FILING CODE: M63 FST-CV14-6024364 S CHIEF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL i SUPERIOR COURT vs. : JUDICIAL DISTRICT 7 OF STAMFORD KRISTAN PETERS-HAMLIN JANUARY 21, 2015 AMENDED APPLICATION FOR RECIPROCAL DISCIPLINE PURSUANT TO PRACTICE BOOK §2-39 To the Superior Court within and for the Judicial District of Stamford, comes now the Chief Disciplinary Counsel, duly appointed and qualified and acting as such, and makes amended application to said court pursuant to Practice Book §2-39 that Kristan Peters-Hamlin be disciplined and complains and says: 1. On March 20, 2000, Kristan Peters-Hamlin, Juris no. 418067 (hereinafter "Respondent"), was admitted to the Connecticut bar. 2, On or about April 10, 2008, the Respondent was suspended from practicing law in the United States District Court for the Southem District of New York. 3. The Second Circuit rendered a decision on April 25, 2011 vacating the Suspension order in the Southern District of New York Grievance Proceedings and remanding the matter for other proceedings before the S.D.N.Y. Grievance Committee. 3. On April 4, 2014, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld an order suspending the Respondent for a period of seven (7) years dating from April 10, 2008, A copy of the orders imposing discipline is attached hereto as Exhibits A, B and C.WHEREFORE, the Petitioner prays, pursuant to Practice Book §2-39, that commensurate action be taken by this Court and that the Respondent be ordered suspended for a period of 7 years (nunc pro tune) dating from April 10, 2008; and that the Respondent shall be automatically reinstated to the practice of law on April 10, 2015. Dated at Hartford, Connecticut this January 21, 2015. OFFICE OF CHIEF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL By: = /Beth£- Baldwin (Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel Juris No. 422382 100 Washington Street Hartford, Connecticut 06106 phone (860) 706-5055 fax (860) 706-5063FST-CV14-6024364 S CHIEF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL SUPERIOR COURT vs. : JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF STAMFORD KRISTAN PETERS-HAMLIN 5 JANUARY 21, 2015 ORDER The foregoing Amended Application for Reciprocal Discipline having been heard, it is hereby Ordered, that Respondent Kristan Peters-Hamlin, Juris no, 418067 is hereby: DateFST-CV14-6024364 S CHIEF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL SUPERIOR COURT vs. : JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF STAMFORD KRISTAN PETERS-HAMLIN 7 JANUARY 21, 2015 SUMMONS To Any Proper Officer: By the authority of the State of Connecticut, you are hereby commanded to make due and legal service of this Summons and attached Amended Application for Reciprocal Discipline, Order, and Order for Hearing and Notice on the Respondent, Kristan Peters-Hamlin for a hearing to be held at___a.m./p.m.onthe___day of. » 2015 at the Superior Court, 123 Hoyt Street, Stamford, Connecticut, , Court Room by in- hand service on said Kristan Peters-Hamlin, 1100 Summer Street, 2° Floor, Stamford, CT 06905, a true and attested copy hereof so that then and there or some reasonable time thereafter the Respondent can answer to the foregoing Amended Application for Reciprocal Discipline. (service costs to be paid for by the Judicial Branch) Hereof fail not, but due service and return make. Dated at Stamford, Connecticut this__day of. , 2015. By the Court,EXHIBIT A EXHIBIT A EXHIBIT AIne Peters, 543 F.Supp 20 326 (S.D.N.Y., 2008) 543 F-Supp.2d 326 In the Matter of Kristan PETERS, Respondent, No. M-2-238. United States District Court, $.D. New York. April 10, 2008, Page 327 ‘Mare L. Mukasey, Bracewell & Giulia New York City, for Respondent, OPINION AND ORDER RAKOFF, District Judge, for the Com This matter comes before the Committee on Grievances for the Southern District of New York (the "Committe") to consider the imposition of discipline against respondent Kristan Peters. based upon the proceedings (collectively, the "Wolters Kluwer proceedings’) before the Hon. Harold Baer, United States District Judge, Southern Distrot of New York, described in Judge Baers opinions in Wolters Khover Financial Services, Inc. ¥. Scivantage, 2007 WL 1098714 (S.D.NY. Apr.12, 2007) Wolters Kliewer 1”); Wolters Kluwer Financial Services, Inc. v. Scivantage, 2007 WL 1498114 (SDNY. May 23, 2007) Wolters Kluwer 10, and Wolters Kluwer Financial Services, Ine. v Scivantage, 525. FSupp2d | 448 GDNY2007)CWolters — Khuver IP). Full familiarity with these opinions is here assumed. ‘The Wolters Kluwer proceedings, involving alleged infringement of trade secrets and the like, began on March 21, 2007, with an application’ by Ms, Peters, then a partner at Dorsey & Whitney LLP ("Dorsey"), counsel for plaintiff, for a Temporary Restraining Order and emergency discovery. 525 F.Supp.2d at 455, The case was assigned to Judge Baer. Over the next few weeks, there was a rash of activity in the ease, culminating, on April 13, 2007, in plaintiffs voluntary dismissal of the action in the Southem District of New York and plaintiffs filing of| «a similar action in federal court in Massachusetts. Id at 495-98. This did not end the activity relating to Judge Baer’s prior orders, however, which continued for some days and ultimately led the defendants in the Wolters Kluwer proceedings to move before Judge Baer, on April 24, 2007, for sanctions pursuant to Fed RCivP. 37, Fed. R.Civ.P. 16(0), 28 US.C. § 1927 and the inherent powers of the court, and for civil contempt against Peters, among others (the "Sanctions Motion"). Ms. Peters was lead counsel for Wolters Kluwer in the litigation generally and, in particular, in connection with the events giving rise to the Sanctions Motion. 525 F.Supp.2d at 451, 509, Judge Baer conducted five days of hearings over a period of two months on the Sanctions Motion. P lastcase (ee on Grievances. Sixteen witnesses testified, and over one-hundred exhibits were received, Ms. Peters, who was represented at various times during the proceedings by Michael Ross, Esq., Pery Krinsky, Esq., Robert Katzberg, Esq, and Charles Stillman, Esq., testified at length: her testimony spans over 160 pages of the transcript. Ms. Peters also actively participated pro se during the proceedings, conducting voir dite, offering documents, making objections, and cross-examining witnesses. See, e.g, Tr. 7/23/2007 at 58-80, 104-121, 123-125; Tr. 8/15/2007 at 49-108, 127-146, 149-151, 167-98; Tr. 9/4/2007 at 20-34, 53-71, 118-149, 168- 174, and 238-80.' Judge Baer also granted Ms. Peters’ requests, over Page 328 defendants’ objections, to examine witnesses out-of: order and to call witnesses who were not on any witness list. 525 F.Supp.2d at 535, 536 n. 326, At the conclusion of the hearings, the Court issued a 109-page opinion imposing more than ‘twenty-four separate reprimands or sanctions on Ms. Peters, grounded on 28 U.S.C. § 1927, the inherent powers of the Court, and Fed R.Civ.P. 37 and 16(1), ‘The legal standard for imposing such reprimands and sanctions is “clear and convincing evidence." See, eg., Capital Bridge Co,, Lud. v. IVL Techs. Ltd, No. 04:CV-4002, 2007 WL 3168327, *8 (SD.N.Y. Oct, 26, 2007) (to impose sanctions under § 1927 or the inherent power of the courts, there must be a finding, of misconduct "by clear and convincing evidence"); Scholastic, Inc. v. Stouffer, 221 F.Supp.2d 425, 439- 40 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (sanctions based on the court's inherent power must be based on "clear and ‘convincing evidence"). In his Amended Opinion and Order dated November 30, 2007, Judge Baer referred the matter to this Committee, 525 F.Supp.2d at $50.” By Order dated December 10, 2007, the Committee designated Barbara S. Gillers, Esq, a member of the panel of attomeys appointed to adviseIn re Peters, 549 F.Supp.2d 326 (S.D.NY.. 2006) and assist the Commitee pursuant to Rule 1.5(a) of the Local Civil Rules ofthe Southem District of New York, to investignte the matter as necessary and prepare such statement of charges as the Committee deemed warranted, Thereafter, by Order To Show Cause dated January 30, 2008, the Committee directed Ms. Peters, pursuant to S.P.N-Y. Local Civil Rules 1,5(6)(5) and (€)(4), to show cause why the Court should not discipline ler and, in the interim, suspend her temporarily from practicing before this Court, The Order alleged that Ms. Peters had violated the New York Code of Professional Responsibility, 22 NYCRR § 1200.1 et seg., by, imer alia: () engaging in conduct involving fraud, dishonesty, deceit or misrepresentation, in violation of DR 1- 102(A)(4); Gi) knowingly making a false statement of fact or law, in violation of DR 7-102(A)(S); (i) ‘engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, in violation of DR 1-102(A)(3); and, (iv) disregarding the ruling of a tribunal made in the coutse of a proceeding, in violation of DR 7-106(A). The bases for these violations were Ms. Peters! tisconduet in (1) instructing an associate in her firm to alter or amend documents for the purpose of preventing their discoverability and then attempting to mislead the Court as to these events; @) participating ina conference with the Court to adjourn a TRO hearing and discuss future depositions at a time when the respondent knew that those depositions and the TRO hearing would not take place; and (3) copying transcripts and ordering additional copies of transcripts in intentional disregard of court orders, and then using the transcrip in an action in Massachusetts in violation of the Court's Confidentiality Order. The Committee directed respondent t0 file « personal affidavit as to the facts and a memorandum of counsel as tothe law within 20 days, However, respondent's time 10 file papers was thereafter extended, at her request, 0 February 27, 2008. On February 27, 2008, respondent, represented. by Mark Mukasey, Esq., of Bracewell & Guiliani (now replaced by her Page 329 current counsel, Richard Maltz, Esq), filed a 62-page declaration and a 36-page memo of law. These submissions disputed the aforementioned charges on the merits and also asserted that the proceedings before Judge Baer were improper, unfit, biased and lacking in due process. The papers also argued that, because these various contentions were or would be fastca Se presented to the Second Circuit on Ms. Peters’ appeals from Judge Baer’s decisions, the Committee should defer making any final determinations until the appeals were completed.’ Finally, respondent ‘argued that any interim suspension would subject her to undue hardship. ‘The full Committee (consisting of Chief Judge Wood, Judges Castel, Haight, Keenan, Lynch, ‘McMahon, Stanton, Magistrate Judge Freeman, and the undersigned as Chair) has now reviewed Ms. Peters’ lengthy submissions, as well as the record before Judge Baer. After careful deliberation, the Committee is unanimously of the view that Judge Bacrs findings are strongly supported by the record and that the proceedings afforded Ms. Peters ample due process. ‘The preliminary remedy of an interim suspension is available in such instances to protect the public from future disciplinary violations of the respondent during the pendency of proceedings before this Committee. Considering the nature and seriousness of the charges against Ms. Peters, the strength of the record supporting those charges, and the danger of recurrence as demonstrated by respondent’ lack of appreciation ofthe wrongfulness of her misconduct, the Committee concludes that an interim suspension of respondent from the practice of law before this Court pending final adjudication of the charges against her is warranted. In the exercise of its discretion, the Committee will defer the final adjudication of the charges against respondent pending before this Committee until her appeal of Tadge Beer's Amended Opinion and Order dated November 30, 2007 is devided. ‘The interim suspension of respondent would be ‘warranted on the basis of Judge Baer’ findings alone. Such findings aze commonly given preclusive effet in subsequent disciplinary proceedings. In particular, this is setled law in Now York, whose disciplinary code (though not necessarily its law of collateral estoppel) is applied in the Southern District of New York. See, e.g, In re Abady, 22 8.D.34 71, 77-78, 81, 800 NY'S2d 651 (Ist Dept 2005) (noting that the New York "Court of Appeals and numerous appellate courts in [New York] have upheld the use of collateral estoppel in (disciplinary) proceedings" and barring a lawyer from re-ltigating before the disciplinary committee whether he had violated, inter alia, DR. 1-102(a\4), DR 1-102(a)(5) and DR 7- 106(a) on the basis of findings that led to sanctions by the New York Supreme Court) (citations omitted;Inre Peters, 543 F Supp.2¢ 326 (S.D.NY., 2008) Jn re Osborne, | A.D:34 31, 32, 766 N-Y.S.2433 (Ist Dep't 2003) (applying collateral estoppel to discipline a lawyer "based on the findings made in three unrelated civil cases in which monctary sanctions Page 330 were imposed on [the lawyer] for pre-trial misconduct that exhibited disdain for the court." including one case decided by Southern District Magistrate Peck); In re Morrissey, 217 A.D.2d 74, 75, 79, 634 NY.S.2d 51 (Ist Dep't 1995) (applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel to facts found by the Southern District in a civil ease). Moreover, even if collateral estoppel were inapplicable here, this Committee routinely accords substantial deference to the factual findings of the court that heard the evidence, for much the same reasons that an appellate court gives such deference, i.e. that the court that hears the evidence is in the best position to assess credibility. See, e.g, United States v. Carlton, 442 F.34 802, 811 (2d Cir.2006) (We accord strong deference to a district cour's credibility determinations, particularly where that court based its findings on such determinations."); United States v, Mendez, 315 F.3d 132, 135 Qd Cir2002) ("[wJhere the district cour’s factual findings are premised upon credibility determinations, we grant particularly _ strong deference to those findings") (citations omitted), But even if all this were disregarded, the record before us amply demonstrates that at least some of the charges against Ms, Peters are so strongly supported as to warrant interim suspension on any analysis. Consider the following facts, which are (except where otherwise noted) substantially undisputed As noted, on Friday, April 13, 2007, the plaintiff, counseled by Ms. Peters, voluntarily dismissed the Wolters Kluwer action in the Southern District of New York pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(@)(1}(i) and filed a new action in the United States District Court for Massachusetts, Wolters Kher Financial Services Inc. v, Scivantage, No. 07- ‘CV-10729, 2007 WL 1098714 (D. Mass., filed April 13, 2007)(the "Massachusetts action"). 