
The UN charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their
rights, and the declaration of human rights contains nothing more than a mere recommendation,
or a common standard of achievement for all people and all nations.
The treaty of amity between phil-china guarantees equality of treatment to the chinese nationals
upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country. But the nationals of china are not
discriminated against because nationals of all other countries, except those of US personnel
who are granted special rights by the constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail
trade. But even supposing the law infringes upon said treaty, the treaty is always subject to
qualification or amendmentby a subsequent law and the same may never curtail or restrict the
scope of the police power of the state.
Gonzales vs Hechanova
FACTS:
Exec. Secretary Hechanova authorised the importation of foreign rice to be purchased from
private sources. Gonzales filed a petition opposing the said implementation because RA No.
3542 which allegedly repeals or amends RA No. 2207, prohibits the importation of rice and corn
"by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency."
Respondents alleged that the importation permitted in RA 2207 is to be authorized by the
President of the Philippines, and by or on behalf of the Government of the Philippines. They add
that after enjoining the Rice and Corn administration and any other government agency from
importing rice and corn, S. 10 of RA 3542 indicates that only private parties may import rice
under its provisions. They contended that the government has already constitute valid executive
agreements with Vietnam and Burma, that in case of conflict between RA 2207 and 3542, the
latter should prevail and the conflict be resolved under the American jurisprudence.
ISSUE:
W/N the executive agreements may be validated in our courts.
RULING:
No. The Court is not satisfied that the status of said tracts as alleged executive agreements has
been sufficiently established. Even assuming that said contracts may properly considered as
executive agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a constitutional
viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207
and 3452. Although the President may, under the American constitutional system enter into
executive agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive
agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto.
Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by
Congress. He may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except
in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired

Held:
The court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the treaty on academic degrees
between the republic of the phils. and spanish state cannot be invoked by the applicant. said
treaty was intende to govern filipino citizens desiring to practice their profession in spain. The
treaty could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to
the practice of law in the phils., for the reason the executive may not encroach upon the
constitutional prerogative of the supreme court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice
of the law in the phils. The power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only
to the congress of the phils.
People of the Philippines vs Tranquilino Lagman
In 1936, Tranquilino Lagman reached the age of 20. He is being compelled by Section 60 of
Commonwealth Act 1 (National Defense Law) to join the military service. Lagman refused to do
so because he has a father to support, has no military leanings and he does not wish to kill or be
killed. Lagman further assailed the constitutionality of the said law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Defense Law is constitutional.
HELD: Yes. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except
through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to
make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to
enlist therein. Hence, the National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military
service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful
compliance therewith. The defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the
fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil
service.
People v Lagman and de Sosa
FACTS: The accused were charged with and convicted of refusal to register for military training
as required by the National Defense Act. On appeal, Sosa argued that he was fatherless, had a
mother and eight (8) brothers to support, while Lagman alleged that he had a father to support,
had no military training and never wished to be killed. Both claimed that the statute was
unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the National Defense Act is unconstitutional.
HELD:
The Supreme Court affirmed its conviction holding that the law in question was based on Sec. 4,
Art. XVI of the Constitution. It added that the National Defense Act, insofar as it established

compulsory military services, does not go against any provisions of the Constitution, but is in
faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the government to defend the state cannot be
performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the people
would be to make this duty of the government excusable should there be no sufficient men to
volunteer to enlist therein.
Aglipay v Ruiz 64 PHIL 201 (1937)
Facts: Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against respondent Director of Posts
from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic
Congress. Petitioner contends that such act is a violation of the Constitutional provision stating
that no public funds shall be appropriated or used in the benefit of any church, system of
religion, etc. This provision is a result of the principle of the separation of church and state, for
the purpose of avoiding the occasion wherein the state will use the church, or vice versa, as a
weapon to further their ends and aims. Respondent contends that such issuance is in
accordance to Act No. 4052, providing for the appropriation funds to respondent for the
production and issuance of postage stamps as would be advantageous to the government.
Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom to religion.
Held: What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious freedom and not mere religious
toleration. It is however not an inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of
its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and
elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And in so far as it instills into the minds the purest
principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. The phrase in Act No.
4052 advantageous to the government does not authorize violation of the Constitution. The
issuance of the stamps was not inspired by any feeling to favor a particular church or religious
denomination. They were not sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. The postage
stamps, instead of showing a Catholic chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the
Philippines and the location of Manila, with the words Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic
Congress. The focus of the stamps was not the Eucharistic Congress but the city of Manila,
being the seat of that congress. This was to to advertise the Philippines and attract more
tourists, the officials merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance.
Although such issuance and sale may be inseparably linked with the Roman Catholic Church,
any benefit and propaganda incidentally resulting from it was no the aim or purpose of the
Government.
Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil 726
Facts: Pursuant to the power delegated to it by the Legislature, the Director of Public Works
promulgated rules and regulations pertaining to the closure of Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue
to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles for a year in prohibition against respondent-public officers.
Among others, the petitioners aver that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon
constitutional precept on the promotion of social justice to insure the well being and economic
security of all people.
Issue: Whether or not the rules and regulation promote social justice.
Held: Yes. The promotion of Social Justice is to be adhered not through a mistaken sympathy
towards any given group.
Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic force by the State so that
justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social
justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of
measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society,
through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the
members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable,
or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice,
therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers

and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended
to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort and quiet of
all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC
Facts: Several petitions are the root of the case:
e. A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and RA 6657. Subjects
of the petition are a 9-hectare and 5 hectare Riceland worked by four tenants. Tenants were
declared full owners by EO 228 as qualified farmers under PD 27. The petitioners now contend
that President Aquino usurped the legislatures power.
f. A petition by landowners and sugarplanters in Victorias Mill Negros Occidental against
Proclamation 131 and EO 229. Proclamation 131 is the creation of Agrarian Reform Fund with
initial fund of P50Billion.
g. A petition by owners of land which was placed by the DAR under the coverage of Operation
Land Transfer.
h. A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not
exceeding seven hectares.
Issue: Whether or Not the aforementioned EOs, PD, and RA were constitutional.
Held: The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Police power and
eminent domain.
The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was authorized
under Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore it is a valid exercise
of Police Power and Eminent Domain.
RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP becomes necessary to
deprive owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there
is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation
is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is
required is the surrender of the title and the physical possession of said excess and all beneficial
rights accruing to the owner in favour of the farmer.
A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is concurrence of the lawful
subject and the method.
Subject and purpose of the Agrarian Reform Law is valid, however what is to be determined is
the method employed to achieve it.
PT&T vs. NLRC and Grace de Guzman
G.R. No. 118978, May 23, 1997
This is a case for illegal dismissal filed by Grace de Guzman against PT&T.
Grace de Guzman is a probationary employee of PT&T. In her job application, she represented
that she was single although she was married. When management found out, she was made to
explain. However, her explanation was found unsatisfactory so she was subsequently dismissed
from work.
Grace thus filed a case for illegal dismissal against PT&T with RAB. According to the Labor
Arbiter, Grace, who had already gained the status of regular employee, was illegally dismissed
by PT&T. Moreover, he ruled that Grace was apparently discriminated against on account of her
having contracted marriage in violation of company rules.

