MA. DARLENE DIMAYUGA-LAURENA vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and JESSE LAURO

LAURENA, G.R. No. 159220, September 22, 2008
FACTS:
Ma. Darlene Dimayuga-Laurena (petitioner) and Jesse Lauro Laurena (respondent)
were married on 19 December 1983 at the Church of Saint Augustine in Intramuros,
Manila. They have two children, Mark Jordan who was born on 2 July 1985 and Michael
Joseph who was born on 11 November 1987.
On 19 October 1993, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
against respondent. Petitioner alleged that respondent was psychologically incapable of
assuming the essential obligations of marriage, and the incapacity existed at the time of
the celebration of the marriage although she discovered it only after the marriage.
Petitioner alleged that respondent gave priority to the needs of his parents; would
come home past midnight; and even tried to convert her to his religion. In addition,
respondent was a womaniser and that the respondent had feminine tendencies. They
would frequently quarrel and one time, respondent hit her face. Petitioner alleged that in
September 1990, respondent abandoned their conjugal home and stopped supporting
their children. Petitioner alleged that respondents psychological incapacity was manifested
by his infidelity, utter neglect of his familys needs, irresponsibility, insensitivity, and
tendency to lead a bachelors life.
Petitioner prayed for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, for custody
of their children, and for monthly support of P25,000.
Respondent denied petitioners allegations. He asserted that petitioner was
emotionally immature, stubborn, unstable, unreasonable, and extremely jealous.
Respondent alleged that some of the properties claimed by petitioner were not part of their
conjugal partnership of gains. Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the petition.
The trial court denied the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. The trial
court found that the manifestations of respondents psychological incapacity alleged by
petitioner were not so serious as to consider respondent psychologically incapacitated.
The trial court ruled that petitioners evidence only showed that she could not get along with
respondent. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision with modification.
Decision.
ISSUE:

1) Whether respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential

marital obligations; and
2) Whether the properties excluded by the Court of Appeals form part of the conjugal
partnership of gains between petitioner and respondent.
HELD:
The petition has no merit.
Issue #1. Petitioner failed to prove respondents psychological incapacity. Both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioner failed to satisfy the guidelines in
the Molina case.
As found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner anchored her petition on respondents
irresponsibility, infidelity, and homosexual tendencies. Petitioner likewise alleged that
respondent tried to compel her to change her religious belief, and in one of their
arguments, respondent also hit her. However, sexual infidelity, repeated physical violence,
homosexuality, physical violence or moral pressure to compel petitioner to change religious
affiliation, and abandonment are grounds for legal separation but not for declaring a
marriage void.
In sum, the totality of the evidence presented by petitioner failed to show that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated and that such incapacity was grave,
incurable, and existing at the time of the solemnization of their marriage.
Issue #2. Properties of respondents parents do not form part of conjugal
Partnership of gains.
Petitioner assails the Court of Appeals exclusion of the properties of respondents
parents from their conjugal partnership of gains. In particular, the Court of Appeals
excluded the ancestral house and lot in Tanauan, Batangas; the duplex house and lot on
Dayap Street, Makati City; and the properties acquired through the operations of the
Jeddah Caltex Station and Jeddah Trucking.
Supreme Court sustain in part the Court of Appeals Decision with MODIFICATION
by including the duplex house and lot on Dayap Street, Makati City in the conjugal
partnership of gains.

EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE vs. ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE, G.R. No.
161793, February 13, 2009
FACTS
Petitioner Edward Te first met respondent Rowena Te in a gathering organized by
the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Initially, he was attracted to Rowenas
close friend but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court
Rowena, which happened in January 1996. It was Rowena who asked that they elope but
Edward refused bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence, however, made
him relent. They left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel
money of P80,000 and she, purchasing the boat ticket.
They decided to go back to Manila in April 1996. Rowena proceeded to her uncles
house and Edward to his parents home. Eventually they got married but without a
marriage license. Edward was prohibited from getting out of the house unaccompanied
and was threatened by Rowena and her uncle. After a month, Edward escaped from the
house, and stayed with his parents. Edwards parents wanted them to stay at their house
but Rowena refused and demanded that they have a separate abode. In June 1996, she
said that it was better for them to live separate lives and they then parted ways.
After four years in January 2000, Edward filed a petition for the annulment of his
marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters psychological incapacity.
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
HELD:
The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six months. They met in
January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June.
The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically
incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent
personality disorder, and respondents, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality
disorder
There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented
is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show

a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.
The presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment
of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe
and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.
Indeed, petitioner, afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the
essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and
rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice
from others, and allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as where to
live). As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the
persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a
person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.
As for the respondent, her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes
her unable to assume the essential marital obligations on account for her disregard in the
rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, and her
tendency to blame others. Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and
domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail
and of committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological
incapacity, the precipitous marriage that they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared
null and void.