525 FSupp.2d at 497; see also Wolters Kluwer Il, 2007 WL 1498114 at "2, The complaint in the Massachusetts action was not served on the defendants immediately and the notice of the voluntary dismissal was served by United States mail, 525 FSupp.2d at 496.97. That same day, £. fastcase ‘unaware of the dismissal and the filing of the new action, defendants, in response to the plaintiffs prior discovery demands in the action before Judge Baer, produced "a) electronic copies of the approximately 54,774 pages [previously] provided on April 11 in paper form, in response to Ms, Peters’ further demands, and ) 98,474 pages of additional documents, in accordance with Ms. Peters' requests, ‘and the Court's discovery orders." 525 F.Supp.2d at 499. On Monday moming, April 16th, defendants’ counsel "informed the Court by email that Plaintift voluntarily dismissed the case, accepted documents, and now refused to return them." 525 F.Supp.2d at 501, During a conference call later that day, the Court, ordered Dorsey to retum the documents that Defendants had produced into the Cour’s custody and to do so within 24 hours." $25 F.Supp.2d at $02, Nine days later, on April 24th, all of the documents had still not been delivered to the Court. That day the Court sent an email to Ms. Peters, among others, stating that "The Judge would like to remind the parties ... “that [the Court's] April 16 verbal order “ordered discovery returned to the court’ ‘with the intention that the parties would not utilize such discovery..." 525 F.Supp.2é at 516. The cmail directed Ms. Peters to “represent to the whether [her] firm currently possesses, or has possessed since Friday, April 20, any copies (in any format) of any transcripts of any depositions taken in this action" and Page 331 to return any such copies to this Court by 11 A.M. tomorrow...” Id It was against this background that Ms. Peters gave the direction fo a young associate that constitutes one of the charges against her. The lawyer in question, Jordan Brackett, was a first year associate at Dorsey working on the matter with Ms. Pojers. When Mr. Brackett leamed of the Cours April 24th email, he ‘immediately reviewed the transcripts in his office and realized tht several of the transcripts he previously thought were work product’ were in fact unmarked" and therefore should be delivered to the Court. 525 F.Supp.2d at 518. He “called Ms, Peters and told her that he stil had teanseripts, some of which were unmarked." Jd. Mr Brackett had his copies ofthese transcripts delivered to Ms, Peters office on April 25th, 525 F.Supp.2d at 520. ‘The next day, on April 26th, Ms. Peters and Dorsey partner Jonathan Herman "discussed the issueine Peters, 543 F Supp.24 920 (S.D.N.Y., 2008) of returning transcripts to the Court, and that some of [the] transcripts may have been work product." Jd. at 521. Mr. Herman, and others at Dorsey, directed Ms. Peters to comply with the Court's order by delivering all of the transcripts to the Court 1d.; see also id. n. 275. Ms. Peters challenged this direction. Mr. Herman told Ms. Peters to contact Dorsey's ethics specialist Bill Wernz or Dorsey's chief administrative partner Tom ‘Tinkham. Ms. Peters did contact, ‘Tinkham and he told Herman that he gave Ms. Peters the same advice, ie., to return the transcripts to the court, fd. n, 275; see also, Ts. 9/12/2007 at 346:11- 17, 347:15-18, Ms, Peters then asked Mr. Brackett to return to her office so they could review the transcripts he had had delivered to het. 525 F.Supp-2d at 521. Mr. Brackett testified that at this meeting Ms. Peters told him fo mark up transcripts so that they would be work product and therefore could be withheld from the Court. According to Bracket: | first showed [Ms. Peters] the transcripts that had some type of marking and which I thought were likely attomey work product. I then showed her the other transcripts and flipped through them to demonstrate that they had no markings. Ms. Peters then instructed me to write on the unmarked transeripts so that they would be considered attomey work product, and so that we would not have 10 rotum them to the Court. To the best of my recollection, Ms. Peters said something to the effect, of “scribble all over them.’ Ms. Peters then told me that she would leave her office so that I could write all over the transcripts without her being present. To the best of my recollection, she said that she would leave for a few minutes — either to powder her nose or to get something to drink. Ms. Peters then left the office. I was shocked by Ms, Peters’ statement, but I understood that Ms. Peters was instructing me to do ‘what she said and that she was not joking, Brackett Decl. at $¥ 28-31"; see also, 525 FSupp.2d at 521. Mr. Brackett promptly reported the incident to Dorsey management, who conducted an inquiry the same day. Richard Silberberg (a member of Dorsey's management committee and chair of its advocacy practice), Zachary Carter (head of Dorsey's trial group for the New York office), Page 332 > fastcase and Robert Dwyer (the head of the firm's New York office) interviewed Mr. Brackett and Ms. Peters separately. During his interview, Mr. Brackett said that "he had had a conversation with Ms. Peters [earlier that day] in which he believed that she had communicated to him a direction to alter transcripts, to make them appear that they were work product privilege." Tr. 9/11/2007 at 58:4-14, At the close of the meeting, Mr. Silberberg told Ms. Peters “that ‘what she said to Mr. Brackett, even if one were to assume it was a joke, was highly improper and unacceptable.” Tr. 9/4/2007 at 95:5-7. As the district court noted, "[a] subsequent Dorsey internal investigation into various allegations by Ms. Peters ‘concluded that “it appears beyond question that Mr. Brackett actually believed Ms. Peters suggested to hhim that he mark up the transcripts so that they appeared to be work product and would not have to be returned to the court, It is indisputable that such @ suggestion made by a partner to an associate is alarming and unethical." 525 F.Supp.2d at 522 n. 278 ‘Testifying before the district court, Ms. Peters id not deny that such a conversation took place but referred to the situation as a "joke" and said that she “recalled saying 10 Brackett, "Well hell, if Zach {Carter} said it's work product, let's make it work product." 525 F.Supp.2d at 521 n. 276; see also Tr. 9/11/2007 at 219:4-12. In her submission to the Committe, Ms. Peters also did not deny that she sade such statements but she claimed that whatever she said to Mr. Brackett was facetious (Peters Decl dated Feb, 27, 2008 at $9177, 96) or sarcastic (Peters Decl. at $Y 96, 116). We find such assertions highly unlikely on their face; but, even if respondent subjectively believed her statements to be a "joke," the statements were made in @ context in which there ‘was a high likelihood that they would be taken seriously by a young associate, and this, at a rinimum, evidences a reckless disregard of the prohibitions ofthe Now York Disciplinary Code. Ms, Peters has also claimed that she was denied due process because (i) she only teamed that the Brackett "allegation would be a subject of the hearing fow days [sic] before he testified" (Peters Memo, at 17-18, citing Peters Decl. at 89) and (i) that she "was only provided with fifteen minutes to cross- examine Mr, Brackett" Peters Memo at 18. Our review of the record, however, convinces us that MS. Peters and her counsel had ‘ample opportunity to challenge Mr. Bracketts version ofthese eventsIn re Peters, 543 F Supp 24 326 (S.O.N., 2008) Ms. Peters! cross-examination of Mr. Bracket spans 19 pages of the transcript. See Tr. 9/12/2007 at 399.418. One of Ms. Peters’ lawyers, Michael Ross, ‘was in the courtroom throughout. With regard to the length of time permitted for the cross-examination, the district court noted, "Regarding Brackett's recounting of this incident, at the hearing, Bracket’s counsel on direct simply confirmed that Bracket's Declaration was true and accurate, thus providing Ms. Peters with additional time to cross-examine Brackett on any issues." Tr. 9/12/2007 at 399:1-12, Ms, Peters "chose not to directly cross-examine Brackett about the incident of Thursday, April 26th." 525 FSupp.2d at $21 n, 277. For these and other reasons evident from the record, we find no fault in the procedures utilized with respect to Bracket's testimony and eross-examination Independently of the above, we also, as noted, accord substantial weight to Judge Baer's own credibility findings om this issue. At the close of Mr. Brackets testimony, the following colloquy took place: Court: There was a lot of conversation about ‘whether that was said in Page 333 Jjest. What is your view about whether she was saying itin jest? Mr. Brackett]: It was absolutely notin jest. (fr, 9/12/2007 at 419:2-5) On this record Judge Baer respondent falsely stated that she was " she "ordered a junior associate to alter transcripts that, had been ordered retumed to the Court by “seribbling, all over them’ so that the transcripts might be considered "work product’ and thus arguably not returnable" to the Court. 525 F.Supp.2d at 549-50; see also 525 F-Supp.2d at $21-22. Judge Baer further stated: From the evidence, it is clear that Ms. Peters ordered a junior associate to alter transcripts that had been ordered retumed to this Court by ‘scribbling all, over them,’ so that the transcripts might be considered ‘work product’ and thus arguably not retumable. Nonetheless, Ms. Peters, after her direction 10 the associate concocted a post hac explanation that she ‘was ‘joking’ when she gave that order. The evidence supports the clear finding that she was not. That “ fastcase representation was false. More to the point, Ms, Peters’ order to an associate to alter evidence that a Court ordered retuned is disturbing to say the least Itevinces a blatant disregard for court orders, and a willingness to take any action necessary towards the desired end, including ordering subordinates to commit misdeeds that, apparently, she felt uncomfortable committing herself 525 F Supp.2d at $49-550. As to the breach of the confidentiality order, on April 12, 2007 Judge Baer, noting that "[p}rotective orders that limit access to certain documents «0 ‘counsel and experts only are commonly entered in litigation involving trade secrets," entered a "Confidentiality Stipulation and Protective Onder" (the "Confidentiality Order"). It provided, "inter alia, as noted at length in [the Courts] Opinion of May 23, 2007, that protected materials shall not be used in “any other litigation proceeding’ See generally Wolters Khewer Fin, Servs, v. Seivantage, 2007 WL. 1498114, 2007 Dist. LEXIS 37306 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. [sic] 23, 2007)" 525 F.Supp.2d at 480 (footnote omitted) Materials protected by the Confidentiality Order included "any copies, abstracts, summaries, or information derived from" discovery materials. CO at | 2(h). The terms on use are crystal clear.” The Confidentiality Order says several times that protected material shall not be used in any litigation otker than the captioned proceeding. See, e.g,, CO at 47a) Protected Material "shall be used only for the ‘purpose of the prosecution or defense of this action. [and] shall not be used ... in any other lit proceeding"); CO at 4 4(b) (Protected Materials “shall be used solely for purposes of the prosecution and defense of the above-entitled litigation .."); CO at 1 4(c) (Protected Materials "shall be used solely for purposes of the prosecution and defense of the above- entitled litgation...") ‘The Confidentiality Order provided a mechanism for challenging the designation of materials as confidential. See CO at 8. It also provided that "(t]he obligations created by [the] Order shall survive the termination of this lawsuit unless otherwise modified by the respective Court in, each action" CO at $13. Ms. Peters does not deny that she used materials protected by the Confidentiality Page 334Ine Peters, 543 F.Supp 24 326 (S.O.NY., 2008) Order in the Massachusetts action, As she says in the Peters Decl. at ¥ 37: "In connection with the Motion for Preservation of Evidence filed in Massachusetts, wwe filed as an exhibit a Reply Brief that had, as an exhibit, excerpts of transcript pages..." See also 9/12 Tr, 366:4-7 (Ms. Peters “attached a copy of the reply papers from a form motion to the Massachusetts filing and that that set of reply papers had excerpts from the transcripts"); Peters Memo, at 7, 9-11 Ms, Peters argues, however, that her use of the transcripts in the Massachusetts litigation was proper because Judge Baer had permitted the parties "to keep" such excerpts. Peters Decl. 437. Peters Memo, at 9-10. This is, frankly, preposterous on its face.’ She argues further that her “good faith" is demonstrated by her request that an associate research whether the Massachusets litigation was the same litigation within the meaning of the Confidentiality Order. See Peters Memo, at 10, But this can hardly be considered evidence of genuine good faith when the Confidentiality Order itself provided a mechanism for seeking guidance from the Court on its scope. See Confidentiality Order at ‘9 9, 10, 13. Ms, Peters’ good faith claim is further belied by the fact that her own client did not agree with her use of the transcripts in the Massachusetts action. See 525 FSupp.2d at $14 n, 254 ("Wolters Kluwer did rot sign off on Peters’ using the transcripts in MA without getting permission [from the court] first and ‘of course that never happened.) In reprimanding Ms. Peters for the use of transcripts in the Massachusetts action, Judge Baer wrote: Ms, Peters used the transcripts fin the Massachusetts action) in a bad-faith effort for the improper purpose of gaining advantage (and expedient relief) in a new cour after she had “judge shopped,’ and after she had gained extensive discovery without providing any discovery of her wn, and in an effort to have that Court eviscerate the Confidentiality Order that this Court had entered to ‘govern discovery produced in this litigation (which remained in force after this Itigaion) 525 F.Supp.2d at $48; see also, Wolters Khawer UL We agree, New York DR 1-102(a)(5) prohibits conduct prejudicial t© the administration of justice. Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(4) prohibits a lawyer £ fastcase from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. DR 7-106(A) declares that "[a] lawyer shall not disregard or advise the client to disregard a ... ruling of a tribunal made in the course of a proceeding." Offering guidance on DR. 7-106(A), New York Ethical Consideration (EC") 7-22 provides that "[rlespect for judicial rulings is essential to the proper administration of justice." EC 7-25 states further that: Rules of evidence and procedure are designed to lead to just decisions and are part of the framework of the law, Thus while a lawyer may take steps in ‘god faith and within the framework of the law to test the validity of rules, the lawyer is not justified in consciously violating such rules and should be diligent in his or her efforts to guard against unintentional violation of them, Page 335 Ms, Peters clearly violated at least these three disciplinary niles. See, e.g, In re Hausch, 36 A.D.3d T4l, 143, 145, 825 N.Y.S.2d 109 (2d Dept 2006) (by “failing to timely comply with one or more court directions," Hausch violated DR_1-102(a)(5); by "disrogarding and/or advising her client to disregard a ruling of a tribunal made in the course of a proceeding” Hausch violated DR. 7-106(a)); In re Goll, 27 AD.3d 131, 133, 807 NYS.2d 137 Qd Dep't 2006) (by failing to produce a proposed judgment and necessary supporting documentation after being ordered to do so by the court, Goll violated DR 1-102(a)(5) and DR 7-106(a)); Jn re Hirsch, 231 A.D.2d 358, 360, 661 N.Y.S.24 233 (24 Dep't 1997) ("fbly failing to comply with discovery demands and court orders,” Hirsch violated DR 1-102(a)(3)); see also, In re Stuart, 22 AD3d 131, 803 NY.S.2d 577 (2d Dept 2005) (lawyer violated DR_1-102(a)(4), (5) and (7) when, in response 0 a justice's question about the whereabouts ‘of a witness, the lawyer falsely indicated that he had no knowledge of her whereabouts); Jn re Hock, 274 AD.2d 130, 131, 711 N.Y S.2d 803 (4th Dep't 2000) (lawyer violated DR 1-102(a)(4) and (7) and DR 7- 102(a)(3) when he “submitted a false expert disclosure statement and made false statements to the trial court and to defense counsel with regard to the availability and prospective testimony of the expert witness"); In re Bridge, 196 A.D.2d 43, 44, 607 N.Y.S.2d 997 (4th Dep't 1994) (lawyer violated DR I- 102(@)(4) while representing a client in a criminal appeal when he "misrepresented to [the][cJourt on two successive applications for a stay of execution ofIne Peters, 543 F Supp.26 326 (S.D.NY., 2008) the sentence that he lad ordered the trial transcript that [it] was being prepared” when in fact he had failed to take the necessary steps to obtain the trial transcript in a timely fashion"). Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, respondent is hereby suspended from practicing in the Southem District of New York pending the outcome of these proceedings and until further order of this Court, ‘SO ORDERED. Notes: 1, "Tr." refers to the transcript of the hearings on the Sanctions Motion, 2. While Judge Baer also referred the matter to the State disciplinary authorities, those authorities subsequently informed this Committee that, in order fo conserve resources and avoid "parallel investigations, they would await this Committee's actions before taking up the matter. 3. Ms, Peters has taken appeals from Wolters If and U1, ‘The Second Circuit has consolidated those appeals and has already extended the briefing fastcase schedule twice. By scheduling order dated January 18, 2008, her brie? was originally to be filed on or before February 22, 2008. By order dated February 4, 2008, reciting that “appellants {had] requested a ‘modification of the scheduling order,” the Second Circuit extended the filing deadline to April 4, 2008, By further order dated March 20, 2008, the Second Circuit (granted Mr. Mukasey’s motion for leave to withdraw as counsel on the appeal (where he had also represented Ms. Peters); (i) gave Ms. Peters 30 days to appear pro se or have new counsel file a notice of appearance; and, (i) extended the filing deadline to May 5, 2008. 4, In accordance with Judge Baers practice, Mr. Brackett’ direct testimony was presented in the form of a swom Declaration, dated September 9, 2007. He ‘was cross-examined at the Sanctions Motion hearing ‘on September 11, 2007. 5. The scope of the Confidentiality Order is also discussed in Wolters Kluwer II 6. Ms. Peters’ convoluted explanation to the district, ‘court is described at $25 FSupp.2d at 519, 519 n. 269. After setting out these facts in detail, the Court ‘observed that this was *just one more effort in a saga of obfuscation perpetrated by [Ms. Peters)..."EXHIBIT B EXHIBIT B EXHIBIT BInte Peters, 682 F.36 381 (2nd Gi, 2011) 642. F.3d 381 In re Kristan PETERS, Attorney. Docket No. 09-90098-am. United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. ‘April 25, 2011. (642 F.34 383] Steven D. Ecker, Cowdery, Ecker, & Murphy, LLC, Hanford, CT, for Kristan Peters.Before: CABRANES, SACK, and WESLEY, Circuit Judges.PER CURIAM: Kristan Peters, an attomey admitted to the bars of both New York and Connecticut,) and formerly a partner atthe law firm of Dorsey & Whitney, appeals from an order of the Committee on Grievances for the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Grievance Committee”) suspending her from practicing before that court for a period of seven years. The Grievance Committee found that she had engaged in the following misconduct (0) instructing a junior attomey, Jordan Brackett, to deface transcripts in order to render them, under the guise of the attorney work-product privilege, unretumable to the district court (“the Brackett allegation”); and 2) violating a confidentiality order issued by the district court by filing, in a Massachusetts action, ‘transcript excerpts encompassed by that order(“the Confidentiality Order allegation”)? (642 F.3d 384] See In re Peters, S43 FSupp.2d 326, 331-34 (S.D.NY.2008) (interim suspension order); In re Peters, M-2-238, doc. 125 at 3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 5, 2009)(disbarment order, based on the findings and reasoning of the interim suspension order); Jn re Peters, M-2-238, doc. 192 at 5 (S.D.NY, Avg. 6, 2009)(order reducing penalty ftom disbarment to seven-year suspension, based on mitigating factors), ‘The Grievance Committee concluded that Peters's misconduct had violated: New York Disciplinary Rule (“DR”) 1-102(a)(5), which prohibited conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; DR I 102(A)(4), which prohibited a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; and DR 7-106(A), which prohibited a lawyer from disregarding, or advising a client to disregard, a ruling of a tribunal made in the fastcase ‘course of a proceeding. + Sce Peters, S43 F.Supp.2d ‘at 334-35; Peters, M-2-238, doc. 125 at 4. In her brief, Peters argues, inter alia, that the Grievance Committee's failure to hold an independent hearing, and its reliance on a prior sanctions hearing conducted by Judge Baer in the underlying litigation, violated her due process rights ‘and the district courts local rules. She also argues that the two charges of misconduct now at issue do rot, a8 a matter of law, support the Grievance Committee's imposition of discipline. Although this Court already has affirmed the underlying sanctions order entered by Judge Bacr to the extent he reprimanded Peter, the two charges upon which the Grievance Committee's suspension is based were not addressed in that prior appeal, since this Court limited its review of Judge Bacr’s order to three other charges. See Wolters Kluwer Fin. Servs, Inc. v. Scivantage, 564 F.3d 110, 118-19 (24 Cir.2009), cafirming, in part, 525 ESupp2d 448 (S.D.NY.2007) Gudge Baers sanctions decision). Except as discussed below, we assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case. This Cour's review of an original disciplinary order entered by a district court is governed by the abuse of diseretion standard, although the issue of whether a disciplinary rule prohibits the conduct in question is reviewed de novo. See In re Edelstein, 214 F.3d 127, 130-31 (2d Cit.2000). A district court, has abused its discretion if its imposition of sanctions ‘was based on “an erroneous view ofthe law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence,” or “eannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” Wolters Kluwer, 564 F.3d at 113 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “when the district court is accuser, fact finder and sentencing judge all in one,” as was essentially the ease here, this Court’ review is “more exacting than under the ordinary abuse-of-diseretion standard.” # Zd, at 113— 14 Gntemnal quotation marks omitted). Thus, even under the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard of review, this Court must be careful to “ensure that any [decision to impose sanctions) is made with restraint and diseretion.” Sohlaifer Nance & Co. v. Estate of Warkol, 194 F.3d 323, 334 (24 Cir.1999).In te Peters, 642 F.34 381 (2n6 Ci, 2019) _ [642 F.34385] Because an attomey disciplinary proceeding is quasi-criminal in nature, the Due Process Clause centitles the charged attorney to, inter alia, adequate advance notice of the charges, and the opportunity to effectively respond to the charges and confront and cross-examine witnesses. See In re Ruffalo, 390 US. 544, $50-S1, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968); Erdmann v. Stevens, 458 F.2d 1205, 1209 Qd Cir.1972) ([A] court's disciplinary proceeding against a member of its bar is comparable to a criminal rather than to a civil proceeding”) In examining the Grievance Committee's decision not to hold a full evidentiary hearing, this Court “consider(s} the private interest affected by the action of the [Grievance Committee] in following [Uudge Baers sanctions decision] without [holding] an [independent] evidentiary hearing, the risk of erroneous deprivation of that private interest, and the {Grievance Committee's] interest in foregoing an evidentiary hearing” In re Jacobs, 44 F.3d 84, 90 (2d Cir.1994) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 US. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 LEd.2d 18 (1976)). This Court has held that a district court grievance committee's decision not to hold a full evidentiary hearing did not violate the charged attomey’s due process rights when the risk of erroneous deprivation of the attorney's imerest in practicing before the district court was “extremely fow,” and there was an "important public interest in not’ expending judicial resources on a proceeding that would largely duplicate a prior proceeding,” given that the attomey “had made no showing that such a hearing would reveal an infirmity of proof or lack of due process in the [prior] proceeding or risk of grave injustice from suspending [the attorney] on the basis of {a prior} order.” fd. at 90-91 (holding that a district court grievance committee's reliance on a state cour's findings, Without holding an independent hearing, did not violate the attomey’s due process rights), With respect to the Brackett allegation, an independent evidentiary hearing would not have been, duplicative of Judge Baer's sanctions proceeding since, in that prior proceeding, Peters was not provided adequate prior notice of that allegation or adequate opportunity to respond and to cross- examine adverse witnesses. With respect to. the Confidentiality Order allegation, although Peters had adequate notice and opportunity to respond to the allegation during the prior proceeding, the evidence fastcase concerning the allegation was not adequately developed during that prior proceeding so as to permit the Grievance Committee to forego an independent evidentiary hearing in the present matter. We therefore vacate the Grievance Committee's suspension order and remand the matter for the Committee to hold further proceedings consistent with our decision. I, Brackett Allegation. Collateral Estoppel, Res Judicata, and Law of the Case First, this Court never reviewed the particular charges on which the Committee based its discipline. Instead, in the appeal from Judge Baer’s sanction order, this Court stated that it “need only review a sampling of Peters's conduct to affirm the district court's imposition of sanctions,” and then discussed three charges not now at issue. Wolters Kiuwer, 564 F.3d at 116, 118-19. The Court then concluded as follows: Having reviewed these three instances, we see no need to consider the other sanctions for which the district court issued reprimands, No likely argument has been advanced as to why the other nineteen sanctions are defective, and because the sanctions are all non-monetary, [642 F.3d 386] the subtraction of one or another from the whole course of conduct would not alter the nature or tenor of the district court's rulings. Id, st 119. Although the Court saw no “likely argument” concerning the sanctioned conduct presently at issue, the Court nonetheless made clear that appellate review had been limited to the sampling of conduct explicitly discussed in the opinion, We therefore disagree with the Grievance Committee's statements that “Judge Baer's conclusions regarding the incident involving Mr. Brackett have been affirmed by the Second Circuit,” in re Peters, M-2-238, doc. 193 at 5, and that “(the Second ‘Cireuit affirmed all of the sanetions on Ms. Peters” id. at 7. Thus, the Committee was incorrect to rely on such preclusion doctrines as collateral estoppel and res judicata in finding that it need not hold its own hearing. See Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 94 F.36 747, 754 (2d