Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig v.

Military Shrine Services

Philippine Veterans Affairs Office
(G.R. Nos. 187587, 187654, June 5, 2013)
FACTS
Originally declared as closed for disposition for being part of a military reservation in
1957, Fort Bonifacios land area was reduced pursuant to Marcos issuance of Proclamation
No. 423. In 1986, Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476 to amend No. 423. The law excluded
barangays Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from the operation of the
previous proclamation and declared these areas open for disposition to the public.
At the
bottom portion of No. 2476, Marcos made a handwritten and countersigned addendum
stating that Western Bicutan was likewise declared open for disposition.
The Marcos proclamation was later published in the Official Gazette but it did not
include his handwritten addendum.

ISSUE: WON handwritten addendum of Marcos have the force and effect of a law
HELD
The High Court affirmed the appellate courts ruling and found that the handwritten
addendum of Marcos in Proclamation No. 2476 does not have the force and effect of the law
as this portion of the proclamation was not published. Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly
provides that laws take effect after the completion of its publication in the Official Gazette.
As held in Taada v. Tuvera (230 Phil. 528, 533-538 [1986]), the Court said that
publication is an indispensable requirement in order for a law to become effective. The term
law covers presidential decrees, executive orders, local ordinances and others which
invariably affect public interest. The Taada case also held that publication must be in full
or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the
laws.

Erectors Inc., v NLRC

FACTS:
Erectors Inc. challenges the jurisdiction of respondent Labor Arbiter to hear and
decide the complaint for underpayment of wages and non-payment of overtime pay
filed by private respondent Florencio Burgos, an overseas contract worker.
In September 1979, Erectors Inc. recruited Florencio Burgos to work in Saudi Arabia
as a service contract worker with a combined salary and allowance of $330/month.
Their contract was approved by the Ministry of Labor and Employment. However,
the contract was not followed because according to Erectors Inc, the position of
service contract driver was no longer available. They executed another contract
which changed the position of Burgos to Helper/Laborer with remuneration totaling
just $210/month. He went to Saudi Arabia and finished his contract. Upon his return
to the Philippines, he invoked his first contract and demanded that petitioner pay
the difference between his salary and allowance as indicated in the said contract
and the amount actually paid to him plus his contractual bonus.
He filed a complaint with Labor Arbiter against Erectors Inc for underpayment of
wages and non-payment of overtimes pay and contractual bonus. While the case
was still in conciliation stage, EO 797 creating the POEA took effect which gave
POEA the exclusive authority and jurisdiction over all cases including money claims
involving employer-employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or
contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment. The Labor Arbiter
proceeded to try the case on the merits and rendered a decision in favor of Burgos,
rendering Errectors Inc. to pay Burgos.
Erectors Inc. then questioned the jurisdiction of Labor Arbiter Julio Andres Jr.
considering the enactment of EO 797.
Issue: W/N EO 797 should be applied retroactively and as such, divest the Labor
Arbiter of his jurisdiction over this case
Held:
EO 797 was only promulgated after the filing of the above case. As a rule, laws
should be applied prospectively unless the legislative intent to give them retroactive
effect is expressly declared or necessarily implied from the language used (Art. 3
Civil Code) The court further held that it failed to perceive in the language used that
EO 797 an intention to give it retroactive intent.
Furthermore, EO 797 is not a curative statute. A curative statute is enacted to cure
defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings, instruments or acts of public
authorities which would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain
existing legal requirements. EO 797 was not intended to remedy any defect in the
law. It created the POEA to assume the functions of the Overseas Employment
Development Board, the National Seamen Board, and the overseas employment
2

functions of the Bureau of Employment Services. The rule of prospectivity of laws

should apply to EO 797 and should not affect cases filed prior to its effectivity.

FAR EAST BANK & TRUST CO. vs. MARQUEZ

ISSUE
Petitioner contends that Section 18 of PD 957 is merely a directory provision,
noncompliance with which does not render the mortgage transaction void.
HELD
In determining whether a law is mandatory, it is necessary to ascertain the
legislative intent, as stated by Sen. Arturo M. Tolentino, an authority on civil law:
There is no well-defined rule by which a mandatory or prohibitory law may, in all
circumstances, be distinguished from one which is directory, suppletory, or
permissive. In the determination of this question, the prime object is to ascertain
the legislative intention. Generally speaking, those provisions which are mere
matter of form, or which are not material, do not affect any substantial right, and do
not relate to the essence of the thing to be done, so that compliance is a matter of
convenience rather that substance, are considered to be directory. On the other
hand, statutory provisions which relate to matters of substance, affect substantial
rights and are the very essence of the thing required to be done, are regarded as
mandatory.
In Philippine National Bank v. Office of the President, 11 we had occasion to mull over
the intent of PD 957 thus:
x x x [T]he unmistakable intent of the law [is] to protect innocent lot buyers from
scheming subdivision developers. As between these small lot buyers and the
gigantic financial institutions which the developers deal with, it is obvious that the
law -- as an instrument of social justice -- must favor the weak. Indeed, the
petitioner Bank had at its disposal vast resources with which it could adequately
protect its loan activities, and therefore is presumed to have conducted the usual
due diligence checking and ascertaining (whether thru ocular inspection or other
modes of investigation) the actual status, condition, utilization and occupancy of the
property offered as collateral, x x x On the other hand, private respondents
obviously were powerless to discover the attempt of the land developer to
hypothecate the property being sold to them. It was precisely in order to deal with
this kind of situation that P.D. 957 was enacted, its very essence and intendment
being to provide a protective mantle over helpless citizens who may fall prey to the
razzmatazz of what P.D. 957 termed unscrupulous subdivision and condominium
sellers.

Concededly, PD 957 aims to protect innocent lot buyers. Section 18 of the decree
directly addresses the problem of fraud committed against buyers when the lot they
have contracted to purchase, and which they have religiously paid for, is mortgaged
without their knowledge. The avowed purpose of PD 957 compels the reading of
Section 18 as prohibitory -- acts committed contrary to it are void. Such construal
ensures the attainment of the purpose of the law: to protect lot buyers, so that they
do not end up still homeless despite having fully paid for their home lots with their
hard-earned cash.