Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Week 11&12
Week 11&12
Treaties
A. Sources of International Law
1987 Constitution Art II Sec 2
The Philippines renounces war as
an instrument of national policy, adopts
the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the
land and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation,
and amity with all nations.
B. Bayan Muna v. Alberto Romulo
Under international law, there is no
difference between treaties and
executive agreements in terms of their
binding effects on the contracting states
concerned, as long as the negotiating
functionaries have remained within their
powers. However, a treaty has greater
dignity than an executive agreement,
because its constitutional efficacy is
beyond doubt, a treaty having behind it
the authority of the President, the
Senate, and the people; a ratified treaty,
unlike an executive agreement, takes
precedence over any prior statutory
enactment. Petitioner, in this case,
argues that the Non-Surrender
Agreement between the Philippines and
the US is of dubious validity, partaking as
it does of the nature of a treaty; hence, it
must be duly concurred in by the Senate.
Petitioner relies on the case,
Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea
Trading, in which the Court stated:
international agreements involving
political issues or changes of national
policy and those involving international
arrangements of a permanent character
usually take the form of treaties; while
those embodying adjustments of detail
carrying out well established national
policies and traditions and those
involving arrangements of a more or less
temporary nature take the form of
executive agreements. According to
petitioner, the subject of the Agreement
does not fall under any of the subjectcategories that are enumerated in the
Eastern Sea Trading case that may be
covered by an executive agreement, such
as commercial/consular relations, mostfavored nation rights, patent rights,
trademark and copyright protection,
postal and navigation arrangements and
settlement of claims. The Supreme Court
held, however, that the categorization of
subject matters that may be covered by
international agreements mentioned in
Eastern Sea Trading is not cast in stone.
of
the
International
international
tribunal,
unless
such
tribunal has been established by the UN
Security Council, absent the express
consent of the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines [GRP].
4. When the [GRP] extradites, surrenders,
or otherwise transfers a person of the
[USA] to a third country, the [GRP] will
not agree to the surrender or transfer of
that person by the third country to any
international
tribunal,
unless
such
tribunal has been established by the UN
Security Council, absent the express
consent of the Government of the [US].
5. This Agreement shall remain in force
until one year after the date on which
one party notifies the other of its intent
to terminate the Agreement. The
provisions of this Agreement shall
continue to apply with respect to any act
occurring, or any allegation arising,
before the effective date of termination.
In response to a query of then Solicitor
General Alfredo L. Benipayo on the status
of
the
non-surrender
agreement,
Ambassador Ricciardone replied in his
letter of October 28, 2003 that the
exchange of diplomatic notes constituted
a legally binding agreement under
international law; and that, under US law,
the said agreement did not require the
advice and consent of the US Senate.
In this proceeding, petitioner imputes
grave abuse of discretion to respondents
in
concluding
and
ratifying
the
Agreement and prays that it be struck
down as unconstitutional, or at least
declared as without force and effect.
Issue: Whether or not the RP-US NON
SURRENDER AGREEMENT is void ab initio
for contracting obligations that are either
immoral or otherwise at variance with
universally recognized principles of
international law.
Ruling: The petition is bereft of merit.
Validity of
Agreement
the
RP-US
Non-Surrender
whether
denominated executive agreements or
exchange of notes or otherwise begin,
V. Ordinances
White Light Corp vs City of Manila
Police Power Not Validly
Infringement of Private Rights
Exercised
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the
decision promulgated on April 24, 1985.
Respondent argued that while publication was
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was
otherwise as when the decrees themselves
declared that they were to become effective
immediately upon their approval.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made
between laws of general applicability and laws
which are not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in
publications of general circulation.
HELD:
The clause unless it is otherwise provided
refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in
any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislature may make the law
effective immediately upon approval, or in any
other date, without its previous publication.
Laws should refer to all laws and not only to
those of general application, for strictly
speaking, all laws relate to the people in general
albeit there are some that do not apply to them
directly. A law without any bearing on the public
would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as
class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the
legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably
affect the public interest eve if it might be
directly applicable only to one individual, or
some of the people only, and not to the public as
a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application
and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin
15 days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication
at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of
the content of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that
publication of laws must be made in the Official
Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement
for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not
called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or
to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at
least as soon as possible.
J. Cruz:
Laws must come out in the open in the clear
light of the sun instead of skulking in the
shadows with their dark, deep secrets.
Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules
cannot be recognized as binding unless their
existence and contents are confirmed by a valid
publication intended to make full disclosure and
give proper notice to the people. The furtive law
is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint,
parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
E. Commissioner of Customs vs. Hypermix
Feeds
FACTS:
November
7
2003,
petitioner
Commissioner of Customs issued CMO 27-2003
(Customs Memorandum Order). Under the
memorandum, for tariff purposes, wheat is
classified according to: 1. Importer or consignee,
2. Country of origin, and 3. Port of discharge.
Depending on these factors wheat would be
classified as either as food grade or food feed.
The corresponding tariff for food grade wheat
was 3%, for food feed grade 7%. A month after
the issuance of CMO 27-200 respondent filed a
petition for declaratory for Relief with the
Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City.
Respondent contented that CMO 27-2003 was
issued without following the mandate of the
Revised
Administrative
Code
on
public
participation, prior notice, and publication or
registration with University of the Philippines
Law Canter. Respondent also alleged that the
regulation summarily adjudged it to be a feed
grade supplier without the benefit of prior
assessment and examination, despite having
imported food grade wheat, it would be
subjected to the 7% tariff upon the arrival of the
shipment, forcing to pay 133%. Respondent also
claimed that the equal protection clause of the
Constitution was violated and asserted that the
retroactive application of the regulation was
confiscatory in nature.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss. They
alleged that: 1. The RTC did not have jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case, 2. an action
for declaratory relief (Rule 63, Sec.1 who may
file petition) was improper, 3. CMO 27-2003
was internal administrative rule not legislative in
nature, and 4. The claims of respondent were
speculative and premature, because the Bureau
of Customs had yet to examine respondents
products.
RTC held that a petition for declaratory
relief was proper remedy, and that respondent
was the proper party to file it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CMO 27-2003 of the
petitioner met the requirements for the Revised