On appeal to the NLRC, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was upheld. The Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise rebuffed, hence, this special civil action.

privileges and to full back wages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary
equivalent.
On Stipulation against Marriage

Petitioner argued that the dismissal was not because Grace was married but because of her
concealment of the fact that she was married. Such concealment amounted to dishonesty, which
was why she was dismissed from work.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the company policy of not accepting married women for employment was
discriminatory
Whether or not Graces act of concealment amounted to dishonesty, leading to loss of
confidence
Whether or not Grace was illegally dismissed
HELD:
There was discrimination
Article 136 of the Labor Code explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of the marriage
of a female employee.
Petitioners policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker
who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all
women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to petitioners
assertion that it dismissed private respondent from employment on account of her dishonesty,
the record discloses clearly that her ties with the company were dissolved principally because of
the companys policy that married women are not qualified for employment in PT&T, and not
merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.
Concealment did not amount to willful dishonesty
Verily, private respondents act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T could not
be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did
mainly because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. In other words, she
was practically forced by that very same illegal company policy into misrepresenting her civil
status for fear of being disqualified from work. While loss of confidence is a just cause for
termination of employment, it should not be simulated. It must rest on an actual breach of duty
committed by the employee and not on the employers caprices. Furthermore, it should never be
used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified.
However, SC nevertheless ruled that Grace did commit an act of dishonesty, which should be
sanctioned and therefore agreed with the NLRCs decision that the dishonesty warranted
temporary suspension of Grace from work.

In the final reckoning, the danger of PT&Ts policy against marriage is that it strikes at the very
essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the
family as the foundation of the nation.
Petition dismissed.
Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals
Facts:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through RA No. 4850 in order to
execute the policy towards environmental protection and sustainable development so as to
accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding
provinces and towns.
PD No. 813 amended certain sections of RA 4850 since water quality studies have shown that
the lake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check the same.
EO 927 further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the LLDA and enumerated the
towns, cities and provinces encompassed by the term Laguna de Bay Region.
Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the municipalities assumed
exclusive jurisdiction & authority to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters since
Sec.149 thereof provides: Municipal corporations shall have the authority to grant fishery
privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefore
Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens & fish cages to the
consternation of the LLDA.
The implementation of separate independent policies in fish cages & fish pen operation and the
indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits by the lakeshore municipalities have saturated the lake
with fishpens, thereby aggravating the current environmental problems and ecological stress of
Laguna Lake.
The LLDA then served notice to the general public that (1) fishpens, cages & other aqua-culture
structures unregistered with the LLDA as of March 31, 1993 are declared illegal; (2) those
declared illegal shall be subject to demolition by the Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen
and Illegal Fishing; and (3) owners of those declared illegal shall be criminally charged with
violation of Sec.39-A of RA 4850 as amended by PD 813.
A month later, the LLDA sent notices advising the owners of the illegally constructed fishpens,
fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their respective
structures otherwise demolition shall be effected.
Issues:
1.Which agency of the government the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the
region should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna lake and its environs insofar as the
issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned?
2. Whether the LLDA is a quasi-judicial agency?

Grace attained regular status as an employee

Private respondent, it must be observed, had gained regular status at the time of her dismissal.
When she was served her walking papers on Jan. 29, 1992, she was about to complete the
probationary period of 150 days as she was contracted as a probationary employee on
September 2, 1991. That her dismissal would be effected just when her probationary period was
winding down clearly raises the plausible conclusion that it was done in order to prevent her
from earning security of tenure.

Held:
1. Sec.4(k) of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813,and Sec.2 of EO
No.927, specifically provide that the LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for
the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region. On the
other hand, RA 7160 has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery
privileges on municipal waters. The provisions of RA 7160 do not necessarily repeal the laws
creating the LLDA and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake
region.

There was illegal dismissal

As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and as she had been dismissed
without just cause, she is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other

Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, latter should prevail since
it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. The special law is to be
taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a

contrary conclusion. Implied repeals are not favored and, as much as possible, effect must be
given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered
by a subsequent general law by mere implication.
The power of LGUs to issue fishing privileges was granted for revenue purposes. On the other
hand, the power of the LLDA to grant permits for fishpens, fish cages, and other aqua-culture
structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating & monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay
region and for lake control and management. It partakes of the nature of police power which is
the most pervasive, least limitable and most demanding of all state powers including the power
of taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the LLDA which embodies a valid exercise of police power
should prevail over the LGC of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
2. The LLDA has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution
cases with authority to issue a cease and desist order and on matters affecting the construction
of illegal fishpens, fish cages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay.
Sec.149 of RA 7160 has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, as
amended. Thus, the LLDA has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for enjoyment of fishery
privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority
to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it.
Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)
FACTS:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first
complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the
Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary
of the Department of Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they
are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the
country's virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they represent their generation as
well as generations yet unborn and asserted that continued deforestation have caused a
distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of environmental
tragedies.
Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License
Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new TLAs.
Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no
cause of action against him and that it raises a political question.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed
for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court to
rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely
abused his discretion in dismissing the action.

Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right
violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not
agree with this. The complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said
right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the environment and implies, among many
other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of
E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary government agency responsible for
the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization, development and conservation of the
country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in
Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of
1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation, and have
defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they
represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and
advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect
or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the
granting of the TLA, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their
right to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further
TLAs should be renewed or granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough
to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.
Second Issue: Political Issue.
Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded
jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom
of the decision of the Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or
excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.
The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state regulates
the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is
not a contract within the purview of the due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause
cannot be invoked. It can be validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public
welfare as in this case. The granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it
property or property rights.
Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit by the
exercise by the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and
general welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State.
The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC decision is
SET ASIDE.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.
(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts.
RULING:
First Issue: Cause of Action.