BENJAMIN G. TING vs. CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING, G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009
FACTS:
Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez-Ting first met in 1972 while they were classmates
in medical school. They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975, in Cebu City
when respondent was already pregnant with their first child. On October 21, 1993, after
being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while their youngest child was only

two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed
that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of
their marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter.
Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological incapacity consisted of the
following manifestations:
1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his
profession;
2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary to sell
the family car twice and the property he inherited from his father in order to pay off his
debts, because he no longer had money to pay the same; and
4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to give
regular financial support to his family.
In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained
that he is a respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He also pointed out that it was
he who often comforted and took care of their children, while Carmen played mahjong with
her friends twice a week. Both presented expert witnesses (psychiatrist) to refute each
others claim. RTC ruled in favor of the respondent declaring the marriage null and void.
Petitioner appealed to the CA. CA reversed RTCs decision. Respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Molina guidelines should not be applied to this
case
ISSUES:
1

Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the
guidelines set forth under the Santos and Molina cases.
3) Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological
incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the
Family Code has been liberalized.
4) Whether the CAs decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent
null and void is in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
HELD:

No. Respondents argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and
Molina should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare
decisis is no longer new.

5) The Case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged
not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according
to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
6) There is no evidence that adduced by respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is
psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and more
particularly, that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the
marriage eighteen (18) years ago.

RODOLFO A. ASPILLAGA vs. AURORA A. ASPILLAGA, G.R. No. 170925, October 26,
2009
FACTS:
Rodolfo Aspillaga filed a petition for annulment of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of Aurora Aspillaga. Aurora alleged upon her return to
Manila, she discovered that while she was in Japan, Rodolfo brought into their conjugal
home her cousin, Lecita Rose A. Besina, as his concubine. Aurora alleged that Rodolfos
cohabitation with her cousin led to the disintegration of their marriage and their eventual
separation.
During trial, expert witness Dr. Eduardo Maaba explained that both parties are
psychologically incapacitated. The RTC found the parties psychologically incapacitated to
enter into marriage.
The CA reversed the RTC decision and declared the marriage of Rodolfo and
Aurora Aspillaga valid. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was also
denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of the parties psychological
incapacity.

HELD:
No. As early as 1995, in Santos v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 112019, January 4,
1995), it has been categorically ruled that:
Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such
that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it
were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
In the instant case, Dr. Maaba failed to reveal that the psychological conditions were
grave or serious enough to bring about an incapacity to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. Indeed, Dr. Maaba was able to establish the parties personality disorder;
however, he failed to link the parties psychological disorders to his conclusion that they
are psychologically incapacitated to perform their obligations as husband and wife. The
fact that these psychological conditions will hamper their performance of their marital
obligations does not mean that they suffer from psychological incapacity as contemplated
under Article 36 of the Family Code. Mere difficulty is not synonymous to incapacity.
It must be stressed that psychological incapacity must be more than just a
difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations (Republic v.
CA). The intention of the law is to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage (Tongol v. Tongol, G.R. No.
157610, October 19, 2007).
Psychological disorders do not manifest that both parties are truly incapacitated to
perform the basic marital covenants. Moreover, there is nothing that shows incurability of
these disorders. Incompatibility and irreconcilable differences cannot be equated with
psychological incapacity as understood juristically.
As to Rodolfos allegation that Aurora was a spendthrift, the same likewise fails to
convince. While disagreements on money matters would, no doubt, affect the other
aspects of ones marriage as to make the wedlock unsatisfactory, this is not a ground to
declare a marriage null and void. In fact, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that
disagreements regarding money matters are a common, and even normal, occurrence
between husbands and wives.