Cir. 1996) Citis a well-established principle of federal law that if an appellate court considers only one of a lower court alternative bases for its holding, affirming theIn Peters, 642 F. judgment without reaching the alternative bases, only the basis that is actually considered can have any preclusive effect in subsequent litigation.”); Gelb v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 198 F.2d 38, 45 (2d Cir-1986) C[IJF an appeal is taken and the appellate court affirms on one ground and disregards the other, there is no collateral estoppel as to the unreviewed gground."); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 emt. 0 (1982), ‘The Commitice also relied on the law of the ‘case doctrine in finding that it need not hold its own hearing. The law of the case doctrine, although not, binding, “counsels a court against revisiting its prior rulings in subsequent stages of the same case absent “cogent” and ‘compelling’ reasons,” including, iner alia, “the need to correct a clear error or prevent ‘manifest injustice.” Ali v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 478, 490 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Tenzer, 213 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir-2000)), We ni whether the present matter is the Judge Bacr's sanctions proceeding because, even assuming arguendo that the doctrine could apply, the present issues are sufficiently compelling to warrant revisiting the Brackett allegation. See i. B. Notice and Opportunity to Respond Second, this Court's due process analysis in Wolters Kluwer is of limited aid in the present appeal because the notice Peters received in Judge Bacr’s sanctions proceeding conceming the Brackett allegation, and her opportunity to respond, differed significantly from the notice and opportunity to respond she had concerning the three charges discussed in this Cour's Wolters Krhaver decision. AS, an initial matter, the Brackett allegation was not included in the defendants’ sanctions motion, see Peters's App. (“App.”) at A68-A100, although Judge Baer noted in his sanctions order that he had “specifically reiterated at the begining of the hearings thatthe [district court] was only considering the same issues raised by [the] sanctions motion,” Wolters Kluwer, 525 F-Supp.2d at 452 n, 8; see also ‘App. at A287 (Letter from Judge Bacr, copied to all atlomeys, conceming sanctions hearing) (“The scope of the hearing will encompass the relief requested by Defendants in their motion for contempt, sanctions, and fees."), A374 (similar statement by Judge Bacr at beginning of the hearing). While that description of the scope of the sanctions hearing may not be controlling, since an attomey may receive adequate notice of a misconduct charge by means other than a ‘sanctions motion served prior to the fastcase 381 (2nd Cir, 2011) [642 F.3d 387] sanctions hearing, see Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 US. 306, 314, 70 8.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950) (explaining that due process requires only notice “of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information”), it does not appear, fon the present record, that Peters received adequate notice of, and opportunity to respond to, the Brackett, charge by any means.* The sanctions motion charged Peters with, inter alia, failing to deliver all deposition transcripts to the district court, in violation of Judge Baer’s protective order, which required her firm to deliver all of the transcripts to him, See App. at A73, A82-8S, Although the Brackett allegation was related to Peters's alleged intention to retain transcripts in violation of Judge Bacr’s order, the sanctions motion, contained nothing that would suggest to reasonable person that the Brackett allegation might be a basis for sanctions. There is a simple explanation for this: the sanctions motion was signed and served on April 24, 2007, see id. at A100; S.D.N.Y. Docket 07-ov- 2352, Doe. 124, item 200 at 143 (Cert. of Service), while the Brackett allegation concemed an event that, ‘occurred on April 26, 2007, see App. at AT14-15 (Brackett Decl.) ‘The Brackett allegation did not surface during the sanctions proceeding until September 4, 2007, the third day of the five days of hearings before Judge Baer, when a witness testified that he had been told that Peters had directed Brackett to write “attomey notes” on clean copies of deposition transcripts. See id, at A6S7-59. However, the focus at that point remained whether the law firm or Peters had possessed transcripts that previously should have been delivered to the court. See generally id. at AGSS~72, In fact, Peters's cross-examination of that witness barely touched on his mention of the Brackett, allegation—in that regard, Peters simply asked if the ‘witness had himself heard the conversation between Brackett and Peters, and whether the witness had participated in the decision not to call Brackett as a ‘witness in the sanctions hearing, at which point Judge Baer stated, “We can fix that.” fd, at A670. At that time, it appears that the Brackett allegation. was regarded as evidence relevant to whether Peters intended to deliver all of the transcripts covered by the protective order to the district court, and not as a separate charge of misconduct. By letter dated September 5, 2007, Judge Baer requested Brackett to submit a declaration regardingtr re Peters, 642 F.3d 381 (2nd Gr, 2011) his involvement in the litigation, “particularly regarding his involvement in activities relating to the allegations that he (had been] directed to alter transcripts provided to [the district eourt}.” Doc. 124, item 409. Judge Baer also stated that, after reviewing Brackets declaration, he would decide if Brackett would be called as a witness. Id. The declaration itself is dated September 9, 2007, see App. at A716; it was emailed to [642 F.34388} Iudge Bacr's law clerk and Peters’ attomey, among, ‘others, on September 10, 2007, see Doc. 124, item 413; and both Peters and her attomey acknowledged. receipt of the declaration on that day, see id. at items 414, 416; App. at A719, A767, ‘Upon Peters's receipt of the Brackett declaration, cone arguably might conclude that she was then on. notice that the transcript defacement allegation constituted a disciplinary charge that could subject her to sanctions. However, Judge Baer did not explicitly characterize it as such, and other attorneys intimately involved in the proceedings apparently still did not recognize it as a charge. Afler Peters responded to Bracket's declaration by requesting an ‘opportunity to cross-examine Brackett and several other persons, see Doc. 124, item 414, an opposing attomey objected to Peters's “last-ditch and blatant effort to protract [the] proceedings,” and listed the six issues that the attorney belioved were before the district court, a list which did not include the Brackett allegation, see id. at item 420. Despite these ambiguities, for purposes of this decision, we assume that Peters lad notice of the Brackett charge as of ‘September 10, 2007, but find that, for the reasons that follow, she nonetheless did not have adequate time to respond to that charge. It is not clear how much time Peters had, after receipt of the Brackett declaration on September 10, to prepare for her cross-examination of Brackett on September 12. While Peters may have had some preparation time on September 10, she and her ‘counse] were occupied for substantial portions of the next two days by the hearing itself: on September 11, the hearing ran from approximately 10:35 am. 10 ‘approximately 8:00 p.m,, see App. at A718, A796, and, on September 12, it began at 9:30 am., see id. at ‘A804, Additionally, any preparation time Peters may hhave had on September 10 and 11 also had to cover four witnesses other than Brackett who were to testify on September 11 and 12, and Peters's own testimony on September 11. Peters also may have rs fastcase spent some of her availabe time preparing for several other possible witnesses who ultimately did not testify. See id, at AG3B (Peters requesting testimony of three attomeys), A719 (plaintiff's counsel noting possible need to call three defendants), A827 (Peters requesting testimony of five witnesses). However, even if we assume that Peters bad to prepare only for four potentially adverse witnesses, and not for her cown testimony, those four witnesses were relevant to a number ofthe charges in the sanctions motion, and not simply the Brackett allegation Furthermore, Judge Baer informed the attomeys fon September 11 that tho September 12 hearing ‘would run from 9:30 am, t0 11:00 am., see id, at A801, with Brackett taking “no more than 15 or 20 minutes,” id, at A775, clearly requiring Peters 10 prioritize her preparation time, presumably giving greater priority to the witnesses and allegations directly relevant to the known charges. But, as discussed above, it is not clear when the Brackett allegation became a known “charge"—one that independently exposed her to possible sanction in that proceeding—or, if it was a known charge by September 10, a charge important enough to warrant reallocating scarce resources and time away from the issues that, up to that point, had been treated as the ‘central issues, Since the Brackett allegation was, at the very least, an important basis for the seven-year suspension, we assume that Peters would have cross- ‘examined him on it if she had had unlimited time for cross-examination, See id. at A732 (Peters requesting another witness to provide the “exact words” used by Brackett “for impeachment [642 F.3d 389] purposes”), A887 (Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Compel Discovery (filed Sept. 24, 2007) (objecting to, inter alia, the “truncated opportunity for cross examination” of witnesses “such as Jordan Brackett who have brought what (Judge Bacr] has indicated {he} deems the most serious allegations against Peters”)). Of course, no lawyer is permitted unlimited cross-examination; rather, “[Mhe scope and extent of cross-examination are generally within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the decision to restrict eross-examination will not be reversed absent fan abuse of discretion.” United States v. Rosa, 11 F.3d 315, 335 (2d Cir-1993); see also United States v. Elfgeeh, 515 F.3d 100, 125 (2d Cir.2008). Although the trial court may, under proper circumstances, impose a time limit on eross-examination, see UnitedIne Poters, 682 F.34 381 (2nd Ci, 2011) States v, Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1173 Qd Cir-1989) (upholding time limit when defense counsel had adequate time to elicit evidence of ‘witness's motive for testifying falsely and counsel had not identified other areas of inquiry they wished to pursue), such Timits should be imposed with caution, cf United States v. Vest, 116 F.3d 1179, 1187 (7th Cir.1997)(stating that a tial judge's “rigid adherence to time limitations” would prevent the judge from making the necessary “particularized judgment” as to the proper length of cross ‘examination. Here, we are not directly reviewing Judge Baer's decision to limit Peter's cross-examination of Brackett; instead, we are reviewing the Grievance Committee's reliance on the procedures employed by Judge Baer, which included that limitation. That distinction may be highly relevant here since Judge Baer only imposed a reprimand, and specifically declined to suspend Peters, finding it more appropriate to refer Peters to the Grievance Committee “because of the procedural protections inherent to that process.” Wolters Kluwer, 525 F.Supp.24 at $50. It is not known which specific “procedural protections” Judge Baer had in. mind however, that statement suggests that the very judge ‘who conducted the hearing did not believe that the procedures employed were necessarily sufficient for purposes of a suspension. During the September 12, 2007 hearing, Judge Baer stated that Peters would have fifteen minutes to cross-examine Brackett, see App. at A814, and then kept a close eye on the clock, announcing When only five minutes remained, id. at A822, and when only two minutes remained, id. at A823, and stopping Peters mid-question id. The transcript defacement issue, which was not covered by Peter's cross- examination, was first mentioned during. opposing counsels redirect examination of Brackett, with Judge Baer asking the only question relevant to the present proceeding—soliciting from Brackett that he ‘id not believe that Peters's statement that he should seribble on the transeripts was said in jest. Id. at A824, After that, Judge Baer immediately excused Bracket from the stand. 1d Under these circumstances, we do not agree that Peters ‘chose not io directly cross-examine Brackett about the [defacement allegation].’ ” Jn re Peters, 543 F Supp.2d at 332 (quoting [642 F.3d 390) f fastcase Wolters Kluwer, 525 FSupp2d at 521 n. 277), Instead, the record strongly suggests that Peters simply ran out of time as a result of the strict time limit imposed by Judge Baer. Furthermore, although the Grievance Committes noted that the Brackett cross-examination “spannfed] 19 pages of the tanscript” and that one of Peters's lawyers was present, i., neither of those facts suggests that Peters hhad adequate time to question Brackett on the defacement issue, given that his declaration covered a number of topics relevant to several of the misconduct charges. Additionally, the limited advance notice of the Brackett allegation severely restricted Peters's ability to investigato and obtain impeachment evidence relevant to that charge, beyond the evidence and ‘witnesses already scheduled for presentation to Judge Baer. We do not, however, comment on whether Peters was prejudiced by that particular limitation, which may be mooted in whole or part by the further proceedings to be held by the Grievance Committe. In light of the “more exacting” standard that applies to this matter, Wolters Kluver, 564 F.3d at 113-14 (quoting Perez v. Danbury Hosp., 347 F3d 419, 423 2nd Ci.2003)), we conclude that Peters ‘was denied due process with respect to the Brackett allegation and vacate the Grievance Committee's suspension order to the extent it was based on that allegation. However, the Grievance Committee is free, on remand, ‘to hold further proceedings concerning that charge, providing Peters with sufficient opportunity to respond and cross-examine adverse witnesses. In those further proceedings, the Grievance Commitice should decide, in the ‘first instance, what evidence Peters should be permitted to present in her defense, and, if the Grievance Committee declines to consider particular proffered evidence, it should provide detailed findings in support of that decision. For example, regarding the Committee's finding that Peters had unreasonably delayed in presenting certain evidence from Peters's former secretary, see In re Peters, M-2-238, doc. 193 at 6 (SPA-45) (S.D.NY. Aug. 6, 2009), itis not clear to us what prior opportunity Peters had to present that evidence, or how it substantially altered her position, However, since the scope of any new proceedings will be decided by the Grievance Committee, any further discussion of potential evidence would be speculative. We also decline to consider, at this juncture, whether Peters's suspension may be based on aIn ro Peters, 642 F.3¢ 381 (2nd Cie, 2011) conclusion that Peters's statements to Brackett evidenced, at a minimum, a “reckless disregard of the prohibitions of the New York Disciplinary Code.” Jn re Peters, 543 FSupp.2d at 332; see Peters's Br. at 72-71. If that issue remains relevant on remand, Peters should present her argument on that point to the Grievance Committee for its consideration in the first instance. Il. Confidentiality Order Allegation. Notice of Charge We reject Peters's argument that she had inadequate notice of the Confidentiality Onder allegation prior to Judge Baers hearing.* See Peters’ Br. at 55-57. First, Peters's argument that this allegation was not “included in any way, shape or form in the Sanctions Motion,” id, at 55, is incorrect. Although the defendants did (642 F.3d 391) not, in a separate count, charge Peters with violating, the Confidentiality Order, that allegation was made in several sections of the motion: (1) as part of the charge that Peters had improperly refused to rem discovery and had attempted to use discovery from the New York action in the Massachusetts action, see App. at A84 (“The unmistakable inference from plaintiff's conduct is that it intends to use the discovery it tricked the [defendants] into providing in this matter in the Massachusetts Action or otherwise, for its own improper benefit... Now thet the New York action thas concluded, the only reason for [plaintiffs ‘counsel's request for leave to share transcripts with its client] is to misappropriate defendants’ information, cither in the Massachusetts Action or for plaintif's anti-competitive business purposes. Meanwhile, the Complaint in the Massachusetts Action ... clearly utilizes information gleaned from the depositions in this case, in further violation of the Confidentiality ‘Order issued in this case.” (emphasis in original), ‘A82-83 (tating that, afer the plaintiff angued that “plaintiff needed to retain a copy of the [discovery] documents for the Massachusetts Action,” the district court “indicated that the plaintiff would have to take discovery anew in any such action and ordered plaintiff to return all discovery to the Court... This Girective also was consistent with the Confidentiality Order issued in the case, which unambiguously prohibited the use of material marked CONFIDENTIAL or HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL in fastcase ‘connection with any other proceeding.” (citations omitted)); (2) as part of the request that the district court bar the use in any other action of any materials ‘covered by the Confidentiality Order, see id. at A9S (Plaintiff and its counsel breached the [Confidentiality] Order's express prohibition on using. discovery information in other cases by utilizing information gleaned from Attorneys’ Eyes Only ‘depositions in the Massachusetts Complaint and necessarily sharing it with their Massachusetts counsel. The Court should thus enforce the [Confidentiality] Order and bar plaintiff, its affiliates, its employees, and its counsel, from using discovery from this case in the Massachusetts Action."); 3) as part of the request that plaintiff's counsel be disqualified from prosecuting the Massachusetts, action, see id at A96 (“Pursuant to the [Confidentiality] Order .., the parties were required fo treat confidential information or information, exchanged on an ‘Attorneys Eyes Only” basis as “Protected Material,’ as defined therein, As such, this material was ordered ‘not to be used ... in any other litigation proceeding.’ [Confidentiality] Order 4 7(a) at 11. Despite this [Confidentiality] Order, plaintiffs counsel has already shown its willingness fo use such information in the Massachusetts Action.”); and (4) as part of their argument that the plaints should be held in civil contempt, see id, at A99 (stating that plaintiff's Massachusetts complaint uliliz{ed) information obtained in discovery in this, action designated as ‘Attomeys' Eyes Only,’ despit this Court's [Confidentiality] Order on April 12, 2007, which provides, inter alia, that material so designated ‘shall not be used ... in any other litigation, proceeding,’ Protective Order 4 7(a) at 11.”). ‘Through the above-noted portions of the defendants’ sanction motion, a reasonable person ‘would have been on notice that the Confidentiality Order allegation, if proved, could lead to sanctions, See (642 F.34392] Mullane, 339 US. at 314, 70 $.Ct. 652; In re Jacobs, 44 F.3d at 90, Peters herself appears to have reached that very conclusion as of May 24, 2007, when she signed an affidavit and a memorandum of law in support of her firm's opposition to the sanctions motion. See App. at A122~64 (Mem. of Law), A165 237 (Peters AfT), In that affidavit and memorandum,Ine Peters, 642 F.2d 381 (2nd Ci, 2011) Peters explicitly treated the Confidentiality Order allegation as an asserted ground for sanctions. Jd, at 155-64, A232-37. The relevant portion of the ‘memorandum begins as follows: Defendants contend that sanctions are warranted. in this case due to Plaintif’s use of the deposition transcripts from the New York Action, which Defendants had designated as “Attomeys’ Eyes Only,” in motion papers filed under seal in the ‘Massachusetts Action. Defendants assert that this use. of the transcripts constituted a violation of the Confidentiality Order warranting sanctions. Dorsey strenuously opposes this grounds (sic) for sanctions. Id, a A155, In her brief, Peters argues that “the Sanct Motion could not have included the Confidentiality Order Allegation, because the transcript excerpts were filed in Massachusetts after the Sanctions Motion was delivered to Dorsey's offices on April 24, 2007.” Peters's Br. at 55 (emphasis in original) However, the allegations in the sanctions motion concerning violation of the Confidentiality Order were broad enough to encompass both violations that had already occurred and violations that were anticipated. See App. at A84 (The unmistakable inference from plaintiff's conduct is that it intends to use the discovery ... in the Massachusetts Action or cotherwise[."). In any event, a reasonable person ‘could not read the defendants’ request for sanctions based on the prior filings in Massachusetts violating, the Confidentiality Order without realizing that similar subsequent filings in Massachusetts. would likely also be at issue. Additionally, a defense against sanctions for the post-April 24 filings in Massachusetts did not require different preparation than a defense against sanctions for the pre-April 24 filings—the primary issue was not whether particular filings were improper, but whether the Massachusetts, action was the same action as the New York action, for purposes of the Confidentiality Order. Peters also received adequate advance notice of the charge through the district court's May 2007 order, in which the district court made clear that the Confidentiality Order allegation constituted a ground for sanctions that would be considered during the sanctions proceeding. See Wolters Kluwer Fin, Servs, Inc. v. Scivantage, 07-cv-2352, 2007 WL 1498114, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2007) (“Plaintiff's counsel also suggested that following Plaintiffs voluntary dismissal, this Cour’s repeated orders 0 retum discovery forthwith concomitantly modified fastca Se the [Confidentiality] Order and granted her the ability {0 use transcripts of these ‘attomeys' eyes only’ depositions in the Massachusetts action. Such a contention strains credulity. I will address Plaintiffs actions, however, in a future opinion regarding Defendants’ motion for contempt and sanctions, once such motion is fully briefed... I will decline, at this time, to direct Plaintiff to redact from its filings in the Massachusetts action the ‘attorneys’ eyes only" transcripts of depositions taken in this action... will, reserve decision on that sanction, as well as the more serious sanctions, including contempt, requested by Defendants... These sanctions, as well as the branch of Defendant's motion that socks disqualification of Plaintiff's counsel from the Massachusetts action, will, abide the fully briefed motion and any hearings [642 F.3d 393] that are warranted.” (internal citations and footnote omitted), Thus, Peters had ample notice of this charge prior to the commencement of Judge Baer's sanctions proceeding. B. The Confidentiality Order Was Violated Although we do not find the Confidentiality Order to be, in all relevant respects, “crystal clea In re Peters, 543 F.Supp.2d at 333, we conclude that it barred the use, in the Massachusetts action, of New York discovery materials covered by the order. ‘The Confidentiality Onder slates, in. various provisions, that it governs the handling of ‘confidential dacuments in “this action” (used at least nineteen times), “the action” (used once), “this lawsuit" (used twice), “the above-entitled litigation” {used thrice), “this litigation” (used once), “the litigation” (used once), and “this case” (used once)? ‘App. at A43-47 (Confidentiality Ordes). The order ‘also references “these actions” and “each action,” id at AS3, AST, which appear to be errors and, in any event, are not relevant to the present issue. Although use of these different phrases introduced a degree of ambiguity, the context makes apparent that all of these phrases were meant tobe synonymous and refer to the same legal proceeding. However, we agree ‘with Peters that such phrases may, depending on the circumstances, refer to @ group of separate, but related, legal proceedings before more than one court, or judge, rather than a single action with a single docket number in a single court. Since these phrases are not defined in the order, and are susceptible todifferent definitions, most of them are of litle use in interpreting the scope of the ord. We focus on two portions of the onder. First, paragraph 4 of the order contains the following language: (b) Access to Confidential Information. In the absence of written permission from the Producing Party or Designating Party, as applicable, or an onder of the Court, any Protected Material consisting of or containing CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION shall be used solely for purposes of the prosecution and defense of the above-entitled litigation] Confidentiality Order 4 4(b). Paragraph 4(cis ‘identical to 4(b), except that the phrase, “ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY INFORMATION,” is. used in place of “CONFIDENTIAL. INFORMATION.” Although one can argue over the precise meaning of “above-entitled litigation,” there is no plausible definition of that phrase that would encompass both the New York action and the Massachusetts action. “Above-entitled” refers to the “title” appearing on the first page of the Confidentiality Order itself, however, every conceivable part of that litigation “title” differs from the comparable portion of the Massachusetts action's “title”: (a) the names of the partes differ, in that the Massachusetts action involved one " additional plaintiff and one additional defendant; (b) the name of the court differs; and (@) the docket number differs, Second, after defining “Court” as referring to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, see Confidentiality Order § Q)(1), the order [642 F.3d 394] states that: the “Court” may overrule a party's confidentiality designation, id. (a); the “Court” may permit the use of confidential material for purposes beyond the “above-entitled litigation,” id. § 4(@)(0); “Court” employees owe no duty to the parties (0 maintain the confidentiality of documents filed with the “Court,” id. §) 6(2); applications and motions to the “Court” appending confidential ‘materials are to be filed under seal with the “caption of this case” appearing on the outside of the envelope, id. 4] 6(b); the parties may move the “Coun” to resolve disputes over the sealing of documents, id. 6(¢); the party challenging a confidentiality designation may seck relief from the fi Tastcase 042 F.84 381 (2nd Cl, 2014) “Court.” id 8; and “(he Court shall retain jurisdiction, even after termination of this lawsuit, 0 ‘enforce this Order and to make such amendments and ‘modifications (0 this Order as may be appropriate,” id. 4 13. These procedures and remedies, limited exclusively to the Southem District of New York, ‘would make no sense if the order were read as (a) permitting any party, without leave, 10 file confidential documents in any other court, and/or (b) ‘iving the Southern District authority over filings and other proceedings in other courts. The order clearly anticipates that the Southern District, and no other court, would control all matters of confidentiality covered by the order. An essential component of that, control is the requirement that confidential documents be used only in that case in that court. To the extent that Peters argues that the Confidentiality Order was orally modified by Judge Baer in some fashion relevant to the present issue, see Peters's Br. at 88-90, we reject the argument. Although Judge Baer addressed the treatment of discovery materials on several occasions, Peters has not cited any oral order, or comment, altering any provisions governing the filing of documents in any other litigation or court. We agree with the Grievance Committee that Judge Baer's instruction that Peters’ firm could “keep” certain transcript excerpts did not alter the Confidentiality Order’s bar on the use of those excerpts elsewhere, including in Massachusetts, ‘See In re Peters, S43 F.Supp 2d at 334. ‘Thus, Peters's submission of confidential materials to the Massachusetts court, without the prior leave of Judge Baer, violated the Confidentiality Order. C. Proof of Culpable Mental State Although Peters violated the Confidentiality Order, an attorney's violation of a court order docs not, by itself, necessarily constitute sanctionable misconduct. To be sanctionable, the attomey’s violation must be accompanied by a culpable state of mind. See, e.g, ABA Standaeds for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, R. 6.21-6.24 (1986, amended 1992)(outlining range of sanctions for violating a court order or rule, depending on the lawyer's mental state and other factors); In re Ryan, 189 A.D.2d 96, 104, $94 N.Y.