Taada, et al., v. Angara, et al., G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997

THE FACTS
Petitioners Senators Taada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the concurrence by the
Philippine Senate of the Presidents ratification of the international Agreement establishing the
World Trade Organization (WTO). They argued that the WTO Agreement violates the mandate
of the 1987 Constitution to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the

preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods. Further, they
contended that the national treatment and parity provisions of the WTO Agreement place
nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local
products, in contravention of the Filipino First policy of our Constitution, and render
meaningless the phrase effectively controlled by Filipinos.
II.

THE ISSUE

Does the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade
liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is
liberalized, deregulated and privatized?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DISMISSED the petition. It sustained the concurrence of the Philippine Senate of the
Presidents ratification of the Agreement establishing the WTO.]
NO, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade
liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is
liberalized, deregulated and privatized.
There are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the
Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement.
[W]hile the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and
enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the
world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only
against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution
did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and
services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not
encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it
does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and
reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
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[T]he constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy does not
necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither
economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international community. As explained by
Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of
overdependence on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean autarky
or economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the international community.
Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the national economy,
especially in such strategic industries as in the development of natural resources and public
utilities.
The WTO reliance on most favored nation, national treatment, and trade without
discrimination cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and
reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on
equality and reciprocity, the fundamental law encourages industries that are competitive in
both domestic and foreign markets, thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered
domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries
that can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino
enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade
environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino
capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.

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It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State to
develop an independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect
and/or prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic materials and locally produced goods. But it is
equally true that such principles while serving as judicial and legislative guides are not in
themselves sources of causes of action. Moreover, there are other equally fundamental
constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a trade policy
that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the
basis of equality and reciprocity and the promotion of industries which are competitive in both
domestic and foreign markets, thereby justifying its acceptance of said treaty. So too, the
alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced
by the adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all
nations.
That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent
to the WTO Agreement thereby making it a part of the law of the land is a legitimate exercise of
its sovereign duty and power. We find no patent and gross arbitrariness or despotism by
reason of passion or personal hostility in such exercise. It is not impossible to surmise that this
Court, or at least some of its members, may even agree with petitioners that it is more
advantageous to the national interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a
legal reason to attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate and to nullify its decision. To do
so would constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our own judicial power and duty. Ineludibly,
what the Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was wise,
beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between
the elected policy makers and the people. As to whether the nation should join the worldwide
march toward trade liberalization and economic globalization is a matter that our people should
determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of
membership, should this be the political desire of a member.
GARCIA vs CORONA (Full text)
On November 5, 1997, this Court in Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy and
Lagman, et al., v. Hon. Ruben Torres, et al., 1 declared Republic Act No. 8180, entitled "An Act
Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes", unconstitutional, and its
implementing Executive Order No. 392 void.
R.A. 8180 was struck down as invalid because three key provisions intended to promote free
competition were shown to achieve the opposite result. More specifically, this Court ruled that its
provisions on tariff differential, stocking of inventories, and predatory pricing inhibit fair
competition, encourage monopolistic power, and interfere with the free interaction of the market
forces.
While R.A. 8180 contained a separability clause, it was declared unconstitutional in its entirety
since the three (3) offending provisions so permeated the law that they were so intimately the
esse of the law. Thus, the whole statute had to be invalidated.
As a result of the Tatad decision, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8479, a new deregulation
law without the offending provisions of the earlier law. Petitioner Enrique T. Garcia, a member of
Congress, has now brought this petition seeking to declare Section 19 thereof, which sets the
time of full deregulation, unconstitutional. After failing in his attempts to have Congress
incorporate in the law the economic theory he espouses, petitioner now asks us, in the name of
upholding the Constitution, to undo a violation which he claims Congress has committed.
The assailed Section 19 of R.A. 8479 states in full:
Sec. 19. Start of Full Deregulation. Full deregulation of the Industry shall start five (5)
months following the effectivity of this Act: Provided, however, That when the public interest so

requires, the President may accelerate the start of full deregulation upon the recommendation of
the DOE and the Department of Finance (DOF) when the prices of crude oil and petroleum
products in the world market are declining and the value of the peso in relation to the US dollar
is stable, taking into account relevant trends and prospects; Provided, further, That the foregoing
provision notwithstanding, the five (5)-month Transition Phase shall continue to apply to LPG,
regular gasoline and kerosene as socially-sensitive petroleum products and said petroleum
products shall be covered by the automatic pricing mechanism during the said period.
Upon the implementation of full deregulation as provided herein, the Transition Phase is deemed
terminated and the following laws are repealed:
a)

Republic Act No. 6173, as amended;

b)

Section 5 of Executive Order No. 172, as amended;

c)

Letter of Instruction No. 1431, dated October 15, 1984;

d)

Letter of Instruction No. 1441, dated November 20, 1984, as amended;

e)

Letter of Instruction No. 1460, dated May 9, 1985;

f)

Presidential Decree No. 1889; and

g)

Presidential Decree No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137:

VIOLATES THE VERY OBJECTIVE AND PURPOSE OF R.A. NO. 8479, WHICH IS TO
ENSURE A TRULY COMPETITIVE MARKET UNDER A REGIME OF FAIR PRICES.
C.
SAID SECTION 19 OF R.A. No. 8479, BEING GLARINGLY PRO-OLIGOPOLY, ANTICOMPETITION AND ANTI-PEOPLE, BEING PATENTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND BEING
PALPABLY VIOLATIVE OF THE LAW'S POLICY AND PURPOSE OF ENSURING A TRULY
COMPETITIVE MARKET UNDER A REGIME OF FAIR PRICES, IS A VERY GRAVE AND
GRIEVOUS ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE
BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT.
D.