RENATO REYES SO vs. LORNA VALERA, G.R. No. 150677, June 5, 2009
FACTS:
The petitioner and the respondent first met at a party in 1973 after being introduced
to each other by a common friend. The petitioner at that time was a 17-year old high
school student; the respondent was a 21-year old college student. Their meeting led to
courtship and to a 19-year common-law relationship, culminating in the exchange of
marital vows at the Caloocan City Hall on December 10, 1991. They had three (3) children
(Jeffrey, Renelee, and Loni) in their relationship and subsequent marriage.
On May 14, 1996, the petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of
the nullity of his marriage with the respondent. He alleged that their marriage was null and
void for want of the essential and formal requisites. He also claimed that the respondent
was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage, as
shown by the following circumstances: the respondent failed and refused to cohabit and
make love with him; did not love and respect him; did not remain faithful to him; did not give
him emotional, spiritual, physical, and psychological help and support; failed and refused to
have a family domicile; and failed and refused to enter into a permanent union and
establish conjugal and family life with him. The petitioner presented testimonial and
documentary evidence to substantiate his charges.
Summons was served on the respondent on July 17, 1996, but she failed to file an
answer. The RTC ordered the public prosecutor to investigate if there had been collusion
between the parties and to intervene for the State to see to it that evidence was not
fabricated. Prosecutor Andres N. Marcos manifested that he was unable to make a ruling
on the issue of collusion since the respondent failed to appear before him.
The RTC nullified the marriage. The RTC decision wholly dwelt on the question of
the respondents psychological incapacity based on the testimony of the petitioner and Dr.
Gates, his expert witness. The CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed
the petition for lack of merit.
ISSUES:
1

Whether or not the CA seriously erred in reversing the RTC decision without ruling on
the trial courts factual and conclusive finding that the marriage between petitioner and
respondent was null and void ab initio;

7) Whether or not the CA seriously erred in departing from the accepted and usual course
of judicial proceedings that factual findings of the trial courts are entitled to great weight
and respect and are not disturbed on appeal; and
8) Whether or not the CA seriously erred in totally disregarding the undisputed fact that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.
HELD:
Supreme Court DENY the petition for lack of merit, and hold that no sufficient basis
exists to annul the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. No case of lack of
essential and formal requisites of marriage has been proven or validly ruled upon by the
trial court.
Shorn of any reference to psychology, the Supreme Court conclude that the case
here of parties who have very human faults and frailties; who have been together for some
time; and who are now tired of each other. If in fact the respondent does not want to
provide the support expected of a wife, the cause is not necessarily a grave and incurable
psychological malady whose effects go as far as to affect her capacity to provide marital
support promised and expected when the marital knot was tied. To be tired and to give up
on ones situation and on ones husband are not necessarily signs of psychological illness;
neither can falling out of love be so labeled. When these happen, the remedy for some is
to cut the marital knot to allow the parties to go their separate ways. This simple remedy,
however, is not available to us under our laws. Ours is still a limited remedy that addresses
only a very specific situation a relationship where no marriage could have validly been
concluded because the parties, or one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable
psychological illness existing when the marriage was celebrated, did not appreciate the
obligations of marital life and, thus, could not have validly entered into a marriage. Outside
of this situation, this Court is powerless to provide any permanent remedy.
WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM
the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated July 4, 2001 and October 18,
2001, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 65273. Costs against the petitioner.

LESTER BENJAMIN S. HALILI vs. CHONA M. SANTOS-HALILI and THE REPUBLIC

OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 165424, June 9, 2009

FACTS:

Petitioner Lester Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage to respondent Chona
Santos-Halili null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity to perform the
essential obligations of marriage. He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking
that it was a joke. After the ceremonies, they never lived together as husband and wife.
However, they started fighting constantly a year later, at which point petitioner decided to
stop seeing respondent and started dating other women. It was only upon making an
inquiry that he found out that the marriage was not "fake."
ISSUE:
Whether or not his marriage to respondent ought to be declared null and void on the
basis of his psychological incapacity.
HELD:
In the recent case of Te v. Yu-Te and the Republic of the Philippines, this Court
reiterated that courts should interpret the provision on psychological incapacity on a caseto-case basis - guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines and by decisions of church tribunals.
In Te, this Court defined dependent personality disorder characterized by a pattern
of dependent and submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and
frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by others'
comments.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who
have this disorder may be unable to make everyday decisions without advice or
reassurance from others, may allow others to make most of their important decisions (such
as where to live), tend to agree with people even when they believe they are wrong, have
difficulty starting projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do things that are
demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when
alone and are often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.
It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a psychological condition that
was grave and incurable and had a deeply rooted cause. Based on the foregoing, it has
been shown that petitioner is indeed suffering from psychological incapacity that effectively
renders him unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage and thus the Court
declared the marriage null and void.