$.2d 168 (Ist Dep't 1993) (stating that “venal intent” is element of DR. 1~102(A)@4)); In re Cohn, 194 A.D.2d 987, 990-91, 600 NY.S.2d 501 Gd_ Dep't 1993Ystating that ““venal intent”. is “apparent element” of DR 1-102(A)(4) and holdingInyo Peters, 642 F.3d 381 (2nd Gir, 2011) _ that, although venal intent was lacking, “the same specifications... supported (642 F.34 395] charges of conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice involving misstatements in official documents misleading to judicial and other ‘governmental agencies"). For the following reasons, we find that, on the present record, there is insufficient evidence that Peters acted with a culpable state of mind when she violated the Confidentiality Order, First, the record created by Judge Baer does not make clear the degree of Peters's familiarity with the Confidentiality Order during the relevant time period. ‘The record contains evidence, presented by Peters, that: other attomeys in Peters's firm had taken the lead in negotiating that order; the order had been issued by the district court on April 12, 2007; Peters hhad left the country the following day and did not have a copy of the order during her time abroad; she hhad not reviewed the order prior to her departure {although she had discussed it briefly with others); and she had relied on the advice of other attorneys in her firm as to the order's requirements. See App. at A792, A907, A923-24; see also A840 (Brackett research email dated Apr. 19, 2007) (“I think that we can construe the Massachusetts Action as a. continuation of the previous matter.”), Zachary Carter and Jonathan Herman, two of the atiomeys upon whom Peters claims to have relied, see id, at A769, A811, testified that they had not read the Confidentiality Order during the relevant time period, see id. at A727, A731, A733, ABIL However, Herman, who had been ‘assigned by the firm to supervise Peters's conduct of the litigation, see id. at T31, 804, had asked Carter on April 24, apparently on Peters's behalf, whether use of transeript pages from the New York action in an exhibit to an anticipated Massachusetts filing would violate “any existing court order of [Judge] Baer,” id. at A846, In response, Carter advised that, although there was an outstanding motion requesting the return of transcript pages, republishing them in the exhibit would be “fair game.” id. According to Carter's testimony, however, he was not familiar with the Confidentiality Order at the time he gave that advice, as “the only orders that [he] had been ... exposed tol were those that had been issued” from April 16 through the time he gave that advice. Jd. at A731 The record does not indicate whether Peters knew, of fastcase should have known, the limited nature of Carter's advice AAs for Mate Reiner, Deidre Sheridan, and Bracket, the Dorsey altomeys who Peters alleged were the most familiar with the Confidentiality Order, see id, at A792, A907, A92I-24; of id. al A697 (Reiner testifying that he had read the order carefull), theit testimony and declarations donot cover the issue of Peter's familiarity with the Confidentiality Order, see id. at A239-43, A244-50, ‘AG80-106, A708-16, A819-24, although they were presumably the most knowledgeable about that point, aside from Peters herself. In fact, Sheridan never testified at all, Although Reiners testimony, and an email indicate that he had informed Peters of Judge Baers April 16 instruction that her firm “should seek new discovery” in the Massachusetts action, see id. at ‘A686, A835, he did not mention the Confidentiality (Order in relation to that instruction, Judge Baer and the Grievance Committee rejected Peters's assertion that she had acted in good faith as demonstrated by her reliance on Brackets research on whether the Massachusetis and New York cases were the same litigation within the meaning of the Confidentiality Order. See In re Peters, $43 FSupp.2d at 334; App. at A839-41 However, a rejection of that evidence requires a finding as to her familiarity with the Confidentiality Order, Le, whether she knew, or should have known, [642 F.3d 396) that the Confidentiality Order barred the filing in Massachusetts of material covered by that order. Furthermore, if the Grievance Committee concludes, fon remand, that Peters did not know that the Massachusetts filing was barred by the Confidentiality Order, but should have known, a finding as tothe degree of her culpability is necessary since mere negligence might not warrant severe, or any, disciplinary measures. See ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, R. 6.23-6.24 (stating ‘that reprimand or admonition is generally appropriate for negligent failure to comply with court order or rule). On the other hand, it is possible that Peters would warrant discipline for violating the Confidentiality Order even if she was not familiar with its terms—if, for example, her failure to familiarize herself with the order was in bad faith, However, such a conclusion would require detailed factual findings.Second, we disagree with the Grievance Committee's conclusion that Peters's “good faith” defense is undermined by provisions of the Confidentiality Order that “providel ] mechanism for seeking guidance from the Court on its scope,” Jn re Peters, 543 FSupp.2d at 334 (citing Confidentiality Order $4} 9, 10, 13), and by the asserted “fact that her own client did not agree with her use of the transcripts in the Massachusetts action,” id. (citing Wolters Kluwer, 525 F.Supp.2d at 514 n, 254), Paragraph 9 of the Confidentiality Onder permits “any person to seek judicial modification or amendment of [the] [olrder"; paragraph 10 requires that notice be given to a party if disclosure is sought of that party's “Protected Material”; and paragraph 13 provides that the obligations created by the order ‘would survive the termination of the lawsuit “unless ‘modified by the respective Court in each action” ‘and that the district court would retain jurisdiction to enforce, amend, or modify the order. None of those provisions contain an explicit mechanism for seeking guidance on the scope of the Confidentiality Order. While such guidance could be sought, with or without reference to any provision of the Confidentiality Order, no provision mandates that @ party seek guidance as to the meaning of a term or provision of the order or suggests that failure to seek ‘guidance is necessarily unreasonable or in bad faith, The record also does not contain clear evidence that Peters's client disagreed with her use of the New ‘York transcripts in Massachusetts, At one point, the relevant witness, in-house counsel for the client, testified that he had instructed Peters to make an argument to the district court about the use of New York depositions in the Massachusetts action. See App. at A460-61. However, in response to a question, about whether he understood that the district court hhad made a “further ruling on these issues,” he testified that there had been “additional communications on that,” without describing. that ruling or those communications. See id. at A461. ‘That witness also testified that he had authorized Peters to request the Massachusetts court to order the defendants to again produce the documents that Indge Baer had ordered be retumed to him, see id. at ‘A464, and that he had been consulted prior to the filing of New York transcripts in the Massachusetts action, had been advised that the Confidentiality Order’ did not cover the anticipated filing, and, apparently, had not objected, see AS18-19:- fastcase In re Peters, 642 F.36 381 (2nd Cir, 2011) [642 F.34397] ‘Third, in finding that Peters had violated the Confidentiality Order in bad faith, the Grievance Committee adopted Judge Baer's conclusion that Peters used the transcripts [in the Massachusetts action] in a bad-faith effort for the improper purpose of gaining advantage (and expedient relief) in a new ‘court after she had ‘judge-shopped,’ and after she had gained extensive discovery without providing any discovery of her own, and in an effort to have [the Massachusetts) Court eviscerate the Confidentiality (Order that this Court had entered to govern discovery produced in this litigation. In re Peters, $43 FSupp-2d at 334 (first alteration in original) (citing Wolters Kluwer, 525 F.Supp.2d at 548). This conclusion, however, links the Confidentiality Order allegation to several other allegations made in the defendants’ sanction motion, without separate analysis of those other allegations. Additionally, part of Judge Bacr’s conclusion was rendered questionable by this Court's opinion in the appeal from Judge Baers reprimand order. In that appeal, this Court reversed the district courts. reprimand ‘against Peter's law firm for voluntarily dismissing the Wolters Kluwer litigation, stating that the fiem was “entitled to file a valid Rule 41 notice of voluntary dismissal for any reason,” and rejecting Judge Baer’ conclusion that the dismissal \was an improper attempt to judge-shop, or that the ling of the Rule 41 notice itself was sanctionabl. Wolters Kluwer, S64 F.3d at 114-15; see also id. at 115 (It follows that Dorsey was entitled to file a valid Rule 41 notice of voluntary dismissal for any reason, and the fact that it did so to flee the jurisdiction or the judge does not make the filing sanetionable”). Furthermore, the record shows that there were legitimate reasons supporting dismissal, as both the client's in-house counsel and certain Dorsey atiomeys, Peters included, had become aware of a possible lack of personal jurisdiction in New York; indeed, the defendants had filed a motion to dismiss on that basis. See App. at A648, A832 (email exchange between Peters and opposing counsel discussing the issue). Additionally, there does not appear to be a dispute that Peters initially had opposed dismissal under Rule 41 and had instead attempted, unsuccessfully, to have the district court rule on her motion to have the case transferred to Massachusets.” See, ei. at A202 (Peters Decl. § 132), A239-41 (Reiner Deel. f) 2-6), A680-81(Reiner testimony), A833-34 (emails, between Peters and other attomeys, discussing issu). For the forgoing reasons, we also vacate the portion of the Grievance Committee's order sanctioning Peters based on the Confidentiality Order allegation. On remand, however, the Grievance Committee is fiee to make a new determination, ‘based on detailed factual findings, of whether [642 F.3d 398] Poters acted with a culpable state of mind when she violated the Confidentiality Order and, if 80, to discipline her accordingly. IIL, Seven-Year Suspension The preceding conclusions, by themselves, necessitate vacatur of the seven-year suspension imposed by the Grievance Committee. Thus, at this juncture, we need not address whether that suspension was excessive. However, if the Grievance Committee determines, after additional proceedings, that suspension or disbarment is warranted, the Committee should explain its rationale for the severity of the sanction imposed, with a discussion, oft mitigating and aggravating factors; Peters's state ‘of mind and motive; any prejudice caused by her conduct to the parties, public, and district court; and. the relevant case law and other authorities supporting its determination. IV. Conclusions For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is VACATED’ and the matter is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this decision. In vacating the Grievance Committee's determination, we do not intend to suggest that the changes against Peters were improperly brought, only that certain procedures and findings were inadequate. We therefore deny Peters’s request that the Grievance Committee be directed to terminate its disciplinary proceeding against her. All remaining issues raised by Peters in her brief either are rendered moot by this, decision or should be raised in the first instance on remand. Notes: f fastcase _ ln re Peters, 682 F.3d 981 (2nd Cir, 2011) “Peters is registered in New York as “Kristan Peters” and in Connecticut as “Kristan Peters: Hamlin.” 