Provided, however, That in case full deregulation is started by the President in the exercise of
the authority provided in this Section, the foregoing laws shall continue to be in force and effect
with respect to LPG, regular gasoline and kerosene for the rest of the five (5)-month period.
Petitioner contends that Section 19 of R.A. 8479, which prescribes the period for the removal of
price control on gasoline and other finished products and for the full deregulation of the local
downstream oil industry, is patently contrary to public interest and therefore unconstitutional
because within the short span of five months, the market is still dominated and controlled by an
oligopoly of the three (3) private respondents, namely, Shell, Caltex and Petron.
The objective of the petition is deceptively simple. It states that if the constitutional mandate
against monopolies and combinations in restraint of
trade 2 is to be obeyed, there should be indefinite and open-ended price controls on gasoline
and other oil products for as long as necessary. This will allegedly prevent the "Big 3" Shell,
Caltex and Petron from price-fixing and overpricing. Petitioner calls the indefinite retention of
price controls as "partial deregulation".
The grounds relied upon in the petition are:
A.
Sec. 19 OF R.A. NO. 8479 WHICH PROVIDES FOR FULL DEREGULATION FIVE (5) MONTHS
OR EARLIER FOLLOWING THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE LAW, IS GLARINGLY PROOLIGOPOLY, ANTI-COMPETITION AND ANTI-PEOPLE, AND IS THEREFORE PATENTLY
UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING IN GROSS AND CYNICAL CONTRAVENTION OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL POLICY AND COMMAND EMBODIED IN ARTCLE XII, SECTION 19 OF
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AGAINST MONOPOLIES AND COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT
OF TRADE.
B.
SAID SECTION 19 OF R.A. No. 8479 IS GLARINGLY PRO-OLIGOPOLY, ANTI-COMPETITION
AND ANTI-PEOPLE, FOR THE FURTHER REASON THAT IT PALPABLY AND CYNICALLY

PREMATURE FULL DEREGULATION UNDER SECTION 19 OF R.A. NO. 8479 MAY AND
SHOULD THEREFORE BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID EVEN AS THE REST OF ITS
PROVISIONS REMAIN IN FORCE, SUCH AS THE TRANSITION PHASE OR PARTIAL
DEREGULATION WITH PRICE CONTROLS THAT ENSURES THE PROTECTION OF THE
PUBLIC INTEREST BY PREVENTING THE BIG 3 OLIGOPOLY'S PRICE-FIXING AND
OVERPRICING. 3
The issues involved in the deregulation of the downstream oil industry are of paramount
significance. The ramifications, international and local in scope, are complex. The impact on the
nation's economy is pervasive and far-reaching. The amounts involved in the oil business are
immense. Fluctuations in the supply and price of oil products have a dramatic effect on
economic development and public welfare. As pointed out in the Tatad decision, few cases carry
a surpassing importance on the daily life of every Filipino. The issues affect everybody from the
poorest wage-earners and their families to the richest entrepreneurs, from industrial giants to
humble consumers.
Our decision in this case is complicated by the unstable oil prices in the world market. Even as
this case is pending, the price of OPEC oil is escalating to record levels. We have to emphasize
that our decision has nothing to do with worldwide fluctuations in oil prices and the countermeasures of Government each time a new development takes place.
The most important part of deregulation is freedom from price control. Indeed, the free play of
market forces through deregulation and when to implement it represent one option to solve the
problems of the oil-consuming public. There are other considerations which may be taken into
account such as the reduction of taxes on oil products, the reinstitution of an Oil Price
Stabilization Fund, the choice between government subsidies taken from the regular taxpaying
public on one hand and the increased costs being shouldered only by users of oil products on
the other, and most important, the immediate repeal of the oil deregulation law as wrong policy.
Petitioner wants the setting of prices to be done by Government instead of being determined by
free market forces. His preference is continued price control with no fixed end in sight. A simple
glance at the factors surrounding the present problems besetting the oil industry shows that they
are economic in nature.
R.A. 8479, the present deregulation law, was enacted to implement Article XII, Section 19 of the
Constitution which provides:
The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires. No
combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.
This is so because the Government believes that deregulation will eventually prevent monopoly.
The simplest form of monopoly exists when there is only one seller or producer of a product or
service for which there are no substitutes. In its more complex form, monopoly is defined as the
joint acquisition or maintenance by members of a conspiracy, formed for that purpose, of the
power to control and dominate trade and commerce in a commodity to such an extent that they

are able, as a group, to exclude actual or potential competitors from the field, accompanied with
the intention and purpose to exercise such power. 4
Where two or three or a few companies act in concert to control market prices and resultant
profits, the monopoly is called an oligopoly or cartel. It is a combination in restraint of trade.
The perennial shortage of oil supply in the Philippines is exacerbated by the further fact that the
importation, refining, and marketing of this precious commodity are in the hands of a cartel, local
but made up of foreign-owned corporations. Before the start of deregulation, the three private
respondents controlled the entire oil industry in the Philippines.
It bears reiterating at the outset that the deregulation of the oil industry is a policy determination
of the highest order. It is unquestionably a priority program of Government. The Department of
Energy Act of 1992 5 expressly mandates that the development and updating of the existing
Philippine energy program "shall include a policy direction towards deregulation of the power
and energy industry."
Be that as it may, we are not concerned with whether or not there should be deregulation. This is
outside our jurisdiction. The judgment on the issue is a settled matter and only Congress can
reverse it. Rather, the question that we should address here is are the method and the
manner chosen by Government to accomplish its cherished goal offensive to the Constitution? Is
indefinite price control in the manner proposed by petitioner the only feasible and legal way to
achieve it?
Petitioner has taken upon himself a most challenging task. Unquestionably, the direction towards
which the nation's efforts at economic and social upliftment should be addressed is a function of
Congress and the President. In the exercise of this function, Congress and the President have
obviously determined that speedy deregulation is the answer to the acknowledged dominion by
oligopolistic forces of the oil industry. Thus, immediately after R.A. 8180 was declared
unconstitutional in the Tatad case, Congress took resolute steps to fashion new legislation
towards the objective of the earlier law. Invoking the Constitution, petitioner now wants to slow
down the process.
While the Court respects the firm resolve displayed by Congress and the President, all
departments of Government are equally bound by the sovereign will expressed in the
commands of the Constitution. There is a need for utmost care if this Court is to faithfully
discharge its duties as arbitral guardian of the Constitution. We cannot encroach on the policy
functions of the two other great departments of Government. But neither can we ignore any
overstepping of constitutional limitations. Locating the correct balance between legality and
policy, constitutional boundaries and freedom of action, and validity and expedition is this Court's
dilemma as it resolves the legitimacy of a Government program aimed at giving every Filipino a
more secure, fulfilling and abundant life.
Our ruling in Tatad is categorical that the Constitution's Article XII, Section 19, is anti-trust in
history and spirit. It espouses competition. We have stated that only competition which is fair can
release the creative forces of the market. We ruled that the principle which underlies the
constitutional provision is competition. Thus:
Sec. 19, Article XII of our Constitution is anti-trust in history and in spirit. It espouses
competition. The desirability of competition is the reason for the prohibition against restraint of
trade, the reason for the interdiction of unfair competition, and the reason for regulation of
unmitigated monopolies. Competition is thus the underlying principle of section 19, Article XII of
our Constitution which cannot be violated by R.A. No. 8180. We subscribe to the observation of
Prof. Gellhorn that the objective of anti-trust law is "to assure a competitive economy, based
upon the belief that through competition producers will strive to satisfy consumer wants at the
lowest price with the sacrifice of the fewest resources. Competition among producers allows
consumers to bid for goods and services, and thus matches their desires with society's
opportunity costs." He adds with appropriateness that there is a reliance upon "the operation of

