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Judicial Department 1. de Leon vs. Ca 2. Fabian vs. Desierto Facts: 4. Fortich vs. Corona Facts
Judicial Department 1. de Leon vs. Ca 2. Fabian vs. Desierto Facts: 4. Fortich vs. Corona Facts
1. DE LEON VS. CA
2. FABIAN VS. DESIERTO
FACTS:
Petitioner Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and
President of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation
which was engaged in the construction business. Private
respondent Nestor Agustin was the District Engineer of the First
Metro Manila Engineering District. PROMAT participated in the
bidding for government construction projects, and private
respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his official position,
inveigled petitioner into an amorous relationship. Their affair
lasted for some time, in the course of which, private respondent
gifted PROMAT with public works contracts and interceded for it in
problems concerning the same in his office. When petitioner tried
to terminate their relationship, private respondent refused and
resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of
harassment, intimidation and threats. Petitioner filed an
administrative complaint against private respondent.
Ombudsman found private respondent guilty of misconduct and
meted out the penalty of suspension without pay for 1 year. After
private respondent moved for reconsideration, the Ombudsman
discovered that the private respondents new counsel had been
his classmate and close associate, hence, he inhibited himself.
The case was transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman who
exonerated private respondent from the administrative charges.
Petitioner appealed to the SC by certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
ISSUE/S:
W/N Section 27 of RA 6770 which provides for appeals in
administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the
Ombudsman to the SC in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is valid.
HELD:
The revised Rules of Civil Procedure preclude appeals from
quasi-judicial agencies to the SC via a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45. Under the present Rule 45, appeals may
be brought through a petition for review on certiorari but only from
judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in Sec. 1
thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial
agencies are now required to be brought to the CA on a verified
petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule
43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a
uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the
SC from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the
proscription in Sec. 30, Art. VI of the Constitution against a law
which increases the appellate jurisdiction of the SC.
3. RE: CLASSIFYING AND STRENGTHENING THE
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATIVE SETUP OF THE PHILJA
Adolfo requests permanent- co terminus chancellor
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally
conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number
of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack
of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary
concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the
rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and
independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing
Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is
not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or
commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous
and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and
the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands requires that
every petition for the issuance of the Writ must be supported by
justifying allegations of fact.
HELD:
No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the
source of power of the President to grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after
conviction by final judgment. The provision, however, cannot be
interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the
enforcement of their decisions after their finality.