2X4n the Grievance Committee's January 2008 order dirceting Peters to show cause why she should not be disciplined, she also was charged with “participatfing] in a conference with the [district court] to adjourn a TRO hearing and discuss future depositions at a time when [Peters] knew that those depositions and the TRO hearing would not take place,” and “copfying] transcripts and order[ing] additional copies of transcripts in intentional disregard of court orders.” In re Peters, M-2-238, doc. 51 at 2 (SPA4) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2008). However, since Peters's suspension was not based on. those charges, they are not addressed here. S—-Bflective April 1, 2009, the New York Disciplinary Rules were replaced withthe New York Rules of Professional Conduct (*RPC"), The text of DR 1-102(a)(5), DR 1-102(A){4), and DR 7-106(A) can now be found in respectively, RPC 8.4(@), R 8.4(c), and RPC 3.4(c). Although we are not reviewing Judge Baer's reprimand decision, we nonetheless apply the “more exacting” abuse of discretion standard since the Grievance Committee relied on Judge Baer’s sanctions proceeding and adopted his findings. “At the beginning of the hearing, Judge Baer stated: Any sanctions or contempt imposed, should that come to pass, will be based solely on the conduct of | this matter, although I might add that knowledge by [the] plaintif| } of any prior improprieties of Ms, Peters at the time it engaged her and initiated this, lawsuit may be pertinent App. at A374, Although this statement arguably ‘wamed Peters that additional charges were possible, it did not constitute notice of the Brackett allegation. A mumber of sealed documents that are part of the district court record for the Wolters Kluwer action were placed on a single disc that was filed as document 124. In the present decision, a citation to “Doe. 124, item x” refers to the document numbered “se” on the disc filed as document 124, LPeters's questioning of other witnesses was similarly truncated. See, eg, App. at A813 (Peters “Your Honor, I must tell the Court that I have some oetn 0 Peters, 642 F.2d 381 (2nd Ci, 2011) critical questions fremaining for Mr. Herman.” Judge Baer: “Well you should have gotten them out in the time table that I... have prescribed”), A8I8 (tating, that Peters, in questioning Eric Epstein, had “had [her] 10 minutes”). Further, at the termination fof the sanctions hearing, Peters was denied the opportunity to call two additional witnesses who, she stated, could attest that she had not opposed returning twanscripts to the district court. See id. at A827. ‘the confidentiality order is entitled “Confidentiality Stipulation and Protective Order,” ‘see App. at A43, but is usually referred to in the record as either the “confidentiality order” or the “protective order.” In this decision, we refer to it as, the “Confidentiality Order.” “According to the Grievance Committee, “[i]he Confidentiality Order says several times that protected material shall not be used in any litigation, other than the captioned proceeding,” In re Peters, 543 F.Supp.2d at 333 (emphasis omitted). However, while the order does refer to “the above-entitled litigation,” it does not use the phrase “the captioned proceeding.” 104n her brief, Peters argues that the provision of the order preserving the right “to seek judicial modification or amendment of thfe] Order” permitted, the parties to seek relief from a court other than the Southern District of New York. See Peters’s Br. at 87 (quoting Confidentiality Order ¥ 9). Even if that interpretation is accurate, that provision did not override, and no other court ever modified, the provisions of the Confidentiality Order limiting the use of confidential material. The testimony concerning in-house counsel's failure to object to the Massachusetts filing is ambiguous. Peters asked in-house counsel the following question: “And you didn’t say anything to ‘me about not filing that pleading with the—with transcripts attached, correct?” App. at ASI. In-house counsel answered, “No,” id. at A519, which might be interpreted as “No, you are not correct,” or the ‘opposite, “No, | didn't say anything fo you about not filing that pleading,” The context appears to favor the latter interpretation. At the very least, the testimony relevant to whether the client disagreed with the filing of the transcripts is too ambiguous to reach any firm conclusion, “4m his May 2007 order, Judge Baer stated that, hhad Peters’ client moved under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 to transfer venue, its argument that the Massachusetts action represented “continuing litigation” would have been stronger. See Wolters Kluwer, 2007 WL 1498114, at *8. However, Peters's firm had made such a motion in April 2007, and, as Judge Baer acknowledged in his later sanctions order, he had “declined to address the [venue] issue at that time.” Wolters Khower, 525 F.Supp.2d at 495. a1.EXHIBIT C EXHIBIT C EXHIBIT CCase: 13-1916 Document: 199-1 Page:1 04/04/2014 119448914 13-1916-cv Kristan L. Peters v. Committee on Grievances Un the Gnited States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit AucGusT TERM 2013 No. 13-1916-cv KRISTAN L. PE! Appellant, ERS, v. COMMITTEE ON GRIEVANCES FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. M-2-238 (CM) — Colleen McMahon, Judge, for the Committee on Grievances. ARGUED: FEBRUARY 19, 2014 DecreD: ApRriL 4, 2014 Before: CABRANES, SACK and WESLEY, Circuit Judges. Kristan Peters, an attorney admitted to the bars of New York and Connecticut, appeals from the April 10, 2013 Order of the Committee on Grievances for the United States District Court for the 1of 16Case: 13-1916 Document: 199-1 Page:2 04/04/2014 1194489 2 No. 13-1916cev Southern District of New York (the “Committee”) suspending her from practicing law in the Southern District of New York for seven years, based on a conclusion that she violated various provisions of the New York Code of Professional Responsibility (“Professional Code”), 22 NYCRR §§ 1200.1 et seq., while a partner at the law firm of Dorsey & Whitney. Peters challenges both the finding that she violated the Professional Code, and the reasonableness of the seven- year suspension. Upon review of the record, we find no error in the Committee’s conclusion that Peters violated the Professional Code. We hold further that the Committee acted well within its informed discretion in ordering a seven-year suspension, notwithstanding the lack of directly analogous precedent, based on its conclusion that Peters’s conduct was sui generis. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the Committee suspending Peters from practice in the Southern District of New York for a period of seven years. ELKAN ABRAMOWITZ (Catherine M. Foti, Daniel F. Wachtel, on the brief), Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello, P.C,, New York, NY, for Appellant Kristan L. Peters, QUAN A. Gao (David B. Tulchin, Esterina Giuliani, on the brief), New York, NY, for Appellee Committee on Grievances. 14 2 0f 16Case! 13-1916 Document: 199-1 Page:3 04/04/2014 1194489 3 No. 13-1916cv PER CURIAM: Kristan Peters, an attorney admitted to the bars of New York and Connecticut, appeals from the April 10, 2013 Order of the Committee on Grievances for the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Committee”)! suspending her from practice in the Southern District of New York (“SDNY”) for seven years, based on a conclusion that she violated various provisions of the New York Code of Professional Responsibility (“Professional Code”), 22 NYCRR §§ 1200.1 et seq., while a partner at the law firm of Dorsey & Whitney. Peters challenges both the finding that she violated the Professional Code, and the reasonableness of the seven-year suspension. This case comes to us on appeal for the second time, after we vacated the Committee's first order suspending Peters for a term of seven years, and remanded with instructions to, inter alia, conduct an independent evidentiary hearing on the charges. On review of the new record, we find no error in the Committee’s conclusion that Peters violated the Professional Code. We hold further that the Committee acted well within its informed discretion in ordering a seven-year suspension, notwithstanding the lack of directly At the time of the April 10, 2013 Order, the Committee members were District Judge P. Kevin Castel (Chairman), Chief Judge Loretta A. Preska, District Judges Vincent L. Briccetti, Katherine B. Forrest, Paul A. Gardephe, John F. Keenan, Colleen McMahon, Louis L. Stanton, Richard J. Sullivan, and Magistrate Judge Frank Maas. Judge McMahon served as Chairman Pro Tempore on this matter, and Judge Briccetti took no part in its consideration, 14 3 of 16Case: 13-1916 Document: 199-1 Page:4 04/04/2014 1194489 4 No. 13-1916cev_ analogous precedent, based on its conclusion that Peters’s conduct was sui generis. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the Committee suspending Peters from practice in the Southern District of New York for a period of seven years. BACKGROUND A. Charges Against Peters The facts underlying the challenged suspension have been repeated in several opinions, over hundreds of pages, and need not be re-stated here? Briefly, the charges against Peters arose out of her conduct as a partner at the law firm of Dorsey & Whitney, in the course of litigation in SDNY before Judge Harold Baer, Jr. (the “Wolters-Kluwer litigation”). Peters was charged principally with (1) instructing a first-year associate, Jordan Brackett, to “mark up” deposition transcripts on the theory that the markings would bring the transcripts under the protection of the attorney work-product privilege, thereby exempting them from Judge Baer’s order that all discovery be returned to the District Court, and attempting to mislead the Court as to those events (the “Brackett Allegation,” or “Charge One”); and (2) “coplying] transcripts and order[ing] additional .. . transcripts in intentional disregard of court orders,” and “us[ing] the transcripts in a[ ] [related] action in Massachusetts,” in knowing violation of a 2 For detailed background, see, eg, January 23, 2013 Report and Recommendation, Special Appendix ("SPA") 26-143; In re Peters, 543 F. Supp. 2d 326, 331-34 (G.D.N. Y. 2008) (interim suspension order). 14 4 of 16Case: 13-1916 Document: 199-1 Page:5 04/04/2014 1194489 5 No. 13-1916cv confidentiality order (the “Confidentiality Order”) entered by Judge Baer (the “Confidentiality Order Allegation,” or “Charge Three”)# See January 30, 2008 Order to Show Cause, Special Appendix (“SPA”) 1-2. B. Procedural History We outline the extensive procedural history of this case only insofar as it is relevant to Peters’s claims on appeal. In 2007, after conducting a sanctions hearing regarding Peters’s conduct during the Wolters-Kluwer litigation, Judge Baer imposed non-monetary sanctions on Peters for violating the Professional Code, and referred the case to the Committee for further disciplinary proceedings. In 2009, the Committee issued a final ruling‘ that Peters had violated at least three disciplinary rules in connection with the charges (outlined above) against her: (1) Disciplinary Rule (“DR”) 1- 102(A)(5), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in “conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice”; (2) DR 1-102(A)(4), ° The allegations that formed the basis for the original “Charge Two" against Peters were not at issue on remand. «The Committee first ordered Peters to show cause why she should not be disciplined. On review of Peters's submissions and the record before Judge Baer, the Committee concluded that “Judge Baer's findings are strongly supported by the record,” and suspended Peters temporarily from practicing in SDNY, but deferred final adjudication pending resolution of the appeal from Judge Baer’s sanctions order. In re Peters, 543 F. Supp. 2d 326, 329-35 (SID.N.Y. 2008). In an April 21, 2009 Order and Opinion, this Court affirmed Judge Baer’s sanctions order against Peters, but vacated the sanctions against Dorsey & Whitney and a junior partner, Marc Reiner. See Wolters Kluroer Fin, Seros,, Inc. v. Scioantage, 564 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2009). The Committee then proceeded with its final adjudication of the charges against Peters. 14 5 of 16Case: 13-1916 Document: 199-1 Page:6 04/04/2014 1194489 6 No. 13-1916cev prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in “conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation”; and (3) DR 7- 106(A), prohibiting a lawyer from “disregard[ing] or advis[ing] [a] client to disregard... a ruling . . . made in the course of a proceeding,”> 22 N.Y.CRR. §§ 1200.33, 1200.37. As a penalty, the Committee initially ordered disbarment, but, on reconsideration, imposed a seven-year suspension. On appeal from the Committee’s 2009 decision suspending Peters for seven years, we applied a “more exacting [standard] than ... the ordinary abuse-of-discretion standard,” in light of the fact that the Committee had based its conclusions on the findings of Judge Baer, who had, in the nature of things, acted as “accuser, fact finder and sentencing judge all in one.” In re Peters, 642 F.3d 381, 384 & na (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Applying that standard, we vacated the findings regarding the Brackett Allegation on the basis that Peters was entitled to, and had not received, an independent evidentiary hearing. Id. at 390. We also vacated the charge based on the Confidentiality Order Allegation, holding that although Peters violated the Confidentiality Order, the Committee had made insufficient findings as to whether Peters had the requisite culpable state of mind. In vacating that charge, we emphasized that the Committee was “free [on remand] to make a new determination, based on detailed factual findings, of » Effective April 1, 2009, the New York Rules of Professional Conduct replaced the New York Code of Professional Responsibility. Former DR 1-102(A\(5) is now RPC. 8.4(d); former DR 1-102(A)(4) is now RPC 8.4(¢); and former DR 7-106(A) is now RPC 3.4(c). The rules are substantively unchanged. See SPA 83-85. 14 6 of 16Case: 13-1916 Document: 199-1 Page:7 04/04/2014 1194489 ze No. 13-1916cv whether Peters acted with a culpable state of mind . . . and, if so, to discipline her accordingly.” Id. at 397-98. On remand, Judge Colleen McMahon, acting as Chairman Pro Tempore of the Committee, ultimately referred the matter to Magistrate Judge Lisa M. Smith, who took submissions and heard eleven full days of testimony.’ Judge Smith then issued a 118-page Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) concluding that Peters’s conduct during the Wolters-Kluwer litigation violated the Professional Code, and recommending a five-year suspension © We expressly did “not . . . suggest that [either of] the charges against Peters, ‘were improperly brought,” and left open the possibility that the Committee might again impose a suspension or disbar Peters as long as it explained the rationale for the sanction imposed. Peters, 642 F.3d at 398, ” During the hearing, the Committee was represented by the same counsel as on appeal. Peters had different counsel before the Committee. 