DIGNA A. NAJERA vs. EDUARDO J. NAJERA, G.R. No. 164817, July 3, 2009
FACTS:
On January 27, 1997, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Petition for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage with Alternative Prayer for Legal Separation, with Application for
Designation as Administrator Pendente Lite of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains.
Petitioner alleged that she and respondent are residents of Bugallon, Pangasinan,
but respondent is presently living in the United States of America (U.S.A). They were
married on January 31, 1988 by Rev. Father Isidro Palinar, Jr. at the Saint Andrew the
Apostle Church at Bugallon, Pangasinan. They are childless.
Petitioner claimed that at the time of the celebration of marriage, respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of the
marriage, and such incapacity became manifest only after marriage.
Petitioner prayed that upon filing of the petition, an Order be issued appointing her
as the sole administrator of their conjugal properties; and that after trial on the merits,
judgment be rendered (1) declaring their marriage void ab initio in accordance with Article
36 of the Family Code; (2) in the alternative, decreeing legal separation of petitioner and
respondent pursuant to Title II of the Family Code; and (3) declaring the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of petitioner and respondent and the forfeiture in favor of petitioner of
respondents share in the said properties pursuant to Articles 42 (2) and 63 (2) of the
Family Code; and (4) granting petitioner other just and equitable reliefs.
On March 31, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision that decreed only the legal
separation of the petitioner and respondent, but not the annulment of their marriage.
Petitioner appealed the RTC Decision and Resolution to the Court of Appeals. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the RTCs judgment in toto.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the totality of petitioners evidence was able to prove that respondent
is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage
warranting the annulment of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
RULING:
Petitioners argument is without merit.
It must be pointed out that in this case, the basis of the declaration of nullity of
marriage by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is not the third paragraph of
Canon 1095 which mentions causes of a psychological nature, but the second paragraph
of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment
concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted.
Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual basis of the decision of the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is similar to the facts established by petitioner
before the trial court, the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal confirming
the decree of nullity of marriage by the court a quo is not based on the psychological
incapacity of respondent. Petitioner, therefore, erred in stating that the conclusion of
Psychologist Cristina Gates regarding the psychological incapacity of respondent is
supported by the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal.
In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the Decision of the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 68053, dated February 23, 2004, and its Resolution dated August 5, 2004,
are hereby AFFIRMED.

ROWENA PADILLA-RUMBAUA vs. EDWARD RUMBAUA, G.R. No. 166738, August

14, 2009
FACTS:
The present petition traces its roots to the petitioners complaint for the declaration
of nullity of marriage against the respondent before the RTC. The petitioner alleged that
the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of
marriage as shown by the following circumstances: the respondent reneged on his promise
to live with her under one roof after finding work; he failed to extend financial support to
her; he blamed her for his mothers death; he represented himself as single in his

transactions; and he pretended to be working in Davao, although he was cohabiting with

another woman in Novaliches, Quezon City.
ISSUES:
The petitioner argues in the present petition that
1

The OSG certification requirement under Republic v. Molina[22] (the Molina case)
cannot be dispensed with because A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which relaxed the
requirement, took effect only on March 15, 2003;
5. Vacating the decision of the courts a quo and remanding the case to the RTC to recall
her expert witness and cure the defects in her testimony, as well as to present
additional evidence, would temper justice with mercy; and
6. Dr. Tayags testimony in court cured the deficiencies in her psychiatric report.
HELD:
The petition was DENIED for lack of merit.
1

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is applicable.

The amendment introduced under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is procedural or remedial in
character; it does not create or remove any vested right, but only operates as a remedy
in aid of or confirmation of already existing rights. The settled rule is that procedural
laws may be given retroactive effect. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, as a remedial measure,
removed the mandatory nature of an OSG certification and may be applied
retroactively to pending matters. In effect, the measure cures in any pending matter
any procedural lapse on the certification prior to its promulgation.

7. A Remand of the Case to the RTC is Improper

In the present case, the petitioner cites the inadequacy of the evidence presented by
her former counsel as basis for a remand. She did not, however, specify the
inadequacy. That the RTC granted the petition for declaration of nullity prima facie
shows that the petitioners counsel had not been negligent in handling the case.
Granting arguendo that the petitioners counsel had been negligent, the negligence
that would justify a new trial must be excusable, i.e. one that ordinary diligence and
prudence could not have guarded against. Hence, theres no justifiable reason to grant
the petitioners requested remand.