the "market" system (free enterprise) to decide what shall be produced, how resources shall be
allocated in the production process, and to whom the various products will be distributed. The
market system relies on the consumer to decide what and how much shall be produced, and on
competition, among producers to determine who will manufacture it." 6
In his recital of the antecedent circumstances, petitioner repeats in abbreviated form the factual
findings and conclusions which led the Court to declare R.A. 8180 unconstitutional. The foreign
oligopoly or cartel formed by respondents Shell, Caltex and Petron, their indulging in price-fixing
and overpricing, their blockade tactics which effectively obstructed the entry of genuine
competitors, the dangers posed by the oil cartel to national security and economic development,
and other prevailing sentiments are stated as axiomatic truths. They are repeated in capsulized
context as the current background facts of the present petition.
The empirical existence of this deplorable situation was precisely the reason why Congress
enacted the oil deregulation law. The evils arising from conspiratorial acts of monopoly are
recognized as clear and present. But the enumeration of the evils by our Tatad decision was not
for the purpose of justifying continued government control, especially price control. The objective
was, rather, the opposite. The evils were emphasized to show the need for free competition in a
deregulated industry. And to be sure, the measures to address these evils are for Congress to
determine, but they have to meet the test of constitutional validity.
The Court respects the legislative finding that deregulation is the policy answer to the problems.
It bears stressing that R.A. 8180 was declared invalid not because deregulation is
unconstitutional. The law was struck down because, as crafted, three key provisions plainly
encouraged the continued existence if not the proliferation of the constitutionally proscribed evils
of monopoly and restraint of trade.
In sharp contrast, the present petition lacks a factual foundation specifically highlighting the need
to declare the challenged provision unconstitutional. There is a dearth of relevant, reliable, and
substantial evidence to support petitioner's theory that price control must continue even as
Government is trying its best to get out of regulating the oil industry. The facts of the petition are,
in the main, a general dissertation on the evils of monopoly.
Petitioner overlooks the fact that Congress enacted the deregulation law exactly because of the
monopoly evils he mentions in his petition. Congress instituted the lifting of price controls in the
belief that free and fair competition was the best remedy against monopoly power. In other
words, petitioner's facts are also the reasons why Congress lifted price controls and why the
President accelerated the process. The facts adduced in favor of continued and indefinite price
control are the same facts which supported what Congress believes is an exercise of wisdom
and discretion when it chose the path of speedy deregulation and rejected Congressman
Garcia's economic theory.
The petition states that it is using the very thoughts and words of the Court in its Tatad decision.
Those thoughts and words, however, were directed against the tariff differential, the inventory
requirement, and predatory pricing, not against deregulation as a policy and not against the
lifting of price controls.
A dramatic, at times expansive and grandiloquent, reiteration of the same background
circumstances narrated in Tatad does not squarely sustain petitioner's novel thesis that there
can be deregulation without lifting price controls.
Petitioner may call the industry subject to price controls as deregulated. In enacting the
challenged provision, Congress, on the other hand, has declared that any industry whose prices
and profits are fixed by government authority remains a highly regulated one.
Petitioner, therefore, engages in a legal paradox. He fails to show how there can be deregulation
while retaining government price control. Deregulation means the lifting of control, governance
and direction through rule or regulation. It means that the regulated industry is freed from the

controls, guidance, and restrictions to which it used to be subjected. The use of the word
"partial" to qualify deregulation is sugar-coating. Petitioner is really against deregulation at this
time.
Petitioner states that price control is good. He claims that it was the regulation of the importation
of finished oil products which led to the exit of competitors and the consolidation and dominion of
the market by an oligopoly, not price control. Congress and the President think otherwise.
The argument that price control is not the villain in the intrusion and growth of monopoly appears
to be pure theory not validated by experience. There can be no denying the fact that the evils
mentioned in the petition arose while there was price control. The dominance of the so-called
"Big 3" became entrenched during the regime of price control. More importantly, the
ascertainment of the cause and the method of dismantling the oligopoly thus created are a
matter of legislative and executive choice. The judicial process is equipped to handle legality but
not wisdom of choice and the efficacy of solutions.
Petitioner engages in another contradiction when he puts forward what he calls a self-evident
truth. He states that a truly competitive market and fair prices cannot be legislated into
existence. However, the truly competitive market is not being created or fashioned by the
challenged legislation. The market is simply freed from legislative controls and allowed to grow
and develop free from government interference. R.A. 8479 actually allows the free play of supply
and demand to dictate prices. Petitioner wants a government official or board to continue
performing this task. Indefinite and open-ended price control as advocated by petitioner would
be to continue a regime of legislated regulation where free competition cannot possibly flourish.
Control is the antithesis of competition. To grant the petition would mean that the Government is
not keen on allowing a free market to develop. Petitioner's "self-evident truth" thus supports the
validity of the provision of law he opposes.
New players in the oil industry intervened in this case. According to them, it is the free market
policy and atmosphere of deregulation which attracted and brought the new participants,
themselves included, into the market. The intervenors express their fear that this Court would
overrule legislative policy and replace it with petitioner's own legislative program.
The factual allegations of the intervenors have not been refuted and we see no reason to doubt
them. Their argument that the co-existence of many viable rivals create free market conditions
induces competition in product quality and performance and makes available to consumers an
expanded range of choices cannot be seriously disputed.
On the other hand, the pleadings of public and private respondents both put forth the argument
that the challenged provision is a policy decision of Congress and that the wisdom of the
provision is outside the authority of this Court to consider. We agree. As we have ruled in Morfe
v. Mutuc 7:
(I)t is well to remember that this Court, in the language of Justice Laurel, "does not pass upon
question or wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation." As expressed by Justice Tuason: "It is
not the province of the courts to supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety
and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative concern." There can be no
possible objection then to the observation of Justice Montemayor: "As long as laws do not
violate any Constitutional provision, the Courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of
whether or not they are wise or salutary." For they, according to Justice Labrador, "are not
supposed to override legitimate policy and . . . never inquire into the wisdom of the law."
It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections, that only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken,
may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be: The principle of
separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of each
department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be intrusion not
allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the

judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to be,
the last offender should be the courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy
precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack on
the validity of the challenged provision likewise insofar as there may be objections, even if valid
and cogent, on its wisdom cannot be sustained.
In this petition, Congressman Garcia seeks to revive the long settled issue of the timeliness of
full deregulation, which issue he had earlier submitted to this Court by way of a Partial Motion for
Reconsideration in the Tatad case. In our Resolution dated December 3, 1997, which has long
become final and executory, we stated:
We shall first resolve petitioner Garcia's linchpin contention that the full deregulation decreed by
R.A. No. 8180 to start at the end of March 1997 is unconstitutional. For prescinding from this
premise, petitioner suggests that "we simply go back to the transition period, price control will be
revived through the automatic pricing mechanism based on Singapore Posted Prices. The
Energy Regulatory Board . . . would play a limited and ministerial role of computing the monthly
price ceiling of each and every petroleum fuel product, using the automatic pricing formula.
While the OPSF would return, this coverage would be limited to monthly price increases in
excess of P0.50 per liter.
We are not impressed by petitioner Garcia's submission. Petitioner has no basis in condemning
as unconstitutional per se the date fixed by Congress for the beginning of the full deregulation of
the downstream oil industry. Our Decision merely faulted the Executive for factoring the
depletion of OPSF in advancing the date of full deregulation to February 1997. Nonetheless, the
error of the Executive is now a non-issue for the full deregulation set by Congress itself at the
end of March 1997 has already come to pass. March 1997 is not an arbitrary date. By that date,
the transition period has ended and it was expected that the people would have adjusted to the
role of market forces in shaping the prices of petroleum and its products. The choice of March
1997 as the date of full deregulation is a judgment of Congress and its judgment call cannot be
impugned by this Court. 8
Reduced to its basic arguments, it can be seen that the challenge in this petition is not against
the legality of deregulation. Petitioner does not expressly challenge deregulation. The issue,
quite simply, is the timeliness or the wisdom of the date when full deregulation should be
effective.
In this regard, what constitutes reasonable time is not for judicial determination. Reasonable
time involves the appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions, political, social and
economic. They are not within the appropriate range of evidence in a court of justice. It would be
an extravagant extension of judicial authority to assert judicial notice as the basis for the
determination. 9
We repeat that what petitioner decries as unsuccessful is not a final result. It is only a beginning.
The Court is not inclined to stifle deregulation as enacted by Congress from its very start. We
leave alone the program of deregulation at this stage. Reasonable time will prove the wisdom or
folly of the deregulation program for which Congress and not the Court is accountable.
Petitioner argues further that the public interest requires price controls while the oligopoly exists,
for that is the only way the public can be protected from monopoly or oligopoly pricing. But is
indefinite price control the only feasible and legal way to enforce the constitutional mandate
against oligopolies?
Art. 186 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, punishes as a felony the creation of
monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade. The Solicitor General, on the other hand,
cites provisions of R.A. 8479 intended to prevent competition from being corrupted or
manipulated. Section 11, entitled "Anti-Trust Safeguards", defines and prohibits cartelization and
predatory pricing. It penalizes the persons and officers involved with imprisonment of three (3) to
seven (7) years and fines ranging from One million to Two million pesos. For this purpose, a

Joint Task Force from the Department of Energy and Department of Justice is created under
Section 14 to investigate and order the prosecution of violations.
Sec. 8 and 9 of the Act, meanwhile, direct the Departments of Foreign Affairs, Trade and
Industry, and Energy to undertake strategies, incentives and benefits, including international
information campaigns, tax holidays and various other agreements and utilizations, to invite and
encourage the entry of new participants. Section 6 provides for uniform tariffs at three percent
(3%).
Sec. 13 of the Act provides for "Remedies", under which the filing of actions by government
prosecutors and the investigation of private complaints by the Task Force is provided. Sections
14 and 15 provide how the Department of Energy shall monitor and prevent the occurrence of
collusive pricing in the industry.
It can be seen, therefore, that instead of the price controls advocated by the petitioner, Congress
has enacted anti-trust measures which it believes will promote free and fair competition. Upon
the other hand, the disciplined, determined, consistent and faithful execution of the law is the
function of the President. As stated by public respondents, the remedy against unreasonable
price increases is not the nullification of Section 19 of R.A. 8479 but the setting into motion of its
various other provisions.
For this Court to declare unconstitutional the key provision around which the law's anti-trust
measures are clustered would mean a constitutionally interdicted distrust of the wisdom of
Congress and of the determined exercise of executive power.
Having decided that deregulation is the policy to follow, Congress and the President have the
duty to set up the proper and effective machinery to ensure that it works. This is something
which cannot be adjudicated into existence. This Court is only an umpire of last resort whenever
the Constitution or a law appears to have been violated. There is no showing of a constitutional
violation in this case.

"[t]he marker is motivated by price and profits (and sadly, not by moral values [or public
interest]). The market does not automatically supply those who need (no matter how badly they
need it) but only those who have the money to buy." 3
The buzz words of the third millennium are "deregulation," "globalization" and "liberalization."
Territorial frontiers are virtually erased by these schemes, as goods and services are exchanged
across borders unhampered by traditional tariffs, taxes, currency controls, quantitative
restrictions and other protective barriers. Thus, states and governments tend to surrender some
of their authorities and powers to the "market" and to the renewed energy of laissez faire, such
that the threats to civil liberties and human rights, including economic rights, may shift from
government abuses to the more bedeviling market forces that transcend boundaries and
sovereignties. In developing countries more than in developed ones, such threats are real and
ever present.
Judicial Review
to Checks Abuses
This is where the power of judicial review comes in to examine the legal effects of these new
economic paradigms and, in the present controversy, to check whether the present Oil
Deregulation Law (RA 8479) restrains rather than promotes free trade, in contravention of the
Constitution. True, the President and Congress, not this Court, have the power and the
prerogative to determine whether to adopt such market policies and, if so, under what conditions
and circumstances. However, all such policies and their ramifications must conform to the
Constitution. Otherwise, this Court has the duty to strike them down, not because they are
unwise or inconvenient, but because they are constitutionally impermissible.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

Doctrinally, policies and acts of the political departments of government may be voided by this
Court on either of two grounds infringement of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion. 4
An infringement may be proven by demonstrating that the words of the law directly contradict a
provision of the fundamental law, or by presenting proof that the law authorizes or enables the
respondents to violate the Constitution.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner Garcia's Thesis on

Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena and De Leon,
Jr., JJ., concur.