8 On this second appeal, Peters claims that the charges against her were inappropriately expanded on remand. See Appellant's Br. 51. This claim is without merit, for substantially the reasons stated in the R&R, see SPA 31 n4, 137-38, and the April 10, 2013 Order, see SPA 152. In short, the charges that formed the basis for the Committee's suspension were within the scope of the original charges against Peters, which were not narrowed on remand. See Note 5, ante. Moreover, Peters had ample notice of the charges against her, and on which she was sanctioned. Finally, to the extent that the Committee viewed the evidence against Peters more harshly after the independent hearing before Judge Smith, that was a risk Peters assumed in seeking further process, and there is no evidence that the Committee's second decision was a result of vindictiveness. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 39 US. 711, 720, (1969) (“[A] corollary of the power to retry a defendant is the power, upon the defendant's reconviction, to impose whatever sentence may be legally authorized, whether or not itis greater than the sentence imposed after the first conviction,” as long as the higher sentence is not a result of “vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction ....”), overruled on other grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989). Notably, the Committee's final decision here did not impose a harsher “sentence” than that imposed originally. 14 7 of 16Case: 13-1916 Document: 199-1 Page:8 04/04/2014 1194489 8 No. 13-1916cv Inan April 10, 2013 Order, the Committee adopted the finding that Peters had violated the Professional Code, but concluded that “this case is sui generis—and deserving of [a seven-year suspension].” SPA 155. Peters moved for reconsideration, and relief from judgment, both of which the Committee denied. Itis against this backdrop that we review Peters’s appeal. DISCUSSION On appeal, Peters claims principally that: (1) she was denied a full and fair disciplinary hearing in the proceedings before Judge Smith and the Committee, resulting in the erroneous conclusion that she violated the relevant disciplinary rules; and (2) the Committee “abused its discretion” in imposing a seven-year suspension, which was outside the range of discipline imposed in comparable cases, and improperly considered aggravating factors of which Peters lacked notice. We address the “liability” claim and the “sentencing” claim in turn. A. The Conclusion that Peters Violated the Professional Code In general, we review “[tJhe decision whether to impose disciplinary sanctions on an attorney [under] an abuse-of-discretion standard.”® Grievance Comm. for S. Dist. of N.Y. v. Simels, 48 F.3d 640, ° One exception to this deferential standard is where a party appeals “the Committee's interpretation of a particular disciplinary rule,” in which case our review is, “plenary,” or de novo. Simels, 48 F.3d at 645. Another is where we are reviewing a decision in which the judge is necessarily the “accuser, fact finder and sentencing judge,” as was the case in Peters's first appeal. Peters, 642 F.3d at 384 & n4. Neither of these exceptions applies here. 14 Bof 16Case: 13-1916 Document: 199-1 Page:9 04/04/2014 1194489 9 No. 13-1916cv. 645 (2d Cir. 1995); Peters, 642 F.3d at 384. A court “abuse[s] its discretion” when it “base[s] its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or render{s] a decision that cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” Sims v. Blot, 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 1, The Brackett Allegation (Charge One) The challenges Peters raises with regard to the finding of guilt on the Brackett Allegation relate almost exclusively to Judge Smith’s credibility determinations and the assessment of conflicting evidence. As set forth above, Judge Smith conducted an extensive evidentiary hearing, approximately five-and-one-half days of which were devoted to Peters’s testimony. Judge Smith also considered testimony from Brackett, and numerous other lawyers and staff members from Dorsey & Whitney, in reaching her conclusions. The Committee then reviewed the R&R’s “extensive, record- based findings,” along with Peters’s specific objections. SPA 146-47. During the review process, transcripts of the hearing and the parties’ exhibits were also available to the Committee. In adopting the R&R, the Committee properly accorded substantial deference to Judge Smith’s credibility determinations, Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1985), and found them to be “supported by substantial evidence.” SPA 148. The Committee also independently concluded that Peters lacked credibility. See SPA 149 (noting that Peters’s “effort to minimize her role in the lawsuit and the unfolding 14 9 0f 16Case: 13-1916 Document: 199-1 Page:10 04/04/2014 1194489 10 No. 13-1916cv events seriously wounded her credibility in the eyes of Judge Smith and of the Committee”). Our review of the record reveals no error, much less clear error, in Judge Smith's findings, which the Committee adopted after its own review of the record. Accordingly, we conclude that Peters’s arguments with respect to the Brackett Allegation are without merit. 2. The Confidentiality Order Allegation (Charge Three) ‘The only open question regarding the Confidentiality Order Allegation is whether Peters acted with the requisite “culpable state of mind,” defined as “venal intent.” Peters, 642 F.3d at 394-95. That portentous term, at least in the context of the Professional Code, merely means “scienter, deceit, intent to mislead, or knowing failure to correct misrepresentations.” Matter of Altomerianos, 160 A.D.2d 96, 101 (Ist Dep't 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. (invoking term “venal intent” for the first time and noting: “That venal intent is a necessary element to DR 1-102(A)(4) we think is compelled by the definition of fraud given in the . . . Code as ‘not includfing] conduct . . . which lacks an element of scienter, deceit, Ha As evidence of Peters’s culpable state of mind, the Committee intent to mislead, [etc.] cited, among other things, “e-mails that demonstrated her familiarity with the terms of the Confidentiality Order,” and evidence that other partners told Peters that the Confidentiality Order did not permit her to use materials in a related litigation in 4 10 of 16Case: 13-1916 Document: 199-1 Page:11 04/04/2014 1194489 i No. 13-1916cv. Massachusetts.” SPA 149, The Committee found Peters’s “deliberate[] [choice] to obtain additional copies of the transcripts after being ordered to surrender them . . . by lying to the court reporter,” and her “far-fetched and wholly implausible explanation for her conduct,” was “strong evidence of her culpable state of mind.” SPA 151. The Committee's findings are sufficient to establish the requisite culpable intent, and nothing in our review of the record suggests that they were clearly erroneous or that the Committee “abused its discretion” in sustaining Charge Three. B. The Seven-Year Suspension Our review of the sanction imposed in a disciplinary proceeding is analogous to our review of a sentence imposed in an ordinary criminal action. Where, as here, there has been “a very great deal of process,” SPA 162, and no procedural error, our “abuse-of-discretion” review is akin to a review for “substantive unreasonableness.” United States v. Rigas, 583 F.3d 108, 114, 121-22 (2d Cir. 2009). As we have explained, such review “provide[s] a backstop for those few cases that, although procedurally correct, would nonetheless damage the administration of justice because the sentence imposed was shockingly high,” results in “manifest "© In remanding, we noted that if the Committee found Peters to be merely negligent in disobeying the Order, it “might not warrant severe, or any, disciplinary measures,” whereas if the Committee found that Peters’s “failure to familiarize herself with the [O}rder was in bad faith,” such a finding might warrant discipline. Peters, 642 F.3d at 396. 14 11 of 16Case: 13-1916 Document: 199-1 Page:12 04/04/2014 1194489 12 No. 13-1916cev, injustice,” or is “otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law.” Id. at 123. In determining the appropriate sanction, Judge Smith considered mitigating and aggravating factors, the prejudice caused by Peters’s actions, and the relevant authorities, as directed by this Court. See Peters, 642 F.3d at 398. Judge Smith recognized Peters’s clean disciplinary record and favorable character testimony, but noted her apparent, and continuing, lack of remorse. She also considered: (1) Peters’s refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of her conduct; (2) the “pattern of providing testimony that placed blame for any and all wrongdoing on all of the other attorneys,” SPA 127; (3) “instances in which Peters was untruthful” at the hearing, SPA 132; (4) the fact that Peters came “dangerously close to engaging in bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding,” SPA 137; and (5) Peters’s substantial legal experience, SPA 139.'! Notwithstanding the “seriousness of [the] misconduct,” Judge Smith recommended a five-year suspension due to her inability to find an analogous case resulting in a longer suspension. SPA 141. The Committee took Judge Smith’s recommendation “quite seriously,” SPA 154, but concluded that a seven-year suspension was warranted under the circumstances. SPA 155. The Committee found Peters’s “most serious failing’—which it deemed “particularly heinous”—to be her “corruption of a young and “ Peters’ argument that she lacked notice of the aggravating factors that Judge Smith would consider is without merit. As the Committee noted, Judge Smith made clear that she would consider the factors set forth in the ABA Center for Professional Responsibility Standards, and did just that. See SPA 158. 14 12 of 16Case: 13-1916 Document: 199-1 Page:13 04/04/2014 1194489 13 No. 13-1916cv inexperienced lawyer, over whom she had power and authority.” SPA 154. Additional aggravating factors noted by the Committee were Peters’s attempts to “salvage her reputation at the expense of . . . Mr. Brackett”; her “habit of twisting the truth’; her “flagrant mischaracterization of the record’; and the fact that, in the Committee’s view, Peters had “yet to accept any responsibility for ... serious professional wrongdoing.” SPA 154-55. Accordingly, the Committee concluded that the case was sui generis and deserving of a longer punishment. Our direction that the Committee should consider relevant precedent was intended to inform, not confine, the Committee’s exercise of its discretion in determining the appropriate sanction for a violation of the Professional Code. Every such sense, sui generis; that is, it requires a fact-particular inquiry and is iolation is, in some not amenable to a rigid calculus based on other cases. It is for that reason that we have a Committee on Grievances that may draw upon the cumulative authority of a panel of experienced judges. In view of the Committee’s conclusions regarding the nature of Peters’s conduct, we cannot say that its imposition of a seven-year suspension was “substantively unreasonable,” shocking to the judicial conscience, or otherwise unsupportable. 14 13 of 16Case: 13-1916 14 Document: 199-1 Page:14 04/04/2014 1194489 No. 13-1916cv. CONCLUSION To summarize: (1) 2) (3) The Committee did not make clearly erroneous factual findings regarding the Brackett Allegation (Charge One), and properly sustained that charge against Peters. ‘The Committee made sufficient findings to support the conclusion that Peters acted with “venal intent,” as that term is understood in the law of professional responsibility, in disobeying the Confidentiality Order (Charge Three), and properly sustained that charge against Peters. Upon consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors and relevant precedent, the Committee reasonably exercised its informed discretion by imposing a seven-year suspension, notwithstanding the absence of directly analogous case law imposing a comparable sanction. For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the Committee suspending Peters from practice in the Southern District of New York for a period of seven years." 7 The seven-year suspension dates from April 10, 2008, the date on which Peters was suspended pendente lite, 14 14 of 16Case: 13-1916 Document: 199-2 Page:1 04/04/2014 11944891 United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Thurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse 40 Foley Square New York, NY 10007 ROBERT A. KATZMANN CATHERINE O'HAGAN WOLFE cee sunce CuERKOF COURT Date: April 04, 2014 DC Docket #: 02-M-238 Docket #: 13-1916cv DC Court: SDNY (NEW YORK CITY) Short Title: In Re: Kristan Peters DC Judge: McMahon BILL OF COSTS INSTRUCTIONS The requirements for filing a bill of costs are set forth in FRAP 39. A form for filing a bill of costs is on the Court's website. The bill of costs must: * be filed within 14 days after the entry of judgment; be verified; * be served on all adversaries; * not include charges for postage, delivery, service, overtime and the filers edits; * identify the number of copies which comprise the printer's unit; elude the printer's bills, which must state the minimum charge per printer's unit for a page, a cover, foot lines by the line, and an index and table of cases by the page; * state only the number of necessary copies inserted in enclosed form; * state actual costs at rates not higher than those generally charged for printing services in New York, New York; excessive charges are subject to reduction; * be filed via CM/ECF or if counsel is exempted with the original and two copies. 15 of 16Case: 13-1916 Document: 199-3 Page:1 04/04/2014 11944891 United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cireuit ‘Thurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse 40 Foley Square New York, NY 10007 ROBERT A. KATZMANN CATHERINE O'HAGAN WOLFE ccuIEF suGe CLERK OF COURT Date: April 04, 2014 DC Docket #: 02-M-238 Docket #: 13-1916cv DC Court: SDNY (NEW YORK CITY) Short Title: In Re: Kristan Peters DC Judge: McMahon VERIFIED ITEMIZED BILL OF COSTS. Counsel for respectfully submits, pursuant to FRAP 39 (c) the within bill of costs and requests the Clerk to prepare an itemized statement of costs taxed against the and in favor of for insertion in the mandate. Docketing Fee Costs of printing appendix (necessary copies Costs of printing brief (necessary copies Costs of printing reply brief (necessary copies _ i) (VERIFICATION HERE) Signature 16 of 16