8. Petitioner failed to establish the respondents psychological incapacity

The Court commiserates with the petitioners marital predicament. The respondent may
indeed be unwilling to discharge his marital obligations, particularly the obligation to
live with ones spouse. Nonetheless, we cannot presume psychological defect from the
mere fact that respondent refuses to comply with his marital duties. As we ruled in
Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty
as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so
due to some psychological illness. The psychological illness that must afflict a party at
the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to
deprive the party of his or her awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she was then about to assume.

VERONICA CABACUNGAN ALCAZAR vs. REY C. ALCAZAR, G.R. No. 174451,

October 13, 2009
NATURE:
This is a petition for review on certiorari, which seeks to reverse the decision of the
CA in affirming the decision of the RTC to dismiss petitioner Veronica Cabacungan
Alcazars complaint for the annulment of her marriage to respondent Rey C. Alcazar
FACTS:
On October 11, 2000, Rey Alcazar wed Veronica. After the wedding, they lived
together for five days in Mindoro where they consummated their marriage. However, after
they went back to Manila, Rey left for Riyadh to work as an upholsterer for a year and a
half. And upon his return, he did not go home to Veronica nor did he contact her. Thus,
Veronica filed a complaint for nullity of marriage due to Reys physical incapability to
consummate his marriage under Art. 45. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, dismissed this
complaint thus, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Reys physical incapability to consummate their marriage a ground
for annulment?

HELD:
No. Art 45 (5) of the FC refers to the lack of power to copulate. Incapability to
consummate denotes the permanent inability on the part of the spouse to perform act of
sexual intercourse. Veronica even admitted that they had intercourse at least once. Hence,
there was no ground for annulment.

EDWARD N. LIM vs. MA. CHERYL STA. CRUZ-LIM, G.R. No. 176464, February 4, 2010
FACTS:
Petitioner Edward N. Lim and respondent Maria Cheryl Sta. Cruz-Lim met in 1978 in
Cebu, where petitioner, who resides in Makati City, spent a semestral break from college;
and respondent, who resides in Gingoog City, Cagayan de Oro, was a boarder in
petitioners uncles house. At that time, petitioner was twenty-six (26) years old, a college
student, and working in the family business, while respondent was a secretarial student.
After less than a year of courtship via long distance phone calls, petitioner and
respondent became sweethearts in early 1979. As is customary among those of Chinese
descent, petitioner and respondent took up residence with the formers grandparents and
parents in Forbes Park, Makati City. The couple was blessed with three (3) children.
Respondent filed a criminal complaint for (1) Concubinage where she caught
petitioner in their house in a compromising situation with the stay-in caregiver of petitioners
grandmother and (2) Physical Injuries against petitioner which was eventually dismissed by
the investigating prosecutor for lack of merit. Subsequently, respondent filed with the RTC
of Makati City an action for support against petitioner and petitioners parents.
On October 29, 1999, petitioner filed a petition and sought the declaration of nullity
of his marriage to respondent on the ground of the latters psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code. Three years thereafter, on July 22, 2002, petitioner filed an
amended petition including an allegation of his own psychological incapacity, as both he
and respondent were diagnosed with personality disorders dependent personality disorder
and histrionic personality disorder, respectively.
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage between petitioner and respondent is null and void on the
ground of the parties psychological incapacity.

HELD:
No. It was folly for the trial court to accept the findings and conclusions of Dr.
Villegas with nary a link drawn between the psychodynamics of the case and the factors
characterizing the psychological incapacity. Dr. Villegas sparse testimony does not lead to
the inevitable conclusion that the parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations. Even on questioning from the trial court, Dr. Villegas
testimony did not illuminate on the parties alleged personality disorders and their
incapacitating effect on their marriage.
The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of seven (7) hours of
interview, and unsupported by separate psychological tests, cannot tie the hands of the
trial court and prevent it from making its own factual finding on what happened in this case.
The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of his
theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that he can render to the courts in showing
the facts that serve as a basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of his
conclusion is founded.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74822 is hereby AFFIRMED.

JORDAN CHAN PAZ vs. JEANICE PAVON PAZ, G.R. No. 166579, February 18, 2010
FACTS:
Jordan and Jeanice met sometime in November 1996. Jeanice was only 19 years old while
Jordan was 27 years old. In January 1997, they became a couple and, on 10 May 1997,
they were formally engaged. They had their civil wedding on 3 July 1997, and their church
wedding on 21 September 1997. They have one son, Evan Gaubert, who was born on 12
February 1998. After a big fight, Jeanice left their conjugal home on 23 February 1999.
The petitioner alleged that he was psychologically incapable of assuming the essential
obligations of marriage that was manifested by his uncontrollable tendency to be selfpreoccupied and self indulgent, as well as his predisposition to become violent and
abusive. He had a tendency to lie about his whereabouts and had the habit of hanging out
and spending a great deal of time with his friends. He has not provided any financial
support or visited their son since she left their conjugal home. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration while he admits that he failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the trial

court's 13 May 2003 Decision, Jordan submits that Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
should not have been strictly applied against him because it took effect only on 15 March
2003, or less than two months prior to the rendition of the trial court's 13 May 2003
Decision.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Jordan is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations.
HELD:
No. The totality of the evidence presented by Respondent failed to show that
Petitioner was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations and that such incapacity was grave, incurable, and existing at the time of the
solemnization of their marriage.
Petitioners alleged psychological incapacity was not shown to be so grave and so
permanent as to deprive him of the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond.

JOCELYN M. SUAZO vs. ANGELITO SUAZO and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 164493, March 10, 2010
FACTS:
Angelito Suazo and Jocelyn Suazo were married when they were 16 years old only.
Without any means to support themselves, they lived with Angelitos parents while Jocelyn
took odd jobs and Angelito refused to work and was most of the time drunk. Petitioner
urged him to find work but this often resulted to violent quarrels.
A year after their marriage, Jocelyn left Angelito. Angelito thereafter found another
woman with whom he has since lived. 10 years later, she filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage under Art. 36 Psychological incapacity. Jocelyn testified on the alleged
physical beating she received. The expert witness corroborated parts of Jocelyns
testimony. Both her psychological report and testimony concluded that Angelito was
psychologically incapacitated.

However, Angelito was not personally examined by the expert witness. The RTC
annulled the marriage on the ground that Angelito is unfit to comply with his marital
obligation, such as immaturity, i.e., lack of an effective sense of rational judgment and
responsibility, otherwise peculiar to infants (like refusal of the husband to support the
family or excessive dependence on parents or peer group approval) and habitual
alcoholism, or the condition by which a person lives for the next drink and the next drinks
but the CA reversed it and held that the respondent may have failed to provide material
support to the family and has resorted to physical abuse, but it is still necessary to show
that they were manifestations of a deeper psychological malaise that was clinically or
medically identified. The theory of the psychologist that the respondent was suffering from
an anti-social personality syndrome at the time of the marriage was not the product of any
adequate medical or clinical investigation.
The evidence that she got from the petitioner, anecdotal at best, could equally show
that the behavior of the respondent was due simply to causes like immaturity or
irresponsibility which are not equivalent to psychological incapacity, or the failure or refusal
to work could have been the result of rebelliousness on the part of one who felt that he had
been forced into a loveless marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a basis to nullify Jocelyns marriage with Angelito under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
HELD:
The Court find the petition devoid of merit.
The CA committed no reversible error of law in setting aside the RTC decision, as
no basis exists to declare Jocelyns marriage with Angelito a nullity under Article 36 of the
Family Code and its related jurisprudence.
Jocelyns evidence is insufficient to establish Angelitos psychological incapacity.
The psychologist evaluated Angelitos psychological condition only in an indirect manner
she derived all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her
cause cannot of course be doubted. The psychlologist, using meager information coming
from a directly interested party, could not have secured a complete personality profile and
could not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelitos
psychological condition. While the report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to
Jocelyns psychological condition, this is not true for Angelitos. The methodology
employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of examination

required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. Both the
psychologists report and testimony simply provided a general description of Angelitos
purported anti-social personality disorder, supported by the characterization of this
disorder as chronic, grave and incurable. The psychologist was conspicuously silent,
however, on the bases for her conclusion or the particulars that gave rise to the
characterization she gave.
Jurisprudence holds that there must be evidence showing a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder
itself. As testimony regarding the habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job,
while indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological
incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital
obligations.
It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated,
had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these
obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor an adverse integral element
in the respondents personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying
with his essential marital obligations must be shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in
the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from
incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable
differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and
the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article
36, as the same may only be due to a persons refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.