Unconstitutionality Concerns Policy

Davide, Jr., C.J., in the result. I also join Mr. Justice Panganiban in his separate opinion.
Vitug, J., in the result.

Having set down the doctrinal legal parameters, let me now discuss the petitioner's thesis.
Petitioner Enrique T. Garcia anchors his position on the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 19
of RA 8479, 5 which sets the full deregulation of the oil industry five months from the effectivity of
the law, on the argument that said provision directly violates Section 19, Article XII of the
Constitution, which reads as follows:

Panganiban, J., please see Separate Opinion.

Gonzaga-Reyes, J., took no part. Spouse with counsel for intervenors.
Separate Opinions
PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion;
In essence, deregulation shifts the burden of price control from the government to the "market
forces" in order (1) to eliminate government intervention that may "do more harm than good" 1
and (2) to achieve a truly competitive market of fair prices. 2 It is also aimed at removing
government abuse and corruption in price-setting. At bottom, deregulation is supposed to
provide the best goods and services at the cheapest prices.
The policy, however, is not an infallible cure to abuse, for the evil sought to be avoided may well
pass on to the market players, particularly when they combine to restrain trade or engage in
unfair competition. In the words of Prof. Romulo L. Neri of the Asian Institute of Management,

Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires.
No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.
He maintains that once Section 19 of RA 8479 is struck down, the government will be able to fix
and lower petroleum prices indefinitely while awaiting the advent of "real" competition in the
market.
Petitioner contends that the three largest oil companies (the "Big Three") comprise an oligopoly
of the downstream oil industry. Oligopolies, he claims, "negate free market competition and fair
prices." He submits that "regulation through price control . . . is patently required by the public
interest [and] the failure to regulate the oligopoly through price control is patently inimical to the
national interest and patently negates, circumvents and contravenes Section 19, Article XII of
the Constitution."

In Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 6 this Court defined a monopoly and a
combination in restraint of trade as follows:
A monopoly is a privilege or peculiar advantage vested in one or more persons or companies,
consisting in the exclusive right or power to carry on a particular business or trade, manufacture
a particular article, or control the sale or the whole supply of a particular commodity. It is a form
of market structure in which one or only a few firms dominate the total sales of a product or
service. On the other hand, a combination in restraint of trade is an agreement or understanding
between two or more persons, in the form of a contract, trust, pool, holding company, or other
form of association, for the purpose of unduly restricting competition, monopolizing trade and
commerce in a certain commodity, controlling its production, distribution and price, or otherwise
interfering with freedom of trade without statutory authority. Combination in restraint of trade
refers to the means, while monopoly refers to the end.
In that case, RA 8180, the predecessor of RA 8479, was struck down by this Court for being
contrary to Section 19, Article XII of the Constitution. We took this action because we found that
its provisions on (1) tariff differential, (2) minimum inventory and (3) predatory pricing "inhibit fair
competition, encourage monopolistic power and interfere with the free interaction of market
forces." We concluded, "The aftermath of R.A. No. 8180 is a deregulated market where
competition can be corrupted and where market forces can be manipulated by oligopolies."
In my Concurring Opinion in Tatad, I labeled RA 8180 as "a pseudo deregulation law which in
reality restrains free trade and perpetuates a cartel, an oligopoly" because of the aforecited three
provisions, and because petitioners therein demonstrated to the Court "that the Big Three oil
companies were producing and processing almost identical products which they were selling to
the general public at identical prices. When one company adjusted its prices upwards or
downwards, the other two followed suit at the same time and by the same amount." 7
In his present Petition, petitioner persistently alleges that "[i]t is self-evident truth that public
interest requires the prevention of monopolistic/oligopolitic pricing . . . ," and that such
"monopolistic/oligopolistic pricing may be prevented only through price control during the regime
of monopoly/oligopoly or through a truly competitive market under a regime of fair prices." In
support of his allegations, he cites "self-evident truths [which] have
. . . been officially recognized and implemented during more than 20 years of price control before
the passage of the two oil deregulation laws" and which "have also been recognized and upheld
by no less than the Supreme Court En Banc in the Tatad and Lagman cases . . . ." He contends
that "the Big 3 remain as strong and dominant as ever."
In other words, petitioner believes that there is no valid reason to lift price control at this time
when allegedly there still exists an oligopoly in the industry. He proposes instead that
government control should stand for an indefinite period until the new players are able to capture
a substantial part of the market.
Unfortunately, however, the foregoing thematic statements and economic theory of Petitioner
Garcia are policy in nature and are arguments supporting the wisdom of interim government
price control. Indeed, "self-evident truths," economic theories, deeply-held beliefs, speculative
assumptions and generalizations may be the bases of legislative and executive actions, but they
cannot be substitutes for evidence and legal arguments in a judicial proceeding. Considered
judgment calls of the legislative and the executive departments are the issues of whether the
country should adopt the policy of complete or partial deregulation, and when such policy should
take effect and over what products or services. These issues come within judicial determination
only when there is clear and substantial proof that said policy and its concomitant variations are
violative of the Constitution or are made by those agencies in grave abuse of their discretion.
The Legal Issue Is Whether Petitioner
Has Submitted Sufficient Proof That the

Big Three Have Violated the Constitution

To be more specific, the pivotal issue before this Court is not whether it is wiser and more
beneficial to empower the government to fix fuel prices; rather, it is whether petitioner has
submitted enough factual bases to justify the legal conclusion that the Big Three Petron, Shell
and Caltex have combined themselves "in restraint of trade or [to cause] unfair competition,"
to such an extent as to legally justify a striking down of Section 19 of RA 8479. The task of
proving this issue is not easy; in fact, it is formidable and daunting. This is because laws are
prima facie presumed constitutional and, unless clearly shown to be infirm, they will always be
upheld. 8 So, too, regularity in the performance of official functions is the postulate, and any
allegation of grave abuse or irregularity must be proven cogently.
Deregulation per se Is
Not Constitutionally Infirm
A close perusal of the assailed Section 19 of RA 8479 and Section 19 of Article XII of the
Constitution does not readily reveal their irreconcilability. Indeed, even petitioner admits that the
deregulation policy per se is not contrary to the Constitution. Neither could it be successfully
argued that the implementation of such policy within the five-month phase-in period is per se
anathema to our fundamental law. It is his imperative task therefore to adduce before the Court
factual and legal bases to demonstrate clearly and cogently the unconstitutionality of the acts of
Congress and the President in adopting and implementing full deregulation of petroleum prices
at this time.
In this context, I have pored over the records of this case and searched long and wide for such
factual and legal bases but, other than presumptions and generalizations that are unsupported
by hard evidence, I could not find any. Petitioner fails to substantiate his allegations that the
three oil giants have engaged, directly or indirectly, in an unholy alliance to fix prices and restrain
trade.
True, retail prices of petroleum products have been increased, to the consternation of the public,
but petitioner has not shown by specific fact or clear proof how the questioned provision of RA
8479 has been used to transgress the Constitution. He has not demonstrated that the Big Three
arbitrarily dictate and corrupt the price of oil in a manner violative of the Constitution.
Petitioner merely resurrects and relies heavily on the arguments, the statistics and the proofs he
submitted two years ago in the first oil deregulation case, Tatad v. Secretary of the Department
of Energy. Needless to state, those reasons were taken into consideration in said case, and they
indeed helped show the unconstitutionality of RA 8180. But exactly the same old grounds cannot
continue to support petitioner's present allegation that the major oil companies Petron, Shell
and Caltex persist to this date in their oligopolistic practices, as a consequence of the current
Oil Deregulation Law and in violation of the Constitution. In brief, the legal cause and effect
relationship has not been amply shown.
Petitioner Has Not Proven
Arbitrariness or Despotism
Petitioner harps at the five-month period of transition from price control to full deregulation
provided under Section 19 of RA 8479. He claims that such short period is not enough to ensure
a "truly competitive market" in the supposed oligopoly of the oil industry. Again, his statement is
not backed up by evidentiary basis. He offers no substantial proof that Congress, in deciding to
lift price controls five months from the effectivity of RA 8475, gravely abused its discretion. To
repeat, it is not within the province of the judiciary to determine whether five months is indeed
short and, for that matter, what length of time is adequate. That is a matter of legislation
addressed to the discretion of our policy makers.

It is basic to our form of government that the Court cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency
of the acts of the executive or the legislative department, unless there is a clear showing of
constitutional infirmity or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 9
"By grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse
of discretion, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of
a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation
of law." 10 These jurisprudential elements of arbitrariness, despotism, passion and hostility have
not been shown to exist under the present circumstances.
Market Share of New Players
Has Increased Under RA 8479
Historically, deregulation as a policy in the downstream oil industry was begun in 1996 when
new players started to set up and operate their businesses in the country. That was practically a
full three years of operations, the last two of which saw no significant barriers in terms of tariff
differential, minimum inventory or predatory pricing.
Obviously, the conditions prevailing when the Court struck down RA 8180 two years ago have
not been proven to be prevalent at present. In 1996, the new players had a market share of
barely one percent. 11 The new players have since expanded or increased in number (46 as of
June 30, 1999), and they now have about nine percent share of the market. 12 Significantly,
these new players have intervened in this case in defense of the law. These are the little Davids
who claim that with RA 8479 as their slingshot, they can, given enough time, fight and win
against the three erstwhile unbeatable Goliaths. Indeed, they believe that the questioned
provision has given them the impetus to compete and thereby eventually show the benefits of
deregulation; namely, the best products at the cheapest prices.
With this factual backdrop and in the dire absence of contrary proof, it would be specious to
conclude that under the aegis of Section 19 of RA 8479, the Big Three have restrained trade or
unduly restricted competition.
Moreover, the three provisions in RA 8180 which were adjudged abhorrent to the fundamental
principles of free enterprise are no longer found in RA 8479. The depletion of the Oil Price
Stabilization Fund, the extraneous factor that was considered by the President in accelerating
the implementation of full deregulation under RA 8180, was no longer taken into account in the
present milieu. The Court's reasons for declaring the unconstitutionality of RA 8180 are,
therefore, not germane to the validity of RA 8479. The petitioner cannot rely on the same
rationale for the purpose of successfully assailing RA 8479. Indeed, he admits that "the Tatad
and Lagman cases . . . did not consider and adjudicate on the lifting of price control per se,
under RA 8180, as an issue."
Epilogue
In sum, I make no secret of my sympathy for petitioner's frustration at the inability of our
government to arrest the spiraling cost of fuel and energy. 13 I hear the cry of the poor that life
has become more miserable day by day. I feel their anguish, pain and seeming hopelessness in
securing their material needs.
However, the power to lower petroleum prices through the adoption or the rejection of viable
economic policies or theories does not lie in the Court or its members. Furthermore, absent
sufficient factual evidence and legal moorings, I cannot vote to declare a law or any provision
thereof to be unconstitutional simply because, theoretically, such action may appear to be wise
or beneficial or practical. Neither can I attribute grave abuse of discretion to another branch of
government without an adequate showing of patent arbitrariness, whim or caprice. Should I do

so, I myself will be gravely abusing my discretion, the very evil that petitioner attributes to the
legislature.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the Petition.
Cruz vs DENR, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000
FACTS: Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States
ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources
therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains
which may include natural resources. Cruz et al content that, by providing for an allencompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might even include
private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of
private landowners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.
HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7
vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote,
Cruzs petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may
include natural resources somehow against the regalian doctrine.
Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent
COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a
nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a
registered political party with a national constituency.
Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the
COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section
26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those
who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The
COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the
presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the
office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous
national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international
campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government.
ISSUE:
Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?
RULING:
No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to
limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level
of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests
such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled
"Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally
considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different
treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II,
the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies
a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to
any cause of action before the courts.
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that
would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as

written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is

difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means
and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed
under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access,"
"opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their
inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people
an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be
sourced.

elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for
logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation
for the election. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous
enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable
campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies
which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged
by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the
instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.

The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations.
Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates. As long as the limitations
apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not
violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are
meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar,
there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they
create.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual.
The basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for
the reception of further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the
reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao
Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election
Code.
Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an international lawyer and is
thus more qualified compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a high school dropout. Under
the Constitution (Article VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the following: (1) natural-born
citizen of the Philippines; (2) registered voter; (3) able to read and write; (4) at least forty years
of age on the day of the election; and (5) resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election.

The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of
candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The
State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and
orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting